1 Logistics integration strategies in container shipping: a multiple

2 case-study on Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM

3
4 Hubert Paridaens1 and Theo Notteboom2*
5
6
7 Full reference: Paridaens, H., Notteboom, T., 2022, Logistics integration strategies in
8 container shipping: a multiple case-study on Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM, Research in
9 Transportation Business & Management, 45 (part C), December 2022
10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2022.100868
11
12 Abstract
13
14 Shipping lines have recently been reshaping their operations to include more logistics integration, which
15 could indicate a change in business strategy. This paper analyses recent developments in the strategic
16 paths of Maersk Line, CMA CGM and MSC in the context of logistics integration and presents empirical
17 findings on their strategic positions and associated drivers. By applying a conceptual framework
18 highlighting and exploring various key strategic, tactical, and operational issues, the study provides an
19 in-depth overview of logistics integration in liner shipping. First, we perform a literature review to figure
20 out how the literature on logistics integration has changed over time in response to economic cycles
21 and corporate interests. Second, we present a conceptual research framework exploring the ways in
22 which logistics integration takes place among Maersk Line, CMA CGM and MSC. Third, we empirically
23 demonstrate that different facets, building blocks and attributes shape the strategic path of these three
24 shipping lines. A summary reading grid facilitates the concluding analysis of logistics integration
25 developments at work within the three container carriers. The multi-case study provides empirical
26 findings on intra- and inter-carrier differences in the temporal paths of logistics integration, the spatial
27 coverage when implementing integration initiatives and the implementation methods.
28
29 Keywords
30 Corporate strategy, intermodal, liner shipping, logistics, supply chain integration, vertical integration

31
32 1. Introduction

33 Containerization has had a significant impact on the maritime shipping industry’s organization
34 as well as the relationships among the players of the maritime supply chain (MarSC) (Soppé et al., 2009).
35 Container shipping has changed the scale and scope of global freight distribution, making the transition
36 from a transactional to a relational market easier (Frémont, 2010). The MarSC has traditionally been
37 considered as a set of distinct but well-defined operations in which each member is accountable for a
38 specific aspect of the process (Lam and Van De Voorde, 2011). However, globalization and outsourcing
39 opened new windows of opportunities for market players (Notteboom, 2006). Numerous intermediate
40 processes in the MarSC have been eliminated because of increased functional integration, allowing

1Faculty of Sciences, Antwerp Maritime Academy, 2030 Antwerp, Belgium; hubert.paridaens@hzs.be

2Faculty of Sciences, Antwerp Maritime Academy, 2030 Antwerp, Belgium; Maritime Institute, Faculty of Law and
Criminology, Ghent University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; and, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Antwerp, 2000
Antwerp, Belgium; theo.notteboom@ugent.be
* Correspondence: theo.notteboom@ugent.be
41 global logistics integrators to manage many aspects of the MarSC (Rodrigue, 2006). A number of
42 shipping lines (SLs) have responded by providing new value-added services in an integrated package,
43 through integration of logistics activities (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2017). They saw the promise of
44 creating value along the entire end-to-end MarSC journey, promoting the container not as individual
45 components but as a single offering (JOC, 2021)3, thereby presenting themselves on the market as
46 integrated logistics service providers (Leggate et al., 2004).
47 In recent years, many SLs seem to have developed a much greater interest and involvement in other
48 segments of the MarSC, especially in logistics. SLs have been redesigning the scope of their activities
49 towards more logistics integration which may imply a shift in corporate strategy (Notteboom, 2021;
50 Parola et al., 2015). Logistics integration (LI), also termed vertical integration or freight integration,
51 pushes SLs to deploy global networks by relying on mergers and acquisitions, although there are variants
52 in the way this process has taken place among companies and among regions. SLs can gain control over
53 a major section of the MarSC and exert growing control as global logistics service providers by managing
54 inland transportation, offering door-to-door delivery, and providing value-added logistics services (Van
55 Baalen et al., 2008).
56 This paper analyses recent developments in the strategic paths of SLs in the context of LI and presents
57 empirical findings on their strategic positions and associated drivers. The multiple case-study focusing
58 on Maersk Line, CMA CGM and MSC provides empirical findings on intra- and inter-carrier differences
59 in the temporal paths of LI, the spatial coverage when rolling out LI initiatives and the implementation
60 means. We examine both the dependency of selected SLs on LI as well as their overall long-term
61 commitment. By following a multiple case-study approach grounded on a conceptual research
62 framework, the study provides answers to three research questions related to the corporate strategy
63 of the three above mentioned SLs in light of LI:

64 RQ1. To what extent are the chosen SLs strategically committed to and dependent on LI?

65 RQ2. How do SLs adopt the LI implementation design and transformation planning?

66 RQ3. What enablers and impediments are guiding LI decision-making by SLs?

67 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will conduct a literature review to analyze how the
68 extent literature on LI has evolved with economic cycles and corporate priorities of SLs. Section 3
69 presents a conceptual research framework to answer the stated research questions by exploring the
70 ways in which the LI process takes place among the selected SLs of our case study. In the next sections
71 (4 to 11), we will empirically demonstrate that different facets, building blocks and attributes shape the
72 strategic path of SLs towards becoming global logistics integrators. Finally, we will provide a summary
73 reading grid to facilitate the concluding analysis of LI developments at work within the three container
74 carriers.
75 2. Literature review
76 Integration strategy is a frequently examined topic in the MarSC literature. However, the academic
77 interest for this subject seems to be strongly dependent on the market conditions which favor or not
78 such integration moves. The following literature review makes a distinction between three periods with
79 their related contextual high-level integration strategy. To do so, we will first examine how SLs have
80 considered these high-level strategic options in the past and how these vary from scale, scope, and
81 intent (see periods 1 and 2 mentioned below). Then the focus will be directed on the option of interest
82 (see period 3) by explaining what happened over the last five years in containerized transport chains.

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 83 • (1) the period following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its related weak integration
84 strategy. This period was characterized by fleet overcapacity, low freight rates, poor carrier
85 profitability and corporate reorganizations aimed at carrier survival;
86 Context: the 2008-2009 financial crisis caused a severe deterioration in the financial health of liner
87 shipping companies. Following the global financial crisis, the freight rates collapsed and the industry’s
88 troubles were further aggravated by an oversupply of ships (Ha and Seo, 2017). As a result, managerial
89 attention focused on asset divestment (Pawlik et al., 2011), vessel deployment, network configuration,
90 route, and service restructuring (Brooks et al., 2014) and economies of scale by deploying bigger ships
91 to transport cargos.
92 High-level strategy: given the industry’s weak financial position, carriers primarily focused on the survival
93 of their core business of container liner activities. Integration strategies in general were seen as a non-
94 essential draining of funds away from the core business (Frémont, 2009; Notteboom et al., 2010).
95 • (2) the period 2014-2017 and its related cooperative integration. This period was characterized
96 by a horizontal integration wave and various cooperation schemes in liner shipping against a
97 backdrop of continued poor market conditions;
98
99 Context: during the period 2014-2017, SLs were forming strategic alliances to extend service coverage
100 and better compete with powerful competitors (Tran, 2022). Integration moves could also take the form
101 of a SL acquiring another SL (Göçer et al., 2019). The academic research examining this period
102 investigated the consolidation at work and the potential impact of alliances on the industry’s prospects,
103 especially on terminal and port authorities (e.g., El Kalla et al., 2017; Notteboom et al., 2017; Yap and
104 Zahraei, 2018; for a complete overview, see Ghorbani et al., 2022).
105 High-level strategy: SLs showed inclination for horizontal integration via strategic alliances and mergers
106 and acquisitions (M&As) of global and regional carriers (Crotti et al., 2019; Notteboom, 2021) to tap into
107 specific geographic footprints or complementary segments. By reaching a more optimal size (Álvarez-
108 SanJaime et al., 2013), SLs can chase economies of scale and exercise overall cost control through
109 horizontal integration.
110
111 The contemporary period is totally singular. The recent exceptional market conditions as well as the
112 repeated large-scale logistics moves in the market provide evidence that the liner industry is at a pivotal
113 moment.

