Wi-Fi Roaming

Rome wasn’t built in a day…
and neither is roaming!

Who am I?
David Coleman
Senior Mobility Leader - Aerohive Networks
CWNE #4
@mistermultipath
Who am I?
Co-author of:
Sybex CWNA Study Guide

4th Edition
ISBN: 978-1118893708
Amazon:
http://a.co/c6aNiRb
Who am I?
Available now:
Sybex CWSP Study Guide
2nd Edition
ISBN: 978-1119211082
Amazon:
http://amzn.com/1119211085
Layer 2: Roaming
BSSID
#1
BSSID
#2 • Clients make the
AP #1 AP #2 roaming decision
Roaming client station
© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 5

Client to AP handoff
• Clients make the

roaming decision
• Based on factors
such as RSSI or SNR
• The client sends a
frame called the
-75 dBm -70 dBm reassociation
request frame, to
start the roaming
procedure.

AP to AP handoff
The AP-to-AP handoff
communications involves
two primary tasks:
• The target AP informs the
original AP that the client
station is roaming.
• The target AP requests the
client’s buffered packets
from the original AP.

Fast Secure Roaming
RADIUS Server
• PMK caching
•Preauthentication
• Opportunistic Key Caching
• Fast BSS Transition
Roam

Overview
• There is a symbiotic relationship between PSK/802.1X
authentication and the generation of dynamic encryption keys.
• An outstanding by‐product of 802.1X/EAP can be the generation

and distribution of dynamic encryption keys.
• Dynamic encryption keys can also be generated as a by‐product

of PSK authentication.
• Encryption and authentication are tied to each other in a Robust

Secure Network Association (RSNA).

RSNA
A robust security network

association (RSNA) requires two
802.11 stations (STAs) to establish
procedures to authenticate and
associate with each other as well
as create dynamic encryption keys
through the 4-Way Handshake
process.

PMKSA
Robust security network

associations (RSNAs) can be
PMK
broken down into several subtypes.
• 802.1X/EAP or PSK authentication

process is needed to produce the
pairwise master key (PMK)
PMK
• This is known as a pairwise master
key security association (PMKSA)
PTKSA
• The PMK is the seeding material

for the 4-Way Handshake.
PTK PMK
• The handshake creates the
pairwise transient key (PTK)which is
4-Way Handshake
used for encryption and
decryption of unicast traffic.
• This is known as a pairwise
PTK
transient key security association
PMK (PTKSA)

RSN Information Element (RSNIE)
• RSN security can be identified

by a field found in certain
802.11 management frames.
• This field is known as the robust

security network information
element (RSNIE) and is often
referred to simply as the RSN
information element.

RSN Information Element (RSNIE)
• The RSN information element field
is always found in four different
802.11 management frames:
• beacon management frames
• probe response frames
association request frames
• reassociation request frames
• The RSNIE can also be found in

reassociation response frames if
802.11r mechanisms are enabled.

PMKID
• A unique identifier is created for

each PMKSA that has been
PMK
established between the
authenticator and the supplicant.
• The pairwise master key identifier

(PMKID) is a unique identifier that
refers to a PMKSA.
PMK

PMKID
Element Length Version Group Pairwise Pairwise AKM AKM RSN PMKID PMKID
ID Cipher Cipher Cipher Suite Suite Capabili- Count List
Suite Suite Suite Count List ties
Count List
• The pairwise master key identifier (PMKID) is found in the

RSN information element in association request frames
and reassociation request frames that are sent from a
client station to an AP.
• The PMKID is also found in FT Action frames.

PMKID
The PMKID can reference the following types of pairwise master key
security associations:
• PMKSA derived from a PSK for the target AP
• Cached PMKSA from an 802.1X/EAP or SAE authentication
• Cached PMKSA that has been obtained through preauthentication
with the target AP
PMKID
The PMKID can reference the following types of pairwise master key
security associations:
• PMK-R0 security association derived as part of an FT initial mobility
domain association
• PMK-R1 security association derived as part of an FT initial mobility
domain association or as part of a fast BSS transition
PMKSA
The components of a PMKSA include:
• PMK - he created Pairwise Master Key.
PMK • PMKID - The unique identifier of the
association.
• Authenticator MAC - Layer 2 address of the
authenticator.
• Lifetime - The key lifetime is not otherwise
specified, then the PMK lifetime is infinite.
• AKMP - The authentication and key
management protocol.
PMK • Authorization parameters - Anything
specified by the authentication server or
supplicant. Example: Authorized SSID
PMKSA – 802.1X/EAP
Without any type of fast secure
roaming mechanism
• Every time a client roams, the
client will re-authenticate.
• Therefore, every time time a

client roams a new PMKSA is
established.

