Plan C

KEY CHALLENGES
In Japan’s Defense Policy
EDITEDD BY YUKI TATSUMI & PAMELA KENNEDY
MARCH 2020
© Copyright 2020 by the Stimson Center. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of
America.
Visit www.stimson.org for more information about Stimson.
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Contents
CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................. 3
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. 5
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... 6
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. 7
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 8
ENDNOTES............................................................................................................................ 11
JAPAN AS A STABLE BUILDER OF FORCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC..................... 13
Policy Objectives ............................................................................................................. 13
Background ...................................................................................................................... 14
ISSUES AT HAND ................................................................................................................... 14
JAPAN’S RESPONSES ............................................................................................................. 15
Impact of U.S. Policy ....................................................................................................... 16
Challenges........................................................................................................................ 17
THE CHINA GAP AND TAIWAN GAP?...................................................................................... 18
Policy Recommendations: ................................................................................................ 18
Endnotes........................................................................................................................... 21
JAPAN’S DEFENSE POLICY IN CYBERSPACE ........................................................... 26
Background ...................................................................................................................... 26
EVOLVING JAPAN’S CYBERSECURITY POLICY AND JAPAN-U.S. COOPERATION .................... 26
VAST “GRAY-ZONE” SITUATIONS ......................................................................................... 27
Challenges for Achieving Policy Objectives .................................................................... 28
LIMITED MISSIONS AND ROLES OF THE SDF ......................................................................... 28
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES: ARTICLE 21 ................ 29
Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................. 31
Endnotes........................................................................................................................... 33
The Defense of Japan in a Hyper-Aging Society ............................................................. 36
YOSHIMITSU SATO .......................................................................................................... 36
Endnotes........................................................................................................................... 37
JAPAN’S SPACE SECURITY POLICY: JAPAN’S ROLE IN THE ERA OF
STRATEGIC COMPETITION............................................................................................ 40
Policy Objectives: ............................................................................................................ 41
Background and Challenges:........................................................................................... 42
IMPACT ON MILITARY BALANCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: .......................................... 42
MULTILATERAL APPROACH .................................................................................................. 44
BILATERAL APPROACH (U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION) ............................................................ 46
ALL-OF-JAPAN APPROACH.................................................................................................... 47
Endnotes........................................................................................................................... 50
THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE STRATEGY IN LONG-TERM STRATEGIC
COMPETITION .................................................................................................................... 53
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Background ...................................................................................................................... 53
Challenges........................................................................................................................ 54
Endnotes........................................................................................................................... 60
FINAL THOUGHTS ............................................................................................................. 63
About the Experts ............................................................................................................. 66
About Views from the Next Generation ........................................................................... 68
About Stimson .................................................................................................................. 68
About the Japan Program ................................................................................................ 68
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Preface
I am delighted to present the latest publication from the Stimson Center’s Japan Program. "Key
Challenges in Japan’s Defense Policy" is the seventh volume of "Views from the Next
Generation," an annual collection of policy briefs that offer recommendations for the most
significant challenges facing Japan and its partners today. This edition benefits from the diverse
expertise of five leading and emerging scholars, who share with us fresh insights on Japan’s
defense policy.
The topics they cover—ensuring a human resource base for the military, deterring attacks from
new technologies, balancing budget constraints with emerging threats, and maintaining
partnerships amidst political changes—are pressing questions for not only Japan but states
around the world. As governments design policy to adapt to novel domains like outer space,
cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, the acceleration and complexity of threats
mandate new thinking. Here we look to nuanced analysis from up-and-coming experts to shed
light on how Japan and its partners can ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Across its
seven-year history, the "Views from the Next Generation" series has been uniquely positioned
to provide balanced, original perspectives on today’s security challenges. I am confident the
discussions in this volume raise timely and universal questions about the realities and future of
security policy in Asia.
I am once again grateful to Yuki Tatsumi for leading this project as a part of Stimson’s
expansive work on Japan. Yuki has dedicated her career to deepening ties across the Pacific,
and her reputation as a rigorous scholar and nonpartisan voice on Japanese security and alliance
policy precedes her. In this volume, she again demonstrates her commitment to facilitating
cross-border understanding. Pamela Kennedy and Jason Li also provided critical support to this
publication. Finally, my colleagues and I are grateful for the continued support from our friends
at the Embassy of Japan for their support of this initiative.
Brian Finlay
President and CEO
The Stimson Center
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Acknowledgments
"Key Challenges in Japan’s Defense Policy," the seventh volume of the "Views from the Next
Generation" series, is the product of a great team effort. First and foremost, I would like to
thank our contributing authors, Mr. Takahisa Kawaguchi, Dr. Masashi Murano, Ms. Ayumi
Teraoka, Lt. Col. Taro Sato, and LCDR Yoshimitsu Sato, for producing high-quality essays. I
very much appreciate their commitment to meeting various deadlines for drafts and revisions
under relatively short writing and editing schedules.
I am also grateful for the encouragement and collaboration of the Embassy of Japan since the
inception of this project seven years ago. This series would not be possible without their
consistent support, and I truly look forward to continuing this collaboration. I am especially
thankful to Mr. Michiru Nishida for making the project management as smooth as possible.
As always, my gratitude goes to my Stimson colleagues for their support and assistance. Brian
Finlay, Stimson’s president and chief executive officer, continues to be tremendously
supportive of the Japan Program’s efforts, including this project, to broaden the intellectual
exchange between American and Japanese scholars beyond familiar names and faces. I am
thankful for Stimson’s Communications team and our talented graphic designer Lita Ledesma,
who made the publication process seamless. I am also deeply grateful to Research Analyst
Pamela Kennedy, Research Assistant Jason Li, and Research Intern Joseph Ross for taking on
the labor-intensive details of our preparation for publication.
This is the first publication following Stimson’s Japan Program reaching the milestone of its
20th anniversary in 2019. My team and I have a renewed sense of commitment to our efforts
to not only produce our own timely analyses but also continue to cultivate the fresh perspectives
of emerging security policy experts from Japan.
Yuki Tatsumi
Co-Director, East Asia Program Director, Japan Program
March 2020
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Abbreviations
A2/AD - Anti-access/area denial
ASDF - Air Self-Defense Force
ASAT - Anti-satellite weapon
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW - Anti-submarine warfare
BRI - Belt and Road Initiative
C4ISR - Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CSG - Carrier Strike Group
DA-ASAT - Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite
E.U. - European Union
EW - Early warning
FOIP - Free and open Indo-Pacific
FONOP - Freedom of navigation operation
GEO - Geostationary orbit
GOJ - Government of Japan
GSDF - Ground Self-Defense Force
INF - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
ISR - Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAXA - Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JPS - Japan Pension Service
LEO - Low Earth orbit
LTS - Long-term sustainability
MOD - Ministry of Defense
MRBM - Medium-range ballistic missile
NDPG - National Defense Program Guidelines
NDS - National Defense Strategy
NISC - National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity
NSPM - National Security Presidential Memorandum
NSS - National Security Strategy
PLA - People’s Liberation Army
PLAN - PLA Navy
PNT - Position, navigation, and timing
RPO - Rendezvous and proximity operation
SATCOM - Satellite communication
SBIRS - Space-based infrared system
SDF - Self-Defense Forces
SSA - Space situational awareness
U.S. - United States
USCYBERCOM - U.S. Cyber Command
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Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy
Introduction
YUKI TATSUMI AND PAMELA KENNEDY
On January 19, 2020, the United States and Japan celebrated the 60th anniversary of the signing
of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The foreign and defense ministries of the two
countries recognized this occasion by issuing a Joint Statement on January 17, followed by
celebratory messages from U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe, commemorating the “peace, security, and prosperity” enabled by the “pillar immovable”
that is the alliance.1
Through these statements, the two governments sent two significant messages: (1) the U.S.-
Japan alliance is more critical than ever for the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region
and beyond, and (2) the two governments are committed to continuing to strengthen the
alliance. From Tokyo’s perspective, one of the critical components of Japan’s own effort to
reinforce the alliance is to continue to modernize its defense capability to better meet the
security challenges of today and the future. In this context, Japan released two key defense
policy-planning documents in December 2018: the National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG), a policy document that guides Japan’s defense policy for the next five years, and the
Mid-Term Defense Program, an acquisition planning document that supports the NDPG.
The 2018 NDPG put out “Multidomain Defense Force (tajigen tōgō bōei-ryoku)” as an
organizing concept that Japan will strive towards. Explained as deepening the concept of a
“Dynamic Joint Defense Force (dōteki bōei-ryoku)” that was laid out in the 2013 NDPG, this
new concept is supposed to serve as a vision that guides the effort to better prepare Japan to
effectively meet the security challenges that Japan will face over the next several years. 2
At the time of the release, the reference made in the NDPG to the possibility of acquiring long-
range missile capability and the clear indication of Japan’s intention to acquire an aircraft
carrier attracted intense media attention. However, the document highlighted other domains as
the new priority for Japan’s defense planners: space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic
spectrum.
Some of these “new” domains identified are not new to the 2018 NDPG. In fact, the 2013
NDPG already identified space and cyberspace as emerging battle domains that can potentially
affect the operation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) considerably. However, while
these domains’ importance to the SDF’s future operational environment was mentioned,
investment in these areas was not prioritized. What makes the 2018 NDPG’s emphasis on these
areas, along with the electromagnetic spectrum, different from previous defense policy
iterations is that they are identified as critical enablers for future SDF operations in cross-
domain environments and acknowledged as high-priority areas of investment.
The 2018 NDPG also reiterates that the security environment in Japan’s immediate
neighborhood continues to degrade, stressing the importance of continuing to strengthen
Japan’s alliance with the United States. In addition, the NDPG discusses the need for Japan to
continue to expand its security cooperation with other like-minded countries, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region.
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Indeed, the security environment that Japan—and the U.S.-Japan alliance broadly—faces is
changing at an accelerated speed, its unpredictability quickly growing. In addition to the threats
that have consistently been present, such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile program and
China’s growing aggressive behavior, and the impact of emerging technologies in the
battlespace, Japan finds itself in a security environment that is becoming less and less safe,
particularly given the perceived declining commitment of the U.S. in the region. Given such
circumstances, analyses that carefully examine how Japan plans to meet these challenges are
indeed appropriate. That is why Stimson’s Japan Program decided to “go back to the basics”
and chose key challenges for Japan’s defense policy, as identified and highlighted in the 2018
NDPG, as the theme for this year’s edition of the Views from the Next Generation series.
As in previous years, we are fortunate to have a talented pool of up-and-coming thinkers and
policy professionals contribute to this volume.
In “Japan as a Stable Builder of Force in the Indo-Pacific,” Ayumi Teraoka (Ph.D. candidate
and Fellow, Center for International Studies, Princeton University) examines how Japan can
leverage its partnerships with like-minded countries as a force multiplier in the Indo-Pacific
region. Arguing that China’s growing power projection capabilities and economic heft pose a
serious concern for Japan’s declining material resources, including human resources, Teraoka
identifies Japan’s progress in deepening security ties and economic cooperation with the United
States and other friendly nations. Cautioning that solidifying a network of partnerships will
require overcoming recent tendencies in the United States and elsewhere towards isolationism,
she recommends measures to confront the challenges of partnership, enhance security
cooperation and capacity building, and build an economic and security consensus among the
partner states.
In “Japan’s Defense Policy in Cyberspace,” Takahisa Kawaguchi (Senior Fellow, Tokio

Marine and Nichido Risk Consulting Co.) assesses the intersection of cyberspace and Japan’s
security, emphasizing the need to deter cyberattacks while also taking preemptive actions.
Discussing the development of Japan’s cybersecurity policy, Kawaguchi notes the challenge
in identifying a threshold for cyberattacks outside of the gray zone, which still encompasses
many types of cyber incidents. The limited role of the SDF and constitutional restrictions on
surveillance capabilities pose unique difficulties that require a creative approach to
cybersecurity. Kawaguchi offers recommendations such as enhancing Japan’s defensive and
attribution capabilities for cyberattacks as well as collaborating with the United States and like-
minded countries to establish norms for cyberspace.
In “The Defense of Japan in a Hyper-Aging Society,” a short commentary article, Yoshimitsu

Sato (Nonresident Fellow, Stimson) explores the urgent challenge of recruiting the necessary
personnel for the Self-Defense Forces. Drawing upon key defense and population documents,
Sato discusses the necessity of reinforcing the SDF’s human resources. With recommendations
ranging from assessment of hiring and retirement age limits to increasing the SDF’s
competitiveness in the job market, Sato provides a useful comparison of Japan’s dilemma to
other countries in Asia facing similar issues.
In “Japan’s Space Security Policy: Japan’s Role in the Era of Strategic Competition,” Taro
Sato (Nonresident Fellow, Stimson) delves into the ways in which Japan can leverage its space
capabilities to promote international norms in space, build partnerships with other like-minded
countries, and ensure space remains peaceful and stable. Discussing the challenges that space
and counter-space capabilities present to the Indo-Pacific military balance, including threats to
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Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy
military assets and communication channels, Sato emphasizes a three-pronged approach to an

improved space policy. With multilateral, U.S.-Japan bilateral, and all-Japan
recommendations, Sato encourages Japan’s cooperation with other space-developed countries,
joint operating capabilities with the U.S., and a stronger environment of innovation and training
across Japan’s government, universities, and industries.
Finally, in “The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-Term Strategic Competition,” Masashi

Murano (Japan Chair Fellow, Hudson Institute) analyzes Japan’s defense capabilities and the
U.S.-Japan alliance in the context of competition with China. Rejecting the idea that Japan and
China are in a traditional security dilemma, Murano assesses how the alliance should approach
the challenge of fundamental competition with
China, including the possibility of adjusting the SDF’s posture to provide more cost-effective
deterrence in cooperation with the United States. With examples of the capabilities of SDF
assets, Murano identifies challenges and vulnerabilities that Japan should address with
acquisitions that improve the SDF’s ability to effectively face China across domains and with
closer U.S.-Japan cooperation on operational plans.
It is our hope that this volume will provide analysis that is not only scholarly rigorous but also
pragmatic in a way that helps security policy communities beyond the United States and Japan
better understand Japan’s efforts in these important areas.
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Endnotes
1. Trump, Donald J. “Statement from the President on the 60th Anniversary of the United
States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.” The White House. January
18, 2020. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
60th-anniversary-united-states-japan-treaty-mutual-cooperation-
security/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-60th-
anniversary-united-states-japan-treaty-mutual-cooperation-security/).
Abe, Shinzo. “Remarks by the Prime Minister, Marking the 60th Anniversary of the
Signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.” Kantei. January 19, 2020.
[https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202001/_00002.html](https://japan.kantei
.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202001/_00002.html).
2. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Heisei 31 nendo ikō ni kakaru bōei keikaku no taikō ni
tsuite” 平成 31 年度以降に係る防衛計画の大綱について [Outline of defense plan
for FY2019 and beyond]. December 18, 2018.
[https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218.pdf](https://
www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218.pdf), pp. 9-10. NB:
The title of this document is translated as the “National Defense Program Guidelines
for FY2019 and beyond.” See the provisional translation at:
[https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf](https
://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf).
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CHAPTER ONE
Japan as a Stable Builder of Force in the

Indo-Pacific
AYUMI TERAOKA1
The more forces we can concentrate in our center of gravity, the more certain and massive the
effect will be.2 —Carl von Clausewitz
From the Anglo-Japanese alliance to the Tripartite Pact to the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan’s
alignment decisions with major world powers have proved fateful in determining the success
and failure of its grand strategy. Such strategic alignments have always been important ways
and means for Japan to achieve its visions and positions on the world stage. As Tokyo grapples
with its declining material capability in the face of China’s growing power and influence, Japan
should concentrate "forces" as suggested by Clausewitz, and such forces should take the form
of Japan’s existing and future partnerships with other friendly countries. These partnerships,
and the trust and confidence that enable them, are the invaluable assets Japan has gained
through its tireless diplomatic efforts of reconciliation after World War II. Tokyo should waste
no time in actively shaping these partnerships into a force multiplier to achieve its national
interests.
Policy Objectives
The following policy objectives are designed to secure Japan’s national interests as outlined in
the 2013 National Security Strategy, which is to maintain the peace, security, and prosperity of
Japan and its people, as well as to preserve and expand the international order that is rooted in
universal rules and values.3
1. Deter Chinese provocations, in particular the use of force to settle international

disputes in the Indo-Pacific, in order to maintain the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Japan and its partners.
Japan lies at the forefront of a dynamic security landscape in the Indo-Pacific, with its
home islands making up the strategic first island chain and its coast guards in regular
stand-off with Chinese counterparts in the East China Sea. Against the backdrop of
China’s military capability, it is critical to enhance Japan’s deterrent—both
independently and collectively—against China, in particular its use of force against
disputed territories in the Indo-Pacific.
2. Maintain free, open, and stable seas and strengthen a rules-based order free from
coercion in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
As a maritime nation, Japan cannot achieve its security and prosperity without a free,
open, and stable sea and global order surrounding it. The international and regional
order rooted in the rule of law, market economy, and respect for human rights has
allowed Japanese firms and talents to compete fairly and safely abroad. In the era of
shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s proactive efforts in preserving
and fostering such an external environment are of acute necessity.
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Ayumi Teraoka
3. Enhance Japan’s position on the international stage in order to maintain leverage

