OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

By Ken Camel

The largest airborne operation in history began on a sunny autumn Sunday in September 1944. An entire airborne army was committed in a bold attempt to seize the key bridges over the numerous rivers and canals leading into the heartland of the Reich. Over 4,000 Allied aircraft took off from airfields in the United Kingdom, France and Belgium to launch a surprise assault on German-occupied Holland. Three British corps each led by an armoured division were poised at the Belgian border to follow up this airborne attack. The ultimate goal was to gain a bridgehead over the Rhine River, a formidable natural boundary, in an attempt to end the war by Christmas.

Moscow
GERMANY POLAND
AL LI ED

SOVIET FORCES

N
W

E S

FRANCE

With the coming of summer 1944, the beginning of the end of the war in Europe was unfolding. The landings in Normandy followed immediately by Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive in the East, had the Allied armies on both fronts only 800 miles (1300km) from the German capital of Berlin. The race was on. Throughout June and July, the western Allies ground forces slogged their way through the Bocage country of northern France while their Soviet Allies raced across Byelorussia, having crushed the German armies of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre). Then on 25 July 1944 with Operation Cobra, the newly formed US 12th Army Group (the US First and Third Armies) led by General Omar Bradley, broke out of Normandy. Germany was witnessing both its Western and Eastern Fronts crumbling before the

FO RC ES

The Race For Berlin

armoured advances of the Allied armies. By the end of August, the Soviets had burst into Poland and secured three bridgeheads over the Vistula River. In the west, British and American armoured formations were also recreating the Soviet successes. By the first of September the Allies had advanced 240 miles (400km) towards Berlin. The western Allies crossed the Loire River (11 August), invaded southern France (15 August), liberated Falaise, Chartres and Orleans (17 August), crossed the Seine River (20 August), closed the Falaise Gap (21 August), liberated Paris and captured Troyes and Vernon (25 August), and liberated Amiens (31 August). August had proved to be just as bad in the West as July had been in the East for Hitler and Germany. With the arrival of September, the British Second Army rolled into Belgium. Crossing the Somme River (1 September) British forces liberated Douai (2 September), Brussels (3 September), Lille (4 September) and Ghent (5 September). By 8 September the British XXX Corps had reached the Albert Canal on the Belgium-Dutch border.

A MATTER OF SUPPLY
The rapid Allied advance now created an enormous logistics nightmare. The growing multi-national force, together with the widening expanse of the front, dictated a new strategy. The lack of sufficient port facilities, the growing length of supply lines, and the now greater need for more supplies became the driving factor in any future offensive plans.

Arhnem Bridge

MAY 45

MAY 45

0 0

KM

100 100

MILES

MAR 45 SEP 44 SEP 44 MAR 45 MAY 45

6 JUN 44 AUG 44 AUG 44 SEP 44

MAR 45

MAY 45

AUG 44 AUG 44 AUG 44

SEP 44

C-47 Skytrain

1ab

1AB

9. SS-PANZER DIV

KG Tettau

Wolfheze Heelsum Oosterbeek Renkum Heveadorp

er Riv

ARNHEM

10. SS-Panzer DIV

HOLLAND
R

Heteren

Driel

POL ARMY GROUP B HQ Model

To

e hin

Th eR uh r

SEE MAP ON PAGE 8

General Key
Objective Bridges
0 0 5 Scale in Kilometres Scale in MILES 15 10 20

Valburg

Elst

Wa

al R ive

r
SS-KG Euling 508/505

Weurt Hernen
er

Ma

as

Riv

NIJMEGEN
Alverna Hatert
504

Beek-Ubergen Wyler

Berg En Dal Malden Molenhoek Heumen Mook Cuijk

GERMANY
II. Fallschirmkorps 3 FJD

Korps Feldt

Nederasselt
XI IC O RP S

Groesbeek Horst
505

Kleve

Oss Heesch SEE MAP ON PAGE 6

Grave

Overasselt

Breedeweg

SEE MAP ON PAGE 7 SHertogenbosch

KG Dewald

Heeswijk
327 Glider

U N I T E D March KINGDOM Uden Hatfield London

Vught

1. Fallschirmarmee STUDENT

Dinther

HOLLAND Amsterdam Arnhem

Air routes

501

Schijndel

Eerde Koevering

Veghel
506

Nijmegen Brussels Eindhoven BELGIUM

LUX.

