Year Vessel Rejected by Inspection VIQ Index(VIQ7)

Company

2008 VLCC BP BP 5.16

7.12
(Total of 28
observations were
pointed out, the above
1
two cases appear to be
HIgh Risk)

2 2010 VLCC SHELL SHELL 5.43

2010 MR Tanker BP BP 5.16

3
2011 MR Tanker BP BP 4.60
4
2011 VLCC BP BP 8.20(Petroleum)
8.21(Petroleum)
5

2011 VLCC BP BP 8.21

2012 AFRAMAX Petronas Petronas 5.17

Tanker
7

2012 MR Tanker BP BP 8.19

8
 2012 MR Tanker BP BP 3.3
5.23
5.23
5.9
5.44
9

2012 MR Tanker BP BP 6.30

10

2013 VLCC SHELL SHELL 5.24

11

2013 MR Tanker SHELL 10.29

12 10.34

13 2013 Chemical SHELL SHELL 8.10(Chemical)

2014 MR Tanker BP SHELL 4.13
14
15 2014 MR Tanker BP SHELL 4.10
2014 MR Tanker BP SHELL 4.12
16
17 2014 VLCC BP PSC 5.28

2014 VLCC BP PSC 5.28

18
2015 MR Tanker BP BP 4.13
19
2015 MR Tanker BP BP 8.20(Petroleum)
20
2015 MR Tanker BP BP 5.16

21

22 2015 MR Tanker BP 5.13

 2015 MR Tanker SHELL SHELL 10.31
23
2015 VLCC SHELL PSC 5.27
5.28
5.29

24

2016 MR Tanker CHEVRON CHEVRON 5.90

25
2016 MR Tanker BP BP 5.39
10.21

26

2016 MR Tanker BP BP 3.2

5.16

27
 2016 MR Tanker SHELL SHELL 8.26(Petroleum)
8.3(Petroleum)
28

2017 MR Tanker BHP BHP 8.18(Petrolum)

29 8.13(Petroleum)

2017 LRII BP BP 4.20

30
2017 LPG ADNOC SHELL 2.3
3.2
4.1
5.37
8.15(LPG)
8.60(LPG)

31

2017 LNG BP SHELL 11.11

32
 2018 MR Tanker CHEVRON AMPOL 8.20(Chemical)
8.23(Chemical)

33

2018 MR Tanker SHELL BP 4.10

34
2018 LPG BP SHELL 4.2
8.23(LPG)
2.1
4.10
35
8.69(LPG)

2019 LPG BP SHELL 4.15

8.12(LPG)
8.52(LPG)

36

2019 LRII BP BP 4.14

4.17
5.19
8.3(Petroleum)
37 8.31(Petroleum)

2020 LPG BP BP 2.7

38 10.32
 2020 MR Tanker BP BHP 6.13
9.8
11.11
5.22
5.10
39 2.16

2020 MR Tanker AMPOL BHP 5.38

10.12
10.32
40 11.4

2020 VLCC BP BP 8.46(Petroleum)

10.29
10.32

41
 2020 MR Tanker BP BP 9.29
10.31
9.5

42

2017～ MR Tanker BP, TOTAL, BP, TOTAL, IMT 11.10

43 2019 IMT

4.60

44

4.50

45

MR Tanker SHELL SHELL 8.21

46
 MR Tanker 5.43
47
 History of high risk findings basis that vessels were rejected by Oil majors
(updated 21-Apr-21)

A VLCC (age less than a year) was rejected by BP and by other oil majors in year 2008 basis failure o
numerous findings in inspection (please refer to the attached findings).

One of the underlying cause was, instead of senior officers, a junior officer accompanied inspector dur
inspection. Questions posed by inspector were not satisfactorily answered.

View high importance associated with SIRE inspection from vessel's business point-of-view, it is param
importance that vessel remains well prepared and inspector is accompanied by senior officers. This is to
inspector's query is adequately answered during inspection stage.

VLCC- 03 SCBA sets found leaking from hose connect to air bottle

There have been rejection of vessels basis incorrect filling up of enclosed space permit. BP construed
senior officers are not serious to fill up permit correctly, there is strong likelihood of taking shortcuts in
space entry.
Vessel passed through restricted visibility area, however, watch level was not increased as per SMS an
checklist was used.
VLCC (BP)- The spark arrester of PV hi vent valve were rusted and corroded to extent that it holed wh
with finger.
IG valves of few tanks were not locked after last tank cleaning operation, even though rounds of inspe
officers were conducted after tank cleaning and prior commencing cargo operation.
VLCC- The flame screen on vacuum side of PV valve was wasted. When slightly pressed to check stre
Rejected by BP basis repeated finding on chapter 8 in back to back BP inspections dated 12-Sep-11. V
rejected till 12-March-12 basis a successful BP inspection after 12-March-12. However, acceptance sta
reinstated due owners do not require BP vetting.