114 • (3) the ongoing period (2017-now) and its related vertical integration. This period is
115 characterized by major disruptions such as trade disputes, the COVID-19 pandemic, eventually
116 emanating in a high market volatility, a global supply chain crisis and record profitability for SLs.
117
118 Context: since the summer of 2020, container freight rates have increased significantly to reach record-
119 high levels in late 2021, and with it also record operating margins of SLs (Notteboom et al. 2021). The
120 underlying causes of this surge include stronger demand than expected coupled with capacity
121 constraints by carriers and significant operation challenges such as bottlenecks, port congestion,
122 pandemic-related delays in intermodal connections, and severe shortage of containers, logistics and
123 port staff (Kent and Haralambides, 2022; Notteboom and Pallis, 2021; UNCTAD/RMT/2021).
124 High-level strategy: LI has been seen as a strategic path to make SLs more resilient to the disturbances
125 of the sea-leg segment. The recent blockage of the Suez Canal has shown how SLs have mitigated the
126 global MarSC disruption by offering alternative modes of transport such as air freight. Several container
127 lines use their regained financial strength to intensify their focus on LI (Notteboom et al. 2021).
128
129 Although integration strategy in general has gained much prominence and research attention in the
130 past 15 years, vertical integration has specifically received limited exposure so far. In the aftermath of
131 2008-2009, the focus has been very much on other strategic priorities such as company survival. During
132 the period 2014-2017, strong horizontal integration moves overshadowed the few attempts to vertically
133 integrate. At that time, the dominant business strategy became saving costs, chasing economies of scale
134 via larger ships and industry consolidation through an increase of market share (ITF, 2022). Logically,
135 this dominant strategy has led to a ‘commoditization’ of the container liner business. Commoditization
136 occurs as carriers offer increasingly homogenous liner shipping services to price-sensitive customers
137 who incur relatively low costs in changing suppliers (Maloni et al., 2016; Reimann et al., 2010). Because
138 of that, the advantages of horizontal integration (i.e., cost control) have gradually been exhausted while
139 these of vertical integration (i.e., differentiation) are becoming more and more prominent. SLs have
140 thus progressively thought about alternative business strategies considering the commoditized and
141 consolidated market that they themselves contributed to create. Whereas vertical integration has for a
142 long time been seen as a complementary strategy to support horizontal integration (Cariou, 2008), the
143 strong financial performance of the SLs combined with a higher customer demand for truly integrated
144 MarSC seems to create a new momentum to expand their business towards more LI. However, at the
145 time of writing, the LI developments since late 2020 have only been commented by specialized trade
146 press and occasional reports. As mentioned in one of these reports (ITF, 2022), “[even if] the [LI]
147 ambitions were articulated and operationalized well in advanced of the COVID-19 [and MarSC] crisis,
148 the high profits recorded in 2020 and 2021 provide an even greater impetus for [such an] expansion”.
149 These different contextual elements justify to (re)open and (re)assess the subject of LI in an academic
150 context.
151 This research complements existing literature in several ways. First, even when considering the recent
152 renewed attention of SLs to LI, it remains unclear whether SLs are now more strategically committed to
153 LI than in the past or whether we are witnessing a pendulum circumstances-driven process. Second,
154 there is room to more explicitly analyze if LI is a fundamental strategic path disruption or rather a
155 temporary evolution of an existing corporate strategy. Finally, extant literature provides little
156 understanding on how SLs develop a novel corporate strategy to integrate logistics activities. The above-
157 mentioned extant literature has addressed the issue of integration strategy, but previous studies
158 generally don’t explore the impact of a portfolio restructuring process.
159 3. Methodology and data collection
160 This paper uses a case-study approach following a conceptual stepwise research framework
161 empirically supported by key data.
162 3.1. Research framework
163 The research framework on LI by container SLs is captured by a diamond shape made up of four
164 facets, see fig.1. Each facet is subdivided into two building blocks with their related questions. The
165 dotted black arrows refer to the various questions that are explored in each building block of the facets:
166 • (1) the inheritance facet explores the drivers as well as the corporate endowment via
167 respectively the questions “why?” and “from whence?”;
168 • (2) the architecture facet analyzes the strategies and the tactics via the questions
169 "how?" and "which?";
170 • (3) the spatiotemporal facet studies the temporality and the spatial dimension via the
171 questions “when?” and “where?”;
172 • (4) the operations facet focuses on the products and services as well as the outcomes
173 via the questions “what?” and “how far?”.
174 <Insert figure 1 about here > / color should be used for any figures in print
175 Figure 1: The Strategic ‘Diamond’ Research Framework on LI in Container Shipping
176 As depicted in fig.1 by the unbroken black arrows, the framework provides a multi-faceted approach to
177 answer research question 1 (RQ1) on the SL’s strategic commitment to and dependency on LI, while the
178 green and red arrows refer to the identification of enablers and impediments in LI decision-making by
179 SLs (RQ3). Through the combination of its facets, the framework can also provide essential insights in
180 view of answering research question 2 (RQ2) on the implementation design and transformation
181 planning.
182 The first facet [inheritance] focuses on the drivers that have pushed SLs to consider LI as a valuable
183 functional domain (why?). By mobilizing the notion of corporate endowment (what SLs start with), we
184 illustrate that different starting points have influenced the way LI has taken place among SLs (from
185 whence?). In the second facet [architecture], we first analyze the corporate strategies of the selected
186 SLs by looking at their communication planning and self-presentation to the market (how?). Although
187 Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures (M&A&D) have been extensively used by SLs as a vehicle to pivot
188 their portfolios towards logistics growth and add capabilities rapidly, we study the importance SLs
189 should place when selecting the vertical control forms for their newly acquired logistics firms as these
190 forms might act as a strategic differentiator (which?). In the third facet [spatiotemporal scene], we make
191 a distinction between past and current staging processes towards LI. We provide evidence that in the
192 past SLs had a propensity to rely either on long-term commitment or opportunity grasping. This
193 dichotomy does no longer seem to match the current staging processes. By introducing the notion of
194 “active waiting”, we demonstrate that there is a current convergence that reconciles the two staging
195 approaches (when?). We investigate the geographical embeddedness of LI strategies, and we
196 demonstrate that recent logistics acquisitions are partly shuffling the cards even if these acquisitions
197 are often motivated by their geographical complementarity with the existing SL’s footprint (where?). In
198 the fourth facet [operations], we demonstrate that the concept of “adjacency expansion from the core”
199 is at the heart of SL’s growth strategy. We argue that moves to penetrate segments located far from the
200 core are a sign of a strong strategic commitment towards LI even if it induces managerial constraints
201 due to the weak relatedness with the core business (What?). Finally, we leave this topic deliberately
202 open for further discussion, especially about how far SLs will be able to scale their logistics product into
203 their wider ocean client base. For that purpose, we discuss several impediments and enablers as
204 depicted by red and green arrows in fig. 1 (How far?).
205 3.2. Case study selection and data collection
206 The paper employs a multiple case-study research methodology to achieve a holistic, empirically
207 focused, and in-depth investigation (Stake, 2006; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2014; for a complete overview, see
208 Harrisson et al., 2017). The multiple case design is based on a cross-case analysis to assess LI in a variety
209 of corporate SL’s situations. This approach allows for an overview of the interrelated aspects and
210 complexities of LI strategies among SLs. The methodology captures not only the numerical information
211 on the strategies employed, but also the reasons for employing them and how they are used in relation
212 to other strategies (Zainal, 2007). As highlighted by Yin (1981a), the use of three cases has been found
213 sufficient for a case-based research design.
214 The case study analysis focuses on the LI developments of three selected SLs, namely Maersk, CMA CGM
215 and MSC. The three SLs have been selected for the following reasons:
216 • (1) their position in the top tier of twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) fleet capacity rankings. The
217 presented analysis intends to particularly study the LI maneuvers initiated by the leaders in the
218 field based on their total TEU fleet capacity. Leading firms in an industry generally act as
219 catalyzers and foreshadow global further trends and developments in the industry.
220 • (2) it concerns three European private companies with a strong historical focus on container
221 shipping. The origins of quite a few other top-tier container carriers differ in terms of their
222 ownership status (e.g., Cosco from China is a state-owned company), broader company profile
223 or historical market focus. For example, Japanese carriers traditionally are part of Keiretsu such
224 as Mitsui which are sets of companies with interlocking business relationships and
225 shareholdings. South Korean carriers, such as HMM and bankrupt Hanjin, were controlled by
226 large industrial conglomerates with a focus on a broad range of economic activities and run by
227 an individual or family, also known as Chaebol.
228 • (3) their operation of port terminals via dedicated subsidiaries. According to a process described
229 as the terminalization of MarSC (Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2009; Slack, 2017), port terminals
230 are considered as real gateways to inland logistics. Conforming to the terminology commonly
231 used in this field (see Bichou and Bell, 2017; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012), we decide to limit
232 our research to Terminal Operating Shipping Lines (TOSLs) exclusively, i.e., SLs which operate
233 terminals on a dedicated or common-user basis. Logistics from terminalized cargo flows is of
234 strategic importance for SLs.
235 • (4) their strategic profiling compared to directly competing SLs that don't seem to be interested
236 in LI (yet). In contrast with Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM that are keenly focused on expansion
237 into the logistics sector and that are applying significant investment capital to pursue such
238 expansion through acquisitions, there is currently no explicit indication from ONE, Evergreen or
239 even Hapag-Lloyd of a large investment ramp-up in logistics companies. Hapag-Lloyd,
240 Evergreen, and ONE have not followed competitors' strategic forays into logistics, container
241 terminals, or air freight business (Shipping Watch, 2021). This can be partly explained by the
242 presence of a logistics company in the shareholding of these SLs (e.g., the Kühne family as one
243 of the main shareholders of Hapag-Lloyd while also being active in global 3PL company Kühne
244 & Nagel) or by the fact that these SLs belong to larger conglomerates somewhat already active
245 in the logistics sector (e.g. the Japanese NYK Group as active shareholder of carrier ONE while
246 also having its own logistics division Yusen Logistics).

247 As demonstrated in the literature review, high-level strategies are always embedded in a particular
248 economic context and can be influenced by particular ownership and governance structures. High-level
249 strategies are neither fixed in time nor immutable, as contemporary disruptions affect SLs with varying
250 intensities. While some SLs seem to be opting for a continued focus on the core business, other top tier
251 SLs now also seem to be moving towards more LI. For example, Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM)
252 recently released a new five-year strategy calling for $11.4 billion in investments to lay the foundations
253 for future growth prospects as well as to respond to the major disruptions and challenges of today's
254 ever-changing economic environment (Press release 14/07/2022). In this new strategic roadmap, the
255 South Korean SL (separated from the Hyundai Motor Group conglomerate in 2016) formalizes its
256 intention to invest “in a range of initiatives, including securing core assets such as ships, terminals, [but
257 also] logistics facilities”. In the near future, it is therefore not excluded that other SLs in the top tier may
258 also deserve special academic attention in the context of LI as things are evolving rapidly.

