Case 2:96-cr-00030-KS-MTP Document 933 Filed 02/03/25 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION

KIRKSEY MCCORD NIX, JR. DEFENDANT/PETITIONER

V. CRIMINAL CAUSE NO. 2:96-CR-30-KS-MTP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESPONDENT

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on the Motion for Compassionate Release [909] filed

by Petitioner Kirksey McCord Nix, Jr. The Government responded to the original motion. See

[918]. Petitioner then sought leave to amend and supplement his original motion. See [919]. The

Court granted the requested leave in a Text Only Order dated October 23, 2023 and allowed the

Government time to file a response to any new arguments made, but it did not do so. On

December 11, 2023, Petitioner sent a letter to the Court that was docketed. See [928]. 1 The Court

has reviewed all the filings and the underlying docket in this matter, as well as the applicable

case law, and otherwise being duly advised in the premises, the Court finds that Petitioner’s

request for compassionate release will be denied for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

In the instant case, following a jury trial in July 1997, Petitioner was found guilty and

convicted on 32 counts of a federal indictment that included the following crimes:

Count 1: Conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)

that addressed eleven specific acts of racketeering involving the Petitioner (Acts
A-K). These acts included, but were not limited to, a conspiracy to murder Vincent
and Margaret Sherry, as well as the actual murders, numerous acts of wire fraud,
money laundering, and conspiracy with intent to distribute marijuana. 2
1
The same letter was filed on December 13, 2023 at Doc. No. [929] only in a different word font.
2
“Racketeering Act A” involved the conspiracy to murder both Vincent and Margaret Sherry and the actual murder
of Vincent Sherry. [895] at p. 9-12. “Racketeering Act B” involved the actual murder of Margaret Sherry. Id. at p.
13.
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Count 2: Engaging in a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)

that involved the same specific acts of racketeering listed in the conspiracy
violation in Count I.

Count 3: Conspiracy to escape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 that involved a plan

to escape from the Harrison County jail.

Counts 22-49: Committing wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 that

involved the transfer of money by wire as part of a lonely-hearts scam operation.

Count 51: Conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.

This case, however, was not the Petitioner’s first run-in with the law nor was it his first

conviction for elaborate and violent crimes. In 1972, Petitioner was convicted for the murder of

Frank Corso, a New Orleans grocery executive, and began serving a life sentence without parole

in the Louisiana State Prison System at Angola State Penitentiary. See generally, State v. Nix,

327 So. 2d 301, 313 (La. 1975). In addition to his 1972 conviction, and prior to his conviction in

this case, in 1992, Petitioner was convicted for conspiracy to violate the fraud-by-wire and

murder-for-hire statutes, along with substantive wire fraud violations. See Case No. 1:91-cr-40

(S.D. Miss. 1991); United States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1993). 3 It was while Petitioner

was incarcerated at Angola that the underlying events giving rise to these federal convictions

took place—all in an effort “to earn enough money to buy his way out of prison.” United States

v. Nix, No. 2:96-cr-30-KS-MTP, 2007 WL 737752, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2007).

As for Petitioner’s sentences on these numerous convictions, in addition to the life

sentence without parole for the Louisiana crime, Petitioner was further sentenced in 1992 to five

3
The “sordid tale” of the underlying events has been set forth in prior opinions by the Fifth Circuit, one of which
was cited by this Court and is hereby incorporated by reference. See 2007 WL 737752, at *1-2 (quoting United
States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1999)). In the 1992 case, the court described Petitioner as having
“masterminded” the underlying conspiracy. See Sharpe, 995 F.2d at 50.

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years on each of the three counts that are to run consecutively for a total of 15 years, all of which

were to run consecutively to the Louisiana sentence. (Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ¶ 98).

Further still, for his conviction in this case on September 22, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to

concurrent life sentences on each of Counts 1 and 2, concurrent five-year sentences on each of

Counts 18, 22-49 and 51, fined $500,000 and ordered to pay restitution of $232,767.11. See Final

Judgment [626]. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to any undischarged

sentences already imposed. Id. Needless to say, Petitioner is not forecast to be released from

prison within his lifetime.

Petitioner has filed a motion seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A). When Petitioner filed his motion, he was incarcerated at BOP El Reno and

requested that he not be transferred during the pendency of his request for a sentence

modification absent a verifiable medical reason. See [911]. The Court denied that request. [914].

Since that time and apparently for medical reasons, Petitioner was transferred to the Medical

Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (“MCFP Springfield”). See [920] (Gov’t

Certificate of Service); see also https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/?os=vb.&ref=app (last accessed

2/3/25).