in shaping the international environment.
Amidst growing uncertainty over the future global order, it is in Japan’s best interests
to maintain its own capacity to shape the external environment in a way that is
conducive to its values and interests. Given the projected decline in its material
capability, such as population size and economic growth rate, Japan should aim to
enhance its strategic position through multilateral and regional networks with partner
states and leverage its comparative advantages.
Background
Issues at Hand
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has gained momentum as a key strategic concept under
the leadership of President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. This vision aims to
turn "the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that
values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion."4 While
the names and buzzwords behind major policies may change with a new administration, the
general strategy in dealing with Indo-Pacific geopolitics will likely persist for Japan and
likeminded states beyond the Abe-Trump era. Though North Korea poses an immediate
security concern, Japan’s most critical strategic problem for the coming decades is the future
direction of Chinese power, which, if managed incorrectly, will be the major obstacle to Japan’s
policy objectives.5
China’s rapid military modernization is an undeniable fact of life that Japan has had to face,
and will continue to face, for quite some time.6 China’s defense budget grew from a mere $11.4
billion in 1989 to $250 billion in 2018, jumping from being only 40 percent of Japan’s defense
budget to 536 percent.7 In 2017, President Xi Jinping projected that “by the mid-21st century,”
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will “have been fully transformed into world-class forces”
that “can fight and win.”8
China’s growing power projection capabilities such as long-range precision fires pose difficult
military challenges to Japan and its partners. China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy
is designed to limit states’ capability to enter an operational area. For instance, China’s A2/AD
may pose greater risks and costs for Washington to enter the Taiwan Strait during contingencies
and could also hamper the ability of the U.S. and its allied forces to maneuver freely once inside
the area.9 The question of how and in what range China’s A2/AD could be effective in military
warfare is highly scenario-dependent, in particular China’s ability to strike moving targets
without being itself vulnerable to opponents’ A2/AD assets. 10 Nonetheless, such Chinese
capabilities may be sufficient to convince risk-averse U.S. leaders not to order interventions in
such a contingency—or may make allies think that they might, damaging the credibility of U.S.
commitment to its allies.
In addition to China’s assertions over various territorial claims and unilateral decisions to
militarize reefs in the South China Sea, the PLA Navy is seeking to gain greater access to port
facilities along the Indian Ocean to support its “out-of-area” operations.11 China uses its vast
economic heft and expanding network of United Front work abroad—co-opting ethnic Chinese
individuals and communities to work for Beijing’s interest—to purchase long-term leases of
strategic ports, such as the ports in Darwin, Australia and Hambantota, Sri Lanka.12 While these
tactics are not always successful, the threat they pose may drive liberal democracies to overplay
their hands.
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Japan’s Responses
In response, Japan has made quantitative and qualitative improvements in its defense
capabilities. Its defense budget is steadily increasing, albeit slowly, and the 2018 National
Defense Program Guidelines calls for Japan’s new multidomain defense force with cross-
domain capabilities that include space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum.13
Japan has also accelerated the process of deepening security ties with a number of other U.S.
partners in Asia and Europe, through agreements on information sharing, logistical exchange,
and defense technology transfer.14 It now holds regular security consultations, 2+2 Ministerial
Meetings, with the United States, Australia, Russia, France, Britain, Indonesia, and India. 15
These key documents and the institutionalization of security partnerships are essential not only
as a signal to China of solidarity and collective resolve over shared security concerns, but also
as a step for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to upgrade and expand joint military exercises
with these partners. The SDF’s three services now hold regular and multifaceted joint military
exercises with various militaries, as shown in Table A, learning best practices and enhancing
interoperability.
Table A. JSDF’s Bilateral Joint Exercise Partners (2016-2019)16
Service Partner Country

All Threee Services U.S., India, and Britain
Air and Sea Australia
Sea France, Canada, and Philippinees
Unspecified European Union and New Zealand
In addition to enhancing its own capability and interoperability, Japan has also taken the lead
in capacity-building efforts for the militaries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) through the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation framework, the Vientiane Vision.
These efforts include Maritime SDF’s deployment of Izumo-class destroyers to various
ASEAN countries (Indo-Pacific Deployment), the Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation
Program, and a transfer of five TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy, along with pilot
training as well as maintenance and repair assistance.17
Contrary to China’s and the current U.S. administration’s penchant for bilateralism over
multilateralism, Japan has led the way in strengthening various layers of multilateral fora in
the Indo-Pacific. Against the backdrop of a U.S. absence, Japan has kept alive one of the most
strategic rule-making initiatives, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership, and has also invited friendly powers outside the region, such as Britain and
France, to become more involved in Asia’s geostrategic landscape.19
Moreover, Japan has promoted investment frameworks for Asian and African developing
economies, as in the cases of the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt in Bangladesh and the
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor in Africa, co-sponsored with Indian counterparts, as well as the
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, a collaboration between the Asian Development Bank
and Japan’s aid agencies. Such projects not only provide recipient states more transparent and
fairer alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but also incentivize other partners
to become more active players in the region through joint funding, sending stronger signals to
Beijing about its malpractices abroad, and ultimately shape China’s investment practices.
15
Ayumi Teraoka
Impact of U.S. Policy

The United States’ continued forward presence and active engagement with the region will
remain indispensable for Japan’s effective deterrent against China for the foreseeable future.
Advanced U.S. military assets in the Indo-Pacific, quality intelligence, and joint and combined
combat experience with other militaries place the United States at the center of regional
deterrence.
The U.S. military has developed a joint doctrine to counter Chinese and Russian A2/AD
capabilities, where interoperability among partner militaries is identified as one of the most
critical elements. To penetrate and disintegrate enemy A2/AD, the 2018 U.S. Army’s joint
doctrine calls for U.S. joint and combined forces to work with partner militaries to first “rapidly
strike the enemy’s long-range systems” and then use cross-domain capabilities to neutralize
the enemy’s mid-range systems.19
Cooperation with the United States is also critical to Japan’s strategy for achieving the desired
Indo-Pacific order. As the traditional hub in the alliance system in Asia, the United States has
helped Japan deepen its security ties with other U.S. allies, encouraging Japan to hold a number
of multilateral military exercises as shown in Table B. The recent U.S. effort to lead an allied
coalition against ships smuggling fuel to North Korea is yet another example.20
Moreover, the United States is the only country with security ties with Taiwan through its 1979
Taiwan Relations Act. Whether Washington is able to help Taiwan defend against Beijing’s
coercion remains a critical litmus test for the viability of free and open order in the region and
the credibility of U.S. security commitments to the countries directly within China’s A2/AD.
Table B. Examples of Japan’s Multilateral Exercises with Key Partners21

Trilatelar Quadrilateral Pentagonal
U.S.-Korea-Japan U.S.-Australia-Korea-Japan
U.S.-Australia-Japan U.S.-France-Britain-Japan
U.S.-India-Japan U.S.-Philippine-India-Japan U.S.-Australia-
U.S.-Philippines-Japan U.S.-France-Australia-Japan Korea-Canada-
U.S.-Britain-Japan U.S.-Australia-Canada-Japan Japan
Canada-New Zealend-Japan U.S. –India-Philippines-Japan
Australia-Canada-New Zealand-Japan
The United States continues to have unrivaled diplomatic impact in shaping the global strategic
discussion about China and the region. While Abe was among the first leaders to propose "the
Indo-Pacific" as a strategic concept, it was only when the Trump administration adopted it into
strategy documents that the concept turned into a global strategic phrase. Such an endorsement
tremendously empowered this concept and allowed Japan to further expand and strengthen its
networks of like-minded states. This turn of events speaks to the value of close U.S.-Japan
cooperation not only in the context of the bilateral relationship but also in promoting the key
global strategic frameworks that Japan desires. Japan’s wartime legacy in Asia and the U.S.
legacy in Southeast Asia also make it preferable for the two states to develop strategic
relationships with these nations together, making this effort more politically acceptable and
resilient than when they operate independently.
16
Challenges
1. Alliance solidarity for overcoming China’s A2/AD challenges to ensure credible
deterrent
Despite the U.S. Army’s updated joint doctrine to deal with China’s A2/AD, the most
imminent risk lies in the psychological impact of A2/AD on civilian decision-makers.
If China’s A2/AD renders risk-averse leaders in Washington or its allied capitals to
only choose low-military risk actions, it may damage the deterrent by convincing
Beijing that A2/AD has in fact successfully reduced U.S. and allied levels of resolve to
engage in combat. It may also raise the fear of entrapment in some capitals located
farther away from China’s coast where China’s A2/AD could be less effective, such as
Australia. Although Canberra has recently strengthened its concerns about China’s
political and information operations inside Australia, it may not be politically ready to
commit to theater-wide military operations to deal with the defense of Taiwan or the
South and East China Seas directly under China’s A2/AD. Following America’s
withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the possible
deployment of U.S. land-based long-range precision fires in Australia, Japan, or the
Philippines to penetrate and disintegrate China’s A2/AD might also face strong
domestic backlash.
2. U.S. mixed messages and the burden-sharing debate

Mixed messages from Washington about future U.S. commitment to the region and its
direction of foreign policy present a central challenge to Japan’s grand strategy. On one
hand, the Trump administration’s hardline view towards China, commitment to the
FOIP, and Trump’s personal ties with Abe, as well as Congress’s Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act that authorized funding for U.S. engagement with the Indo-Pacific, are
all reassuring. A majority of the American public also support their country’s active
global engagement (69 percent approval and 30 percent disapproval) and see U.S.
security alliances as mutually beneficial. 22 An emerging consensus in Washington that
China is a “strategic competitor” leaves Japan relatively at ease that a possible U.S.-
China condominium at the expense of allies’ interests is unlikely in the near future.
On the other hand, Trump’s proclivity for achieving “deals” either with enemies or
partners and some Republican members of Congress’s libertarian, isolationist foreign
policy agenda have raised concerns in Tokyo. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, preceded by years of congressional resistance to multilateral free
trade agreements, and Trump’s acrimonious attitude towards allies over trade and U.S.
base hosting costs, have damaged allies’ confidence in Washington as a reliable partner.
While the Japanese public view of the United States remains steadfastly favorable, their
confidence in the U.S. president dropped sharply from 78 percent to 24 percent when
Trump took office.23
Japan and the United States will begin another burden-sharing negotiation in 2020, as
the current agreement expires in March 2021. The U.S. Department of Defense 2004
compendium on allies’ contributions noted that Japan offset 74.5 percent of U.S. basing
costs, and more recently former Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada stated that
Japan covered 86.4 percent in 2015.24 According to media reports, however, Trump
administration officials have already demanded that Japan quadruple its share of U.S.
basing costs.25 Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who two years ago called
Japan “a model of cost-sharing, of burden-sharing,” has left the administration in
protest against Trump’s approach to U.S. allies.26
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Ayumi Teraoka
These mixed signals about U.S. commitment to allies are troubling, and along with
other U.S. allies, Japan is anxiously waiting for its friend to put the house in order.
3. Democracies as stable promoters of the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific?
To achieve free and open order in the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative that major regional
powers continue to work together towards shared visions. This requires joint funding
efforts to ensure smaller powers have an alternative foreign investment to choose rather
than accepting Beijing’s financial package under duress. However, major regional
powers who share an interest in doing so are also democracies that could face domestic
constraints in pursuing this kind of long-term objective. Already, some partners such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France face the rise of nationalist and
isolationist political factions, which will make it more difficult for Japan to collaborate
on strengthening the coalition of shared values and interests. Even Tokyo, where Abe’s
stable leadership and well-managed alliance relationship with the United States allowed
Japan’s substantial contribution to spreading the FOIP framework over recent years,
cannot take the status quo for granted going forward.
With this in mind, it is important that like-minded states fill the vacuum of leadership
when other democracies are in domestic turmoil. It is yet unclear, however, whether
such an interstate collaboration to manage domestic instability and promote their shared
goal abroad will be sustainable.
The China gap and Taiwan gap?

There is an increasing consensus among U.S. allies and partners that China poses a direct threat
to their territorial integrity, their sovereignty, or the global commons. The consensus over what
to do about the threat, however, has not yet been formalized. Analysts point out possible
divergence in states’ approaches to the vision for the Indo-Pacific, in particular over the degree
of inclusivity or the level of confrontational tone targeting China. 27
More specifically, what to do about the future of Taiwan and how to prioritize this issue in the
FOIP vision is one of the thorniest issues in Asian alliance coordination. How should the
supporters and promoters of the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific address China’s
increasing economic coercion and diplomatic isolation efforts towards Taiwan, as well as a
possible military contingency over the Taiwan Strait? Japan and like-minded states have not
yet come to terms with these questions, and it is time they do so.
Policy Recommendations:
1. Be mindful but don’t overreact to the China gap
It is crucial to be cognizant of any gap states have among the envisioned strategic
framework for the Indo-Pacific, yet Japan and its partners should be mindful that perfect
convergence is not necessary. In fact, such a divergence is a healthy one, and resilience
despite the divergence has been one of the most prominent strengths of the U.S.-led
order. Diverse approaches among allies could also present opportunities to moderate
China’s behavior. For instance, more assertive U.S. attitudes towards China might
allow more moderate regional powers such as Japan or Australia to persuade China to
offer concessions. Overemphasizing disagreements or rushing to create consensus,
however, only highlights the lack of solidarity and depresses the strategic weight of
what they do agree upon, which itself is valuable.
2. Enhance allied counter-capabilities to China’s A2/AD capabilities
18
To deal with China’s improving A2/AD capabilities, Japan and other U.S. allies should
work to enhance their own A2/AD capabilities with advanced radar systems, anti-ship
missiles, and air defense systems, and focus on developing capabilities that can disperse
quickly and flexibly, such as through mobile land forces. 28 In addition to such defense
investments, Japan should work with the United States and other partners such as
Australia and India to regularize and expand tabletop and joint military exercises to
improve interoperability for a theater-wide combined-force military strategy. Such
efforts will help build confidence and trust in allied capabilities to penetrate and
disintegrate China’s A2/AD. In the process, allies and partners should engage in regular
security dialogue about how states farther away from China’s coast, such as Australia,
may work for the defense of those directly impacted by China’s A2/AD. The need and
the risks of possible deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles on allies’ soil,
including the risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement, should also be assessed.
3. Coordinate capacity building efforts for ASEAN and other smaller maritime
states
Along with India and Australia, Japan should work with France, the United Kingdom,
and Canada to coordinate capacity-building efforts with ASEAN states and other
smaller maritime nations through arms sales, joint exercises, and training. While many
U.S. allies and partners thus far have refrained from conducting U.S.-style freedom of
navigation operations (FONOPs) near Chinese-occupied features in the South China
Sea, Japan, Australia, and India have all been much more willing to increase their
military presence in Southeast Asia in the form of joint military exercises with, port
visits to, and capacity building for ASEAN states. Similarly, London and Paris have
already shown interest in deeper reengagement with the Indo-Pacific.29 These efforts
are just as important as FONOPs in countering Beijing’s claims and restoring military
balance in the South China Sea and should be strengthened and coordinated. Such
efforts present an opportunity for Japan to expand the network of like-minded states,
leading another multilateral cooperation framework.
4. Work with Asian and European liberal democracies to expand free and open
investment frameworks in Asia and beyond
Japan should continue to lead by example by providing alternative investment
frameworks, which are based on decades of experience in Asian development. As in
the case of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor that India and Japan cosponsored, Japan
should continue to find co-sponsoring partners from other like-minded states, such as
Australia, the United Kingdom, France, or Canada, to reinforce investment projects in
Asia and Africa. Such collaboration helps generate larger funds required to compete
with China’s BRI, offers platforms for other middle power states to take part, and
allows Japan’s projects to be seen not just as a product of Sino-Japanese rivalry but a
reflection of global awareness of the Asian infrastructure gap. Existing frameworks
such as the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure should be extended beyond 2020, with
new partners involved.
5. Build nonpartisan consensus on Indo-Pacific strategies in Japan and its partner
states
In order to compete with a China that allocates a vast budget for military development
and innovation, Japan and its partners must try to forge nonpartisan support for the
shared vision for the Indo-Pacific and continue to implement the agreed strategy across
administrations. To do so, Japan should encourage expansion of track 1.5 dialogues that
include representatives from various opposition parties, including those with a populist
bent, and improve upon public diplomacy to nurture deeper understanding among the
public. These efforts should help ensure that competition with China remains a less-
19
Ayumi Teraoka
polarized issue in various liberal democratic capitals. Such a domestic political

environment allows for long-term planning, which in turn enables gradual resource
reallocation for long-term defense and foreign investment.
6. Changing the pattern of the burden-sharing debate

While today is not the best time to put the burden-sharing debate at the center of alliance
relationships and antagonize both publics’ sentiment against one another, the
acrimonious burden-sharing debate has been a recurring theme in the U.S.-Japan
alliance for decades and in some sense is unavoidable. First, to avoid misunderstanding
on numbers, the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense
should work together to establish common calculating standards and regularly provide
the most updated numbers for U.S. allies’ share of basing costs. Then, through public
diplomacy, engagement with congressional members, and military diplomacy, Japan
should continue to cultivate broader American support and understanding for the U.S.-
Japan alliance and Japan’s contributions to the alliance that are unrepresented by the
basing costs. Last but not least, Washington and Tokyo should move forward with their
conversation for possible co-basing of SDF units and U.S. Forces Japan, starting from
co-locating lower-rank personnel from the Foreign Liaison Officer to the Foreign
Exchange Officer to enhance interoperability.
7. Squarely face Taiwan’s future in Indo-Pacific strategy

Beijing’s economic coercion and increasing pressure of diplomatic isolation towards
Taipei are undeniable facts. Japan and its partners must engage in thorny conversations
about where to place the issue of Taiwan in the context of the desired free and open
order in the Indo-Pacific. For decades, Taiwan has been considered a major issue of the
U.S.-China bilateral relationship, yet what Taiwan represents are much broader
strategic issues of the defense of the first island chain, China’s A2/AD challenges, and
the viability of the Indo-Pacific free and open order. Starting regular, quiet, and
incremental conversations among like-minded states towards unofficial security
cooperation with Taiwan is an important step. On the other hand, Taiwan should also
work to enhance its intelligence protection framework. Washington should facilitate
this process and embed Taipei in a multilateral allied cooperation framework to protect
U.S. allies against expected coercive pressure from Beijing.
8. Bolster channels of dialogue with Beijing to prevent misperceptions at all times