• 802.1X/EAP authentication can
take 700 milliseconds (ms) or
longer for the client to
authenticate.
• VoWiFi requires a handoff of

150 ms or less to avoid a
degradation of the quality of
the call or even worse, a loss of
connection.

• 802.1X/EAP authentication can
take 700 milliseconds (ms) or
longer for the client to
authenticate.
• VoWiFi requires a handoff of

150 ms to avoid a degradation
of the quality of the call or
even worse, a loss of
connection. A 50 ms or less
handoff is ideal.

• The normal delay will disrupt
the communications of time-
sensitive applications such as
voice and video.
• Therefore, the 802.11-2012

standard defines three fast
secure roaming mechanisms:
• PMK caching
• Preauthentication
• Fast BSS transition

PMK Caching
• The 802.11-2012 standard states
“An AP whose authenticator has
retained the PMK for one or
more of the PMKIDs can skip the
IEEE 802.1X/EAP authentication
and proceed with the 4-Way
Handshake.”
• In simpler words, when the client
roams back to the original AP,
both devices still have the
original cached PMK #1 and
they can skip the 802.1X/EAP
exchange.

PMK Caching
• The client does not need
to re-authenticate and
create a new PMK
because the original PMK
still exists.
• The cached original PMK

is then used to seed the
4-Way Handshake.

PMK Caching
• PMK caching is sometimes
called fast secure roam-
back.
• This does not address fast

secure roaming when the
client roams forward.

Preauthentication
• A client station can use
preauthentication to
establish a new PMKSA with
an AP prior to roaming to a
new target AP.
• Preauthentication allows a
client station to initiate a
new 802.1X/EAP exchange
with a RADIUS server while
associated with the original
AP.
Preauthentication
• The purpose of the new
802.1X/EAP authentication is
to create a new PMKSA
relationship with a new
target AP where the client
might roam.
• The client does not need to

re-authenticate and create
a new PMK because a
precreated cached PMK
already exists.
Preauthentication
An AP can indicate to the
client station that the AP is
capable of preauthentication
in the RSN information element
sent in the AP’s probe response
or beacon frames.

PMK Caching and Preauthentication
• Both PMK caching and preauthentication were originally defined in
the 802.11i security amendment.
• The intent was to use them together to solve fast secure roaming.
• Neither method scaled very well and preauthentication put a

tremendous load on RADIUS servers.
• Instead, vendors began to adopt a non-standard method called

opportunistic key caching (OKC).

Opportunistic Key Caching (OKC)
• OKC allows for PMK caching between multiple APs that are
under some sort of administrative control.
• Unlike preauthentication, OKC does not mandate how a PMK

arrives at the target AP.
• OKC instead allows a client station the opportunity to take

advantage of a single cached PMK shared among multiple
access points.

• OKC forwards a PMK from an original AP and then distributes it
to other APs.
• The PMK distribution between APs is dependent on the WLAN

architecture and is usually proprietary.
• In a WLAN controller environment, the PMKs are usually

forwarded by the controller to the APs. In a non-controller
environment, the PMKs are forwarded by the APs to each
other using a proprietary protocol. Aerohive: AMRP
Step 2: PMK #1 forwarded by original AP to target AP
PMK #1
Step 1: Original AP Target AP Step 4: Target AP looks at the MAC

802.1X/EAP address of the STA that just sent the
reassociation request and calculates
PMKID #2 using the same formula. The
target AP responds with a reassociation
PMK #1 response.
Step 3: Roaming STA calculates a 4-Way Handshake

new PMKID #2 using the original PMK
#1 + target AP MAC address + STA
MAC address. STA sends a
reassociation request frame to the
target AP with PMKID #2
Step 5: 802.1X/EAP has been

skipped. Final encryption
Client roams to the target AP keys are created.
PMK #1 PMK #1
AP roaming cache
• Supplicant #4 is a client that is currently associated to the AP.
• The other supplicants are client stations that are one hop away and
not associated to the AP.
AP roaming cache
• The PMKs of the other stations have already been forwarded to this
AP and are cached.
• Any client that also supports OKC can use its original PMK when
roaming to this new AP
OKC – Is it supported?
• OKC is not an official fast secure roaming standard.
• Most enterprise WLAN vendors support OKC.
• However, many clients do not support OKC.

