1. A notion of prominence for games with natural?language labels. (2021). Sontuoso, Alessandro ; Bhatia, Sudeep.
   In: Quantitative Economics.
   RePEc:wly:quante:v:12:y:2021:i:1:p:283-312.

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2. Learning Frames. (2021). Vriend, Nicolaas ; Daskalova, Vessela.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ucn:wpaper:202118.

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3. Learning frames. (2021). Vriend, Nicolaas J ; Daskalova, Vessela.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:929.

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4. Learning frames. (2021). Vriend, Nicolaas ; Daskalova, Vessela.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:78-96.

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5. Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning. (2019). Smith, Alec ; Nave, Gideon ; Camerer, Colin F.
   In: Management Science.
   RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:4:p:1867-1890.

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6. Identifying the Ranking of Focal Points in Coordination Games on the Individual Level. (2019). Schmidt, Robert J.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:awi:wpaper:660.

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7. Capitalizing on the (false) consensus effect: Two tractable methods to elicit private information. (2019). Schmidt, Robert J.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:awi:wpaper:0669.

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8. Point beauty contest: measuring the distribution of focal points on the individual level. (2019). Schmidt, Robert J.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:awi:wpaper:0667.

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9. Identifying the Ranking of Focal Points in Coordination Games on the Individual Level. (2019). Schmidt, Robert J.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:awi:wpaper:0660.

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10. Schelling Point as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium. (2018). teng, jimmy.
    In: Conference Papers.
    RePEc:sps:cpaper:10484.

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11. Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device. (2018). Lecouteux, Guilhem ; Larrouy, Lauren.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01923244.

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12. Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device. (2018). Lecouteux, Guilhem ; Larrouy, Lauren.
    In: GREDEG Working Papers.
    RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-29.

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13. Circulant games. (2016). Grani, Ura-Georg ; Kern, Johannes .
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:80:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-014-9478-4.

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14. Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods. (2016). Cartwright, Edward ; Alberti, Federica.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:166:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0321-z.

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15. The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence. (2016). Poulsen, Anders ; Bett, Zoe .
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
    RePEc:eee:soceco:v:60:y:2016:i:c:p:29-34.

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16. Challenging Conformity: A Case for Diversity. (2015). Kets, Willemien ; Sandroni, Alvaro.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:68166.

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17. Focal points and bargaining in housing markets. (2015). Pope, Jaren ; Sydnor, Justin R.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:93:y:2015:i:c:p:89-107.

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18. How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence. (2013). Poulsen, Anders ; Bett, Zoe .
    In: Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS).
    RePEc:uea:wcbess:13-02-r.

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19. How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence. (2013). Poulsen, Anders ; Bett, Zoe .
    In: Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS).
    RePEc:uea:wcbess:13-02.

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20. Institutions as game theory outcomes: toward a cognitive-experimental inquiry. (2013). Ambrosino, Angela.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:42752.

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21. Hidden symmetries and focal points. (2013). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:226-258.

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22. On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices. (2013). Vriend, Nicolaas ; Bosch-Domenech, Antoni.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:94:y:2013:i:c:p:52-67.

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23. Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence. (2013). Sugden, Robert ; Poulsen, Anders ; Isoni, Andrea ; Tsutsui, Kei .
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:167-188.

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24. Equal split in the informal market for group train travel. (2013). Waichman, Israel ; Requate, Till ; Korzhenevych, Artem.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:327-329.

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25. Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience. (2012). Shahriar, Quazi ; Dugar, Subhasish.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2012:i:3:p:954-975.

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26. We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory. (2012). smerilli, alessandra.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:73:y:2012:i:4:p:539-560.

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27. Salience as an emergent property. (2012). Tsutsui, Kei ; Sugden, Robert ; Alberti, Federica.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:82:y:2012:i:2:p:379-394.

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28. Salience as an emergent property. (2011). Tsutsui, Kei ; Sugden, Robert ; Alberti, Federica.
    In: Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS).
    RePEc:uea:wcbess:11-07.

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29. Network formation in repeated interactions: experimental evidence on dynamic behaviour. (2010). Galizzi, Matteo ; Bernasconi, Michele.
    In: Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences.
    RePEc:spr:minsoc:v:9:y:2010:i:2:p:193-228.

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30. Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes. (2010). Dickinson, David ; Hunnicutt, Lynn.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:615-634.

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31. Minority voting and long-term decisions. (2010). Gersbach, Hans ; Fahrenberger, Theresa .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:329-345.

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32. On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices. (2008). Vriend, Nicolaas ; bosch-domènech, antoni ; Bosch-Domenech, Antoni.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:1064.

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33. Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion. (2008). Shelkova, Natalya.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-33.

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34. Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points. (2008). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: TWI Research Paper Series.
    RePEc:twi:respas:0035.