259 The Strategic ‘Diamond’ Research Framework is used to analyze and compare the LI strategies of the
260 three selected SLs. We do not carry out three separate studies of the LI processes at work among the
261 SLs. Rather, we use the case-based inputs to illustrate the different facets of LI processes and to
262 underline the associated mechanisms and related theoretical concepts with ultimate aim to answer the
263 central research questions. In following the case-study approach, we derive data that show corporate
264 model change towards LI, including an extensive and detailed examination of information on the past
265 and current involvement of SLs in the logistics functional domain.
266
267 To feed the case-based analysis and avoid personal and strategic biases, we collected a large amount of
268 primary and secondary sources, including press releases, annual reports, as well as specialized trade
269 news and consulting reports related to the container industry. We also surveyed and reviewed academic
270 publications related to theoretical concepts of LI strategies.
271
272
273 4. WHY? Drivers [inheritance facet]
274 A combination of drivers contributes to corporate commitment to LI. The key drivers examined in
275 this building block include efficiency gains, transaction cost minimization via access to know-how,
276 differentiated positioning, and new market entry barriers. SLs may respond to these drivers differently,
277 based upon their view of the relationship between their core business and their logistics forays along
278 with the combination of drivers they confront. Each SL’s response, ranging from the action-reaction to
279 the first-mover leadership, reflects varying levels of commitment towards LI.
280 The most systematic and long-standing efficiency improvement strategy pursued in the past by the SLs
281 was to acquire shares in, or full ownership of some key terminal facilities. In so doing, SLs secure
282 dedicated terminal capacity and achieve efficiency gains in fleet operations (Haralambides et al., 2002).
283 Terminals also serve as sources of new revenue streams for SLs, offering higher operating margins than
284 container shipping in the period 2009-2019 (Notteboom et al., 2021). Specific vehicles within the
285 corporate groups of the SLs have been established to focus on terminal operations: APM Terminals as
286 a full subsidiary of the Maersk Group; TiL and Terminal Link with MSC and CMA CGM as majority
287 shareholders respectively. However, SLs have new commercial incentives to go beyond this initial
288 strategy focused on terminals. Indeed, end users and multinational corporations now want faster and
289 more predictable delivery, as well as a broader and more sophisticated choice of logistics services. This
290 has raised the need to provide customers with one-stop shipping experiences and the necessity to rely
291 on LI to increase efficiency. Therefore, SLs move towards LI because it results in efficiency gains and
292 provides customers with highly valued service reliability (Begazo Gomez et al., 2018). In this context, LI
293 may help carriers to satisfy shipper’s needs for efficiency and reliability. SLs give more and more
294 consideration to a business scope enlargement strategy towards logistics, by analyzing the logistics
295 segments they are likely to tap into and expanding capabilities in those segments accordingly. As an
296 illustration, exploring the e-commerce sector has been identified as centrally important by some SLs,
297 especially Maersk and CMA CGM. To take advantage of the e-commerce trade potential, SLs need to
298 adapt, harness effective integration for better efficiency gains, and build e-commerce-friendly
299 integrated MarSC solutions (Wan, 2021). Indeed, ever-changing challenges make it critical for SLs to
300 adapt and plan for change to remain a relevant market player. In this respect, SLs are redesigning their
301 corporate strategy to account for these trends, to ensure efficiency gains and to capture market share.
302 As an illustration, Maersk's global integrator strategy aims to reduce costs, increase reliability, improve
303 responsiveness, and forge a better link with customers (Maersk Annual Report, 2018). This strategy
304 seems to have been followed afterwards by CMA CGM with the CEVA Logistics’ takeover in 2019 which
305 serves as a vehicle to explore other segments of the logistics industry and expand its capabilities. To a
306 lesser extent, MSC seems to be moving towards the same strategic intent, although we note that the
307 focus is more on multimodality rather than exploring new logistics forays such as the e-commerce
308 market.
309
310 Another well-recognized benefit of LI is that SLs may create a more cost-efficient organization. Given
311 the asymmetry of information and lack of transparency that characterize the MarSC, the interaction of
312 information management and operational "know-how" may help to lower transaction costs. Integration
313 across the logistics opens new possibilities for innovative business models that take use of data and
314 information gaps and asymmetries that exist in the current logistics set up. A major objective of LI is
315 then to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, transaction costs, the main source of which are the costs
316 involved when separate companies own two segments of the MarSC (Buzzell, 1993). SLs have been
317 steadily acquiring the missing MarSC segments they need to provide full control of customer’s cargo
318 beyond just the ocean leg (JOC, 2021)4. By aligning the incentives of firms operating in different
319 segments of the MarSC, logistics mergers may also reduce the double-marginalization problem, which
320 describes a situation where every firm in the MarSC wants to maximize its profits (Pilsbury et al., 2010).
321 LI allows SLs to control this problem by internalizing the profits made at other levels of the MarSC. Thus,

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322 integrated SLs offer their own logistics services to reduce service-specific transaction costs and to
323 eliminate double markups.
324
325 Offering their own end-to-end service is of strategic importance for SLs as demand for transport and
326 logistics services is heterogeneous. The ocean business is characterized by an increasing level of
327 commoditization of container services leaving little room for differentiation between carriers when only
328 focusing on liner services. LI provides SLs with a path towards focused differentiation combined with a
329 high degree of specialization and increasing market power for the provision of certain services.
330 Integrated SLs want to stimulate demand by offering seamless logistics solution packages with less
331 duplication and more premium services. After spending the second decade of this century making little
332 or no money due to a highly commoditized market, LI puts SLs in a better position to differentiate their
333 offering and scale their logistics portfolio to an even broader customer base. In this sense, SLs are
334 showing a growing interest in omnichannel as a new marketing lexicon used to describe continuity of
335 experience for customers across brands, formats, and devices (Lloyds List, 2021)5. As an illustration,
336 Maersk’s CEO Soren Skou emphasizes that “the omnichannel capabilities would be the foundation for
337 future organic growth” (TradeWinds, 2021)6.
338
339 As far as growth prospects are concerned, one of the main strategies carried by SLs is indeed to create
340 and increase the ‘share of wallet’; in other words, sharing activities by cross-selling the container line
341 and logistics products (Haddad, 2008). As an illustration, the Chairman and Maersk’s CEO have recently
342 stated that “[Maersk] has acquired […] business to super charge logistics growth through cross-selling
343 to our […] ocean customers” (Message from the Chairman and the CEO, 09/02/2022). For CMA CGM,
344 the acquisition of CEVA Logistics was motivated by "cross-selling with CMA CGM and […] increasing
345 share of wallet while diversifying to medium and small size customers” (Press release, 26/11/2018).
346 Established SLs are using integration to increase their share of existing customers' wallets in order to
347 consolidate market share (Pompa et al., 2000). Therefore, LI may reduce the number of players in the
348 field. Established SLs may combine their logistics operations as a way of raising the stakes and
349 discouraging potential new entrants (Buzzell, 1993), thus building further competitive barriers to entry.
350 Because service providing requires sector-specific knowledge, new players may face higher entry
351 requirements. In the long run, LI may thereby benefit incumbents while raising entry barriers for new
352 competitors (Begazo Gomez et al., 2018).
353
354 As a conclusion, SL’s interest in logistics activities is a result of associated drivers. We observe a
355 convergence – fueled and explained by the drivers – which pushes SLs to undertake LI. Although SLs
356 share the same diagnosis over the integration of logistics activities as a valuable functional domain, the
357 process of implementing this strategy direction strongly varies from one SL to another, as will be
358 discussed in the next building block.
359 5. (FROM) WHENCE? Corporate endowment [inheritance facet]
360 Most SL’s strategies are based on what has been done in the past. In this section we show that each
361 SL is embedded in its specific corporate endowment. Thus, the notion of corporate endowment can
362 provide a starting point for explaining the difference over how LI has taken place among SLs. The case
363 of Maersk is used as a starting point for the discussion. In a second step, we extend the discussion to
364 corporate endowments of other SLs, especially by examining how historical legacy comes to weigh
365 heavily on the present. We argue that endowments have affected the way the LI path is viewed by SLs.
366