Boxtel

Erp
Aa

Volkel

Normandy

Paris FRANCE

GERMANY

St. Oedenrude
18 flak BDE 502/506

Ri ve r

Gemert
US 82nd Airborne Division US 101st Airborne Division

Son Best Wilhelmin a Canal

Breugel Bort Nederwetten Nuenen

504 Parachute Infantry Regiment

th

501 Parachute Infantry Regiment

st

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

107 PZ

502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment 327th Glider Infantry Regiment 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion
German Units KG

508 Parachute Infantry Regiment

th th

Helmond

325 Glider Infantry Regiment 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion

British Units

EINDHOVEN
Aalst

GDS

Guards Armoured Division XXX (30th) Corps 1st Airborne Division (British) 1st Airborne Division (Polish)

KG=Kampfgruppe. PZ=Panzer Brigade. ID=Infantry Division 3. Fallschirmjger Division 6. Fallschirmjger Regiment SS=SS Division 1. Fallschirmarmee STUDENT 18. FlaK BDE Army Group B Hq Model

XXX

3FJD

1AB 719 ID

6FJR

Valkenswaard
KG Walther

POL

XX XC OR PS CLU BR OU TE

KG Chill

Div Erdman

6FJr

GDS XXX

PS OR II C 176 id VI

E UT RO RT EA H

Weert

B E L G I U M

But the Germans, General, the Germans. Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski, Commander 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade.
General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was faced with a dilemma. There was simply not sufficient supply capacity available to keep two full army groups, the British 21st Army Group (containing the British Second Army and the Canadian First Army) and the American 12th Army Group (containing the US First, Third, and Ninth Armies), on the offensive. Logistics would identify the next front and the next offensive. Market Garden became the primary offensive plan while operations in the Lorraine region of France became a secondary offensive. Both operations constituted Allied thrusts to break through the remaining German defence and enter into the German homeland. Both counted on a continued German retreat, trusting the enemy was incapable of building a defensive line before Allied forces could overrun them. Both underestimated the resilience of the German Army.

ARMY GROUP B
As the exhausted British and American armies replenished their supplies and debated the merits of the single thrust or broad front strategy to finish off the Germans, Generaloberst Jodl, the chief of the OKW (Armed Forces Operations Staff), began to organise the semblance of a defence in Holland. On 4 September there was just 719. Infanteriedivision (719th Infantry Division), supplemented by a Dutch SS battalion and a few Luftwaffe (Air Force) detachments holding the line against the advancing British. By 13 September, through outstanding staff and improvised field work, the newly created 1. Fallschirmarmee (First Parachute Army) under Generaloberst

THE PLAN
Eisenhowers original plan called for a wide-front strategy keeping continuous pressure on the Germans across the entire front. Whereas, Field Marshal Montgomery, commander of the British 21st Army Group, had proposed a narrower thrust to the north through Holland and into Germany. In the first weeks of September, while both armies halted to catch their breath, General Eisenhower consulted with his field commanders. Logistics prohibited him from continuing his wide plan. A new strategy was needed to keep up the pressure on the Germans until the logistics problem could be solved. For now, only one army would be able to keep up the offensive. Montgomerys plan was selected with the twist of using the newly formed First Airborne Army. The plan, as all plans, was a compromise to everyone. Releasing the use of the airborne army to Montgomery would give the airborne troops a chance to shine, while also giving Montgomery the chance to prove his single thrust attack. Aiming the thrust towards the Ruhr, Germanys industrial heartland, could shorten the war but removing the air assets to support the airdrops could slow supplies to the other Allied armies. This would not prove too crucial as Bradley had no immediate use for the airborne troops and the US Third and Seventh Armies were both marching into Lorraine and consolidating their gains. Marseille, on the Mediterranean, would soon be open as a supply port, allowing a more direct route to the southern armies. Additionally, cutting off the German army in Holland could speed the liberation of the channel ports to alleviate the supply situation. Though a risky plan, it could springboard the Allies into Germany ahead of the Red Army. Market Garden, the operational name given to Montgomerys plan, could be the knockout punch to the now reeling German Army.