Aframax Tanker (Petronas)- While entering in pump room along with inspector, the pump room atmo
checked as part of pre entry check. The H2S content was noted 4-6 ppm due to low battery voltage o
While investigation was underway to confirm correct H2S content, pump-man ignored the H2S readin
down in pump room. Petronas construed that pump man (representing ship's crew members) was no
hazards of H2S ( which could even result in fatality), as result, ignored H2S reading and entered in pu

a). MR tanker (BP)- While discharging at Australia, low pressure developed in Non Working Cargo Tanks (non w
were vapor segregated to prevent vapor migration), however, no action was taken by chief officer and tanks gr
slight negative pressure due to fall of ambient temperature.

Since C/O was experienced and working on NYKSM vessel for quite some time, BP construed that he might not
action in similar scenario on all his previous vessels, however, it could not identify by company till BP inspector
observation. This is one of the elementary safety practice of tankers which must not be breached and rejected v
business.
1. Use of non working language among officer and deck crew members in cargo operation.
2a). Tankscope RX 415 – One out of two meters on board was found failed for ‘zero calibration’ and fa
of 4 % VOL was displayed when tested during the inspection.
2b). Multi-Gas meter GX 111 kept at pump room top – faulty CO reading of 0-4 ppm.
3. The Ship/Shore Safety Checklist was not completed accurately. Items such as window type air con
system and vapour return line which were not applicable to the ship were still ticked as checked. The
a procedure under item ‘A’ were not specified in the remark column of the checklist.
4. One out of two EEBD sets (spare) kept in the Fire Station was found with low pressure (indicator sh
zone).

MR Tanker- At the manifold one 20 l plastic jerry can was kept. When inspector queried about the con
can, crew replied it AFFF solution for using along with applicator. When he further queried, it was foun
can had the OSD and applicator kept at manifold was not for foam but to spray OSD in case of major
This was a serious observation on crew knowledge and vessel was rejected. At present, since OSD is no
unless authorized by port, OSD and OSD applicator must not be kept at manifold.

VLCC- rejected by Shell basis incorrect / inadequate recordkeeping & documentation of hot work in en
The company approval of hot work did not match actual hot work time, there was not hot work plan,
risk assessment, no record of disabling and enabling of smoke detectors

MR tanker- In engine room at four location oil rags were found under machineries. Senior officer took
time to remote cut off of fuel tank of emergency generator.

Vessel on hold due to non operational Framo pump of 6S. Once pump repaired, Shell released accepta
MR Tanker- The NAVTEX was not printing message for past five days, BTM could realize it only when
by inspector.
MR Tanker- Navigating officer could not respond to vary basic questions of ECDIS e.g. ECDIS symbols
marks, channel
MR Tanker- Thedepth
recordetc.
of T&P correction / NAVTEX notices of ECDIS was not maintained.

1. VLCC- Basis PSC finding that lifeboat engine could not be started on individual batteries

VLCC- Life boat engine could not start within five attempts due weak battery.

NAVTEX Navigational warning (that was 07 miles from the charted passage) was marked as not appli
out and same was not plotted on the chart.

MR Tanker- Branch IG valve of one tank found unlocked

Vessel rejected basis findings of Ch4, 5, 6 and 8. Total 13 observations.

MR tanker on BP TC- Vessel did not record benzene in enclosed space entry of cargo tanks. // Entry
validity started prior to Master authorized entry (validity start time 0800 hrs Master signature 0825hrs
NYKSM on caution on repeated findings on enclosed space and incorrect record of rest hours. Highly I
Check past 06 months tank entry permits. If any issue is observed, send the erroneous permit to com
impart training to officers.

2. MR Tanker- Three engine room crew members were shown taking rest during routine drill.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that oil majors no more consider record keeping error of rest hour
error''. Even minor error rest hour record keeping can lead to vessel rejection.
The discharging line for the IGS scrubber of the sea water in the engine room was found temprarily repaired by
was also mentioned in Class Memo.
A VLCC was datained by PSC at Tianjin, China on 11th Mar. 2015. The vessel took corrective actions a
inspection had been done. Corrective actions had
been verified by PSC officers and the vessel released from detention on 13th Mar.. She left Tianjin afte
of discharging cargo on schedule without any delay. However, so
many 13 items of deficiencies including code 30 were pointed out.
Of the 13 dificiencies, 5 were points related to Lifeboat, which Shell held for a year.
・One limit switch for port side L/B david. - Malfunction
・The port side L/B engine can not be started by No.1 or No.2 battery.
・One handle of the hatch for port L/B - Out of order
・The flow of water can not cover the exterior of the L/B(P).
・The flow of water can not cover the exterior of the L/B(S).