• Example: iOS clients never supported OKC.

Fast BSS Transition (FT)
• The 802.11r-2008 amendment is known as the fast basic service
set transition (FT) amendment.
• The main difference between OKC and FT is that the 802.11r-

2008 amendment fully defined the key hierarchy used when
creating cached keys.
• The fast BSS transition mechanisms originally defined in the

802.11r-2008 amendment are now found in clause 12 of the
802.11-2012 standard.
• FT mechanisms operate within a

BSSID BSSID mobility domain.
#1 #2
• A mobility domain is set of basic
AP #1 AP #2 service sets (BSSs), within the same
extended service set (ESS), that
support fast BSS transitions
between themselves.
Roaming client station • In simpler words, a mobility
domain is a group of APs that
belong to the same ESS where
client stations can roam in a fast
and secure manner.
• The first time a client station
enters a mobility domain, the
client will associate with an
AP and perform an initial
802.1X/EAP authentication.
• From that point forward, as

the client station roams
between APs, the client will
be using fast BSS transitions.

• FT uses the 802.1X/EAP
exchange to create the
master session key which
seeds a multi-tiered key
management solution.
• After the supplicant and the

RADIUS server exchange
credentials, a first-level
pairwise master is created.

• The first-level pairwise master is
called the PMK-RO key and is
sent to the authenticator and
the WLAN client.
• Depending on the WLAN

architecture, the 802.1X/EAP
authenticator can either be
an AP or a WLAN controller.

Fast BSS transition uses a three-level key hierarchy:
Pairwise Master Key R0 (PMK-R0) The first-level key of the FT key

hierarchy. This key is derived from the master session key (MSK).
Pairwise Master Key R1 (PMK-R1) The second-level key of the FT

key hierarchy.
Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) The third-level key of the FT key

hierarchy. The PTK is the final key used to encrypt 802.11 data
frames.
Fast BSS transition also assigns different roles to different devices.
Each device is assigned a key holder role to manage one or more
of the multiple keys used in the FT key hierarchy.
Device Key holder role
Original AP or WLAN controller Pairwise master key (PMK) R0 key holder
(R0KH)
Access point Pairwise master key (PMK) R1 key holder
(R1KH)
Client station Pairwise master key (PMK) S0 key holder
(S0KH)
Client station Pairwise master key (PMK) S1 key holder
(S1KH)

• The various levels of FT keys are
derived and stored in different WLAN
devices depending on the WLAN
architecture that has been
deployed.
• For example, in a controller-less
environment, the first level PMK-R0
key is created and cached on an
access point.
• In an environment where WLAN
controllers are deployed, the first
level PMK-R0 key is created and
cached on a WLAN controller.

FT Key hierarchy
• The various levels of FT keys are
derived and stored in different WLAN
devices depending on the WLAN
architecture that has been
deployed.
• For example, in a controller-less
environment, the first level PMK-R0
key is created and cached on an
access point.
• In an environment where WLAN
controllers are deployed, the first
level PMK-R0 key is created and
cached on a WLAN controller.

FT Key hierarchy: WLAN controller infrastructure
• The PMK-R0 is created and
cached on the WLAN controller.
The WLAN controller is the key
holder for the first-level key.
• The second-level PMK-R1 keys are

derived from the PMK-R0 and
sent from the WLAN controller to
the controller-based APs.
• The PMK-R1 keys are cached on

the APs.
FT Key hierarchy: WLAN controller infrastructure
• The access points are the key
holders for the PMK-R1 keys.
• The PMK-R1 keys are used to

derive the PTKs, which are used
to encrypt 802.11 data frames.