II. DISCUSSION

Between his initial motion and his amended motion, Petitioner raises four bases in his

request to have this Court to reduce his sentence to time served. The first three grounds are raised

pursuant to the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” provision of Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)

based on Petitioner’s health issues and age, as well as an arguable change in the law. The third

ground is based on Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii), addressing age and the duration of time spent in

prison. The Government has responded that regardless of Petitioner’s technical eligibility, the

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Court should deny this motion because the Petitioner is a danger to the community and

consideration of Section 3553(a)’s sentencing factors alone justify the denial of relief.

A. Exhaustion Requirement

Before a district court assesses the merits of a motion for compassionate release, a

defendant must show that he has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of

the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf,” or that “30 days [have

passed] from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility.” 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A). Petitioner states in his motion and avers in a declaration dated July 25, 2023 that

on May 5, 2023, he submitted to FCI Warden Goldey a petition for the BOP to request a

sentence modification. [909] at Ex. A. Petitioner further avers, and the records show, that the

Warden denied Petitioner’s request on July 20, 2023 and notified Petitioner that he had 20 days

to appeal the decision. The instant motion was filed on August 22, 2023. Therefore, the Court

concludes that Petitioner has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement, and the

Government does not argue to the contrary.

B. Merits of the claims

1. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court may reduce the term of imprisonment if, after

considering the applicable sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent they are

applicable, it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting a motion for reduction in sentence, a court must also conclude

that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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The analysis of extraordinary and compelling reasons is informed by the policy statement

issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (Reduction in Term of

Imprisonment Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Policy Statement)). Section 1B1.13 was

recently amended with an effective date of November 1, 2023 and now contains a non-exclusive

list of six extraordinary and compelling reasons within the policy text itself, offering greater

clarity to courts. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual Supplement to App. C (U.S. Sent’g

Comm’n 2023) at 200–210 (Am. 814). 4 Petitioner relies on the following three extraordinary

and compelling reasons listed in the policy statement: (1) medical circumstances of the

defendant; (2) age of the defendant; and (6) unusually long sentence. The Court will address each

briefly in turn.

a. Medical circumstances

Policy statement 1B1.13, as amended, sets forth certain medical circumstances that a

defendant may be suffering from, as well as age itself, that could qualify as extraordinary and

compelling reasons. The two medical circumstances cited by Petitioner are that the defendant is

“suffering from a serious physical or medical condition” and “experiencing deteriorating

physical or mental health because of the aging process”—either of which must “substantially

diminish[] the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a

correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” See U.S.S.G. §

1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(i),(iii). Plaintiff also relies on the “age of the defendant” provision that

provides:

The defendant (A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is experiencing a serious

deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and

4
Amendment 814 revised Section § 1B1.13, which, among other things, now made clear that the policy statement
applies to both defendant-filed and BOP-filed motions for sentence reductions.

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(C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment,
whichever is less.

Id. at § 1B1.13(b)(2).

Petitioner, at the time of this motion, was 80 years old. [909] at p. 7. He states that he is a

Medical Care Level 3 inmate, who by definition has complex and chronic medical or mental

health conditions and who requires frequent clinical contacts to maintain control or stability of

their condition. Petitioner claims to have mobility issues and has moved around by wheelchair

for the past few years. [909] at p. 4. He has been diagnosed with chronic ischemic heart disease

and has a history of edema, exertional dyspnea, hypertension, hearty surgeries, and

hyperlipidemia. 5 Petitioner cites to and relies on cases where similar ailments, age, and mobility

issues have resulted in various courts’ granting compassionate release. [909] at p. 6. 6

Based on what Petitioner has presented in both his original motion and his amended

motion, and without addressing each and every case that analyzes certain medical conditions, on

its face, Petitioner’s motion appears to have stated an extraordinary and compelling reason under

the policy statement due to his multitude of medical conditions. The Court must note, however,

that Petitioner is now in custody at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners and is presumably

receiving better care for all of his ailments.

b. Unusually long sentence

Another basis for release argued by Petitioner in his amended motion is predicated on one

of the newly promulgated extraordinary and compelling reasons listed in the Sentencing

Guidelines policy statement: “unusually long sentence.” [919] at p. 3 (citing U.S.S.G. §

5
In his amended motion, Petitioner addresses, inter alia, his congestive heart failure, diabetes, sleep apnea, high
cholesterol, long haul Covid, and cataracts. [919] at pp. 8-14.
6
Petitioner cites to cases from the Middle District of Florida and the Southern District of Alabama. The Court finds
that the cases indeed reflect the granting of motions for similar health conditions.