HOLLAND UNITED KINGDOM Calais BELGIUM Dieppe L U X. Mainz Antwerp

Cologne

2nd British Army 1

st

Paris
Us Army

FRANCE

Strasbourg

Montgomerys narrow plan

HOLLAND UNITED KINGDOM Calais Antwerp

GERMANY Cologne

Dieppe

BELGIUM

Mainz

L U X.

21st Army GroUp 12th Army GroUp

Paris

FRANCE

Strasbourg

Eisenhowers Wide plan

Kurt Student had four divisions holding the line of the Meuse-Escaut Canal. This included the 719. Infanteriedivision, Kampfgruppe Chill, a division-sized battlegroup containing elements of the 84th, 85th, and 89th Infantry Divisions. Division Erdman, (a scratched together Parachute Division), and 176. Infanteriedivision recently removed from the Siegfried Line near the German city of Aachen. In addition, two more infantry divisions, 59. and 245. Infanteriedivision, (both from the retreating 15. Armee (Fifteenth Army), would be available by 16 and 17 September, respectively. Also, on 13 September, a battlegroup, Kampfgruppe Walther, was formed with four parachute battalions from Oberleutnant Von der Heydtes 6. Fallschirmjgerregiment (6th Parachute Regiment), a Luftwaffe penal battalion, Sperrverband Heinke, a blocking force consisting of two SS battalions, an SS tank-hunter battalion and a motorised artillery battery from II SS-Panzerkorps (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and some anti-aircraft batteries. In the nine days the Allies took to launch Market Garden, the defence of Holland had gone from one division of old men and boys to an army of six infantry divisions supported by a battlegroup of crack parachute and SS troops.

Behind them Generalfeldmarschall Model began to rebuild the rest of Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B). Obergruppenfhrer Bittrichs II SS-Panzerkorps, consisting of the survivors of 9. Hohenstaufen SS-Panzerdivision and 10. Frundsberg SS-Panzerdivision (9th and 10th SS-Panzer Divisions) after their retreat from Normandy, was refitting near Arnhem. Although well under strength, they still could field a very dangerous battlegroup. Another battle group, Kampfgruppe Tettau, formed near Arnhem consisting of a variety of battalions including three SS battalions from local reserve depots and training schools. Although lightly armed, it was well led by veteran officers. Once the battle began additional replacement and reserve formations where released from Germany to help defend Holland against the Allied assault. 107. Panzerbrigade (107th Panzer Brigade), 208. StuG Brigade (208th Assault Gun Battalion), and 506. Schwere Panzerabteilung (506th Heavy Tank Battalion), together with a number of naval, air force, and security battalions all eventually reinforced the German defenders. In three weeks the Germans managed to scrape together over 100,000 troops and nearly 200 panzers to counter the Allied advance up the single highway towards Arnhem.

OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

Market Garden consisted of two parts: Market, the airborne portion and Garden, the ground portion. Its prize was the bridge at Arnhem, a full 60 miles/100km behind enemy lines. The airborne army would be dropped to provide a carpet for the ground forces to race ahead and secure the bridges over the numerous rivers and canals in Holland. Accomplishing this would allow the armoured forces of the British XXX Corps to continue into Germany and attack the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. With but a weeks planning, the operation was executed. The largest airborne operation in history began on a Sunday with a three-day timetable to push through the German lines and secure the bridges to Arnhem. Resistance was expected to be light as Allied intelligence had identified few combat-ready German units along the planned route. Surprise and speed were thought the only necessary advantage needed to overcome the remnants of Hitlers army.

Operation Market
To Grab the Bridges with Thunderclap Surprise Lieutenant General Brereton, Commander First Airborne Army.
assigned to perform an airborne assault and secure one town and all its bridges to link the roads leading north from the Dutch-Belgian border to the town of Arnhem across the Lower Rhine. The US 101st Screaming Eagles Airborne Division under Major General Maxwell D Taylor was assigned to take the first town, Eindhoven. This included the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son as well as Hells Highway, the road through Veghel between Eindhoven and the Grave bridge. The US 82nd All American Airborne Division led by Brigadier General James M Gavin was assigned to take the second town, Nijmegen. Their objectives included the Groesbeek Heights, the Grave Bridge and the Nijmegen Bridge. Major General R E Urquhart, commander of the Red Devils of the 1st British Airborne Division, was given the ultimate prize, the bridge over the Rhine River at Arnhem.

