Treaty of Ancon

The Treaty of Ancón, officially the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
republics of Chile and Peru, was signed by the representatives of Chile, Jovino Novoa
Vidal, and Peru, José Antonio de Lavalle, on October 20, 1883, in Lima , the Peruvian
capital although it was made in Ancón. The treaty ended the Pacific War and stabilized
post-war relations between them.
Of the 14 articles of the treaty, the first reestablishes peace, in the second Peru cedes
to Chile perpetually and unconditionally the dominion over the department of
Tarapacá and in the third determines the Chilean occupation for a period of ten years
of the provinces of Tacna and Arica. Once that period expires, a plebiscite would be
organized to determine the nationality of these and other concessions. Articles five to
twelve determine the financial and commercial obligations that will affect the
exploitation of guano and saltpeter, Peruvian debts, and compensation to Chilean
citizens expelled from Peru. The last two articles stipulate the recognition of
administrative and judicial acts during the occupation and the ratification of the treaty
itself.
The negotiations occurred during the War of the Pacific, while Lima was occupied by
the Chilean army and were initiated and carried out by the Peruvian government of
Miguel Iglesias against the opposition of the Peruvian government of Lizardo Montero
who represented an important part of the Peruvian political spectrum. After the battle
of Huamachuco, in August 1883, and the flight of Montero to Bolivia, the military
leader of the opposition, Cáceres chose to recognize the treaty as a fait accompli.
However, Peru's European creditors opposed the treaty and achieved joint action by
the governments of their countries against it, which was unsuccessful due to the joint
response of Chile and Peru.

Historic context
After the occupation of Lima by the Chilean army in January 1881, the Pacific War did
not find an end but continued to bleed both countries and plunge Peru into a civil war
that at times seemed to endanger its existence as a nation. Although everyone wanted
peace, the belligerents, especially Peru and Chile, could not agree on a peace treaty.
Bolivia had an expectant attitude, hoping to recover the territories occupied by Chile in
1879.
To the extent that blood was spilled and resources were consumed, the costs of war,
the conditions of peace hardened. If before the war the dispute was over taxes, after
the occupation of Antofagasta, Chile did not agree to vacate it without guarantees as
requested by the Peruvian mediation of José Antonio de Lavalle. And after the capture
of the Huáscar, in an offer of mediation from the plenipotentiary minister of the
United States in Bolivia, Solomon Newton Pettis, Chile demanded the cession of
Antofagasta.1 During the Arica peace conference, on the USS Lackwanna, Chile
demanded the transfer of Antofagasta and Tarapacá, plus the guarantees that it would
not be threatened by a Peru-Bolivia treaty.
Creditors
The Guano Era and the war itself had left Peru mired in enormous debts that had been
guaranteed with the wealth of guano and saltpeter and its creditors exerted pressure
and influence to obtain payment. Among the creditors were the financiers of the loans
of 1868, 1870 and 1872 that had financed the construction of Peru's railways, the
holders of the bonds with which Peru had paid for the expropriation of the nitrate
mines in 1875, the Dreyfuss House, in charge of sell Peruvian guano in Europe on
behalf of the Peruvian state and that had made advance payments to Peru (see
Dreyfus Contract), Crédit Industriel et Commercial, a French consortium to which M.
Prado gave him the consignment of the guano in Europe in exchange for heavy loans at
the beginning of the war but which Piérola had ousted and reinstated Dreyfuss, and
the Peruvian Company, an American company based solely on the supposed rights of
Alexander Cochet by US $900,000,000 (at the time) for having been the discoverer of
the industrial use of guano and Jean Theophile Landreau for US$300,000,000 (at the
time) for having discovered several nitrate mines in Tarapacá.2:4353 :70 (Do not
confuse the Peruvian Company with the Peruvian Guano Company, which was
appointed consignee in 1876 for 4 years in the so-called Raphael Contract.4:145)
Meanwhile, the Chilean government, which had privatized the Tarapacá nitrate mines,
had restarted the production and sale of guano and saltpeter and granted the creditors
of the Peruvian debt a part of the profits, but the Peruvian Company and Crédit
Industriel were not affiliated with the government. of Chile5 but offered the
governments of García Calderón and Montero to keep Tarapacá under Peruvian
sovereignty and pay compensation to Chile in exchange for control of the nitrate and
guano mines of Peru.
United States intervention
Main article: Foreign intervention in the Pacific War
See also: Big Stick and Gunboat Diplomacy.
The American administration of Rutherford Hayes (1877-81), although it did not
achieve success, did not worsen the situation, despite the proposal of its
plenipotentiary minister in Lima, Christiancy, to annex Peru to the United States. It
should also be noted that American mediation achieved the signing of the 1881
boundary treaty between Chile and Argentina.6:p50
The factor that most influenced Peru's denial of the cession was the US mediation
policy during the administration of US President James A. Garfield (March to
September 1881) and his Secretary of State (Minister of Foreign Affairs) James G.
Blainen 1, carried out by its representative in Lima Stephen A. Hurlbut, who
encouraged Peruvian politicians not to sign the surrender of Tarapacá, suggesting that
the United States of America would support Peru and Bolivia militarily. The
interference of private economic interests and lack of professionalism led to the
unnecessary prolongation of the war through American mediation.6:40:49
Through skillful lobbying and commission offers, Crédit Industriel first gained the
support of the US plenipotentiary minister in Paris, Levi P. Morton, who in exchange
obtained the monopoly on the sale of Peruvian saltpeter in the United States. Morton
informed Blaine that the president of France Jules Grévy condemned the "extravagant
pretensions of Chile." J. Blaine then supported the Crédit Industriel firm in its project
to pay Chile compensation, prevent the transfer of territory and leave Tarapacá under
the private control of the company. This plan had the approval of the García Calderón
government.7 But when American public opinion did not show interest but rather
criticism in the intervention, Blaine abandoned the Crédit Industriel project and
supported the Peruvian Company.2:435 To achieve For his purposes, Hurlbut managed
to unite Cáceres and García Calderón around Montero as president of Peru (to the
detriment of Piérola) and maintained that the US would not accept the forced cession
of Peruvian territory to Chile.8 Furthermore, Hurlbut He even negotiated the Peruvian
cession of Chimbote for the US Navy.9 and Hurlbut would obtain economic benefits
from the base.10