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1B1.13(b)(6)). This provision provides specifically:

If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10

years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment
to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered
in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling
reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the
sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the
motion was filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized
circumstances.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)).

Petitioner argues that he has served well over 10 years of his sentence and contends that

that a “change in the law” came over 20 years ago in Apprendi v. New Jersey, when the U.S.

Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530

U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Petitioner contends that the sentencing factor that caused the judge in his

case to sentence him to the statutory maximum of life on Counts 1 and 2 (for violations of 18

U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d)) was based on the underlying racketeering activity of murder

(Racketeering Acts A and B) but the jury never found specifically that Petitioner was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of that particular underlying offense because he was charged jointly

on numerous other racketeering activities. [919] at pp. 4-5.

While this is an interesting argument, it misapprehends the holding of Apprendi as

applied to this case. Here, the penalty statute for racketeering states: “Whoever violates any

provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the

maximum penalty includes life imprisonment) . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Thus, the statutory

maximum could be life. The underlying racketeering activity of murder was used to determine

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the defendant’s base offense level, which did not increase the defendant’s statutory

maximum—it only increased the guideline to life imprisonment. 7 As such, Apprendi does not

apply. See United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the

“decision in Apprendi was specifically limited to facts which increase the penalty beyond the

statutory maximum and does not invalidate a court’s factual finding for the purposes of

determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Elwood, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 20265, at *12 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2024); see also United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407,

412 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that fact finding on relevant conduct, to the extent it increases the

discretionary sentencing range for a district judge under the sentencing guidelines, need not be

made by a jury). Thus, Apprendi does not represent a change in the law that result in a gross

sentencing disparity in Petitioner’s case. 8

c. 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Even if a court finds there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence

reduction, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) mandates that the Court may reduce the term of imprisonment

only after considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent they

are applicable” and determine whether they counsel for or against release. See United States v.

Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021). The following are some of the applicable factors a

7
As the Government points out and this Court has verified, according to the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) for the Petitioner, at the time of sentencing, Petitioner had a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history
category of III, resulting in a guideline range for imprisonment of “life.” [918] at p. 1 (citing PSR at ¶ 131). The
Court’s pronouncement at sentencing makes clear how the guidelines were adjusted, not the statutory minimum. See
Tr. of hearing [642] at pp. 77-80.
8
The Court notes that Petitioner made this very argument on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit found that the
district court properly sentenced Petitioner. See United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 873 (5th Cir. 1999). As the
court explained, “The applicable sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 [sic] provides that the base level is the
greater of 19 or the ‘offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.’ Here, the underlying activity
involved violations of Mississippi murder statutes, and the district court properly analogized this offense to the
federal first-degree murder offense during sentencing.” Id. This Court notes that the Fifth Circuit may have
mistakenly referred to the wrong sentencing guideline because it is not U.S.S.G. 2D1.1., but 2E1.1, that deals with
“Unlawful Conduct Relating to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.”

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court may consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed . . . medical care.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),(2).

It is important to note that a court may still deny compassionate release where the §

3553(a) factors override, in any particular case, what would otherwise be extraordinary and

compelling circumstances. See United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 2022)

(explaining that a “district court has discretion to deny compassionate release if the Section

3553(a) factors counsel against a reduction.”). Here, even assuming Petitioner’s age and medical

conditions meet the definition of an extraordinary and compelling reason under the policy

statement, the Section 3553(a) factors strongly counsel against Petitioner’s early release.

First, as to the nature and circumstances of the singular “offense,” it must be said that

there are many offenses for which Petitioner has been convicted—undoubtedly, the most

egregious of which was his involvement in not one, but three murders—the ultimate offense

against humanity. As for the history and characteristics of the defendant, one need not look any

further than Judge Pickering’s findings during Petitioner’s sentencing, some of which are as

follows:

“Mr. Nix, even in his teen years, was brash, abrasive and coolly calculating.”

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“[I]n his twenties, Mr. Nix made a living by gambling and cheating at cards and
apparently by burglary as well. At age 25, Mr. Nix served his first term in the
penitentiary for attempting to bribe a police officer . . . . When Mr. Nix was 27, he
committed a brutal murder in the course of a brazen burglary in New Orleans.”

