Lifting Bodies

Dedicated to the Preservation of Aerospace Technology
A Not-for Profit Corporation

(805) 947-9440 Fax (805) 947-9402
e-mail: wayne@patprojects.org
World Wide Web:http//www.patprojects.org
418 Bogie Street Palmdale, CA 93551
The image above is a reproduction of the mural commissioned by NASA Dryden and created
by Robert T. McCall , 1977, which is part of the visitor's lobby at the NASA Dryden
Research Center, Edwards, CA.
Testing Lifting Bodies at Edwards
By
Robert G. Hoey
A PAT Projects, Inc., Publication
Air Force/NASA Lifting Body Legacy History Project
PAT Projects, Inc.
September 1994
418 Bogie Street
Palmdale, CA 93551

(805) 947-9440
Fax (805) 947-9402
e-mail: ......wayne@patprojects.org
WWW: http://www.patprojects.org
v
PDF Version for Adobe Acrobat
The conversion of the HTML publication to PDF has been designed to accomodate a hard
copy print of this document for single sided page printing layout. the key conversion items
are:
1. Elimination of all HTML navigation tools and links.
2. Use of images sized for page layout in lieu of "thumbnails" linked to larger size
images.
Material
PDF File
PDF
File Size
Contents and Illustrations coil.pdf
64k
Entire Publication (all of the above files integrated into one) lbbook.pdf
10,183k
Front Matter (all materials preceding Chapter 1) fm.pdf
734k
Chapter 1: Returning From Space ch1.pdf
181k
Chapter 2:Lifting Entry With Horizontal Landing: The Quest
Begins
ch2.pdf
312k
Lifting Bodies: A NASA Perspective nasap.pdf
8k
Chapter 3: The M2-F1 Program ch3.pdf
637k
Chapter 4: The M2-F2 and M2-F3 Program ch4.pdf
2,467k
Chapter 5: The HL-10 Program ch5.pdf
858k
Chapter 6: The X-24A Program ch6.pdf
1,393k
Chapter 7: The X-24B Program ch7.pdf
1,168k
Chapter 8: Epilogue ch8.pdf
336k
Back Matter (all materials following chapter 8) bm.pdf
2,106k
vi
Sponsorship
World Wide Web Publication
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center
NASA Contract # I-2102D to PAT Projects, Inc.
July 31, 1997
Original Works
Air Force Flight Test Center
Subcontract No. CS4-00012
Prime Contract No. FO 4611-92-C-0045 (USAF)
LOTD 17P3D0011: NASA Lifting Bodies and Cold War Jets Study
21 September 1994
In 1993 the Legacy Resources Management Program provided funding to the Air Force for a
study of AF/NASA Lifting Body Program. The Air Force tasked Computer Sciences
Corporation (CSC) to undertake a historical, cultural, and technological study of the Lifting
Body Program. CSC subcontracted with PAT Projects, Inc., to produce a general and
technical narrative history of the Lifting Body Program
vii
Foreword
At long last the point has been reached where Space Shuttle flights have lost their novelty
and become nearly routine matters to the aerospace community. After Columbia's first two-
day test mission in April 1981, the initial flush of enthusiasm about the new space era began
a steady evolution into a proud but casual acceptance of its technological marvels. Even the
Challenger tragedy proved to be only a temporary setback, and now each successful Shuttle
mission is seen as a completely normal occurrence. These days an Orbiter falling out of the
sky onto a runway at the Kennedy Space Center or Edwards Air Force Base merits little more
than a brief segment on the evening news programs.
This is, in the main, a desirable state of affairs. NASA's long-term goal has been to make
space activities routine, systematically transforming the adventure and drama of the new
space medium into a practical exploitation. Yet this very predictability also minimizes the
critical problems involved in each space flight and habituates us to the extraordinary
applications of technology which are necessary to overcome them.
Not least of these are the numerous problems involved in returning a Shuttle safely to the
ground. Several possibilities were considered during the early design phase of the project.
The one ultimately selected--reentering the atmosphere without power and landing--seemed
"natural" and unexceptional to the layman, but its simplicity was deceptive. Data from the
X-15 studies suggested that a craft with minimal wing area could consistently make
successful dead-stick landings. Proving the concept, however, necessitated an elaborate and
inherently fascinating effort by AFFTC, NASA and the industry. In the end the two
programs--X-15 and Lifting Body--converged to validate the concept which has now been
successfully used for the last decade-and-a-half.
Oddly enough, though, the very success of the Lifting Body Program seems to have helped
insure its relative obscurity. With the Shuttle Orbiters now in routine operation and no
similar space ventures in sight, the lifting body technology has been fully absorbed by the
aerospace community but allowed to become dated. At the same time, the Lifting Body
Program and its unique aircraft have received singularly little attention from the public, even
from the hardy breed of aviation buffs. The muted attention to the subject even extends to
the printed page, where very little more than professional papers have seen public print.
viii
In view of this, Robert Hoey has done a commendable service in presenting this long-
overdue study of the entire Lifting Body Program. More importantly, although he presents
the story from the viewpoint of the engineers and test pilots, he has made it accessible to the
layperson who is interested in space activities. Likewise, his associates have explored other
program ramifications which are usually neglected in basic engineering studies.
Preserving aerospace technology, and especially the means and processes by which it has
been developed, is the central mission of PAT Projects, Inc., which proposed and managed
this work. Technology does not exist in a vacuum, and having only the final data of a
successful program tells little about how that accomplishment might be replicated. It is
apparent that researching the story of the lifting body effort was a singularly worthwhile
venture for this group.

Raymond L. Puffer, Ph.D.
AFFTC History Office
Edwards Air Force Base
ix
Introduction
This document attempts to bridge the communication gaps between the technical/scientific
community, the history and archival disciplines, and the non-professional aviation enthusiast.
It describes the events of the Lifting Body Program with as much objectivity and detail as
possible so as to provide an accurate history of the program. At the same time, the technical
aspects of the program are discussed in sufficient detail to assure that the engineering
community will benefit from the new technology that was derived from these tests. Chapter
1 presents a brief, simplified introduction to the subject of atmospheric entry so that the non-
technical reader may also read and understand the lifting body story. Hopefully all readers
will sense the excitement, the pioneering spirit, the camaraderie, the "can-do" attitude that
prevailed within the small team of engineers and pilots who were privileged to participate in
the lifting body flight test program at Edwards.
x
Preface
This historical document portrays the Lifting Body Program as seen by the engineers and
pilots who actively participated in the development and testing of these unique vehicles. You
may notice a lack of reference to political policies and decisions, or media events and labels
(for example, International Geophysical Year, Cold War, creation of NASA, Sputnik, Space
Race, etc.). Such events or labels are commonly used in historical documents to indicate
changes in direction or an altered public perception of advances in technology. In actuality,
these events or labels had little, if any, effect in the near term on the Lifting Body Program.
They were almost transparent to those actually working in the technical field.
Advancement in science and technology is a continuing process. Advances usually occur
through a series of small steps in theory and/or laboratory demonstrations. Often
technological "breakthroughs" occur in almost simultaneous, but unrelated demonstrations in
different parts of the world. It is occasionally necessary for the scientists to pause in a line of
investigation, and allow the engineers to construct a complete operating device to validate
their findings and demonstrate practical applications. Periodic demonstration of current
technology is important to validate the ability to construct real hardware, and to boost and
update the industrial base.
Frequent hardware demonstrations reduce the technical risk for each step. When the cost and
complexity of a hardware demonstration becomes very high (such as in most space travel
ventures) the decision to build hardware may be deferred for political or economic reasons.
This results in fewer demonstrations and therefore higher risks for each step. Engineers then
begin looking for low cost, partial demonstrations that will sustain the technological advance
but reduce the risk for the next big hardware demonstration step.
The Lifting Body Program falls into the category of a low cost, partial technology
demonstration to reduce the high technical risk that was emerging from the Dyna Soar
program (discussed in Chapter 2). Notice that the Lifting Body Program was created PRIOR
to cancellation of Dyna Soar, and was NOT a result of that cancellation. The ASSET
program, discussed in Appendix A, section 4.4, falls into the same category further
highlighting the recognition within the technical community of the high technical risk of
Dyna Soar. Other similar technology advances and partial demonstrations were continuing
in other fields such as the development of new thermal protection materials, power sources
and flight control systems. All of these partial technology demonstrations were intended to
reduce the risk for whatever larger and more costly demonstration of controlled, manned
entry would eventually follow. What follows is the lifting body story told from the
perspective of engineers and pilots.
xi
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Johnny Armstrong from the AFFTC
Research Projects Office in locating, and making available, various documents and photos
that were used in the preparation of this report. Jack Kolf of NASA FRC graciously allowed
the use of the heavy-weight Lifting Body Flight Logs which he had assembled earlier from
other NASA FRC documents. The Photo Department at NASA FRC were also very helpful
in locating and printing copies of various photos which were used in the document. I also
appreciate the help of the NASA DFRC Library and AFFTC History Office for personal
assistance and access to historical resources.
In a quick-reaction peer review, the draft report benefited from comments of the following
individuals who actually participated in the various activities described in this document;
Jack Wesesky
Jack Paulson
Clarence Syvertson
A. J. Evans
Fred Stoliker
David Richardson
Dale Reed
Jack Kolf
Johnny Armstrong
Dyna Soar and X-15
HL-10 configuration definition
M2 configuration definition
NASA Headquarters
AFFTC Technical Director
X-24A, X-24B Performance Engineer
M2-F1, Program Manager
X-24B Program Manager for NASA
X-24A, X-24B Program Manager for AFFTC
I offer a special thanks to Ray Puffer of the AFFTC History Office who reviewed the
manuscript and wrote the Foreword.
Contract supervision came from John Terreo, Computer Sciences Corporation, and Richard
Norwood, AFFTC Historic Preservation Office.
The author also wishes to thank the following members and consultants of PAT Projects,
Inc., for their direct contributions to sections of this document, as well as their review of the
final manuscript: Betty Love, for gathering photos and preparing the M2-F1 flight log in
Appendix C; Bruce Peterson and John Manke for the pilot comments in Appendix B; John
McTigue for information about the M2-F2 and HL-10 procurement from Northrop; Lyle
Schofield for his assistance in preparing the discussion on aerodynamic heating and low L/D
approaches; Anne Millbrooke for her insightful review and her help in reformatting the text
for historical validity; Chris Licciardi for computer graphics and production support; and
Wayne Ottinger for his overall assistance and management of the effort.
xii
World Wide Web (WWW) Publication
Some minor corrections and additions were made to the original works for the WWW
publication. Book Two, The Cold War Context, and most of Book Three, Lifting Bodies As
Cultural Resources, were not included in the WWW publication. The author, Robert G.
Hoey, and Betty Love provided the minor corrections and additions. With NASA's
assistance, the color photographs available were selected as substitutions for the black and
white photos original used. Wayne Ottinger, of PAT Projects, Inc., produced the WWW
version in both HTML and PDF configurations with the assistance of Carla Thomas (Adobe
Photoshop
4.0) and Denise Pregenzer (Corel Corporation CorelDRAW

TM
7), both under a
consulting services order from PAT Projects, Inc. The HTML version was produced with
Microsoft
FrontPage 97
TM
and the PDF version was produced using both Microsoft

Word
97 SR-1 and Adobe
Acrobat 3.0
.
xiii
Contents
Book One of Original Air Force Publication
TESTING THE LIFTING BODIES AT EDWARDS
PDF VERSION FOR ADOBE ACROBAT
v
SPONSORSHIP vi
FOREWORD vi
INTRODUCTION ix
PREFACE x
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
CONTENTS xiii
ILLUSTRATIONS xvi
PHOTO OF NASA HANGAR xix
Chapter 1: Returning From Space 1
..................1.1 The Capability: Exiting the Atmosphere 1
..................1.2 The Challenge: Atmospheric Entry 1
..................1.3 Ballistic Entry 3
..................1.4 Semi-Ballistic Entry 5
..................1.5 Lifting Entry 6
..................1.6 Emergence of the Lifting Body 7
..................1.7 Glider Landing Techniques 9
Chapter 2:Lifting Entry With Horizontal Landing: The Quest Begins 10
Lifting Bodies: A NASA Perspective 16
Chapter 3: The M2-F1 Program 18
..................3.1 Theoretical DevelopmentChapter 3: The M2-F1 Program
(Continued)
18
..................3.2 Technical and Physical Development 19
..................3.3 Construction 21
..................3.4 Flight Testing 23
..................3.5 Technology Lessons Learned 27
..................3.6 Test Sites 29
................. 3.7 Current Status of Aircraft 29
xiv
Chapter 4: The M2-F2 and M2-F3 Program 30
..................4.1 Theoretical Development 30
..................4.2 Technical and Physical Development 31
..................4.3 Construction 34
..................4.4 Flight Testing of the M2-F2 40
..................4.5 M2-F2 Landing Accident 48
..................4.6 Flight Test of M2-F3 52
..................4.7 Technology Lessons Learned 56
..................4.8 Test and Support Sites 59
..................4.9 Current Status of Aircraft 60
Chapter 5: The HL-10 Program 61
.................5.1 Theoretical Development 61
.................5.2 Technical and Physical Development 62
.................5.3 Construction 64
.................5.4 Flight Testing 65
.................5.5 Technology Lessons Learned 71
.................5.6 Test Sites 73
.................5.7 Current Status of Aircraft 73
Chapter 6: The X-24A Program 74
.................6.3 Construction 80
.................6.4 Flight Testing 85
.................6.6 Test Sites 95
Chapter 7: The X-24B Program 97
.................7.3 Construction 101
.................7.4 Flight Testing 105
.................7.6 Test Sites 116
Chapter 8: Epilogue 117
xv
APPENDICES:
Appendix A: The X-20 "Dyna Soar" Program 123
.................1.0 Basic Concept and Design Evolution 123
.................2.0 The X-20 Glider 130
.................3.0 Configuration Reassessment (Phase Alpha) 136
.................4.0 Program Cancellation 136
Appendix B: Pilot Comments 142
Appendix C: Lifting Body Flight Logs 160
.................Part One: Light Weight; M2-F1 161
.................Part Two: Heavy Weights 164
Appendix D: AFFTC/NASA Memorandum of Understanding 170
Appendix E: Lifting Body Personnel 174
Glossary 179
Source Essay and Literature of the Field 184
About the Author 198
xvi
Illustrations
All photos and old artwork images were scanned originally at 300 dpi and in 'True Color or 256 gray scale as
appropriate. All images were processed with DEBABELIZER
PRO at 75% on the "quality" scale to reduce

file sizes.
For 1280 X 1024 pixel size images from the NASA Dryden photo server, go
to: http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/gallery/photo/index.html
There, is an index at that site to retrieve the larger image files for images
listed on this table.
Figure # and Title
Page
No.
NASA
Photo
ECN #
Figure 1-1: Entry Angle
2
New
Figure 1-2: Ballistic Coefficient 3 New
Figure 1-3: Ballistic Entry 4 New
Figure 1-4: Semi-Ballistic Entry 5 New
Figure 1-5: Lifting Entry 7 New
Figure 1-6: Lifting Body Entry 8 New
Figure 2-1: Entry-Related Testing 1957-1982 11 New
Figure 2-2: Dyna Soar Glider on Titan III Booster 13 ?
Figure 3-1: Evolution of M2 Lifting Body Design 18 ?
Figure 3-2: Three-View Drawing, M2-F1 19 ?
Figure 3-3: Internal Structure of the M2-F1
20 E-10756
Figure 3-4: M2-F1 in Ames 40 X 80 Wind Tunnel
21 A-33718
Figure 3-5: Pontiac Convertible Tow Vehicle
22 ED9643663-1
Figure 3-6: M2-F1 Low Speed Car Tow
24 E-9829
Figure 3-7: M2-F1 Air Tow Behind C-47
24 E-10962
Figure 3-8: M2-F1 in Free Flight using "Instant L/D Rocket" 25 ?
Figure 3-9: M2-F1 Trimmed Lift/Drag Ratio 28 ?
Figure 4-1: Comparison of M2-F1 and M2-F2 Configurations 31 ?
Figure 4-2: Three-View Drawing of M2-F2 32 ?
Figure 4-3: M2-F2 Cutaway Drawing
35 E-12972
Figure 4-4: XLR-11 Rocket Engine
36 E-23356
Figure 4-5: Air Force Rocket Engine Test Facility (RETF) 37 ?
Figure 4-6: M2-F2 and HL-10 Manufacturing Schedule 38
Figure 4-7: M2-F1 and M2-F2 Lifting Bodies
38 1107 (E-14339)
xvii
Figure # and Title
Page
No.
NASA
Photo
ECN #
Figure 4-8: M2-F2 in Full Scale Wind Tunnel )
39 847 (E-13742)
Figure 4-9: Air Force Hybrid Simulation of M2-F2 41 ?
Figure 4-10: Typical Lifting Body Ground Track 43 ?
Figure 4-11: Typical Lifting Body Approach, Flare and Landing 43 ?
Figure 4-12: NASA FRC Circa 1966
44 646
Figure 4-13: Mating of M2-F2 with B-52 at NASA Hanger
45 E-13865
Figure 4-14: M2-F2 in Captive Flight
46 1438
Figure 4-15: M2-F2 Lifting Body with F-104 Chase
47 1701
Figure 4-16: M2-F2 After Crash on Lakebed
48 E-16731
Figure 4-17: Variation of M2-F2 Roll Characteristics with Interconnect Ratio 49 ?
Figure 4-18: M2-F3 in Flight
50 2924
Figure 4-19: M2-F3 Powered Flight
52 3272
Figure 4-20: Location of Lifting Body Facilities at Edwards 53 ?
Figure 4-21: NASA Mission Control Room
54 E66-15774
Figure 4-22: Dry Lakebeds Near Edwards AFB Used for Lifting Body Operations 55 ?
Figure 5-1: Three-View Drawing of HL-10 62 ?
Figure 5-2: HL-10 Control Surface Configurations
63
64
1463
1462
Figure 5-3: NASA HL-10 Simulator
66 E-18900
Figure 5-4: HL-10 Glide Flight
67 63-187
69-2346
(E-21089)
Figure 5-5: Inward-Cambered Glove Modification to HL-10 Fins 68 ?
Figure 5-6: HL-10 Landing
70 2367
Figure 6-1: Three-View Drawing of X-24A
77
?
Figure 6-2: X-24A Control Surface Configurations
78
78
E-23373
E-23377
Figure 6-3: X-24A Cutaway Drawing 81 ?
Figure 6-4: X-24A Propulsion System Test Stand 82 ?
Figure 6-5: X-24A in Full Scale Tunnel with Simulated Ablative Coating
83 1926
(E-18533)
Figure 6-6: X-24A Iyy Inertia Test Setup 84 ?
Figure 6-7: X-24A Simulator Cockpit 85 ?
Figure 6-8: X-24A Glide Flight 87 ?
Figure 6-9: X-24A Powered Flight
89 2511
(E-21733)
Figure 6-10: X-24A In-Flight Jettison 92 ?
Figure 6-11: Lifting Bodies Displayed in AF Museum, WPAFB 96 ?
Figure 7-1: X-24B Glove Modification to X-24A 99 ?
Figure 7-2: Three-View Drawing of X-24B 99 ?
Figure 7-3: X-24B Upper Body Shape 100 ?
Figure 7-4: X-24A Conversion to X-24B 102 ?
xviii
Figure # and Title
Page
No.
NASA
Photo
ECN #
Figure 7-5: X-24B Landing Gear Drop Test
104 E-26140
Figure 7-6: X-24B High Speed Taxi Test using XLR-11 Rocket Engine 105 ?
Figure 7-7: X-24B Glide Flight (Touchdown)
107 4914
Figure 7-8: X-24B Fuel Jettison Modification 108 ?
Figure 7-9: X-24B Powered Flight
109 EC75-4638
Figure 7-10: X-24B Runway Landing 111 ?
Figure 7-11: Test Pilots Who Flew the X-24B
113 4968
Figure 8-1: L/D Comparisons, Gear Up 119 ?
Figure 8-2: L/D Comparisons, Gear Down 119 ?
Figure 8-3: Orbital Entry Footprints for Lifting Bodies and Other Vehicles 121 ?
Figure A-1: Entry-Related Testing 1957-1982 123 New
Figure A-2: Dyna Soar 125 ?
Figure A-3: Planned Dyna Soar Sub-Orbital Tests 127 ?
Figure A-4: Dyna Soar Glider on Titan III Booster 129 ?
Figure A-5: Once-Around to Edwards 130 ?
Figure A-6: Dyna Soar, X-20 Glider 131 ?
Figure A-7: X-20 L/D vs. Angle of Attack 132 ?
Figure A-8: Energy Management Overlay, X-20 132 ?
Figure A-9: Flight Integrator Overlay, X-20 134 ?
Figure A-10: Assigned Pilots for the X-20 Dyna Soar 139 ?
Figure A-11: ASSET Vehicle Configuration 140 ?
Miscellaneous Images With No Figure Numbers
Figure # and Title
Page
No.
NASA
Photo
ECN #
McCall Mural i EC 77 8474
Footprint Cover ii New
Frontispiece iv New
NASA Hangar with X-15s and Lifting Bodies Research Aircraft, 1966) xix
HL-10 on Pedestal 61
M2-F3 Head-on Photo 51 EC70 2454
HL-10/ Bill Dana With B52 Fly-over 70 2203
X-24B & 3 Chase 112 EC73 4895
X-24A, M2-F3, and HL-10 Lifting Bodies 10 2357
M2-F2 and F-104 Chase 30 ?
M2-F1 Glide Flight 17 EC 64 406
M2-F1 Under Tow 17 EC 63 299
Bruce Peterson and the M2-F2 145 ?
X-24A on B52 Pylon 74 ?
X-24B Glide Flight 97 EC 75 4642
xix
X-15s and Lifting Body Research Aircraft in Main NASA Hanger, 1966
1
Chapter 1
Returning From Space
1.1 The Capability: Exiting the Atmosphere
Exiting the atmosphere into space is an exercise in "brute force." The rocket engines must
have thrust that exceeds the weight of the entire vehicle (including propellants) before it can
lift off from the launch pad. An exit trajectory is usually very steep (nearly straight up) so
the vehicle is well above the dense atmosphere before it accelerates to high speed. Exiting
the atmosphere for the express purpose of placing a warhead in a precise location several
thousand miles away requires not only "brute force," but also a sophisticated control and
guidance system. Exiting the atmosphere to achieve a permanent circular orbit requires the
same technology as the warhead delivery. It was only natural that the first orbital flight of a
man-made object would be a direct application of missile technology.
To return an object from space is a more challenging task. Friction with the atmosphere
creates very high heating at the surface of an object. Shooting stars or meteors are
demonstrations of the extreme environment associated with atmospheric entry.
1
Some type
of thermal protection is required for objects entering the earths atmosphere.
1.2 The Challenge: Atmospheric Entry
The term "Lifting Body Program" usually refers to a flight test program conducted between
1963 and 1975 at Edwards, California on a strange looking family of wingless aircraft. The
reason for these unusual configurations is found in the challenge to design a manned vehicle
which would survive entry into the earths atmosphere. Three factors would affect the design
of a manned entry device:

1
The terms "entry" and "reentry" are often used interchangeably in the industry. In this document the term
"reentry" refers to a suborbital maneuver where the path and environment back through the atmosphere are
dictated by the launch trajectory; the flight from launch to landing can be viewed as a single maneuver. The
term "entry" refers to a maneuver which is initiated from orbital or super-orbital conditions where the path and
environment back through the atmosphere are created independently from the launch trajectory.
2
(1) Intense heat generated by friction with the earths atmosphere,
(2) High accelerations, and resulting "g" loads
2
associated with the rapid loss of speed
during entry,
(3) Selection and control of the initial entry angle (relative to the horizontal) which would
dictate the heat and g loads (Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1: Entry Angle
These three factors are related to each other and they offered the early entry vehicle designers
some trade-offs. Steep entry angles were known to produce very high g loads. The time of
entry would be very short, however, and, although temperatures were expected to be
extremely high, there were known methods for handling the short heat pulse. This entry
method was appropriate for ballistic missile warheads but g loads were far too high for
human survival (100 "g" or more). Shallow entries could be tailored to produce lower g
loads but would result in a longer entry time. Peak temperatures were expected to be lower
but the longer duration heat pulse was an additional design challenge. There was a very
narrow range of entry angles which would provide acceptable g loads for human survival,
and these required very careful trajectory control at the beginning of the entry. Thus there
was reason to believe that a ballistic entry could be tailored to allow a manned vehicle to
survive entry through the atmosphere.

