Agoraki, Maria Eleni; Tsamis, Anastasios

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Bank profitability and regulation in emerging
European markets

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1

Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging

European Markets

Maria-Eleni K. Agoraki*
Athens University of Economics and Business & Panteion University, Greece

Anastasios Tsamis
Panteion University, Greece

This paper investigates the effect of bank-specific, industry-specific and

macroeconomic determinants, as well as the regulatory environment on the
profitability of the emerging European banking sector over the period
2000-2016. Banks in countries with higher capital requirements, market
discipline and more restrictions on banking activities performed better, while the
better-performing banks had extensive foreign ownership. The empirical
analysis reveals that performance is affected by bank-specific determinants like
equity capital and bank size, while traditional activities lead to increased
profitability. The specific measures of economic policy must be oriented
towards specific aspects of the banking business. This will set new standards in
performance and efficiency, urging bank management to address particular
firm-specific issues, such as the composition of the balance sheet, the quality of
the credit portfolio, as well as the range of financial products and services.
Overall, the evidence shows that regulation, and balance sheets help in
understanding bank profitability during the crisis.

Keywords: banking sector profitability; financial crisis; regulatory

framework; emerging markets

* An earlier version was presented at the Hellenic Finance and Accounting Association
(H.F.A.A.), 16-17 December 2016, Thessaloniki, Greece and thanks are due to conference
participants for valuable comments and discussions. The paper has also benefited from
helpful comments and discussions by seminar participants at Athens University of Economics
and Business and Panteion University. We thank Manthos Delis, Dimitris Georgoutsos,
Iftekhar Hasan, George Kouretas and Chris Tsoumas for many helpful comments and
discussions. Finally, we thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments which
improve the paper substantially. The usual caveat applies.

(Multinational Finance Journal, 2017, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 177–210)

© Multinational Finance Society, a nonprofit corporation. All rights reserved.
178 Multinational Finance Journal

Article history: Received: 18 July 2017, Received in final revised form: 17

February 2018, Accepted: 27 April 2018, Available online:
02 October 2018

I. Introduction

Credit institutions are idiosyncratic organizations bearing distinctive

intermediation characteristics and calling for exceptional regulatory
treatment. Banks provide liquidity insurance and allow better risk
sharing among depositors with varying consumption needs. Moreover,
they constitute the principal originators of non-market finance to the
economy while monitoring borrowers on behalf of lenders, hence
significantly reducing information asymmetry and screening costs. In
other words, the banking sector provides financing for commercial
enterprises, basic financial services and access to payment systems to
a broad segment of the population, turning itself to a critical component
of any economy.
The banking industry is one of the most regulated in the world. Two
arguments are usually presented to justify this kind of practice: systemic
risk and depositor protection. The first argument contends that the
purpose of regulation is to prevent systemic bank runs, which in turn
may be caused by the inherent instability of banks’ structure or
weaknesses in the framework within which banks operate. According
to the second argument, the regulation rationale builds on a corporate
governance problem. The challenge of safeguarding financial stability
has become even more vital in recent years in light of the new global
financial environment that has rapidly evolved. The new environment
is characterized by enhanced financial liberalization and integration,
rapid development of new financial products and technologies, as well
as consolidation in the banking industry and increasing competition
(Moshirian, 2008).
During the last three decades, forces such as globalization,
technological change, deregulation and European integration have
fundamentally transformed the European banking industry. It is clear
that rapid changes in the financial industry structure occur around the
globe. Even though banking system restructure was quite profound over
the last decade in most emerging European markets, there is still much
to be done for their financial systems to be classified in the category of
developed markets.1 The Central and Eastern European countries (CEE)

1. This term includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 179

have undergone major structural changes during the transition period

dated back in the early 1990s. They present a quite different group of
emerging economies as opposed to Latin America and Southeast Asia
since the last two groups have not gone through a transition from
centrally planned economies to market economies. Therefore the
establishment of financial markets and the banking sector is a fairly new
process and we expect that the determinants of CEE bank profitability
could differ to some extent from those in the banking system of Latin
America and Southeast Asia on the basis that although these economies
are considered to be emerging economies they have always operate
within the broad context of a market economy.
The varying transition paths from central planning to market
economy have resulted in different legal and politico-institutional
frameworks, which have consequently affected the efficient functioning
of banking systems and national economies in general. This process
involved the restructuring, rehabilitation and privatization of
state-owned banks, the liquidation of insolvent institutions and an
improvement in the administrative efficiency and capability of the
banking sector. Other factors that enhanced banking intermediation
were the introduction of new prudential regulation and tighter
supervision. Despite faster development in the second half of the 1990s,
when relatively stable financial and macroeconomic conditions
emerged, the quantity and quality of banking products and services still
lagged behind those of more developed European countries.
In emerging markets, an efficient and properly governed banking
sector is better equipped to withstand negative shocks and contribute to
the stability of the financial system, considering the underdeveloped, in
many cases, stock markets. Moreover, regulators are interested in the
sources of financial instability and mechanisms to avoid it, taking into
account that banks are highly leveraged firms taking a wide range of
complex risks in their daily operations, including, among others, credit,
liquidity, interest rate, operational and market risk. Capital adequacy
and liquidity requirements set by the regulators, constraints on large
exposures, and requirements concerning the efficiency of internal
control and risk management systems of financial institutions all
constitute an ex-ante response to systemic risk.
The intensified information asymmetry problems (Furfine, 2001)
and/or psychological factors may trigger the spread of isolated liquidity
problems into the banking system, as depositors may perceive such
problems as a warning sign of a more general banking crisis. The strong

Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

180 Multinational Finance Journal

interdependencies existing between banks also contribute to the

augmentation of the “contagion” or “domino” effect (Rochet and Tirole,
1996). It is believed that there could be a contagion effect resulting from
the instability of one bank, which would affect a class of banks or even
the entire financial system and the economy. As one bank becomes
unstable, there may be a heightened perception of risk among depositors
for the entire class of such banks, instigating a run on the deposits and
putting the entire financial system in jeopardy. The consequences of
mismanaging their risks can be severe indeed - not only for an
individual bank, but also for the system as a whole. This reflects the fact
that the failure of one bank can rapidly affect another through
inter-institutional exposures and confidence effects. Consequently any
prolonged and significant disruption of the financial system can
potentially incur severe repercussions on the wider economy.
The crisis reshaped the environment in a way that distorted the
features of the banking business and its income structure. With the
regulatory changes implemented (Basel III), a scenario of lower
profitability is emerging in which there will be a structural change in the
income structure. In times of both expansion and crisis, banks have
reacted to the changing environment with a view to maintaining their
levels of profitability (Maudos, 2017). A wide range of studies on
transition countries have highlighted the fact that the financial reform
process positively affects bank profitability and that a banking sector
reform is a necessary condition for the development and deepening of
the sector (Fries and Taci, 2002; Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras, 2011).
One of the central issues in emerging banking systems, along with
the transition process to a market economy, is the development of a
profitable and efficient financial system. The empirical analysis is
carried out for 11 emerging European banking systems over the period
2000-2016. The examined period includes two different phases of the
financial cycle: a pre-crisis period of booming financial markets, with
the sample starting date being the year 2000 up to 2006 and the global
financial crisis, from 2007 to 2016. A better understanding of the
determinants of the profitability could be valuable for modeling and
predicting the decision towards expansion, reorganization or default.
The theoretical financial literature identifies several firm-specific
factors (strategic and non-strategic factors) that can explain profitability.
This study employs the important research output of the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), i.e. the bank and
enterprise reform database, to quantify the reform process in emerging
European banking. Since the EBRD performs a yearly assessment of
regulatory reform we are able to make the best use of the time-series
aspect of these indices. Finally, we rely on information from the World
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 181

Bank (WB) database on bank regulations and supervision (Barth Caprio

and Levine, 2001, 2006, 2008; Cihak et al., 2102) to construct indices
that relate to capital requirements, market discipline, official
supervisory power and restrictions on bank activities.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
theoretical underpinnings of the relevant literature. Section III describes
how the profitability of banks during the crisis relates to bank-specific
characteristics, regulation, and country characteristics. Section IV
discusses the dataset. Section V presents and analyzes the empirical
results. A number of conclusions are offered in the final section.

II. Literature review

Several researchers have focused on the causes and determinants of

financial crises in both single and cross-country studies as well as the
impact on bank profitability. Adrian and Shin (2008) and Diamond and
Rajan (2009) among others have emphasized the run on the funding of
banks that relied on short-term finance in the capital markets for a
substantial fraction of their financing. Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999)
show that the banking system is more fragile in countries where banking
activities are more restricted.
Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) using 7900 bank
observations from 80 countries for the 1988-1995 period, found that
foreign banks enjoy higher profits than domestic banks in developing
countries, but the opposite is the case for developed countries.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report that banks in countries with
more competitive banking sectors are less profitable, as well as banks
that rely largely on deposits for their funding. Naceur (2003) in his
study investigates the impact of bank characteristics, financial structure
and macroeconomic indicators on bank profitability in the Tunisian
banking industry for the time period 1980-2000.
Bouzgarrou, Jouida and Louhichi (2018) conclude that foreign banks
are more profitable than domestic banks, especially during the financial
crisis. Bitar, Pukthuanthong and Walker (2018) in a sample of 39
OECD countries demonstrate that both risk- and non-risk based capital
ratios improve bank efficiency and profitability. Aydemir and Ovenc
(2016) suggest that a short-term interest rate has a negative and
significant impact on profits while Bolt et al. (2012) find long-term

2. Beck, Dermirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), Schaeck, Sihak and Wolfe (2009),
Agoraki (2009) and Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras (2011) have also used these indices as
control variables in their somehow related cross-country studies.
182 Multinational Finance Journal

interest rates in previous years to be important determinants of bank

profit in times of high economic growth.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) also find that greater regulatory
restrictions on bank activities are associated with higher probability of
suffering a major banking crisis and bank fragility, respectively.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) conclude that countries
where banks have to report regular and accurate financial data to
regulators and market participants have sounder banks. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache (2002) provide evidence that an explicit deposit
insurance scheme, in the absence of strong banking regulations tends to
increase the probability of a collapse taking place. However, Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2003) point out that official government power is
particularly harmful to bank development in countries with closed
political systems. According to Miyake and Nakamura (2007), capital
adequacy regulations work as a factor of stabilization in the sense that
they moderate the macroeconomic effects of negative productivity
shocks.
Finally, in times of both expansion and crisis, banks have reacted to
the changing environment with a view to maintaining their levels of
profitability. During the expansion, the progress of disintermediation
drove a change in income structure, with an increase in the relative
importance of non-interest income, associated with what could be
termed non-traditional business. Increased competition led to a drop in
the financial margin, which also acted as an incentive to find other
sources of income (Berger et al., 2000; Lepetit et al., 2008; Maudos,
2017).

III. Empirical specification

A. Theory and identification

Given the considerations of the theoretical and empirical literature, we

specify the following empirical model to study the determinants of bank
profitability, as a function of income structure and bank-specific factors,
macroeconomic indicators, market power and regulation.
Due to the dynamic nature of the reforms implemented, the
impediments to informational opacity and/or the sensitivity to
regional/macroeconomic shocks, a dynamic specification of the model
has been adopted, which includes a lagged dependent variable.3