“The evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Nix is deceitful, treacherous, merciless
and that he has a heart of concrete.”

“I do not know of anyone that I’ve come across since I’ve been on the bench who
has inflicted more heartache and misery or cost to society than Mr. Nix.”

“No [] individual[] that this Court has ever come across come[s] closer to
epitomizing the work of the devil than Kirksey Nix.”

[642] at pp. 73-76.

There is indeed a need for the life sentence that was imposed. It is needed in this case to

reflect the seriousness of his offenses. In addition to the murders, Petitioner was the mastermind

of a years-long scam against lonely individuals willing to send money unsuspectingly. Having

led a life of crime for so many years, even his 1992 conviction could not stop Petitioner’s thirst

for crime because Petitioner “continued his schemes from jail after the 1991 trial.” United States

v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1999). Such a pattern of conduct and the types of offenses

establishes that the sentence imposed is needed to promote respect for the law, provide just

punishment, and deter criminal conduct. And most importantly, due to the breadth and reach of

these crimes, the sentence is needed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 9

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds conclusively that the sentencing factors strongly

militate against a reduction in sentence, let alone early release. See United States v. Levin, 2020

WL 253778 at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 19, 2020) (noting “society would benefit from defendant

continuing to serve his life sentence, as defendant will not be able to engage in further horrific

9
In exercising its discretion, the Court has also considered the submission of Lynne Sherry Sposito (on behalf of the
Sherry family) pursuant to the Crimes Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2), (4). [930-1].

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acts or otherwise cause additional torment to [survivors of murder victims]”). On this basis, the

motion will be denied, but in the interest of thoroughness, the Court will address Petitioner’s

final argument.

2. Age and duration in prison

In addition to his “extraordinary and compelling reasons” argument, Petitioner also relies

on the second provision of Section 3582(c)(1)(A), which states that a defendant must be at least

70 years of age and must have served “at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed

under Section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently

imprisoned, and that the defendant is not a danger to the safety to any other person or the

community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Petitioner argues that he was 80 years old at the time

of filing and that his convictions in 1991 and his current prison term arose from the “same course

of conduct,” resulting in his present incarceration of over 31 years, thereby qualifying him under

the statute.

The policy statement indicates that if a plaintiff qualifies, the court still must determine

that “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as

provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2). 10 Petitioner urges that he is no

longer a danger to society because the acts that resulted in his conviction occurred more than 36

years ago. [909] at p. 7. While acknowledging that he was incarcerated at Angola at the time of

his federal offenses, Petitioner claims that the “lax conditions and easy corruptability [sic] of

prison administration and staff fostered and nurtured an environment for Defendant to engage in

10
Section 3142 addresses the release or detention of a defendant pending trial. Among the factors to be considered
are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence [] ;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including—the
person’s character . . . criminal history, and whether, at the time of the current offense, the person was on probation,
on parole, or on other release; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

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criminal activity while he was imprisoned there.” Id. He claims to accept full responsibility for

his actions, though, and urges the Court to acknowledge his rehabilitation and take note that his

last disciplinary infraction was over 14 years ago at the time of filing the motion. Id. at p. 8.

Petitioner claims that he does not pose a risk to others or the community due to his age and his

laundry list of health issues. See id.; see also [919] at p. 22 (arguing that he does not pose any

type of danger whatsoever, “as he knows the consequences of any type of misbehavior”). The

Court disagrees.

While the Court recognizes the age of the Petitioner and notes his numerous health

issues, the Court is not convinced that he is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the

community. As the Government points out, the safety of the community has been found to refer

“not only to the mere danger of physical violence but also to the danger that the defendant might

engage in [any] criminal activity to the community’s detriment.” United States v. Mackie, 876 F.

Supp. 148, 149 (E.D. La. 1994). Petitioner’s criminal history alone shows that he is a danger to

the community. Cf. United States v. Gonzales, No. 2:08-318-12, 2018 WL 9372475, at *1 (S.D.

Tex. Sept. 17, 2018) (denying a motion for a sentence reduction on the basis that the defendant’s

aggravating role in a large-scale conspiracy and history of trafficking narcotics poses a danger to

the community).

As plainly admitted by Petitioner, almost his entire life has been one of crime. In his

letter to the Court, Petitioner describes how his early cons and scams began when he was just 21

years old in 1964. See [928] at p. 2 (admitting that he “went through life gambling, cheating,

stealing and conning and harming too many victims to count”). 11 Given the convictions for his

most recent crimes, Petitioner may well be one of the most notorious criminals in Mississippi’s

11
Judge Pickering also recounted Petitioner’s life of crime during the sentencing hearing. [642] at pp. 81-82.

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modern history. In assessing his criminal history, the Court is mindful of the boldness, the

nature, and the goal of many of Petitioner’s past crimes.