2
.."g" loads are those forces affecting the vehicle and its occupants resulting from rapid changes in speed
(accelerations or decelerations). The normal measure of "g" load is the "load factor" or "g" which is the ratio of
the force experienced under acceleration to the force that would exist if the object was at rest on the surface of
the earth.
3
1.3 Ballistic Entry
A ballistic entry is one in which the force created is always parallel to the line of flight, that
is, a "drag" force. The trajectory is always in the form of a parabola and represents the
balance of forward speed with the earths gravity. Baseballs, arrows, bullets and artillery
shells follow ballistic trajectories but their velocities are too low to induce significant
atmospheric friction. The primary design parameter for ballistic entry is the Ballistic
Coefficient;
Ballistic Coefficient = Weight/(Drag Coefficient x Area)
Heating and deceleration are less intense for a low Ballistic Coefficient (low weight and/or
high drag and large frontal area) than for a high value since the entry occurs high in the
atmosphere where the air is less dense (Figure 1-2).
Figure 1-2: Ballistic Coefficient
Early Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) utilized this reentry method. Thermal
protection for these early warheads was a massive metallic heat shield which merely
provided a "heat sink" for the short heating pulse. It was soon discovered that delivery
accuracy could be improved by increasing the values of the Ballistic Coefficient thus
increasing the impact velocity so that the final descent phase was less affected by winds.
Thermal protection was provided by allowing the material at the surface of the heat shield to
melt or vaporize thus transferring much of the heat back into the atmosphere. This method of
thermal protection is referred to as "ablation," and the material that is applied to the vehicles
outer surface is called an "ablator."
The development of missile warheads was the primary technological goal of the fifties, and
significant progress in the development of ablators was accomplished as a result. Early
designs for manned entry vehicles took maximum advantage of the missile warhead
technology. By using low Ballistic Coefficients and shallow entry trajectories the g load
could be maintained within the human tolerance level. This resulted in a longer time for a
manned entry, however, and thus required a thick layer of ablation material on the outer
surface.
4
The initial entry angle (determined by the capsule attitude at retrofire) was quite critical and,
at best, the g loads were almost incapacitating to the crew (approximately 8 "g" for about a
minute and a half). Centrifuge studies had shown that the human tolerance to long periods of
high g loads was greatest if the subject was in a reclining position and the force was applied
from front to back (that is, "eyeballs-in"). Manned ballistic entry capsules were therefore
designed to position the crew member(s) lying on their backs facing away from the direction
of flight (Figure 1-3).
Figure 1-3: Ballistic Entry
During the final phase of a manned, ballistic entry some type of auxiliary device was
necessary to slow the vehicle to a very low sink rate at the moment of impact with the earth
(parachute, rotor, landing rocket, etc.). This entry vehicle concept was commonly referred to
as the "Decoupled Mode" since the aerodynamic features necessary for the atmospheric entry
were different (or "decoupled") from those necessary for final landing. The Mercury
program was the only U.S. manned entry program to utilize a pure ballistic entry trajectory.
A parachute was used for the final landing (Figure 1-3). Even before the first Mercury flight
it was recognized that the pure ballistic entry was too critical for an "operational" (that is,
routine and low cost) manned entry system. In addition to the g load and heating criticality
of the entry, the poor predictability of the final impact point led to the selection of ocean
landing areas requiring a rather large contingent of ships and helicopters for recovery as
evidenced by the Mercury program.
Some improvement in the recovery accuracy was possible by adding maneuverability to the
second, decoupled phase. A maneuverable parachute concept (Rogallo wing) was explored
as a potential improvement for decoupled mode entries, but it has never been incorporated in
any U.S. manned system. The concept, however, has continued to evolve. Recently,
successful low speed demonstrations of parachute recoveries of small, unmanned entry
shapes have been made using high-lift parachutes.
5
1.4 Semi-Ballistic Entry
By providing a small amount of "lift" during entry, that is, an aerodynamic force
perpendicular to the flight path, the severity of the entry could be reduced substantially and
the recovery accuracy could also be improved. Lift was created by offsetting the center of
gravity of the entry vehicle slightly so that the blunt face of the heat shield was inclined at an
angle to the flight path (Figure 1-4).
Figure 1-4: Semi-Ballistic Entry
By controlling the bank angle during entry, the lift could be directed to control the flight
path. Initially the lift could be directed upward to maintain a small flight path angle as long
as possible. Once the vehicle passed the high speed heating pulse, it could be banked to turn
toward the desired recovery point. After achieving the heading to the target recovery point, a
continuous roll could be introduced to cancel the lift effects and thereby simulate a pure
ballistic trajectory for the remainder of the entry.
The resulting semi-ballistic entries were of longer duration than a pure ballistic entry, but
produced somewhat lower g loads and lower peak temperatures. The design of the ablator
heat shield was more complex since the heating was not symmetrical on the heat shield and
the duration of high heating was somewhat longer. A modified ablator, called a "non-
receding, charring ablator," evolved. At high temperature the material burned and released
hot gases, but the char stayed in place and maintained the outer contours of the surface. In
this way the aerodynamic and lifting capabilities of the shape were retained. The material
was molded into a honeycomb grid during construction to help control the shape of the char.
When the ablator was used in sufficient thickness the combination of char and virgin ablator
material provided an effective insulation blanket during entry and thus allowed the use of
common materials for the sub-structure (steel, titanium or even aluminum). The semi-
ballistic entry gave the entry vehicle designer more latitude for design trade-offs. The
trajectory could be continuously adjusted throughout the entry for control of both heating and
recovery location. The g loads on the human crew were no longer a limiting factor; however,
the semi-ballistic entry still required the reclined, aft-facing crew position and a parachute or
some other type of "decoupled mode" recovery device.
6
The Gemini and Apollo capsules employed semi-ballistic entry designs using non-receding,
charring ablators, and both used non-maneuverable parachutes and water recovery for the
final de-coupled phase. Of course all of the ballistic and semi-ballistic concepts discussed
thus far were designed to survive a single entry. Although technically feasible, major
refurbishment would have been required to refly any of the vehicles.
1.5 Lifting Entry
A lifting entry is one in which the primary force being generated is perpendicular to the flight
path, that is, a "lift" force. Although drag is present throughout the entry, the resulting flight
path can be adjusted continuously to change both vertical motion and flight direction while
the velocity is slowing. The gliding flight of a sailplane is an example of "lifting" entry
without high velocities and heating. The primary design parameter for lifting entry is the Lift
to Drag Ratio, or L/D;
L/D = Lift/Drag
Low values of L/D produce moderate g loads, moderate heating levels and low
maneuverability with moderate entry duration's (essentially the same as the semi-ballistic
entry). High values of L/D produce very low g loads, but entries are of very long duration
and have continuous heating. Although the peak temperatures of a lifting entry are below the
peak temperature of a ballistic entry, the total heat load that must be absorbed over the
duration of the entry is higher. Lateral maneuverability during entry (commonly referred to
as "cross-range capability") is dramatically increased as the L/D increases.
A secondary, but important, parameter for lifting entry is the Wing Loading;
Wing Loading = Weight/Projected Area
The Wing Loading for a lifting entry is comparable to the Ballistic Coefficient for a ballistic
entry with a similar effect. Low Wing Loadings (low weight and/or large projected area)
cause the deceleration and heating to occur high in the atmosphere. Heating and deceleration
are less intense for a low Wing Loading (similar to low Ballistic Coefficients).
The lifting entry promised improved conditions for crew members during entry. The g loads
of a lifting entry were expected to be so low (approximately 1.5 "g") that the crew members
could be seated in a normal aircraft-like fashion facing the direction of flight. It was also
expected that the crew could function normally throughout the entry without concern for
even a temporary loss of consciousness (Figure 1-5).
7
Figure 1-5: Lifting Entry
One of the advantages foreseen for a lifting entry vehicle was the high probability that the
vehicle could be landed like a normal glider after completing the entry. This would eliminate
the need for parachutes or other "decoupled mode" recovery concepts. Theoretical and wind
tunnel studies, however, showed that the aerodynamic configurations which produced the
highest L/D at very high Mach number during entry did not necessarily produce "high" L/D
at landing speeds. The highest L/Ds during entry were produced by long slender cones or
wedges without wings. The highest L/D for landing was, of course, obtained with a long,
glider-like wing. Compromises were soon found in the form of delta-wing configurations
(triangular wing planforms) with moderately high L/D during entry yet also with the
capability to land on a normal runway. Wing loading also had an effect on the land-ability;
low wing loadings resulted in slow landing speeds and high wing loadings resulted in high
landing speeds.
Thermal protection concepts for lifting entry were more challenging than the ballistic and
semi-ballistic methods due to the longer entry time. Early thermal protection methods (of the
late 1950s) revolved around two basic concepts: (1) "Active cooling" concepts which
circulated fluid through the hot area, then through a radiator, much like the engine cooling
system for an automobile; and (2) "Passive or Radiative cooling" concepts which used thin,
high-temperature materials that reached an equilibrium temperature by radiating the heat
away from the surface, much like the heating element of a stove. The ceramic tiles or fire
brick then available were brittle and far too heavy to be seriously considered. Both active
and passive thermal protection methods could be reusable with little if any refurbishment
required, but both were complex and dependent on the successful development of high
temperature materials.
The lifting entry concept gave the entry vehicle designer even more latitude for design trade-
offs than ballistic or semi-ballistic entry concepts. A reusable entry vehicle capable of
landing on a normal aircraft runway was seen as a key to increasing manned access to space
at a reasonable cost.
8
1.6 Emergence of the Lifting Body
The entry concepts described thus far have been portrayed in a sequence that shows an
increase in complexity (from pure ballistic to lifting), and a parallel increase in capability or
utility. The knowledge of these different interactions and trade-offs did NOT emerge
gradually as different vehicles were built and tested. All of these factors and trade-offs were
well known by the late 1950s as a result of pioneers in the field, such as Alfred J. Eggers
and H. Julian Allen of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Ames
Research Center (ARC) (Reference Syvertson, 1968). The technology required to implement
the more complex (but more useful) lifting entry methods, however, was not yet fully
developed or proven.
The application of available "ablator" technology appeared to provide a means for near-term
manned space flight. The question that arose was:
Could a low L/D lifting entry vehicle be developed that would use the available thermal
protection methods of the non-receding charring ablators, yet still have sufficient low speed
L/D so it could land safely?
The use of ablator technology would limit the allowable time for entry and thus the
maximum useful entry L/D to a value of about 1.0. The use of ablators would also constrain
the value of the entry L/D to a relatively narrow range around the nominal value of 1.0. This
entry L/D was easily achievable by a variety of blunt-nosed, wingless entry shapes. The
answer to the second part of the question was less obvious. Designers proposed
modifications to several of these entry configuration shapes which would hopefully allow
them to perform horizontal landings (Figure 1-6).
Figure 1-6: Lifting Body Entry
A brief flight test program was conducted on an F-104 by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Flight Research Center (FRC) in 1959 (Reference Matranga,
1959) to explore low L/D landing methods. If landings were feasible, a lifting body vehicle
could be used in the near term to demonstrate the primary advantages of lifting entry without
being dependent upon the development of the exotic materials or systems necessary for a
high L/D entry vehicle.
9
The "Lifting Body Program" was conceived to answer the land-ability question regarding
these proposed entry configurations. The program called for the construction of low cost, all-
aluminum airframes that would not include thermal protection systems, or other subsystems,
necessary for an actual entry. The program addressed concerns not only for the low speed
L/D and land-ability, but also for the transonic stability and control of these blunt shapes as
they decelerated through the critical transonic speed regime.
1.7 Glider Landing Techniques
Lifting entry vehicle designers gave serious consideration to including a propulsion system
for landing. Although landing engines would allow a vehicle to land like a normal airplane,
the powered approach was not an attractive alternative due to the added weight and
complexity. Before beginning a discussion of the individual projects, it is, therefore,
appropriate to describe simply the techniques used to land unpowered airplanes.
All gliders, whether they are sailplanes (L/Ds from 25 to 50) or lifting bodies (L/Ds from
2.8 to 5.0), use the same general strategy to perform safe and accurate horizontal landings.
The energy possessed by an airplane is of two forms: potential energy (altitude above the
ground) and kinetic energy (forward velocity relative to the ground). Unlike a powered
airplane which can add energy or maintain a constant energy level, a glider is constantly
losing energy. Potential and kinetic energy can be traded with each other. A constant-speed
glide loses only potential energy while a slow-down at constant altitude loses only kinetic
energy. The pilot must control the loss of energy so that he arrives at the desired landing
point at zero altitude and at the proper landing speed. There are three primary methods used
to control energy: speed, landing pattern geometry, and drag-producing devices (speed
brakes). The usual philosophy for performing a safe glider landing is to give up potential
energy for an increase in kinetic energy as the glider gets closer to the ground; that is,
increase speed by allowing the approach angle to steepen. Since speed can be quickly
dissipated near the ground by drag devices, this excess speed allows for last minute pattern
corrections for winds or other anomalies. Although the general technique for landing a
lifting body is similar to that of a sailplane, there is an enormous difference in the levels of
energy involved. The development and perfection of this energy exchange to achieve a
controlled, accurate landing were primary objectives of the Lifting Body Program.
10
X-24A, M2-F3, and HL-10 Lifting Bodies
Chapter 2
Lifting Entry With Horizontal Landing; The Quest Begins
Many concepts for accomplishing a lifting entry followed by a horizontal landing were
proposed in the late 1950's. There were inflatable vehicles with very low wing loading,
delta-winged flat-on-top shapes, delta-winged flat-on-bottom shapes, semi-ballistic shapes
with extendable wings, and several lifting bodies. Some of these configurations received
considerable attention and were tested extensively in wind tunnels. None were committed to
hardware, however until about 1957 when the Air Force initiated a design competition for the
X-20 "Dyna Soar" program. It was to be a continuation of the Air Forces "X-plane" research
on manned, high speed flight, and was to be conducted in a fashion similar to the X-15
program. The vehicle would be designed and constructed by industry, then turned over to a
joint Air Force/NACA team who would conduct the research flight testing.
An overall schedule for projects that were actually committed to hardware between 1957 and
1982 is shown in Figure 2-1. The various programs discussed in this document are related to
each other, and to parallel programs by this figure.
11
Figure 2-1: Entry-Related Testing 1957-1982

2.1 High L/D, or Low L/D?
The lifting body concept for manned entry vehicles was first introduced during the
competition for the X-20 Dyna Soar contract in the mid fifties. The configuration that was
finally selected for the Dyna Soar was NOT a lifting body, but was a high L/D, delta-winged
glider that would use the "lifting" entry concept described in Chapter 1. The X-20 was never
completed and never flew, nevertheless, it represents the first serious attempt to design and
build a vehicle which would perform a lifting entry from orbit followed by a horizontal
landing. The program was cancelled in December, 1963 while the first flight vehicle was
under construction. A more complete description of the X-20 program is included in
Appendix A.

12
2.2 From X-15 to X-20
The Dyna Soar program grew out of concepts first proposed by Eugen Snger, a German
scientist, in the 1930's (Reference Geiger as quoted in Hallion, Vol. I, 1987). Snger
envisioned a winged aircraft boosted to near-orbital speeds above the earth's atmosphere by a
rocket engine. It would then skip along the outer reaches of the atmosphere like a flat stone
on water until it slowed to a normal glide speed for landing. The term "boost-glide vehicle"
was born. The range of the aircraft would be greatly extended by the skipping action, as
would the maneuverability. Snger coined the term "dynamic soaring" to describe the
concept. This terminology was shortened to "Dyna Soar" as the name for the program even
though the reentry was envisioned as a long, controlled glide without "skipping."
The Dyna Soar program evolved from the aircraft community rather than the missile
community, which was the primary source of entry technology for the Mercury program.
The Dyna Soar glider was seen as a natural progression of the successful X-series high speed
rocket-powered aircraft. At the time of the first design competition in the mid fifties the X-
15 was under construction. The X-15 was expected to advance the frontiers of manned flight
to Mach 6.6 and to 250,000 feet altitude. It was recognized that the next step upward in
speed and altitude beyond the X-15 could probably not be achieved by air-launching or by
using a self-contained propulsion system. Some large, unique air-launching platforms were
studied and proposed but none were built. Existing ICBM's had the capability to boost small
payloads (approximately 5,000 lbs.) to orbit, but could also boost a 9,000-pound research
aircraft to a speed of about 17,000 ft per second (about Mach 20) and well into the reentry
heating regime. Considering the anticipated future increase in booster capability, the Dyna
Soar was proposed as a research glider that would be designed for entry from orbit, but
would be initially tested and developed in sub-orbital flight. The program married the ICBM
booster technology and high speed research airplane technology. For launch, the glider
would be mounted on the top of a modified ICBM booster. The booster trajectory would be
altered to place the glider in a nearly horizontal trajectory at burnout, as envisioned by
Snger, rather than the typical steep and high ballistic trajectory of an ICBM.
13
Figure 2-2: Dyna Soar Glider on Titan III Booster
14
2.3 Legacies of Dyna Soar
After program cancellation, several of the systems that were under development for the X-20
program found a place in the continued technology advance of the early 1960's and provided
the cornerstones for the continuation of lifting entry research. Some of these systems and
concepts are outlined below.
(1) The ASSET Program - The ASSET vehicle was designed to validate the "hot structure"
concept of the Dyna Soar glider. The structure and shape of the vehicle represented the
forward 4 feet of the X-20 in most respects. Six vehicles were built and successfully flown
between 1963 and 1965 (mostly after the cancellation of the X-20) along gliding reentry
trajectories . Although this program received little attention at the time, its success validated
the X-20 "hot structure" thermal protection concept (Reference Hallion, Vol. I, 1987).
(2) The self-adaptive, fly-by-wire flight control system designed for the X-20 was adapted to
the X-15 mission and was installed in the #3 X-15 . The features of the system, including the
autopilot and the merging of aerodynamic and reaction controls, were demonstrated on many
successful X-15 flights.
(3) The first Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) airborne instrumentation system was initiated for
the X-20 program. The NASA FRC at Edwards recognized the potential value of this system
and continued support of its development (known as the CT-77 Instrumentation System). It
was used successfully on all of the lifting body programs.
(4) The Inertial Guidance System that was developed for the X-20 program also found its
way into the X-15 program, where it provided a major improvement in accuracy for the later
high-altitude flights.
(5) Special simulation computer hardware and software (hybrid digital/analog) were procured
to provide an accurate, real-time simulation of the X-20 lifting entry for mission planning
and crew training. An accurate lifting entry simulation was established at Edwards AFB, and
the new equipment was used to support the lifting body programs at Edwards as well as the
Space Shuttle program.
(6) The X-20 laid much of the ground work for the crew escape philosophy which is used in
the Space Shuttle today. The X-20 glider design team recognized that it was not practical to
provide an escape mode for all aspects of a space flight. In case of an emergency, the entry
vehicle itself was considered the primary method for returning the crew to subsonic speeds.
Design safety features, usually in the form of system redundancy, were incorporated in the
entry vehicle to insure that it could function following most high-probability space
emergencies.
15
(7) The booster man-rating concept was first addressed during the X-20 program. Available
ICBM boosters were designed to deliver an unmanned payload one time, consequently they
lacked any redundancy for emergencies. The escape towers and escape rockets used on the
early manned flights of these boosters were designed to fly the manned vehicle away from
the booster in the event of a fire or explosion. Although the X-20 also planned to use an
abort rocket, the program highlighted the need to merge the airplane and booster man-rating
philosophies for any reusable manned entry vehicle.
2.4 Death of the Dyna Soar
By December of 1963, when the Dyna Soar program was cancelled, many of the perceived
barriers to lifting entry and horizontal landing had been laid to rest by the perseverance of the
X-20 team. Lifting entry and horizontal landing were still viewed as the most cost-effective
way to return astronauts from orbit. The stage was set for a different approach; one with less
technical risk than the X-20.
16
Lifting Bodies: A NASA Perspective
Robert G. Hoeys study, "Testing Lifting Bodies at Edwards," provides a valuable history of the lifting body
program conducted jointly by the NASA Flight Research Center (now NASAs Hugh L. Dryden Flight
Research Center) and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, California. It does so,
however, from the perspective of an Air Force civil servant who worked on both the Dyna-Soar and the lifting
body programs.
While this perspective is not blatant or entirely one-sided, it comes through significantly in Chapter 2, which is
devoted exclusively to the X-20 Dyna-Soar and which might lead an unsuspecting reader to infer a greater
influence of the X-20 on the lifting body program than Hoey specifically implies. In Chapter 2, Hoey states
explicitly that Dyna-Soar "was NOT a lifting body," but a winged glider designed to test lifting reentry. Despite
this disclaimer and Hoeys careful and very limited claims for Dyna-Soars contributions to the lifting body
program, the fact that there is an entire chapter devoted to a non-lifting body that never flew in a study that
devotes a single chapter to the M2-F2 and the M2-F3 and one each to the other lifting bodies, all of which did
fly, gives undue prominence to Dyna-Soar. Hoeys study, after all, is explicitly about lifting bodies and not
about lifting reentry and other programs to which the X-20 made significant contributions.
From a NASA perspective, at least, the lifting body program had its beginnings--as Hoey briefly relates--in the
studies of H. J. "Harvey" Allen, Alfred J. Eggers and others at the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics Ames Aeronautical Laboratory in the early to mid-1950s into the blunt body reentry principle and
the concept of lifting reentry from space. This predated Dyna-Soar. And it was these studies, plus roughly
contemporary ones at the NACA Langley Aeronautical Laboratory on wingless lifting shapes, that led R. Dale
Reed, a young engineer at the Flight Research Center, to advocate a flight research program involving lifting
bodies. In turn, it was Reeds efforts, seconded by research pilot Milton O. Thompson and supported by FRC
Director Paul Bikle, that really inaugurated the lifting body flight research program.
In the course of time, as Hoey relates, Langleys studies led to the HL-10, one of the lifting body
configurations. Later studies by the Martin Company under contract to the Air Force resulted in the SV-5
configuration that became the X-24A, later modified to the X-24B--two other lifting body configurations flown
at Edwards.
In view of these developments and the chronology discussed above, it is misleading from the NASA perspective
to devote an entire second chapter in a study of lifting bodies to the Dyna-Soar, even though it did make
contributions to lifting bodies in the development of the Pulse Code Modulation data system used in the lifting
body program. This is not to denigrate Dyna-Soars overall contributions to lifting reentry technology. Even
though the X-20 never flew, the research and wind-tunnel testing for the program contributed significantly to
many hypersonic and reentry programs, especially the Space Shuttle.
The point of this brief essay is rather one of focus. The intent here is not to disagree with Hoeys facts but
simply to present a different perspective on what was and was not critical in the development of the lifting body
program. The reader can then make a more informed decision as to which perspective is more valid. This issue
aside, the Hoey study is a valuable contribution to an important story. For that reason, it is made available on
the NASA Dryden website.
Reference: For further reading, consult From Max Valier to Project Prime, vol. 1 of The Hypersonic
Revolution, edited by Richard P. Hallion (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Aeronautical Systems
Division, 1987), esp. Clarence J. Geiger, "Strangled Infant: The Boeing X-20A Dyna-Soar," pp. 185-377, and
John V. Becker, "The Development of Winged Reentry Vehicles: An Essay from the NACA-NASA
Perspective, 1952-1963," 379-447.
17
M2-F1 Under Tow
M2-F1 Glide Flight
18
Chapter 3
The M2-F1 Program
The first attempt to actually fly and land an entry-configured lifting body occurred in April
1963. The flight occurred at NASA FRC at Edwards AFB. The vehicle was a small, light
weight shape designated the M2-F1.
3.1 Theoretical Development
The M2 Lifting Body configuration was developed by Alfred J. Eggers, C.A. Syvertson,
George Edwards, and George Kenyon at the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC). The
approximate evolution of the design is shown in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: Evolution of M2 Lifting Body Design
The design started with a blunted, 26-degree nose cone. With a vertically offset center of
gravity to establish an angle of attack, a nose cone such as this could perform a semi-ballistic
entry. The top half of the cone was flattened to provide additional lift and to reduce the base
area and thus reduce drag. The base area was reduced even more by boat-tailing both the
upper and lower surfaces of the half cone. The boat-tailing simultaneously improved the
entry trim capability. Fins were added to provide directional stability and to add lift at low
speed (Reference Syvertson, 1968). Preliminary low-speed wind tunnel tests indicated that
this configuration should have a maximum L/D of about 3.5 and would probably be land-able
if an adequate control system could be developed.
19
Robert D. "Dale" Reed was a research engineer at the NASA FRC (now Dryden Flight
Research Center) at Edwards. He had been following the development of the lifting body
shapes at Ames and Langley with some interest and wanted to develop a low-cost approach
to assessing the land-ability of these shapes. Reed and Eggers began to develop an M2
configuration that would be suitable for a piloted experiment. They added small horizontal
control surfaces or elevons outboard of the vertical fins (referred to as "elephant ears") to
provide lateral control and lateral damping. A cockpit and windows in the nose provided
visibility for the pilot during landing. This configuration was designated the M2-F1 (Figure
3-2).
Figure 3-2: Three-View Drawing, M2-F1
3.2 Technical and Physical Development
Reed constructed a 24-inch radio-controlled model of the M2-F1 shape and towed it behind a
larger radio-controlled model. He showed movies of these flights to NASA FRC Director
Paul Bikle, and presented him a proposal to build a piloted, light-weight, low-cost version of
the M2-F1. Reed envisioned a pathfinder program that would establish the feasibility of
landing an entire class of lifting body vehicles. Both Reed and Bikle were active sailplane
pilots (Bikle was an internationally known competition pilot), and thus both were familiar
with glider landing techniques and also launching techniques. Bikle decided to proceed in
September 1962. He appointed Reed to head a small team of research engineers
(approximately six people). They designed a light weight vehicle that could be built in two
segments: (1) an internal structure including the landing gear, flight controls, seat, and
primary load carrying structure (Figure 3-3), and (2) a light-weight external shell in the shape
of the M2-F1. Close and continuous coordination with personnel from NASA ARC
continued throughout the design of the vehicle.
20
Figure 3-3: Internal Structure of the M2-F1
The control system was simple with designed-in flexibility for experimentation during the
early flights. The pilots control stick was connected to a "swash-plate" at the rear of the
aircraft. There were four horizontally-hinged control surfaces (left and right elevons inboard
of the fins, and left and right elevons outboard of the fins) and two vertically-hinged surfaces
(left and right rudders on each fin). These surfaces could be connected to the "swash-plate"
in several ways. This allowed various control surface combinations and stick gearing values
for pitch and roll control to be tested by simply changing the connections at the "swash-
plate." There was no stability augmentation in the M2-F1.
NASA FRC created an internal organization that was composed of Reed, the design
engineering team of Richard Klein and Richard Eldredge, and eight skilled craftsmen in the
NASA FRC shops (four machinists and four sheet metal workers), as well as test pilots and
operations engineers from FRCs Flight Operations. The intent was to keep the contracted
cost low so as to not incur the delays associated with high-level review and approval. Bikle
thought that the M2-F1 shell should be constructed by someone familiar with glider
construction methods. The contract for construction avoided reference to government
specifications and documentation and thereby greatly reduced the cost. This cost-effective,
hands-on approach maximized the use of skilled, in-house personnel and minimized the
complexity of contracts and work statements for outside work. This modus operandi was
used through the entire Lifting Body program.
21
3.3 Construction
The size of the M2-F1 was dictated by the desire to achieve a fairly light wing loading
(approximately 9 lbs. per sq. ft.). This produced a vehicle that was 20 feet long with a base
width (or span) of 9.5 feet. Under the direction of Dale Reed and his small team of design
engineers, the NASA FRC shop personnel manufactured the internal structure.
Simultaneously the construction of the external shell was contracted to Gus Briegleb, a
sailplane designer who was operating a glider operation at nearby El Mirage airport at
Adelanto, California. The shell was constructed at his shop by a team of about five workers
including his two sons, Ross and Ken. The M2-F1 shell was constructed of plywood using
methods typical of glider construction at that time. NASA gave Briegleb the necessary loft
lines for the M2-F1 shape and also identified the shell attach-point dimensions and expected
loads. The total contracted cost for the M2-F1 shell was approximately $10,000. The shell
was completed and delivered to NASA FRC. The final assembly of the shell and internal
structure was completed at NASA FRC only four months after the go-ahead from Bikle.
Following ground checkout of the control system, the M2-F1 vehicle was trucked to the
NASA Ames Research Facility at Moffett Field, California, where it was installed in the
40x80-foot full-scale wind tunnel (Figure 3-4).
Figure 3-4: M2-F1 in Ames 40 X 80 Wind Tunnel
A complete low-speed wind tunnel test series was performed. On many of the wind tunnel
runs the assigned test pilot, Milt Thompson, was seated in the M2-F1 operating the controls
while data measurements were being taken. Because of the low wing loading of the M2-F1
(9 psf), the airspeeds obtained in the wind tunnel were about the same as those expected in
flight. The success of these tests was crucial to the continuation of the program. A
removable, triangular center fin had been constructed in anticipation of low directional
22
stability, and tests were run with and without the fin. The results showed that the directional
stability was adequate without the fin. Overall the wind tunnel results supported the potential
flyability and land-ability of the vehicle. It was returned to Edwards to be prepared for flight
(Reference Horton, 1965). A small solid landing rocket, referred to as the "instant L/D
rocket," was installed in the rear base of the M2-F1. This rocket, which could be ignited by
the pilot, provided about 250 pounds of thrust for about 10 seconds. The rocket could be
used to extend the flight time near landing if needed.
Two standard methods for launching sailplanes are the car-tow and the air-tow. The NASA
test team intended to use both methods for launching the M2-F1. Recognizing that the drag
of the lifting body would be considerably higher than that of a sleek sailplane, NASA FRC
procured a high performance Pontiac convertible and proceeded to have it modified to "race
car" status in order to have the speed and power needed for the car tows. The convertible
body style allowed engineers to observe the M2-F1 flights from aft-facing seats (Figure 3-5).
Walter Whiteside, Assistant to the Chief of Operations at NASA FRC, became the crew chief
and "tow-driver" of the Pontiac. Ralph Sparks maintained the cars high performance
capability throughout the program.
Figure 3-5: Pontiac Convertible Tow Vehicle
Air-tows were accomplished behind a C-47 "Gooney Bird" cargo airplane, which NASA
FRC maintained as a utility aircraft. A tow hook (of the type used during World War II for
towing troop gliders) had been found in a junk yard and installed on the tow plane. A 1000-
foot towline was used.
23
3.4 Flight Testing
The M2-F1 flight test program ran from the early car tows in April 1963 to the last flights in
August 1966. Seven pilots flew the vehicle.
3.4.1 Car Tows
Flight testing began with car tows on the smooth surface of Rogers dry lakebed at Edwards
on 5 April 1963. NASAs Milt Thompson was at the controls of the M2-F1. The Pontiac
towed the vehicle until it was airborne, then the pilot assessed the handling qualities of a
particular control combination. Among the combinations tried were connecting the rudder to
the lateral stick deflection and the pedals to the elevons. Differential upper flap deflections
had been found to have low roll effectiveness in the full-scale tunnel so the left and right
body flaps were linked together for pitch control only, then left that way for the entire test
program. The most suitable system was a standard hookup with the lateral stick deflection
moving the elevons, the rudder pedals operating the rudders, and the longitudinal stick
moving both the body flap and pitch movement of the two elevons. When acceptable control
was established, the tow speeds were increased until the vehicle could lift off and fly for
several minutes behind the tow car, then release and land (Figure 3-6). Since the full-scale
tunnel tests did not show any improvement in lateral stability or handling qualities with the
center fin installed, the fin was never tried in actual flight. The small landing rocket was
tested during taxi tests and was also operated while airborne during car tows.
About 93 car tows were performed before the first air tow was attempted. The car-tow
technique was used throughout the program to evaluate any changes that were made to the
vehicle or the control system and to check out new pilots. Nearly 400 car tows were
accomplished during the course of the program.
3.4.2 Air Tows
Prior to the first air tow, an T-37 ejection seat replaced the simple, light-weight pilot seat that
was used in the test vehicle for car tows. This gave the pilot a capability to eject safely from
the M2-F1 from any portion of a flight including a zero-altitude, zero-speed condition.
Thompson flew the first air tow on 16 August 1963. The flight was quite successful. It was
followed by a series of test flights to determine the actual performance and stability
characteristics of this unique aircraft (Figure 3-7).
Taking off from Rogers dry lakebed, the M2-F1 pilots maneuvered into a high tow position
above the wake of the tow plane. The flights circled the edge of the lakebed during the climb
to insure that the M2-F1 could reach a lakebed runway in the event of a rope break. When
the tow plane reached an altitude between 8,000 and 11,000 feet above the lakebed, and was
approximately over the intended landing site on the lakebed, the M2-F1 pilot would release
from the tow plane and begin a steep gliding turn. He would initiate the landing flare about
300 feet above the ground and at a speed of about 110 knots. Because of the light wing
loading, the M2-F1 lost speed very quickly. Only 8 seconds elapsed between the start of
flare and touchdown at approximately 75 knots (Figure 3-8).
24
Figure 3-6: M2-F1 Low Speed Car Tow
Figure 3-7: M2-F1 Air Tow Behind C-47
25

