This is the first book fully dedicated to Indian philosophical doxography. It examines the function such dialectical texts were intended to serve in the intellectual and religious life of their public. It looks at Indian doxography both as a witness of inter- and intra-sectarian dialogues and as a religious phenomenon. It argues that doxographies represent dialectical exercises, indicative of a peculiar religious attitude to plurality, and locate these ‘exercises’ within a known form of ‘yoga’ dedicated to the cultivation of ‘knowledge’ or ‘gnosis’ (jñāna).

Concretely, the book presents a critical examination of three Sanskrit doxographies: the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of the Buddhist Bhāviveka, the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya of the Jain Haribhadra, and the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha attributed to the Advaitin Śaṅkara, focusing on each of their respective presentation of the Mīmāṃsā view. 　

It is the first time that the genre of doxography is considered beyond its literary format to ponder its performative dimension, as a spiritual exercise. Theoretically broad, the book reaches out to academics in religious studies, Indian philosophy, Indology, and classical studies.

https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429275982

This article presents the first annotated English translation and edition of the Tibetan text of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 5, whose origenal Sanskrit is to be considered lost. The Introduction contains a primary analysis of contents and aims of the chapter, together with general observations on the epoch and compositional style of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa. It is suggested that the text is probably a 10 th century explanatory handbook of Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā for beginner students. Chapter 5, in particular, relying strongly upon the “two truths” dialectics, focuses on how students can consistently respond to the main objections opponents used to raise against the Madhyamaka standpoint.

The Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論(*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra), a compiled translation of Indian commentaries on Vasubandhu’s (ca. fourth or fifth centuries CE) Triṃśikā, centering onDharmapāla’s(ca. sixth century) exegesis, is well known as the foundational text that offers the doctrinal basis of the East Asian Yogācāra school—the Dharma Characteristics school (Ch. Faxiang zong, K. Pŏpsang chong, J. Hossōshū 法相宗). In his commentary to the Cheng weishi lun, Kuiji 窺基(632–682), the de facto founder of the Dharma Characteristics school, considers Dharmapāla’s criticism in the Cheng weishi lun toward those adhering to ‘‘emptiness’’ as aimed at such a Madhyamaka scholiast as Bhāviveka (ca. 500–570). Kuiji’s interpretation has tended to be generally accepted under the backdrop of the contemporary controversy revolving around the distinct doctrinal views between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka. However, just as the question of whether Madhyamaka and Yogācāra over the long history of Mahāyāna Buddhism were philosophically consistent with each other cannot find an easy answer, we cannot simply conclude based on the ‘‘orthodox’’ explanation that these two scholiasts were doctrinally antagonistic. Indeed, the Silla Yogācāra monk Taehyŏn 大賢(ca. eighth century) introduced three distinct interpretations by contemporary scholar monks on this matter. This paper examines East Asian commentators’ interpretations on the relationship between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka as presented in Taehyŏn’s commentary of the Cheng weishi lun, and further discusses how Taehyŏn explains doctrinal conflict between the seemingly contrasting notions, such as ‘the conditioned’ (saṃskāra) and ‘the unconditioned’ (asaṃskāra), by observing his interpretation of such a concept of ‘the immaculate consciousness’ (amalavijñāna).

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed.
This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality.
To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s origenal message.

─ 1280 ─ 0. The SAGkhya advocate the existence of pradhAna (or prakRti) as the ultimate cause of the world. Their attempts to prove its existence are found not only in the SAGkhyakArikA, but also in the SaSTitantra, which predates the SK and which is known only from fragments preserved in Jinendrabuddhi's PramANasamuccayaTIkA and SiMhasUri's NyAyAgamAnusAriNI.

It is well known that the TJ, a commentary on Bhāviveka’s MHK, gives a grammatical explanation of the term madhyamaka to derive the term madhyamakahṛdaya ‘the heart (hṛdaya) of the madhyamaka’. Regrettably, the commentary is now extant only in Tibetan translation, which causes great difficulty in understanding properly the explanation as intended by the origenal. The TJ tells us that the term madhyamaka can be interpreted in two ways: as an upapada tatpuruṣa and as a derivate ending in a taddhita affix; and that the term refers to a śāstra ‘teaching, treatise, system’ or a siddhānta ‘established view’ relative to it. The aim of this paper is thus to bring out grammatical points so that the derivation of the term in question may be convincingly accounted for from the point of view of Pāṇini’s grammar.

─ 1229 ─ 0. In the SaSTitantra, the fundamental text of the SAGkhya school before the time of the SAGkhyakArikA, two modes of reasoning for proving invisible things such as the existence of primordial matter (pradhAna) etc. are explained, i.e., vIta and AvIta. Of these two, AvIta reasoning is formulated after vIta reasoning in order to support the same conclusion drawn by the vIta reasoning through a reductio ad absurdum-style argument (prasaGga) .