While taking the above-mentioned measures, it is still necessary to engage in
continuous dialogue with Beijing to prevent misperceptions and unnecessary spirals. In
a period of great power rivalry and strategic competition, Japan should develop and
maintain its own line of communications with Beijing and have regular fora to gauge
each other’s intent.
20
Endnotes:
1. I thank Zack Cooper, Jessica Drun, Pamela Kennedy, Tomoaki Nakano, Sagatom Saha,
and Yuki Tatsumi for their helpful comments and feedback on my earlier drafts. All
mistakes are my own.
2. von Clausewitz, Carl, Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie. On War.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 489.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “National Security Strategy (NSS).” Updated
April 6, 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the
Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development
(TICAD VI).” Kenyatta International Convention Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, August 27,
2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
5. As Japanese Minister of Defense Takeshi Iwaya explicitly stated during the 2019
Shangri-La Dialogue, the issue of the Korean Peninsula “is integral to” the question of
whether it is possible to achieve this FOIP vision. Embassy of Japan in Singapore.
“Speech by Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya.” IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, 18th Asia
Security Summit, Second Plenary Session on “Korean Security: the Next Steps,”
Singapore, June 1, 2019. https://www.sg.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000486058.pdf.
6. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. “Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2019.” 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-
1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
7. These numbers are adjusted to current USD figures in calendar years. “SIPRI Military
Expenditure Database 2019.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
8. Xi Jinping. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era.” Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China. Xinhua Net. October 18, 2017.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_Nati
onal_Congress.pdf. 16 and 48.
9. Bonds, Timothy M., Joel B. Predd, Timothy R. Heath, Michael S. Chase, Michael
Johnson, Michael J. Lostumbo, James Bonomo, Muharrem Mane, and Paul S.
Steinberg. “What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial
Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression?” RAND Corporation. 2017.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1820.html ; Friedberg, Aaron L.
“Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy.” Foreign Affairs 91 no. 5
(September/October 2012). 48–58.
10. The range of medium or intermediate-range ballistic missiles such as DF-21D or DF-
26 could extend beyond 1,500 km–2,000 km, while some argue limitations such as
radar vulnerability and U.S. and allies’ own A2/AD capabilities could geographically
restrict the range of China’s A2/AD effectiveness to 400–600 kilometers from its
controlled landmass, only covering Taiwan, territories in East and South China Seas,
and Okinawa. Biddle, Stephen and Ivan Oelrich. “Future Warfare in the Western
21
Ayumi Teraoka
Pacific: Chinese Anti-access/Area Denial, U.S. Air Sea Battle, and Command of the
Commons in East Asia.” International Security vol. 41 no. 1 (Summer 2016). 7–48.
11. Yung, Christopher D., Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon, and Joshua Wiseman. China’s Out
of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential
Solutions. Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives no. 3.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010.
12. Reportedly, Ream Naval Base in Cambodia has also been a target of such Chinese
operations. Diss, Kathryn. “Chinese construction boom in Cambodian town raises fears
of secret military pact.” ABC. July 25, 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-
26/chinese-construction-in-cambodia-raises-military-pact-fears/11345410.
13. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and
beyond.” December 18, 2018.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf.
14. Over the last decade only, Japan has signed information sharing agreements with
Australia (2012), Britain (2013), France (2011), India (2015), Korea (2016), Italy
(2016), and NATO (2010); signed logistical agreements, Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement, with Australia (2010 and 2017), Britain (2017), France (2018),
and Canada (2018); and signed defense technology transfer agreements with Australia
(2014), Britain (2013), France (2015), India (2015), the Philippines (2016), Germany
(2017), Italy (2017), and Malaysia (2018). Ministry of Defense of Japan. Defense of
Japan 2019. 2019.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf. 515. See
reference no. 37.
15. “Japan’s Security Policy—Bilateral and Multilateral Security Cooperation,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000085.html.
“Joint Statement - First India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting,”
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 30, 2019,
https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/32131/Joint+Statement++First+India-
Japan+2432+Foreign+and+Defence+Ministerial+Meeting.
16. Made by the author based on reference nos. 39-46 in Defense of Japan 2019, 516-526;
press releases from the Ministry of Defense; as well as consultations with SDF officials.
This list includes the states with which SDF conducts bilateral joint exercises [kyōdō
kunren] and excludes partners for so-called “goodwill training” [shinzen kunren],
search and rescue exercise with Russia, or other types of military exchanges. Exercises
with Turkey in 2016 and Brunei in 2019 are not listed here, since, despite being labeled
as joint bilateral exercises, these exercises had strong features of goodwill training
according to my consultation with SDF officials
17. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. “Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019 (IPD19).”
https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/operation/IPD19.html; Ministry of Defense of Japan.
“The 3rd Japan–ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program.” June 23, 2019.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2019/0623a.html; and Defense of Japan 2019,
364.
18. Prime Minister Abe welcomed Britain’s entry into the CPTPP, another step by Japan
to bring a prominent European power into the Asian geo-economic landscape. “Brexit:
Japan ‘would welcome’ U.K. to TPP says Abe.” BBC. October 8, 2018.
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45780889.
19. Long-range assets include integrated air defense system, short-range ballistic missiles,
long-range multiple rocket launcher, and command and control and mid-range systems
include self-propelled artilleries and standard multiple rocket launchers. U.S. Army.
22
“U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.
December 2018. viii-ix and 30.
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-
1_30Nov2018.pdf. The Marine Corps similarly calls for experimentation of lethal long-
range unmanned systems to counter A2/AD capabilities. U.S. Marines.
“Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps.” July
2019. 5.
https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant%27s%2
0Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700.
20. Lubold, Gordon and Ian Talley. “Seven Countries Join to Hunt Ships Smuggling Fuel
to North Korea.” Wall Street Journal. September 14, 2018.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-u-s-led-coalition-to-track-illicit-fuel-shipments-to-
north-korea-1536922923.
21. Made by the author based on reference no. 51 in Defense of Japan 2019, 532-534. The
list is not exhaustive. In particular, it excludes ADMM Plus, RIMPAC, PSI, and other
multilateral joint exercises such as Cobra Gold, Pacific Partnership, and Indo-Pacific
Endeavor.
22. Smeltz, Dina, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm.
“Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support U.S. Engagement in Global Affairs.” Chicago
Council on Global Affairs. 2019.
https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/report_ccs19_rejecting-
retreat_20190909.pdf. 3–4.
23. Stokes, Bruce and Kat Devin. “5. Views of the U.S. and President Trump.” Pew
Research Center. November 12, 2018.
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/11/12/views-of-the-u-s-and-president-
trump/.
24. Mie, Ayako. “How much does Japan pay to host U.S. forces? Depends on who you
ask.” Japan Times. January 31, 2019.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/31/national/much-japan-pay-host-u-s-
forces-depends-ask/#.XhKNsRczZTY; and U.S. Department of Defense. “2004
Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: Covers
Allied Contributions in 2003.” 2004.
https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf.
25. Seligman, Lara and Robbie Gramer. “Trump Asks Tokyo to Quadruple Payments for
U.S. Troops in Japan.” Foreign Policy. November 15, 2019.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/15/trump-asks-tokyo-quadruple-payments-us-
troops-japan/.
26. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Joint Press Conference with Japanese Minister of
Defense Tomomi Inada and U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.” February 4, 2017.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conference/2017/02/04.html; “James Mattis’
resignation letter in full.” BBC. December 21, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
us-canada-46644841.
27. Koga, Kei, Mie Oba, Ken Jimbo, and Zack Cooper. “#3 U.S.-Japan Cooperation on
Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture.” Policy Memorandum, Sasakawa Peace
Foundation. September 26, 2019, https://www.spf.org/en/jpus/spf-asia-initiative/spf-
asia-initiative003.html; Szechenyi, Nicholas and Yuichi Hosoya, “Working Toward a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Alliance Policy Coordination Brief, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. October 10, 2019.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/working-toward-free-and-open-indo-
pacific-pub-80023.
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Ayumi Teraoka
28. Bonds, et al.; Friedberg, Aaron L. Beyond Air–Sea Battle: The Debate over U.S.
Military Strategy in Asia. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014.
29. Vaughn, Bruce, Derek E. Mix, and Paul Belkin. “France, the United Kingdom, and the
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP): Issues for Congress.” In Focus, Congressional
Research Service. December 18, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11052.pdf.
24
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Takahisa Kawaguchi
CHAPTER TWO:
Japan’s Defense Policy in Cyberspace

TAKAHISA KAWAGUCHI
Policy Objectives
Cyberspace has evolved beyond a mere information system. It now serves as the basic and
underlying framework of the real world, supporting the economy, social infrastructure,
electronic communications, and more. However, cyberspace has also been exploited as a
platform for malicious activities by various actors, including criminals, anarchists, terrorists,
nation states, and their proxies. Japan's policy objectives in cyberspace are as follows:
1. Establish and Maintain a Rules-Based, Liberal, and Open Order in Cyberspace

“Rules-based”: All users of cyberspace, such as nations, companies, individuals, and
other entities, should comply with agreed-upon rules when accessing and using virtual
space.
“Liberal and open”: Cyberspace should ensure freedom of access and communications.
However, some nations have disrupted the free flow of digital data by requiring data
localization, which mandates storing digital data within the nation's borders.
2. Deter Significant Cyberattacks, Especially When Equivalent to "Armed Attacks”:

Even if order in cyberspace is thus maintained, there will always be perpetrators who
try to launch a destructive cyberattack. Japan must deter such attacks, in particular
destructive cyberattacks and those deemed to be “armed attacks” by nation states and
their proxies.
It has been a subject of great debate over the past decade or more whether deterrence
by punishment can work in cyberspace or not.1 Naysayers underscore the attribution
problem.2 However, today it is widely thought that time, resources, and legal
permissions will enable us to determine the attacker to some extent. Clear attribution
and credible retaliation can deter revisionist states from launching a devastating
cyberattack..
3. Practice Preemptive Actions in Areas Where Deterrence Does Not Work Well, and
Improve Social Resilience and Retaliation Capabilities when Deterrence Fails:
Cyberattacks below the threshold of armed attacks are common and may be difficult to
deter. Vigilant and preemptive actions must be taken upon detecting signs of an attack.
Efforts should focus on minimizing cyber risks and preparing for potential cyberattacks.
If deterrence fails, damage to information systems and social infrastructure must be
controlled and limited, with credible retaliation imposed on the adversary.
Background
Evolving Japan’s Cybersecurity Policy and Japan-U.S. Cooperation
In a December 2018 Cabinet meeting, the Abe administration adopted the new National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which declare: (1) improvement of defense capabilities
inclusive of acquisition of “superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace, and
electromagnetic spectrum,” and (2) implementation of so-called “cross-domain” operations,
26
military activities across all domains consisting of new ones in addition to physical domains,
i.e., land, sea, and air. The NDPG emphasizes that Japan, in cyberspace, shall achieve a radical
strengthening of “its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack
against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.”3
Tokyo and Washington are enhancing the Japan-U.S. alliance in response to cyber threats. The
Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee affirmed that certain cyberattacks could
constitute armed attacks under the Japan-U.S.4 Security Treaty. Japan has asserted its readiness
to respond to cyberattacks with physical means, including defense operations by the Japan Self-
Defense Forces (SDF).
The determination of cyberattacks as armed attacks and the exercise of the right of individual
and collective self-defense are subject to case-by-case assessment by scholars of international
law and policy officials.5
Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya said on April 26, soon after the 2+2 Ministerial Meeting, that
the ministry would delve into what factors would satisfy the self-defense criteria “in light of”
the examples which the U.S. once showcased.6 The U.S. had illustrated that cyberattacks
leading to, for example, core meltdown of a nuclear plant, collapse of a dam built upstream of
an area of high population density, and an aircraft crash would constitute armed attacks. 7
Experts have raised an alert over possible cyberattacks against the electric power grid. These
can also be regarded as armed attacks under certain conditions. 8 In Ukraine, cyberattacks
caused two massive blackouts in December 2015 and December 2016. Also, in parts of the
western U.S. in March 2019, there was a power failure due to a cyberattack, though it was
small in scale and lasted for less than five minutes.
Vast “Gray-zone” Situations
Measures to be taken in response to the most devastating cyberattacks or those equivalent to

armed attacks are being put in place. However, there extends a vast blank space, or gray-zone,
between armed attacks and minor cyber-crimes.
Revisionist powers conduct cyberattacks for the purpose of achieving their geopolitical aims,
at a level of magnitude below the threshold of armed attacks, i.e., at a degree which will not
trigger a large-scale reprisal or retaliation by the target. In direct terms, revisionist powers are
neither afraid of nor reluctant in using their cyber capabilities against the U.S., Japan, and their
allies in the following areas.
The first is election interference. Acts of campaign interference by a foreign government were
confirmed during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and also elsewhere such as the U.K.,
France, Germany, and Taiwan in varying degrees. Cyberattacks and influence operations on
social media are intended not only to affect the success or failure of a certain candidate but also
to damage the legitimacy of an election or undermine public trust in democracy. 9
No cyber interference by any foreign government has been confirmed in the national elections
of Japan so far. A national referendum, however, if held for the amendment of the Constitution,
will definitely split public opinion, making it an attractive target for hostile states.
27
Takahisa Kawaguchi
The second is organizational, large-scale cyber-enabled theft for the purpose of achieving
economic advantages. General Keith B. Alexander, the first commander of the U.S. Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM), said in 2012 that the loss of business secrets and intellectual
property through cyber theft by China constitutes the “greatest transfer of wealth in history.”
The U.S. and China once reached an agreement. According to a statement by the White House
in September 2015, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping agreed that neither country’s
government would conduct or knowingly support “cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property,
including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” 10
Nevertheless, cyberattacks dispatched from China have not decreased.11 Among various
hypotheses possible, however, the very conceptual framework of the 2015 agreement where
“security, diplomacy, and defense” were separated from “business and economy” may have
been unreasonable. For Beijing, the maintenance of its unique political system is a matter of
national security, and planned economic development is quintessential for the stability of the
regime.
The third is cyberattacks against big data, which cannot be defined simply by economic value.
The aim of data breaches against the Japan Pension Service (JPS), U.S. Health insurance
provider Anthem, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Singaporean medical institution
SingHealth, the Marriott Group, and others may have been to build databases of the population
of target nations, including politicians, senior officials, and military personnel. 12
The Japanese government and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity (NISC) made an investigation into the cause of JPS’s information leak in 2015
when 1.25 million cases of personal data were leaked. They publicly disclosed that they could
not identify the penetrator. According to the report from Macnica Networks Corp released
around the same time, however, it is obvious that the cyberattack was launched from inside
mainland China.13
Acts of probing and exploitation into the target are often orchestrated as a prelude to these
cyberattacks. Whether the hacker’s activity ends with probing or exploitation or it develops
further to gray-zone situations or armed attacks is indistinguishable in the initial stage.
Deterrence by punishment does not have much effect on gray-zone situations, probing, or
exploitation in cyberspace. It is necessary to impose an intolerable cost on the attackers, to
neutralize their efforts and force them to alter their strategic calculations, through efforts such
as preemptive actions, upgrading and expanding deterrence by denial, or enhancement of
resilience.
Challenges for Achieving Policy Objectives

In order to achieve the policy objectives mentioned above, Japan faces several challenges.
Limited Missions and Roles of the SDF
At present, the SDF are engaged in limited roles and missions compared to USCYBERCOM.
Tokyo needs to constructively examine the involvement of defensive support of the
government and critical infrastructure, and offensive operations.
28
In March 2014, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) established the Cyber Defense Group under the
SDF Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command. The most recent
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) state that the SDF will organize a "Cyber
Defense Unit (1 squadron)" as a "Joint Unit."14 Additionally, in March 2019, the 301 System
Protection Unit was established within the Western Army of the Ground SDF (GSDF) in
Kumamoto Prefecture. This marks the first time that the SDF has created a cyber-related unit
within any of the area armies. The 301 System Protection Unit, consisting of 60 members, is
responsible for defending the GSDF's networks and systems deployed in Okinawa and the
southwestern islands.
Each of these units is tasked with the defense of the SDF's networks and information systems.
However, it's important to note that defense of the government's network outside the Ministry
of Defense (MOD) and critical infrastructure falls outside the scope of their current mission.
The National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) plays a role
in defending the government's network. NISC's responsibilities include monitoring, analyzing,
probing, and inspecting government networks. Since the revision of the Basic Law for Cyber
Security in 2016, NISC's mission has expanded to cover incorporated-administrative agencies
and some designated corporations.
Designated sectors, including finance, energy, and telecommunications, are expected to defend
their critical infrastructure systems through self-help efforts and response measures against
cyberattacks. However, this situation is evolving, and NISC has publicly disclosed the criteria
and severity evaluation process for cyberattacks against these designated sectors. The severity
of impact on people and the nation resulting from critical infrastructure system failures is
evaluated on a scale from 0 to 4 .15
Besides, NISC launched the Cybersecurity Council in April 2019, which is a framework for
information sharing among the national and local governments, critical infrastructure, security
companies, and other private businesses. Members will actively exchange substantial
information, including undefined information, under “a duty of confidentiality” that includes a
punitive clause and “an obligation to share information.” 16
Constitutional Restrictions on Surveillance Capabilities: Article 21

The exclusively defense-oriented policy derived from Article 9 of the Constitution has shaped
not only Japan’s cybersecurity policy but also the entire framework of its national security
policy. However, in the field of cybersecurity, what is perhaps even more important than
Article 9 is Article 21, which states, “No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy
of any means of communication be violated.” According to experts, the secrecy of
communication stipulated in Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the
Telecommunications Business Law is more strictly interpreted and applied than in other
developed countries, making it especially difficult for the government and telecommunications
carriers to monitor packet communication.17 That is, the interpretation of Article 21 is partially
limiting Japan’s cybersecurity policy.
The case of the Japanese piracy site Manga-mura, which was also taken up in the Diet, sparked
great controversy about the secrecy of communication. Manga-mura illegally uploaded images
of many comics and got about 100 million views a month in its prime, against which publishers
claimed damages of around ¥300 billion. On April 13, 2018, the Japanese government urged
Internet service providers to block access to three piracy sites including Manga-mura as an
29
Takahisa Kawaguchi
emergency step.18 As this “blocking” included monitoring of each terminal destination on the
Internet, it came under fire for the possibility of violating the provisions of no censorship and
secrecy of communication.
Though the MOD and SDF are monitoring some wireless telecommunications, 19 a vast body
of wired digital information is left intact. Of course, Tokyo cannot concentrate its limited
resources intensively on monitoring all the wired digital information. One practical idea is that
at least highly security-oriented ministries, agencies, and infrastructure should consider
executing such exhaustive monitoring under Article 21 with reinterpretation.