Figure 3-8: M2-F1 in Free Flight using "Instant L/D Rocket"
3.4.3 Handling Qualities
The M2-F1 in free flight had fairly good handling characteristics. Pitch control was positive
and well damped. Steady state sideslips could be accomplished smoothly, although they
required high pilot concentration.
The M2-F1 exhibited one unusual characteristic that required some learning and adapting by
the pilots. It was brought about by the combination of sideslip produced by deflection of the
ailerons, and of very high dihedral effect (a tendency to roll sharply when a small amount of
sideslip is present). When the vehicle was commanded to roll, there was a slight hesitation
brought about by a small sideslip. The vehicle would then begin to roll as originally
commanded.
3
This characteristic was of little consequence during free flight of the M2-F1
when there was little requirement for quick response or for precise bank angle control. While
on tow, however, the pilots visibility was hampered by the small nose window. The poor
visibility, coupled with a requirement to stay in position behind the tow plane, created a need
for quick roll response. The use of a small amount of rudder for coordination was used by
most pilots, however excessive rudder resulted in a tendency toward Pilot Induced
Oscillation (PIO). Some pilots had difficulty adapting to this characteristic (See Paragraph
3.5.1).
During the flare maneuver just before landing, the wide upper deck of the M2-F1 and the
extreme nose-high attitude of the vehicle caused the pilot to lose his view through the canopy
of the ground and the horizon. He was forced to transfer his viewing to the small nose
window. This hampered his depth perception and thus his ability to accurately control the
landing sink rate. All M2-F1 pilots eventually learned to compensate for this difficulty.
Other handling quality comments are contained in Appendix B.

3
This characteristic is commonly referred to as "adverse yaw" in the aircraft community. It is a feature which
designers strive to eliminate or minimize by altering the shape of the wings or ailerons.
26
3.4.4 Schedule and Pilots
In the early 1960s the lifting body concepts were viewed as adversarial to the winged-entry
concepts such as the X-15 and X-20. In fact, the lifting body supporters were at least partly
responsible for the cancellation of the Dyna Soar program. They advocated the use of
existing ablation technology rather than supporting the development of the exotic high-
temperature materials required by the Dyna Soar. It was with some chagrin, therefore, that
the winged-entry advocates viewed the M2-F1 vehicle flight test program growing out of the
airplane community rather than the missile community, which had previously been their
prime adversary. Test pilot Milt Thompson simultaneously supported the X-20 program
while flying the early flights on the M2-F1. Flight research was viewed as advancing the
technology of flight in any direction that seemed fruitful. This philosophy was typical of
Bikle and others at NASA FRC at that time.
Colonel Chuck Yeager flew 33 car tows and five air tows in the M2-F1. At the time he was
the Commandant of the Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB. Bikle had a high
degree of respect for Yeagers abilities as an aviator and for his accurate reporting abilities as
a test pilot. Bikle invited him to fly the M2-F1 to get his opinion as to the practicality of the
concept. On 10 Dec 1963, shortly after his first successful air tow in the M2-F1, Yeager
ejected from a rocket-assisted NF-104A and received severe facial burns. The M2-F1 was
the first aircraft that Yeager flew following his month-and-a-half hospital recuperation
(likened by some to a long stay in orbit). After his successful flights in the M2-F1 Yeager
enthusiastically supported the lifting body venture.
In all, ten pilots flew approximately 395 M2-F1 car tows. Seven of the ten pilots flew an
additional 77 air tows. (The M2-F1 schedule relative to the other lifting bodies is shown in
Figure 2-1. A summary log of flights and pilots is included in Appendix C.)
Pilot Number of Car Tows Air Tows
Milt Thompson
Bruce Peterson
Major Don Sorlie
Captain Jerry Gentry
Colonel Chuck Yeager
Don Mallick
Bill Dana
Captain Joe Engle
Fred Haise
Major Jim Wood
Unknown
49
33
Unknown
33
32
Unknown
3
3
10
46
17
5
2
5
2
1
0
0
0
27
3.5 Technology Lessons Learned
The M2-F1 flight test program generated technical knowledge from accidents and lesser
incidents as well as through improvements and problem resolutions. Some problems
remained unresolved at the end of the program.
3.5.1 Accidents/Incidents
The M2-F1 landing gear was equipped with automotive shock struts serviced with heavy-
weight oil. The system worked well during the early flights which were in warm weather.
On a very cold morning in December 1963, pilot Bruce Peterson made a rather hard landing
following an air tow. Both wheel axles failed due to the combination of the hard landing and
shock struts stiffened by the cold temperature. Luckily both axles failed simultaneously so
the vehicle settled abruptly onto the gear legs, but tracked straight ahead to a stop. The shock
struts were subsequently replaced with elastic "bungee" cords and no further incidents of gear
failure occurred.
The M2-F1 was still flying when the M2-F2 and HL-10 were delivered to NASA FRC
(Figure 2-1). Near the end of the M2-F1 flight program the AF assigned test pilot Captain
Jerauld Gentry to the Joint AF/NASA Lifting Body program in anticipation of delivery of the
heavy weight vehicles. NASA agreed to a checkout flight for Gentry in the M2-F1. Shortly
after takeoff behind the C-47 tow plane, and at an altitude of a mere 400 feet above the
lakebed, the M2-F1 began to roll violently from side to side. The oscillations increased in
magnitude until the vehicle was inverted. At this point, Gentry released from the tow line
and completed the roll back to an upright position. He used the landing rocket after
recovering from the roll to give him more time to accomplish the landing and he landed
safely straight ahead on the lakebed. After a limited discussion and analysis it was concluded
that the vehicle had been upset by the tow plane slipstream. After receiving some additional
tow training in a sailplane, Gentry again tried an M2-F1 air tow. An identical incident
occurred on the second attempt. It was generally concluded that the combination of poor
forward visibility on tow (Gentry was shorter than the other M2-F1 pilots), known lag in the
lateral responsiveness, and aggressive pilot actions had caused a classical pilot-induced
oscillation (PIO) to occur. At this point Bikle grounded the M2-F1. Its primary mission
accomplished, it was retired from further flight activity on 18 August 1966.
3.5.2 Validations
The M2-F1 program demonstrated the feasibility of the lifting body concept for horizontal
landings of atmospheric entry vehicles. It also demonstrated a procurement and management
concept for prototype flight test vehicles that produced rapid results at VERY low cost
(approximately $40,000 excluding salaries of Government employees assigned to the
project).
In-flight measurements of Lift-to-Drag ratio were 10 percent higher than those measured on
the same vehicle in the full-scale wind tunnel. The measured free-flight value of maximum
L/D was 2.8 (Figure 3-9). Notice that both the full-scale tunnel results and the flight test
results for L/D were considerably less than the value of 3.5 predicted with earlier and smaller
wind tunnel models. The reason for the discrepancy was that the M2-F1 had a fixed landing
gear and some canopy differences as well as some of the normal manufacturing joints and
other protrusions associated with real flight vehicles.
28
Figure 3-9: M2-F1 Trimmed Lift/Drag Ratio
3.5.3 Problems Resolved
An acceptable (but not optimized) flight control system was developed during the early car
tows and was used throughout the M2-F1 program. Even though this system was a simple
mechanical control system, it produced acceptable handling qualities over most of the flight
envelope. It demonstrated that an acceptable and practical control system for a lifting body
vehicle was possible.
3.5.4 Unresolved Problems
In a foreboding of things to come, the M2-F1 exhibited some peculiar roll response
characteristics resulting from adverse yaw and the very high roll-to-sideslip ratio of the
highly swept conical shape.
Although successful landings were performed at very low values of L/D (less than 3.0), the
wing loading of the M2-F1 was considerably lower than that of any of the proposed lifting
body entry vehicles. The ability to land at the higher mission weight and resulting higher
approach and landing speeds had yet to be demonstrated.
Forward visibility was considered to be marginal during air tows and was barely adequate
during the actual landing at high angle of attack. This was in spite of a window placed in the
nose area specifically for the landing maneuver. The requirement for a thick ablator on the
nose of an actual entry vehicle would preclude the use of ANY forward window in this
location for pilot visibility at landing. Periscopes or blow-off panels were being considered
to solve this problem for future lifting body vehicles.
29
3.6 Test Sites
All flights of the M2-F1 lifting body were conducted over, and landed on, Rogers dry
lakebed at Edwards AFB, California. After the full-scale wind tunnel tests at Ames, the
vehicle remained at NASA FRC and maintenance was accomplished in the Calibration
Hangar (now building Number 4801). Tests of the solid rocket "instant L/D" motor were
conducted on the ramp as well as on the lakebed during early taxi tests.
3.7 Current Status of Aircraft
The M2-F1 vehicle remained at NASA FRC after its last flight in August 1966. It was
displayed in an informal museum area in front of the main building for several years. The
fabric and plywood structure deteriorated from the sun and weather. The vehicle was
eventually donated to the Smithsonian Institution. In February 1994 a contract was let
through NASA FRC to Dick Fischer (a former NASA FRC employee) for $100,000 to begin
restoration of the M2-F1. He has subcontracted much of the work to other NASA retirees
who actually worked on the airplane during its construction and flight testing days. The
restoration is expected to be completed in 1997. The location and method of final display of
the M2-F1 has not yet been decided, but it is expected to remain at Edwards.
The Pontiac tow vehicle was turned over to the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC),
which used it to tow test devices for measuring tire/runway friction.
30
M2-F2 and F-104 Chase
Chapter 4
The M2-F2 and M2-F3 Program
The M2-F2 and M2-F3 were the same vehicle, initially configured and tested as the M2-F2.
Following a crash, NASA had the vehicle rebuilt as the M2-F3 and continued the flight test
program.

The M2-F2 and M2-F3 retained the same basic M2 shape described in Chapter 3.
Theoretical analysis of both the aerodynamics and thermodynamics of the M2 shape had
continued at NASA ARC while the M2-F1 was being flown at NASA FRC. ARCs goal was
to minimize entry heating problems and to improve on the subsonic L/D. The M2-F2
configuration resulted from these analyses.
31
Retaining the same basic configuration as the M2-F1, the M2-F2 was also the same size. The
width or span (the diameter at the base of the original cone) was found to be about the same
as the diameter of the upper stage of a Titan II or Titan III launch vehicle. It was hoped that
by constraining the outer size of the glide vehicle to the mold lines of the booster the
destabilizing influence of a lifting shape on the nose of the booster could be minimized. Of
course neither the M2-F1 nor the M2-F2 was designed to perform an actual entry. The
ARC/FRC design team, however, thought that a successful demonstration of a safe landing
by a vehicle of this dimension would be of value to the space program.
There were some differences between the M2-F1 and M2-F2 that resulted from the
continuing evolution of the M2 as an entry configuration (Figure 4-1):
Figure 4-1: Comparison of M2-F1 and M2-F2 Configurations
(1) Pilot location - The M2-F2 cockpit was moved forward to allow the propellant tanks to be
located on the center of gravity. This would minimize the trim change as fuel was being
used. It would also provide an "over-the-wing" ejection capability while the vehicle was still
mated to the B-52 and improve the forward visibility for the pilot. The nose window was
retained, however, to provide depth perception at landing.
(2) Outboard elevons - Further analysis and high speed wind tunnel tests at Ames indicated
that thermal protection for the outboard elevons would be extremely difficult. The M2-F2
thus returned to the split, upper body-flap for roll control that was discarded during early M2-
F1 wind tunnel tests.
32
(3) Aft fuselage - The boat-tailed region of the aft fuselage was extended so that the rear end
of the fuselage corresponded with the rear end of the pitch flap. This space later contained
the XLR-11 rocket engine.
(4) Lower Body Flap - An additional pitch flap was installed on the aft lower surface of the
fuselage.
(5) Landing Gear - Unlike the fixed landing gear of the M2-F1, the landing gear of the M2-
F2 was flown in a retracted position and was extended for landing.
The M2-F2 was controlled with 5 control surfaces: a single flap on the lower aft fuselage, left
and right flaps inboard of the fins on the upper aft fuselage, and left and right rudders on each
fin which moved outboard only (Figure 4-2). The single lower flap was used exclusively for
pitch control. The upper flaps were deflected differentially for roll control (ailerons). They
could also be moved symmetrically by the pilot through a trim wheel in the cockpit.
Differential deflections of the inboard upper flaps were known (from wind tunnel tests) to
have low roll effectiveness. To enhance the roll control, the M2-F2 was equipped with a roll-
yaw interconnect. This system mechanically linked aileron commands to the rudder through
a ratio changer that was controlled by the pilot. The pilot could vary the amount of rudder
created by an aileron command from 0 to 100 percent (that is, from no rudder, to equal
amounts of rudder and aileron). The interconnect ratio was referred to as the "KRA" setting.
The rudders could also be operated by the pilots rudder pedals.
Figure 4-2: Three-View Drawing of M2-F2
33
The M2-F2 was equipped with a three-axis stability augmentation system which consisted of
rotational rate dampers. The damper signals were mechanically added to the pilots stick and
rudder commands. The M2-F2 did not have a speed brake capability.
Because of the conical shape of the M2-F2 and M2-F3, the landing gear design was
somewhat of a challenge. In the final design the extension of the landing gear was expected
to result in a significant increase in drag as well as a loss of lift. Main landing gear doors
would open to expose vary large holes in the lifting lower surface. The landing gear was also
expected to cause a significant nose-down trim change upon extension. The high drag and
predicted trim change from the landing gear were known by the pilots and engineers from the
beginning of the program. Recognizing the research nature of the program, they felt that the
vehicle could be landed safely with appropriate training and anticipation. A rapid,
pneumatic, blow-down feature was added which would extend all three gear in less than one
second. By delaying the landing gear extension until after flare completion, the pilots
expected to be able to successfully land the airplane in the same manner as the X-15. (The
blow-down feature was added to the landing gear of all lifting bodies.)

4.2.1 Funding and Procurement Philosophy
After the success of the M2-F1, Ames Research Center was supportive of the construction
and testing of a heavy-weight version of their vehicle. Bikle and other pragmatists at NASA
FRC felt that a high risk flight test venture of this type would be best served by the
construction of two test articles, a primary and backup vehicle.
Eugene Love, Bob Rainey, Jack Paulson and others at the Langley Research Center had
developed their own version of a Lifting Body, the HL-10 (Horizontal Landing, model 10).
The HL-10 (discussed in detail in Chapter 5) represented a different approach to
accomplishing a lifting entry. Although conceptually different from the half-nose-cone
concept of the M2, it was predicted to have similar landing characteristics. NASA FRC
proposed the construction of one each of these vehicles rather than two M2-F2 vehicles. The
generic similarity between the two vehicles allowed either one to serve as the research
backup for the other. Both Ames and Langley agreed to support the development of their
respective vehicles. By capitalizing on the rivalry between these two NASA agencies, Bikle
was able not only to gain their support at NASA Headquarters for funding of the program,
but also to obtain their in-house support for theoretical and wind tunnel studies that would
otherwise have been very difficult to obtain.
Hubert Drake, one of the research engineers involved in the conception of the X-15 program,
prepared a single request for proposal for construction of both the M2-F2 and HL-10
vehicles. Reed, the instigator of the lifting body flight test concept and manager of the M2-
F1 program, oversaw the initial evaluation of the proposals. Bikle recognized that
overseeing this relatively large procurement activity would be a totally different task for
Reed and proposed that his creativity might be better utilized by allowing him to conceive
and develop new ideas and other projects. Reed agreed. Bikle then selected John McTigue,
a NASA FRC Operations Engineer with a reputation of getting things done, to manage the
Lifting Body program for NASA FRC. Reed subsequently explored several other innovative
34
ideas on entry vehicle design and demonstration, including the HYPER III project which was
based on the Air Forces FDL-7 entry shape.
McTigue and a small team of engineers and technicians evaluated the proposals for the
manufacture of the two different NASA lifting bodies. The primary competition was
between North American Aviation (now Rockwell) and Northrop. Northrops proposal
identified (by names of individuals) a small but experienced team who had been working on
the F5 fighter program development. Bikle and McTigue wanted to use a small
government/contractor team, similar to the concept used successfully on the M2-F1 vehicle,
so Northrops small-team concept was consistent with FRCs approach to the Lifting Body
effort. Northrop was (and is) a non-union shop which was another key factor in its selection.
Closed union shops of most large aircraft manufacturers prevent government personnel from
assisting in the actual construction or instrumentation installation. The proposed joint
government/contractor team posed no problem for Northrop.
The work statement to the contractor was very brief, estimated by McTigue at one tenth the
size of a similar government work statement for normal aircraft procurement. It avoided
most references to common aircraft design specifications. It was rightly assumed that
Northrop (or any other aircraft manufacturer) would use common military or civil aircraft
design specifications whether or not they were named in the contract. The cost of
documenting and ground testing to these specifications was avoided by requesting that the
contractor abide by the "intent" of various specifications but not necessarily the "letter" of the
documents. A contract for construction of two vehicles, the M2-F2 and the HL-10 was
signed on 2 June 1964 The cost was $2.4 million dollars. NASA directed Northrop to make
maximum use of off-the-shelf hardware and existing proven technology. This approach
would minimize both cost and program risk, and concentrate attention on the aerodynamic
and piloting objectives. The M2-F2 was to be constructed first. The total contract time was
19 1/2 months (Reference Northrop, 1966). The delivered vehicles were to be gliders
equipped with water ballast tanks for adjusting weight and center of gravity. Approval from
NASA headquarters for inclusion of the XLR-11 rocket engine occurred later. The contract
was then modified to incorporate the necessary rocket engine substructure, and to build the
water/alcohol fuel tank and liquid oxygen tank that would replace the ballast tanks.
Included in the contract was a requirement to build a pylon adapter for each vehicle which
would mount to the existing X-15 pylons on the two B-52s. The lifting body would then
mount to the adapter and all electrical and LOX topoff lines, as well as the launch
mechanism, would be transferred through the adapter to the lifting body.
4.3 Construction
Design and construction of the M2-F2 began in June 1964, immediately after NASA awarded
the contract. The vehicle was delivered to NASA FRC a year later in June 1965.
4.3.1 Management and Organizational Structure
Northrop assigned Ralph Hakes to be the companys Program Manager for the Lifting Body
program. Hakes assembled a small team of about 30 highly experienced engineers and
35
craftsmen. They set up shop in a small corner of the plant at Hawthorne, California. The
engineers and their drafting tables were in the same room as the sheet metal workers and
machine tools. Hakes proudly proclaimed that the average experience level of his "skunk
works" team was over 20 years.
NASA FRC assigned Meryl DeGeer to be the Operations Engineer for the M2-F2 program.
He was responsible for configuration control, maintenance scheduling and vehicle flight
preparation. Several NASA FRC inspectors, instrumentation technicians, and engineers were
assigned to stay on-site at Northrop throughout the construction. Instrumentation sensors,
attachment brackets, holes in bulkheads for wiring, etc., could then be accommodated or
installed on the spot as the vehicle was manufactured.
4.3.2 Government-Provided Instrumentation and Subsystems
Most of the subsystems for the M2-F2 and HL-10 were off-the-shelf items from other
programs - landing gear, ejection seats, control surface actuators, hydraulic pumps, etc.
(Figure 4-3). These components were procured through either AF, NASA, or Northrop
supply channels as appropriate. Flight-test-unique subsystems, such as cockpit instruments,
research instrumentation, rocket engines and associated support hardware, were supplied
directly from Government stock at NASA FRC or AFFTC. Although most of the space and
provisions in the vehicles for government-supplied hardware (such as instrumentation boxes)
were included in the manufacturing process, the final installation of these components was to
take place after delivery to NASA.
Figure 4-3: M2-F2 Cutaway Drawing
36
4.3.3 Rocket Engine Procurement and Refurbishment
While the vehicles were being constructed at Northrop, McTigue began a search for the
remaining Reaction Motors XLR-11 rocket engines (Figure 4-4). These engines had been
used first in the X-1 research aircraft (first to achieve supersonic speed in 1947), but were
also used in the Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket and early flights of the X-15. McTigue found
most of the engines and spare parts either in museums, dusty warehouses at Edwards or in
airplanes on outside display pedestals. Some thrust chambers had been chrome plated for
museum display and were discarded. The Air Force Rocket Engine Shop at AFFTC would
normally have been responsible for refurbishment, assembly and ground testing of these
engines. The X-15 program was in full swing however, and the AF Rocket Shop was very
busy keeping the larger and newer XLR-99 engines in operation to support three X-15
airplanes. The XLR-11 engines and parts which McTigue found were turned over to Jack
Russell, the rocket shop supervisor at NASA FRC. Russell and a small team of NASA
mechanics who had worked on the earlier rocket airplanes completely disassembled and
refurbished the engines. The engines were then turned over to the AF Rocket Shop which
supported the XLR-11s, concurrently with the XLR-99s, at the Rocket Engine Test Facility
(RETF) for the remainder of the X-15 and Lifting Body program (Figure 4-5).
Figure 4-4: XLR-11 Rocket Engine
37
Figure 4-5: Air Force Rocket Engine Test Facility (RETF)
The test team decided that an emergency landing rocket, similar to that installed on the M2-
F1, was also a necessary provision on the heavy-weight vehicles. A higher thrust level was
required for the M2-F2 due to the heavier weight, so the team selected the hydrogen peroxide
rockets from the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV). Each rocket produced a thrust of
500 pounds. Four of these rockets were installed in the M2-F2. For glide flights a relatively
large peroxide tank was used. These four rockets could produce a total thrust of 2000 pounds
for about 35 seconds.
4.3.4 Schedule and Delivery
The manufacturing schedule for construction of the M2-F2 is shown in Figure 4-6. The
vehicle was delivered to NASA FRC on 15 June 1965 (Figure 4-7), and the installation of the
remaining government-supplied instrumentation and other subsystems started immediately.
38
Figure 4-6: M2-F2 and HL-10 Manufacturing Schedule