FT Key hierarchy: Supplicant
• The various levels of FT keys
are also derived and stored
on the client station.
• The PMK-R0 is cached on the

supplicant, which is the
client station.
• The client station is the key

holder for the first-level key.
• The client station derives the
second-level key, PMK-R1,
from the PMK-R0.
• The PMK-R1 key is cached on

the client station.
• The supplicants are the key


• The PMK-R1 key is cached on
the client station.

derive the PTKs, which are
used to encrypt unicast
802.11 data frames.

FT Key hierarchy: Distributed AP architecture
• The 802.1X/EAP exchange
creates the master session key
(MSK). The MSK is used to create
the first-level master key, PMK-R0.
• The PMK-R0 is created and

cached on an AP where the
client first associates.
• The original AP is the key holder

for the first-level key.
• The second-level PMK-R1 keys are
derived from the PMK-R0 and
sent from the original AP to other
target APs over a secure
channel.
• How the PMK-R1 keys are

securely distributed is outside of
the scope of the 802.11-2012
standard.
• The PMK-R1 keys are cached on
the target APs, which are the key

derive the PTKs, which are used
to encrypt unicast 802.11 data
frames.
Mobility Domain Information Element
Bytes 1 1 2 1
Element ID Length MDID FT Capability and Policy
Fast BSS
Resource Request
transition Reserved
Protocol Capability
over DS
Bits: 1 1 6
• The mobility domain information element (MDIE) is used to indicate

the existence of a mobility domain as well as the method of fast
BSS transition.
• The mobility domain identifier (MDID) field is the unique identifier of
the group of APs that constitute a mobility domain.
Mobility Domain Information Element
Bytes 1 1 2 1
Element ID Length MDID FT Capability and Policy
Fast BSS
Resource Request
transition Reserved
Protocol Capability
over DS
Bits: 1 1 6
• The FT capability and Policy field is used to indicate whether over-

the-air or over-the-DS fast BSS transition is to be performed.
• We will discuss the difference between over-the-air and over-the-

DS fast BSS transition later in this module.
Fast BSS Transition Information Element
MIC Optional
Element ID Length MIC ANonce SNonce
Control Parameter(s)
Octets: 1 1 2 16 32 32 Variable
• The fast BSS transition information element (FTIE) includes

information needed to perform the FT authentication sequence
during a fast BSS transition.
• Notice that some of the fields look very similar to the information
used during a typical 4-Way Handshake exchange.
FT Initial Mobility Domain Association
• The FT initial mobility domain
association is the first association
in the mobility domain.
• Open System authentication
request/response frames with the
first AP.
• The client station and AP then use
the MDIE and FTIE information in
the association request/response
frames to indicate future use of
the FT procedures.

• The PTK and GTK encryption keys
are created during the FT 4-Way
Handshake and the 802.1X/EAP
controlled port is unblocked.
• The original 802.1X/EAP

exchange also creates the
master session key (MSK) that is
used for the FT key hierarchy.

• The FT initial mobility domain
association is not much different
than any initial association used
by clients that do not support fast
BSS transition.
• The main difference is that extra

information, such as the MDIE
and FTIE, is communicated during
an FT initial mobility domain
association.

Non-FT roaming
Original AP Target AP Open System

authentication
PMK #1 Reassociation
request and response
• If a client does NOT have to re-authenticate,

a total of 8 frames are still exchanged.
• 16 frames if you include the ACKs 4-Way Handshake
Client roams to the target AP

Over-the-Air Fast BSS Transition
• The FT process defines a more
efficient method that effectively
combines the initial Open System
authentication and reassociation
frames with the 4-Way Handshake
frames.
• In other words, four fewer frames are

needed when a client roams, thus
speeding up the roaming process.

• An FT protocol frame exchange is
used to initiate the roaming
exchange and create dynamic
encryption keys.
• Note that the authentication

request/response frames and
reassociation request/response
frames carry an FT authentication
algorithm(FTAA) along with nonces
and other information needed to
create the final dynamic keys.

• This process is known as over-the-air
fast BSS transition.
• The client station communicates

directly with the target AP using
standard 802.11 authentication with
the FT authentication algorithm.
• The PMK-R1 key is the seeding

material for the over-the-air fast BSS
transition process that creates the
final pairwise transient key (PTK).