OPERATION MARKET
The airborne plan was designed to lay a carpet of airborne troops across three Dutch towns. Each airborne division was

Eindhoven
101ST SCREAMING EAGLES AIRBORNE DIVISION
The US 101st Screaming Eagles Airborne Division jumped into Holland in a daylight aerial assault on 17 September 1944, north of Eindhoven. Unlike the other two drops at Arnhem and Nijmegen, where the key bridges to be captured were located within the towns centre, the bridges assigned to the 101st Airborne at Best and Son were a full 8 miles (13km) north of Eindhoven. The 101 Airborne would secure seven bridges. The first over the Wilhelmina Canal at the town of Son was the responsibility of the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR). Two spanning the Dommel River at St. Oedenrude were to be taken by the 502nd PIR supported by a company of the 326th Airborne Engineering Battalion. Finally, four more over the Aa River fell to the 501st PIR near the town of Veghel. After that, Eindhoven was also to be captured by the 506th PIR while the rest of the 101st held open 15 miles (23km) of the road toward Arnhem for the advancing British XXX Corps.
st

SHertogenbosch

Aa

Riv er
1-501

KG HUBER (59. DIV & KG Chill)

23 September, 13.00 hours

German Roadblock CORRIDOR OPEN

Vught

26 September

Heeswijk Dinther
DZA
501

327 Glider

Uden

22-23 September

Schijndel
22-23 September

Eerde Hoevering

Veghel
506

KG Walther

Volkel Erp
id Zu

Boxtel

6 FJR

ille -W

St. Oedenrude
502 59. Infanterie Div

DZW 17-19 September

26 September, 13.00 hours

German Roadblock CORRIDOR OPEN

Gemert

ms n Ca al

506

Wilhelm

Best

Son Forest

Son Bort Nederwetten Nuenen

107. Panzer Bde

ina Ca

nal

19-20 September

Helmond

By the end of Market Garden, the 101st would refer to this stretch of road as Hells Highway. Securing the Son and Best bridges and holding Hells Highway from repeated German counterattacks ultimately cost the division 2100 casualties over the nine days of Market Garden.
0 Kilometres 5 0 MILES 3

EINDHOVEN

101st US Airborne Division, and British Guards Armoured Division 18 September, 18.30 hours
Guards Armoured DIV

CONTACT

Valkenswaard

1726 September 1944 101st US Airborne Division

EINDHOVEN

Nijmegen
82ND AIRBORNE ALL AMERICAN AIRBORNE DIVISION
The US 82nd All American Airborne Division learned of their fourth and final combat drop of the war two days before the 17 September air drop. Their objective was to capture and hold the key bridges at Grave and Nijmegen as well as some subsidiary bridges over a canal to the east of Grave. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) was given the objective of seizing the Grave Bridge over the Maas River and several smaller bridges over the MaasWaal Canal. One company was dropped on the south side of the bridge while the rest of the regiment was dropped to the north. The Grave Bridge, the longest in Europe at the time, was secured on the first night. The 508th PIR was assigned two major objectives. Their first was to secure the Groesbeek Heights to prevent German counterattacks from Kleve in overrunning their drop zones. Their second objective was to take and hold the bridge at Nijmegen. Both General Browning and General Gavin thought taking the heights was a priority over securing the bridge. Events were to prove them wrong. The regiment took and held the heights on the first day, but their initial efforts to secure the Nijmegen Bridge were repulsed. German attacks from an ad hoc German force, Korps Feldt (a divisionsized battlegroup), at Groesbeek caused 139 killed, 479 wounded, and 178 missing, but the 508th PIR held taking 483 prisoners. For the next two days, the 82nd held their ground while conducting aggressive combat and reconnaissance patrols until the Irish Guards from the British Armoured Guards Division spearheading the advance of the XXX Corps, made the ground link-up. However, the Nijmegen road and rail bridges, which were the last remaining link to the British airborne forces in Arnhem, remained in enemy hands. On 20 September, the 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR, together with the Guards Armoured Division, took the Nijmegen Bridge with a daylight river crossing and an assault on the SS positions south of the bridge. That same day, the 505th PIR, with help from the Coldstream Guards, also stopped a counterattack at Mook keeping the Germans from severing the highway.