Figure 4-7: M2-F1 and M2-F2 Lifting Bodies
4.3.5 Wind Tunnel Tests
Two necessary wind tunnel tests preceded the first glide flight in the M2-F2. A test program
was conducted in the Langley 7X10-foot High Speed wind tunnel to define the launch
transients produced by the flow field of the B-52 mother ship and to define the proper carry
39
angle for the pylon adapter. These tests predicted that an abrupt but controllable right roll
would occur at launch. The second required test was the full-scale wind tunnel test of the
actual M2-F2 vehicle in the Ames 40x80-foot wind tunnel (Figure 4-8). Data from these
tests were analyzed in detail and the results showed that the performance and stability were
adequate to begin flight testing.
Figure 4-8: M2-F2 in Full Scale Wind Tunnel
40
4.3.6 Ground Tests
After installation of all systems necessary for the glide flights, the M2-F2 was mounted on a
steel cradle in the NASA FRC hangar. The cradle was suspended on knife edges and
supported by springs. This structure was used to measure the moments of inertia of the
vehicle. Analysis of stability and control data requires accurate values for moments of
inertia.
Flight control system checks on the ground showed several discrepancies. Modifications
were required to avoid structural vibrations which were triggered by the flight control
system. Taxi tests were performed in February 1966 using the landing rockets to test for
braking and steering capability. There was no nose gear steering system, and the castering
nose wheel provided excellent directional stability on the ground. The only available
directional steering was through differential braking. When one brake was applied, the
vehicle would initially turn slightly toward the braked wheel, but would then return to the
original heading. This was apparently a result of the increased weight applied to the tire on
the outside of the desired turn. The "bias-ply" tires were replaced with "radial-ply" tires and
a small, but acceptable, steering capability was achieved. The HL-10 and X-24A were
subsequently equipped with "radial-ply" tires.
4.4 Flight Testing of the M2-F2
NASA and the AF conducted flight tests of the M2-F2 at Edwards from 1966 to 1967. The
testing of the M2-F2 ended on the sixteenth flight with a crash on the lakebed.
4.4.1 AFFTC/NASA-FRC Test Team
The effort by NASA to construct and flight test two lifting body shapes did not go unnoticed
by the Air Force who also had some lifting body shapes under study. The contract to build
the X-24A (discussed in detail in Chapter 6) was under serious consideration at the time the
Northrop contract began.
When construction of the M2-F2 and HL-10 vehicles started, the X-15 rocket research
aircraft flight test program was under way at Edwards by a joint AF/NASA team. Both local
organizations - AFFTC and NASA FRC - were contributing capabilities that were specialized
within their individual organizations, but complementary to each other for this type of test
program. NASA FRC had a unique, in-house capability to operate and maintain one-of-a-
kind research airplanes, to install and operate research instrumentation systems, and to
conduct and control research test missions. The AFFTC had a capability to operate and
maintain bomber aircraft (B-52 mothership), to maintain and test rocket engines, and to
provide fire, crash and rescue capability for local and up-range operations. Facilities and
equipment required to sustain these capabilities within both agencies were institutionally
funded, so only direct time and manpower costs were charged to a project.
41
Both organizations had an excellent and experienced staff of flight test engineers and test
pilots to draw from, so those responsibilities were shared. The chase pilots and chase aircraft
were also shared responsibilities. Bikle and Brig. Gen. Irving "Twig" Branch (Commander
of the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards) decided to create an AF/NASA Lifting Body
Joint Operating Committee along the same lines as the existing AF/NASA X-15 Joint
Operating Committee. The Lifting Body Joint Operating Committee would oversee the
conduct of tests on the M2-F2 and HL-10 vehicles. Everyone understood that if, and when,
the X-24A was funded by the Air Force, it would be added to the fleet. Robert Hoey directed
the AFFTC engineering team supporting both the X-15 and the Lifting Body test programs.
John McTigue directed the NASA FRC participation.
(The Memorandum of Agreement between the AFFTC and NASA FRC is shown in
Appendix D.)
4.4.2 Fixed Base and Airborne Simulators
The X-15 program had reinforced the need for fixed base simulators to support the conduct
of research flight testing. All flight planning and pilot training for the first M2-F2 flight, and
for the first 15 glide flights were performed on the AFFTC Hybrid Analog/Digital simulator
(Figure 4-9). This AF simulation facility was being used to support several programs
including the X-15A-2. The AFFTC agreed to support the initial M2-F2 flights on an interim
basis using a modified X-15 cockpit, while NASA FRC was installing new computers and an
M2-F2 cockpit at their facility. Both simulators incorporated all of the available wind tunnel
data, including the Ames full-scale tunnel results.
Figure 4-9: Air Force Hybrid Simulation of M2-F2
42
Flight planning engineers used the simulators to plan the trajectories, establish the proper
launch points, study the effects of prediction uncertainties and high-altitude winds, and
establish the appropriate control system settings (Reference Durrett, 1967). The test pilots
used the simulators to develop and practice the individual flight plans, and to develop and
practice emergency procedures for various system malfunctions. All glide and powered
flight plans were developed using the fixed base simulators either at FRC or AFFTC.
Alternate flight plans were developed which would return valuable data even if one or two of
the XLR-11 rocket chambers failed to start. (This technique of using simulators for test
planning and conduct was later infused into the more conventional flight testing done at
AFFTC). The NASA simulation was used to support preparation for the 16th flight of M2-
F2 and all flights of the M2-F3.
The Air Force NT-33 Variable Stability Airplane, operated by the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory in New York, was used to simulate the handling qualities of the M2-F2 in flight.
The tendency toward a lateral pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO), similar to that seen on ground
fixed-base simulations, was observed during these tests. The violence of the maneuver
quickly overloaded the variable-stability equipment on the NT-33 and tripped the simulation
off-line, so the seriousness of the situation was not readily apparent to the pilots. The NASA
C-140 "Jetstar" Variable Stability Airplane was also used to simulate the handling qualities
of the M2-F2 vehicle.
The test pilots felt that they needed some type of in-flight training device, in addition to the
fixed base simulator, to practice the steep approaches that would be required with a lifting
body. A similar need within the X-15 program had prompted a series of tests on the F-104
fighter that identified a configuration which would reproduce the unpowered landing
approach of the X-15. Accordingly, specific tests conducted on both the F-104 and F5D
fighter aircraft established aircraft configurations (some combination of flap, speed brake,
landing gear and power) that best matched the predicted performance of the M2-F2. AF and
NASA pilots then made repeated practice approaches and landings using these in-flight
simulations. On the morning of an actual launch they usually flew a training flight to
experience the effects of current upper altitude winds. These same aircraft and
configurations were used to provide close chase and photo chase during the actual
approaches and landings of the M2-F2 and M2-F3. Chase pilots called out wheel height
during the final few seconds before touchdown, a valuable help to the lifting body pilot.
Flight experience in the M2-F1, simulator studies, and training flights in the F-104s were all
used to develop a baseline landing procedure for unpowered lifting bodies. The ground track
for a typical glide and powered flight is shown in Figure 4-10. The geometry of a typical
final approach, flare and landing are depicted from a side view in Figure 4-11. Only the aim
point locations and final approach flight path angles were different for each vehicle.
43
Figure 4-10: Typical Lifting Body Ground Track
Figure 4-11: Typical Lifting Body Approach, Flare and Landing
44
4.4.3 Glide-Flight Program
Two B-52 motherships were available at the beginning of the Lifting Body program. Both
were being used in their primary role as launch aircraft for the X-15, and both were
maintained and flown by the Air Force. A lifting body glide flight operation began the day
before a scheduled flight. One of the B-52 mother ships would be towed to the NASA FRC
ramp area (Figure 4-12) and the appropriate pylon adapter would be installed on the X-15
wing pylon. The lifting body was towed into position and mated to the adapter using hoists
and special mating fixtures. The lifting body was then serviced with breathing oxygen,
pressurization gases, hydrogen peroxide (for the landing rockets) and other servicing fluids
(Figure 4-13).
Figure 4-12: NASA FRC Circa 1966
45
Figure 4-13: Mating of M2-F2 with B-52 at NASA Hanger
Prior to the first glide flight, six planned captive flights, wherein the M2-F2 remained
attached to the B-52, were performed (Figure 4-14). The first of these was a short, straight-
ahead lift-off and landing on the long lakebed runway to validate the structural integrity of
the pylon adapter. During this test there was no pilot in the M2-F2. A pilot flew in the M2-
F2 during the remaining five planned captive flights, which tested whether the systems on the
aircraft would operate satisfactorily in the high-altitude environment, and whether the battery
power system had sufficient capacity to safely complete a flight with plenty of margin.
46
Figure 4-14: M2-F2 in Captive Flight
NASA test pilot Milt Thompson flew the first glide flight of the M2-F2 on 12 July 1966
(Figure 4-15). The roll-off at launch was less severe than predicted. Lift and drag
measurements were found to be close to predictions, as were stability and control
characteristics. Early flights showed that the prediction of a lateral instability at low angle of
attack (high airspeed) was correct, and some controlled tests were conducted to try to
establish the boundary for this instability.
47
Figure 4-15: M2-F2 Lifting Body with F-104 Chase
Following the fourteenth glide flight, the XLR-11 engine was installed in the vehicle in
preparation for the first powered flight. Space and weight limitations resulted in a reduction
in the tankage for the peroxide landing rockets as well as a reduction in the number of
rockets from four to two. The potential run time of the two landing rockets was about 10
seconds. A conical fairing was added to the lower flap of the vehicle to provide adequate
clearance for the engine. Glide flights number 15 and 16 were conducted to insure that the
handling qualities were not degraded by these changes.
4.4.3.1 Handling Qualities: Simulator studies showed that the gliding handling qualities of
the M2-F2 would not be as good as the M2-F1, primarily due to the reliance on the inboard
elevons and rudders for lateral control. Flight tests confirmed the simulator predictions.
Longitudinally the vehicle was stable and easy to fly. The vehicle was highly sensitive to the
aileron/rudder interconnect setting in the lateral axis and pilots often commented that they
felt uncomfortably close to a lateral instability during the high speed portion of the final
approach. Other handling quality comments are contained in Paragraph 4.5.2 and in
Appendix B.
48
4.4.3.2 Schedule and Pilots: Four pilots flew sixteen glide flights in the M2-F2 between 12
July 1966 and 10 May 1967. (The schedule relative to the other lifting bodies is shown in
Figure 2-1. A complete log of flights and pilots is included in Appendix C.)
Pilot Glide Flights
Milt Thompson
Bruce Peterson
Major Don Sorlie
5
3
3
5
4.5 M2-F2 Landing Accident
The most famous event of the Lifting Body program in terms of public awareness, was the
spectacular crash landing of the M2-F2 on flight 16. Bruce Peterson was the pilot.
4.5.1 Events
On 10 May 1967 the M2-F2 was launched on its 16th flight, the last planned glide flight
before beginning the powered flight phase. This was Bruce Petersons third flight in the M2-
F2. As he was completing his turn to line up with the runway and was accelerating to pre-
flare speed, the vehicle began a series of violent rolling motions. Peterson recovered control
of the vehicle, but he was no longer lined up with the marked runway on the lakebed and he
was too low to make a correction. The vehicle was now aimed toward a rescue helicopter
that was hovering near the runway. He was concerned that it was in the way. Peterson
successfully completed the flare, lit the landing rocket, and he had just pulled the landing
gear deployment handle when the vehicle touched the lakebed. Contact with the ground
prevented completion of the landing gear extension cycle. The vehicle rolled and tumbled
several times before coming to rest upside down on the lakebed (Figure 4-16). Peterson was
severely injured and was immediately flown to the hospital at Edwards AFB. He made an
excellent recovery although he lost the use of one eye.
Figure 4-16: M2-F2 After Crash on Lakebed
49
4.5.2 Cause of the Accident
The M2-F2 used a split upper flap for roll control rather than the outboard elevons that had
been used on the M2-F1. The effectiveness of this control was considerably less than that of
the elevons. To augment its effectiveness, some rudder deflection was needed to assist in the
roll. The aileron-to-rudder interconnect (described in Section 4.2) provided the appropriate
rudder deflections. The setting for the interconnect ratio was known to be quite critical for
acceptable handling qualities (Figure 4-17). If the setting was too low, there was insufficient
roll power to control the vehicle at low speed just before touchdown. If the setting was too
high the pilot could induce a severe pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO) during the high speed
final approach phase. This high speed boundary was quite abrupt. The vehicle could change
from a normal flying airplane to a violently out-of-control airplane with a change in angle of
attack of less than 2 degrees. The PIO potential had been observed on three previous
occasions during the glide flight testing, once inadvertently (1st flight) and twice
intentionally to validate the boundary. Later theoretical analysis would show that this
instability was possibly a result of a "coupled roll-spiral" mode
4
of the pilot/airplane
combination (Reference Kempel, 1971).
Figure 4-17: Variation of M2-F2 Roll Characteristics with Interconnect Ratio

4
A "coupled roll-spiral" mode is a combining of two classical handling characteristics which are normally quite
benign (roll mode and spiral mode). When the two combine into an oscillatory mode, the handling qualities can
become unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable
50
On the day of the accident it is speculated that the pilot momentarily entered the PIO region
while establishing his final approach glide slope, possibly as a result of an upset due to wind
shear. After the oscillation started he reacted properly and increased the angle of attack.
This action produced an immediate recovery. But the vehicles heading was no longer
aligned with the runway and its altitude was too low to complete a correction. The
completion of the flare maneuver was further complicated by the lack of markings on the
lakebed for depth perception.
4.5.3 Reconstruction to the M2-F3
The wreckage of the M2-F2 was transported back to the Northrop plant at Hawthorne.
Northrop was given a small amount of money to "inspect" the vehicle while NASA was
deciding whether to rebuild. The vehicle was reinstalled in the manufacturing jigs, and skins
and structural components were systematically removed by the manufacturing team. Many
of the components were magically returned to the vehicle in "good-as-new" condition and
were reinstalled on the vehicle. When the approval was finally obtained from NASA
Headquarters to rebuild and modify the vehicle to a new M2-F3 configuration, much of the
structure had already been repaired. The cost of rebuilding and modifying the vehicle was
$700,000. The M2-F3 was delivered to NASA FRC in July 1969. Gary Layton took over as
the NASA FRC Lifting Body Program Manager from John McTigue.
The primary modification from the M2-F2 to the M2-F3 was the addition of a "splitter" fin
on the upper aft centerline of the fuselage between the upper flaps (Figure 4-18). This fin
was not for the purpose of adding directional stability, as was the earlier center fin on the
M2-F1. It was for the purpose of preventing the strong yawing moment produced when the
upper flaps were deflected unsymmetrically for roll control. Wind tunnel tests had shown
that the splitter would significantly reduce adverse yaw and thereby eliminate most of the
lateral handling quality problems which had been observed on the M2-F2. (Lateral control
on the M2-F1 had used the outer elevons, thus the handling quality advantage of the center
fin was not apparent.)
Figure 4-18: M2-F3 in Flight
51
M2-F3 Lifting Body

The M2-F3 was also equipped with a speed brake capability not available on the M2-F2.
Even though the L/D of the M2-F2 was the lowest of the three lifting bodies, and the
approach angle was the steepest, the pilots recognized the need for a speed brake to control
the energy on final approach. The rudders of the M2-F3 could be simultaneously flared
outboard to increase drag (similar to the speed brake system proposed for the X-20).
A structural change in the nose window region was also incorporated in the M2-F3 but the
forward visibility remained essentially unchanged.
52
4.6 Flight Test of M2-F3
After reinstallation of the instrumentation and other internal hardware, the modified vehicle,
the M2-F3, was carried aloft on 2 June 1970 for its first glide flight. Test maneuvers by
NASA test pilot Bill Dana showed that the splitter fin had, in fact, solved the lateral handling
qualities problems seen in the M2-F2. Although the L/D of the M2-F3 was the lowest of the
original 3 heavy weight lifting bodies, the handling qualities were now considered adequate
for powered flight (Figure 4-19).
Figure 4-19: M2-F3 Powered Flight
It should be noted that the first flight of the M2-F3 followed, chronologically, the successful
powered flights of the HL-10 and X-24A (Figure 2-1). A rocket-powered lifting body flight
required some different procedures for flight preparation. After mating of the lifting body
and the B-52 mothership, the B-52 was towed to the X-15 Servicing Area where the large
volumes of fuel (water-alcohol), (WALC) and liquid oxygen (LOX) were serviced (Figure 4-
20). The LOX-top-off system, which was installed in the B-52 to support X-15 flights, was
also serviced and was used to replace LOX that boiled off from the lifting body LOX tank
while the B-52 was climbing to altitude.
53
Figure 4-20: Location of Lifting Body Facilities at Edwards
Full pressure suits were used by the pilots for all powered flights since the altitude was
expected to exceed 50,000 feet. In preparation for a flight a special Life Support van was
parked near the B-52. The lifting body pilot donned his pressure suit, and suit operation was
completely checked out inside the van.
All lifting body flights used the NASA FRC Control Room (Figure 4-21). Since all flights
were conducted in close proximity to Edwards, no on-board recording was provided. All
data were gathered through telemetry directly to receiving stations on the ground.
54
Figure 4-21: NASA Mission Control Room
In the fall of 1972, when Rogers lakebed became wet while Rosamond lakebed remained dry,
two M2-F3 flights were successfully flown with planned landings on Rosamond lakebed
(Figure 4-22). The vehicle was towed back to the NASA hangar along Rosamond
Boulevard, the normal access road to Edwards. (The schedule relative to the other lifting
bodies is shown in Figure 2-1. A complete log of flights and pilots is included in Appendix
C.)
55
Figure 4-22: Dry Lakebeds Near Edwards AFB Used for Lifting Body Operations
4.6.1 Handling Qualities
The rebuilt vehicle with the new designation M2-F3 employed the same basic flight control
system (built by Sperry) as the X-24A, rather than the Northrop system that had been used in
the M2-F2. The lateral-directional characteristics were significantly improved with the
center fin. The aileron-rudder interconnect, which was so critical on earlier flights, was no
longer needed and the system was removed shortly after flying resumed. The first few
powered flights into the transonic region revealed a longitudinal problem. The basic flight
control system was incapable of either stabilizing the low level of pitch stability or
suppressing the small, abrupt pitch transients that were encountered during the climb phase in
the transonic speed range with the rocket engine running. This posed a significant pilot work
load during powered flight. Occasional lateral disturbances, or upsets, were also observed
during the climb; this characteristic was found on all lifting bodies. The improved lateral
stability of the M2-F3 caused these upsets to be only a minor nuisance to the pilot. (The
56
upsets were later determined to be caused by high altitude wind shear and is discussed in
Chapter 7.)
The M2-F3 was later equipped with a Command Augmentation System (CAS) and a side-
arm controller. These improved the handling qualities, and also explored the applicability of
modern fly-by-wire concepts to lifting body vehicles. The CAS system included a pitch-rate-
command mode and some autopilot features such as an angle-of-attack hold mode. When
used during the climb, the CAS system significantly reduced the pilot work load. It also
eased the piloting task during the transonic deceleration and configuration change.
A Reaction-control Augmentation System (RAS) (similar to the attitude control system used
in a spacecraft) was also installed for several flights. When engaged, it provided a normal
control system stability augmentation function in the pitch axis but used small reaction-
control jets rather than control surfaces to pitch the vehicle. In some flight regimes this
system was as effective as the aerodynamic controls, and in other regions it was somewhat
less effective. These two control system modifications produced improvements in the
handling qualities of the M2-F3 relative to the early control system configuration.
(Additional pilot comments are found in Appendix B.)
Four pilots flew the M2-F3 on a total of 27 flights between 2 June 1970 and 20 December
1972. The vehicle reached a maximum altitude of 71,500 feet and a maximum speed of
Mach 1.613. (The schedule relative to the other lifting bodies is shown in Figure 2-1. A
complete log of flights and pilots is included in Appendix C.)
Pilot Glide Flights Powered Flights
Bill Dana
John Manke
Major Cecil Powell
4
1
0
0
15
0
4
3
The M2-F2/F3 was the first of the heavy-weight, entry-configuration lifting bodies. Its
successful development as a research test vehicle answered many of the generic questions
about these vehicles.
The M2-F2 accident on 10 May 1967 (section 4.5.1) was the only major accident in the
Lifting Body program.
One incident occurred that could have been disastrous if it had not been properly handled.
After mating the M2-F3 to the B-52 in preparation for one powered flight, crew members
discovered fuel (water/alcohol) flowing out of the liquid oxygen vent line. A multiple failure
had occurred in one of the servicing valves. This failure allowed fuel to be inadvertently
57
pumped into the liquid oxygen tank. The crew knew that a mixture of LOX and water
alcohol was potentially explosive and highly unstable. It could be set off by the slightest
movement (much like nitroglycerin). They had no way of determining the exact amount of
either fuel or LOX in the tank and therefore could not determine the level of instability of the
mixture. They elected to carefully open the vent valves on the LOX tank and evacuate the
area until the LOX had completely vented from the tank. That took several days. The M2-
F3 ground crew notified the Flight Operations Office at the AFFTC of the situation and all
supersonic flights were cancelled during the interim to avoid the possibility of a sonic boom
triggering an explosion. After the LOX had completely boiled off, the tank was purged, the
faulty valve replaced, and the servicing restarted without incident.
4.7.2 Validations
The M2-F2 program demonstrated that lifting bodies could be successfully landed at realistic
mission weights. Wind tunnel predictions of low speed stability and performance were
validated. The M2-F3 also validated the wind tunnel predictions in the transonic region
where confidence in wind tunnel results had been low.
As the first of the heavy-weight lifting bodies to fly, the M2-F2 demonstrated the continuing
value of air-launched, rocket-powered, manned research aircraft to validate predictions of
unconventional shapes or concepts.
4.7.3 Improvements
The splitter fin which was installed during the rebuild to the M2-F3 configuration provided a
significant improvement to a known lateral handling quality deficiency of the M2 shape.
This problem had been circumvented during early glide flights by extensive pilot training and
careful flight planning. Unlike the M2-F2, the HL-10 and X-24A had center fins installed in
their original configurations (based on the need to minimize adverse yaw from the upper
flaps). This feature emanated from earlier and independent wind tunnel tests on these
configurations and represents an example of a technical discovery occurring almost
simultaneously, but independently, at Ames (on the M2), at Langley (on the HL-10), and at
Martin (on the X-24A).
Improved flight control systems, which included both a Command Augmentation System
(CAS) and a Reaction control Augmentation System (RAS), were successfully tested in the
M2-F3 vehicle. Handling qualities were noticeably improved by the fly-by-wire features of
the new control systems.
After completing one of these short and intensive lifting body flights, the pilots consistently
remarked that events seemed to happen faster during the flight than they did on the simulator,
and they had the feeling of being 'behind the airplane". Jack Kolf speculated that by running
the simulator "faster-than-real time" he might be able to better match the the pilots
comprehension of the actual flight experience. After completion of the M2-F3 flight test
program the M2-F3 simulator was modified to use a variable time base. Kolf used a flight
plan for a flight that had actually been flown, to experiment with the variable time base. He
found that a time factor of 1.4 faster than real time produced very positive responses from the
M2-F3 pilots. They commented that this time base was very close to what they perceived in
58
flight. This time-compression concept was applied very successfully to the simulator
training for an F-15 Stall/Spin program that was performed by NASA DFRC using a 3/8
scale remotely-piloted vehicle.
The M2-F2 control system, in its original configuration, proved inadequate and unsafe for
flight. A large deadband in the rudder controls, transients in the damper system, and
structural resonance (flight controls responding to structural excitation) prompted a redesign
of the basic control mechanism. The deadband in the rudder control was eliminated by
biasing the neutral position of each rudder so that both rudders could operate simultaneously
(one inboard and one outboard) rather than separately (outboard only on one side or the
other). Frequent automatic disconnects of the system were experienced even though no
failure was present (these were known as nuisance trip-outs).
The transients and structural resonance were resolved by filtering some of the electrical
signals. Nuisance trip-outs were avoided by eliminating the monitor channels in the yaw and
roll axes and by limiting the authority of the system.
Available wind tunnel data on the M2-F2 configuration prior to the first flight was
incomplete and somewhat inconsistent between different wind tunnels, especially in the
transonic region. Flight testing proceeded cautiously and the resulting test data resolved
those differences.
As expected, the extension of the landing gear created a large drag increase and a significant
nose-down pitch trim change. With the blow-down feature this trim change occurred very
abruptly and required quick reaction from the pilot while he was only a few feet above the
ground. The highly trained test pilots associated with the Lifting Body research program did
successfully adapt to these characteristics. These problems were never seriously addressed
from the viewpoint of an operational vehicle. An engineering redesign could have
significantly improved the gear-down characteristics.
Although the cockpit was farther forward on the M2-F2/F3 than the M2-F1, the nose window
still was needed and used by the pilots to establish the desired final sink rate and to receive
depth perception cues for landing. The requirement for a thick ablation heat shield on the
nose of an actual entry vehicle would preclude the use of ANY forward window in this
location for pilot visibility at landing. On one flight the nose window of the M2-F3 was
intentionally covered with paper so that the only forward visibility was over the sides of the
fuselage. Bill Dana made a successful, but hard, landing in this configuration. He concluded
that the situation was dangerous and that the experiment should not be repeated. Periscopes
or blow-off panels were being considered to solve this problem.
The degradation in performance and stability due to the roughened surface of the ablative
heat shield after entry was not factored into the Lifting Body flight test program. Subsequent
analysis (discussed in Chapter 8) would show that this degradation was sufficient to raise
serious questions as to the true land-ability of these vehicles following an actual entry.
59
4.8 Test and Support Sites
The AF/NASA Joint Operating Agreement specified the breakdown in responsibilities for
support activities. This division of responsibilities remained the same throughout the M2-F2
and M2-F3 program.
4.8.1 NASA Facilities
Test vehicle maintenance was a NASA responsibility conducted mostly in the West Hangar
at NASA FRC (now building number 4802). The vehicle mating to the B-52 occurred on the
NASA FRC ramp southeast of the NASA hangar (Figure 4-12). Servicing of hazardous
fluids was done in the X-15 servicing area which was about a mile southeast of NASA FRC,
well away from active hangars and offices (Figure 4-20). After each flight the vehicle was
towed from the lakebed back to the ramp at NASA FRC where tanks and lines were purged
before returning the vehicle to the hangar.
NASA FRC purchased pressure suits from the David Clarke Company for the non-military
lifting body pilots. These suits were turned over to the AFFTC Life Support Facility (Bldg.
3920) where they were maintained, as were the AF pressure suits for the military pilots,
throughout the Lifting Body program.
All electrical and hydraulic power on all of the lifting bodies was provided by silver-zinc
batteries. NASA FRC created a new Battery Shop in building 4801 to develop, test, and
maintain these batteries. Their work significantly contributed to the success of the Lifting
Body program and also to the general technology of large, high-discharge-rate batteries.
The NASA Control Room was used for all M2-F2 and M2-F3 flights (Figure 4-21). Both
real-time and follow-on data reduction were provided by the NASA FRC data reduction
computers and staff. Radar tracking was displayed in the control room and was provided by
NASA radar, although the display of AFFTC radar was available as a backup.
4.8.2 AFFTC Facilities
Procurement of spare rocket engine parts and stockbins of parts were maintained at the Air
Force Rocket Engine Test Facility. All engine maintenance, following the initial
refurbishment, was performed there. The RETF was used to test-fire engines after major
maintenance (Figure 4-5). For the first few installed engine runs the M2-F3 vehicle was tied
down in the rocket engine test area. Later the installed engine runs and leak checks were
performed at the south end of the NASA ramp.
The two B-52 mother ships (Serial Number 003 and 008) were operated by the Air Force and
maintained by Air Force crews in the Maintenance & Modification (M&M) Hangar (Figure
4-20).
Fire Crash and Rescue support was provided by the AFFTC Fire Department. The fire
department was often required to position fire trucks and teams at two different runways on
Rogers lakebed as well as an emergency truck at Rosamond or Cuddeback lakebed.
60
The flight preparation, planning and pilot training for the first 15 flights of the M2-F2 were
supported by the AF hybrid analog/digital simulation in building 1408 at the AFFTC (Figure
4-20).
NASA donated The M2-F3 vehicle to the Smithsonian Institute in December 1973. It is
currently hanging in the Air and Space Museum along with X-15 aircraft number 1 which
was its hangar partner from 1965 to 1969.
61
HL-10 Lifting Body at the Entrance to the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center
Chapter 5
The HL-10 program
Concurrent with the development of the M2-F2/F3 vehicle was the development of the HL-
10 vehicle. The HL-10 lifting body evolved from work at NASA Langley.