As cyber risks become increasingly apparent, the Trump administration has dramatically
evolved its policy of responding to cyberattacks. In July 2018, the Trump administration
declassified the Obama-era Presidential Policy Directive 20 and rescinded the self-restraint
cyber response strategy. Instead, President Trump signed the National Security Presidential
Memorandum 13 (NSPM-13), an offensive policy on combating emerging cyberattacks.
NSPM-13 is a classified document, but according to a report from The Washington Post, the
memorandum “frees the military to engage, without a lengthy approval process, in actions that
fall below the ‘use of force’ or a level that would cause death, destruction, or significant
economic impacts.”20
Then, based on the concept of NSPM-13, “defend forward” was emphasized in the 2018
Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.21 As far as the relevant documents are concerned,
“defending forward” is possibly interpreted as a strategy that may be exercised on an external
network which is not the department’s subject of management or defense, and often on a
foreign network.22
The Trump administration’s policy implies a vital perception of the circumstances. That is,
cyber defense requires constant activity outside the nation’s network, especially in the defense
against cyberattacks below the threshold of armed attacks or use of force. Deputy Secretary of
Defense William J. Lynn III indicated this a decade ago: “The United States cannot retreat
behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun.” 23 It is critical to detect
cyberattacks and activities at all levels, to relentlessly track them and identify the attacker, and
to beat the source of the attack. This is the very “persistent engagement” which General Paul
M. Nakasone, Commander of USCYBERCOM, advocated.24
"Defending forward" is a realistic necessity for cybersecurity, although it may raise arguments
from the viewpoint of international law. Japan may find it difficult to implement complete
"defending forward" in the near term, but policy discussions with this consideration are
nonetheless required.
As mentioned, the missions and roles of the SDF primarily involve defensive behavior.
However, in cybersecurity, Japan's underlying concept of an exclusively defense-oriented
policy after World War II is not entirely applicable. Although the latest NDPG states that the
SDF will aim to acquire the "capability to disrupt opponent's use of cyberspace," it also
specifies that these capabilities are exclusively for use "during attack against Japan." 25
In cybersecurity, distinguishing between an emergency and ordinary times is challenging. For

example, the Israel Defense Forces, in response to a cyberattack by Hamas, used physical
means against the building from which the terrorist group's cyber unit was launching the
30
attack.26 This retaliatory strike occurred shortly after the detection of the cyberattack. Vigilant
probing and espionage activities enabled such prompt retaliation. Occasionally, defending
forward beyond the regular firewall is necessary for national security. Hack-back against the
originator of a cyberattack also needs clear specification as an act of necessity or legitimate
self-defense.
Policy Recommendations
1. Enhancement of attribution capabilities
Without attribution, adversaries will launch a cyberattack with no fear or hesitation.
Tokyo needs to enhance attribution capabilities beyond its current level. Cyber
attribution is akin to intelligence work, which requires information gathering and
probing activities during peacetime. Tokyo is especially recommended to take the
following measures: (1) enhancing capabilities for capture and surveillance of vast
amounts of wired digital information, including further reinterpretation of secrecy of
communication in Article 21 of the Constitution, and (2) codifying in law that hack-
back against the source of cyberattacks is an act of necessity or legitimate self-defense.
Of course, both efforts must be controlled under a framework with the commitment of
the Diet and the principle of protection of secrets. In Japan, the State Secrecy Law,
officially the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, was enacted in
2013. Besides, the Cybersecurity Council is taking the lead in experimentally using a
kind of clearance system. However, a more comprehensive system for security
clearance should be set up. In attribution judgments, validity and reliability are of key
importance just as they are in judgments by an intelligence organization. Whether or
not to attribute a cyberattack to a specific state or to disclose the attribution details will
eventually require a high-level political decision. When facing the impending crisis of
a real event, it will be difficult to gather accurate and adequate intelligence. Japan
should improve not only technical or intelligence aspects of cyber attribution, but also
the political part of it. Japan may need additional efforts to review the process of the
Cabinet’s confirmation of a situation as an armed attack.
2. Development of defensive capabilities against cyberattack

In addition, Japan needs to strengthen its ability to cope with cyberattacks and their
sources. In particular, the following areas are crucial:
Development and enhancement of disruptive capability: The latest NDPG has
declared the strengthening of “capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan,
opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.”27 In order to materialize this disruptive
capability, Tokyo should accelerate investment in staffing for, and study of operations.
The new NDPG’s disruptive capability will contribute to Japan’s deterrence against
cyberattacks. However, the meaning of disruptive capabilities is closer to deterrence by
denial than deterrence by punishment. Such capabilities are constitutionally acceptable,
and the Japanese government considers these to be compatible with its exclusively
defense-oriented policy. In the future, Tokyo should consider exercising the disruptive
capabilities, currently limited to emergency situations, even during ordinary times.
Otherwise, dealing with cyberattacks below armed attacks and use of force will be more
challenging.
31
Takahisa Kawaguchi
Expanded options for sanctions and retaliation: If Japan receives a cyberattack

below an armed attack or use of force, it must make the attacker pay the price. Besides,
Japan must deter potential cyberattacks effectively. To these ends, Tokyo should ensure
that multiple options of sanctions and retaliation are readily available. Measures of
reprisal involve naming and shaming, economic sanctions like asset freezing, criminal
prosecution, diplomatic sanctions, or retaliation by cyber and kinetic means. Tokyo
needs to impose proportional and appropriate sanctions and retaliation on the attacker
for the severity of attacks such as election meddling, cyberattacks targeting commercial
interests, and big-data theft. In particular, a naming and shaming campaign, financial
sanctions, and criminal prosecution are more effective when implemented in
cooperation with allies and coalition partners.
Engaging in defense of critical infrastructure: If there is a potential cyberattack on
critical infrastructure that could have a significant impact, it is desirable for the
Japanese government to minimize the impact and develop countermeasures. First,
Japan should develop a predictive approach for evaluation and improve
countermeasures, based on the severity evaluation criteria. In addition to the non-
military countermeasures by the Japanese government, the involvement of the MOD
and SDF in defending some of the critical infrastructure should be actively considered.
In fact, the SDF and the U.S. military already have this inside the scope of their
assumptions.28
3. Coordinated practices to establish a norm

Declaring Japan’s position on cyberspace and international law repeatedly, Tokyo
needs to establish a norm of conduct on cybersecurity together with the U.S. and like-
minded countries. Tokyo should continue to make efforts to clarify that the existing
international law applies in cyberspace. If the existing international law loses validity
in cyberspace, both concepts of armed attack and self-defense right will have no
meaning, and cyberspace will become more violent. It is as vital as ever for the G7
countries and coalition partners to mutually verify the rules and principles of action,
which could not be adopted at the UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2017.29
Generally speaking, however, norms are established based on past performance. It is

important to resort to tangible behavior if necessary. From the viewpoint of establishing
a norm of conduct, it is also crucial to disclose the attribution of an attack and enforce
sanctions or take retaliations against the attacker. In fact, Tokyo, along with
Washington and like-minded countries, formally condemned the worldwide-infectious
malware WannaCry, which a North Korean hacker perpetrated in December 2017,30
and the sophisticated hacking group APT10, which was linked to the Ministry of State
Security of China in December 2018.31
32
Endnotes
1. For example, the following sources give differing views on attribution and deterrence
by punishment. Affirmative views on feasibility of deterrence by punishment have
gained momentum since about 2011. Lynn, William J. “Defending a New Domain: The
Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5 (September/October 2010):
97–108; U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Strategy for Operat- ing
in Cyberspace. July 2011. 4–5.
2. Attribution means to identify the attacker who attempted a cyberattack. In cyberspace,
victims, computers and servers used for the attack, and the nationality of perpetrators
generally span multiple countries, which can make the real attacker all the more
difficult to identify. Attribution is neither a choice of two alternatives nor a question of
black and white, but is a matter of degree. This aspect shares common traits with the
expression of a probabilistic distribution when an intelligence organization makes a
statement as to its judgment or the confidence of intelligence sources, instead of “a
choice of two alternatives.”
3. Ministry of Defense of Japan. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and
beyond. December 18, 2018. 2, 20. Besides, the “Medium Term Defense Program
(FY2014-FY2018)” attached to the previous NDPG had referred to the investigation
into “acquisition of capabilities to prevent an enemy from using cyberspace.” However,
this is the first time that Japan has specified its cyber offensive capability in the NDPG.
4. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee. “Joint Statement of the Security
Consultative Commit- tee.” April 19, 2019.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/fa/page3e_001008.html.
5. The details are omitted in this paper, but refer to the following: Schmitt, Michael N.,
ed. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
6. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Bōei daijin kisha kaiken” 防衛大臣記者会見 [Minister
of Defense press conference]. April 26, 2019.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2019/04/26a.html.
7. Though Minister Iwaya did not mention the source, he is more likely to have referred
to the following: Koh, Harold Hongju. “International Law in Cyberspace.”
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference. Fort Meade, MD. September 18,
2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm.
8. A cyberattack against the power grid may be determined an armed attack if the scale
and effect of the attack is comparable to that caused by a kinetic one. Schmitt, Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operation, 340–341.
9. Kawaguchi, Takahisa and Motohiro Tsuchiya. “Contemporary Election Interference
and Our Prepared- ness in Japan: The Impact of Cyber Attacks and Influence
Operations on Social Media.” Tokio Marine Nichido Risk Consulting. 2019.
10. The White House. “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United
States.” September 25, 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings- state-visit-united-states.
11. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community of 2017 and
2018 described, “Pri- vate-sector security experts continue to identify ongoing cyber
activity from China, although at volumes significantly lower than before the bilateral
Chinese-U.S. cyber commitments of September 2015,” on pages 1 and 6 respectively,
but this description has been removed in the 2019 edition.
33
Takahisa Kawaguchi
12. Otake, Tomoko. “Japan Pension Service hack used classic attack method.” Japan
Times. June 2, 2015. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/02/national/social-
issues/japan-pension-service-hack-used- classic-attack-method. The U.S. Department
of Justice. “Member of Sophisticated China-Based Hacking Group Indicted for Series
of Computer Intrusions, Including 2015 Data Breach of Health Insurer Anthem Inc.
Affecting Over 78 Million People.” May 9, 2019. Volz, Dustin. “Chinese National
Indicted on Hacking Charges Related to Anthem Breach: ‘An extremely sophisticated
hacking group operating in China’ blamed, according to prosecutors.” The Wall Street
Journal. May 9, 2019.Pepitone, Julianne. “China Is ‘Leading Suspect’ in OPM Hacks,
Says Intelligence Chief James Clapper.” NBC News. June 26, 2015.
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/clapper-china-leading-suspect-opm- hack-
n381881. “SingHealth’s IT System Target of Cyberattack.” Ministry of Health
Singapore. July 20, 2018. https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-
highlights/details/singhealth’s-it-system-target-of-cyberattack. Thrush, Glenn and
Alan Rappaport. “Marriott Data Breach Is Traced to Chinese Hackers as U.S. Readies
Crackdown on Beijing.” The New York Times. December 12, 2018.
13. Macnica Networks Corp, “Advanced Persistent Threat: A Survey of Large-Scale Cyber
Spy Activities against Japan.” June 2016.
14. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond. 33.
15. National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC).
“Severity Evaluation Criteria about Service Failure in the Critical Infrastructure due to
Cyber Attacks.” July 25, 2018. https://
www.nisc.go.jp/active/infra/pdf/hyouka_kijun_shohan.pdf.
16. National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). “About
the Cybersecuri- ty Council.” April 1, 2019.
https://www.nisc.go.jp/press/pdf/kyogikai.pdf.
17. E.g. See the report produced by the Internet and secrecy of communication study group
hosted by the Institute of Information Security (IISEC): International Comparison of
‘Secrecy of Communication’ in the Internet Age. May 2014. https://www.canon-
igs.org/research_papers/pdf/201405_sog_report.pdf.
18. Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, Japan. “Inta-netto jō no kaizokuban saito
ni taisurukinkyū taisaku” インターネット上の海賊版サイトに対する緊急対策
[Emergency measures against online piracy sites]. April 13, 2018.
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/honpen.pdf; “Joint Meeting of the
Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters and the Ministerial Meeting Concerning
Measures Against Crime.” April 13, 2018.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201804/_00028.html.
19. The Radio Wave Department of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters is monitoring
radio waves at the following six and more communication sites: Higashichitose,
Hokkaido; Kofunato, Niigata; Ooi, Saitama; Miho, Tottori; Tachiarai, Fukuoka:
Kikaijima, Kagoshima.
20. Nakashima, Ellen. “White House authorizes ‘offensive cyber operations’ to deter
foreign adversaries.” The Washington Post. September 21, 2018.
21. U.S. Department of Defense. Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018.
September 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-
1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.
22. Nagano, Hideo. “Beikoku no saiba- senryaku ni okeru zenpō bōei to wa nani ka?” 米
国のサイバー戦略における前方防衛とは何か？ [What is ‘defending forward’ in
the context of the U.S. cybersecurity strategy?]. The Japan Association of
Cybersecurity and Law. November 23, 2019.
34
23. Lynn, “Defending a New Domain,” 99.
24. “An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone.” Joint Force Quarterly, No.92, 1st Quarter
(January 2019). 4–9; Naka- sone, Paul M. “A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations,”
Joint Force Quarterly, No.92, 1st Quarter. 10–14.
25. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond, 20.
26. Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) posted “CLEARED FOR RELEASE: We thwarted an
attempted Hamas cyber offensive against Israeli targets. Following our successful cyber
defensive operation, we targeted a building where the Hamas cyber operatives work.
HamasCyberHQ.exe has been removed.” Twitter. May 6, 2019.
https://twitter.com/idf/status/1125066395010699264.
27. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond, 20.
28. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation released in April 2015 say that
Tokyo and Wash- ington already plan to promote joint effort to “protect critical
infrastructure and the services upon which the United States Armed Forces and the Self-
Defense Forces depend to accomplish their missions.” U.S. Department of Defense.
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. April 27, 2015.
29. In June 2017, the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts “failed to agree on a report in
which the United States sought explicit detail on how international law applied to
cyberspace, particularly the applicability of the law of countermeasures and the inherent
right of self-defense.” Grigsby, Alex. “The Year in Review: The Death of the U.N.
GGE Process?” Net Politics, Council on Foreign Relations. December 21, 2017. https://
www.cfr.org/blog/year-review-death-un-gge-process.
30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “The U.S. Statement on North Korea’s
Cyberattacks (Statement by Press Secretary Norio Maruyama).” December 20, 2017.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pres- s4e_001850.html.
31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Cyberattacks by a group based in China known
as APT10 (Statement by Press Secretary Takeshi Osuga).” December 21, 2018.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/ press4e_002281.html; Office of Public Affairs,
U.S. Department of Justice. “Two Chinese Hackers Associ- ated With the Ministry of
State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns Targeting
Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information.” December 20, 2018.
https://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-
security-charged-global-computer-intrusion.
35
Takahisa Kawaguchi
ISSUE SPOTLIGHT
The Defense of Japan in a Hyper-Aging Society
YOSHIMITSU SATO
The security environment around Japan has recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel
become increasingly tense. Despite United has been a serious challenge. On March 31,
States President Donald Trump’s top-down 2019, the number of authorized positions
effort to engage North Korean leader Kim for uniformed SDF Personnel was 247,154,
Jong Un on denuclearization, Pyongyang while the actual number of staff was
continues to develop nuclear weapons and 226,547—a gap of about 20,000 people and
ballistic missiles. China is expanding and a staffing rate of 91.7 percent.1 Most
intensifying its activities in the East and recently, the National Defense Program
South China Seas, and its military strategy Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond
continues to lack transparency. In addition, identified securing human resources for
Russia has changed the status quo in SDF personnel as “an imminent challenge
Ukraine with “hybrid warfare,” which in the face of shrinking and aging
intentionally blurs the boundaries between population with declining birth rates.”2
military and non-military activities, and Therefore, it is important to analyze the
similar tactics might be used in Japan’s current population shift in Japan and
Northern Territories in the future. In such a explore how to reinforce the human
situation, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) resource base in the SDF.
and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) must secure
highly qualified personnel who can respond Japan’s aging challenge is serious. The
to diversified missions. However, the Annual Report on the Ageing Society and
36
the Declining Birthrate White Paper—both the United States does, may help the SDF
published by the Japanese government— services recruit enough personnel by
elaborate on the urgency that surrounds expanding the number of eligible Japanese
Japan’s aging and population decline. In for some of the services.
today’s Japan, the current average lifespan
is 81.09 years for men and 87.26 for Furthermore, the extension of life
women.3 This is expected to increase every expectancy indicates that older people may
year, reaching 84.95 and 91.35 years be healthier than in the past. As the average
respectively by 2065. Japan’s total life continues to lengthen, the MOD should
population began to decline in 2011, and its consider further extension of mandatory
population is estimated to decrease from retirement ages in order to leverage the
126.44 to 88.08 million between 2018 and potential of older people, who have rich
2065.4 With this overall trend of population knowledge, skills, and experience.
decline, the working-age population (15 to
64 years old) is projected to shrink from The MOD/SDF also needs to take further
75.45 million in 2018 to 45.29 million by measures to increase the SDF’s
2065. Concurrently, Japan’s aging process attractiveness in order to encourage
will accelerate. The elderly population talented In Japan, there is still an allergy to
(defined as 65 years old and older) is discussions about security, the military, and
estimated to reach 38.4 percent of the total war. Although Japanese tend to think inside
population by 2065. Simply put, one in the box, they should creatively debate
three Japanese will be over 65 years old in realistic and practical ways to prevent and
2065.5 deter a harrowing war. Still, in order to
meet today and tomorrow’s security
Given such circumstances, the MOD/SDF challenges for Japan, the MOD/SDF need
has already begun to take measures to to consider all the relevant factors from the
mitigate the impact of aging and population changing security environment to cutting-
decline in SDF recruitment. For example, edge military technology and search for
as a measure to better prepare the solutions to secure the sufficient number of
organization for the shrinking population, personnel required for the defense of Japan.
the MOD/SDF raised the upper age limit
for entrance of new SDF personnel from 26 The views and opinions expressed here are
to 32 years old in order to expand the of the author only.
recruitment of enlisted soldiers.6 As a
measure to accommodate the aging society, Endnotes
the MOD announced in December 2018
1. Ministry of Defense of Japan.
that it would gradually extend the
Defense of Japan 2019. 2019. 539. See
mandatory retirement age of SDF personnel
reference no. 55.
starting in 2020.7
“National Defense Program Guidelines for
But there are other measures that may also
FY 2019 and beyond.” December 18, 2018.
be worth considering. One is to vary the
23.
hiring age limit depending on the services.
3. Cabinet Office of Japan. Annual
In the United States, for instance, each
Report on the Ageing Society. 2019. 6.
service has a different enlistment age limit
https://www8.cao.go.jp/
(Marine Corps: age 28; Coast Guard: 31;
kourei/whitepaper/w-
Army: 34; Navy and Air Force: 39).8 Given
2019/zenbun/pdf/1s1s_01. pdf.
that the personnel requirements and
4. Cabinet Office of Japan. Annual
physical abilities for each SDF service
Report on the Declining Birthrate. 2019. 2–
differ, setting appropriate age limits, like
3. https://www8.
37
Yoshimitsu Sato
cao.go.jp/shoushi/shoushika/whitepaper/m
ea- sures/w-
2019/r01pdfgaiyoh/pdf/01gaiyoh.pdf.
5. Annual Report on the Ageing
Society, 3.