Over-the-DS Fast BSS Transition
• An alternative to the FT method is
over-the-DS fast BSS transition,
which requires the use of FT
Action frames to complete the
PTK creation process.
• The over-the-DS process uses the

FT Action frames over the wired
802.3 infrastructure.

• The client station sends an FT Action
request frame to the target AP via
the original AP.
• The FT Action request frame frame is

forwarded over the distribution
system (DS), which is the wired
infrastructure.
• The target AP responds back to the

client station over the DS with an FT
Action response frame.

• The reassociation request and
response frames are then sent
from the client station to the
target AP over the air.
• The PMK-R1 key is the seeding

material for the over-the-DS fast
BSS transition exchange that
creates the final pairwise transient
key (PTK).

• Over-the-DS fast BSS transition is
considered to be an optional
method that may be supported
by a few WLAN vendors.

Fast BSS Transition and PSK authentication
Original AP Target AP Open System

authentication
PMK-R1 Over-the-
Reassociation Air Fast BSS
request and response Transition
PMK-R1
• PSK authentication also uses over-
the-air Fast BSS transition
Client roams to the target AP • By eliminating the 4-Way Handshake,
an FT roam is slightly faster.

Fast BSS Transition
The RSN information element found in WLAN management
frames includes three authentication and key management
(AKM) suites:
• FT authentication using IEEE 802.1X, with FT key management

• FT authentication using PSK, with FT key management
• FT authentication over SAE with SHA-256, with FT key management

802.11k
• The 802.11k-2008 amendment, in conjunction with the ratified

802.11r-2008 amendment, together have the potential to
improve roaming performance within secure 802.11 WLANs.
• 802.11k defines radio resource measurement (RRM)

mechanisms that enable 802.11k-compliant radios to better
understand the RF environment in which they exist.

802.11k
• A key component of RRM is the neighbor report, which is

used by client stations to gain information from the
associated AP about potential roaming neighbors.
• The neighbor report information assists the fast roaming

process by providing a method for the client to request from
the associated AP a report about neighboring APs available
within the same mobility domain.
802.11k
• This can speed up the client scanning process by informing

the client device of nearby APs to which it may roam.
• The neighbor report information is typically delivered

through a request/report frame exchange inside 802.11
Action frames.

802.11v
• The IEEE 802.11v-2011 amendment defined wireless network
management (WNM) as information about network
resources that is exchanged between the client devices
and an AP.
• The intended goal is to enhance overall performance of the

wireless network.
• Whereas 802.11k provides exchange of information about

the RF environment, 802.11v exchanges WNM information
about surrounding existing network conditions.
Voice Enterprise
• In 2012, the Wi-Fi Alliance debuted a
vendor-interoperability certification
called Voice Enterprise that defines
enhanced support for voice
applications in the enterprise
environment.
• Many aspects of the 802.11r,

802.11k, and 802.11v amendments
are tested for Voice Enterprise
certification.
Voice Enterprise
Performance of equipment submitted

for Wi-Fi Alliance Voice Enterprise
certification has to meet the following
thresholds to ensure that the Wi-Fi
network preserves good voice call
quality:
• Latency (One way delay < 50 ms)

• Jitter (< 50 ms)

Voice Enterprise SSID
• Voice Enterprise settings may cause connectivity issues with legacy

clients.
• The drivers of the legacy clients may not be able to handle the
802.11k/r/v information elements.
• Separate SSID may be needed.

Layer 3 roaming boundaries
• One major consideration

when designing a WLAN is
what happens when client
stations roam across Layer
3 boundaries.
• Client stations will lose

Layer 3 connectivity and
must acquire a new IP
address.
© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential

Layer 3 roaming boundaries
• Any connection-oriented
applications that are
running when the client
reestablishes Layer 3
connectivity will have to
be restarted.
• For example, a VoIP phone

conversation would
disconnect in this scenario,
and the call would have to
be reestablished.
Mobile IP
• The only way to maintain upper-
layer communications when
crossing Layer 3 subnets is to
provide a Layer 3 roaming
solution that is based on the
Mobile IP standard.
• Mobile IP uses an IP tunneling

method and IP header
encapsulation to allow packets
to traverse between separate
Layer 3 domains.

passp passp
Secure Authentication of Equals
hrase hrase
SAE Authentication (Commit message) • Once the PMK is

created and the
SAE Authentication (Commit message)
association process
SAE Authentication (Confirm message) completes, the AP and
SAE Authentication (Confirm message)
the client can then
PMK PMK commence a 4-Way
Handshake to create a
Association Request pairwise transient key
(PTK).
Association Response
4-Way Handshake
PTK PTK
SAE Roaming
Once the PMK is created and the association process completes, the AP and
the What about roaming when using SAE authentication?
There are two potential methods:
• Option 1 A client station could roam to a new AP with the following

sequence of frame exchanges: Probe Request/Response frame exchange,
SAE authentication frame exchange, reassociation frame exchange, and
then a 4-Way Handshake.