In port, engine scavenge space was inspected without informing terminal and recording it ship-shore
checklist.
・NON IS type test kit was used in pump room for testing heat detector (this vessel was fitted with he
pump room) without hot work approval. Officers could get to know the test kit being non IS only after
pointed it out.
・While demonstrating operation of OMD; only trouble part of Oil Mist detector alarm could be genera
and oil mist level alarm did not activate.

Note- vessel was using 'stop-card' to block the light. Since opacity of stop card was very high and it w
the maker’s recommendation, instead of oil mist part of alarm, trouble alarms was being generated. L
fond that past many months during regular testing of OMD only trouble alarm was getting activated a
level alarm.

A review of enclosed space entry permits for the maintenance (painting) in #8 water ballast tank dated on 27 J
August 2016 and 02 August 2016 indicated that 2(two) DMA (Deck Maintenance Assistance) members entered
0805Lt and out from the space at 1550Lt on each day; however, the rest hour records indicated that these crew
were rested from 1200Lt to 1300Lt for a lunch break on each day.

Note-
1. For ballast tank maintenance, company provided 2 DMA. On enclosed space permit, only two DMA were show
tank 0805 and exit 1550. As usual DMA exited tank for tea and lunch break but it was not recorded in permit.

2. The other issue that DMA is most inexperience person onboard but no senior officer entered in tank
well being and to guide them for the job.
(Basis following repeated observations on same vessel)
1. As per calibration certificate of Pressure and temperature calibrators, the certificate was valid for one year. C
found expired at time of inspection.
2. The pressure test of cargo pipelines (1.5 times of MAWP) was conducted in DD; however, the test pressure
1.5 times of MAWP.

a) The tank dome on a product tanker found to have visible sign of leak from the dome packing.
B) The calibration of the cargo and ballast system pressure gauges was not conducted annually as required by c

UKC calculations for the this port were not done properly.
Six observations were pointed out, and the Hiigh risk seems to be a miscalculation UKC.
・SMS manuals including company policy were provided in electronic format only on bridge computer
independent means of power supply to the computer was provided at the time of inspection.
・Review of last month crew work and rest hour record revealed that the record of "Hours of rest in a
period" for C/E contained the rest hour less than 10 hours in 8 days and the same records for 2/E con
rest hour less than 10 hours in 4 days in the month of Feb. 2017, however no evidence of company fe
comments on these issues were sighted.
・ALDIS lamp was in use on board however no portable battery of minimum capacity for 2 hours peri
as per Res.MSC95 (75) was provided onboard.
・The enclosure with fire control plan was fitted at port and starboard ships accommodation ladder o
per MSC circ.451, in oil tankers, chemical tankers & gas carriers the fire control plans should not be lo
exterior boundaries of superstructures which face cargo tanks and on the surfaces within 3 m from th
side.
・The cargo pump delivery valve indicator fitted on No.4 cargo tank dome (S) was out of service indic
value between zero and 100% open position while the valve was actually opened at 35% only
・Cargo delivery line fitted on tank dome of No2 & No.3 was observed to be heavily rusted and paint
partly cracked, although evidence of crew maintenance on the said piping was sighted
・The pressure gauge fitted to the outboard of off shore side (port) manifold on no.2 liquid line was in
pressure at 140 kPa while the gate valve at manifold was closed position.

11 in number light shades in the motor room and 2 in number of the light in the compressor room pla
cylindrical shades were cracking. The long crack when thumb pressed on either side were causing clea
and gap.
Rejected due to repeated remarks. The ship was considered to be for sale and the repair costs were s
MR tanker - CHEVRON
a) Cargo tanks 6(S) & 6(P) which were not being discharged were checked for Oxygen content. COT 6(S) Oxyg
stopped dropping after 9.8% Another Gas meater was used with the same results. Cargo tanks 6(P) was then c
Oxygen content and found with 9.7%. Chief officer advised that all cargo tanks were checked before arrival and
8% Oxygen.
This was a very serious observation as fraudulent entries were also found in respect to this observation
ii) IGS interlock switch which trips cargo pumps when cargo tank pressure reaches below defined limit was bypa

MR Tanker - SHELL - VDR not operational on day of inspection - Flag State dispensation was taken

LPG Tanker - BP - High number of observations - Observations on

1. Parallel Indexing not used in Passage plan.
2. Damaged insulation on Cargo Valves.
3. PMS overdue for Cargo Hold Space inspection.
4. Doppler Log not working.
5. Soft Patch on Deck Spray Line.