WAAL

9. SS-PZ Aufkl Abt

Weurt

Oow

NIJMEGEN
Beek-Ubergen Honinghutze Alverna Bridge Demolished Bridge Demolished MAAS
504

Nebo

Hatert

508 2-505

DZT

Malden

Groesbeek

Horst

Nederasselt Grave Overasselt Malden

DZ/LZO

Heumen

Molenhoek Bridge Mook Demolished

505/support

Breedeweg

DZN

Cuijk

0 0

Scale in Kilometres Scale in MILES

5 3

17 September 1944 82nd US Airborne Division

NIJMEGEN

G E R M A N Y

Sionshop

Berg En Dal

Wyler

ARNHEM
BRITISH 1ST RED DEVILS AIRBORNE DIVISION
Dropped the furthest behind enemy lines, the British 1st Airborne Division was to capture the road and rail bridges across the Lower Rhine River at Arnhem. General Browning planned for 1st Airborne to hold out for four days until relieved by XXX Corps. For their part, the 1st Airborne Division was delighted to be going into action. The fact that they had only one week to plan and mount the operation did not unduly alarm them as they had planned nearly two dozen aborted operations since June. Their commander, General Urquhart, saw the first problem as logistics. There were not enough aircraft to get his whole division to Arnhem in one air drop. He decided to take 1st Parachute Brigade and 1st Airlanding Brigade with the Divisional HQ on the operations D-Day. The 1st Parachute Brigade was to seize the bridges while the Airlanding brigade guarded the drop zones. The 4th Parachute Brigade followed in the second air drop on the next day while the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade was scheduled for a third drop. This plan had the 1st Parachute Brigade holding the bridges, the 4th Parachute Brigade securing the high ground north of Arnhem, and the 1st Airlanding maintaining the perimeter at Oosterbeek. The Poles would land south of the river, crossover, and create a perimeter to the east. Because of unsuitable ground and heavy flak expected over Arnhem, the RAF insisting the drop zone be seven miles (11km) from the bridge at Arnhem, the primary objective. General Urquhart reluctantly agreed, mainly because enemy strength in Arnhem was believed to be very low. Bureaucracy and secrecy prevented any additional intelligence suggesting greater German strength in the area from reaching the airborne troops. The initial drops went well. The 2nd Parachute Battalion (2nd Para), led by Colonel Frost, made for the bridge on foot, taking a route that followed the river bypassing the town of Oosterbeek. Further north 3rd Para moved through Oosterbeek towards the bridge, leaving 1st Para in reserve. 2nd Para was the only unit to reach the bridge. 3rd Para ran headlong into two depleted SS-Panzer Divisions, the 9th and 10th, together with an assortment

of reserve forces that were training and refitting in the Arnhem area. Their rapid response to the air drop stopped 3rd Para cold and resulted in surrounding 2nd Para at the bridge. With the additional German reinforcements of Kampfgruppe Tettau, 280. StuG Brigade, and 506. Schwere Panzerabteilung arriving in the following days, the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division was contained at Oosterbeek, and forced to retreat across the Rhine suffering very heavy casualties.

KG von Tettau (19 SEP)

9. SS PD (17 SEP)

LZ-S

LZ-L SDP-V (Supply dropping Point)

1 Para

Bos Hoeve
LZ-Z

DZ/LZ-X

Wolfheze

KG Kraffts blocking Line (17 SEP)

Johanna Hoeve

Blocking Line (18/19 SEP) KG Spindler

ARNHEM
(17 SEP)

3 Para

2 Para

OOSTERBEEK
1st AB Perimeter

Blocking Line (19 SEP) Frosts Perimeter

Heelsum Heveadorp
R RI JN
Polish DZ

NE

DE

Driel

Heteren

1726 September 1944 1st British Airborne Division

ARNHEM

The first Airborne Army

The sole strategic reserve of the western Allied armies was the First Airborne Army. Formed on 8 August 1944, it brought five airborne divisions, three American and two British, a Polish airborne brigade, and a British air-transportable division, together under one commander, Lieutenant General Brereton.