3. We apply the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 183

J
BPit  c  aBPi ,t 1    j X itj   it (1)
j 1

where BPit denotes the observed bank profitability for bank i at year t,
c is a constant term, Xits are j explanatory variables and εit is the
disturbance term. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms to
improve the goodness of fit of the regression and to reduce possible
simultaneity bias. Country effects are included in the estimations
because structural conditions in banking and general macroeconomic
conditions, such as differences in accounting standards and tax
structures may generate differences in bank performance as well.
Finally, a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the years 2007-2016
has been included, in order to reflect the crisis effect, as well as an EU
membership dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country is a
member of the eurozone.
As the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of
the instruments, we consider two specification tests suggested by
Arellano and Bond (1991). We report results of the Sargan-Hansen test
as well as the Arellano-Bond test of first- and second-order
autocorrelation. To test model specification validity, the Sargan test of
over-identification of restrictions is estimated. This test examines the
lack of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The AR
(1) and AR (2) statistics measure first- and second-order serial
correlation. Given the use of first-difference transformations, some
degree of first-order serial correlation is expected, in order for the
estimator to be consistent, this correlation does not invalidate the results
though. However, the presence of second-order serial correlation does
suggest omitted variables.
The dependent variable is bank profitability. All performance
measures, regardless of their specific objectives, use accounting and
market data to assess the financial condition of an institution at a point
in time, as well as to determine how well it has been managed over a
period of time. Profitability can be used as a summary index of
performance. Therefore, we incorporate the two most widely used
measures of bank profitability, the return on average assets (ROA), i.e.,
the ratio of earnings to average assets, and the return on average equity
(ROE), i.e., the ratio of earnings to average equity. In both cases, profits

tackle the potential endogeneity of bank characteristics. Moreover, this estimator does not
break down in the presence of unit roots (see Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran, 2003; Agoraki,
2009; Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras, 2011).
184 Multinational Finance Journal

are taken before tax to avoid discrepancies resulting from the different
taxation systems that are implemented across the European region.
Accounting profitability can be used as a measure of performance
for at least three reasons. First, researchers have shown some market
inefficiencies even in the most developed countries (Lo and MacKinlay,
1988; Conrad and Kaul, 1998). Thus, stock prices are less likely to
reflect all available information when the stock market shows
inefficiency (Joh, 2003). Second, Mossman et al. (1998) show that a
firm’s accounting profitability is more directly related to its financial
viability than its stock market value is. Many studies use accounting
measures to predict bankruptcy (Takahashi, Kurokawa and Watase,
1984) or financial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991).
Third, accounting measures allow the evaluation of performance for
both privately held firms as well as that of publicly traded firms (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Ely, 1991).
The bank-specific variables account for differences in output quality
and risk preferences, and capture the heterogeneity of financial
institutions. We focus on the CAMEL approach.4 The theoretical
considerations discussed above point to a number of variables to be
used as proxies for the determinants of Bank Profitability (BP). In what
follows all the variables used in the present study are discussed.
Income Structure: A commonly used practice to analyse the
diversification of banking activities is to examine the income structure,
i.e. traditional intermediation activities versus other non-traditional
activities (non-interest income). Non-interest income includes
dividends, net fee income, income from financial transactions, earnings
on exchange rate differences and other income. Income structure is
measured by the ratio of non-interest income in total net income (see
also Maudos, 2017).
Default risk: Credit risk (a bank’s quality of assets) is measured by
the ratio of non-performing loans to loans and refers to the uncertainty
associated with loan repayment. Since most of bank earning assets are
in the form of loans, problems with loan quality have been the major
cause of bank failure. A high proportion of loan loss relative to loan
assets and rapid growth of the loan portfolio are potential early-warning
indications of loan-quality problems, which may indicate potential
failure. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) and Strong and Meyer (1987)
suggest that investors use information on loan-loss provisions to revise
their expectations of a bank’s future performance while Cooper, Jackson
and Patterson (2003) find that loan-loss reserves to total loans is
important in forecasting the cross-section of bank stock returns.

4. Capital Adequacy; Asset Quality; Management Quality; Earnings and Liquidity.

Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 185

Portfolio performance: Portfolio performance captures the bank’s

capability in matching the needs for deposit and loan services and is
measured by the loans to assets ratio. Bank loans are naturally the main
source of income, being the most risky and having the highest yield (in
terms of expected return) among bank assets as well as the highest
operational costs, as they need to be originated, serviced and monitored.
If banks that held fewer loans had more credit-risky securities, we
would expect these banks to have performed worse because of the
increase in credit spreads that took place during the crisis (see also
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).
Leverage: Leverage (capital adequacy) is proxied by the ratio of
equity to assets and serves as an indicator for the risk of insolvency and
the market value of assets (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004).
Equity represents the amount of own funds available to support a bank’s
activities and acts as safety net in the case of adverse developments.
Since equity is a relatively expensive source of funding, an increase in
equity capital on a voluntary basis or as a result of regulation may
increase the average cost of capital (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000;
Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). It is believed by depositors, especially
in developing countries that well capitalized banks are safer and face
lower costs of going bankrupt. Especially in southern economies,
depositors have few alternatives for bank deposits; yet they are regularly
confronted with information about bad asset quality in some banks and
even outright bank failures. Moreover, since capital is considered to be
the most expensive form of liabilities in terms of expected return,
holding capital above the regulatory minimum is a credible sign of
creditworthiness on the part of the bank.
Management quality: This variable is proxied by the ratio of earning
assets to total assets. Management decisions are reflected in the
composition of a bank’s portfolio by means of providing, inter alia,
profitable composition of assets and low-cost liabilities.
Overhead expenses: This variable is measured by operational
expenses divided by total assets and is used to capture cost management
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Abreu and Mendes, 2003;
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004).
Bank size: We employ the logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to capture
the effect of bank size in order to account for potential economies or
diseconomies of scale in the banking sector. Scale economies in banking
may arise from a variety of sources. Size entails a reduction in costs
insofar as it may offer better diversification opportunities in the deposit
base as well as investment and loans, and therefore it reduces the
likelihood of a liquidity shortage. On the other hand, agency problems,
control problems and all the difficulties and costs associated with
186 Multinational Finance Journal