The HL-10 (Horizontal Lander, model number 10) entry configuration was developed at the
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) under the general guidance of Gene Love, Bob
Rainey and Jack Paulson. It was based on some studies initiated in 1957 that showed that an
entry configuration with negative camber (cross section like an inverted wing airfoil) and a
flat bottom would have good stability during entry and a slightly higher L/D than a blunt
half-cone (Reference Kempel, 1994). Work continued at LaRC on the development of this
concept and in 1962 the configuration was designated as the HL-10 . When Bikle suggested
62
the construction of the heavy weight M2-F2 to NASA headquarters, the Langley engineers
proposed that their HL-10 shape was a viable alternative and worthy of consideration.
Headquarters approved the construction of both vehicles and the contract was awarded to
Northrop in April 1964. The Langley engineers then concentrated on the development of a
practical shape that could be safely flown in the transonic and subsonic flight regime, yet
would retain the aerodynamic features necessary for successful atmospheric entry.
The HL-10 design team made no attempt to incorporate in their vehicle a canopy for forward
visibility as was done on the M2-F2. The pilot was completely enclosed within the vehicle
outer mold lines and would be totally dependent on the nose and side windows for visibility
during landing.
Wind tunnel tests on the basic HL-10 continued at Langley after the contract award to
Northrop. These tests showed that there were some deficiencies in directional stability
around Mach 1.5 and that the subsonic L/D of the basic configuration was lower than
expected. In February 1965 (10 months after contract award) Langley proposed some
changes to the HL-10 configuration. The size of the center fin and tip fins was increased and
additional control surfaces were added at the aft end of the vehicle to "boat-tail" the
individual surfaces and reduce the base drag at low speed. Although the increased
complexity of the control system was not popular with the NASA FRC team at the time,
Northrop incorporated these changes during initial construction (Figure 5-1).
Figure 5-1: Three-View Drawing of HL-10
63
The HL-10 was equipped with thick elevons, left and right, at the aft edge of the body.
These surfaces were deflected differentially for roll control and symmetrically for pitch
control. A single, split rudder was mounted to the center vertical fin. Both sides of the
rudder could be deflected together, asymmetrically for yaw control. The two sides of the
rudder could be extended symmetrically to serve as a speed brake.
Secondary moveable surfaces were located on the inboard and outboard trailing edges of the
tip fins and the upper surface of the elevons. These were slow moving controls designed to
reduce the base area, and thus the drag, at low speed. They were also used to flare the aft end
of the vehicle for added stability in the transonic region (Figure 5-2).
Figure 5-2: HL-10 Control Surface Configurations, Subsonic
64
Figure 5-2: HL-10 Control Surface Configurations, Transonic
Like the M2-F2, the HL-10 was equipped with a three-axis stability augmentation system
which consisted of rotational rate dampers. The damper signals were mechanically added to
the pilots stick and rudder commands.
The landing gear design philosophy for the HL-10 was similar to that for the M2-F2, namely,
a rugged, non-optimized design with a rapid (one-second) blow-down feature. The pilots had
accepted this philosophy based on the research nature of the program.
5.3 Construction
The HL-10 was procured with NASA funds under the same contract and
government/contractor team philosophy as the M2-F2 (discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3).
Langley was still working on the final loft lines when the contract was awarded so the HL-10
construction and delivery were to follow the M2-F2. The HL-10 construction started in
January 1965 and finished in January 1966 (Figure 4-6). The construction proceeded
smoothly in spite of the late configuration changes mentioned earlier. Initially George
Sitterle was assigned as the NASA FRC Operations Engineer for the HL-10. He was on site
at Northrop during most of the vehicle construction.
65
5.3.1 Wind Tunnel and Ground Tests
A test program was conducted in the Langley 7X10-foot High Speed wind tunnel to define
the launch transients produced by the flow field of the B-52 mother ship and to define the
proper carry angle for the pylon adapter. After delivery of the HL-10 to NASA FRC on 18
January 1966, the government-furnished equipment was installed. The vehicle was then
trucked to the Ames 40X80-foot wind tunnel for final testing. Results were generally
satisfactory although some momentary flow separation was noted on the tip fins at some
flight conditions.
Since the landing gear and tires of the HL-10 were similar to the those on the M2-F2, lakebed
taxi tests were not considered necessary. Flight control system checks showed some
discrepancies. Filters were installed to suppress structural vibrations which were being
triggered by the flight control system. An inertia "swing" was performed in a manner similar
to the M2-F2 to measure the moments of inertia about all axes. By late 1966 the HL-10 was
declared ready for flight.
5.4 Flight Testing
Flight testing began with a glide flight in December 1966. Glide and powered research tests
were concluded in July 1970.
5.4.1 AFFTC/NASA FRC Test Team
The HL-10 flight test program was conducted under the auspices of the Edwards AF/NASA
Lifting Body Joint Operating Committee described earlier (and in Appendix D). Most of the
support functions provided by AFFTC and NASA FRC were the same as those provided to
the M2-F2 program. The AF provided the B-52 maintenance and support, fire crash and
rescue, and rocket engine maintenance. NASA provided the test vehicle maintenance,
instrumentation, data reduction and control room operation. NASA FRC maintained flight
safety responsibilities for each operation. After receipt of the HL-10 vehicle, NASA FRC
assigned Herb Anderson as the Operations Engineer for the HL-10 responsible for
maintaining configuration control and for overseeing maintenance and flight scheduling
activities.
By the time the HL-10 was ready for flight the X-24A program had been approved and
construction was under way. The AFFTC engineering team, which had been supporting the
M2-F2 flight planning effort, turned to preparations for the X-24A program. The NASA
engineering team therefore assumed all aspects of the HL-10 simulation and flight planning
effort with minimum engineering support from the Air Force (Figure 5-3). Air Force and
NASA test pilots continued to share pilot and chase responsibilities for all lifting body
flights.
66
Figure 5-3: NASA HL-10 Simulator
67
5.4.2 Glide Flight Program
The test team initially planned to conduct two captive flights for the HL-10 to check out all
subsystems. Only one was found necessary. Bruce Petersen flew the first glide flight on 22
December 1966 (Figure 5-4). Shortly after launch moderate vibrations were felt by the pilot
and were observed via the telemetry in the control room. The pilot was advised to change
some flight control switch positions to reduce damper gains. He did and the vibrations
subsided. One of the planned maneuvers for the first flight of any of the lifting bodies was a
practice flare at altitude. The purpose of this maneuver was to investigate whether the
vehicle was controllable throughout the high speed approach (planned at 300 knots) and the
subsequent deceleration to a low speed landing condition (expected to be about 180 knots).
It also insured that the vehicle had sufficient L/D to complete the flare. As Peterson
accelerated to the 300-knot high speed approach condition, he noticed that the vehicle was
very sensitive in the pitch axis. He completed the practice flare and, as he was slowing
down, noticed that the vehicle was no longer responding properly to pitch and roll
commands. He lowered the nose and immediately regained control of the airplane. He
decided to fly the final landing approach at a higher speed than originally planned so that he
could land before slowing into the area of poor control. As he approached 340 knots on final
approach, he again encountered some control vibrations and the vehicle became very
sensitive. He completed the flare and made a successful landing, touching down quite fast,
however, at about 280 knots (See Appendix B).
Figure 5-4: HL-10 Glide Flight
68
5.4.2.1 Analysis, Test and Redesign: The flight control vibrations of that first glide flight
were a result of an error in the predicted elevator effectiveness and an improper filter in the
rudder flight control electronics. These discrepancies, along with the overly sensitive pitch
control, were quickly identified and easily rectified. The loss of control at low speed was a
more difficult problem to identify. It took several weeks before the data were fully analyzed
and correlated. The problem was identified as a separation of the airflow over the upper
surface of the outboard fins. This flow separation caused the elevons to become ineffective
(Reference Kempel, 1994).
The NASA Langley aerodynamicists returned to the wind tunnel. Soon they were able to
duplicate the flow condition experienced in flight, a condition observed in earlier tests (and
in the full scale tests at Ames) but dismissed as spurious scatter in the data. Langley devised
several "fixes" and presented them to the NASA FRC Lifting Body team (now headed by
Program Manager Gary Layton). NASA FRC selected adding an inward-cambered glove to
the leading edge of the tip fins (as shown in Figure 5-5). This glove allowed the airflow to
stay attached to the upper surface of the tip fins at high angles of attack (low speeds).
Figure 5-5: Inward-Cambered Glove Modification to HL-10 Fins
69
The entire process of retesting in the wind tunnels, redesigning the fins, manufacturing the
gloves, installing them, and retesting the control system took over one year. Since the
problem flight condition had been successfully duplicated in the small scale wind tunnels,
NASA FRC decided that a return to the full-scale tunnel was unnecessary. The second glide
flight occurred on 15 March 1968. It achieved a more reasonable approach speed of 300
knots and a normal touchdown speed below 200 knots. The flight was quite successful and
was followed by nine more glide flights to refine the control system and prepare for powered
flight.
5.4.3 Powered Flight Program
NASA FRC pilot John Manke performed the first rocket powered flight of a lifting body on
13 November 1968. The vehicle was the HL-10. An earlier attempt in the same vehicle by
AF Major Gentry had failed when the rocket engine malfunctioned after launch. The flight
envelope of the HL-10 was expanded gradually on successive flights by igniting two, then
three, then all four of the chambers of the XLR-11 rocket engine. The first supersonic flight
was accomplished on 9 May 1969, and by February 1970 the HL-10 had attained a maximum
Mach number of 1.86 and a maximum altitude of 90,300 feet - - the fastest and highest of any
of the lifting bodies (Reference Kempel, 1994).
The final two flights of the HL-10 explored the potential use of low thrust during the landing
to produce an approach angle that was less steep, and more "airplane-like." For these tests the
XLR-11 engine had been removed and had been replaced by three hydrogen peroxide
emergency landing rocket engines (approximately 300 pounds of thrust each). A relatively
large propellant tank was also installed. This allowed the pilot to light the rockets on final
approach and thereby reduce the approach angle from about 18 degrees to only 6 degrees.
Both landings were made on the south lakebed runway number 17 which was seven miles
long. The plan called for the pilot to maintain an airspeed of 280 knots while the HL-10 was
on the 6-degree flight path with the rockets burning. At 200 feet altitude the pilot would shut
off the rockets and lower the landing gear. He would then perform a deceleration and gentle
flare to landing (Figure 5-6). Captain Pete Hoag flew both of these flights and his comments
were quite negative. He reported that the shallow approach made it difficult for him to judge
where the airplane would touchdown. The nose-high attitude during the entire maneuver
forced the pilot to rely on the nose window, and its resulting poor depth perception, for a
long time before touchdown.
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Figure 5-6: HL-10 Landing
Pilot Bill Dana, the Hl-10 and the B-52 Fly-over
71
The largest deterrent to a low-thrust, rocket-powered landing, however, was the need to
establish a safe procedure to land the airplane if the rockets did not fire. For the two tests,
the pilot set up for an unpowered landing on the near end of the seven-mile runway. At some
pre-determined altitude he would try the rockets. If the rockets failed to light, he would land
close to the near end of the runway. If the rockets worked properly, he would establish a new
aim touchdown point about four miles farther down the runway. This procedure was not
very practical for a runway of normal length. The tests successfully pointed out the need for
alternate-runway planning for any future entry system that required an engine to be started
after entry, but before landing.
5.4.3.1 Handling Qualities: The handling qualities of the HL-10 on the second glide and all
subsequent flights were quite good. The vehicle was susceptible to rather abrupt rolling
motion in turbulence, as were the M2 and X-24A vehicles. It had exceptionally good
inherent damping characteristics with the stability augmentation system disengaged. Even
after several control system improvements, however, the HL-10 was still slightly sensitive in
the pitch axis during the high speed final approach. A transonic pitch trim change occurred
between 0.97 and 0.96 Mach number. The magnitude of the trim change was as expected,
but the trim change was much more abrupt than predicted, apparently a result of an abrupt
flow change or shock wave movement. (Additional pilot comments are included in
Appendix B.)
5.4.3.2 Schedule and Pilots: A total of five pilots participated in the HL-10 program which
included 13 glide flights and 24 powered flights.
Bruce Peterson
John Manke
Bill Dana
Major Pete Hoag
1
7
3
1
1
0
2
7
8
7
(The schedule relative to the other lifting bodies is shown in Figure 2-1. A complete log of
flights and pilots is included in Appendix C.)
Some new and different lessons were learned through the successful flight testing of the HL-
10. These lessons, when combined with lessons learned with the sister ship, the M2-F2/F3,
provide an excellent starting point for designers of future entry vehicles.
There were no major incidents or accidents associated with the HL-10 test program beyond
the rather frightening first glide flight. This safety record is a tribute to the dedicated
engineers and pilots of the Lifting Body team.
72
5.5.2 Validations
After correction of the local tip-fin flow separation problem of the first glide flight, the flight
test data validated wind tunnel predictions for stability and L/D from transonic down to
landing speeds. The flat-bottom, negative-camber concept did produce a flyable and land-
able vehicle which had an L/D that was 14 percent higher than the M2 half-cone concept
(Reference Kempel, 1994). The additional complexity of the "boat-tail" control surfaces
(added during the initial construction) proved to be a worthwhile investment and probably
produced much of this difference in L/D.
The HL-10 was judged to be the best handling of the three original heavy-weight lifting
bodies (M2-F2/F3, HL-10, X-24A). The HL-10 also achieved the highest speed and altitude
of any of the lifting bodies.
5.5.3 Improvements
NASA FRC selected the HL-10 to explore potential advantages of powered approaches
during landing because the vehicle had the best low speed handling qualities, and the
smallest landing gear trim change, of the three early lifting bodies. The results of the tests
were largely negative, however, and only two powered approaches were flown.
Although the first HL-10 glide flight was completed successfully, four serious problems were
encountered. It is remarkable that, based on a single flight that lasted a mere three minutes
and seven seconds, all of these problems were identified and subsequently corrected. The
problems were directly or indirectly a result of misinterpretation of wind tunnel data. The tip
fin stall was corrected through additional wind tunnel tests which duplicated the condition
and allowed aerodynamicists to develop suitable modification options. A glove was added to
the fin leading edge to improve flow over the tip fins at moderate and high angle of attack.
Two different flight control vibrations were the result of errors in the predictions of both
rudder and elevon effectiveness. These were suppressed by altering the flight control
electronics. The high stick sensitivity was related to the error in control effectiveness and
was corrected easily by altering the stick gearing. Participating engineers learned some
valuable lessons on how to interpret wind tunnel data.
On one of the early captive flights a test of the propellant jettison system was planned. At
the initiation of jettison a violent vibration began. Both the HL-10 pilot and the B-52 crew
felt the vibration. It stopped when the HL-10 pilot turned the flight control stability
augmentation off. Apparently the pulsing of the jettison had triggered a structural vibration
in the B-52 wing/pylon/adapter that was sustained by the HL-10 flight control system.
Subsequent captive jettisons were done with the stability augmentation off.
73
The HL-10 program left a few problems unresolved. For example, the visibility through the
nose window was distorted such that the depth perception near landing was poor (as
indicated in Appendix B). Pilots adapted to this visibility restriction and landings were easily
accomplished. A substantial ablation heat shield would be required over the entire nose area
on a mission vehicle, however, and some other provision for pilot landing visibility would be
required. This problem, which was similar for the HL-10, M2-F2/F3, was never seriously
addressed during the Lifting Body program at Edwards.
The degradation in performance and stability that would be caused by the roughened surface
of an ablative heat shield after entry was not factored into the Lifting Body flight test
program. Subsequent analysis (discussed in Chapter 8) showed that this degradation was
sufficient to raise serious questions as to the true land-ability of these vehicles following an
actual entry.
5.6 Test Sites
The test sites for the HL-10 flight test program were the same as for the M2-F2/F3 program -
all at AF and NASA properties at Edwards AFB. The two vehicles were stable mates in
every sense of the word and used many common subsystems.
Following an unfortunate handling accident - the vehicle was damaged while being
repositioned for display in San Diego, California - the HL-10 was restored to display status.
It was mounted on a pedestal in front of the NASA FRC building and was dedicated in a
ceremony on 3 April 1990.
74
Photo of X-24A on B-52 Pylon
Chapter 6
The X-24A Program
Growing out of the AFs independent studies of lifting body concepts, the X-24A aircraft
evolved from Martins SV-5 configuration and other paper design studies. Both AF and
NASA pilots participated in its flight testing between April 1969 and June 1971.