The assassination of US President James A. Garfield in September 1881, the

inauguration of President Arthur and his new Secretary of State, Frederick T.
Frelinghuysen and the subsequent accusation in the North American Senate against
Blaine for influence peddling led the US and Chile to sign the Viña del Mar Protocol11
in which the US, among others, accepts Chile's right to annex Tarapacá as war
compensation.12 Hurlbut died in Lima and Trescott took over as minister in Lima.n 2

Historian Jason Zorbas wrote:

In fact, it is possible to state that American attempts to affect the peace settlement not
only prolonged the War but made the final peace much harsher on Peru and Bolivia,
contrary to America's intentions, and cost America considerable prestige in all three
countries.
(In fact, it is possible to say that American attempts to influence the peace agreement
not only prolonged the war but made the peace reached harder on Peru and Bolivia,
contrary to the intentions of the United States, and diminished considerable prestige in
the three countries)6:p66
Miguel Iglesias and the Montán Manifesto
Main article: Government of Miguel Iglesias
When Cáceres raised the peasant and indigenous masses to fight the Chileans, it had
created a social conflict within the country, since the peasants demanded a share of
power that the landowners could not give them without affecting the social structure.
Furthermore, many Peruvians felt threatened more by the indigenous people than by
the Chileans.

On August 31, 1882, in view of the disasters caused by the fighting in the country and
the impossibility of militarily defeating the occupying army, Colonel Miguel Iglesias,
with the support of the northern provinces of Peru, issued the Montán manifesto. ,
calling for peace to be signed between Chile and Peru, accepting the territorial transfer
as part of the agreement; In January 1883, Iglesias proclaimed himself "Regenerating
President of the Republic" and his envoy José Antonio de Lavalle began the discussion
of a peace treaty with the Chilean negotiators led by Jovino Novoa Vidal who agreed
on the bases of the treaty on May 3. of 1883.

Avelino Cáceres, who was strictly opposed to accepting the cession of territories, tried
to put an end to the Iglesias government and marched north, but was defeated in the
battle of Huamachuco on July 10, 1883. The disappointment generated by the defeat
among the enemies of peace was taken advantage of by Iglesias and Lynch (the head
of the Chilean occupation government) to consolidate the Iglesias government, who
arrived in Lima on October 23, 1883. On October 22, 1883, the Chilean army had
occupied Ayacucho, seat of Lizardo Montero's government.
Miguel Iglesias convened a Constituent Congress that, under the presidency of Antonio
Arenas, elected Miguel Iglesias himself as Provisional President. The agreement
between the governments was signed on October 20, 1883 between Jovino Novoa, for
Chile, and José Antonio de Lavalle and Mariano Castro Zaldívar for Peru.