managing large institutions may decrease the benefits of scale

economies, while large banks may hold a substantial amount of market
power and/or higher efficiency levels.
Moreover, we incorporate regulatory and macroeconomic variables
to capture the differences in the banking and macroeconomic
environment.
Regulation: To examine the impact of banking sector reform we
apply the EBRD index of banking sector reform and individual
regulatory indices.
The EBRD index of banking sector reform has been compiled with
the primary purpose of assessing the progress of the banking sectors of
formally centrally planned economies.5 As this indicator quantifies and
qualifies the degree of liberalization of the banking industry, it is
suitable for an explicit evaluation of the effect of banking sector reform
on the profitability of banks (see also Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2007).
The reform scores of EBRD range from 1.0 to 4.0+, with 1.0 indicating
a rigid centralized economy and 4.0+ implying the highest level of
reform, which corresponds to a fully industrialized market economy.
Since the EBRD performs a yearly assessment of regulatory reform we
are able to exploit the time-series aspect of these indices.
Finally, we rely on information from the World Bank (WB) database
on bank regulations and supervision (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001,
2006, 2008; Cihak et al., 2012) to construct indices that relate to capital
requirements, market discipline, official supervisory power and
restrictions on bank activities. We focus on these four regulatory
policies because they are central in the agenda of policy makers and
theory suggests that they can have a direct impact on risk-taking (for a
detailed analysis see also Agoraki, 2009 and Agoraki, Delis and
Pasiouras, 2011).6
The capital requirements index shows the extent of both initial and
overall capital stringency. Initial capital stringency refers to whether the
sources of funds counted as regulatory capital can include assets other
than cash or government securities and borrowed funds, as well as
whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources.
The supervisory power reveals the power of the supervisory agencies to
take specific actions in relation to their authority against bank

5. The EBRD uses the number of banks (and the share of foreign owned banks), the
asset share of state-owned banks, the percentage of bad loans, credit to the private sector and
stock market capitalization (EBRD, 2001).

6. New regulatory initiatives are unlikely to affect the profitability of banks in the
immediate term. In the estimations below, we will be using both the first and the second lags
of the regulation variables.
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 187

management and directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. Higher

values indicate more powerful supervisors. Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2004) mention that among others, strong official supervision can
prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking behaviour,
contributing to bank development, performance and stability. However
this may not always be the case, especially in transition economies.
The activities restriction index is determined by considering whether
securities, insurance, real estate activities, and ownership of
non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or prohibited.
Higher values indicate higher restrictions. Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2004) indicate that restricting bank activities is negatively associated
with bank development and stability. The market discipline index shows
the degree to which banks are forced to disclose accurate information
to the public (e.g., disclosure of off-balance sheet items, risk
management procedures, etc.) and whether there are incentives to
increase market discipline (e.g., subordinated debt, explicit deposit
insurance). Higher values indicate higher disclosure requirements and
more incentives to increase market discipline.
Macroeconomic environment: To capture the effect of the
macroeconomic environment we use GDP growth (gdpg) as a proxy for
the fluctuations in economic activity and the short-term interest rate to
capture monetary stance. An increase in GDP growth could be expected
to increase a bank’s income as a result of more lending and lower
default rates (Brock and Suarez, 2000; Claeys and Vander Vennet,
2007).
Market structure: The structure of a banking market is captured by
the degree of competition and concentration. According to the
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis (Bain, 1951), bank
concentration (or market share) implies market power and a positive
association between profits and concentration. In other words, market
structure influences the behavior of banks through the pricing of their
products in an imperfectly competitive market, with increased
concentration resulting in higher profits. This hypothesis postulates that
greater profits are the results of collusion between the firms of the
industry.
As a proxy of the degree of concentration, we consider
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (calculated as the sum of squared
market shares in term of assets of the individual banks).7 As an
alternative measure, we also apply a direct indicator of market power
following the method of Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). A common

7. For a review of concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, see

Rhoades (1977).
188 Multinational Finance Journal

argument is that competition drives down loan rates and bank profits,
reducing banks’ incentives to screen loan applicants (Gehrig, 1998),
leading to eased lending criteria and increased bank failures (Bolt and
Tieman, 2004).
In particular, we jointly estimate the following system of three
equations that correspond to a translog cost function, to a revenue
equation obtained from the profit maximization problem of banks, and
to an inverse loan demand function:

1 1
ln Cit  b0  b1 ln qit  b2  ln qit   b3 ln dit  b4  ln dit   b5 ln wit
2 2

2 2

1
 b6  ln wit   b7  ln qit  ln wit   b8  ln qit  ln dit 
2

 b9  ln qit  ln wit   eitC

(2)

Rit  t Rit  rit qit  cit  b1  b2 ln qit  b7 ln wit  b8 ln dit 
t

qit
 Cit  b3  b4 ln dit  b8 ln qit  b9 ln wit   eits
dit

ln pit  g 0  1 / t  ln qit  g1 ln gdpgt  g 2 ln irt  eitD

where C is the total cost (i.e., total expenses) of bank i at time t, q is

bank output measured by total earning assets, d are total deposits and
short-term funding, w are the prices of inputs, in this case measured by
the ratio of total operating expenses (overheads) to total assets, R is total
bank revenue, r is the interest rate on deposits calculated as the ratio of
interest expenses to total deposits and short-term funding, p is the price
of bank output given by the ratio of total revenue to total earning assets,
and e are the error terms. Variables with bars represent deviations from
their cross sectional means at each time period, and are transformed in
this way so as to remove their trend, specified in this way to reduce
multicollinearity. We use the annual % GDP growth (gdpg) and the
short-term interest rate (ir) as exogenous variables that affect demand.
The degree of competition in each year is denoted by θ, which
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 189

represents the well-known conjectural variations elasticity of total

industry output with respect to the output of the ith bank.8
The range of possible values of θ is given by [0, 1]. In the special
case of Cournot competition, θit is simply the output share of the ith
bank at each point in time. In the case of perfect competition, θit = 0;
under pure monopoly, θit = 1; and, finally, θit < 0, implies pricing below
marginal cost and could result, for example, from a non-optimizing
behavior of banks. Estimation is carried out for each country separately
using seemingly unrelated regression. The full set of θt results are
presented in table 2.
Ownership: We distinguish banking institutions into three mutually
exclusive categories, namely, majority state-owned banks, majority
domestic private ownership, and strategic foreign ownership. We
include dummy variables for the foreign ownership that equals one if
the majority is held by strategic foreign owners, the government
ownership variable that equals one if the majority is held by a
governmental body and the domestic private ownership variable that
equals one if the majority is held by domestic private investors.

IV. Data sources

We use an unbalanced panel dataset of approximately 3750 bank-annual

observations of 388 commercial, savings and cooperative banks
operating in the 11 CEE markets shown in table 1 over the period
2000-2016.9 We collect our data from a number of sources. Individual
bank data are taken from annual statements. Data for the regulatory
indices are obtained from the World Bank database on “Bank
Regulation and Supervision” developed by Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2001) and updated by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006, 2008) and
Cihak et al. (2012). Data for the market structure and macroeconomic
conditions are collected from the EBRD’s Transition Reports and the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Table 1 provides
some descriptive statistics for our sample.