“Saiyō jōgen nenrei no hikiage ni tsuite” 採
用上限年齢の引上げについて [Raising
the upper age limit for
recruitment]. October 1, 2018.
https://www.mod.
go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/news/.
“Jieikan no tein- en nenrei no hikiage ni
tsuite” 自衛官の定年年齢の引上げにつ
いて [Raising the mandatory retire-
ment age of SDF personnel]. December 21,
2018.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/
12/21c. html.
8. USA.gov. “Join the Military.”
December 4, 2019.
https://www.usa.gov/join-military.
38
39
Taro Sato
CHAPTER THREE
Japan’s Space Security Policy: Japan’s Role

in the Era of Strategic Competition
TARO SATO
The U.S.-China strategic competition, rivalry over geopolitics, geo-economics, and values
between liberalism and authoritarianism, has begun in the Indo-Pacific region over the past
decade. Space is not an exception to this competition; rather, space is becoming its main
battlefield. In the last two decades after the Cold War, the United States maintained a dominant
position in outer space. However, such an environment is changing with the significant
progress of Chinese space development and utilization. China is rapidly catching up with the
U.S. in both quantity and quality: it has been launching more rockets than the U.S. since 2018, 1
and its space-related technology is evolving speedily. In June 2018, China successfully
launched the world’s first relay satellite Queqiao into the halo orbit of Lagrange point 2 in the
Earth-Moon system.2 As technology advances, the competition arena of outer space has been
expanding. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has proven through many wars that the
superiority of space is directly linked to the superiority of traditional domains. In the Indo-
Pacific region, the strategic competition in space is one of the crucial factors determining the
region’s military superiority and thus regional geopolitics.
In response to the U.S.-China competition, Japan is dramatically shifting its space security
policy. In December 2018, the Government of Japan (GOJ) announced the National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG), in which the GOJ identified “acquiring and strengthening
capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains” 3 as the top priority for strengthening
Japan’s defense capability, and announced that the SDF will expand its Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in space. Furthermore, the NDPG
acknowledged that “to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed
contingencies, the SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance
capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications, and
information.”4 The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has decided to enhance its defense capabilities
to acquire active Space Control capabilities. In August 2019, the MOD announced the
establishment of a “Space Operations Command” in the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF).5 In
January 2020, multiple media sources reported that the GOJ began Renaming the ASDF to
“Air and Space Self-Defense Force” by 2023.6 Although Japan has lagged behind other
developed countries in the area of space security, it is rapidly developing its space security
policy and accelerating the development of its capabilities in outer space. Promoting space
security policy within Japan’s limited resources requires unifying efforts with various national
and international actors who share the same values, benefits, and awareness of issues under
clear goals. This paper proposes approaches for space security policy and ten policies that Japan
should pursue in the future."
40
VISION:
Development of a Free and Open Outer Space
Mission:
Maintain peace in space, ensure prosperity through space, and maintain space as an
“international public good” comprehensively and transparently.
Objectives:
1. Strengthening international norms in space, maintaining free access to space, and promoting
international cooperation in space.
2. Strengthening economic connectivity through space.
3. Ensuring peace and stability in space.
Approaches: Means:
1. Multilateral approach. 1. Diplomatic power.
2. Bilateral approach (U.S.-Japan alliance). 2. Science and technology power.
3. All-of-Japan approach. 3. Military power.
Policy Objectives:
The importance of outer space may be similar to that of the ocean. Free access to the seas,
especially the securing of sea lanes (sea lines of communication), has not only sustained the
lives of the people and Japan’s economic development through securing resources and trade
but also played an important role in terms of Japan’s diplomatic presence and territorial
defense. Today, space supports social, economic, and military infrastructure and includes
indispensable “informational lines of communication” for people’s lives, economic prosperity,
and security. For example, the location information provided by satellite navigation systems is
used not only for military purposes but also for agriculture, construction, mining, logistics, and
supply chain management, and the time information supports communication networks,
financial systems, financial markets, and transmission network systems. Thus, stable utilization
of outer space is an indispensable requirement for people to live with peace of mind and for a
nation to continue its prosperity. Certainly, as in the U.S. after the Cold War, stable utilization
of outer space may be achieved by establishing dominance in outer space. However, such a
one-sided environment cannot be envisaged in an age of competition with those whose
economic and military growth will continue.
In view of the similarity between sea and space, Japan needs to pursue development of free and
open space together with countries with which it shares values, as many sea power countries
aspire to free and open maritime development. It is in the common interest of free and open
societies to maintain peace in outer space, ensure prosperity through outer space, and maintain
and develop outer space as a global commons in a comprehensive and transparent manner.
Therefore, Japan must play an active role in achieving the following three objectives: (1)
strengthening international norms in outer space, maintaining free access, and promoting
international cooperation; (2) strengthening economic connectivity through outer space; and
(3) ensuring peace and stability in outer space. It is also essential for Japan to utilize its three
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means of diplomatic, scientific, and technological, and military powers through three
approaches: multilateral cooperation, bilateral cooperation, and all-Japan efforts.
Background and Challenges:

Since the 2000s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been rapidly advancing counter-
space capabilities. Between 2005 and 2019, China conducted at least ten tests of ground-based
direct anti-satellite (DA-ASAT, direct ascent anti-satellite) weapons.7 In January 2007, it
succeeded in destroying a satellite flying in low Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of 865 km with
DA-ASAT weapons,8 and in 2013 it is said that it conducted DA-ASAT experiments on
geostationary orbits (GEO) at an altitude of around 36,000 km.9 Also, China tested a new type
of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon called DN-3 in October 2015, December 2016, August 2017,
and February 2018.10 Critical militarily satellites, such as reconnaissance satellites, satellite
PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing) system, communications satellites, and early
warning satellites, are deployed between LEO and GEO in which China is conducting DA-
ASAT experiments. China’s opaque development of counter-space capabilities is a serious
concern for Japan, the U.S., and free and open societies.
China is also developing space-based counter-space capabilities. In general, space-based
counter-space capabilities “include kinetic kill vehicles, radiofrequency jammers, lasers,
chemical sprayers, high-power microwaves, and robotic mechanisms,” 11 all of which require
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) with other satellites. Since 2010, China has
repeatedly conducted RPO tests in outer space, and in August of that year, it brought an SJ-12
satellite less than 300 meters near its own SJ-06F satellite. In July 2013, China launched three
satellites for the purpose of developing satellite maintenance technology. 12 Besides, in recent
years, Chinese ASAT technology has diversified. For example, in June 2016, China launched
the Aolong-1 satellite with a robotic arm as an experiment to collect and remove space debris.
During the mission, China announced that it had successfully refueled other satellites with the
Tianyuan-1 satellite.13 Given the “dual-use” nature of satellites, there is a concern that these
technologies, if diverted for military use, could become a co-orbital ASAT weapon.14
The PLA is also actively promoting the development and utilization of space. For example,
since 2006, China has launched more than 30 series of Yaogan remote sensing satellites 15 and
4-5 Tian Lian data relay satellites optimized for the Western Pacific.16 The Yaogan remote
sensing satellite is reported to be equipped with an optical sensor, synthetic-aperture radar, or
electronic intelligence sensors. The Chinese government officially announced that China aims
to conduct scientific research, although many analysts believe “this class of satellite is being
used for reconnaissance purposes.”17 Other research has reported that “these dual-use
capabilities provide global, near-real-time, multi-spectral reconnaissance coverage—albeit
optimized for the Western Pacific.” 18 In this manner, the Chinese space-based ISR system is
monitoring the SDF and U.S. forces, including the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and the
readiness of U.S. air bases in the Pacific region. Moreover, information from remote sensing
satellites such as the Yaogan Satellite and the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System has been
integrated to enhance anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities through ballistic missiles
capable of precision attacks, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) such as the DF-21D and DF-
26, and cruise missiles.
Impact on Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific Region:

China’s counter-space capabilities threaten free access to outer space, and its space
development and utilization lack transparency. Also, due to the dual-use nature of satellites,
the boundary between the development of science and technology in space and military
intentions is becoming vague. In the Indo-Pacific region, mutual distrust between the U.S. and
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Japan and China in space has led to a security dilemma not only in space but also in traditional
domains. For example, discussions on China’s strengthening of precision intermediate-range
missile attack capabilities based on its space-based ISR system and the deployment of U.S.
intermediate-range missile forces in East Asia are likely to be relevant. In addition, the U.S.
Department of Defense recognizes that the threat of China’s space capability requires
“[transforming] to more resilient space architectures.” 19 In October 2019, the Space
Development Agency announced the National Defense Space System to respond to threats in
outer space. Furthermore, the expansion of China’s counter-space capabilities and space
development and utilization have had a significant impact on Japan’s defense policy.
Japan’s defense policy is based on the credibility of the U.S. military presence in the Indo-
Pacific region, with the assumptions of U.S. forward presence, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s
freedom of maneuver throughout the region, and a broad command, control, and
communication structure to enable long-distance contact. However, as the PLA strengthens its
A2/AD capabilities based on its counter-space capabilities and space development and
utilization, these assumptions are becoming extremely fragile. First, the PLA’s space-based
C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance) system can find and fix on the U.S. forward bases and major SDF facilities.
It can also track the U.S. Navy CSG and provide target information for a variety of ballistic
and cruise missiles, including ASBMs. In addition, given the PLA Navy’s efforts to expand
operational areas from near seas to far seas and the PLA Air Force’s ongoing program to
develop next-generation bombers, it is highly likely that these systems will be used as a means
of engaging targets’ information transmission for the PLA’s surface ships, nuclear submarines,
long-range bombers, and other long-range weapons in the region.
Second, the PLA’s counter-space capabilities not only reduce the U.S. and Japan’s qualitative
advantage such as precision strike capabilities but also enable them to deceive, deny, disrupt,
or destroy command and control communication lines in the Western Pacific. Although satellite
communication (SATCOM) is not the only method in use, the loss of SATCOM would restrict
operation capabilities including ISR, unmanned aerial vehicle operations, and missile defense.
Thus, the PLA’s space capabilities in outer space and its unclear space development and
utilization overturn the assumption of a military balance between the U.S. and China in the
Indo-Pacific region, increasing the risks and costs of forward deployment by the U.S., while
lowering the political and military costs of China’s ambitious efforts in the region.
Development and Challenges of Japan’s Space Security Policy
1. Development of Japan’s space security policy

Japan’s pacifism has uniquely shaped its space policy. Japan’s space policy was
initiated by the establishment of the National Space Development Agency of Japan, the
predecessor to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), under the National
Space Development Agency of Japan Act of 1969. At the time of the enactment of the
bill, a supplementary resolution was adopted by the House of Councilors that “activities
related to the development and use of outer space shall be limited to peaceful purposes,”
and “peaceful purposes are non-military.”20 Thus, the use of space for military purposes
was prohibited in principle.
In such a political environment, it was difficult for security-related organizations such
as the Defense Agency to conduct space activities. However, this situation has changed
rapidly over the past twenty years, in response to the expansion of threats in outer space
since the 2000s. In 2008, the Japanese government enacted the Basic Space Law,
transforming its conventional science and technology-oriented policy into a three-
pronged policy of “security, industrial promotion, and science and technology.” 21 In
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addition, space security was increasingly emphasized in the Space Basic Plan,
formulated in 2009, 2013, and 2015, with a significant policy change in the 2015
iteration. In response to the 2013 National Security Strategy of Japan in which
“ensuring the stable use of outer space and promoting its use for security purposes” 22
was listed as one of the strategic approaches, security came to be positioned at the center
of space policy. Furthermore, since 2018, even Japan, which has a relatively self-
contained security policy compared to other countries, has recognized the need for
offensive counter-space capabilities.
2. Challenges of Japan’s space security policy

In contrast to its development, there are many challenges in promoting Japan’s space
security policy. First, even if there is a need to establish and expand space units in the
SDF in the future, it will be challenging to secure the necessary personnel with Japan’s
declining and aging population. Since operating in space is a relatively new field for
the MOD and the SDF, those two organizations have not yet trained enough space
experts sufficiently, and space doctrine has not yet been developed. Second, due to
Japan’s unique pacifism, there is a significant gap in the collaboration of industry and
government with academia.23 Third, although the defense budget is expected to
continue to increase, the government as a whole cannot expect a drastic increase in
science and technology-related expenditures allocated to the MOD due to an increase
in fiscal expenditures, including social security expenditures with the aging population.
Fourth, with the establishment of Japan’s future space operations capabilities, it is
necessary to standardize the actions between Japan and the U.S. in a joint operation
plan. Thus, in order to promote Japan’s space security policy, a comprehensive
approach is necessary to overcome those issues.
Policy Recommendations
Given the strategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region and
Japan’s limited resources, Japan’s space security policy must be promoted not only through the
country’s efforts but also through cooperation with its allies and countries that share its values.
Through these efforts, Japan should achieve the three goals that contribute to the overarching
vision: formation of free and open space and an Indo-Pacific strategy that aspires to “stability
and prosperity of the international community.” 24 From this perspective, Japan needs to
promote its space security policy through three multilayered approaches: (1) Multilateral, (2)
Bilateral (U.S.-Japan Alliance), and (3) All of Japan.
Multilateral Approach
1. Shaping international norms for the development and use of space
To contribute to the peaceful use of outer space, Japan must actively participate in the
formation of norms in space with other countries that share “free and open” values.
Japan played an essential role with the U.S., Canada, and France in the formulation of
the “Long-Term Sustainability (LTS) Guidelines for Space Activities” adopted by the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in June 2019.25 Japan should
continue to play an active role in the international implementation of good practices in
space and the formation of new international norms. In the future, international
discussions on how existing international law can be applied to outer space must be
advanced. In particular, discussions should be encouraged on what activities in outer
space fall under the category of “the threat or use of force” under the U.N. Charter.
Even if a consensus cannot be reached as a comprehensive international norm, dialogue
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with countries sharing common values can be the basis for collective action in the event
of the threat of the use of force in space.
2. Promoting transparency and confidence-building measures
Promoting transparency and confidence-building measures in space is crucial for
stabilizing the security environment. In contrast to the fact that less binding
international norms such as the LTS Guidelines have achieved positive results, it has
become challenging to formulate more binding international norms such as
disarmament and arms control on space weapons. One of the reasons for this is the
interest gap between the major powers, but the most fundamental reason is the dual-use
nature of satellites. Even if space weapons could be defined, banned, and restricted,
civil or commercial satellites could easily be converted to military use in space. In
particular, there is no fundamental technical difference between on-orbit services and
on-orbit ASAT. Therefore, considering the difficulty of disarmament and arms control
in space, it would be more practical to promote transparency and confidence-building
measures even if they are non-binding. For example, since China’s proximity
operations to U.S. satellites is one of the concerns in space, the establishment of
proximity limits in geostationary orbit and the framework for mutual notification of
proximity can be options for advancing transparency and confidence-building
measures. There are also options in which Japan could cooperate with potential
competitors in the field of scientific exploration, like the Apollo Soyuz Test Project
during the Cold War and the current International Space Station. It may also be able to
cooperate in areas such as debris removal projects.
3. Strengthening cooperation with likeminded space-developed countries