75
After the Martin Company lost the X-20 Dyna Soar competition to Boeing in 1958, the AF
Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) continued to fund Martin to study some
lifting body concepts that had been suggested during the Phase Alpha review. Martin
engineers found that they could improve the L/D of the early conceptual lifting bodies at both
hypersonic and subsonic speeds by making the body more slender and the lower surface
flatter. After consulting with engineers at the AF Flight Dynamics Laboratory they
introduced positive camber in the longitudinal axis (the opposite of that used on the HL-10).
They also improved the L/D as well as the directional and longitudinal stability by canting
the tip fins outboard slightly. A configuration named the SV-5 evolved from an earlier
configuration, the A3-4, under the guidance of Hans Multhopp, a World War II German
engineer (Reference Hallion, Vol. I, 1987). The X-24A was one adaptation of the SV-5
configuration.
John Rickey, an aerodynamicist at Martin, was assigned to refine the SV-5 configuration into
a practical design that would be capable of both hypersonic entry and horizontal landing.
Low speed wind tunnel tests were conducted throughout 1963. These tests led to several
changes to the shape to enhance the transonic and low speed characteristics. The angle of the
nose ramp was altered slightly to accommodate both high speed and low speed trim
capability. Wind tunnel tests revealed the need for a center fin (splitter). The center fin
would reduce adverse yaw if the upper flaps were to be used for roll control. Low speed
tunnel tests also showed that extra care was required in the shaping of the airfoil for the outer
tip fins in order to prevent fin stall at the higher angles of attack. As finalized in late 1963,
the configuration incorporated both a center fin and a tip fin airfoil that included inward
camber. (Both of these findings were to be rediscovered later during the initial M2-F2 and
HL-10 test flights.)
Martin presented the final SV-5 configuration to the Air Force in December 1963 (about the
time of Dyna Soar cancellation). The contractor suggested that the SV-5 was the best shape
for future lifting body research.
The AF Space Division had considered the use of a maneuvering lifting body configuration,
with an ablator heat shield, as a potential unmanned data-return capsule for orbital space
missions. In 1964 a program called START (Spacecraft Technology and Advanced Reentry
Test) was conceived to flight test the Martin SV-5 configuration.
The first phase of the START program was to boost a capsule-sized vehicle (approximately 7
feet in length) to orbital entry speeds and to demonstrate its thermal protection system and
cross-range maneuvering capability. At this phase the vehicle was designated the SV-5D or
PRIME (Precision Recovery Including Maneuvering Entry). The PRIME vehicle was to be
recovered through deployment of a parachute, and air-snatching the chute over the ocean
with a C-130 cargo airplane, which was the standard recovery mode in use at that time for
ballistic data capsules (Reference Vitelli, 1967).
76
The second phase of the START program was to build a larger piloted vehicle
(approximately 25 feet in length) and test it at transonic and landing speeds. The intent was
to explore the land-ability of this same configuration (SV-5) for potential application as a
space ferry vehicle for resupply missions to future military manned space stations. The
larger, low speed vehicle was designated the SV-5P or PILOT (PIloted LOw speed Test). It
later became the X-24A. The Air Force intended to add the PILOT vehicle to the AF/NASA
Lifting Body test program at Edwards.
Martin conducted additional low speed wind tunnel tests on the SV-5 in 1964 to further
optimize the configuration for a piloted vehicle. They chose to address the forward visibility
problem by adding a canopy for the pilot. The initial canopy configuration was found to be
destabilizing at subsonic speeds. After several iterations, a low profile canopy was
developed which did not detract from stability.
A control law for the deceleration through the transonic region also evolved from these wind
tunnel tests. It recognized the need for a large "wedge angle" (combined angle of the upper
and lower flaps as well as an outboard flare to both rudders) to provide stability in this
region. At landing speed the wedge angle needed to be reduced (boat-tailing of the rear of
the vehicle) in order to increase the L/D.
The basic control system for the X-24A version of the SV-5 configuration (Figure 6-1)
consisted of eight moveable surfaces located at the aft end of the vehicle. Pitch control was
derived from symmetrical deflection of two upper flaps, or two lower flaps, depending on the
flight condition. Differential deflection of these flaps provided the primary roll control.
Pitch or roll commands that caused either lower flap to fully close resulted in control being
transferred to the corresponding upper flap through a mechanical clapper mechanism. Two
pairs of rudder surfaces (upper and lower) were deflected symmetrically as a bias feature
with directional control being provided by asymmetrical deflection of only the upper rudder
surfaces.
77
Figure 6-1: Three-View Drawing of X-24A
An automatic programming feature was designed into the vehicle to cause the "wedge angle"
configuration change to occur automatically. When engaged, the upper flap position, rudder
bias position, and elevator gearing were programmed to change with Mach number as the
vehicle slowed through the transonic region.
As a backup to this non-redundant, automatic configuration-change feature, the X-24A was
equipped with a manual "upper-flap bias" feature operated by a spring-loaded switch in the
cockpit. When activated this switch symmetrically and simultaneously altered the positions
of the upper and lower flaps and altered the stick gearing. The combined bias feature was
designed to minimize the total trim change. This upper-flap bias feature could also create
two discrete configurations - one for low speed (subsonic) and one for high speed (transonic)
flight (Figure 6-2).
78
Figure 6-2: X-24A Control Surface Configuration, Subsonic
Figure 6-2: X-24A Control Surface Configuration, Transonic
79
Like the M2-F2, the X-24A was equipped with an aileron-to-rudder interconnect. The
interconnect ratio (KRA) was automatically programmed with angle of attack and Mach
number. The automatic schedule could be biased up or down by the pilot.
The X-24A used a triply redundant, three-axis, stability augmentation system. The damper
signals were mechanically added to the pilots commands.
6.2.1 Funding and Procurement Philosophy
The START program was approved in November 1964 in a decision boosted by the demise
of the X-20 Dyna Soar program. Work started immediately to build the PRIME vehicle and
test it in the hypersonic environment. Approval to proceed with the PILOT program lagged
behind. In September 1965 direction was received from the Secretary of the Air Force to
procure a single rocket-powered vehicle. The same directive letter transferred management
of the low-speed PILOT program from the START office within the USAF Space Division at
El Segundo, CA, to the USAF Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) at Wright Paterson
AFB, OH (Reference Vitelli, 1967).
For some people at ASD this decision was a bitter pill to swallow. They had been managing
the X-20 Dyna Soar program and had been strong advocates of winged, high L/D entry
configurations. They had lost the winged battle to the lifting body advocates. Now they had
been tasked to manage and support a lifting body flight test effort. Some key members of the
AF Flight Dynamics Laboratory, such as Al Draper, had been studying a different class of
lifting bodies with hypersonic L/D as good as, or better than, the winged vehicles. They
viewed the SV-5P program as a foot-in-the-door to gain a practical understanding of the low
speed characteristics of lifting bodies.
The program was officially transferred to ASD in October of 1965, and Bill Zima from the
AFFDL was assigned as the ASD Program Manager. Northrop and Martin submitted
proposals to the AF to build a single SV-5P vehicle. Martin had the aerodynamic
background and wind tunnel data on the vehicle, while Northrop had recent experience
building the M2-F2 and HL-10 vehicles. In March 1965 Martin was selected by the AF to
build the vehicle and the designation was changed from PILOT, or SV-5P, to X-24A, an
experimental designation.
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6.3 Construction
Martin constructed the X-24A in its Baltimore plant between April 1966 and August 1967.
The AF provided all funding for its construction.
The Martin Company was a closed union shop. The Government/Contractor team
relationship was therefore not as close during construction of the X-24A as it had been with
the Northrop/NASA team during M2-F2 and HL-10 construction. The vehicle was
constructed in a small shop area at the Martin facility in Baltimore, Maryland. The 2000-
mile distance between the manufacturing site and the flight test site at Edwards further
inhibited the formation of a close team. NASA FRC assigned Norm DeMar as the
Operations Engineer for the X-24A. He would be responsible for scheduling and
maintaining the vehicle after delivery. A few NASA technicians were on-site in Baltimore
during the manufacturing process. They were allowed to install some wiring, but often were
frustrated by their inability to make small changes that they knew would be required later. In
spite of these differences, the construction of the X-24A proceeded on schedule.
All of the earlier proposals for the PILOT program had included more than one vehicle, some
as many as four (two rocket-powered and two jet-powered). When contract approval
specified only one rocket-powered X-24A vehicle, Martin management elected to construct
two additional structural shells with company funds. These shells were configured initially
for jet power and were designated SV-5J. Martin hoped to sell them either as backup
vehicles for the X-24A, or as jet-powered trainers to the Air Force Test Pilot School at
Edwards.
By the time the X-24A was delivered to Edwards in August 1967, the AF Lifting Body team
had assembled and checked out a simulation of the vehicle. Using the simulator, the lifting
body team members briefly explored the potential use of the jet-powered version (SV-5J) for
either research or as a trainer. Results of this study confirmed earlier reservations about the
value of the jet-powered vehicles. They would be severely underpowered and flight safety
would be compromised during the ground takeoff and initial climb (for any kind of engine
malfunction). Some consideration was given to air-launching the jet version, but little
appeared to be gained over the planned flights of the X-24A. The AFFTC Lifting Body team
recommended against AF procurement of the SV-5J vehicles except as backup to the rocket-
powered X-24A.
Like the M2-F2 and HL-10, the X-24A used off-the-shelf items, such as landing gear,
ejection seats, control surface actuators, and hydraulic pumps, from other programs for most
of the subsystems (Figure 6-3). These components were procured by the AF Program Office
or through Martin supply channels, as appropriate, and were delivered to Baltimore for
installation by Martin technicians. NASA FRC technicians prepared the flight-test-unique
subsystems, such as research instrumentation, rocket engines and associated support
hardware, for installation in the X-24A, but this hardware was not installed until after vehicle
delivery to Edwards.
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Figure 6-3: X-24A Cutaway Drawing
The primary difference between the Northrop and Martin contractual processes was the
additional time required after delivery of the vehicle to NASA FRC. That time was needed
for the installation and calibration of the Government-supplied flight test equipment and
instrumentation. The cockpit had to be completely dismantled in order to rework the
necessary flight test instrumentation and controls.
6.3.3 Propulsion System Test Stand
As part of the contract, Martin also constructed a Propulsion System Test Stand (PSTS) for
the X-24A. This unit duplicated all of the tankage and propulsion system components of the
X-24A on a test cart (Figure 6-4). Development of the propulsion system, including actual
engine runs, could then take place in parallel with other vehicle preparations. This alleviated,
to some degree, the schedule impact of the delayed instrumentation installation.
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Figure 6-4: X-24A Propulsion System Test Stand
Martin had begun construction of the X-24A following an initial design review in April
1966. The AF accepted the vehicle in Baltimore on 3 August 1967. For transportation,
Martin removed the tip fins and mounted the vehicle on pallets. It was flown to Edwards in
an AF C-130 cargo airplane and arrived on 24 August 1967 (Reference Armstrong, 1972).
6.3.5 Wind Tunnel Tests
The launch transients produced by the B-52 flow field were tested with a small X-24A model
in the Langley 7X10-foot High Speed tunnel. The pylon adapter carry angle was also
established during these tests. Launch transient results were similar to the M2-F2 and HL-10
- an abrupt, but controllable right roll after launch.
The AF/NASA FRC flight test team carefully reviewed the available wind tunnel data on the
X-24A in light of the flight test results from the early M2-F2 and HL-10 flights. Additional
small scale wind tunnel tests were requested to fill in gaps in the data, partly in order to avoid
a repeat of the HL-10 first flight experience. These tests were also conducted at the Langley
7X10 foot High Speed tunnel.
After the arrival of the X-24A at Edwards, NASA FRC mechanics and technicians reinstalled
the tip fins, then began the installation of subsystems and instrumentation. By 19 February
1968 the vehicle was ready for testing in the 40X80 foot full-scale wind tunnel at Ames.
Test results confirmed the stability and performance predictions from earlier scale model
tests. Additional tests were performed with a simulated ablator roughness applied to the
vehicle (Figure 6-5). A water-soluble glue was sprayed on the airplane, and a wire mesh
83
screen was laid over the surface to simulate the pattern of the ablator honeycomb. A coarse
sand was then sprayed over the surface. When the glue was dry the wire mesh was removed
leaving a rough protruding pattern on the surface. It was hoped that these results could be
correlated with the effects that were observed on the PRIME vehicle following an actual
entry. The results from the full-scale tunnel tests showed a reduction in maximum L/D of 20
percent and some degradation in stability caused by surface roughness. Any thoughts of
flying the vehicle with the simulated ablator roughness were quickly dismissed.
Figure 6-5: X-24A in Full Scale Tunnel with Simulated Ablative Coating
84
6.3.6 Ground Tests
The X-24A inertias were measured by balancing the vehicle on knife edges supported by
calibrated springs (Figure 6-6) (Reference Retelle, 1971). The analysis of flight test stability
and control data required these measurements.
Figure 6-6: X-24A Iyy Inertia Test Setup
Ground tests of the flight control system produced some changes to the electronics. Previous
experience with the M2-F2 and HL-10 had resulted in a more seasoned test procedure and
quick isolation of potential self-induced vibrations. These ground tests also isolated a rather
large deadband in the pitch axis (2 degrees of flap travel) when the control was being
mechanically transferred from the lower to the upper flap. The effect of this deadband on the
handling qualities, especially near touchdown, was unknown. Ground tests also showed the
possibility of a divergent vibration if the controls were maintained in the deadband region for
more than about three seconds. This finding resulted in a reassessment of the control laws
for the first flight to insure that the flaps would not be operating in the crossover region at
landing (Reference Kirsten, 1972).
The X-24A was the first of the lifting bodies to be equipped with nose wheel steering. The
M2-F2 and Hl-10 had castering nose gear; they used differential braking to steer on the
lakebed after landing. Several low speed taxi tests of the X-24A were performed on the
taxiway and also on the lakebed. These assessed the usability of the nose wheel steering
system. The nose wheel steering unit on the X-24A came from a T-39 aircraft and had been
originally designed for low speed taxiing. Because of the very high expected touchdown
speed of the X-24A (about 200 knots ground speed), the steering was far too sensitive for use
during the landing rollout. Since the system had no redundancy and a failure could have led
to a roll-over accident, a decision was made to not use the nosewheel steering capability.
85
6.4 Flight Testing
The X-24A was tested in gliding and powered flight between April 1969 and June of 1971.
Twenty eight flights were successfully completed.
6.4.1 AFFTC/Dryden Test Team
The original AFFTC/NASA FRC Memorandum of Agreement (Appendix D) only mentioned
the M2-F2 and HL-10. It had been assumed from the onset that the X-24A would be treated
as a third vehicle in the program when it arrived, and that the assigned responsibilities would
remain the same. Shared responsibilities of piloting and engineering would also continue
with the exception that the AF engineering team would concentrate on the X-24A and would
hold primary responsibility for the documentation of test results on that vehicle. An
addendum to the Memorandum of Agreement was signed in October 1966. It formally added
the X-24A to the joint program (Appendix D).
The AF engineering team of about eight engineers of varying experience level and headed by
Robert Hoey had been working jointly with the NASA FRC engineers in the planning and
data analysis of the M2-F2 glide flights. The team members had, in fact, gained valuable
experience while programming and utilizing the AFFTC simulation of the M2-F2 to support
the first 15 glide flights. When the X-24A program was approved, they immediately began
to program an engineering simulation (Figure 6-7). They also prepared to oversee the ground
and flight testing of the new vehicle. When the vehicle was delivered to Edwards, Johnny
Armstrong, an AF Flight Planning Engineer on the X-15 program, was reassigned as the
AFFTC Program Manager for the X-24A program.
Figure 6-7: X-24A Simulator Cockpit
86
Throughout the X-24A/B flight test program, the AFFTC engineering team members were in
an unusual position relative to their responsibilities on the program. Since NASA FRC held
flight safety responsibility for all Lifting Body operations, the AFFTC management paid
little attention to the day-to-day activities of these engineers. AFFTC management was far
more concerned (and rightly so) with the variety of other high-risk AF flights at Edwards that
required close safety monitoring and supervision. At NASA FRC, however, engineering and
maintenance personnel viewed the AF engineering team as the final authority on activities
relating to the X-24A, even though they were outside the NASA chain of command. This
placed an unusually high sense of personal responsibility on the AF engineers. They cross
checked and double checked their findings and recommendations before taking them to
NASA FRC. This show of confidence by both the AF and NASA management staff created
a very high morale and sense of job satisfaction within the team members. The situation
permitted a much more rapid response to problems than was possible within the normal chain
of command at either NASA or the AF.
6.4.2 Use of Fixed Base and Airborne Simulators
The X-24A program continued the trend toward an increased reliance on fixed base
simulators for conducting tests on rocket-powered vehicles. The complex automatic control
laws, proposed and designed into the vehicle by Martin, were found to be unsuitable for the
initial flights. The effects of the large crossover deadband mentioned earlier was a concern,
as were the lack of redundancy and an inability to accomplish an appropriate practice flare at
altitude. A simpler first flight control law was devised on the simulator wherein the pilot
manually changed the flap configuration. This control law was used for the low speed
portion of the early X-24A flights.
The F-104 airplane was used to simulate (and chase) the X-24A landings. The M2-F2 and
HL-10 flights continued to show the strong effects of upper altitude winds on the landing
task, especially if a spot landing was being attempted. The X-24A test pilots made F-104
flights during the early morning hours immediately prior to each actual X-24A flight. The
purpose of these flights was to allow the pilot to experience the actual upper altitude wind
effects on the planned landing pattern.
Captain Gentry flew the first glide flight of the X-24A on 17 April 1969 (Figure 6-8). The
practice flare at altitude was performed successfully. Gentry noted some lateral sensitivity at
high speed on his final approach and he related this to the uneasy feeling of the M2-F2 at the
same flight condition. He elected to slow down from 300 knots to 270 knots and then fire the
emergency landing rockets at the start of flare. When the landing gear was extended, a rather
abrupt nose-down trim change was experienced (as expected), but a normal landing was
performed.
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Figure 6-8: X-24A Glide Flight
A review of the flight data showed that a malfunction had occurred in the aileron-to-rudder
interconnect electronics, and this was considered as the most likely cause for the lateral
sensitivity problem.
On the second flight (with the interconnect working normally) the pilot again experienced an
uneasy lateral sensitivity and rolling motions on final. Again he slowed down and used the
emergency landing rockets during the flare and landing.
Prior to flight three, a considerable amount of simulator investigation took place and several
changes to the flight control system, both electronic and mechanical were accomplished. It
appeared that there was a significant error in the wind tunnel prediction of the differential
lower flap effectiveness in yaw. The AF flight test team felt that the final approach lateral
handling problem was a combination of incorrect control settings due to this prediction error,
and an unnatural vehicle response to light turbulence (referred to as "poor riding qualities").
At this juncture of the Lifting Body program, the M2-F2 had been damaged in a serious
accident, the first HL-10 flight had been frightening, and two X-24A flights had been
marginally successful. Both the AF and NASA safety organizations scrutinized the flight
plans and readiness in detail. There were also cross reviews by the individual engineers
within the Lifting Body program.
88
After several briefings and reviews Gentry was cleared to make the third glide flight in the
X-24A. The launch occurred 45 seconds prematurely, which allowed the pilot to fly a
normal flight, but resulted in an approach and landing to a different lakebed runway. Again
the landing rocket was used at the flare. This time, however, the pilot felt more comfortable
during the approach and the rocket was used more for energy management purposes than for
avoiding poor stability.
The wind tunnel mis-prediction was apparently caused by flow interference between the
wind tunnel model mount and the lower flaps. The riding qualities concern persisted for
several flights until the pilots became accustomed to the small sharp rolling motions (due to
high dihedral effect) that accompanied flight through light turbulence or wind shear. Nine
glide flights were accomplished by two pilots before the X-24A was considered ready for
powered flight.
Powered flights for all of the Lifting Bodies were a challenge to the flight test team because
the vehicles were all designed for entry (decelerating flight). During entry a moderate
amount of drag can be helpful. By flaring the aft end of the vehicle, an increase in stability
could be achieved (often referred to as "shuttlecock stability"). For the X-24A this drag and
stability were characterized by the position of the upper flap; the larger the angle, the higher
the stability and drag. During an actual entry of an SV-5 shape, the upper flap deflection was
designed to gradually decrease from 55 degrees at Mach 2, to 35 degrees at Mach 1.
Rocket-powered acceleration was an unnatural mode of flight for the SV-5 shape. In order to
achieve supersonic speeds, it was necessary to keep the drag as low as possible during the
powered phase of flight. The trick was to trade off the desired lower drag (achievable with
smaller flap deflections) with the undesired reduction in stability.
This trade off study was a perfect example of the use of engineering simulators to support
flight testing. Simulator studies showed that powered flight with the upper flap held constant
at 35 degrees would still retain adequate stability margins at transonic and supersonic speeds.
After a couple of subsonic powered flights it was discovered that the rocket engine plume
was causing an additional, and unexpected, reduction in directional stability. In order to
regain the lost stability with the rocket engine running, the upper flap deflection was
increased from 35 to 40 degrees. The additional drag resulted in a reduction in the expected
maximum attainable speed from about Mach 1.8 to about Mach 1.7.
The first powered flight of the X-24A was flown by Gentry on 19 March 1970 (Figure 6-9).
Following that flight, and the subsequent alteration to the upper flap setting, the envelope
expansion program proceeded smoothly.
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Figure 6-9: X-24A Powered Flight
6.4.4.1 Handling Qualities: After the flight control system settings were optimized, the
handling qualities of the X-24A were quite good. It exhibited some transonic pitch trim
changes similar to the HL-10, but these were easily controlled. When the rocket engine was
operating, there was an unpredicted pitch trim change as well as a measurable reduction in
lateral-directional stability. This was surmised to be the influence of the engine exhaust
plume on the flow around the rear of the vehicle (Reference Hoey, 1973).
Pilots commented on occasional spurious and uncommanded rolling disturbances, or upsets,
during the climb. These upsets were small and barely apparent in the data, but were
nevertheless a concern since they were occurring in the transonic flight region (0.85 Mach
number). It was suspected that these mild upsets during steep climbs were a result of passing
through wind shear but they did not seem to correlate with the daily balloon wind surveys.
The confirmation of wind shear as the cause did not occur until the X-24B program
(discussed in Chapter 7).
90
The automatic programming feature of the flight control system, which was designed to
gradually reduce the wedge angle as the vehicle decelerated, was engaged on one transonic
flight. It functioned well but was not used extensively because the system lacked redundancy
and because the programming features were not consistent with the requirement to
systematically gather flight test data in fixed control configurations. Instead of allowing the
automatic system to change the configuration, the transition from a high wedge angle to a
low wedge angle was accomplished as a single, pilot-initiated event (referred to by the pilots
as the "close-up" or "configuration change") after the vehicle was subsonic. This ability to
momentarily increase or decrease the wedge angle, and thus the drag, by simultaneously
increasing or decreasing the upper and lower flap deflections was used as a speed brake
feature during the landing pattern.
The X-24A had a significant nose-down trim change when the landing gear was extended,
similar to the M2-F2. (Additional pilot comments are included in Appendix B.)
Three pilots flew 28 flights in the X-24A between 17 April 1969 and 4 June 1971. A
maximum altitude of 71,400 feet and a maximum speed of Mach 1.60 were reached.
John Manke
Major Cecil Powell
8
1
1
5
11
2
The X-24A configuration evolved from a somewhat different path than the NASA in-house
process that conceived the M2 and HL-10 configurations. A new set of lessons was learned
relative to lifting body reentry vehicles.
91
There were no serious accidents involving the X-24A. On the third glide flight, flown by
Gentry, a switching error by the B-52 flight crew caused the X-24A to be launched about 45
seconds earlier than planned. Luckily all systems were operating normally at that point in the
countdown. The pilots casual comment on the radio - "Ive been inadvertently launched" -
caused a momentary scramble in the control room to choose the best landing runway. The
flight was completed successfully. The landing occurred on an alternate runway on Rogers
lakebed.
On the seventeenth powered flight only two of the four rocket chambers ignited and the pilot
flew a planned alternate flight profile. The landing was normal but inspection of the vehicle
showed evidence of a fire in the engine compartment. Several instrumentation wires and
aluminum pressure-sensing lines were damaged by the fire. One upper flap was warped
slightly and was traded with a flap from one of the SV-5J vehicles at Martin. Engineers were
concerned that the fire could have tempered and embrittled the engine mount, so the engine
and mount were removed from the airplane. John Cochrane, the on-site representative from
Martin, owned a Piper Comanche (single-engine light aircraft). Cochrane and DeMar loaded
the engine mount into the Comanche and flew it to Denver where the engine mount was
annealed in one of Martins heat-treatment ovens.
All engine instrumentation showed that the engine had performed normally during the flight
so the source and cause of the fire were puzzling. Jettison lines were extended and canted
outboard. No further fires occurred on the X-24A.
Subsequently, however, two similar engine fires occurred on the M2-F3. Some clever
detective work isolated the cause of the three fires. The normal procedure was to jettison any
remaining propellants shortly after engine shutdown to lighten the vehicle as quickly as
possible and minimize any hazards (Figure 6-10). In cases leading to fires, an after-fire
(slow burning of fuel remaining in the engine chambers) had sustained itself in the base area
of the vehicle. Both fuel and LOX jettison lines were also located in the base area. When
propellant jettison was initiated the after-fire ignited the fuel and oxidizer which were mixing
in the turbulent region between the upper and lower flaps. The problem had not been seen on
earlier flights since the normal engine shutdown altitude was considerably higher than that
for a two-chamber flight. There was insufficient oxygen in the atmosphere to sustain the
after-fire at the higher altitudes.
92
Figure 6-10: X-24A In-Flight Jettison
93
6.5.2 Validations
The X-24A version of the SV-5 configuration was farther along in the evolutionary process
than were either the M2-F3 or HL-10 at the end of the lifting body program. The center fin
requirement (M2-F2 deficiency) and the criticality of the tip fin airfoil (HL-10 deficiency)
had been resolved earlier in the design phase. A cockpit configuration with suitable visibility
for landing as well as practical possibilities for thermal protection during entry had also been
developed, and it was used on the X-24A.
With the exception of the mis-prediction of differential lower flap effects (mentioned earlier),
the wind tunnel predictions for the X-24A were very close to flight measurements. In-flight
movies of flow-direction "tufts" and some intensive flight testing in the transonic region
showed some small but discrete changes in stability that were related to abrupt changes in the
flow on the inside of the tip fins as Mach number changed. These characteristics were
generally predicted correctly by the wind tunnels, but the data had been interpreted as smooth
Mach effects and not small, abrupt discontinuities as seen in the flight data.
The L/D of the X-24A in its optimized configuration was slightly above 4.0 in the low speed
region. This high L/D was not realizable during landing, however. The preflare airspeed of
300 knots and 0.5 Mach number dictated a larger wedge angle for stability. By the time the
vehicle had flared and slowed to a low Mach number flight condition, the landing gear had
been extended, thus reducing the L/D significantly.
6.5.3 Improvements
The development of a simplified control law allowed flight test data to be gathered in a
systematic manner. It also created a speed brake option which was useful to the pilot in
establishing an accurate landing pattern.
Several specific tests were conducted to establish confidence in the low speed controllability
using the upper flap for both lateral and pitch control. Once this confidence was established,
the normal upper flap setting for landing was changed from 21 degrees to 13 degrees. This
reduction in wedge angle improved the L/D during the high speed portion of the approach,
but primary pitch and roll control remained on the lower flaps. When the landing gear were
extended, the large, and almost instantaneous, trim change allowed a rapid crossover from
the lower flap to the upper flap for control of the final landing.
The large nose-down trim change due to landing gear extension came from two sources. The
nose gear door was a flat plate that pivoted forward 90 degrees at extension and thereby
caused a significant interruption of the flow over the lower surface. All of the landing gear
struts pivoted forward when they were extended and thus produced a significant forward
movement of the center of gravity. During the test program Martin devised a modified hinge
for the nose gear door that allowed it to remain at a 45-degree angle when in the open
position. This produced a small reduction in the landing gear trim change.
94
The lateral sensitivity that was observed on the first two flights was corrected by relatively
minor changes to the flight control system. The unusual riding qualities in turbulence were
partly responsible for the sensed lateral problem. Pilots became less concerned about this
effect as they gained experience in the vehicle.
A longitudinal trim change was observed to occur whenever the engine was ignited or shut
down. This trim change was assumed to be a result of a change in the flow around the aft
surfaces when the rocket plume was present. The effect was easily controllable and no
physical changes were required to compensate for the trim change.
Small lateral disturbances were noted during the powered climb phase on some of the X-24A
flights. These upsets were suspected to be a result of wind shear but could not be correlated
with balloon wind surveys. The high dihedral effect was thought to cause the vehicle to
respond to these upsets with small rolling motions. The correlation with atmospheric wind
shear was validated later during the X-24B test program (See Chapter 7). The engine after-
fire problem was solved by extending the fuel jettison lines and canting them outboard.
The landing gear legs on the X-24A were quite long, resulting in the center of gravity of the
vehicle being high off the ground relative to the width of the main landing gear. As a result
the X-24A had poor crosswind landing characteristics. The vehicle would heel over
uncomfortably during the rollout on the lakebed if the pilot tried to steer straight using
differential braking and aileron. If the pilot did not attempt to steer, the vehicle would tend
to drift downwind off the marked runway. The use of nosewheel steering would have
provided only a small improvement to this characteristic since the problem was mostly
related to the landing gear geometry.
As mentioned earlier, the nose wheel steering system was tried on early taxi tests. It was
non-redundant and too sensitive and so was not developed into a workable system. It did,
however, set the stage for the selection and development of a nose gear steering system for
the X-24B.
The nose-down landing gear trim change on the X-24A was alleviated to some degree by the
modified nose gear door hinge, but it continued to be a nuisance to the pilots. The need to
minimize the landing gear trim change was not obvious during the design of the lifting
bodies. The large drag penalty of the landing gear created a need for late (low altitude) and
rapid (about 1 second) gear deployment. The combination magnified the effect of even a
small trim change. Although there was no easy way to correct the problem on the X-24A,
the lesson was applied to the X-24B design.
95
The latter phase of the X-24A program was affected by a series of XLR-11 engine problems
that resulted in several aborted launches and flights with partial engine runs. These engine
problems were never totally solved, although continual progress was being made. The
decision to modify the airplane into the X-24B had already been made at the time that flight
28 was completed with another partial engine run. The AF engineering team evaluated the
data benefits to be gained from attempting to repeat that flight against the ever-present risk of
damage and further delay, and decided to end the X-24A flight test program.
The effect of ablator surface roughness on stability and L/D was one of the few remaining
unsolved problems of this configuration.
6.6 Test Sites
Upon delivery the vehicle was taken directly to the NASA FRC Hangar (Building 4802).
There it was reassembled and maintained along with the other two lifting bodies. A NASA
maintenance crew chief, Charlie Russell, and an instrumentation engineer, Bill Clifton, were
assigned to the X-24A, as was Operations Engineer Norm DeMar. The other NASA
facilities used for the M2-F2 and HL-10 vehicles were also used to support the X-24A test
program.
The X-24A Propulsion System Test Stand was unique to the X-24A and was maintained and
operated by the AF Rocket Shop at the Rocket Engine Test Facility at Building 1928.
All simulation activities in support of the X-24A were conducted at the AFFTC Simulator
Lab in Building 1408. In that building was the hybrid analog/digital simulator equipment
ordered in June 1963 to support the X-20 Dyna Soar program. Digital computers of that
period were not fast enough to do a complete real-time simulation, but the digital accuracy
was needed to solve the orbital equations of motion for the Dyna Soar mission. By the time
the new equipment arrived in July 1964, the Dyna Soar had been cancelled. The orbital
equations of motion for Dyna Soar had already been programmed. The simulation continued
to use these precise calculations for simulating the X-15A-2 and M2-F2 as well as the X-
24A, X-24B and other vehicles that would follow, even though the degree of precision
required for orbital calculations was no longer necessary (Reference Lyons, 1967).
The X-24A was modified to become the X-24B. The vehicle resides within the X-24B
currently on display at the AF Museum at WPAFB. Martin eventually donated their two SV-
5J structural shells to the Air Force. Neither one was ever flown. Both were configured to
simulate the X-24A (rocket-powered version). One of these, marked as the X-24A, is on
display next to the X-24B in the WPAFB Museum (Figure 6-11). The other is displayed on
an outdoor pedestal at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
96
Figure 6-11: Lifting Bodies Displayed in AF Museum, WPAFB
97
X-24B Glide Flight
Chapter 7
The X-24B Program
98
The X-24B entry configuration was developed by the AF to generate higher values of entry
L/D than the previous lifting body configurations. Unlike the programs discussed previously,
however, the X-24B construction was funded jointly by the AF and NASA. It was flight
tested between August 1973 and November 1975.
In the late 1950s, even before the X-24A program got under way, the AF Flight Dynamics
Laboratory had under study a series of long slender lifting body configurations which were
capable of achieving hypersonic L/Ds of 2.5 or greater. The low speed L/D for some of
these shapes was quite low, however, and the engineers considered switch-blade wings, or
some other variable-geometry concept, to facilitate horizontal landing. (NASA FRCs
HYPER III was a low speed, unmanned flight demonstration of such a vehicle.) Some of the
shapes, such as the FDL-7, had aft, wing-like strakes that produced a subsonic L/D that was
comparable to the other lifting bodies. In the mid 1960s, Al Draper and Bill Zima began to
explore the possibility of building a gloved external shape around the existing jet-powered
SV-5J vehicles that Martin had constructed. The shape which evolved was similar in many
respects to their FDL-7 shape, but it had been adapted to the triple-fin upper fuselage of the
SV-5. The configuration was called the FDL-8 and initial analysis showed that it had
considerable promise as a land-able configuration. The original FDL-8 used a straight 78-
degree-sweep planform.
Loft lines were developed to accurately merge the SV-5 configuration with the FDL-8
configuration, and a steel wind tunnel model was constructed. Several wind tunnel tests were
conducted to develop the best sweep angle for the added aft strakes, the best aileron control
surface size, and to gather the necessary information for design of the flight control system.
These tests resulted in the final, double-delta configuration using 72 degrees of sweep for the
aft strakes.
The personnel at the Flight Dynamics Lab saw this as their opportunity to perform a low cost
flight demonstration on one of their configurations with a hypersonic L/D of 2.5. In contrast,
the three vehicles of the existing Lifting Body program (M2-F3, HL-10, X-24A) had
hypersonic L/Ds of between 1.2 and 1.4. The wind tunnel results looked very promising.
Al Draper proposed to add the glove modification to the X-24A rather than an SV-5J in order
to reduce cost by utilizing existing subsystems and to also obtain transonic flight test data
(Figure 7-1). The designation of the configuration was changed to X-24B in 1971 (Figure 7-
2).
99
Figure 7-1: X-24B Glove Modification to X-24A
Figure 7-2: Three-View Drawing of X-24B
100
The AFFTC simulation of the X-24A had proven to be both complete and accurate in its
representation of the rather complex control system and aerodynamics. In order to assess the
feasibility of the proposed X-24B modification, the X-24A simulation was temporarily
modified. The cockpit and all flight control features of the X-24A simulation were retained.
The only changes were those associated with the modified mass characteristics and new
aerodynamic data tables which had been obtained from recent wind tunnel tests on the X-24B
shape. The simulation was operating within a few months of the receipt of the wind tunnel
data. Pilots quickly became quite enthusiastic about the indicated handling characteristics of
this X-24B configuration. Of particular significance was the effect of the triangular cross-
section of the fuselage. The sloping sides of the forward fuselage tended to counteract the
high dihedral effect produced by the high sweep angle (Figure 7-3). The overall dihedral
effect at low speeds and the lateral handling qualities were more like a normal aircraft than
the X-24A or the other lifting bodies. The aileron surfaces outboard of the tip fins on the
trailing edge of the strakes were also more effective than the inboard surfaces that were
employed on the X-24A. The sloping sides also provided good visibility for landing in spite
of the long nose and high pitch attitude at touchdown.
Figure 7-3: X-24B Upper Body Shape
101
The X-24B used the same control surfaces as the X-24A plus two additional flaps at the aft
end of the strakes outboard of the fins. These new strake flaps were operated differentially
for roll control. There was also a bias capability which allowed the strake flaps to be
trimmed symmetrically for additional pitch trim capability.
The flight control laws for the X-24B were similar to the X-24A except that the inboard
upper and lower flaps were no longer commanded to move differentially, the lateral control
function having been transferred completely to the strake flaps. Pitch control remained with
the inboard upper and lower flaps, and rudder control was on the upper rudders. The upper-
flap-bias function was retained and was used as a speed brake in the same manner as on the
X-24A.
Although both NASA FRC and the AFFTC were strongly supportive of X-24B modification,
there was some resistance within the higher levels of the AF. At a briefing to the joint Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board and National Academy of Sciences, the general philosophy
of the proposed modification was described as well as the results of the quick-response
simulation studies. The review panel members enthusiastically endorsed the program as a
low cost effort with a large technology pay-off (Reference Hallion, Vol. II, 1987).
The modification cost of $1.1 million was to be shared between NASA and the AF, with the
AF managing the procurement. When the AF had difficulty finding their half of the money,
the NASA FRC Program Manager John McTigue forced the issue by forwarding NASAs
portion ($550,000) directly to the AF Flight Dynamics Laboratory. The AF produced its
share of the funds, and the AFFDL engineers finally found themselves enthusiastically
supporting a flight test program on one of their own configurations.
7.3 Construction
The Martin company received the contract to modify the X-24A into the X-24B. They
accomplished the task at their Denver facility in 1972.
The contract for modification was awarded to the Martin Company, which was in the process
of closing its Baltimore plant where the original X-24A had been manufactured. Martin
decided to perform the modification at their missile facility near Denver, Colorado. A few of
the original craftsmen who built the X-24A were transferred to the Denver plant to perform
the modification; these included Dick Boss, the chief of manufacturing for the project. For
the third time (first the M2-F2/HL-10, then the X-24A), a small, enthusiastic group of
designers, technicians and flight test engineers from the AF, NASA and industry, formed a
team to accomplish a low cost, manufacturing task of a new and radical lifting body design
(Figure 7-4).
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Figure 7-4: X-24A Conversion to X-24B
Following the last flight of the X-24A on 4 June 1971, all of its subsystems were removed
and stored at NASA FRC. The vehicle shell was then mounted on a pallet and flown to
Buckley Field (a National Guard Base south of Denver), then trucked to the Martin plant on
15 December 1971. A small corner of the plant was set aside for the construction and Dick
Boss was given free reign of Martins shops and facilities to complete the modification.
The loft lines for the X-24B shape were provided to Martin by the AF Flight Dynamics
Laboratory. The landing gear design was also a product of the FDL. The X-24B would be
heavier than the X-24A, and the center of gravity would be considerably farther forward
relative to the main landing gear. This would result in considerably higher loads on the
landing gear. A new nose gear system with more energy absorption capability was needed.
The Flight Dynamics Laboratory chose the nose gear system from the F-11F-1F (a Navy
fighter) and procured a unit from the Navy. New actuators were also needed for the new
aileron surfaces. X-15 rudder actuators were selected for this function and were provided to
Martin by NASA FRC.
103
While the new vehicle structure was being designed and built, the AFFTC Lifting Body test
team continued to refine the X-24B simulation. It was used to define the control laws and
design loads for the new ailerons. Based on their experience with the other lifting bodies, the
AF test team also provided other design suggestions to Martin. For example, it was
suggested that the nose landing gear move aft during extension (to compensate the center of
gravity change from the main gear moving forward), and that the gear doors open parallel to
the airflow to minimize the landing gear trim change and drag. For the most part, the
AFFDL (who maintained configuration control) and Martin incorporated these suggestions
into the new design.
The B-52 pylon for the X-15 research aircraft had been designed to allow the X-15 pilot to
eject over the wing of the B-52 in the event of an emergency on the mother ship. All three of
the original lifting bodies had been mounted on the B-52 pylon using a pylon adapter. For
those aircraft the adapters were designed to place the pilots location well forward of the B-
52 wing so that ejection over the wing was also possible. The canopy on the X-24B was
farther aft relative to the center of gravity so it was not possible to configure the adapter to
allow captive ejection - not at least without exceeding the pylon load capability. The
decision was made to accept the added risk and configure the adapter so that ejection over the
wing was not possible. A B-52 emergency would have required the X-24B to be launched
before the pilot could have ejected.
The modification was completed in ten months, and the vehicle was returned to Edwards on a
C-5 cargo airplane on 24 October 1972. NASA FRC Operations Engineer Norman DeMar
oversaw the reinstallation of all subsystems by the NASA technicians.
7.3.4 Ground Tests
The good correlation of the full scale wind tunnel tests with small scale wind tunnel tests of
the other lifting bodies prompted a decision to forego the full-scale tunnel tests of the X-24B
vehicle. The B-52 launch experience accumulated on the X-15 and three lifting bodies, also
allowed the AF/NASA FRC test team to forego the launch and separation wind tunnel tests
for the X-24B. They selected an appropriate carry angle for the pylon adapter design based
on data from the previous vehicles.
An "inertia swing" was performed on the X-24B. A series of drop tests to validate the new
landing gear design were also performed. The vehicle was hoisted to a pre-established
attitude and altitude, then released (Figure 7-5). Control system tests uncovered several
structural and hydraulic problems which required both electronic and hardware changes.
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Figure 7-5: X-24B Landing Gear Drop Test
Both the HL-10 and the X-24A programs had generated considerable interest in
understanding the flow fields over the inboard surface of lifting body tip fins. NASA FRC
sponsored an effort to install research instrumentation (pressure and strain gage
measurements) on one of the X-24B tip fins. The entire tip fin structure was removed from
the vehicle and mounted on a fixture. Calibration loads were applied to the fin. Pressure
instrumentation was also installed along the entire length of the fuselage (left side only) for
correlation with similar measurements taken in the wind tunnels (Reference Tang, 1977).
AFFDL was concerned about the possibility of nose-wheel shimmy and tire failure due to the
unusually high predicted loads on the landing gear, and the fact that it was a new and
untested system. The AFFDL Gear Loads Facility conducted a series of tests on the landing
gear system at WPAFB. These tests showed that the tires (standard T-38 tires) could handle
the combination of increased weight and high landing speed if the tires were shaved of their
outer tread and replaced after every landing. These recommendations were passed on to the
Lifting Body test team at Edwards.
105
The Edwards Lifting Body test team also wanted to develop and test the nose-wheel steering
system. Initial low-speed taxi tests were performed to 30 knots on the lakebed using the
emergency landing rockets. Final taxi tests were conducted to a maximum speed of 150
knots using two chambers of the XLR-11 rocket engine; these were commonly referred to as
the "Bonneville Racer Tests" (Figure 7-6). The steering performed well. The tire procedures
recommended by AFFDL were followed and no tire problems occurred during the program.
Figure 7-6: X-24B High Speed Taxi Test using XLR-11 Rocket Engine
7.4 Flight Testing
The flight test program began with a traditional glide flight in August 1973. The program
was completed in September 1975 after 32 successful flights.
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7.4.1 AFFTC/Dryden Test Team
The AFFTC test team, still under the overall guidance of engineer Robert Hoey, led the X-
24B envelope expansion and mission planning effort. There was considerable interest and
participation by the NASA FRC research engineers, led by NASA FRC Project Manager
Jack Kolf. Johnny Armstrong continued to be the AFFTC Program Manager for the X-24B
program and Norm DeMar continued as the NASA FRC Operations Engineer. The assigned
test pilots were John Manke, an experienced lifting body pilot from NASA FRC, and Major
Mike Love, an experienced test pilot who was newly assigned to the Lifting Body team. The
Joint AF/NASA FRC Memorandum of Understanding was extended, although some of the
responsibilities shifted. Maintenance of the aging B-52 mother ship was becoming difficult
for the AFFTC, so the AF offered the airplane to NASA. NASA FRC assumed both
maintenance and operational responsibilities for the B-52 mother ship. The AFFTC rocket
shop was being reduced in size following the completion of the X-15 program in 1969. Its
technicians, however, continued to support the XLR-11 engines throughout the X-24B
program. The cooperation between the AF and NASA continued at all levels throughout the
X-24B program.
7.4.2 Use of Fixed Base and Airborne Simulators
The same AFFTC simulation capabilities that were used for the X-24A continued to support
the X-24B flight test effort. In this instance the simulator supported the design of the vehicle
as well as the direct flight test activity.
About 1972 the AFFTC switched from F-104s to F4s as primary chase airplanes. The
AFFTC F-104 aircraft were, therefore, no longer available to the Air Force Lifting Body test
pilots. The AFFTC Lifting Body team searched for a suitable replacement vehicle for both
chase and pilot training. A series of tests were performed on both the F4 and the T-38 to
determine if these aircraft could be safely configured to duplicate the low L/D of the lifting
bodies. A T-38 configuration came very close to the desired L/D but forced pilots to operate
at, or slightly above, the limit speed for the landing gear doors. A special waiver was
obtained to allow the T-38s to operate at 300 knots with the gear extended, provided that an
extensive gear door inspection was accomplished after each flight. The AF X-24B pilots
flew practice missions in the T-38, but also flew the NASA F-104 aircraft for final practice
runs. Both AF T-38s and NASA F-104s chased the X-24B missions.
NASA FRC pilot John Manke flew the first X-24B glide flight on 1 August 1973 (Figure 7-
7). Although he had to fly through a small cumulus cloud that had formed along the planned
flight path, the flight was quite successful.
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Figure 7-7: X-24B Glide Flight (Touchdown)
As a result of the engine fire which had occurred late in the X-24A program, the Flight
Dynamics Lab engineers had performed a flow visualization wind tunnel test using the X-
24B model. The goal was to identify a fuel jettison location which would prevent fuel from
recirculating into the engine area. The best location identified was in the cove at the base of
the fin and above the aileron. To test the jettison system and insure that no recirculation was
occurring, the vehicle was serviced with a small amount of fuel (water alcohol) for the third
glide flight. When Manke operated the fuel jettison valve, the airplane rolled sharply to the
right requiring 70 per cent of the available aileron to maintain level flight. After the jettison
stopped the lateral control returned to normal. Apparently the fuel, which was exiting at high
pressure, disturbed the flow over the fin and aileron creating a nearly uncontrollable roll.
Subsequently the jettison line was routed directly aft to the rear of the vehicle and the
problem disappeared. The fuel did not recirculate into the engine area from either location
(Figure 7-8). Five more glide flights were performed by two pilots before the vehicle was
declared ready for powered flight.
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Figure 7-8: X-24B Fuel Jettison Modification
Manke, who had flown the first glide flight, also flew the first powered flight of the X-24B.
The flight occurred on 15 November 1973, only 3 1/2 months after the first glide flight
(Figure 7-9). The expansion of the flight envelope proceeded smoothly. Manke and Major
Mike Love alternated piloting duties for these flights.
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Figure 7-9: X-24B Powered Flight
The X-24B was heavier than any of the other lifting bodies. Simulator tests showed that,
with the same XLR-11 propulsion system used on the X-24A, it would only reach about 1.4
Mach number. Two propulsion system engineers, Jerry Brandt from the AF and Bill Arnold
from the engine manufacturer (Reaction Motors/Thiokol), suggested that higher thrust could
be obtained from the XLR-11 engines by increasing the chamber pressure to 300 psi.
(Reference Brandt, 1969). Ground runs had confirmed the safety of the higher pressure. The
only stipulation was that the initial start should be at the baseline chamber pressure of 265
psi. A switch was added in the cockpit. Commonly referred to as the "overdrive" switch,
this switch produced an upward adjustment to the chamber pressure regulator. After launch,
the engine was started with the switch off. When all chambers were running smoothly (about
30 seconds after launch), the pilot engaged the "overdrive" which increased the thrust of the
rocket engine by almost 14 percent (from 8600 lbs. to 9800 lbs.). This capability was added
after flight 10 and was used on most supersonic flights of the X-24B. It allowed the vehicle
to reach a maximum Mach number of 1.76.
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7.4.4.1 Handling Qualities: The X-24B handled differently than the other lifting body
vehicles in two primary respects. The dihedral effect was considerably lower than for the
other vehicles, and the outboard strake flaps operated like normal ailerons which the other
vehicles lacked. The combination created a vehicle with excellent handling qualities as well
as excellent riding qualities in turbulence. When the rocket engine was running, however,
the same longitudinal trim change and reduction in directional stability that were experienced
on the X-24A were also present on the X-24B. This was attributed to the influence of the
exhaust plume on the flow at the rear of the vehicle (Reference Norris, 1979).
During the powered climb phase, small lateral disturbances or upsets were noted on some of
the X-24B flights, as well as on other lifting body flights. These upsets were thought to be a
result of the vehicle climbing at a very steep angle through wind shears (abrupt changes in
wind velocity or direction with changes in altitude). The upsets did not correlate with
balloon wind surveys, however, and a different series of tests was required to validate these
suspicions. By using special balloons and also by photographing the vapor trail during the
powered phase of flight, the abrupt wind shears were verified. It was discovered that the
standard balloon wind surveys were averaging the winds over a large altitude segment thus
masking the sharp wind shears that were, in fact, present in the atmosphere (Reference
Armstrong, 1977). (Additional pilot comments are included in Appendix B.)
7.4.4.2 Runway Landing and Pilot Checkout Program: From the beginning of the X-24B
program the team participants harbored the idea that this second-generation lifting body
vehicle should be capable of demonstrating a landing within the confines of a standard
concrete runway. Steering, braking and cockpit visibility were specially designed for that
capability. In preparation for such a demonstration, an additional research task was added to
nine of the flights (flights 16 through 24). These flights were designated as "accuracy
landing" flights. After completing the high-speed research objectives of the flight, pilots
attempted to land at a designated marker on the lakebed runway. These flights showed that
pilots could successfully touch down within plus or minus 500 feet of the selected marker
(Reference Stuart, 1977). Since the vehicle was traveling at about 320 feet per second at
landing, the pilot was within the touchdown zone for only three seconds - a remarkable
demonstration of energy management.
After expanding the flight envelope of the X-24B and completing the desired research
testing, the project pilots (Manke and Love) proposed that the performance and handling
qualities of the X-24B were good enough to attempt to land on the 15,000-foot concrete
runway at Edwards. This feat had not been possible with any of the previous lifting bodies
because of the lack of adequate steering after touchdown. (The X-15 was equipped with
landing skids so was incapable of landing anywhere but on a dry lakebed.)
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A plan to accomplish runway landings with the X-24B was presented to the FDL, NASA
FRC and the AFFTC Commander (General Robert Rushworth who was an experienced X-15
pilot). Included in this briefing were results of the nine accuracy landings. When the X-24B
team received approval to proceed, it triggered an extensive preparation and training buildup
by Manke, Love and the entire lifting body team. Actually landing on a concrete runway was
a little more difficult than merely saying that it could be done. Earlier high-speed taxi tests
on the lakebed had successfully demonstrated ground steering. Many practice flights were
made in the F-104 to fully assess wind effects and establish reference and aim points for the
new pattern.
Following an alternate powered flight to Mach 1.18 during which only 3 of the 4 rocket
chambers had ignited, Manke performed the first runway landing on 5 August 1975. The
aim touchdown point was a stripe painted on the runway 5,000 feet from the approach end.
Manke touched down in a very slight bank with one main wheel touching before the stripe
and the other wheel after passing the stripe (Figure 7-10). Lt. Colonel Love made the second
runway landing on 20 August 1975, when he touched down 400 feet beyond the stripe. Both
pilots commented that the additional visual cues of roads, Joshua trees, etc., made the final
phase of the landing easier than on the smooth, flat lakebed.
Figure 7-10: X-24B Runway Landing
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X-24B & Chase Fly-Over
The Space Shuttle Orbiter was under construction at this time and was being designed for
unpowered, runway landings, so the successful X-24B runway landing was an important
demonstration. Preparation for this flight by Manke and Love resulted in the concept of a
two-step flare. The two-step flare started, as before, with an initial flare (or "pre-flare") at
1000 feet altitude. The vehicle was flown to a second, shallow glide slope, however, (about
3 degrees) rather than level. Just before touchdown, a final, short flare was performed . The
two-step flare concept is currently used for landings of the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
The handling and performance of the X-24B were considered excellent and very similar to
contemporary fighter aircraft. Following completion of the research program on the X-24B,
it was decided to perform a series of checkout flights for some of the other qualified test
pilots who had not had the opportunity to fly lifting bodies. X-24B glide flights were offered
to the NASA astronauts who were preparing to fly the Enterprise (the first Space Shuttle
Orbiter). Although the astronauts themselves wanted to fly the X-24B, the offer was turned
down for political reasons. Captain Dick Scobee, who was an AFFTC test pilot at that time,
did perform two successful glide checkout flights in the X-24B. He would later become an
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astronaut. On his second Shuttle flight, he was the Commander of the Challenger when it
exploded on 28 January 1986.
Two powered and six glide checkout flights were successfully completed by four different
test pilots (beside Manke and Love), three of whom had never before flown a lifting body
(Figure 7-11). The last flight of the X-24B was flown on 26 November 1975. It closed 30
years of continuous flight testing at Edwards of experimental, rocket-powered research
vehicles that started with the Bell X-1. It is interesting that the first and last of these vehicles
used the same rocket engines, the XLR-11 - not only the same engine model, but the same
actual hardware. The final flight of the X-24B also closed the flight testing program for
lifting bodies.
Figure 7-11: Test Pilots Who Flew the X-24B
Six pilots flew the X-24B between 1 August 1973 and 26 November 1975 on 12 glide and 24
powered flights. A maximum altitude of 74,130 feet and a maximum speed of Mach 1.76
were reached.
John Manke
Lt. Colonel Mike Love
Bill Dana
Einer Enevoldson
Major Dick Scobee
Tom McMurtry
4
2
0
2
2
2
12
10
2
0
0
0
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The X-24B was not only a new lifting body configuration, but was also a second generation
lifting body vehicle. It incorporated some design features that resulted from test flights in the
three heavy-weight vehicles. New lessons were learned, some of which were applicable to
the operational aspects of landing lifting entry vehicles.
Piloting the X-24B was easier than the other lifting bodies as a result of several
improvements that were incorporated in the design. There were no serious accidents or
incidents during the X-24B flight test program.
7.5.2 Validations
The success of the X-24B program reinserted the "winged," high L/D shapes as valid
competitors in the search for an operational lifting entry configuration capable of horizontal
landing.
The handling qualities of the X-24B were the best of the lifting bodies primarily due to the
lower dihedral effect and due to more responsive ailerons. Landing the vehicle compared
favorably with flying simulated low L/D approaches in the T-38 and F-104.
The subsonic L/D of the clean X-24B was only slightly higher than that of the X-24A, but the
gear-down L/D was substantially higher. Subsonic stability was as predicted by the wind
tunnels for everything except the longitudinal stability, which was lower than predicted. At
transonic and supersonic speeds the stability was as predicted except for directional stability,
which was also lower than predicted.
The X-24B performed the first concrete runway landings of an unpowered, low L/D vehicle.
These landings confirmed earlier predictions that accurate landings and controlled rollouts
could be accomplished with this class of vehicle. The task of attempting accurate landings
reinforced the need for a speed brake capability. An interesting sidelight was discovered
during the analysis and preparation for the runway landings. The energy condition and
vehicle location at the start of a flare correlated directly with the stopping point on the
runway (if the same braking technique were used). The actual point of touchdown was of
secondary importance since the vehicle slowed at almost exactly the same rate after flare
completion whether it was still flying or was on the ground.
The reduced friction of the concrete runway relative to the lakebed surface was also
noticeable. The two runway landing rollouts were about 34 percent longer than equivalent
lakebed landings for the same braking. A similar difference was noted between lakebed and
runway landings of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (Reference Hoey, et al, 1985).
During the latter part of the powered flight test program one of the access panels on the lower
surface was used as a test bed for the Space Shuttle thermal protection system tiles. One
array of tiles was bonded to the panel and successfully flown on several flights. The primary
115
objectives were to assess the tiles ability to withstand the aerodynamic shear forces in flight,
and to investigate the susceptibility to damage during landings on the lakebed.
7.5.3 Improvements
The X-24B was the first of the low L/D glide vehicles to incorporate a useable nose gear
steering system. Successful development of ground steering was a key factor in the
demonstration of the concrete runway landing.
The landing gear extension trim change, which had degraded the landing handling qualities
of all of the earlier lifting bodies, was effectively eliminated by careful attention to the design
parameters. Although rocket engine reliability continued to be a problem, the added ability
to increase engine thrust after ignition allowed the X-24B to achieve a higher speed (Mach
1.76) than was originally expected.
The subsonic longitudinal stability was less than that predicted by the wind tunnels.
Discrepancies between different wind tunnels prior to flight test had alerted the test team to
the uncertainty. Pressure measurements were made to obtain the necessary validation data.
Early glide flights were planned with ample margin for error. As a result the discrepancy
between the wind tunnels did not disrupt the test program even though the stability level was
only half of the original prediction. The research flight test data allowed researchers to better
understand the interpretation of wind tunnel data for long, slender vehicles like the X-24B.
The influence of the rocket engine plume was to significantly reduce stability. Similar
effects had been observed on the X-24A. An exhaust plume is very difficult to duplicate in a
wind tunnel so there were only trend predictions available prior to flight tests. Since the X-
24B, and all other lifting body configurations, were intended for gliding entry, the power
effects were of theoretical interest only. Subsequent studies were performed to better
understand these plume effects relative to air-breathing or rocket powered research aircraft
under development such as the X-24C (Reference Norris, 1979).
While jettisoning fuel from the X-24A, recirculation of the fluid back into the engine area
had resulted in a small engine fire. Wind tunnel flow visualization tests were run on an X-
24B model to establish the best location for the jettison line. The initial test of the X-24B
jettison system produced a large lateral trim change. The entire problem was corrected by
extending the line to the aft end of the vehicle.
Flight test data disclosed that one aileron actuator exhibited sluggish response during the
early portion of each powered flight. It was discovered that the LOX vent line was located
just forward of the aileron actuator compartment and was super-cooling the hydraulic fluid in
the actuator, thus causing slow response.
Among the X-24B unresolved issues was the continued need for the center fin. The center
fin was needed on the X-24A as a "splitter" to reduce adverse yaw whenever the upper flaps
were deflected differentially for roll control as discussed in Chapter 6. The lateral control
116
surfaces on the X-24B were located outboard of the tip fins and the upper flaps were only
used for pitch control. The "splitter" function of the fin was therefore no longer required for
the X-24B, and removal of the fin was seriously considered. Early wind tunnel tests had
shown low directional stability in the transonic region for the X-24B with or without the
center fin, so in the interest of safety, the fin was retained, at least for envelope expansion
flights. The noticeable degradation in directional stability at supersonic speeds revealed from
flight test data was never totally explained so the center fin was never removed.
The low directional stability and poor longitudinal trim capability at supersonic speeds could
probably have been corrected by increasing the upper flap position and flaring the rudders
outboard as was originally planned for the X-24A. Since this would have significantly
increased the drag, the desired test Mach numbers would not have been obtained using the
XLR-11 engine so the potential improvement was never explored. Optimization of the
control laws for the X-24B configuration in the supersonic flight regime (Mach 1.2 to 5.0)
was never studied either in wind tunnels or on simulators.
The XLR-11 rocket engines reliability continued to be a problem during the X-24B
program. The components were old and the engine was a 1940s design. Attempts to
streamline and update its capabilities often resulted in the creation of additional problems. In
spite of the frustration at having to repeat some flight attempts, the fail-safe features worked
well, and there were no serious explosions or hazardous flight conditions caused by engine
malfunctions.
Like the X-24A, the X-24B also had poor crosswind landing characteristics, but for a
different reason. Between main landing gear touch down and nose gear touchdown, the
vehicle tended to roll and yaw sharply in the downwind direction. From the cockpit the nose
appeared to slice uncontrollably during the rotation. After the vehicle stabilized on all three
wheels the nose gear steering was adequate to control the rollout. The vehicle did not "heel
over uncomfortably" as was experienced on the X-24A.
7.6 Test Sites
The test sites and facilities supporting the X-24B were identical to those supporting the X-
24A (Figures 4-20 and 4-22) - all AF and NASA properties at Edwards AFB. The
Propulsion System Test Stand was used to develop and validate the uprated thrust capability
of the XLR-11 engine.
In November 1976 the X-24B was loaded into a "Pregnant Guppy" transport aircraft and
delivered to the Air Force museum at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. It is currently displayed
next to one of the two SV5J aircraft which has been configured to look like the X-24A
(Figure 6-11).
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Chapter 8
Epilogue