8. See also Agoraki (2009) and Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras (2011)

9. This panel data set is of substantial size given the availability of the data for all
transition economies and has been used in many recent papers to obtain robust results (see for
example Drakos, Kouretas and Tsoumas, 2016; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012, Kouretas and
Tsoumas, 2013).
 190

TABLE 1. Banking sector indicators (2000-2016)

Czech
Bulgaria Croatia Republic Estonia Hungary
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.010 0.021 0.029 0.017 0.017
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.080 0.111 0.136 0.112 0.121
Income structure 0.135 0.156 0.242 0.217 0.345
Total expenses (C) 72,008 112,325 277,628 315,829 77,622
Total earning assets (q) 656,785 952,148 1,975,165 3,283,007 1,486,338
Total deposits and short-term funding (d) 568,225 799,828 785,152 1,416,848 1,612,549
Price of funds (interest expenses / total
deposits and short-term funding) (w1) 0.062 0.067 0.082 0.070 0.074
Price of labor (personnel expenses
/ total assets) (w2) 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.014
Price of physical capital (total depreciation and
other capital expenses/total fixed assets) (w3) 0.524 0.507 0.398 0.545 0.425
Total revenue / total earning assets (pq) 0.162 0.147 0.151 0.172 0.161
Loans/Total assets 0.432 0.448 0.411 0.417 0.455
Total equity/ Total assets 0.188 0.142 0.117 0.225 0.132
Non-performing loans / Total loans 0.042 0.038 0.044 0.059 0.020
Liquid assets/total assets 0.521 0.331 0.428 0.402 0.405
Earning assets/total assets 0.925 0.817 0.841 0.822 0.857
Overhead cost/total assets 0.018 0.064 0.041 0.032 0.039
Capital requirements index 6.57 3.86 4.86 4.43 6.00
Supervisory power index 11.14 11.54 9.57 13.14 14.00
Activities restrictions index 2.39 1.96 2.86 1.68 2.68
(Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal
TABLE 1. (Continued)

Czech
Bulgaria Croatia Republic Estonia Hungary
Market discipline index 6.00 6.00 6.14 6.43 6.29
Total assets (th. Euros) 812,127 1,658,452 980,420 2,754,348 1,751,120
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 1647.08 1824.65 1752.48 1926.32 1649.06
Annual % GDP growth rate (gdpg) 4.15 2.19 2.95 2.08 4.21
Inflation 17.25 11.14 5.41 12.02 12.72
Short-term Interest rate 14.55 7.08 8.43 14.32 17.05
Public ownership (%) 38.3 14.5 9.5 7.0 0.0
Domestic private ownership (%) 26.0 35.5 35.5 44.4 62.5
Foreign ownership (%) 20.9 46.2 43.2 42.0 27.5
EBRD index on banking reform 2.84 3.21 3.37 3.57 3.75
(Continued )
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets
191
 192

TABLE 1. (Continued)

Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Return on Assets (ROA) 0.033 0.025 0.015 0.013 0.021 0.021
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.145 0.076 0.117 0.078 0.084 0.107
Income structure 0.259 0.154 0.246 0.156 0.151 0.153
Total expenses (C) 52,452 247,527 82,284 83,256 189,525 202,137
Total earning assets (q) 486,227 1,892,467 816,452 1,256,220 2,657,722 1,920,340
Total deposits and short-term funding (d) 4,553,717 1,220,435 757,618 920,642 2,220,747 1,450,128
Price of funds (interest expenses / total
deposits and short-term funding) (w1) 0.045 0.068 0.052 0.081 0.056 0.066
Price of labor (personnel expenses
/ total assets) (w2) 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.018
Price of physical capital (total depreciation and
other capital expenses/total fixed assets) (w3) 0.442 0.517 0.422 0.505 0.412 0.328
Total revenue / total earning assets (pq) 0.115 0.127 0.151 0.144 0.128 0.142
Loans/Total assets 0.359 0.473 0.418 0.463 0.417 0.485
Total equity/ Total assets 0.147 0.212 0.163 0.148 0.182 0.163
Non-performing loans / Total loans 0.050 0.047 0.055 0.049 0.055 0.062
Liquid assets/total assets 0.458 0.442 0.485 0.382 0.425 0.442
Earning assets/total assets 0.722 0.750 0.805 0.703 0.748 0.851
Overhead cost/total assets 0.064 0.071 0.065 0.057 0.042 0.065
Capital requirements index 5.00 3.57 4.57 4.86 5.00 6.57
Supervisory power index 11.29 12.00 9.29 9.86 13.14 12.71
Activities restrictions index 1.89 2.36 1.96 2.93 2.57 2.57
(Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal
TABLE 1. (Continued)

Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Market discipline index 6.86 6.00 6.00 4.86 5.29 6.86
Total assets (th. Euros) 560,430 2,412,620 981,217 1,310,451 2,615,327 2,378,617
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 1812.17 1724.22 1835.28 1705.42 1642.37 1758.97
Annual % GDP growth rate (gdpg) 2.18 2.45 4.61 3.49 4.21 2.87
Inflation 13.05 9.73 11.48 14.52 7.82 8.63
Short-term Interest rate 9.95 9.58 16.56 25.90 11.85 10.45
Public ownership (%) 14.0 30.0 29.05 32.00 40.00 33.50
Domestic private ownership (%) 16.2 27.0 35.00 40.50 20.45 42.80
Foreign ownership (%) 68.0 32.0 23.80 25.50 25.87 19.00
EBRD index on banking reform 3.23 3.03 3.23 2.71 3.04 3.17
Note: Data are averaged across all banks in the country. Source: Banks' Annual reports; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD); World Bank’s World Development Indicators and own estimations.
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets
193
 194

TABLE 2. Evolution of competitive conditions in the emerging European banking systems (θt)