The treaty was approved in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies by 43 votes to one. In the
Chilean Senate, its approval was unanimous. The National Assembly of Peru ratified
the treaty on March 8, 1884 by 99 votes to 6.2:468

Influences and interests

In summary, it can be said that Iglesias' Peruvian government negotiated the treaty
under strong internal and external pressures:

Each group of creditors wanted priority and quick payment through the income from
guano and saltpeter.
Chile demanded the transfer of Tarapacá and at least temporary control of Tacna and
Arica
Cáceres and Montero refused to accept a territorial cession and considered Iglesias a
traitor
Social and ethnic tensions in Peru increased with the duration of the state of war
The duration of the Iglesias government was uncertain, since the Chileans abandoned
Lima
The Peruvian negotiators wrote to the council of ministers when delivering the agreed
text: Although its stipulations are certainly not those to which our patriotism aspires,
they are, nevertheless, the most advantageous that could be obtained, given the
conditions in which Peru finds itself13

In turn, Chile had to act quickly since14 it faced strong international opposition for
maintaining the occupation of Peru3:92 the creditors harassed it for the payment of
debts, it began to glimpse the problems of the 1881 treaty with Argentina, the
occupation had a cost considerable human resources still had to solve the problem of
Bolivia's exit to the sea
Bolivia did not recognize the government of Miguel Iglesias and therefore did not
participate in the negotiations despite the importance of the matter for the highland
country, since it is Bolivia's natural outlet to the sea.
It should be noted that if an agreement was not reached, the Chilean government
would probably have withdrawn its troops to the Sama River and waited for the
international border to be consolidated there or would have handed over part or all of
the region to Bolivia.15: 259

Signing of the treaty

In December 1882 Miguel Iglesias was elected President of Peru by an assembly in the
north, on October 18, 1883 Chile recognized the Iglesias government and two days
later the treaty was signed in Lima. Peru ratified the treaty on March 10, 1884 and the
ratifications were exchanged on March 28, 1884.16:12417:pp. 606-07

Along with the treaty, a complementary protocol was signed that determined the
conditions under which the military occupation would remain in the meantime until its
withdrawal: payment by Peru of $300,000 per month, supply from Chile free of taxes,
two exclusive hospitals for Chilean soldiers and the use of telegraphs. and railways
under conditions analogous to the government of Peru. (Bulnes, III, 521)

The clauses of the treaty

Articles 1, 2, 11, 13 and 14 reestablish peace (art. 1) and the commercial laws in force
before the war (art. 11), they cede to Chile perpetually and unconditionally the
province of Tarapacá (art. 2), recognize the validity of the Chilean administrative and
judicial acts that occurred during the military occupation of Peru (art. 13) and finally,
they order the exchange of ratifications of the treaty within 160 days (art. 14).

Article 3 was the most controversial and stipulated that the territory of the provinces
of Arica and Tacna would continue to be owned by Chile for 10 years, after which a
plebiscite would decide which country the inhabitants wanted to belong to. The
winning country had to pay $10,000,000 to the other. The plebiscite was not held and
the status quo remained until 1929 when Tacna was returned to Peru and Arica
remained as Chilean territory. According to some Chilean historians (Bulnes III), the
"spirit" of the article was a covert transfer (to save the honor of the Iglesias
government) of both provinces to Chile and destined to be delivered to Bolivia when
peace was signed with the country of the plateau. This interpretation is denied by J.
Basadre18 or by Cárlos Paz Soldan.19

Articles 4 to 10 deal with the economic consequences of the change of ownership of

guano and saltpeter deposits. Chile had to allocate 50% of the profits from the sale of
guano from already known deposits to pay the Peruvian debt. Profits obtained from
deposits unknown before the treaty would be entirely for Chile (art. 4), this was valid
for any form of sales contract (art. 7). Peru and Chile had to agree on sales prices and
quantities to prevent harmful competition (art. 5), creditors had to have their titles
qualified by the Chilean authorities (art. 6) and other debt securities would not be
recognized (art. 8). The Lobos de Afuera Islands would remain under Chilean
administration and exploitation as long as there were exploitable guano deposits and
50% of the profits had to be delivered to Peru (art. 9 and 10).

Article 12 established arbitration tribunals that determined the compensation to be

paid to Chilean citizens expelled from Peru whose property had been seized at the
beginning of the war.

Immediate consequences of the treaty

Cáceres recognized the treaty "as a fait accompli" on June 6, 188420 and concentrated
on overthrowing the Iglesias government by starting the civil war of 1884-85. The US
and the German Empire recognized the Iglesias government in April of that
year.16:125 On November 3, 1883, Bolivia recognized the Iglesias government.

On February 15, 1884, the governments of France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy,
Belgium and Spain presented a note of claim to the governments of Chile and Peru in
which they protested the transfer to Chile of deposits of guano and saltpeter that were
guarantee of debts contracted by the Peruvian state with the nationals of the
respective countries.21 Peru and Chile responded that they were sovereign countries
that arranged their treaties according to their interests. The Chilean historian Mario
Barros in "Diplomatic History of Chile" (p. 472) maintains that the refusal of the United
States and Germany to participate in the claim weakened the protest and even made
the Europeans fear consequences if pressure was increased. on both contracting
countries, although it did have long consequences in the courts.