Japan should advance cooperation on the development and utilization of space with
space-developed countries that share “free and open” values. For example, Japan’s
participation in the Combined Space Operation Center, consisting of the U.S., Canada,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as France and Germany, will
not only promote global space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities but also serve
as the first step toward further cooperation. In addition, if Japan shares satellite
platforms and satellite services not only with these countries but also with international
organizations and other space-developed countries like the E.U. and India, it would
ensure technical redundancy and promote political resiliency of space systems by
complicating the political cost calculation of the use of ASAT weapons by hostile
countries.
4. Strengthening cooperation through outer space with countries in the Indo-Pacific

region
It is also crucial to strengthen cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region
through outer space. While it might be difficult to cooperate in the field of space
development with countries other than space-developed countries, it will be possible to
strengthen economic connectivity by providing Japanese space services to countries in
the region. For example, the Japanese version of GPS, QZSS, will be able to provide
highly accurate Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information for all of the
Southeast Asia region. The utilization of that PNT capability for social services,
agriculture, disaster risk management, and environmental monitoring will contribute to
the “promotion of prosperity across the [Indo-Pacific] region.”26 Besides, Japan, with
the U.S. and France, is currently exploring opportunities for cooperation in satellite-
based marine domain monitoring,27 and if it is possible to provide this information to
Southeast Asian countries, it will be possible to align Japan’s space development and
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utilization with its capacity-building projects. China established the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization in 2008 and has been promoting cooperation in space
utilization with countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere; countries such as Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines have already joined or are interested in joining.
Therefore, by seeking opportunities to provide satellite services to these countries,
Japan will not only counterbalance the increase of Chinese influence in space but also
strengthen the political resiliency of Japanese satellites by internationalizing them.
Bilateral Approach (U.S.-Japan cooperation)
5. Strengthening cooperation in fundamental military functions

Cooperation in fundamental military functions includes ongoing cooperation in SSA
and the evolution of consultations toward future space traffic management. In
particular, since SSA will become the foundation for the “capability to disrupt [the]
opponent’s command, control, communications, and information,” 28 SSA architecture
must be integrated with the electronic warfare system in the future. Therefore, further
advancing cooperation in the defense and intelligence sectors between Japan and the
U.S. will be extremely important. Furthermore, given the impact of China’s space and
A2/AD capabilities on the U.S.-China military balance in the Indo-Pacific region as
described above, it is also essential to promote cooperation in the fields of SATCOM,
early warning (EW), and PNT, which are essential for U.S.-Japan joint operations. In
particular, given the increasing demand for SATCOM in future military operations and
its importance as the basis for command and control functions, advancing U.S.-Japan
cooperation in SATCOM will have great significance in improving technical
redundancy and political resilience.
Cooperation on EW may affect the regional military balance more directly because EW
satellites are indispensable for the initial detection and identification of missiles in a
series of missile defense operations. Therefore, they are an essential component of
Japan’s ballistic missile defense architecture. The current EW system in Japan’s
ballistic missile defense system relies on shared early warnings transmitted from the
U.S.’s Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) as the primary source of information.
However, since SBIRS was designed in the 1990s when space was a “sanctuary” for
the U.S., its survivability is a concern. Since the U.S. has started to develop new EW
satellites (e.g., the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared) 29 and the hypersonic
and ballistic tracking space sensor satellites, 30 Japan should seek the opportunity to
cooperate with these programs. Japan succeeded in developing a prototype of a space-
based dual-wavelength infrared sensor module in April 2019 and plans to mount it on
the Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS-3) to be launched in 2020.31 Therefore,
there might be opportunities for cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the joint
development of infrared sensors, cooperation in satellite upgrade programs, or the
establishment of an information-sharing system of the EW systems developed by both
countries.
6. Establishing joint operating capabilities in space from peacetime to contingency

situations
As Japan expands its use of space in the military field in the future, Japan and the U.S.
need to consider the roles, missions, and capabilities across the full range of military
operations. In addition to defensive operations such as SSA and collision avoidance
operations in peacetime, Japan and the U.S. need to deepen joint efforts on how to
respond to malicious actions by competitors in gray-zone situations. The allies need to
46
reach a consensus on how to respond to attacks with “reversible” consequences, or
temporary disruption, such as laser dazzling, electronic jamming, cyberattacks, or any
other malicious actions. Such consensus-building dialogues are crucial for escalation
control in a gray-zone situation and deterrence against ambitious attempts by
competitors.
In addition, in preparation for contingencies, discussions should be advanced on the
collection and sharing of information on potential military targets, role-sharing of
offensive counter-space operations, and rapid response satellite operations under
degraded mission capability in space. Japan and the U.S. should maintain warfighting
mission assurance in space through those comprehensive activities. In addition, based
on the results of various tabletop exercises, including the Schriever Wargame, Japan
and the U.S. need to integrate the space capabilities with joint capabilities in the other
four domains.
7. Advancing cooperation in space exploration with a view to long-term security

effects
Japan should advance cooperation with the U.S. in scientific exploration and the
development of facilities in lunar orbit and on the Moon from the perspective of space
security. It is exceptionally vital for long-term security considerations. In particular,
from a military perspective, the Moon has the potential to become the ultimate “high
ground” in terms of observability and an energy advantage. The benefit of the high
ground in land operations, the superiority of air power over maritime and land forces,
or the effectiveness of space power is based on the essential superiority of the high
ground. In space, gravity defines high and low ground. The point of lower gravity
becomes the high ground because of its energy advantage. Since the Moon has one sixth
of the Earth’s gravity, and Lagrange points are points where satellites can maintain their
position relative to the Earth and Moon, those areas might become high ground in
cislunar space. Therefore, the militarization of those areas will significantly impact
space and terrestrial operations. Although the militarization of the Moon and lunar orbit
is a long-term concern, history proves that any domains that are strategically critical,
such as air, underwater, space, and cyberspace, are eventually militarized. Although the
Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement prohibit military facilities on the Moon,
the possibility remains that “dual-use” facilities will be built for scientific research
purposes. Furthermore, the deployment of weapons in lunar orbits is not prohibited by
these treaties. Therefore, it is essential for Japan and the U.S. to promote international
space exploration on the Moon and in lunar orbit in order to enhance the international
transparency regarding the Moon.
All-of-Japan Approach
8. Strengthening cooperation among industrial, academic, and governmental sectors

In order for Japan to promote space security policies, fostering the industrial base
through industry-academia-government collaboration is critical. Japan is one of the few
countries in the world that has a broad range of space industries, from satellite
manufacturing to rocket manufacturing and launch services. Yet, though the public
sector accounts for about 90 percent of the Japanese space industry, its business scale
is smaller than that of Europe and the U.S. Thus, Japanese space companies, 32
especially small and medium enterprises, are less competitive compared to leading
foreign space companies. To energize the domestic space industry, the GOJ should
continue to reduce barriers to entry for venture capital and facilitate technological
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innovation. Furthermore, the MOD needs to develop a clear vision for space security
policy to increase the predictability of space businesses. For example, in light of the
current space security environment surrounding Japan, constellation technologies,
small rockets and satellites, or advanced sensors will become critical technologies for
ensuring the resilience, readiness, and financial feasibility of space operation
capabilities.
In collaboration with academia, the GOJ needs to ensure that defense-related research
projects at universities do not hinder university independence and governance.
Moreover, incentivizing the university as a whole is also crucial. For example, with
regard to research grants to universities, it may be possible to provide more flexible
funds that include the cost of facility development or the cost of operating facilities.
Additionally, such efforts will also lead to cultivating new talents in the long run.
9. Strengthening whole-of-government efforts

Japan needs to strengthen its whole-of-government efforts. In particular, the MOD
should advance its ties with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and
Technology in basic research and with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in
technology development in order to further integrate the science and technology
policies and space security policies across the government. In addition, given the dual-
use nature of SATCOM, remote sensing, and PNT satellites, multiple ministries can
move ahead with joint project funding to space companies that have critical
technologies. In order to promote research and development in the field of space
security with a limited budget, the MOD should find any opportunities to collaborate
with the civil and commercial space sectors. It is also necessary to strengthen
cooperation between the government’s space operation community and intelligence
community. In particular, cooperation among the ASDF Space Command, JAXA, SDF
intelligence squadron, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, and Cabinet Satellite
Intelligence Center will become important. Furthermore, while the GOJ is advancing
the development program of responsive small satellites as part of its study on
strengthening the mission assurance of the entire space system, cooperation between
the space operation community and the intelligence community will be even more
essential. In addition, in order for the SDF to establish “capability to disrupt [the]
opponent’s command, control, communications, and information” in the future, 33 it is
essential to integrate SSA information with ISR information such as electromagnetic
spectrum information in outer space.
10. Cultivating “space professionals”

Cultivating the space professionals who will play a central role in space security and
bridge the gap between security and the other sectors of space is the most urgent task
for the MOD and ASDF. The MOD and ASDF must accelerate the development of the
quality and quantity of human resources through the recruitment, training and
education, and establishment of career paths. They also should develop an “intellectual
foundation,” including the development of doctrines and the establishment of space
operation procedures. In developing such human and intellectual foundations, the MOD
and SDF will need to develop space professionals in three fields: space policy, space
technology, and space operations. These professionals are necessary to bridge the gap
between civil and commercial space and security space and to evolve air and space into
multi-domain operations.34
Drastic organizational reform of the ASDF will be necessary in order to develop these
human resources. The ASDF should review its existing organization by various
48
measures including the integration of existing units, expansion of private contractors,
utilization of retired SDF personnel, an increase of manpower-saving projects, female
participation, and unmanned systems, and review of the division of roles within the
SDF. However, the ability of the ASDF to create these space professionals is not
fundamentally a matter of organizational structure but of the ability of the ASDF to
transform its organizational culture and identity from air to air and space. The only way
to create these new values is leadership. The ASDF should train the leaders who will
lead the new era of the ASDF.
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Endnotes
1. Aerospace Security Project. “Space Environment: Total Launches by Country.” CSIS.
Updated January 2, 2020. https://aerospace.csis.org/data/space-environment-total-
launches-by-country/.
2. Jones, Andrew. “Queqiao update: Chang’e-4 lunar relay satellite establishing halo orbit
after approaching Lagrange point.” GB Times. June 1, 2018.
https://gbtimes.com/queqiao-update-change-4-lunar-relay-satellite-establishing-halo-
orbit-after-approaching-lagrange-point?feature=chinas-change-4-mission-to-the- far-
side-of-the-moon.
beyond. December 18, 2018. 19.
4. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Wa ga kuni no bōei to yosan” 我が国の防衛と予算
[Our country’s defense and budget]. December 2019. 4.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/yosan_gaiyo/2020/yosan_191220.pdf. The name is
tentative.
5. The media reported “航空宇宙自衛隊” (Kōkū uchū jieitai), which can be translated
either “Air and Space Self-Defense Force” or “Aerospace Self-Defense Force.” Prime
Minister Abe also mentioned the renaming in 2019.
6. Weeden, Brian and Victoria Samson, eds. “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open
Source Assess- ment.” Secure World Foundation. April 2019. 1–14.
https://swfound.org/media/206408/swf_global_count- er-space_april2019_web.pdf.
7. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “2015 Report to Congress of
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.” November 2015. 293.
8. Gertz, Bill. “China ASAT Test Part of Growing Space War Threat.” The Washington
Free Beacon. February 23, 2018. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/asat-test-
highlights-chinas-growing-space-warfare-capabilities/.
9. The National Air and Space Intelligence Center. “Competing in Space.” December
2018. 23. https://www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/documents/Space_Glossy_FINAL--
15Jan_Single_Page.pd- f?ver=2019-01-23-150035-697.
10. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counter-space Capabilities,” 1–4.
11. Xinhua News Agency. “China announces success in technology to refuel satellites in
orbit.” June 30, 2016. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0630/c202936-9079971.html.
12. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. “Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Countermeasures, and Arms Control.” September 1985. 5-6.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a338027.pdf.
13. Gunter’s Space Page. “Spacecraft: Earth Observation – China.”
https://space.skyrocket.de/directories/ sat_eo_chin.htm.
14. Barbosa, Rui C. “Chinese launch again with YaoGan Weixing-6 remote sensing
satellite.” April 22, 2009. https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/04/chinese-launch-
again-with-yaogan-weixing-6-remote- sensing-satellite/.
15. Foster, Harry, Bob Martinage, and Jim Thomas. “Great Power Competition in Space.”
Telemus Group. August 15, 2019. 9.
16. U.S. Department of Defense. “Report to Congressional Defense Committees: Final
Report on Orga- nizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space
Components of the Department of Defense.” August 9, 2018. 3-4.
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/09/2001952764/-1/-1/1/ORGANIZATION- AL-
50
MANAGEMENT-STRUCTURE-DOD-NATIONAL-SECURITY-SPACE-
COMPONENTS.PDF.
17. Space Strategy Office, Cabinet Office of Japan. “Current status, issues and future
directions of space diplomacy and security.” September 2012. 23.
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/dai5/siryou5.pdf.
18. Office of Japan. “Basic Space Plan.” April 2016.
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan3/plan3.pdf.
19. Cabinet Secretariat of Japan. “National Security Strategy.” December 17, 2013. 19.
https://www.cas. go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.
20. Science Council of Japan. “Statement on military security research.” March 24, 2017.
1. http://www.scj. go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo-23-s243.pdf.
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ files/000430632.pdf.
22. Cabinet Office of Japan. “Source: Long-term Sustainability (LTS) Guidelines for Space
Activities, the 81st Session of the Committee on Space Policy.” June 2019.
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/dai81/ sankou6.pdf.
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” 1.
24. Space Policy Committee, Cabinet Office of Japan. “Uchū kihon keikaku kōteihyō” 宇
宙基本計画工程表[Master Schedule for the Basic Space Plan]. November 28, 2019.
91. https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/dai85/siryou2-2.pdf.
25. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “National Defense Program Guidelines 2019.” 20.
26. U.S. Air Force. “AF plans to accelerate defendable space with Next-Gen OPIR.” May
4, 2018. https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1512949/af-plans-to-
accelerate-defendable-space-with-next-gen-opir/.
27. Northrop Grumman. “Northrop Grumman Selected for Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sen- sor Phase IIa Program.” December 2, 2019.
https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northropgrumman-selected-for-
hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space-sensor-phase-iia-program.
28. Cabinet Office of Japan. “Roadmap for the Basic Space Plan (FY 2018 revision).” 97.
29. Cabinet Office of Japan, Committee on Space Policy, Subcommittee on Space Industry
Promotion. “Vision 2030 for the Space Industry.” May 12, 2017. 4.
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/vision/mbrlistsitu.pdf.
30. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “National Defense Program Guidelines.” 20.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/ approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf.
31. Gray, Colin S. Explorations in Strategy. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996. 64–65.
“The word ‘aerospace’ is unfortunate. This is because the term ignores the principles
of physics and refers to the continuity of two spaces with different techniques and
tactics. Space is geographically, technologically, tactically, and operationally distinct
from the sky, just as the sky is different from the sea or land.”
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52
CHAPTER FOUR
The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-

Term Strategic Competition
MASASHI MURANO
Policy Objectives
It has been almost five years since the last Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation were
introduced in 2015. Since then, the Trump administration has taken power, and the United
States and Japan have both reviewed their defense strategies (the 2018 National Defense
Strategy [NDS]1 and National Defense Program Guideline [NDPG]2 respectively).
The U.S.-Japan alliance faces several challenges in preparing for long-term strategic
competition with China. But have the U.S and Japan been able to clearly prioritize defense
investment areas and allocate limited resources? The two countries’ resources are finite, and it
is not practical to pursue full-spectrum dominance.
 Japan should begin to engage in a discussion with the United States to redefine the
roles, missions, and capabilities needed to impose costs on China by exploring the
appropriate mix of offensive and defensive capabilities needed.
 Japan should attempt to define an appropriate force posture for the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) based on threats, not on legal issues including the Constitution. To do so, it is
necessary to reconsider the meaning of an exclusively defense-oriented policy.
 Japan and U.S. alliance handlers should devote more time to verifying not only
hardware issues such as weapon systems but also operational concepts and to updating
the command and control structures.
Background
The security environment in the Western Pacific, where the U.S.-Japan alliance and China
encounter each other, is sometimes described as a risky situation that could lead to an arms
race. Some people see this as a problem of the so-called “security dilemma.”3 However, it is
not appropriate to use the discussion of security dilemmas to explain this regional security
environment. The security dilemma is defined as the spiral model of an unexpected arms race
that occurs even though no side really desires it.4 However, it is clear that China’s military
expansion and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities over the past twenty years are
not reactions to the defense build-up of Japan and the United States. From the late 1990s to
2012, Japan’s defense budget was almost flat or even declining.5 Since 2012 following the
inauguration of the second Abe administration, Japan’s defense budget has grown. But this
growth rate is marginal relative to China’s, which for FY2019 increased by 7.5 percent over
the previous year.6
In recent years, Japan has also been preparing for a state visit from President Xi Jinping.
Diplomatic relations between Japan and China have thus improved. However, China’s Coast
Guard and PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels have been increasingly active in the East China Sea.7
In other words, even if diplomatic relations between Japan and China improve, China’s military
and paramilitary activities have become more active. This indicates that China is engaging in
deliberate military expansion regardless of what Japan and the United States do. This is not an
unexpected arms race spiral like a security dilemma. If China’s military buildup is not a
reaction to the actions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, no matter how much diplomatic
communication improves, there will be a fundamentally competitive relationship between the
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Masashi Murano
U.S.-Japan alliance and China. This is the reality of long-term strategic competition that the
alliance partners must recognize.
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) criticized the U.S. government’s traditional
“engagement” policy for failing to produce results.8 An unexpected arms race could be
prevented by ensuring close communication and transparency. But if the challenger is engaged
in deliberate military expansion, it would not be a realistic objective for a defending side
(status-quo power) to aim to shape its opponent. What a status-quo power should do is identify
what the challenger is trying to do and try to prevent it from doing so. This is the essence of
selective deterrence or selective containment.9

