is4-2013
is4-2013
is4-2013
Offshore Information
Publication Date May 2019 Document Identification
Sheet 4/2013 Rev.3
Review Date May 2022 Master Reference 2019/19168
1.0 Introduction
2.3 For all mobile offshore units, location approvals are expected to meet ISO
19901-7 main text with additional robustness checks for 100-year return period
weather conditions as discussed further in appendix 2. Compliance with ISO
Annex B.2 is expected if the consequence of a mooring failure is intolerable. In
Operating Limits
2.4 Duty holders should establish appropriate operating limits after a line failure.
These limits should consider the stationkeeping performance of the degraded
mooring system and the consequences of a further line failure.
2.5 All installations require an inspection and maintenance system for their
moorings. This needs to take into account guidance such as Oil and Gas UK
Mooring Integrity Guidelines, API RP 2I and API RP 2SM in determining the
nature and frequency of the inspection required.
Verification Scheme
2.6 The mooring system is a safety and environmental critical element (SECE) for
which a verification scheme is required in accordance with the Offshore
Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015.
Duty holders should also define suitable performance standards for thrusters
and the heading control system where they are required for stationkeeping.
1. This appendix gives the reasoning on the HSE recommended code, and
comment on other codes and standards. It applies to both floating production /
storage / permanent moorings and to moorings for mobile offshore units, except
where noted otherwise. For mobile offshore units which operate at a single
location for more than 12 months, duty holders must ensure a robust mooring
integrity management system is in place.
ISO 19901-7
2. ISO 19901-7 is the recommended code for offshore moorings. Compliance with
the technical requirements of Annex B.2 are not mandatory but should be
considered by the duty holder based on the type of installation and the level of
risk. The following aspects of Annex B.2 are considered important by HSE and
should be met where this is reasonably practicable.
Other Standards
5. The following codes and standards are now widely accepted in the offshore
industry
• API RP 2SK
• DNVGL-OS-E301 (superseded POSMOOR ’96)
• Lloyds Register Rules for Classification Floating Units at Fixed location – Part
3
• ABS Rules for Building and Classification of MODUs
• ABS Rules for Building and Classification of Floating Production Installations
• DNVGL Noble Denton: 0032/ND Guidelines for Moorings
6. Although these codes and standards differ in emphasis and content, they do tend
to harmonise with the ISO Code – particularly the agreement on a design
environmental return period of 100 years for permanent moorings.
4. In adverse weather conditions, incidents have shown that power supplies have
been interrupted due to vessel motion and thrusters have tripped or failed to
maintain heading.
5. Most existing codes require full or partial failure of the thruster system to be
assessed. This is considered as a redundancy check in ISO 19901-7, or referred
to as an accidental limit state (ALS) in some other codes.
6. The extent of thruster system failure in the ALS case should be determined from
a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). A complete failure of the thruster
system (e.g. through a blackout) should be considered.
7. HSE recommends that, as a minimum, permanently moored installations with
thruster-assisted mooring should be able to survive a 10-year storm in a blackout
(i.e. with loss of all thrusters). This is in addition to the case(s) based on the
FMEA analysis currently required by the codes.
8. Suitable guidance on requirements for the FMEA for the thruster system and the
power management is contained in outline in ISO 19901-7 and in more detail in
DNV-OS-E301 or Lloyds Register Rules for Classification Floating Units at Fixed
location – Part 3.
9. Duty holders need to consider what thruster system failures are used as
redundancy or ALS cases. Consequences of a thruster system failure may be
most severe in installations where thrusters are used primarily to control vessel
heading, thereby minimising the environmental loads on the vessel.
Mooring Inspection
10. Premature and unexpected chain wear has occurred on some FPSO / FSU
mooring designs close to the termination of the mooring at the turret. Other likely
11. Duty holders are expected to identify critical areas of their mooring systems and
to have mooring inspection regimes in place in line with guidance such as the Oil
and Gas UK Mooring Integrity Guidelines in addition to Classification Society
requirements where these are applicable.
12. The frequency of inspection should increase with the age of the mooring. API RP
2I gives some guidance on this. DNVGL-RP-E304 gives guidance for the damage
assessment of fibre ropes.
13. The duty holder should establish clear acceptance and rejection criteria for the
inspection of all mooring components including chain, wire, fibre rope,
connectors, buoys and anodes.
Mooring Tension and Position Monitoring
14. The duty holder should measure and record mooring line tensions. Where this is
not practicable then suitable arrangements should be in place to verify the
integrity of the mooring system and detect a line breakage. Various surveillance
systems are discussed in the Oil and Gas UK Mooring Integrity Guidelines.
Where none of these is practicable, evaluation of mooring tension may be
inferred from the positional information. In this case the installation’s position
must be continuously monitored using suitably reliable systems.
15. These arrangements should be appropriate for the detection and confirmation of
a mooring line break at the earliest practicable opportunity.
16. Appropriate arrangements for position and mooring tension monitoring are
described in DNVGL-OS-E301.
Response to Line Break Detection
17. Control room operators should have reliable equipment with an alarm that
indicates a line breakage. For further information on line break detection systems,
refer to the Oil and Gas UK Mooring Integrity Guidelines1.
18. Appropriate response procedures should be documented and included in the
emergency response manual. Practice drills should be carried out.
Data Logging and Operational Performance
19. Data logging of mooring tension is regarded as good practice in UKCS. Vessel
positions, motion responses, and environmental conditions should also be
similarly recorded with a view to validate system behaviour and identify failure
causes.
Adverse Weather Policy
23. For those mobile offshore units where it is assessed that compliance with ISO
19901-7 Annex B2 is not expected, location-specific mooring analyses should be
performed to ISO 19901-7 main text or other equivalent standards. In addition to
the location specific analysis to ISO 19901-7 or equivalent, a robustness check
should be done for 100-year return period weather conditions to demonstrate a
minimum factor of safety of 1.0 in the intact condition. If this is not achievable for
any installation with an accepted safety case, a demonstration of robustness
under a minimum of 50-year weather conditions may be acceptable on condition
that additional measures to reduce the risk of a mooring line failure are
implemented. It is expected that the combination of weather used in the analysis
will be onerous to assess the worst-case response to demonstrate adequate
system robustness.
24. The installation duty holder should ensure that the mooring arrangements for a
specific location are suitable for the local conditions and the operations being
undertaken.
25. Location-specific mooring analyses should be prepared to demonstrate the
suitability of a particular mooring pattern for the specific location, water depth,
seabed infrastructure, soil conditions, and nature and duration of the operation.
26. ISO 19901-7 only permits the consideration of line tension adjustments ‘for
operational reasons and/or in advance of foreseeable environmental events’ not
‘the modelling of active adjustments of line tension during the analysis of design
situations’. This is interpreted as follows:
• Line adjustments (in the analysis) following line failure are not permitted.
27. Where emergency mooring release systems are fitted, these should be capable
of operation from a safe location, typically within the temporary refuge, and using
systems which do not create an ignition source in the event of a gas release.
28. Mobile offshore unit duty holders should ensure that they have reliable data on
the soil conditions for the location, and that the anchor penetration and holding
power has been adequately demonstrated.
29. Location specifics including, but not limited to, water depth, surrounding
infrastructure and predicted deep anchor embedment will be considered when
determining pretension, anchor embedment checks and anchor holding capacity
requirements.
30. To confirm anchors are set, mooring lines should be cross tensioned in
accordance with the mooring analysis results.
31. It is recommended that suitable means are employed to verify anchor position
and anchor embedment such as the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).