In August 1884, Chilean troops retreated to the line of the Sama River.

Another consequence of the genesis of the treaty was the US regulations that since
then prohibit diplomats from that country from any business relationship in the
country of their appointment.22

Tarata
Tarata was left under the Chilean occupation, but was handed over to Peru in 1925,
before the Treaty of Lima and for different reasons.

Castellón-Elías Protocol
On January 8, 1890, the Castellón-Elías protocol was signed, which handed over
practically all of Tarapacá's guano exploitation to Peru, under the condition that it
must be handed over to creditors. In exchange, the creditors recognized that the debt
transferred to Chile for the occupation of the mortgaged deposits was limited to that
indicated in the Treaty of Ancón.16:132

The dispute of Tacna and Arica

See also: Chilenization of Tacna and Arica, Treaty of Lima, Question of Tacna and Arica
and War of Don Ladislao.
The plebiscite of Tacna and Arica, which was to be held no later than 1894, was never
carried out and the "Captive Provinces", as they were called in Peru, remained
occupied until 1929. Apparently, no agreement was reached on who the voters were
(only those born in the area or immigrants and from how many years old). Chilean
interest in conserving the region to give it access to the sea for Bolivia was also an
important factor.

In 1888 Chile offered $10,000,000 for the purchase of the disputed region; in 1890,
after a French protest to Peru for non-payment of the debt, Chile repeated the offer.
Peru offered Chile commercial privileges in exchange for the delivery of the two
provinces plus customs facilities for Bolivia.16:134

In 1904 Chile and Bolivia signed the Peace Treaty which, among others, gave
guarantees to Bolivia for the use of the port of Arica and the construction of a railway
line between the port and La Paz, committing Tacna and Arica to the dispute. a third
country (as Bolivia had done in the Puna de Atacama). Furthermore, in an additional
secret treaty, Chile agreed to hand over to Bolivia the two Peruvian provinces if it
obtained them from Peru or a strip in the south of Arica (Vitor a Camarones), a
territory that did not belong to it.16: 135

The dispute over Tacna and Arica overshadowed relations between the former
belligerents, but also influenced relations with other countries. In 1889 Peru offered
the port of Chimbote to the United States as a coaling station for its navy in exchange
for the latter's guarantee for the territorial integrity of the former.16:136 For its part,
Chile promoted an "entente" with Colombia and Ecuador as well as, in the May Pacts,
he obtained the Argentine commitment not to interfere in the affairs of the Pacific
coast.16:143

On April 9, 1898, the Billinghurst-La Torre protocol was signed, which provided for the
plebiscite with the Queen of Spain as the decisive instance in the selection of voters
and the neutral member of the electoral college. Peru approved the agreement, but
the Chilean Senate requested clarifications and it was not approved.16:142

In 1910, Bolivia suggested that Peru hand over Tacna and Arica to obtain access to the
sea. Peru rejected the suggestion.23

Starting in 1910, Chile announced that it considered the 10-year period as a minimum
period for the occupation of the disputed region and expelled Peruvian workers and
priests during a process of Chileanization of the disputed region. That year Chile and
Peru broke their diplomatic relations.16:154

On November 1, 1920, the Peruvian delegation to the League of Nations, a

supranational body created to promote peace, requested the international
organization to review the treaty of Ancón, in particular requesting the return of
Tacna, Arica and Tarapacá because According to the new precepts of international law,
the annexation of territories was not permitted and also because Chile would have
annulled the treaty, systematically violating all the clauses favorable to Peru. The same
day, Bolivia presented a similar request demanding the return of Antofagasta. The
proposals were not accepted by the assembly.16:160

In 1922, US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes persuaded the litigants to accept
the Washington Agreement of 1922, which provided for arbitration on the feasibility of
the plebiscite provided for in Article III of the Treaty of Ancón and, if feasible,
determining the rules to follow. If the referendum is not feasible, present some other
solution. The arbitrator decided at the Coolidge Award, on March 4, 1925, that the
plebiscite was feasible, but in 1926, the president of the commission in charge of
organizing the plebiscite blamed Chile for preventing the referendum from taking
place.16:163

Finally, both governments agreed to restart their diplomatic relations and bilaterally
negotiate a solution to the problem, which they agreed to with the Treaty of Lima.
In 1975 Chile and Bolivia signed the Charaña Agreement and asked Peru to allow the
delivery of a strip of the province of Arica to Bolivia. Peru rejected the proposal.