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367 Maersk was able to accelerate the pace of transformation from a conglomerate with diversified business
368 interests to a global integrator in container logistics, not by forcing the issue, but by leveraging what
369 Hensmans et al. (2013) call “happy accidents” to gain a large platform of support. Unexpected situations
370 or events that lead to transformation are known as happy accidents (Johnson et al., 2012). Since 1962,
371 the Danish company had an energy (oil and gas) division within a diversified conglomerate group. As
372 highlighted by Vazão (2018), a natural hedge was formed by the group's composition. When the price
373 of oil rises, the major cost of operating container ships rises as well, but the energy business keeps the
374 company afloat by increasing its margins. When the price of oil falls, however, the shipping division
375 becomes more profitable. Maersk encountered low freight rates and huge drops in oil prices in 2015
376 and 2016, so the hedging no longer paid off, and the company lost money in 2016. Executives
377 considered alternatives to question which path the company should follow. They agreed in late 2016 on
378 divesting the energy division, claiming there was a conglomerate discount to unwind while focusing on
379 the logistics to keep its leadership within the container shipping industry. Diversity in divisional
380 investment prospects has been blamed for conglomerate discounts, with the hypothesis that such
381 diversity exacerbates agency difficulties, distorts investment allocation, and results in a loss of company
382 value (Burch and Nanda, 2003). Executives decided then to transform A.P. Moller-Maersk from being a
383 conglomerate with diversified business interests in oil, oil services, shipping, and logistics to a global
384 integrator in container logistics (Maersk, Message from the Chairman and the CEO, 20/02/2020). In this
385 sense, the simultaneous drop in oil prices and freight rates acted (in retrospect) as a happy accident
386 because it forced Maersk to take a strategic turn towards LI as a functional domain for future value
387 creation.
388
389 As seen before, Maersk was a diversified conglomerate. Conversely, MSC has opted for a clear strategic
390 choice consisting of a portfolio built by two distinct and separate branches, cruises and container
391 transport. Between the two, we find CMA CGM which initially benefited from a more coherent portfolio.
392 Maersk’s endowment in the energy activities cascaded into a major restructuring process to achieve the
393 transformation towards LI. The past endowment in energy activities has therefore impacted the starting
394 point on which Maersk originally set out on its road towards LI. Conversely, the more coherent portfolio
395 of CMA CGM at the beginning of its LI journey involves a M&A&D program with a lower magnitude.
396 However, it also means that if divestiture is to take place, it will involve strategic assets or at least assets
397 with a high potential for synergies, as opposed to a highly diversified portfolio from which it is relatively
398 easy to divest one business unit.
399 As a conclusion, the SL’s business portfolio restructuring processes towards logistics are not
400 homogeneous among SLs. Corporate endowment implies different starting points influencing the way
401 LI has taken place among SLs. LI processes are path dependent because these processes exhibit memory
402 effects. It is difficult to disentangle corporate endowment and path dependence effects in part because
403 the features that first brought SL to consider LI as a valuable functional domain are not only persistent
404 over time but also embedded in the SL's historic legacy. As examined in this building block, strategic
405 change towards LI can either be done by partially ignoring the past corporate endowment (like Maersk)
406 or by capitalizing on it (like MSC and CMA CGM).
407 6. HOW? Strategies [Architecture facet]
408 Based on our analysis of Maersk’s, CMA CGM’s and MSC’s strategic documents between 2015
409 and 2021, we identified three defining mechanisms or steps in their approach to mission statement
410 reformulation in the context of LI (Fig. 2):
411 • (1) critical juncture. A critical juncture is a moment or specific window in time where
412 there is a significant possibility of a decisive transition from one state to another
413 (Nkomo et al., 2019). LI can be thought of as a significant path disrupter, one possibly
414 capable of undermining SL's traditions and trajectories as well as bringing forward new
415 business paradigms and practices in the container liner industry.
416 • (2) institutionalization. Institutionalization is the process by which a set of activities (i.e.,
417 logistics activities) becomes an integral and sustainable part of a formal system (i.e.,
418 liner shipping) (Zida et al., 2018). It can be viewed as a series of events that lead to the
419 adoption of new practices (Yin, 1981b).
420 • (3) path confirmation. It can be a deliberate strategic act or an event that confirms the
421 strategic path and reduces the possibility of going backwards or moving towards path
422 disruption. The confirmed sequence leads to a confirmed strategy profile.
423 <Insert figure 2 about here > / color should be used for any figures in print
424 Figure 2: Critical juncture, institutionalization, and path confirmation of the strategic
425 reformulation processes of the selected SLs between 2016 and 2022
426 The critical juncture for Maersk can be semantically observed in its transition from being a "worldwide
427 conglomerate" to an "integrated transport and logistics company". This transition took place in 2016-
428 2017. While the focus in 2016 was still on Maersk Line as “one of the world’s largest container shipping
429 companies”, the group in 2017 preferred to present itself as a “global leader in shipping and ports”. The
430 institutionalization mechanism happened in 2017-2018. Before this period, Maersk’s emphasis was on
431 its “wide range of activities in the shipping, logistics and the oil and gas industry”. During the
432 institutionalization step, Maersk rather referred to its “multiple brands” on the one hand and its “stand-
433 alone Energy division” on the other hand. We argue that preferring the terms "brands" or “division”
434 rather than "activities" is the semantic evidence of the institutionalization mechanism. The use of the
435 word "brands" rather than "activities" semantically reinforces the integration perception by regrouping
436 these different brands under one umbrella rather than being confronted with a cluster of different
437 scattered and disconnected activities. Moreover, it is easier to get rid of a “brand” rather than a business
438 “activity”. The mission statement highlighted the “stand-alone” nature of the energy branch which can
439 be interpreted as a premise for its planned divestiture. The path confirmation mechanism occurred in
440 the period 2019-2021. Maersk no longer describes itself as an "integrated transport and logistics
441 company" but as "integrated container logistics company" and thus abandons the term "transport" to
442 refocus on “container logistics” only. In addition, Maersk is emerging as a facilitator in the MarSC by
443 “connecting, simplifying, enabling (global) trade" and “its customer’s supply chains” and by profiling
444 itself as a "global leader in shipping services". Three strategic pillars support its transformation to an
445 integrated container logistics company: (1) End-to-end digitally enabled transport and logistics services
446 by integrating land-based logistics and ocean business to capture consumer synergies; (2) Financial &
447 operational synergies between ocean business and terminals business for lower cost, productivity, and
448 asset utilization; and (3) Building new digital platforms, which enable integrated offerings,
449 standardization & automation (Maersk investor and analyst presentation, 2020).
450 For CMA CGM, the critical juncture took place in 2017, a pivotal year for the CMA CGM Group, with the
451 appointment of Rodolphe Saadé as Chief Executive Officer. In a succession situation, a strategic shift is
452 more likely to occur. CEO successions are a key mechanism for realigning with the corporate or
453 environmental context, and they are frequently a catalyst for breaking through organizational rigidity
454 and resistance (Datta et al., 2005). Rodolphe Saadé became CEO with a new strategic ambition called
455 "Shipping the future" made up of 4 corporate priorities. Among these, we found the “maritime
456 dimension” but also the “inland and logistic development”. The campaign’s visual identity, consisting of
457 a ship sailing in an ocean of stars with the Earth as its stern, implicitly revealed the group's desire to
458 move towards other sectors than shipping. Moreover, a unique typography was used for rebranding all
459 CMA CGM’s subsidiaries at the same time, bringing greater visual connection and integration between
460 the group’s regional lines. The acquisition of CEVA Logistics by CMA CGM was the culmination of the
461 institutionalization mechanism. Since then, the group no longer describes itself in a vague but
462 foreshadowing way such as a "customer-centered group" (cf. "Shipping the future" strategy) but fully
463 embraces its logistics turn by presenting itself as a “leading worldwide transport and logistics group”.
464 The confirmation mechanism took place in 2021 with the presentation of the new group strategy and
465 brand image named "better ways". This new identity aims to be the visual support for the new logistics
466 ambition, while at the same time emphasizing the importance given to sustainability.
467 Concerning MSC, family dynamics play a major role as well. The appointment in 2014 of Diego Aponte
468 to replace his father Gianluigi as CEO of the container shipping business provided a new strategic
469 momentum. As early as 2016, Diego Aponte publicly mentioned that "MSC believes in vertical
470 integration". He added that "MSC cannot be satisfied with the maritime side only, especially in the
471 current highly competitive environment” (Jeune Afrique, 2016)7. Although LI seems to have been
472 considered at the highest level as early as 2016, the critical juncture seems to have manifested itself in
473 the mission statement during 2018-2019. At that point, MSC no longer described itself as a “world
474 leader in global container shipping" but rather as a "global business engaged in the shipping and logistics
475 sector". The institutionalization mechanism extends between 2019 and 2021. During this step, MSC
476 intends to mark its difference in a context where its direct competitors are also integrating logistically.
477 In this sense, MSC is institutionalizing the shift to LI by trying to find where its competitive advantage
478 lies. MSC’s competitive advantage can be semantically found in the mission statement by its willingness
479 to provide LI solutions, especially in “the emerging markets across all continents". It should be noted
480 that the three mechanisms have already been completed by Maersk and CMA CGM. MSC still seems to
481 be between the second and third mechanism. Our categorization of MSC is less clear-cut. This is due to
482 the low level of disclosure within the MSC Group which makes strategic diagnosis via mission statements
483 more complicated. However, recent business events and in particular the acquisition of Bolloré Africa
484 Logistics foreshadow the completion of the third step by MSC as well. As mentioned before, MSC is
485 characterized by a very strong family embeddedness. Therefore, a showdown with MSC's strongly
486 embedded patriarchal hierarchy is probably inevitable following the appointment of Søren Toft (ex-
487 Maersk) as the new CEO of the group in December 2020 (Shipping Watch, 2020)8.
488 The above analysis of the reformulation processes of the mission statements carried by the selected SLs
489 demonstrates how SLs have been committed to LI and how this message has been communicated to
490 the outside world. The findings confirm that LI is considered as a key strategic goal and top priority for
491 the different SLs. To achieve LI, SLs might have to divest some activities, acquire promising competing
492 firms, and merge these business units to exploit operational and financial synergies. In this context, SLs
493 should undertake a programmatic approach towards mergers, acquisitions, and divestures (M&A&D).
494 This is the subject of the next building block.
495 7. WHICH? Tactics [Architecture facet]
496 In a competitive world, gaining a competitive advantage is the result of differentiators. In a context
497 of LI, acquiring unique resources and distinctive capabilities (also known as core competencies) through
498 M&A&D as well as determining the appropriate forms of vertical control, appear to be among the main
499 differentiators used by SLs.
500 Concerning the first identified differentiator, divestiture and resource redeployment via M&A&D have
501 gained relevance as the main reconfiguration strategy that can create economic value for SLs. Indeed,
502 M&A&D have been extensively used by SLs to pivot their portfolios towards logistics growth and add
503 capabilities rapidly. However, M&A&D strategies have been used differently by the selected SLs.
504 During the first years after the release of its strategic intent to become a global integrator, Maersk has
505 embarked on a M&A&D strategic path which can be described as “growing by divesting”. Maersk has
506 divested and spun off some parts of its business while acquiring other businesses to expand its end-to-
507 end logistics offerings. In 2017, Maersk sold its energy subsidiary Maersk Oil to Total for over USD 7.5
508 billion. This was followed by the sale of Maersk drilling, tankers, and supply service. These divestments
509 in the energy sector freed up the necessary funds to invest in transport and logistics. Although "growing
510 by divesting" may seem contradictory, the Maersk case shows that it can be a feasible strategic path for

