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1. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017. (2022). Cagé, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard ; Cage, Julia ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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2. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017. (2022). Cagé, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard ; Cage, Julia ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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3. The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017. (2022). Cagé, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard ; Cage, Julia ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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4. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS. (2021). He, Ming ; Huang, Yangguang.
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6. It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending. (2021). Dewitte, Edgard ; Cage, Julia.
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7. It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending. (2021). Cage, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard.
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8. It Takes Money to Make MPs: Evidence from 150 Years of British Campaign Spending. (2021). Dewitte, Edgard ; Cage, Julia.
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9. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017. (2020). Cagé, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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10. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017. (2020). Cagé, Julia ; Dewitte, Edgard ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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11. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017. (2020). Cage, Julia ; Bekkouche, Yasmine ; Dewitte, Edgard.
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13. The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014. (2019). Cagé, Julia ; Bekkouche, Yasmine.
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50. Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House.. (1994). Levitt, Steven.
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