First ALLIED Airborne Army (ALLIED FORCES)

1st Airborne Division

1st Parachute Brigade 4th Parachute Brigade 1st Airlanding Brigade 1st Airlanding Light Regiment Glider Pilot Regiment

82nd Airborne Division

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment th 325 Glider Infantry Regiment th 376 Parachute Artillery Battalion

501st Parachute Infantry Regiment 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment th 506 Parachute Infantry Regiment th 327 Glider Infantry Regiment 377th Parachute Artillery Battalion th 326 Parachute Engineering Battalion

101st Airborne Division

Market Garden Force Dispositions

German Forces
German Infantry: 107,000 VS

Allied Forces
Allied Infantry: 135,000

German Aircraft: 420 VS

Allied Aircraft: 1,240

German Tanks: 195

Allied Tanks: 1,300

VS

Operation Garden
Operation Garden required the British XXX Corps led by Lieutenant General Brian Jorrocks Horrocks, spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division, to take Eindhoven in two to three hours and then cover the 64 miles (106km) from the Dutch-Belgian border to Arnhem in two to three days. The final 35 miles (58km) to the Ijsselmeer (Zuider Zee) was to be taken after linking up with all three airborne divisions of Operation Market. Both surprise and speed would be the keys to a successful advance. Rapidly moving the three divisions of XXX Corps up one road through enemy territory while meeting the timetable would be critical, as the use of airborne troops that far behind enemy lines had never been done before. Two additional British corps from the Second British Army were assigned to the ground forces of Garden. To the east covering XXX Corps left flank was XII Corps. Their job was to advance up the Turnout Road and take the town of SHertogenbosch. XII Corps consisted of the British 7th Armoured Division, and the infantry of 15th (Scottish) and 53rd (Welsh) Divisions. To the west, on the right flank, was VIII Corps. They were tasked with capturing the town of Venlo and watching the great German Reichswald Forest. VIII Corps contained the 11th Armoured Division and 3rd Division. A lack of transport, a lack of urgency in their advance, and the rapid influx of German defenders all contributed to both corps lagging behind the main advance of

This is a tale you will tell your grandchildren . . . And mighty bored theyll be. Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, Commander British XXX Corps.
XXX Corps. Both flanking corps suffered very heavy casualties and were stopped short of their objectives by tenacious German defenders. Market Gardens final objective was to get Allied forces across the Rhine River and create a bridgehead for subsequent operations into the Ruhr Valley in western Germany. This would cut off the remaining German divisions in Holland, outflank the Siegfried Line (the defences holding the German western border), and provide a route into the northern German plain directly towards Berlin. additional casualties holding the line against German counterattacks. Though a wedge into Holland had been achieved, the next strategic objective for the Allies was now shifted to securing all the territory west of the Rhine River.

A BRIDGE TOO FAR

To identify the politics, what-ifs, and myriad of mistakes on both sides only does an injustice to those who fought in Operation Market Garden. Though historians, authors, and generals have argued for years trying to identify the root causes of the battle, no one has ever suggested that the chance to end the war by Christmas was not worth the gamble. Although all participants in Market Garden suffered significant casualties, especially the British 1st Airborne Division, the figures are minuscule compared to the casualties sustained by the Allies in finally crossing the Rhine into Germany. If Operation Market Garden had worked over 85,000 casualties may have been avoided in the clearing of the Reichswald, avoiding the Battle of the Bulge, and the fighting in crossing the Rhine river in Operations Veritable and Grenade.

AFTERMATH
XXX Corps failed to reach Arnhem, forcing a night evacuation of the 1st Airborne Division. By first light on 26 September, all were across that were going across. Just 2,163 men, out of the original 10,005 who began airdropping nine days earlier made it across the Rhine to safety. Approximately 1,500 1st Airborne soldiers were killed during the battle, and the remainder captured. The 1st British Airborne Division was effectively destroyed and the ultimate objective of Operation Market Garden was never realized. Bitter fighting continued for the next month with both American airborne divisions suffering

Cromwell