7
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/373115/economie/diego-aponte-lafrique-cest-lhistoire-de-famille/
8
https://shippingwatch.com/carriers/Container/article12599094.ece
511 improving SLs' long-term performance through prudent business deletion and resource reallocation
512 decisions (Varadarajan et al., 2001). The Maersk’s case shows that the most logical candidates for
513 divestiture are the strategic business units with the least potential to leverage the SL’s core
514 competencies. As stated by Pawlik et al. (2011), if the assets involved are non-core or just offer assets
515 to operating units on a lease basis, a divestiture has no impact on operational activities.
516 A different picture arises when divesting business areas directly tied to shipping activities (such as
517 transport terminals) to fund a logistics entrance strategy. As an illustration, CMA CGM raised about USD
518 1 billion to support the takeover of CEVA Logistics by selling stakes in 10 port terminals held by fully-
519 owned CMA Terminals to Terminal Link, a joint venture between CMA CGM and China Merchants
520 Holding. CMA CGM was to some extent compelled to sell some of its strategic and synergy generating
521 assets because its corporate endowment was less diversified than its competitors.
522 After pursuing the "growing by divesting" strategy, Maersk then switched to a more programmatic
523 approach to M&A&D, focusing on regular acquisitions of mid-cap logistics companies. Because
524 expanding into a new business field like logistics is typically a difficult experimental process, Maersk uses
525 programmatic M&A&D to systematize growth and capitalize on learning-curve benefits.
526 Unlike Maersk's strategy, which favors a long series of multiple benefits over time, CMA CGM saw the
527 take-over of CEVA Logistics as a window of opportunity to benefit from the magnitude of a single
528 advantage. Conversely, MSC has long favored the development of structural or ad-hoc coordination
529 mechanisms with independent providers, selective investment decisions and subcontracts with logistic
530 partnering firms. However, the recent USD 6.43 billion acquisition of Bolloré Africa Logistics by MSC
531 sheds new light on its LI strategy. Like CMA CGM with CEVA Logistics, MSC seems to have opted for a
532 one-off strategic move of great magnitude. However, there are major differences between these two
533 cases. CMA CGM’s acquisition of CEVA Logistics strategically paved the way for other acquisitions in the
534 logistics sector. By mobilizing the financial resources generated by its liner shipping branch, the French
535 SL was able to make complementary and smaller acquisitions to fill certain gaps in the portfolio of CEVA
536 Logistics and to strengthen its global network. Whereas CEVA Logistics offered a worldwide network
537 with a global reach for the acquiring SL, MSC seems to follow a more regional approach by, among
538 others, acquiring the African logistics activities of the Bolloré Group in 2021 and the Brazilian company
539 Log-In Logistica in the same year. Thus, time will tell whether these acquisitions were solely motivated
540 by strengthening the existing regional embeddedness or whether it sets the stage for a sequence of
541 responsive and complementary acquisitions in the logistics sector.
542 Concerning the second differentiator, CMA CGM and Maersk have often been mentioned in the same
543 breath of carriers pursuing a broader logistics vision, but it seems that this generalization does not
544 capture the essential tactical differences between the two SLs. Instead of the previous arms' length
545 carrier-terminal operator relationship between Maersk Line and APM Terminals, Maersk's key hub ports
546 now function as "a one-company operation," like how UPS and FedEx manage their global distribution
547 hubs (The Loadstar, 2016)9. Furthermore, Maersk is fully integrating supply chain management
548 operations like as origin logistics and customs brokerage into its core transportation business, a
549 significant milestone in liner shipping that has largely gone unnoticed. CMA CGM, on the other hand, is
550 keeping the CEVA business, which includes forwarding, apart from the rest of the group. CMA CGM will
551 achieve its goal of providing end-to-end solutions by bringing together the expertise of several service
552 providers inside a tightly knit, family-owned organization (JOC, 2019)10. CMA CGM's strategy is to
553 increase commercial synergies by recommending CEVA solutions to CMA CGM customers and vice
554 versa, as well as integrating CMA CGM's logistics operations with CEVA. This will expand the logistics
555 provider's footprint in ocean freight forwarding and provide for cost savings through pooled activities
556 such as purchasing and shared services. Even though CMA CGM and CEVA will retain different names,

9
https://theloadstar.com/cross-selling-co-operation-key-maersks-new-direction/
10
https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/cma-cgm/cma-cgm-expands-cost-cutting-effort-amid-
higher-debt_20190529.html
557 CEVA will be operated on an arm’s-length basis, with its inland distribution integrated into the SL's own
558 port-to-port operations (JOC, 2019)11.
559
560 Maersk and CMA CGM complement relatively rigid vertical control forms for their big logistics firms with
561 looser vertical control forms via incubators or accelerators for their small logistics firms. Both SLs provide
562 connections, financial resources, and operational expertise while allowing the fostered start-ups to
563 operate autonomously. As illustration, Maersk has effectively developed e-forwarder Twill Logistics by
564 forming a separate company and enabling it to compete with the existing business (Hausman et al.,
565 2020). The use of flexible forms of vertical control, via incubators and accelerators, addresses the
566 recurring criticism that SLs are often too rigid to bring about drastic changes.
567
568 Achieving a competitive advantage does not necessarily mean that the SL must be at the extreme of
569 one vertical control form but should rather have the best combination of vertical control forms. Our
570 findings in this section show that SL's divestment and resource redeployment decisions via M&A&D are
571 inextricably linked over time, with divestiture decisions influencing resource redeployment decisions
572 and vice versa (Procher and Engel, 2018). The importance of temporal and spatial considerations in this
573 strategic assessment will be further discussed in the next building block.
574 8. WHEN? Temporality [Spatiotemporal scene facet]
575 Researchers have conceptualized strategy as a sequence of competitive actions carried out
576 across time which impact firm performance (Shi and Prescott, 2011). The strategic process of a SL’s
577 portfolio restructuring can be described as a sequence of events resulting in a key change in the business
578 orientation of the firm. It should be remarked that strategies do not always call for equal and balanced
579 initiatives on all fronts. Instead, usually some initiatives must come first, followed by others, and then
580 still others (Hambrick and Frederickson, 2005). Different combinations of interactions between
581 precipitating and enabling dynamics are needed (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Therefore, we will
582 examine the extent to which staging considerations shape the SL’s strategies. To do this, we will make
583 a distinction between past and current staging processes towards LI.
584 For the past staging process of Maersk, the initial burst was akin to a long-term commitment. Given the
585 magnitude of the transformation, Maersk has proceeded as follows: divestiture first but redeployment
586 of resources in logistics and transport activities after. Starting in 2016 and continuously since then,
587 Maersk embarked on the journey to become an integrated logistics company in line with its vision to
588 become a global integrator of container logistics. Maersk completed a program of radical business
589 portfolio reorientation characterized by initial burst of change and followed by relatively continuous
590 progress toward the desired endpoint.
591 In the case of CMA CGM, the past strategy was characterized by bundling and unbundling pendulum
592 moments with the implementation and subsequent commercial failures of Rail Link Europe, Veolia
593 Cargo Link and Greenmodal Transport. During this bundling/unbundling period, CMA CGM faced a
594 steady stream of small and medium-sized opportunities. This stream was interspersed with the
595 possibility to acquire CEVA Logistics. This acquisition represented a real chance to create significant
596 value. Confined to a mundane strategy characterized by an unsuccessful bundling and unbundling
597 strategy in the past, CMA CGM suddenly faced a brief window of opportunity, requiring that it should
598 be pursued in an assertive way. CMA CGM has taken advantage of this window of opportunity and
599 shaped a new logistics narrative around it.
600 Geneva-based MSC seemed to follow an ad-hoc and focused LI strategy targeted on the development
601 of specific port-hinterland corridors (mainly through Medlog and related Medway), and overall
602 opportunity grasping. As an illustration, the liberalization of the Portuguese rail freight sector in 2015