8.1 Summary of Test Results
The initial Lifting Body research flight test program was aimed at the development of
horizontal landing techniques for a class of entry configurations which would use ablation
technology for thermal protection during entry (M2-F3, HL-10, X-24A). Aerodynamic
refinements which produced acceptable low speed L/Ds suitable for approach and landing
were demonstrated . Flight control difficulties for these short-coupled and roll-prone
vehicles were successfully overcome. Following flight at supersonic speeds, each of the
three heavy-weight lifting bodies were successfully landed. Adequate transonic stability and
controllability were thereby demonstrated. Only the X-24A had a pilot canopy configuration
with suitable forward visibility at landing for a mission vehicle.
A successful and highly repeatable approach and landing technique was developed for
unpowered, low L/D vehicles. The critical phases of this technique were identified. In spite
of the high drag of these vehicles, some type of speed brake was required to achieve the
precise, pre-flare energy conditions needed for accurate landings.
The fourth configuration - the X-24B - must be considered a second-generation lifting body.
It could use either metallic or ceramic insulation for thermal protection and could accomplish
considerably more maneuvering during entry than the earlier configurations. The low-speed
handling qualities were improved over the earlier vehicles. Following a supersonic flight, the
X-24B successfully landed on a concrete runway, and thereby demonstrated an additional
aspect of operational flexibility.
While the lifting body flight test data were being gathered, the effects of ablation surface
roughness on low speed drag were also being assembled. As mentioned in Chapter 6, full
scale wind tunnel tests of the X-24A with a simulated rough ablator surface showed a
reduction in L/D of 20 percent (Reference Pyle, 1969). Tests at WPAFB on an 8 percent
model of the X-24A showed similar results (Reference Ash, Vol. II, 1972). Flight tests of the
X-15A-2, which used a thin ablative coating, showed a reduction in L/D of about 15 percent
after a relatively mild exposure to the aerodynamic heating environment (Ref Ash, Vol. II,
1972). Comparison tests of two PRIME vehicles, one before flight and one after flight,
showed a 30 percent reduction in L/D (Reference Spisak).
118
These effects were also accompanied by reductions in stability which would obviously be
quite detrimental to the handling qualities. It must be concluded that the first three lifting
body vehicles, as originally conceived, would probably not have been land-able following an
entry with a normally-ablated thermal protection system.
5

