1. Biases in Beliefs. (2019). Wolff, Irenaeus ; Bauer, Dominik.
   In: Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203601.

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2. Biases in Beliefs: Experimental Evidence. (2018). Wolff, Irenaeus ; Bauer, Dominik.
   In: TWI Research Paper Series.
   RePEc:twi:respas:0109.

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1. A Appendix A.1 Alternative behavioral concepts Cursed equilibrium The relation to cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005) has been discussed in the Introduction: Both concepts assume that players have a mistaken understanding of the type distribution. Given the degree of cursedness χ ∈ [0,1], cursed players assign weight 1−χ to the Bayesian case and χ to the event that their opponents’ types are random and uninformative given the own signal. In the latter case, the opponents play the average strategy σi(a−i|ti) = ∑t−i∈T−i Pr(t−i|ti)∏j6=i σj(aj|tj), and overall, cursed players expect payoffs πCurse i ai|ti,σ−i = (1−χ) ∑ t−i∈T−i ∑ a−i∈A−i Pr(t−i|ti) pi (ai,a−i),(ti,t−i) ∏ j6=i σj(aj|tj) +χ ∑ t−i∈T−i ∑ a−i∈A−i Pr(t−i|ti) pi (ai,a−i),(ti,t−i)
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2. σi(a−i|ti). (9) A strategy profile σ = (σ1,...,σn) is a χ-cursed equilibrium if σi(|ti) ∈ BRti(σ−i|πCurse i ) for all i and ti. I am not aware of independent evidence supporting “random projection” as in cursed equilibrium (as opposed to projection of the own type), but cursed equilibrium appears well-suited to capture beliefs if type sets are asymmetric. Market interactions with one-sided incomplete information as analyzed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) are a prototypical example. In such asymmetric games, type projection appears less intuitive.
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68. Limited depth of reasoning The concepts discussed so far have in common that they are defined in terms of the payoff structure π̃i ∈ {πi,πCRRA i ,π Proj i ,πCurse i }. The players’ beliefs about their opponents’ strategies are taken as given. The complementary approach is to vary the belief structure, allowing that players deviate from BNE by violating rational expectations.29 The seminal model in this strand literature, level-k, follows Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995); other belief structures are discussed below. Assuming level-0 randomizes uniformly, σ0(|ti) = 1/|Ai| for i,ti, and given a payoff structure
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1. Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
   In: CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:wrk:wcreta:34.

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2. Knowing Me, Imagining You:. (2017). Breitmoser, Yves.
   In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:rco:dpaper:36.

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3. Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: Experimental evidence. (2017). Carrillo, Juan D. ; Castro, Manuel ; Brocas, Isabelle .
   In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
   RePEc:eee:soceco:v:67:y:2017:i:c:p:28-40.

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4. Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions. (2016). Breitmoser, Yves.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:68981.

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5. Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective. (2016). Lorentziadis, Panos L.
   In: European Journal of Operational Research.
   RePEc:eee:ejores:v:248:y:2016:i:2:p:347-371.

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6. Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game. (2016). Ray, Indrajit ; Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
   In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2016/13.

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7. Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions. (2015). Breitmoser, Yves.
   In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113160.

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8. Asymmetry and revenue in second-price auctions: a majorization approach. (2015). Xu, Maochao ; Chen, Jihui.
   In: Journal of Economics and Finance.
   RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:39:y:2015:i:3:p:625-640.

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9. Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions. (2015). Breitmoser, Yves.
   In: MPRA Paper.
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10. The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: Laboratory evidence in a first price common value auction. (2015). Carrillo, Juan D. ; Brocas, Isabelle ; Castro, Manuel ; JuanD. Carrillo, .
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11. An Experiment on Social Mislearning. (2015). Weizsäcker, Georg ; Eyster, Erik ; Weizsacker, Georg ; Rabin, Matthew.
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12. Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence. (2015). Carrillo, Juan D. ; Brocas, Isabelle ; Castro, Manuel .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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13. Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction. (2014). Long, Yan.
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14. The performance of corporate alliances: Evidence from oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. (2013). Beshears, John.
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15. Auction designs for allocating wind energy leases on the U.S. outer continentalshelf. (2013). Griffin, Robert.
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16. Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders. (2012). Lorentziadis, Panos L..
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17. Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction. (2012). LI, Daniel.
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18. Keeping out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory. (2011). Onderstal, Sander ; van der Veen, Ailko .
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19. The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction. (2011). Carrillo, Juan D. ; Brocas, Isabelle ; Castro, Manuel ; JuanD. Carrillo, .
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20. Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers. (2011). Nagel, Rosemarie ; Georganas, Sotiris.
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22. The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction. (2010). Carrillo, Juan D. ; Brocas, Isabelle ; Castro, Manuel .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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23. An experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions. (2008). Levin, Dan ; Rose, Susan L..
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24. Irrationality in English auctions. (2008). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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25. Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: Oral Outcry vs. Clock. (2007). Hey, John ; Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
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26. Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format. (2007). de Frutos, Maria-Angeles ; Jarque, X..
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27. The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence. (2007). Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; De Silva, Dakshina.
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28. Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?. (2007). Iriberri, Nagore ; Crawford, Vincent.
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29. Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions?. (2006). Pagnozzi, Marco.
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30. Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?. (2006). Iriberri, Nagore ; Crawford, Vincent.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
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31. The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence. (2005). Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; De Silva, Dakshina.
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32. Almost common values auctions revisited. (2005). Levin, Dan ; Kagel, John.
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33. An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction. (2005). Selten, Reinhard ; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Abbink, Klaus ; Rockenbach, Bettina.
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34. Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?. (2005). Iriberri, Nagore ; Crawford, Vincent.
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35. Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?. (2005). Iriberri, Nagore ; Crawford, Vincent.
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36. Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format. (2004). de Frutos, Maria-Angeles ; Jarque, Xavier .
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37. Cursed Equilibrium. (2003). Rabin, Matthew ; Eyster, Erik.
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38. Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions. (2003). Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul.
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39. Winners curse without overbidding. (2003). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob.
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40. Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions. (2003). Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Pezanis-Christou, Paul.
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41. Cursed Equilibrium. (2002). Rabin, Matthew ; Eyster, Erik.
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42. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2002). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob.
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43. Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study. (2001). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Güth, Werner ; Guth, Werner ; WERNER GÜTH, ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta.
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44. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2000). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, .
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45. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2000). Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, ; Offerman, Theo.
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46. IMPORT TENDERS AND BIDDING STRATEGIES IN WHEAT. (2000). Wilson, William ; Dahl, Bruce L..
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47. An Ascending Auction in the Presence of Rationality and Herd Behaviour. (1999). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
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48. COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON IMPORT TENDERS: THE CASE OF MINOR OILSEEDS. (1999). Wilson, William ; Diersen, Matthew.
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49. Prices and the Winners Curse. (1998). Bulow, Jeremy ; Klemperer, Paul.
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50. Auctions with almost common values: The Wallet Game and its applications. (1998). Klemperer, Paul.
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