It should be noted that the “competition” referred to in the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS contains
elements of “competitive strategy.” Competitive strategy is a concept that aims to overcome
long-term competition by gradually wasting resources through cost-imposition by forcing
competitors to compete in areas that are disadvantageous to them, while identifying and
maintaining areas in which the defender has an advantage.10
The question is how to compete with China. China has a clear “Red Theory of Victory” to use
asymmetric capabilities to form anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), seize the dominant domains
of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and prevent the U.S.’s intervention. Japan—and even the United
States—does not have the equivalent “Blue Theory of Victory.” Why don’t we have a clear
“Theory of Victory”? Here is the difficulty of setting strategic goals for the alliance.
What is clear is that the U.S.-Japan alliance represents a status-quo power and China is a
strategic challenger to the rules-based international order and the balance of power in the
Western Pacific. However, defenders of the status quo tend to have more difficulty in setting
proactive, clear goals than challengers.
The issue might be related to Japan’s overinterpretation of the concept of an “exclusively
defense-oriented policy” or senshu-bōei and its overly restrictive defense posture.11 For a long
time, from the standpoint of exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan restricted the weapons
systems that the SDF could possess. According to past Diet statements, the SDF was not
allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, or attack aircraft
carriers.12
However, the security environment facing Japan is constantly changing. Whether these assets
are necessary for Japan’s defense should be determined on operational demand or a threat-
based approach, not by law. It should not be the law that limits it, but the rationality of the
operations concept, cost analysis, and defense portfolio. This paper will not go into the issue
of Article 9 of the Constitution, but the force posture of the SDF should not be restricted in
advance by law.
So, how should the appropriate force posture for the SDF be designed? It is the strategic
concept that determines it. It is important for the alliance to pursue cost-effective deterrence
and defense strategies and avoid waste as much as possible, not to mention impose costs on its
competitors. Has Japan’s defense strategy been able to do that?
Challenges
Since the 2013 NDPG, operations research such as capability analysis and assessment has been
employed as a scientific method in Japan’s defense force planning.13 These methods
scientifically derive the joint capability areas and functions currently lacking in the SDF, based
on multiple estimates of defense planning scenarios to be addressed in the future, and identify
the gap between the current SDF and future adversaries.
54
The same approach was used in the development of the 2018 NDPG. As a result, the 2018
NDPG comprehensively covers the challenges facing Japan.14 For example, in the 2018 NDPG,
it was specified that Japan would give priority to investments in space, cyberspace, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. The capabilities of these new domains are key enablers in any joint
operation and are a move in the right direction.
However, while scientific analysis reveals gaps that the SDF should fill, the methods do not
decide the priorities of how they should fill those gaps. (This is because Japan’s defense budget
is chronically short of the essential requirements.) The portfolio priorities required to fill them
are selectively determined by factors such as maintaining the defense technology and industrial
bases and by various political decisions such as budget negotiations among the Ministry of
Finance and the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.
For example, assume that a total of 1,000 point gaps are identified across ten capability areas.
When there are only 500 point gaps that can be filled by the size of the execution budget in the
next budget cycle, what to prioritize is the gaps up to the defense planning authorities and the
political will to direct them. In addition, when making additional investments to fill the gaps,
it is not sufficient to divide the available 500 points equally across the ten capability areas,
because there are qualitative and quantitative differences in each function and capability gap.
For example, in capability area A, the SDF needs only a little more effort to fill the gap. On the
other hand, in area B, there is a hopeless lack of capability, and no matter how hard they try,
the SDF cannot achieve the capability needed in the next ten years of budget cycles. In this
case, it would be unreasonable to invest limited resources in area B that would not yield results
in the next ten years. Therefore, it may be more effective to give up gracefully and invest in
other areas.
In this respect, Japan faces difficult challenges. As a basic premise, the budget and human
resources of the SDF are extremely limited. Moreover, the security environment facing Japan
is a combination of low-intensity challenges, such as deterrence in the gray zone with Chinese
Coast Guard vessels, and high-intensity challenges, such as A2/AD, in which the PLA’s
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are present.
China’s opportunistic creeping expansion without military conflict, such as the construction of
artificial islands and the normalization of activities by naval vessels and military aircraft, as in
the case of the disputed South China Sea, may be prevented by regular presence patrols and
regional training by Japan’s Coast Guard and Self-Defense Forces. This is the core concept in
the 2010 NDPG’s “Dynamic Defense Force” and the 2013 NDPG’s “Dynamic Joint Defense
Force.”15
The 2018 NPDG is also basically following these concepts. However, in a high-intensity
environment, forward presence becomes very vulnerable. This is a competing demand.
Ideally, Japan should have the right assets for each scenario. Again, however, Japan’s defense
resources are limited, and it needs to prioritize defense investments.
For this reason, some decisions raise questions about prioritization. A typical case is the
refurbishment of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier destroyer.16 The refurbishment of the
Izumo-class destroyers makes it possible to operate F-35Bs, which have the ability to perform
short takeoff and vertical landing, giving the SDF a capability like a light aircraft carrier.
Subsequent political criticism is that the SDF possesses “aircraft carriers.” However, as
discussed above, the problem is not consistency with previous government statements; more
important is whether decisions are based on clear operational concepts and cost efficiencies.
A review of the refurbishment of the Izumo-class destroyers and the acquisition of the F-35B
suggests that there are roughly four possible operational scenarios: (1) presence operation
during peacetime and gray-zone operations, (2) island defense in the southwest area, (3) air
defense in the front of the Pacific (air-interdiction/defensive counter-air operations in the
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Masashi Murano
Pacific against the PLA’s bombers and fighters, including carrier-based variants), or (4)
combined scenarios of (2) and (3).
First, a combination of these assets would be useful for presence patrol in peacetime. It makes
sense for the Japanese light aircraft carrier and the F-35B to carry out presence operations in
the sea lanes connecting the East China Sea to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in
collaboration with allies and partners such as the U.S., the U.K., France, and Southeast Asian
countries. It is not difficult to imagine that, in the foreseeable future, U.S. and British F-35Bs
will conduct joint exercises to land on and take off from Japanese aircraft carriers in the western
Pacific.
On the other hand, the cost effectiveness of continuous operations of these vessels and the F-
35B should be closely examined. To be sure, patrols by large Japanese destroyers in the South
China Sea and western Pacific accompanied by “carrier-based fighters” should provide a sense
of reassurance to Southeast Asian countries at a time when China has made the operation of its
aircraft carriers regular practice. But it also means that these assets are limited to “show a
presence” tasks in low-intensity peacetime environments.
Since aircraft carriers do not have the ability to defend completely against aerial threats
themselves, it is essential to operate under the protection of accompanying Aegis destroyers.
However, it will be difficult in practice to continue their operations in a high-stress A2/AD
environment while exposed to China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles
and fighter-bombers. In particular, if the deployment of the F-35B increases the military value
of the vessel, the Izumo-class destroyer would become a high-value target for the PLA, and
Japan would have to strengthen its fleet protection. In the case of stealth assets like the F-35
that are hard to detect and intercept in the air, China has an incentive to strike early in a crisis.
This is because detection and neutralization have a much higher probability of success while
such assets are on the ship or base.
Presence operations under the guise of training by Izumo-class destroyers have already been
carried out in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and other areas since 2017, and they in
themselves are beneficial. However, if actual warfighting is not assumed anyway, it is
sufficient to continue the presence operations with the vessels already possessed. Therefore, it
is questionable whether it is a priority to fund the refurbishment cost for the operation of the
F-35B.17
In the second scenario, which assumes the defense of islands in the southwest, it is easy to
imagine the difficulty of securing air superiority due to the shortage of fighter bases. In fact, if
the Naha base in Okinawa becomes unusable due to a series of missile attacks, Air Self-Defense
Force fighter squadrons will be forced to operate from Tsuiki Airbase in Fukuoka and
Nyutabaru Airbase in Miyazaki, which are more than 800 km west of Okinawa (excluding U.S.
bases), until Naha is restored, and Japan will have no hope of maintaining air superiority on its
own. Therefore, it is reasonable to introduce a certain number of F-35Bs that can take off and
land even from short runways to ensure redundancy in air power.
However, the battle for air superiority envisaged on the southwestern front is likely to be high-
intensity multi-domain combat with hundreds of fighter jets and various missiles, so the more
than a dozen F-35Bs may not be able to secure enough force to substitute for the loss of Naha’s
F-15s and F-35As. Also, even if there is an Izumo-class destroyer for emergency landing, it is
highly likely that it will be a priority target for the PLA. In addition, unlike air bases on the
ground, aircraft carriers are difficult to recover once they are seriously damaged, so if high-
intensity environments are expected, they will have to retreat beyond China’s A2/AD zone. If
that happens, the F-35B, which has a shorter combat radius than the F-35A, may have fewer
operational opportunities.
The third demand coming from the air defense scenario on the Pacific side was mentioned only
briefly in the 2013 NDPG, but the 2018 NDPG emphasized the necessity of the refurbishment
56
of the Izumo-class destroyer.18 In fact, as long as Iwo Jima (called Iwo To in Japan) is not used,
measures to deal with intrusions into Japanese airspace around the Ogasawara Islands must be
taken from places such as Hyakuri Airbase in Ibaraki, and it will take a long time to deal with
them. In recent years, the Pentagon’s annual report has stated that PLAN vessels and H-6
bombers have cooperated with each other to cross the first island chain and activate their
activities in the western Pacific.19 In light of this trend, it is reasonable for Japan to deploy the
Izumo-class destroyer and F-35Bs in the Pacific Ocean to interdict Chinese fighters and
bombers in the early stage of confrontation, before
U.S. forces come to support Japan.
What should be discussed is the effectiveness of countermeasures. What quality and quantity
of threats does Japan have to deal with? In this scenario, unlike presence patrols in peacetime,
what is needed here to deter China is a real warfighting capability that can negate its confidence
and operational objectives. It is said that the number of F-35Bs that can be carried on the
modified Izumo-class destroyer is about 8 to 10, but with only 8 to 10 F-35Bs, is it possible to
carry out an effective air interdiction against a Chinese bomber squadron that has breached the
southwestern defense line? In fact, it is natural to think that these bombers are escorted by long-
range fighter bombers such as the J-16 and fifth-generation fighters such as the J-20 and J-31,
and it may not be straightforward for the F-35B, which is inferior to the F-35A in weapons
payload and dogfight capability. In addition, unlike U.S. aircraft carriers, the Izumo-class
destroyer without catapults is not able to take off and land carrier-based early warning and
control aircraft such as the E-2D and electronic support, which are the cornerstones of
defensive counter-air operations.
Furthermore, in a scenario such as the defense of Taiwan in which the situations described in
(2) and (3) occur simultaneously, there is a strong possibility that operational foundations for
the takeoff and landing of fighter aircraft will be required at the southwestern front first, and
therefore there may not be room for the deployment of F-35Bs (with Aegis destroyers for
escort) on the Pacific side.
Thus, of the scenarios discussed, the situations in which these Izumo-class destroyers and the
F-35B can operate effectively will be limited to presence operations from peacetime to gray
zone. In other words, it seems to be the same ground as China’s current concept for operating
its aircraft carriers. The concept of using the same aircraft carrier to compete with China’s
aircraft carrier presence is totally different from the concept of “competitive strategy” or “cost-
imposing strategy” in which one’s own camp chooses a domain that is advantageous and
promotes competition. The only time it is possible to compete head-on is if both sides have a
competitive edge in the same domain.
If that is the case, rather than competing head-on, Japan should place importance on imposing
costs on other countries in the domains in which Japan has an advantage, such as anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) based on a clear understanding of Japan-U.S. cooperation, and
denial strategies using ground-based long-range missiles deployed on the southwestern island
chain. Originally, the Izumo class played an important role as command platforms for ASW
helicopters. At first glance, it may seem convenient to add the landing and takeoff capability
of the F-35B for multi-purpose operation. The multi-purpose equipment, such as fighter jets
and ASW helicopters, which can be replaced by modules, can be used for various missions
within a certain period of time. However, unlike the SM-6 which can switch between anti-ship
and anti-aircraft modes immediately before launch, Izumo cannot be used for multiple purposes
in individual combat situations. More versatile use of assets leads to more complicated
operation plans, more time needed for training personnel, and less efficiency.
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Masashi Murano
Policy Recommendations:
First and foremost, the most desirable aspect of Japan’s defense policy is for the government
to secure the necessary defense budget.
However, the growth rate of Japan’s defense-related expenditures has only been about 0.8–1.4
percent annually for the past six years. To address this situation, in August 2019, the Ministry
of Defense requested an increase of 6.3 percent in its FY2020 defense budget from the previous
year. Unfortunately, the approved budget for FY2020 increased by only 1.2 percent from the
previous year.20
This trend is not appropriate, but given budgetary constraints, it is increasingly important to
make efficient defense investments.
1. To avoid cost-imposed strategy and to shift to cost-imposing strategy

What Japan needs today is nothing but a defense strategy in the era of “competition” in
light of its inferiority to China. The demands of large aircraft carriers and similar large
vessels such as the U.S.’s amphibious assault ships could prove counter-productive to
sustainable defense strategy and portfolios in other important areas. If Japan gets stuck
in the “cost-imposed strategy” where it should have a “cost-imposing strategy against
China,” it will be difficult to change that direction after 2030. It will be difficult to
cancel the Izumo refurbishment program already underway. However, Japan should
avoid acquiring larger vessels.
2. To maintain superiority in an underwater domain

Compared to other domains, the underwater domain is an area of relative advantage for
the U.S.-Japan alliance, and low-visibility underwater assets can also operate in A2/AD
environments. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear, the U.S.’s nuclear
triad is mainly focused on submarine-based systems including low-yield submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and new submarine-launched cruise missiles.21 In order to
maximize an underwater-based deterrent effect, Japan’s ASW units should support the
U.S.’s submarine forces in the form of embedded nuclear deterrence operations by U.S.
submarines.
3. Further enhancement of standoff capability

A wider range of solutions should be discussed to ensure maritime and air superiority.
To achieve these goals, it is necessary to consider Japan and the U.S.’s A2/ AD
capabilities, in which even if it is difficult to secure superiority, the opponent cannot
gain superiority either. In this regard, it is important that the SDF has decided to acquire
standoff weapons such as Joint Strike Missiles and Joint Air- to-Surface Standoff
Missiles.
Frequent rotation of fighters to Iwo Jima should also be considered in order to control
the large maritime area and choke points. In the past, Field Carrier Landing Practice for
U.S. Navy carrier-based fighters was conducted on Iwo Jima, but as these drills will be
conducted on Mageshima, a remote island located south of Kyushu, in the future, Iwo
Jima will have more flexible operational values.
4. Acquisition of long-range strike option to fixed targets

For Japan’s deterrence strategy, it is important to upgrade missile defense capabilities
in stages as before. But unless a revolutionary solution like a directional energy weapon
58
is put to practical use, the cost of being a defender will continue to rise. Therefore,
Japan cannot continue to invest in missile defense–related assets without limit.
Cost efficiency is an important factor when Japan is trying to acquire an offensive
system as well as a defensive weapon. For example, attacking time-sensitive targets
such as ballistic missile mobile launchers requires an integrated strike package such as
advanced dynamic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, multi-role fighters,
precision-guided munitions, and escort jammers for electronic protection. It would not
be practical for the SDF to build this quickly.
When considering the appropriate mix of offensive and defensive capabilities within
limited resources, Japan needs to narrow down its operational concept and target sets.
Japan’s defense posture can remain strategically on the defensive just because it has a
long-range missile. But tactically, having the option to go on the offensive will
complicate the opponent’s calculations. To deter China’s aggression, Japan and the U.S.
should plan a mix of cruise and ballistic missiles that target China’s offensive counter-
air capabilities. These might include ground-launched cruise missiles deployed in the
southwestern islands, long-range ballistic missiles that offset the weaknesses of cruise
missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles deployed around the southwestern islands, as
well as intermediate-range ballistic missiles deployed outside of China’s A2/AD zone,
such as on Iwo Jima or Guam. Therefore, in the post-INF world, it would be possible
for Japan to have conventional medium-range and the United States to have
intermediate-range ballistic missiles with longer ranges.22
5. To establish a U.S.-Japan common operational picture and a joint targeting cycle

If Japan hosts U.S. missiles or if Japan possesses long-range missiles, China will
inevitably be wary of them. Japan must play an active role in developing an operational
plan on the use of various missiles, perhaps through the ongoing Japan-
U.S. joint missile-defense taskforce. Additionally, this will reduce political risks on the
SDF’s side.23
6. Establishment of NDPG Review Commission