SAE Roaming
• Option 2 A client station can be SAE authenticated to many APs

simultaneously by completing the SAE protocol with any number of APs while
still being associated to another AP.
• In other words, a client could perform an SAE commit and confirm exchange
with a potential roaming target prior to roaming to the target AP. This creates
a PMK on neighboring APs.
• When the client roams, the PMK is already on the target AP and all the client
has to do is a reassociation frame exchange and a 4-Way Handshake when
it actually

Upgrade your clients first
clients.mikealbano.com

Blame
Your Wi-Fi sucks!

Layer 2: PSK Authentication Troubleshooting
• Passphrase mismatch
•PMKs never properly created
• 4-Way Handshake fails

Layer 2: Roaming Problems
BSSID
#1
BSSID
#2 • Drivers (client problem)
AP #1 AP #2 • Sticky Problems (bad
design)
• Layer 3 roaming

High Power isis Good
Low Power BAD
• Capacity Problems
• Increase CCI
• Hidden Node
• Mismatch power
between clients and AP
• Roaming – Sticky
problems
• Turn down the power!
How do you measure cell overlap?
BSSID BSSID
#1 #2
• Primary Coverage: -70 dBm
AP #1 AP #2
• Secondary coverage: -75 dBm

• Clients make the roaming decision

Layer 2: Fast Secure Roaming
RADIUS Server
• Do clients support
Opportunistic Key Caching
(OKC)?
• Do clients support 802.11r
and 802.11k mechanisms?
Roam

But… it’s backward compatible!
• Legacy client
devices often cannot
connect when new
802.11 technology is
introduced
• Client drivers do not
know how to handle
new Information
Elements in Beacons
• Example: Fast BSS
Transition IE
Who am I?
Available now:
Sybex CWSP Study Guide
2nd Edition
ISBN: 978-1119211082
Amazon:
http://amzn.com/1119211085
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Rome wasn’t built in a day…

and neither is roaming!

Sybex CWNA Study Guide

Roaming client station

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 5

• Clients make the

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 6

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 7

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 8

• An outstanding by‐product of 802.1X/EAP can be the generation

• Dynamic encryption keys can also be generated as a by‐product

• Encryption and authentication are tied to each other in a Robust

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 9

A robust security network

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 10

Robust security network

• 802.1X/EAP or PSK authentication

• The PMK is the seeding material

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 12

• RSN security can be identified

• This field is known as the robust

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 13

• The RSNIE can also be found in

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 14

• A unique identifier is created for

• The pairwise master key identifier

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 15

• The pairwise master key identifier (PMKID) is found in the

• The PMKID is also found in FT Action frames.

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 16

• Therefore, every time time a

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 20

• VoWiFi requires a handoff of

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 21

• VoWiFi requires a handoff of

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 22

• Therefore, the 802.11-2012

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 23

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 24

• The cached original PMK

© Aerohive Networks, Proprietary & Confidential 25

• This does not address fast

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• The client does not need to

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• Neither method scaled very well and preauthentication put a

• Instead, vendors began to adopt a non-standard method called

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• Unlike preauthentication, OKC does not mandate how a PMK

• OKC instead allows a client station the opportunity to take

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• The PMK distribution between APs is dependent on the WLAN

• In a WLAN controller environment, the PMKs are usually

Step 1: Original AP Target AP Step 4: Target AP looks at the MAC

Step 3: Roaming STA calculates a 4-Way Handshake

Step 5: 802.1X/EAP has been

• Supplicant #4 is a client that is currently associated to the AP.

• OKC is not an official fast secure roaming standard.

• Most enterprise WLAN vendors support OKC.

• However, many clients do not support OKC.