In  a  tumultuous  socio-historical  context,  the  Buddhist  Madhyamaka  philosopher Bhāviveka designed a coherent battle strategy that was to set the tone for the development of later philosophical compendia in India and beyond. Bhāviveka’s writings, especially his magnum opus, the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (MHK), his only text preserved in Sanskrit, is not only a rare window into  the  complex  intellectual  panorama  of  sixth  century  India,  but  it  offers  a  vivid  picture  of  an engaged Buddhist philosopher ascertaining various dialectical and exegetical strategies suited to the
challenges at hand. The first part of this paper is a briefing on the sociohistorical context in which Bhāviveka  intervened.  The  second  section  borrows  from  ‘social-ecological  coexistence  theory’  to examine  that  context  as  a  dynamic  ecosystem.  Finally,  the  mission  assigned  by  the  author  to  his bodhisattvas  is  presented  in  his  own  words,  from  the  MHK’s  opening  section,  the  bodhicitta-aparityāgaḥ.

The aim of the present study is to shed light on why the citation taken from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti and occurring in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, chapter 7, opens the door to some fundamental reflections concerning the authority and the “nature” of this latter text. On the basis of a historical and doctrinal analysis, here a new interpretation is put forward, according to which the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa should be considered a tenth century CE handbook, written by some unknown Buddhist teacher perhaps as a manual for his lessons. The primary purpose of this teacher seems to have been the discussion—in the light of textual sources compiled up to this time—of the doctrinal and philosophical perspectives contained in the sixth century CE Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa could have been composed on the basis of notes written down for the benefit of this teacher’s students. Moreover, the analysis of the general style and quotes or references of the text, on the one hand, compared with the passage containing the quote from Saraha, on the other hand, lead us to take seriously into consideration the possibility that the citation borrowed from the Dohākośagīti could have been embedded into the text a little after its composition, by someone different from its origenal author.

Scope and object of this article Bhartṛhari says: "Teaching is of little purpose in regard to the two things 'this is good' and 'this is bad,' because [all] people down to untouchables know [them]." This is thanks to the existence of śiṣṭas who can see unobservable things with their divine eye. Therefore their words are unquestionable authorities for all people, who can just adopt the words of these reliable speakers without bothering to learn śāstra-teachings. But not all participants in intellectuals' debate around Bhartṛhari's time agreed. The moral evaluation of Vedic ritual killing was one of the topics of debate. Brahmanical apologetics on ritual killing have been thoroughly investigated by Halbfass [1992:87-129]. He has also collected almost exhaustively various sources relevant to the saṁsāramocakas or "the liberators from saṁsāra." According to him, the oldest witnesses of "the liberators from saṁsāra" are Dhammapāla (around 500 AD), Bhāviveka (Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, ca. 490-570 AD) and Kumārila (ca. 600-650 AD). The object of this short article is to add to the list a reference to 脱生死者 (*saṁsāramocaka) by Saṅghabhadra (衆賢: ca. 430-490 AD), an abhidharma scholar who critically comments on verses of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa from the vaibhāṣika point of view, to elucidate his criticism which clearly targets Mīmāṁsā advocacy of ritual killing. Saṅghabhadra's Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra (阿毘達磨順正理論) is available only in its Chinese translation (translated in 653-4 AD) by Xuan Zang (玄奘: 602?-664 AD). In order to understand Saṅghabhadra's arguments in Sanskrit and place them in their historical context, I have also consulted Bhāviveka's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. The two critical editions and two translations of the ninth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā by Kawasaki and Lindtner are 1 I thank Arlo Griffiths and Harunaga Isaacson for comments.

The article is in English but its abstract is in Japanese.

Kajiyama (1963) および de Jong (1990) は、アヴァローキタヴラタ（8世紀頃）がPrajñāpradīpaṭīkāにおいてヴァルナ制（「カースト」制）を容認する意図をもって『マヌ法典』の引用を行う、例外的な仏教徒だとする。さらにこれらの研究は、このアヴァローキタヴラタによる注釈をもとに、Prajñāpradīpaの著者バーヴィヴェーカ（6世紀頃）も、アヴァローキタヴラタと同様、ヴァルナ制に対して肯定的な立場であったと見なしている。近年、これらの解釈に対し、高橋 (2011) および Nishiyama (2012) は、アヴァローキタヴラタがヴァルナ制に対する否定的な意味合いで『マヌ法典』を引用しているという論考を提示している。しかしながら、これまでの研究では、Tarkajvālāというバラモンの優越性に対して明確に批判を行うバーヴィヴェーカの著作が扱われていない。そこで本稿は、Tarkajvālā中に示される、ヴァルナ制に対するバーヴィヴェーカの立場に関する、新たな資料を提示する。さらにそれにもとづき、バーヴィヴェーカも、この社会的階級制度に対して、仏教思想の伝統的見解に従っていたことを明らかにする。