In this case alone, not only the lonely-hearts scam that conned numerous individuals out

of hundreds of thousands of dollars but also, and egregiously worse, racketeering crimes

involving the conspiracy and murders of prominent individuals were crimes Petitioner was able

to commit while incarcerated at a state penitentiary. These were not crimes that required physical

strength, such that an 80-year-old man in failing physical health would not be able to commit in

the future. They simply required a cunning, criminal mind and a telephone. 12 Having led a life of

crime for so many years, even his 1992 conviction could not stop Petitioner’s thirst for crime.

Petitioner “continued his schemes from jail after the 1991 trial.” United States v. Sharpe, 193

F.3d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1999). His wire fraud conspiracy continued into 1996 when he was

indicted and convicted again under the RICO statute. See id. at 866 (5th Cir. 1999).

And lest we forget, Petitioner’s overarching purpose of his many racketeering offenses

was “to earn enough money to buy his way out of prison.” Id. at 860. His crimes did not stop

until he went into federal custody under the sentence imposed by this Court, and it will not be

this Court who gives him a “get-out-of-jail-free card” no matter how “rehabilitated” Petitioner

claims to be. He has been, and the Court finds that he continues to be a danger to the safety of

others and the community.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that both the Section 3553(a) sentencing

factors and the Petitioner’s continuing to be a danger to the safety of others and the community

12
The Final Judgment recommends to the Bureau of Prisons: “That the defendant not have access to a telephone,
unless it is an emergency situation, and only then under close supervision.” [626] at p. 2. As Judge Pickering noted,
“Mr. Nix has demonstrated too many times what he can do with a telephone.” [642] at p. 81.

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militate against allowing Petitioner’s early release from prison.

THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate

Release [909], both as originally filed and as amended [919], is DENIED.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 3rd day of February 2025.

/s/ Keith Starrett___________________

KEITH STARRETT
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. CAUSE NO.: 2:96-CR-30-KS-MTP

KIRKSY MCCORD NIX, JR.

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION

FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Comes now, LYNNE SHERRY SPOSITO (on behalf of herself and the Sherry Family),

by and through her undersigned Counsel, and files this Response in Opposition to Motion and

Amended Motion for Compassionate Release. In support of said Opposition, the LYNNE

SHERRY SPOSITO would show unto this Honorable Court the following:

I. Standing to be Heard

LYNNE SHERRY SPOSITO (and the Sherry Family) have the right to be heard pursuant

to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Specifically, Section

3771(b)(2)(D) defines a “crime victim” as, “…[A] person against whom the State offense is

committed or, if that person is killed or incapacitated, that person’s family member or other

lawful representative.”

In this case, Vincent and Margaret Sherry were each shot multiple times in the head and

died as a result. LYNNE SHERRY SPOSITO is the daughter of Judge and Mrs. Sherry. As such,

the statute grants her standing to be heard.

II. Reasons for Opposing the Request for Compassionate Release

For reasons stated in the letter from LYNNE SHERRY SPOSITO (attached hereto as

Exhibit “A”), the Sherry Family vehemently opposes Mr. Nix being granted any form of release

from Federal Prison.

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III. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Sherry Family respectfully prays that

this Honorable Court will deny any form of compassionate release from Federal Prison for Mr.

Nix.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 29th day of December, 2023.

LYNNE SHERRY SPOSITO (for the

Sherry Family)

By: ___/s/ Robert G. Harenski________

Robert G. Harenski, MSB #10037

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robert G. Harenski, do hereby certify that on this day, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF System, which sent notification of such
filing to all Counsel of record. I have additionally sent a true and correct copy, via U.S. Mail, to:

KIRKSEY MCCORD NIX, JR.

REG NO.: 20921-077
MCFP SPRINGFIELD
FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTER
P.O. BOX 400
SPRINGFIELD, MO 65801

SO CERTIFIED, this the 29th day of December, 2023.

By: _____/s/ Robert G. Harenski______

Robert G. Harenski, MSB #10037

Prepared By:
Robert G. Harenski, MSB #10037
Attorney at Law
296 Beauvoir Road
Suite 100-162
Biloxi, MS 39531
Ph.: 228-669-9700