In Japan, the process of reviewing policies that have already been formulated is hardly
functioning. In formulating the 2018 NDPG, a panel of experts was held, but it is not
enough to exchange opinions and hear them in advance. In order to ensure the
rationality and transparency of the portfolio determined in the NDPG, it is necessary to
consider, as in the case of the National Defense Strategy Commission, providing
security clearances to experts outside the government and retired SDF officers, and then
publicly providing opportunities for them to objectively and ex post facto review
government policies and point out issues.
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Masashi Murano
Endnotes
1. U.S. Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America: Sustaining the American Military’s Competitive Edge.
Washington, D.C.: 2018. https://dod.defense.gov/Por- tals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
beyond. Tokyo, 2018.
3. Christensen, Thomas J. “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in
East Asia.” Inter- national Security, Vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999). In the case of Japan,
see: “Anpo hōan no tekkai wo motomeru gakushara no seimei zenbun” 安保法案の撤
回を求める学者らの声明全文 [Full statement of scholars calling for withdrawal of
security bill]. Asahi Shinbun. June 24, 2015. https://www.asahi.com/articles/
ASH6S65LWH6SUTIL04B.html.
4. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton
University Press, 1978.
5. Ministry of Defense of Japan. Defense Programs and Budget of Japan - Overview of
FY2020 Budget Request. December 2019. 3.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_budget/pdf/191112c.pdf.
6. Hille, Kathrin. “Beijing boosts military budget by 7.5%.” Financial Times. March 4,
2019. https://www. ft.com/content/5956db00-3e28-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece.
7. Grady, John. “China’s Coast Guard Enforcing Its Blue Water Territorial Expansion.”
USNI News. No- vember 19, 2019.
8. White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. December
2017. 3.
9. Schoff, James L. and Sugio Takahashi. Strengthening U.S.-Japan Alliance Deterrence.
Asia Strategy Initia- tive Policy Memorandum #1, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
January 2018. https://www.spf.org/_jpus-j_me-
dia/investigation/pdf/doc_spf_asi_memorandam001.pdf.
10. Mahnken, Thomas G. Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century. Stanford, Stanford
University Press: 2012.
11. Ministry of Defense of Japan. Defense of Japan 2019. 200.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ pdf/2019/DOJ2019_2-1-2.pdf.
12. Ibid., 198.
13. Takahashi, Sugio. “Japan: New Development of National Security Policy.” National
Institute for Defense Studies. East Asian Strategic Review 2014 (May 2014).
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east- asian/pdf/2014/east-
asian_e2014_01.pdf. This method is the Japanese version of capability-based planning.
beyond.
15. Ministry of Defense of Japan. Defense of Japan 2014. Tokyo, 2014.
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_pa- per/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_2-4-3_web_1031.pdf.
145.
16. Ministry of Defense of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and
beyond. 21.
17. According to the budget request for FY2020, MOD will invest ￥3.1 billion
(approximately $28.3 million) to refurbish one Izumo-class destroyer. However, this is
an initial cost for the thermal coating of the flight deck and so on and does not include
60
additional ammunition and fuel storage, procurement of the F-35Bs, and operator
training.
18. The description in the 2013 NDPG is: “In addition, the SDF will also examine the
desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.” Ministry of Defense of
Japan. National Defense Program Guide-lines for FY2014 and beyond. December 17,
2013.https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.
19. U.S. Department of Defense. Special Topic: Overwater Bomber Operations in Annual
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2018. 2018. 118–120.
20. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Wa ga kuni no bōei to yosan” 我が国の防衛と予算
[Our country’s defense and budget]. December 2019. 4.
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/yosan/yosan_gaiyo/2020/yosan_191220.pdf.
21. Murano, Masashi. “The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and Its Strategic Implications in
the Asia-Pacific Region.” In Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy (eds.), Balancing
Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarma- ment: Views from the Next Generation.
Stimson Center. March 2018. https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/ files/file-
attachments/Nuclear-NextGen-FINAL-WEB3.pdf. 69.
22. See further analysis: Murano, Masashi. “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Post-INF World:
Building an Effective Deterrent in the Western Pacific.” Nippon.com. December 18,
2019. https://www.nippon.com/en/ in-depth/d00526/the-japan-us-alliance-in-a-post-
inf-world-building-an-effective-deterrent-in-the-western-p.html.
23. Ibid.
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Masashi Murano
62
Final Thoughts
YUKI TATSUMI
Each chapter in this volume has focused on the key challenges for Japan’s defense policy that
were identified in the December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Some
authors tackled new areas such as cyberspace, outer space, and the modality of Japan’s
deterrence posture in an era of strategic competition. Others examined challenges of an
enduring nature, namely how Japan will play a proactive role in building a stable regional order
in the Indo-Pacific and how Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) might cope with the
irreversible trend of aging and population decline. While these chapters discussed diverse
topics, there are some common themes among them.
First is the importance that Japan places on enhancing security partnerships beyond the United
States, its only treaty ally. As Teraoka argues in Chapter 1, Japan’s own security and its future
have been indivisibly linked with the strategic alignment choices Tokyo has made, dating as
far back as its alliances and partnerships in the early 20th century. In the contemporary context
in which Japan must continue to grapple with the ascendance of its neighbor China as the
United States’ new strategic competitor, she submits that expanding Japan’s security
partnership with other like-minded countries while still anchoring its security policy in its
bilateral alliance with the United States is critical to ensure Japan plays a meaningful role as a
“stable builder of force” in the Indo-Pacific region.
Of course, the importance of alliances and partnerships for Japan is not limited to its regional
strategic environment. In Chapters 2 and 3, Kawaguchi and Taro Sato both emphasize the
importance of maintaining cyberspace and outer space—two key emerging areas that are
rapidly gaining significance—as liberal (free) and rules-based domains. They both also
emphasize the importance of Japan leveraging its partnership with the United States and other
like-minded countries to enhance norms in these domains, making their case of why
multilateral cooperation and bilateral U.S.-Japan cooperation are mutually reinforcing and
critical to achieve Tokyo’s goal.
Furthermore, all the chapters squarely point out the vulnerabilities in Japan’s defense capability
in some of these areas due to limitations—legal, political, economic, or social—that have been
imposed on the SDF. Some of these limitations are more tangible than others. For example, as
Kawaguchi elaborates in Chapter 2, cyberspace is the primary example of how the SDF is
limited in what it can do for the nation’s cybersecurity. Due to both the constitutional
restrictions on the government's ability for surveillance and a legal framework that places non–
Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF cybersecurity outside of the SDF’s jurisdiction, Kawaguchi
points out that the SDF largely depends on the MOD’s ability to coordinate and exchange
information with other government and non-government entities to enhance its ability to
cooperate with non-MOD entities in defending the nation’s cybersecurity. Similarly, in Chapter
4, while he argues that Japan should adjust its posture based on current and anticipated threats
rather than what is permissible in the existing legal framework, some of Murano’s policy
recommendations, such as the establishment of a joint U.S.-Japan taskforce on targeting, will
likely invite intense political debate, which often stymies substantive exchanges and quickly
descends into “what is constitutional” versus “what is unconstitutional.”
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Yuki Tatsumi
Other challenges identified in this volume are based on longer-term trends. In Chapter 1, for
instance, Teraoka refers to Japan’s “declining material capacity” which limits Japan’s ability
to respond to the multi-faceted challenges that China presents for Japan’s future. Similarly,
Yoshimitsu Sato took on the challenge that Japan’s demographic trendline—an aging and
declining population—presents to the future of the SDF.
Finally, all the chapters suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, the necessity of “all-Japan”
efforts in addressing these challenges. In other words, the challenges that are identified in the
2018 NDPG cannot be solved by the MOD alone. Rather, it requires a “whole-of-government”
approach for Japan to fully achieve its policy objectives in these areas. The only exception is
cyber because, as Kawaguchi lays out in Chapter 2, not only a “whole-of-government”
approach but also “government-industry partnership” will be critical for Japan to enhance its
capability in cyberspace, making the nation resilient to incoming cyber threats.
In addition, there are outstanding challenges that are difficult to solve, but nonetheless critical.
First and foremost, regardless of the soundness of policy goals, whether enough fiscal resources
can be allocated remains a critical challenge. Indeed, while the continuous increase of Japan’s
annual defense budget under the Abe government has been encouraging, the current pace of
increase is too incremental to match the pace at which resources will become necessary. Given
the long-term trend under which a greater percentage of Japan’s annual national budget will
have to be allocated for social security as Japan’s aging progresses, it will be more difficult to
secure a defense budget able to fully supply what is needed to defend Japan.
Furthermore, as all the chapters in this volume reflect, for the vision laid out in the 2018 NDPG
to be fully materialized, it requires broad support both inside and outside Japanese government.
In the government, it requires not only the MOD/SDF but also officials in the other agencies
to support the new initiatives, especially the increase in the defense budget that would be
required. In the Diet, the support for the overall policy direction established in the 2018 NDPG
needs to be sustained beyond Prime Minister Abe’s tenure, which will end in 2021. Should the
specific policy objectives under the NDPG need revision because of, for example, considerable
changes in the security environment that Japan faces, such debates should be encouraged,
particularly among the Diet members. But these debates need to be substantive and meaningful,
rather than stalling on nitpicking arguments over the legality and constitutionality of policy
goals or acquisition programs. Avoiding a sincere discussion of Japan’s defense needs would
not only be utterly unproductive but also would hobble necessary steps to enhance Japan’s
defense capability.
Finally, any policy document is useful only to the extent that it aligns with the reality of today
as well as the anticipated reality of tomorrow. While it seems unlikely that the current trends
in the geostrategic environment that undergird the 2018 NDPG will change in the short-term,
the Japanese government should not shy away from conducting a rigorous review of these
policy documents, including the 2013 National Security Strategy, regularly. Though China’s
increasing assertiveness was observed long before Abe returned to power in 2012, Japan went
through a “lost decade” of defense spending decline during that time. Tokyo’s inability to
adjust its spending policy cost Japan an important opportunity to begin modernization of the
SDF before China earnestly began its own investment in some of the same technologies,
forcing Japan to play a belated game of catch-up. Japan should not make the same mistake
again.
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Yuki Tatsumi
About the Experts

AYUMI TERAOKA is a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at Princeton
University and a graduate fellow at Princeton’s Center for International
Security Studies. Her research focuses on the changing U.S. alliance system
and the evolution of threat perceptions among Asian countries. Prior to
enrolling at Princeton, she worked as a research associate for the Japan Studies
program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and for the Japan Chair
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She holds a master’s degree in Asian
Studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. in Law from Keio University. Her writing has
appeared in CFR’s Asia Unbound, The Diplomat, Global Observatory, and Georgetown
Journal of Asian Affairs.
TAKAHISA KAWAGUCHI is a Senior Fellow at Tokio Marine &

Nichido Risk Consulting Co., Ltd. His areas of interest are the impact of the
information revolution on international relations, emerging technologies,
and foreign election interference in cyberspace. He has been a research
member of the 21st Century Public Policy Institute at the Japan Business
Federation (Nippon Keidanren) since 2018 and a co-researcher at the Center
for Global Security at the National Defense Academy in Japan since 2017.
He authored “Cyber War” in Contemporary Geopolitics in Japan, by the Rebuild Japan
Initiative Foundation, eds., (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha Inc, 2017, in Japanese), and
Contemporary Election Interference and Our Preparedness in Japan: The Impact of Cyber
Attacks and Influence Operations on Social Network (with Motohiro Tsuchiya, Tokyo: Tokio
Marine & Nichido Risk Consulting, 2019, in Japanese). He earned his M.A. in media and
governance from the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University.
MASASHI MURANO is a fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is responsible

for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, nuclear/conventional deterrence-related
analysis, and for the past nine years, has been involved in research, analysis,
and facilitation of numerous classified products related to strategic
intelligence assessment and policy planning for the Government of Japan.
TARO SATO (Lt. Col., JASDF) is a Nonresident Fellow at Stimson with

the East Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, science
and technology policy, and space security. With the Japan Air Self-Defense
Force, he served over ten years as an F-15 pilot stationed at Okinawa and
conducted Quick Reaction Alert missions over the East China Sea. He also
contributed to organizing and operating the Joint Task Force Ballistic
Missile Defense during the 2016 North Korean missile scare. Sato earned
his commission upon graduation as a Distinguished Graduate with a B.A. in international
relations from the National Defense Academy in 2002. He holds an M.A. in Military
Operational Art and Science from Air Command and Staff College, Air University, U.S. Air
Force. He completed the Maritime Command and Staff Course at the Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Force and the MOD Executive Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. He is currently an M.A. candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University.
66
YOSHIMITSU SATO (LCDR, JMSDF) is a Nonresident Fellow at
Stimson with the East Asia Program, on assignment from the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force. He is a Surface Warfare Officer who has
engaged in ballistic missile defense patrol missions, anti-piracy maritime
escort operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and
warning and surveillance activity in the East China Sea. Previously, he
served as a Communication and Intelligence Officer at Escort Flotilla Two Headquarters based
at Sasebo, Nagasaki, and oversaw electronic warfare and information operations. Sato has 11
years of experience coordinating with foreign militaries and conducting bilateral and
multilateral navigational and combat exercises. Sato earned his B.A. in Science and
Engineering from the National Defense Academy in Kanagawa, Japan, and holds an M.A. in
International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
YUKI TATSUMI is the Director of the Japan Program and Co-Director of

the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Previously, she was a Research
Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Special Assistant for Political Affairs at the Embassy of Japan in
Washington. She is the author of numerous books, monographs, and articles
on the Japanese defense establishment, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and security
dynamics and challenges in Northeast Asia. In September 2006, she testified
before the House Committee on International Relations, and she is a recipient of the 2009
Yasuhiro Nakasone Incentive Award. In 2012, she was awarded the Letter of Appreciation
from the Ministry of National Policy of Japan for her contribution to advancing mutual
understanding between the United States and Japan. A native of Tokyo, she holds a B.A. in
liberal arts from the International Christian University in Tokyo, Japan, and an M.A. in
international economics and Asian studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies.
PAMELA KENNEDY is a Research Analyst with the East Asia Program

at Stimson. Her research interests include Northeast Asian international
relations, U.S. alliances in Asia, and the role of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific
region. She holds an M.A. in International Relations and International
Economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies and a B.A. summa cum laude in Government and East
Asian Studies from the College of William and Mary. Prior to joining
Stimson, she interned with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Japan Chair and
the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies. She previously worked at the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco.
67
About Views from the Next Generation
Views from the Next Generation is a series of policy papers by emerging experts on the most
pressing security challenges facing Japan and the Indo-Pacific region. Published annually since
2014 by the Stimson Center’s Japan Program with support from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the series raises awareness in the U.S. of issues ranging from peacekeeping to nuclear
weapons – all from the perspective of the next generation of scholars and researchers – through
public seminars and free distribution of the report. With each group of authors who visit
Washington, D.C. for the report launch, ties between the American and Japanese security
policy communities deepen.
Past volumes of Views from the Next Generation:

 International Disaster Response: Rebuilding the Quad? (2019)
 Balancing Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament (2018)
 Peacebuilding and Japan (2017)
 Japan as a Peace Enabler (2016)
 Japan’s Global Diplomacy (2015)
 Japan’s Foreign Policy Challenges in East Asia (2014)
About Stimson
The Stimson Center is a nonpartisan policy research center working to solve the world’s
greatest threats to security and prosperity. Think of a modern global challenge: refugee flows,
arms trafficking, terrorism. These threats cannot be resolved by a single government,
individual, or business. Stimson’s award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address
borderless threats through collective action. Our formula is simple: we gather the brightest
people to think beyond soundbites, create solutions, and make those solutions reality. We
follow the credo of one of history’s leading statesmen, Henry L. Stimson, in taking “pragmatic
steps toward ideal objectives.” We are practical in our approach and independent in our
analysis. Our innovative ideas change the world.
About the Japan Program

The Japan Program provides a dynamic platform for academics and policymakers to engage in
discussion and analysis on the security issues relevant to Japan and its alliance with the United
States. Led by Yuki Tatsumi, the program’s researchers explore ways to proactively respond
to challenges in Japan’s security environment through strengthening security cooperation with
the U.S. and other partners worldwide. Through workshops, seminars, and research reports, the
Japan Program identifies policy areas in which the U.S. and Japan can pursue greater
collaboration and assesses how Japan can successfully overcome shortfalls in the legal and
institutional frameworks of its security policy.
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KEY CHALLENGES

In Japan’s Defense Policy

EDITEDD BY YUKI TATSUMI & PAMELA KENNEDY

Visit www.stimson.org for more information about Stimson.

In “Japan’s Defense Policy in Cyberspace,” Takahisa Kawaguchi (Senior Fellow, Tokio

In “The Defense of Japan in a Hyper-Aging Society,” a short commentary article, Yoshimitsu

military assets and communication channels, Sato emphasizes a three-pronged approach to an

Finally, in “The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-Term Strategic Competition,” Masashi

Japan as a Stable Builder of Force in the

1. Deter Chinese provocations, in particular the use of force to settle international

3. Enhance Japan’s position on the international stage in order to maintain leverage

Service Partner Country

Impact of U.S. Policy

Table B. Examples of Japan’s Multilateral Exercises with Key Partners21

2. U.S. mixed messages and the burden-sharing debate

The China gap and Taiwan gap?

polarized issue in various liberal democratic capitals. Such a domestic political

6. Changing the pattern of the burden-sharing debate

7. Squarely face Taiwan’s future in Indo-Pacific strategy

8. Bolster channels of dialogue with Beijing to prevent misperceptions at all times

Japan’s Defense Policy in Cyberspace

1. Establish and Maintain a Rules-Based, Liberal, and Open Order in Cyberspace

2. Deter Significant Cyberattacks, Especially When Equivalent to "Armed Attacks”:

Vast “Gray-zone” Situations

Measures to be taken in response to the most devastating cyberattacks or those equivalent to

Challenges for Achieving Policy Objectives

Limited Missions and Roles of the SDF

Constitutional Restrictions on Surveillance Capabilities: Article 21

Impact of U.S. Policy

In cybersecurity, distinguishing between an emergency and ordinary times is challenging. For

2. Development of defensive capabilities against cyberattack

Expanded options for sanctions and retaliation: If Japan receives a cyberattack

3. Coordinated practices to establish a norm

Generally speaking, however, norms are established based on past performance. It is

6. Ministry of Defense of Japan.

Japan’s Space Security Policy: Japan’s Role

Background and Challenges:

Impact on Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific Region:

Development and Challenges of Japan’s Space Security Policy

1. Development of Japan’s space security policy

2. Challenges of Japan’s space security policy

3. Strengthening cooperation with likeminded space-developed countries

4. Strengthening cooperation through outer space with countries in the Indo-Pacific

Bilateral Approach (U.S.-Japan cooperation)

5. Strengthening cooperation in fundamental military functions

6. Establishing joint operating capabilities in space from peacetime to contingency

7. Advancing cooperation in space exploration with a view to long-term security

8. Strengthening cooperation among industrial, academic, and governmental sectors

9. Strengthening whole-of-government efforts

10. Cultivating “space professionals”

The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-

Impact of U.S. Policy

1. To avoid cost-imposed strategy and to shift to cost-imposing strategy

2. To maintain superiority in an underwater domain

3. Further enhancement of standoff capability

4. Acquisition of long-range strike option to fixed targets

5. To establish a U.S.-Japan common operational picture and a joint targeting cycle

6. Establishment of NDPG Review Commission

About the Experts