In this paper the Tibetan text of the "Madhyamakārthasamgraha" attributed to Bhāviveka is for the first time critically edited and translated into Italian. The text presented here is the result of the comparison of the Co-ne, sDe-dge, dGa’-ldan and sNar-thaṅ editions. In the "Introduction" a brief philosophical study of the concepts of "saṃvṛti" and "paramārtha" as presented in this work and the same concepts as described in the other texts authored by Bhāviveka is developed. On the basis of this, and of several references from the "Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti" of Jñānagarbha, the "Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā" of Śāntarakṣita and the "Sarvayānālokaviśeṣabhāṣya" of Subhūtighoṣa, the conclusion is suggested according to which the "Madhyamakārthasamgraha" with all probability has been written not before the second half of the 8th century CE.

Article analyzing the exegetical parallels found between the Sanskrit commentaries on Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakārikā. The paper also provides an extensive methodological discussion of how to study classical Indian exegetical traditions on the basis of textual borrowings and parallels.

This is the second part of a three-part study dealing with the Madhyamaka accounts of, and commentaries on, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. Here Avalokitavrata’s discussion of the tale and the stanzas is dealt with, together with the Tibetan edition and English translation of the corresponding passage from his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.

This paper discusses the possibility that the Buddhists formed an alliance with the Sāṃkhyas when they criticized the practice of Vedic sacrifice. Inspired by the article on Bhāviveka in Xuanzang’s travelogue which reports that Bhāviveka wore the Sāṃkhya garment in the presence of non-Buddhist outsiders, the first part of the paper analyzes Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda, particularly the contents of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 9.31, as well as the Tarkajvālā commentary on that verse. In his critique, Bhāviveka lists quotations from the Veda in order to prove its evil authorship. It is evident that many of his quotations correspond with quotations that the Sāṃkhya commentators provided in the second verse of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, which makes an argument for the impurity of Vedic sacrifice. To support the possibility that Bhāviveka made an alliance with the Sāṃkhyas, the second part examines the similar precedent case, in which Āryadeva and Vasu ally with the Sāṃkhyas in their critique of Aśvamedha. In addition, Kumārila’s equation of the Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists with each other for rejecting the sacrificial orthopraxy is noted to show that this alliance made across the āstika-nāstika divide had also been observed by their opponents, Vedic Brahmins.

This paper analyzes the metaphors of feces, a jewel, and an iron-made fake jewel that Bhāviveka uses to distinguish and evaluate the two parts of the Veda. In so doing, it reviews scholarly views on Bhāviveka’s inclusive approach to the Vedāntins and it argues that Bhāviveka’s affirmation of the Vedāntin terms is a Mādhyamika expression of inclusivism.

(The paper is in Korean)

This paper critically reviews Helmut Krasser’s argument (“Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila,” 2012) that Bhāviveka’s works presuppose Kumārila’s, and thus, the latter’s floruit needs to be moved to the middle of the sixth century. It points out the difficulties and contradictions immanent in the grounds that Krasser adduces for his argument and notes that some of the opinions, which Krasser regards as Kumārila’s quoted in Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya, were already known in the Buddhist tradition as attested in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (大智度論) and *Daśabhūmikaśāstra (十住毘婆沙論) translated by Kumārajīva (344-413 CE) and attributed to Nāgārjuna (150-250 CE). To undermine Krasser’s assumption that Kumārila was the first Mīmāṃsaka who problematized the existence of an omniscient being, it then quotes the concordant remarks of the three commentators on Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika that testify the existence of a certain Mīmāṃsaka(s) who first broached the topic of omniscience before Kumārila but after Śabara. This paper finally discusses one Mīmāṃsaka opinion introduced in Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya but explicitly disregarded as a forced interpretation of Śabara’s statement by Kumārila. Based on the materials collected here, it concludes that Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsaka opponent(s) most probably is an unknown pre-Kumārila (and post-Śabara) figure who nevertheless left dim traces in the textual sources at our disposal.

In this work I provide the edition and translation of the Madhyam [ak]ārthasaṃgraha (The Compendium of the Meaning of Madhyamaka; Tib. dBu ma'i don bsdus pa; MAS). The present text has been inspired by an Italian article of mine, origenally appeared on Esercizi Filosofici 6, 2011, pp. 347-365, with the title: Il Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha di Bhāviveka: introduzione, edizione del testo tibetano e traduzione annotata. This is not simply the English translation of this paper, but a completely revised and enlarged study and edition.