Czech
Bulgaria Croatia Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
2000 0.169 0.515 0.500 0.670 0.317 0.713 1.147** 0.888 0.153 0.445 0.901
2001 0.187 0.502 0.366 0.703 0.328 0.846 1.114** 0.742 0.236 0.396 0.970**
2002 0.183 0.514 0.437 0.684 0.450 0.683 1.134** 0.754 0.279 0.412 0.977**
2003 0.259 0.570 0.414 0.801 0.366 0.756 1.138** 0.723 0.381 0.419 1.077**
2004 0.293 0.524 0.577 0.861 0.419 0.671 1.099** 0.742 0.328 0.373 1.067**
2005 0.349 0.537 0.369 0.887 0.377 0.629 1.134** 0.742 0.236 0.321 1.008**
2006 0.210 0.711 0.651 0.936 0.473 0.832 1.163** 0.771 0.293 0.284 1.012**
2007 0.347 0.807 0.653 0.853 0.482 0.773 1.101** 0.800 0.382 0.322 0.996**
2008 0.378 0.793 0.676 0.700 0.563 0.839 1.161** 0.675 0.322 0.356 1.083**
2009 0.340 0.813 0.617 0.646 0.549 0.830 1.107** 0.636 0.293 0.287 0.991**
2010 0.337 0.751 0.632 0.522 0.532 0.821 1.120** 0.612 0.312 0.231 0.824
2011 0.372 0.572 0.600 0.351 0.675 0.883 1.012** 0.642 0.175 0.245 0.687
2012 0.330 0.612 0.611 0.412 0.542 0.831 0.878 0.712 0.126 0.237 0.642
2013 0.292 0.580 0.583 0.380 0.522 0.800 0.825 0.728 0.129 0.245 0.670
2014 0.241 0.502 0.487 0.312 0.450 0.719 0.811 0.682 0.114 0.197 0.682
2015 0.301 0.528 0.579 0.402 0.428 0.813 0.967 0.645 0.286 0.224 0.788
2016 0.297 0.531 0.517 0.378 0.502 0.825 0.895 0.604 0.247 0.249 0.795
Note: The table presents estimates of competition (θ) for 11 emerging European markets over the period 2000-2016. A value of θ statistically
equal to one implies monopoly practices, while a value equal to zero implies competitive conditions. Lower values suggest increased competition
and higher values increased market power. * indicates that the hypothesis of perfect competition is not rejected at the 5 per cent level of statistical
significance and ** indicate that monopolistic conditions are not rejected at the 5 per cent level.
Multinational Finance Journal
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 195

Regarding market power, the estimations are mixed, with the

majority of countries reflecting neither monopolistic nor competitive
behavior. The emerging European banking systems have inherited from
the previous centrally-planned economies a considerable volume of
nonperforming loans. In these countries banking laws were generally
developed to promote sound banking practices among existing and new
market players, and increase the efficiency of delivering intermediation
services. Most of these banking sectors share common structural
characteristics as they follow similar development paths during the
transition period. Moreover, virtually all of these banking systems
experienced periods of insolvency and crisis in the mid-1990s that
necessitated efforts, often more than once, to recapitalize and restructure
the banks (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005).
Bad debt problems and corporate defaults were the major reasons of
banking crises in the region, which reduced a bank’s assets and affected
their lending behavior due to the preference to hold government
securities or liquid assets on their balance sheets. The cost of
overcoming the banking crisis has been significant in all these countries.
The highest costs were observed in Romania (estimates ranging from
around 8% of GDP), in Croatia (30 % of GDP) and Bulgaria (up to 75%
of GDP between 1991 and 1998).
It is noteworthy that, ever since, changes have been made in the
regulatory frameworks and the privatization of the banking sector, as
remedies for the banking crises. Regulatory changes mainly involved
improvements in banking supervision, while the privatization of the
banking sector was carried out mainly through sales to foreign banks.
The expansion of foreign banks in the acceded area has mostly come
from Western European banks which in a short time period managed to
dominate the emerging European banking systems.
Significant steps have been taken towards the improvement of the
banking legislation. There have been continuous amendments on
banking supervision regulative system aiming at its harmonization with
the EU regulative regime and the international standards of effective
supervision. These laws have increased the appeal of the emerging
European banking system for foreign investment, reinforced prudent
standards and practices in the banks’ operations, enhanced corporate
governance, and improved efficiency in banking operations and
supervision. However, it is important to recognize that it is not
legislation on its own that really matters, but the actual implementation
of reforms.
The main motive behind the privatization of state-owned banks was
the desire to enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector
196 Multinational Finance Journal

through increased foreign and domestic participation, while the banking

crises that affected the region during this period have basically
accelerated the privatization process. For instance, beginning in 1995
with virtually no holdings in Croatia, foreigner investors had acquired
about 84% of banking assets by 2000 and, by 2002, all of the ten largest
banks in the country were in majority foreign owned (EBRD, 2004).
As it concerns our dataset, the average ratio of total revenue to assets
indicates the low significance of non-interest income sources in total
operating revenue. The operational expenses variable reflects
over-employment in credit institutions in those countries. Implementing
new technology has been a major factor responsible for the reduction in
operational expenses. The average equity-to-assets is higher than the
European average, due mainly to the ongoing restructuring process of
the state-owned institutions, the relatively low credit expansion, the
riskiness of assets and the banks’ compensation for poor access to other
sources of funds. Although the high ratio may be reassuring in terms of
sound financial management, it also confirms the existence of high-risk
lending operations and the high degree of liquid and non-banking items
on banks’ balance sheets.
The low level of loans to total assets combined with the need for
new investments and the boost in household consumption, could incur
considerable high rates of credit expansion in the future. Sluggish credit
growth can be partially attributed to inadequate legal protection for
lenders, lack of credit history for most companies and scarcity of
adequate risk management techniques. The relatively slow growth may
also have been delayed by the prolonged process of cleaning up the
banks’ portfolio (Cottarelli, Dell and Vladkova-Hollar, 2005). Yet,
given the associations that have often been identified between as
underlying between lending booms and financial stability, an
uncontrollable credit expansion could be unwanted.
However, the period of expansion taking place in Europe up until it
was interrupted by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. The
disintermediation process was driven by the development of new
technologies, deregulation in the sector, and increased non-bank
competition, which affected the banking business. The crisis reshaped
the environment in a way that will affect the features of the banking
business and its income structure. With the regulatory changes
implemented, a scenario of lower profitability has emerged in which
there will be a structural change in the income structure (Maudos,
2017).
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 197