11
https://www.joc.com/international-logistics/logistics-providers/ceva-logistics/cma-cgm-no-special-forwarding-
favors-ceva_20190213.html
603 appeared to be a window of opportunity for MSC. The carrier decided to acquire the cargo division of
604 the Portuguese railways. The sudden appearance of this window of opportunity has somehow disrupted
605 the development model of the group which consisted of strategic partnerships and cooperation
606 agreements with railways providers. A window of opportunity can only have a disruptive impact if the
607 related investment can fit into the corporate's strategic thinking because of its intrinsic relevance and
608 strategic potential. In that context, the most significant benefit for MSC was independence, in fact the
609 ability to control an additional segment of the MarSC.
610 As shown above, SLs have in the past either followed an opportunity grasping, a long-term commitment
611 or a bundling/unbundling strategy to achieve LI. These three staging processes allowed opportunities
612 for trust to be established and enabled SLs to reach a certain threshold in the logistics segment of the
613 MarSC to be taken seriously by investors and other market players. Once this level of credibility is
614 reached, SLs can switch to an ‘active waiting’ strategy, which consists of anticipating, preparing for, and
615 seizing opportunities and dealing with threats as they arise. As described by Sull (2015), the active
616 waiting theory has certain characteristics.
617 First, SLs should develop a fuzzy vision guiding their journey towards LI. A fuzzy vision describes a SL’s
618 domain, geographic scope, and aspiration in broad terms. By way of illustration, the strategic vision of
619 CMA CGM known as “better ways”, states that “as a leader in transport and logistics, [the Group] will
620 develop fair and more balanced economic exchanges respectful of every human being and of the
621 planet” (CMA CGM, Mission Book Better Ways, 2021). A fuzzy vision is effective because it gives general
622 direction, establishes goals, and sets aspirations.
623 Second, exploratory forays into potential new markets, such as investments in promising start-ups and
624 small-scale market experiments, should be made by SLs. SLs have invested in logistics start-ups with the
625 goal of integrating technology know-how and gaining access to new data. As shown in the tactics
626 building block, joining forces with a logistics start-up has proven to be a more flexible solution than
627 developing a solution involving in-house R&D capacities (ITF, OECD, 2018). As an illustration, CMA CGM
628 has developed an investment fund called “CMA CGM Ventures” to support 10 to 20 start-ups per year.
629 In parallel, CMA CGM has launched “ZEBOX”, a start-up incubator and accelerator, dedicated to the
630 development of vertical technologies mainly in transport and logistics. Conversely, “Maersk Growth” is
631 the corporate venture arm of A.P. Moller-Maersk and provides funding for start-ups working in smart
632 logistics and sustainable MarSC.
633 Third, executives are advised to preserve a war chest of cash. In an uncertain market environment, cash
634 has the overwhelming advantage of fungibility since it can be used for a variety of purposes. Nowadays,
635 we see that SLs maintain financial reserves to cover their obligations and investment opportunities. As
636 an illustration, Maersk argues in its 2019 Annual Report that “it is of great importance to maintain a
637 financial reserve to cover the group’s obligations and investment opportunities and to provide the
638 capital necessary to offset changes in the group’s liquidity due to changes in the cash flow from
639 operating activities. The flexibility of the financial reserve is subject to ongoing prioritization and
640 optimization”, for example when the appearance of a window of opportunity requires rapid
641 deployment.
642 Finally, during periods of active waiting, SLs must focus on routine operational improvements.
643 Operational improvements keep companies in the game. Continuous improvement is a must for
644 organizations as it facilitates innovation and helps organizations to transform and become more
645 efficient. Maersk, CMA CGM and MSC have a strong pipeline of continuous improvement projects and
646 initiatives. As an illustration, Maersk has continuously developed several operational improvement
647 projects in terms of demand forecasting and increased customer focus in order to improve the quality
648 of its service delivery (Karenga, 2021).
649
650 As a conclusion, Maersk had in the past a propensity to rely on long-term commitment while MSC
651 preferred to grasp ad hoc opportunities. As for CMA CGM, the French SL followed a median strategy
652 characterized by a succession of bundling/unbundling suddenly accelerated by a window of opportunity
653 (i.e., the take-over of CEVA Logistics). However, this dichotomy seems to not match the current staging
654 processes. There is a current convergence, known as the active waiting strategy, that reconciles the two
655 temporal approaches. Indeed, SLs are nowadays temporally embedded in long periods of evolutionary
656 or incremental change (long-term commitment) interspersed with short, sharp revolutionary transitions
657 facilitated by openings of windows of opportunity (opportunity grasping) (Amis et al., 2004). In addition
658 to this temporal discussion, LI strategies are also shaped by geographical considerations. For example,
659 some acquisitions include a spatial component and are motivated by the desire to obtain access to input
660 and market resources or to engage in multipoint competition (Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013). This is
661 the subject of the next building block.
662 9. WHERE? Geography [Spatiotemporal scene facet]
663 As multinational corporations, SLs face the tension between local-regional responsiveness and
664 global integration (Brauer and Heitmann, 2013). SLs gather information from various sources and select
665 amongst geographically scattered alternatives when making decisions about expansion, innovation,
666 operational changes, and divestiture (Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013). This building block focuses on
667 the spatial aspects of historical embeddedness and the expansion that results from the LI.
668 Historically, the Danish A.P. Moller-Maersk Group has a strong focus on Northern Europe and the
669 Scandinavian peninsula. The CMA CGM Group presents a more hybrid geographic expansion model
670 taking advantage of the dual France’s maritime openings to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. MSC,
671 although based in Geneva, remains a company in the hands of the Italian Aponte family which intends
672 to maintain a strong anchoring in the Mediterranean basin and in Africa. MSC is strongly present in the
673 Iberian Peninsula and in Italy, especially in Genoa, Livorno, La Spezia, and Trieste. In these regions,
674 Medlog (its logistics subsidiary) and Medway (its own railway company) move containerized goods from
675 and to inland terminals which execute an extended gate function for the container facilities controlled
676 by terminal operating division TiL. In Africa, MSC benefits from a considerable footprint in West Africa
677 where the group has the strongest feeder network covering all ports. Despite these differences, Maersk,
678 MSC, and CMA CGM are nowadays truly global service providers, with networks spanning all major
679 regions and many smaller ports (Gadhia et al., 2011).
680 LI is reshuffling the strategic card as there are numerous acquisition opportunities around the world.
681 Therefore, SLs can adjust their global geographic strategies in the light of these opportunities. In this
682 context, SLs are committed to a “think global, act local” logistics growth strategy by adding the local
683 operational know-how of the acquired logistics firms to the SL’s leading global network. SLs aim to
684 become efficient global logistics organizations while tailoring their services to specific market needs in
685 the countries where they operate. The activities of SLs are managed to provide economies of scale
686 through a worldwide organization, while they simultaneously try to handle varying market situations in
687 different parts of the world and differentiate their services to meet local needs (Sornn-Friese, 2019).
688 Compared to the past fairly ad hoc approach to regional opportunities, the “think global, act local”
689 strategy seems to be a more deliberate strategic choice for the SLs as they acquire logistics companies
690 that either bolster their existing global network or fill in the local and regional gaps of their portfolio.
691 As an illustration, the acquisitions of MSC essentially target emerging markets, particularly in South
692 America with the take-over of Log-In Logistica (2021) and in Africa with the control over the African
693 logistics activities of the Bolloré Group (2021). In this latter case, the Italian-Swiss shipowner gets hold
694 of sixteen large container port terminals (Congo, Guinea, Togo...), three rail concessions (Benin,
695 Cameroon...) and a multitude of warehouses spread over the entire continent. This acquisition will allow
696 MSC to benefit from a global coverage in the African continent.
697 Although MSC is the SL in our case study that most assumes its “appetite for growth in Africa” by
698 profiling itself as the “big believer in Africa” (Soren Toft, 2022 Abidjan Forum), it is worth noting that
699 CMA CGM has recently acquired freight forwarder businesses both in Morocco (ASTI Group, 2021) and
700 in East Africa (Spedag Interfreight, 2022). Nevertheless, CMA CGM and Maersk seem to focus on
701 consolidating their footprints in high demand areas to support cargo growth by acquiring new capacity
702 in Asia, North America, and Europe. Maersk made acquisitions in logistics to close capability gaps and
703 strengthen its geographical presence. Maersk's acquisitions of Vandergrift (2019), Visible Supply Chain
704 Management (2021), Pilot Freight Services (2022) and Performance Team (2020) bring strong logistics
705 capabilities to A.P. Moller - Maersk in North America. Some facilities are indeed strategically located
706 near air and ocean gateways with Container Freight Stations (CFS) capabilities. In Europe, the acquisition
707 of B2C Europe (2021) and HUUB (2021) serve as a good base for future geographic expansion.
708 Moreover, Maersk acquired LF Logistics (2021), a significant contract logistics player with a vast
709 footprint across the Asian-Pacific region. The acquisitions of CMA CGM are mainly motivated by
710 complementarity benefits with the existing CEVA Logistics geographic backbone, such as through the
711 takeovers of Oxatis (2020), Ingram Micro (2021) and Colis Privé (2022). These should significantly
712 strengthen the position of CEVA Logistics in the U.S. and European markets, enhancing its ability to
713 capitalize on the e-commerce boom's potential (CSCMP’s Supply Chain Quarterly, 2021)12.
714
715 Thus, SLs show variation in the spatial distribution of potential sources for new resources. The extent of
716 geographic dispersion of logistics activities is likely to vary from SL to SL, dependent on their resources,
717 capabilities, and business realities. The spatial dispersion of logistics activities is not only geographical
718 but also operational, in the sense that SLs offer a very diverse range of logistics products and services.
719 Through M&As, SLs make strategic inroads into a wide variety of MarSC segments, sometimes far
720 removed from their core business. This is discussed in the next building block.
721 10. WHAT? Products & services [Operations facet]
722 Some segments of the MarSC might be identified as centrally important, while others are deemed
723 secondary or peripheral (Hambrick and Frederickson, 2005). New client expectations and an increase in
724 logistics technology that amounts to a digital revolution are transforming the logistics sector
725 environment, both for asset and non-asset firms. SLs should identify current and potential gaps in their
726 portfolio in relation to the firm's overall business plan to integrate logistics activities. Subsequently, SLs
727 try to strike a balance between strengthening the firm’s current strategic position in the shipping
728 business and exploring the logistics market to build a portfolio with the highest potential financial value
729 (Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2008).
730
731 From a logistics service range perspective, LI works in concentric circles outwards bolstering core
732 container shipping capabilities in an increasingly expansion of the perimeter of the liner’s activities. Fig.
733 3 focuses on the acquisitions operated between 2015 and 2022 by the selected shipping companies.
734 The acquisitions can be classified in three levels of adjacency depending on their relatedness to the liner
735 shipping core business in terms of shared customers, costs, channels, capabilities, and competition:
736
737 • (1) the close adjacencies include port terminals, liner-owned shipping agencies and competing
738 SLs. These are sectors in which relatedness with the core business is known to be high.
739 • (2) the midrange adjacencies cover moves into activities such as inland terminal operations and
740 warehousing. These are sectors in which relatedness with the core business is known to be
741 medium.
742 • (3) the distant adjacencies include air freight business, last-mile logistics and e-commerce, and
743 other activities showing a low relatedness with the core business.
744
745 <Insert figure 3 about here > / color should be used for any figures in print
746
747 Figure 3: Strategic radar chart on the adjacencies moves of the selected SLs
748
749 LI has been the driving force behind the development of multimodal and intermodal transportation in
750 recent years, ensuring the continued operation through an ever-complex MarSC network. Some modal