LPG Tanker - BP - High number of observations - Observations on

1. Only one set of safety parameters was used for the whole voyage in contrary to company policy, w
different settings, based on the different UKC requirements, in the different areas.
2. The pressure test of the cargo manifold connection was not recorded in the port log. (Leak test).
3. The selector switches for the cargo tank pressure alarms were still in 'sea condition' and not 'harbo

・The Navigating Officer was not familiar with mandatory alarms & method of testing and unable to id
Isolated Danger mark
・Enclosed space entry made into COT 3 starboard and 6 starboard,the designated attendant on deck
trained personnel(cadet).
・Cargo line pressure test, actual MAWP for the cargo lines were 12 bars(cargo pump head 120 mete
the operator has set the MAWP to 10 bars in their SMS and last test for 150% of the MAWP.
・There were no relief valve fitted on the piping system.
・No procedures available in the SMS regarding over pressure due to purging & blowing with nitrogen
Based on the above five points, BP seems to have rated ECDIS and Enclose as High Risk and decrared
hold.
LPG Tanker - BP - Class outstanding recommendations -
1. Temporarily repaired stern tube sealing system, "Indented side shell plate top edge in connection
deck and main deck plate.
MR/CHEM Tanker - BP - High number of Observations - Observation on
1. ODME got locked while Ch.Mate attempted the simulation test during inspection, system rendered
operational.
2. Twin ropes of dissimilar type/strength were sighted in use both in fore & aft locations.
3. The Pumpmans helmet light was broken & not gastight.
4. WBT gas sensor system has the pipework fitted outside the Cabinet, so a leak in those pipes will no
up by the sensor fitted inside.
5. Several compartment doors were fitted with padlock eyes devoid of internal freeing devices to avo
entrapment.Main Accommodation Doors had these but they were seized with paint & rust.
6. The ladders in the WBTs inspected were in fair & weak condition due to corrosion

MR Tanker - AMPOL -
1. The fire isolation valve that separates the engine room from the deck was unable to fully close.
2. The emergency fuel shut quick closing valve on number two (2) generator was activated and failed
3. The number two (2) generator was sighted with a moderate oil leak from the outboard number thr
cylinder crankcase mist detector door.
4. The vessels service pipelines were in poor condition. There was hard rust sighted on the bunker, ai
condensate
VLCC - BP - lines. There was hard rust sighted on the electrical conduits and boxes.
1. 2 of total 5 gas sampling points in the pump room were set to stop sampling at the time of the insp
inspector asked the reason, Chief Officer switched on those sample points (pump room exhaust duct #
and flow fail alarm became activated from pump room exhaust duct #1.
2. Hydraulic oil was accumulated (about 50 cm x 50 cm area) within the saveall for steering gear lube
tank.
3. It was observed oil was leaking from oil seal of main engine alpha lubricator pump #1.
MR - BP -
1) The emergency towing procedure was generic. There was no ship specific procedure in place.The v
emergency towing chain/chaffing gear was tightly stowed in basket on the forecastle.There was no
safe or timely way due to the length and weight of the chain to remove the chain from basket
when required in an emergency situation. There were no lifting lugs sighted or for basket to be
removed from around the chain.
2) Pipeline condition in Engine Room - The starboard sea water sea chest line of approximately 450 m
diameter was sighted with numerous areas of hard rust of approximately 100 millimetres in
diameter across the entire pipeline length.
3) Repeated finding on Ship Design MBL and non compliance with MEG4 requirements of LDBF - The
design minimum breaking load (MBL) was 55 tons.
The line design breaking force (LDBF) of the mooring lines were 70 tons approximately 20%
greater than the ship design MBL. The MEG 4 and the operators guidelines require the LDBF be
5% greater than ship design MBL.

There have been 4 different cases of rejection basis SIRE Observation on condition of outer hull paint
/ TOTAL & IMT

MR Tanker- While coming in port watch level 2 was assigned. However, when pilot came on bridge, M
look out man for the deck duties. When queried by inspector, Master got bit agitated and replied
had also a pair of eyes and he was looking out. If I sent look-out man what was wrong.
Bp took this observation very seriously and basis non compliance of watch level matrix of SMS, rejecte

Inspector asked to show the tidal information. Vessel did not have TOTAL tide program, Second office
unauthorized tidal program (downloaded from internet) to show the tidal information. Inspector did n
tidal height and asked second officer to calculate secondary port tide using ATT. Second officer could
tidal height of secondary port.
This resulted in serious observation on crew competence and vessel rejected by oil major.

MR Tanker- Prior to loading vessel did tank cleaning / purging and gas freeing operations. Till loading
port, vessel did not take note of black soot marks on sides of PV valve. On the day of inspection, Mast
ordered crew members to paint over the black streaks on side of PV valve. However, crew mistook or
painted over entire PV valve body including the top cone.
While deck round by inspector, the paint dried up and inspector wrote observation that cone was pain
same vessel, a few ropes were hanging loose from PV valve. When inspector queried, crew answered
rope for tying up PV valve so as it does not operate in heavy weather.
Shell took it as gross negligence of safety and rejected vessel.
MR Tanker- Inspector asked accompanying engineering officer to put on full body harness and SCBA s
could not do it in reasonable time.