V. Estimation and results

The aim of this paper is mainly to present an empirical specification of
the determinants of profitability in the emerging European banking
sector for the period 2000-2016. In this section, we investigate whether
profitability is affected by (i) bank-specific and/or (ii) regulatory and
other macroeconomic indicators. In Model (4), in both tables 3 and 4,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is included as a market structure
variable.
To determine whether our instruments are valid in the system GMM
approach, we use the specification tests proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). First, we apply the Sargan test,
a test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of
the instruments. Second, we test whether the differenced error term is
second-order serially correlated. First-order autocorrelation, AR1, could
be expected in the first differences of the errors; however, higher order
autocorrelation would indicate that some lags of the dependent variable
are in fact endogenous, thus bad instruments. In all estimated equations
the test for AR2 rejects the presence of second-order autocorrelation.
Moreover, the Sargan test indicates that the model is not over-identified.
To assess the robustness of the links between bank-specific factors,
regulations, market structure, and macroeconomic indicators we apply
different versions of the model, where variables are gradually included
in the models, in order to check whether they retain their sign and
significance in different models. Table 3 reports the empirical results
where ROA is the dependent variable. The positive impact of equity
capital implies that banks characterized by high levels of capital manage
to perform in higher levels of profitability. Cost efficiency measures
management flexibility to adjust costs to changes in the business
development characterized by revenues and increases profitability.
The positive effect of bank size possibly illustrates the fact that large
banks offer safety of transactions in relatively risky banking sectors,
such as the ones of the emerging European markets, as well as
economies of scale that result in higher profitability. When, ownership
variables are included in our estimation models we do not observe
considerable diversification in the results. The entry of foreign banks
has played an important role in the bank reform process by increasing
levels of efficiency, hence superior profits.10 We find a positive and

10. Foreign banks headquartered in developed nations may have additional advantages
over domestic institutions in developing nations. These may include managerial expertise and
experience, a well-developed business plan, superior access to capital, ability to make larger
loans, a seasoned labor force, market power over suppliers, and so forth.
 198

TABLE 3. Determinants of profitability in the emerging European banking systems (dep. variable: ROA)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Lagged dep. Variable 0.318*** 0.221*** 0.422*** 0.125***
Market power (θ) 0.212*** 0.193*** 0.277***
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.142***
Income Structure –0.073*** –0.049** –0.056** –0.047*
Default risk (non-performing loans/total loans) –0.107** –0.151** –0.128* –0.215*
Portfolio performance(loans/total assets) 0.289*** 0.245** 0.328*** 0.241***
Leverage (equity/total assets) 0.112** 0.132** 0.175** 0.138**
Liquidity risk (liquid assets/total assets) 0.083 0.048* 0.065 0.128
Management Quality (earning assets/total assets) 0.052 0.089 0.228 0.183
Overhead expenses (overhead expenses/total assets) –0.029** –0.015* –0.042** –0.035**
Bank size 0.288*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.225***
GDP growth rate 0.108*** 0.143*** 0.128*** 0.122***
Interest rate –0.024* –0.032* –0.047* –0.025*
Foreign ownership 0.047** 0.017** 0.040**
Public ownership –0.095*** –0.028*** –0.034***
Domestic ownership 0.014 0.083 0.025
EU Membership 0.087 *** 0.028 *** 0.072*** 0.069***
Crisis –0.241*** –0.224*** –0.289*** –0.241***
EBRD 0.081**
Capital requirements index 0.042*** 0.121*** 0.118***
Supervisory power index –0.027* –0.038* –0.045*
Activity restrictions index 0.057** 0.095** 0.042**
Market discipline index 0.029* 0.035** 0.025**
(Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal
TABLE 3. (Continued)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Observations 3794 3416 3742 3712
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.607 0.458 0.542 0.587
Sargan (p-value) 0.325 0.357 0.309 0.410
Note: crisis: dummy variable that takes value 1 for the years 2007-2016; EU membership: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country
is a member of the eurozone. The Wald-test and its associated p-value denote the goodness of fit of the regressions, AR1 and AR2 are the tests for
first and second order autocorrelation and Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions. The tests reject the hypotheses for second order serial
correlation and overidentifying restrictions. The table reports coefficients, with *, **, *** representing significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
All models include country and time dummy variables.
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets
199
 200

TABLE 4. Determinants of profitability in the emerging European banking systems (dep. variable: ROE)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Lagged dep. Variable 0.324*** 0.312*** 0.241*** 0.267***
Market power (θ) 0.187** 0.174** 0.192**
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.105**
Income Structure –0.032** –0.045** –0.012** –0.028**
Default risk (non-performing loans/total loans) –0.201** –0.248*** –0.185** –0.127**
Portfolio performance(loans/total assets) 0.188* 0.165* 0.208*** 0.242***
Leverage (equity/total assets) 0.084** 0.065*** 0.077** 0.062**
Liquidity risk (liquid assets/total assets) 0.028 0.054 0.012 0.025
Management Quality (earning assets/total assets) 0.115 0.040* 0.044 0.015*
Overhead expenses (overhead expenses/total assets) –0.052** –0.087** –0.064*** –0.055***
Bank size 0.212*** 0.207*** 0.149*** 0.099***
GDP growth rate 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.059*** 0.022***
Interest rate –0.028* –0.064* –0.017* –0.032*
Foreign ownership 0.118** 0.154*** 0.097***
Public ownership –0.078*** –0.123* –0.107*
Domestic ownership 0.049 0.130 0.058
EU Membership 0.125*** 0.131*** 0.157*** 0.118***
Crisis –0.088** –0.065 *** –0.179*** –0.136***
EBRD 0.155***
Capital requirements index 0.154** 0.126** 0.152**
Supervisory power index –0.062*** –0.053*** –0.047***
Activity restrictions index 0.051*** 0.038** 0.085**
Market discipline index 0.085*** 0.126** 0.118**
(Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal
TABLE 4. (Continued)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Observations 3825 3520 3710 3728
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.530 0.457 0.581 0.380
Sargan (p-value) 0.224 0.314 0.676 0.554
Note: crisis: dummy variable that takes value 1 for the years 2007-2016; EU membership: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the country
is a member of the eurozone. The Wald-test and its associated p-value denote the goodness of fit of the regressions, AR1 and AR2 are the tests
for first and second order autocorrelation and Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions. The tests reject the hypotheses for second order serial
correlation and overidentifying restrictions. The table reports coefficients, with *, **, *** representing significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
All models include country and time dummy variables.
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets
201
202 Multinational Finance Journal