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3pl-ingram-micro-commerce-and-lifecycle-services
751 integration is more common than others, such as sea-road (e.g., Einride & Maersk’s partnership for
752 electric trucks), while others, such as sea-rail (e.g., CP Carga and Medway) are less common. However,
753 as depicted in the radar chart above, an integration of sea and air transport (e.g., Senator International,
754 Maersk Air Cargo, ITA Airways, CMA CGM Air Cargo, and Air France-KLM) as well as investments in last-
755 mile logistics (Colis Privé) and e-commerce capabilities (Oxatis, Ingram Micro Commerce, Performance
756 Team, LF Logistics, Visible Supply Chain Management, B2C Europe and HUUB) are currently emerging.
757 The radar chart illustrates how SLs re-engineer transportation networks to satisfy the needs of shippers
758 who work on a JIT basis.
759
760 We believe that moves to penetrate segments located far from the core are a sign of a strong strategic
761 commitment towards LI even if it induces managerial constraints due to the weak relatedness with the
762 core business. Maersk and CMA CGM aim to integrate box shipping with the broader logistics chain.
763 They are taking a high-tech approach with an important strategic commitment to innovate and invest
764 in their new roles as global logistics integrators. MSC wants to keep its focus on the core ocean-going
765 business the group already runs (Lloyd’s List, 2019)13. MSC does not venture too much into distant
766 adjacencies. The only exception is its joint bid with Lufthansa in early 2022 to acquire ITA Airways. Such
767 a move potentially creates value added for its freight and MSC cruise businesses, given that commercial
768 planes can carry passengers to its cruise home ports in the Med while at the same time transporting
769 goods in its cargo holds. Combining passengers transport and cargo in the holds can be viewed as a
770 strategic buffer. As many new passenger aircraft will be entering service shortly, additional and cheaper
771 capacity compared to that on a cargo aircraft will be freed up. Therefore, it's unclear whether purely
772 dedicated air cargo business units such as CMA CGM Air Cargo and Maersk Air Cargo would be profitable
773 in the future, especially if the market returns to the conditions of 2017-2019 characterized by plenty of
774 capacity and little money to earn.
775
776 The above raises the question whether SLs should buy assets close to their core business or expand their
777 radius of operation. Providing a definitive answer to this question is difficult given the very recent nature
778 of the moves of SLs in activities somewhat disconnected from their ocean business. We believe there
779 must be a sweet spot in terms of radius where SLs are close enough to their primary business to realize
780 competitive advantage benefits. In that context, it seems that extracting additional value close to home,
781 rather than moving too far away, is the optimal course of action for SLs; assets already in hand but
782 peripheral to the core offer the richest new cores (Zook, 2007). This does not mean that SLs cannot
783 develop hybrid approaches by executing a series of different types of adjacencies moves. Indeed, LI
784 requires very deliberate two-speed approach where legacy core assets (ocean) are managed for cash
785 while new adjacencies business (logistics) are nurtured for growth. However, combining the liner
786 shipping core business with the exploitation of new logistics forays can be facilitated or hindered by a
787 series of enablers and impediments. This is the subject of the next building block.
788
789 11. HOW FAR? Outcomes [Operations facet]
790 Impediments to LI refer to factors that hinder the implementation of LI. Identifying these
791 impediments will help executives to formulate a robust LI strategy to mitigate future challenges. A
792 comprehensive understanding of the enablers to an effective LI strategy is the key to overcome
793 perceived impediments. We argue that LI strategy should be examined systematically covering all
794 enablers and impediments described in this building block as well as their interdependencies.
795 The framework in Fig. 4 (original figure layout has been designed by and first used in Salim et al., 2019)
796 shows how enablers can function as an interconnected system that will overcome the underlying
797 impediments to achieve the LI objective. This framework compiles and synthesizes the enablers and
798 impediments to integrated MarSC in an effort to create a transitional framework from the current status

13
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799 quo towards either logistics disintegration or integration. Three situations can arise from the observed
800 balance between impediments and enablers:

801 • (1) the status quo when the relative weights of impediments and enablers cancel each
802 other out
803 • (2) a strong pull towards LI of the MarSC when enablers outweigh impediments
804 • (3) a strong pressure towards logistics disintegration when impediments overtake
805 enablers.
806 <Insert figure 4 about here > / color should be used for any figures in print
807 Figure 4: Enablers and impediments: status quo, integration, and disintegration
808 Regarding the actors (who?), SLs are not the only ones who are looking at LI and there is no guarantee
809 that they will be the most competitive logistics integrators in the MarSC. Existing E-commerce giants,
810 large 3PLs (third-party logistics service providers) and SLs are increasingly vying for the same e-
811 commerce clients by providing a similar all-in-one solution for transporting products from a factory
812 loading dock to a customer's doorstep. Moreover, when adopting forwarding and logistics services, SLs
813 broaden their commercial range by entering the core business of freight forwarders and 3PLs. By
814 redesigning their website to allow companies to reserve space on their ships or planes directly, SLs cut
815 out the middleman and provide freight forwarding services to their customers directly (Quartz, 2022)14.
816 As SLs enter in direct competition with freight forwarders, the close relationships with these ocean
817 business clients might be compromised. LI might also deteriorate the relationships with the different
818 alliance members and investors.
819 Regarding the drivers (why?), LI strategies are not new, but they have traditionally been driven by the
820 acquiring company's margin concerns rather than the development of value-added customer solutions
821 that can be priced at more predictable premiums (Freightwaves, 2020)15. Moreover, the current super-
822 profits have also put carriers in the political spotlight as a substantial part of these super-profits has
823 been used to fund acquisitions in the freight forwarding and logistics business (ITF, 2022). Some
824 regulatory authorities have expressed concerns about possible competition distortions, dominant
825 positions, and unfair behavior of certain SLs. While many jurisdictions have put regulations in place that
826 support alliances and consortia in the maritime segment of the supply chain, it is highly unlikely that SLs
827 will benefit from the same antitrust immunity in the landside activities. Competition regulators seem to
828 be looking closely at the ongoing LI developments, as evidenced by the U.S. bipartisan Ocean Shipping
829 Reform Act of 2022 that gives the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) an updated toolbox to protect
830 exporters, importers, and consumers from allegedly unfair practices of SLs. A big case from a regulator
831 against one SL could put a damper on LI. The resulting regulatory constraints and associated uncertainty
832 could discourage other SLs to further integrate.
833 Regarding the corporate endowment (from whence?), SLs will kill their new business but also potentially
834 their legacy business if SLs fail to logistically integrate. While LI creates value from synergies, this should
835 not come at the cost of disruption to the endowed business. In this context, strategic and personal
836 biases may alter the perception of market reality.
837 Regarding the strategies (How?), the delivery promise introduced as part of the LI strategy is key to build
838 customer trust and thereby retaining strong brand reputation. In that context, SLs should not neglect
839 their mission statements.
840 Regarding the tactics (which?), SLs that have grown by heavily relying on acquisitions will come to rely
841 on additional acquisitions for continued growth. While relying on acquisitions may provide the kind of
842 growth desired by management, it may also limit the company's future growth options. As SLs become
843 more reliant on acquisitions, they may lose confidence in their capacity to develop organically, leading