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35. On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices. (2008). Vriend, Nicolaas ; bosch-domènech, antoni ; Antoni Bosch-Domènech, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp621.

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36. On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices. (2008). Vriend, Nicolaas ; Bosch-Domenech, Antoni.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:621.

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37. Low-wage labor markets amd the power of suggestion. (2008). Shelkova, Natalya Y..
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38. Low-wage labor markets amd the power of suggestion. (2008). Shelkova, Natalya.
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39. Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning. (2008). Sugden, Robert ; Starmer, Chris ; Mehta, Judith ; Bardsley, Nicholas.
    In: Discussion Papers.
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40. Inflation Targets as Focal Points. (2008). Viegi, Nicola ; Demertzis, Maria.
    In: International Journal of Central Banking.
    RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2008:q:1:a:2.

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41. Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning. (2008). Sugden, Robert ; Starmer, Chris ; Mehta, Judith ; Bardsley, Nicholas.
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42. Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach. (2007). Joosten, R..
    In: Papers on Economics and Evolution.
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43. On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations. (2006). Maarten C. W. Janssen, .
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44. The Nature of Salience Revisited: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning. (2006). Sugden, Robert ; Starmer, Chris ; Mehta, Judith ; Bardsley, Nicolas.
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45. Focal points in coordinated divergence. (2006). Ho, Benjamin ; Berger, Jonah ; Heath, Chip .
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:635-647.

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46. On the strategic use of focal points in bargaining situations. (2006). janssen, maarten ; Janssen, Maarten C. W., .
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47. Finding the key: The riddle of focal points. (2006). Sugden, Robert ; Zamarron, Ignacio E..
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:609-621.

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48. The evolution of focal points. (2006). Binmore, Ken ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:1:p:21-42.

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49. The Nature of Salience Revisited: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning. (2006). Sugden, Robert ; Starmer, Chris ; Mehta, Judith ; Bardsley, Nicholas.
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50. Is it trust we model? An attempt to calculate the non-calculative. (2005). Weitzel, Utz ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie.
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51. Inflation Targets as Focal Points. (2005). Demertzis, Maria ; Viegi, Nicola.
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52. Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative. (2005). Weitzel, Utz ; Rosenkranz, Stephanie.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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53. Nonbinding Suggestions: The Relative Effects of Focal Points versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes. (2005). Dickinson, David ; Hunnicutt, Lynn .
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    RePEc:apl:wpaper:05-13.

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54. Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study. (2004). Lee, Chew Ging ; Hoffmann, Robert ; Chuah, Swee-Hoon ; Ging, Lee Chew .
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55. Inflation Targets as Focal Points. (2004). Viegi, Nicola ; Demertzis, Maria.
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56. Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games. (1997). Bhaskar, V.
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    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9706001.

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1. A Method to Select Best Among Multi-Nash Equilibria. (2023). Thoppan, Jose Joy ; Abraham, Sarin ; Punniyamoorthy, M.
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2. Running Out of Bank Runs. (2023). Nguyen, Dat ; Kiss, Hubert Janos ; Libich, Jan.
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3. The Power of Focal Points is Strong: Coordination Games with Labels and Payoffs. (2020). Bodoff, David.
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4. Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players. (2018). Lecouteux, Guilhem.
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5. Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players. (2018). Lecouteux, Guilhem.
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6. A NonCooperative Approach to Cost Allocation in Joint Replenishment. (2017). Zhang, Jia Wei ; Wang, Xuan ; Sethuraman, Jay ; He, Simai.
   In: Operations Research.
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7. Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games. (2017). Lecouteux, Guilhem ; Larrouy, Lauren.
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8. Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games. (2017). Lecouteux, Guilhem ; Larrouy, Lauren.
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9. Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguc, Zeynep.
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10. Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguy, Zeynep.
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11. Evidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games of complete information Working Paper Version. (2015). Dhami, Sanjit ; al-Nowaihi, Ali.
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12. Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information. (2015). Dhami, Sanjit ; al-Nowaihi, Ali.
    In: Games.
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13. Asymmetric dominance and phantom decoy effects in games. (2007). Pulford, Briony ; Colman, Andrew M. ; Bolger, Fergus.
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14. On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations. (2006). Maarten C. W. Janssen, .
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15. On the strategic use of focal points in bargaining situations. (2006). janssen, maarten ; Janssen, Maarten C. W., .
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16. Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters,. (2004). Bless, Herbert ; Abele, Susanne ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin.
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17. Rationalizing Focal Points. (2001). janssen, maarten.
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18. Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation. (1999). Bacharach, Michael .
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19. Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation. (1998). Colman, Andrew M. ; Stirk, Jonathan A..
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20. PAYOFF DOMINANCE AND THE STACKELBERG HEURISTIC. (1997). Bacharach, Michael ; COLMAN, ANDREW .
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