significant association between market power and profitability that is

robust across all specifications (the results remain qualitatively
unchanged when a concentration measure is applied). Our results
support the collusion hypothesis (or structure conduct performance
hypothesis), where concentration leads to a lower level of competition
and higher bank performance.
Capital requirements appear to be an effective tool in reinforcing
profitability, while supervisory power hypothesis has a negative effect.
The impact of the activities restrictions index is significant, indicating
that there is a positive effect of activity restrictions on profitability. A
potential explanation for this finding is that as the integration of
financial services is restricted, banks focus on the loan market in order
to compensate for the forgone non-interest income. As it was expected,
the crisis seems to have significantly decreased profits, while in the
examined countries the accession to the eurozone has served as a
stability mechanism. Our findings show that an increase in the share of
non-interest income has a negative impact on profitability. This result
indicates that during a crisis, income from the traditional intermediation
business has regained importance. Finally, higher economic growth is
associated with higher returns whereas our results show a negative and
statistically significant effect of short-term interest rate on profitability.
The results in table 4 present the estimations when we use ROE as
a measure of profitability. The coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable is highly significant indicating a considerable level of
persistence in profitability. The positive impact of equity capital implies
that banks characterized by high levels of capital tend to have higher
returns as they represent safer institutions. This effect could also be
associated with the pressure generated by solvency regulations (see also
Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007). The significance of equity-to-assets
variable is relatively important considering that capital adequacy
ensures systemic stability and maintains depositor confidence. On the
same line with the results in table 3, higher supervisory power results in
lower profits. Consistent with the private monitoring hypothesis,
regulatory proposals and previous studies on corporate governance,
financial disclosures and other incentives that enhance market discipline
can be an effective tool in increasing profits. When depositors exert
“market discipline”, this may enable the bank to lower its deposit
funding costs, leading to higher profitability.
During the period under investigation there was a notable entry of
foreign banks. A higher presence of foreign (state-owned) banks in the
market seems to result in higher (lower) profitability which suggests a
number of benefits from the entry of foreign banks in emerging markets
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Serven, 2009). The presence of foreign banks is
often associated with a more stable lending environment, as well as
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets 203

superior managerial experience and risk management. Furthermore, we

once again confirm that a positive and significant association exists
between market power and profitability that is robust across all
specifications (the results remain qualitatively invariable when a
concentration measure is applied).
When we use EBRD we conclude that the effect of reform is
positive to profits. Default risk has a negative and statistically
significant relationship with profits, indicating the risk premium set by
the banks over the net interest margin, in order to compensate for cases
of non-repayment or default of a loan. In addition, Portfolio
performance, used as a proxy for capturing the bank’s capability in
matching the needs for deposit and loan services, has a positive and
significant effect on profits. Finally, GDP growth once again enters with
a positive sign and statistically significant magnitude whereas the
evidence on the negative relationship between the monetary policy tool,
i.e. the short term interest rate, and banks’ profitability falls within the
predictions made.

VI. Conclusions
In this paper, an empirical framework was developed in order to
investigate the effect of bank-specific, macroeconomic determinants and
regulatory environment on the profitability of European banks for the
period 2000-2016. Evidently, the regulatory framework plays a crucial
role. According to the results obtained above, a significant part of
profitability is explained by bank-specific characteristics such as
portfolio performance, default risk and leverage, while focusing on
traditional activities can enhance profitability during crisis. In both
estimations, bank profitability is positively and significantly affected by
internal determinants (the proportion of loans in the asset composition,
the quality of the credit portfolio, the financial leverage of the bank, and
the operational expenses). The positive effect of bank size illustrates the
fact that large banks have higher returns as a compensation for
customers’ worries regarding the safety of transactions in relatively
risky banking sectors, such as the ones of the emerging European
markets. The restructuring that some European banking sectors have
suffered in order to address the recent crisis has increased the degree of
market power, thus promoting the profitability of banks at the expense
of competition. Finally, the diversification of banking income should be
a proactive response to maintain profitability, however a negative
relationship points out the underdeveloped alternative solutions.

Accepted by: Prof. P. Theodossiou, PhD, Editor-in-Chief , April 2018

 204

Appendix A.

Structure of regulatory variables

Capital Requirements This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-6 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite
occurs in the case of questions 7 and 8 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio
risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3-5) Before minimum
capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital: (a) market
value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) unrealized
foreign exchange losses? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities? (7) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or
government securities? (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?
Market discipline This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite
occurs in the case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part
of capital? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any
non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose their
risk management procedures to public? (5) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6)
Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Is an external audit by certified/licensed auditor
a compulsory obligation for banks? (8) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement
while loan is non-performing? (9) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system?
(Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal
Appendix A. (Continued)

Structure of regulatory variables

Official This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following fourteen questions:
disciplinary (1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of
power the bank? (2) Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of
bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against
external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure?
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s
decision to distribute dividends? (8) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the
supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute management fees? (10) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank
shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent?(11) Does banking law allow supervisory agency or any other government agency
(other than court) to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (12) Regarding bank restructuring and
reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) supersede shareholder rights?
(13) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court)
remove and replace management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency or any other
government agency (other than court) remove and replace directors?
Restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1)
on banks securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These activities
activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an overall
Bank Profitability and Regulation in Emerging European Markets

index by calculating the average value over the four categories.

Note: The individual questions and answers were obtained from the World Bank database developed by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2006,
2008) and Cihak et al. (2012). See also, Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras (2011).
205
206 Multinational Finance Journal

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