14
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15
https://www.freightwaves.com/news/flexport-coo-maersk-integration-strategy-no-threat-to-business-with-
video
844 them to rely on acquisitions for future expansion (Kim et al., 2011). In that context, SL should also pay
845 careful attention to the selection of the appropriate vertical control forms for their newly acquired
846 company as a more separated corporate structure between the SL and its new logistics venture tends
847 to reassure the shippers more.
848 Regarding the temporality (when?), a short-term disposal strategy aimed at boosting liquidity is unlikely
849 to be more appealing than a long-term investment strategy centered on cargo terminal facilities that
850 provide control over critical tactical segments of the MarSC. In that context, it should be noted that
851 some carriers have divested deep-sea terminals to finance their logistics ambitions. As underlined by
852 Pawlick et al. (2011), even if terminal asset divestiture could provide a way to raise capital to address
853 short-term financial shortages, analysts and investors should not anticipate a terminal divestment
854 strategy to be a straightforward mitigant.
855 Regarding the geographical footprint (where?), globalization and the rise in containerized world trade
856 has led to substantial growth in the spatial scope of activities performed by carriers (Midoro et al., 2005).
857 As worldwide groups with a global reach, SLs are also exposed to geopolitical tensions. Prolonged
858 geopolitics tensions might drag on global economic growth and container demand and potentially
859 expedite container supply chain recovery, leading to a return to lower freight rates and profits.
860 Regarding the products and services (what?), transforming into a global integrator of container logistics
861 requires an additional focus on building land-based products and becoming a customer led organization.
862 This may present some challenges in terms of expanding the product offering and customer flexibility
863 while maintaining a cost-effective strategy.
864
865 The above discussion on impediments and enablers is not exhaustive. The key is rather to know if the
866 SLs will be able to scale their logistics product into their wider ocean client base. The following years
867 and future financial figures will provide evidence whether this scaling is happening successfully or not.
868 In the near future, SLs must also stabilize earnings in the ocean business by continuing to strengthen
869 the business and ensuring a seamless landing from present elevated high freight rates.
870
871 12. Discussion and conclusions
872 The presented research introduces a framework for examining the LI strategies of three global
873 container SLs. The study explores the process of implementation of an LI strategy by providing an in-
874 depth understanding of the ins and outs of such a strategy. The paper underlines and examines several
875 key strategic, tactical, and operational issues. More precisely, the research shows that LI involves a
876 complex system of embedded facets and strategic biases by demonstrating that their potential
877 interactions may have an impact on corporate strategy. The findings, which provide several significant
878 contributions to scholarly knowledge and managerial implications, are discussed below.
879
880 12.1. Contributions to scholarly knowledge
881 This research presented a multi-faceted analysis of SL’s strategic paths in the context of LI. Using
882 a multiple case-study focusing on Maersk Line, CMA CGM and MSC, the framework was empirically
883 applied to answer three research questions related to the corporate strategy of SLs in light of LI.
884 Table 1 summarizes the attributes for each building block, along with the research questions to facilitate
885 the concluding analysis of LI strategies among SLs. This table functions as a concluding reading grid
886 showing the qualitative assessments of the authors based on the extensive discussions presented in the
887 paper. It uses therefore the following color code:
888 • filled colored circles refer to present attributes observed in the LI strategy of the SL
889 • light colored circles refer to partially present attributes for which a clear-cut answer cannot (yet) be
890 given
891 • empty circles refer to strategic attributes absent or not found during our case study.
892
893 Table 1: Summarizing reading grid on the facets, building blocks, attributes of LI within the
894 selected SLs and their link to the related research questions
895 <Insert Table 1 about here > / color should be used for any tables in print
896 The container liner industry shows differences and similarities in the mode in which the LI is approached
897 by SLs and strategies are continuously tailored depending on a process embedded in market condition
898 changes, competitor’s moves, corporate specific considerations, and financial capabilities. These
899 differences and similarities in the LI strategies of the three container carriers can be assessed by
900 referring to this table. This grid summarizes the strategic ambitions of SLs in terms of LI. It can be read
901 vertically (SL by SL) or horizontally (attribute by attribute). As a result, the table provides answers about
902 the differences and similarities in LI both within and across SLs. We argue that the combination of
903 decisive comparative attributes (e.g., a large-scale business transformation combined with adjacency
904 moves away from the core business) contributes to the measure of the strategic commitment of SLs to
905 LI.
906
907 Concerning RQ1 (To what extent are the chosen SLs strategically committed to and dependent on LI?),
908 it can be concluded that Maersk and CMA CGM show a clear strategic commitment to LI. Conversely,
909 MSC seems to be in a more intermediate position as it keeps multiple strategic options deliberately
910 open. MSC prefers not to venture too far towards LI because it would limit the options for a strategic
911 retreat if economic market conditions dictated it. Although MSC is investing in LI because there are
912 powerful generic drivers that lead to consider integration as a viable functional domain, the group
913 concomitantly secures its core business (based on Alphaliner data, MSC's order book now corresponds
914 to the entire fleet capacity of the fifth-largest container carrier Hapag-Lloyd) and makes complementary
915 investments with high synergy potential. Maersk and CMA CGM see the current market conditions as
916 an opportunity to position themselves on future growth vectors that, while promising, are nevertheless
917 located far from the core business (e.g., e-commerce, last mile logistics and air freight business).
918 While the findings of RQ1 highlight the shared strategic commitment of Maersk and CMA CGM as well
919 as the more cautious position of MSC, the outcomes of RQ2 (How do SLs adopt the LI implementation
920 design and transformation planning?) point to intra- and inter-carrier differences in the temporal paths
921 of LI, the spatial coverage when rolling out LI initiatives and the implementation means of LI. By using
922 innovative concepts never used to our knowledge in the maritime economic literature such as active
923 waiting or happy accident, we demonstrate that convergences and points of differentiation shape the
924 LI strategies (see Table 1 for more details).
925 Concerning RQ3 (What enablers and impediments are guiding LI decision-making by SLs?), the balance
926 between enablers and impediments can lead to one of three outcomes: status quo, disintegration, or
927 full LI. Given the multifaceted nature of LI, we show how the insights gained in RQ2 can be integrated
928 into the discussion of enablers and impediments in RQ3.
929
930 12.2. Managerial implications
931
932 The research contributes to a more general discussion on managerial implications in an LI
933 context. This paper provides a detailed strategic insight into LI in container shipping. This insight can
934 help practitioners such as carriers, ports authorities, traders, and other relevant stakeholders in the
935 MarSC to formulate proactive and reactive initiatives to position themselves within an increasingly
936 competitive market. Among these, strategists and executives are advised to pay attention to the
937 following:
938
939 • Developing a holistic strategic approach: executives are advised to consider that their strategic
940 actions on one facet can sometimes have an unintended consequence on the other facets, just as
941 these actions can exacerbate or diminish related impediments and enablers. Strategists are
942 therefore advised to pursue LI strategic plans that are holistic, coherent, and consistent over time.
943 • Adopting a clear roadmap for effective LI: SLs that continually chase down the next “new logistics
944 thing” may run the risk of pursuing initiatives in the wrong order or duplicating efforts and
945 investments. Executives are advised to re-evaluate all other investments and activities in terms of
946 how well they support the LI strategy. A clear strategic roadmap with a prioritization process can
947 help to mitigate this phenomenon.
948 • Promoting an adaptative corporate culture: executives should pay more careful attention to
949 strategic adaptation because as pointed out by Kraatz and Zajac (2001), adapting too quickly to
950 environmental changes may harm the organization's well-being by depleting the very resources that
951 it has previously relied on for success. An adaptive corporate culture can mitigate this phenomenon.
952 • Operationalizing well-constructed mission statements: executives should communicate not only on
953 which functional domains the SL will be active, but also on how much emphasis will be placed on
954 each (Hambrick and Frederickson, 2005). These mission statements make it clear that the changes
955 being made will be significant (Kunisch et al., 2017) and, therefore, carry a symbolic message to
956 internal and external stakeholders, indicating that the transition to LI will be extensive and wide-
957 ranging. Management of SLs should also engage with their clients to determine whether these
958 mission statements operationally result in effective customized solutions and integrated services.
959 • Seizing mutually reinforcing synergies: a careful balance is needed to avoid failures in managing the
960 expanded spectrum as the services and the customer base become more diverse. Not being able to
961 deliver this strategy in day-to-day operations can weaken the foundation of the new global logistics
962 integrators. In selecting functional domains in which they will be active, strategists should give
963 explicit preference to logistics segments that are mutually reinforcing, consistent with the SL’s
964 resources and capabilities, and highly relevant in the arenas the SL has targeted.
965
966 12.2 Limitations and recommendations for upcoming research
967
968 This research also presents some limitations that pave avenues for further research. Further
969 research could deal with the following:
970 • Expanding the case-study: the case-study selection was limited to three SLs only that might be the
971 more advanced in terms of LI. Further research could be pursued on why other SLs have not taken
972 steps towards LI taking into account differences in economic settings, ownership and governance
973 structures and historical development paths. Further investigation into alternative SLs may also
974 provide insights as to whether the case-study selection has affected the study's findings.
975 • Testing the generality of the proposed approach and methodology in other industries: future
976 research could test the applicability of the proposed framework to other industries undergoing
977 major strategic changes and overall disruptions.
978 • Translating the strategic model into quantitative data: as LI is still ongoing, this paper does not
979 provide final conclusions on the reach of LI steps, especially their impacts on market structure and
980 performance. This limitation may require additional research to analyze if LI cascades into strong
981 financial figures in the logistics divisions of container SLs.
982 • Confirming the reliability of the research framework over time: the research scope cannot anticipate
983 far-reaching changes in external conditions such as regulatory intervention or changing market
984 conditions that could lead to a reorientation or even path disruption in LI strategies. Just as high
985 freight rates and growing consumer demand for integrated services have justified to re-open the LI
986 discussion, new external developments in the industry may change the cards as well. Future
987 research may involve adding more predictive variables to the model to make it more resilient to
988 industry changes.
989 • Investigating how others supply chain actors respond to the LI: potential impact of LI steps of other
990 parties such as e-commerce firms, retailers and 3PLs have not been assessed in detail, in particular
991 their impact on the strategic behavior of SLs and alliance stability. Further research could be
992 pursued to analyze whether SLs will have incentives to return to a defensive approach favoring
 993 disintegration to safeguard their core ocean business, if other supply chain actors launch logistics
994 counterattacks.
995
996 Funding
997
998 This research received no external funding.
999
1000 Conflicts of Interest
1001
1002 The authors declare no conflict of interest.
1003
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Figure 1: The Strategic ‘Diamond’ Research Framework on LI in Container Shipping
Figure 2: Critical juncture, institutionalization, and path confirmation of the strategic
reformulation processes of the selected SLs between 2016 and 2022
Figure 3: Strategic radar chart on the adjacencies moves of the selected SLs
Figure 4: Enablers and impediments: status quo, integration, and disintegration
Table 1: Summarizing reading grid on the facets, building blocks, attributes of LI within the
selected SLs and their link to the related research questions