8.2 Implications for Space Shuttle
These flight test programs represent some, but certainly not all, of the research flight testing
that led to the Space Shuttle Orbiter as the first successful, manned lifting-entry vehicle.
6
The Orbiter is a winged vehicle and bears more resemblance to the X-20 than to any of the
lifting bodies. Landing the Orbiter utilizes unpowered landing techniques that were
originally developed for the X-15 program, and later adapted to the lifting bodies. The
continued successful ability of the AF/NASA team to accurately land all of these vehicles
without power caused the Space Shuttle design team to reassess their need for a landing
engine. John Manke personally made over thirty flights in the NASA 2-seat F-104s or T-
38s demonstrating to various astronauts, engineers, managers and politicians the simulated
lifting body approach and landing patterns. The Space Shuttle design team finally accepted
the unpowered landing technique which had been developed and validated by the AF/NASA
flight test team at Edwards, thus saving a considerable amount of weight and complexity in
the Orbiter.
The low-speed L/Ds of each configuration are compared at the same airspeeds
7
in Figure 8-
1. A similar comparison of the gear-down configurations is shown in Figure 8-2. The
predicted L/D of the X-20 is not shown since it was never flown, but the predicted values
were almost identical to those of the X-24B. Notice that the L/D of the "winged" Orbiter is
closer to the L/D of the "winged" X-15 than to any of the lifting bodies.

5
Further study and wind tunnel testing were required to identify the true cause of these effects. It is likely that
the judicious use of smooth, high temperature materials (such as carbon-carbon) placed in critical locations on
the vehicle would have substantially improved the low speed characteristics after entry.
6
The ASSET and PRIME flight test programs have already been mentioned in the text. Several other test
programs were flown using jet-powered aircraft simulating low L/D vehicles. These programs demonstrated
large-airplane low L/D approaches, instrument approaches to 1000 feet altitude, night landing techniques as
well as telescopes and fiber optics for reduced visibility (Reference Schofield et al, 1970 ).
7
L/D is plotted against the lift coefficient (CL) divided by the wing loading (W/S). This parameter allows
vehicles of different size and configuration to be compared at the same equivalent airspeed.
119
Figure 8-1: L/D Comparisons, Gear Up
Figure 8-2: L/D Comparisons, Gear Down
120
The most significant technology contribution to the success of the Space Shuttle Orbiter
came from the laboratory, not the Lifting Body program. Pioneered by Lockheed and
fostered by NASA Ames Research Center, it was the successful development of a new
thermal protection concept. The light weight ceramic tiles and the associated bonding
attachment methods were truly the enabling technology for lifting entry. As John Becker
stated (Reference Hallion, Vol. I, p. 444),"..the Shuttle enjoys a thermal protection system far
more effective and more durable than the metallic radiative structure of Dyna Soar. In
essence its light weight ceramic blocks are the unobtainium that we could only dream of in
the 50s and early 60s."
The Air Force originally planned to launch the Space Shuttles into polar orbit from
Vandenberg AFB in California. In order to return to the launch site during a once-around-
abort, the Orbiter needed a cross-range capability of 1200 nautical miles. Throughout the
development of the Space Shuttle, the DOD insisted on retention of this 1200-nautical-mile
cross-range capability. Although it has never been demonstrated, transient tests of the
Orbiter during actual entry have shown that the thermal protection system (as currently
configured) is adequate for this high cross-range entry (Reference Richardson, et al, 1983).
The current Shuttle mission does not require high cross-range, and the entry L/D used by the
Orbiter is about 1.0, similar to that available with the M2, HL-10 and X-24A configurations.
Although the technology and hardware are now available, it is significant that a truly high
L/D entry has yet to be flown with any vehicle.

8.3 The Future of Lifting Bodies
The light-weight ceramic tile technology developed for the Space Shuttle opens the door to
ALL of the lifting entry concepts, including the lifting bodies described in this report.
Highly maneuverable entries with over 2400 miles cross-range are possible with X-24B-like
configurations. For non-military entry missions (space station return, space-rescue, etc.),
where payload fraction is more important than cross-range, the entire spectrum of lifting
bodies with entry L/Ds of 1.0 to 1.4 are also now feasible (Figure 8-3).
121
Figure 8-3: Orbital Entry Footprints for Lifting Bodies and Other Vehicles

8.4 Other Benefits
The Lifting Body program highlighted another important attribute not related to technology:
the ability of a small team of dedicated individuals to achieve great accomplishments in a
short time and with limited resources, provided they are not encumbered by political or
bureaucratic constraints. This is especially significant when one realizes that two-thirds of
this team were within the Federal Government (NASA and AF). Team members were
allowed to function in a manner which was outside the typical procurement practices, and,
for the most part, were allowed to make major decisions at the working level throughout the
program. This highly productive environment was created by the outstanding leadership of
Paul Bikle, the Director of NASA Flight Research Center with full cooperation of several
AFFTC Commanders.
122
The rocket-powered research aircraft programs conducted by joint AF/NASA teams over the
years have also made significant contributions in the area of new flight test methods. By
their nature, the flights of these vehicles are very transient. Stabilized flight conditions
(speed and altitude) cannot be sustained for longer than a few seconds. The flight test
engineers supporting these programs developed new methods of transient testing and analysis
involving short control pulses and control sweeps. The value of these new methods, in terms
of data return per minute of test time, were obvious to the jet-airplane testing community,
and many of these methods are now employed in the routine testing of conventional
airplanes.
The value of one-of-a-kind research airplanes continues to be a controversial subject.
Advocates think that the value of periodically constructing and testing new hardware at
relatively low cost will lead to advancements in technology even though the particular
subject of the research may not prove fruitful. Charlie Feltz, Chief Engineer for North
American on the X-15 program, stated that well over 50 percent of the research value from
the X-15 program occurred BEFORE the first flight. He was referring to (1) new
manufacturing methods for Inconel and Titanium, (2) new subsystems designed for operation
at 0 g, (3) a new man-rated rocket engine, (4) the overall systems integration task, and a host
of other new design and manufacturing technologies that had to be developed before flight
could even be attempted. Opponents argue that the research would be better focused on the
development of true, mission-capable vehicles even though technological failure would be
very costly.
Frequent low-cost testing of one-of-a-kind vehicles allows the country to retain a team of
researchers who can provide continuity in technological advancement and changing
operational concepts. The major development of a new mission-capable vehicle is often
separated from its predecessor by 20 to 50 years and the technology transfer is often a major
problem. The AF/NASA team at Edwards provided this technical continuity for over 30
years and provided a major portion of the operational concepts, technical requirements and
personnel to the Space Shuttle program.
The Lifting Body program proved to be a good application of the research airplane principle:
the use of low cost vehicles in a relatively high-risk environment. The success of the Lifting
Body program set the stage not only for the Space Shuttle, but also for an entire family of
future lifting entry vehicles.
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Appendix A
The X-20 "Dyna Soar" Program
The Air Force (AF) initiated the Dyna Soar program as a continuation of its research on
manned, high speed flight. Design and development continued from 1957 to 1963 when the
program was cancelled before completion of the first vehicle.

1.0 Basic Concept and Design Evolution
The lifting body concept for manned entry vehicles was first introduced during the
competition for the X-20 Dyna Soar contract in the mid fifties. The configuration that was
finally selected for the Dyna Soar was NOT a lifting body, but was a high L/D, winged glider
that would use the "lifting" entry concept described in Chapter 1. Although the X-20 never
flew, the story of lifting entry in the United States begins with a discussion of this important
program. An overall schedule of activity between 1957 and 1982 is shown in Figure A-1.
The various programs discussed in this document are related to each other, and to parallel
programs by this figure.
Figure A-1: Entry-Related Testing 1957-1982
1.1 From X-15 to X-20
The Dyna-Soar program grew out of concepts first proposed by Eugen Snger, a German
scientist, in the 1930s (Reference Geiger as quoted in Hallion, Vol. I, 1987). Snger
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envisioned a winged aircraft boosted to near-orbital speeds above the earths atmosphere by a
rocket engine. It would then skip along the outer reaches of the atmosphere like a flat stone
on water until it slowed to a normal glide speed for landing. The term "boost-glide vehicle"
was born. The range of the aircraft would be greatly extended by the skipping action, as
would the maneuverability. Snger coined the term "dynamic soaring" to describe the
concept. This terminology was shortened to "Dyna Soar" as the name for the program even
though the reentry was envisioned as a long, controlled glide without "skipping."
The Dyna Soar program evolved from the aircraft community rather than the missile
community, which was the primary source of entry technology for the Mercury program.
The Dyna Soar glider was seen as a natural progression of the successful X-series high speed
rocket-powered aircraft. At the time of the first design competition in the mid fifties the X-
15 was under construction. The X-15 was expected to advance the frontiers of manned flight
to Mach 6.6 and to 250,000 feet altitude. It was recognized that the next step upward in
speed and altitude beyond the X-15 could probably not be achieved by air-launching or by
using a self-contained propulsion system. Some large, unique air-launching platforms were
studied and proposed but none were built. Existing ICBMs had the capability to boost small
payloads (approximately 5,000 lbs.) to orbit but could also boost a 9,000-pound research
aircraft to a speed of about 17,000 ft per second (about Mach 20) and well into the reentry
heating regime. Considering the anticipated future increase in booster capability, the Dyna
Soar was proposed as a research glider that would be designed for entry from orbit, but
would be initially tested and developed in sub-orbital flight. The program married the ICBM
booster technology and high speed research airplane technology. For launch, the glider
would be mounted on the top of a modified ICBM booster. The booster trajectory would be
altered to place the glider in a nearly horizontal trajectory at burnout, as envisioned by
Snger, rather than the typical steep and high ballistic trajectory of an ICBM.
1.2 Contractor Selection
The initial competition for the Dyna Soar contract drew bids from nine major contractors in
the industry. No definitive selection resulted from the first review and the Air Force held a
second competition between two teams: Martin/Bell, and Boeing/Chance Vought. The
Boeing/Chance Vought glider was a flat bottom, high L/D configuration using a radiative-
cooled structure (hot structure)(Figure A-2). At the time of competition Boeing/Chance
Vought had selected the Atlas-Centaur as the booster. The Martin/Bell glider was a more
blunt, lifting body configuration with a lower L/D than the Boeing/Chance Vought design
and used some active cooling in the structure. Martin/Bell selected the Titan II booster.
Another key difference between the two proposed gliders was the crew escape system. The
Boeing/Chance Vought glider jettisoned the forward flat-bottom section of the vehicle as an
escape capsule. The capsule then performed a low L/D lifting reentry with the pilot facing
forward. The Martin glider also jettisoned the forward section of the vehicle as an escape
capsule, but the capsule turned around to place a heat shield forward. The capsule then
performed a ballistic reentry with the pilot facing aft. In December 1957 the Air Force
declared Boeing/Chance Vought as the winner. Shortly after source selection a decision was
made to switch first to the Titan I, then to the Titan II booster to launch the Boeing/Chance
Vought glider. Like the X-15 program, the Dyna Soar initially received funds and
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management from the Air Force. A joint Air Force /National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) flight test team would conduct the research flights.
Figure A-2: Dyna Soar
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1.3 Flight Test Planning
The expansion of the flight envelope was initially planned by the research airplane
community to be similar to that of other research aircraft. All flights would have a pilot on-
board. A short series of air launches from a B-52 (similar to the X-15 launches) was planned
at Edwards AFB to validate the landing capability. Vertical launches using the Titan II
booster were to be launched to the southeast from Cape Canaveral, Florida. The first flight
was planned as a low-speed, low-altitude flight (about Mach 3 and 100,000 feet) wherein the
booster would be shut down early and the glider would glide to a landing on one of the
Caribbean islands. On each subsequent launch the booster would use a slightly different
trajectory to attain a somewhat higher speed and altitude, and the glider would travel to
landing strips farther down the island chain, eventually reaching Fortaleza, Brazil (Figure A-
3). If the lifting reentry research went well, and the booster capabilities proved to be
consistent with the glider weight, the final flight was envisioned as a once-around, barely
sub-orbital flight, from Cape Canaveral east to Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). This flight
would be intended to demonstrate a maneuverable lifting entry capability from orbit and set
the stage for transition to an orbital research mode and/or military operational mode for the
glider. The glider would use a more powerful, and yet-to-be developed booster.
8
.
The ICBM rocket engines (as well as guidance and other subsystems) had not been man-
rated to the same standards as those in use on the research aircraft programs. There were no
automatic shutdown or redundancy features. (The missile safety record was rather poor in
the late fifties). The incorporation of these capabilities would have extended the cost and
schedule, and also increased both the weight and complexity of the booster system. The
missile community had a different perception of how the Dyna Soar test program should be
conducted. They envisioned designing for only one boost trajectory which would attain a
high cutoff speed and altitude. They wanted a series of unmanned launches to demonstrate
the modified booster features and validate booster safety before beginning the piloted portion
of the glider program.

8
The plans for the flight test of the X-20 were never finalized. The philosophies expressed here were the
viewpoints of the AF/NASA/Boeing flight test engineering personnel who would have eventually been
responsible for conducting the flight test program. The flight sequence may be inconsistent with flight plans
presented in some high-level X-20 documents.
127
Figure A-3: Planned Dyna Soar Sub-Orbital Tests
128
1.4 Sub-orbital to Orbital Decision
Attempts to reach a compromise test concept between the airplane and missile community
were still underway when the decision was made to switch to one of the larger, but untried,
boosters (Saturn I or Titan III). These boosters were being designed to carry both manned
and unmanned payloads thus alleviating some of the reliability concerns with the earlier
ICBM boosters. The larger payload capability of either of these boosters (about 30,000 lbs.
in low earth orbit) changed the Dyna Soar program objectives. Instead of concentrating on
lifting reentry research, some broader objectives were added which included orbital research,
orbital entries, and military payload evaluations (those same objectives that had been
envisioned as following the suborbital glider testing). In order to emphasize the experimental
nature of the Dyna Soar program, the Air Force obtained the designation X-20.
The Titan III was selected as the X-20 booster (Figure A-4) and the first planned X-20
launch was to be the flight that had previously been envisioned as the last flight of the
reentry research program described earlier; that is, a once-around flight to Edwards (Figure
A-5). The Titan III booster had not yet flown, and the X-20 was scheduled to be the first real
Titan III payload following a few developmental launches. The first once-around flight was
now scheduled to occur in 1966, which was prior to the establishment of any continuous
global tracking or communications networks. The glider would have been only
intermittently in contact with the ground from shortly after booster burnout until it emerged
from the entry blackout region at about Mach 12 over the eastern Pacific. The risks had
obviously increased significantly from the earlier suborbital research program. The X-20 test
team was now faced with a difficult decision: Should the first flight be manned or
unmanned? The glider design process had emphasized the utilization of the pilot as an
important ingredient to the successful conduct of a flight in the same manner as other
research aircraft. The pilot could correct malfunctions and select alternate courses of action
for unforeseen events. Relying only upon the automatic features for the first orbital flight
would significantly reduce the chances for success and place the entire program at risk
should the flight end in failure. On the other hand, although the probability of mission
success would have been higher with a pilot on board, the personal risk to the pilot on the
first flight was extremely high and the entire U.S. manned space program would have been in
jeopardy had the pilot not survived, regardless of the reason. The decision was made for an
unmanned first launch with the hope that the glider could perform an automatic reentry and
automatic landing on the dry lakebed at Edwards. Five subsequent piloted flights, some that
were to achieve multiple orbits, were planned.
129
Figure A-4: Dyna Soar Glider on Titan III Booster
130
Figure A-5: Once-Around to Edwards
2.0 The X-20 Glider
The X-20 glider was a single-seat, delta-winged aircraft (Figure A-6). The design of the
glider progressed normally even though the selection of a booster for the program changed
frequently. The design weight of the glider was allowed to grow somewhat after the decision
was made to use the Titan III booster and had reached about 13,500 lbs. at program
termination. Notice that the X-20 glider was designed from the outset as a lifting reentry
research aircraft. The glider was to incorporate overdesign where predictions were uncertain,
and to be capable of exploring lifting reentries over a wide range of L/Ds. The only payload
for the research glider was a 1000-pound instrumentation package to gather the research data.
131
Figure A-6: Dyna Soar, X-20 Glider
2.1 Aerodynamics
The general shape of the X-20 was similar to that of a delta wing airplane such as the Navy
F5D or the Air Force F-102 and the subsonic and transonic aerodynamics were similar. The
predicted maximum L/D during entry (Mach 20) was 1.8, while the maximum L/D at landing
was 4.25. The entry maneuver was designed to occur on the back side of the L/D curve
while the approach and landing was to use the front side of the L/D curve (Figure A-7). The
glider was designed to be stable and controllable over a large angle of attack range and could
fly an entry at any selected L/D between 0.6 and 1.8 (corresponding to angles of attack
between 55 and 18 degrees). By combining different bank angles with different L/Ds, the
vehicle could fly a wide variety of entry trajectories. Selecting a low L/D with zero bank
would result in a very short, straight-ahead trajectory. Selecting a high L/D with a large bank
angle would produce a long, turning entry and very high cross-range. The ground pattern
produced when all possible entry trajectories were plotted was commonly referred to as the
entry "footprint" (Figure A-8). Any landing site that was within the "footprint" at any point
in time during the entry could be reached by the glider. The size of the footprint got smaller
as the vehicle decelerated during the entry. The entry footprint for the X-20 at the beginning
of its entry was expected to be approximately 3,000 miles wide and 8,000 miles long. The
subsonic L/D of the X-20 was very similar to the X-15 airplane and the unpowered approach
and landing techniques developed for the X-15 were expected to be applicable.
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Figure A-7: X-20 L/D vs. Angle of Attack
Figure A-8: Energy Management Overlay, X-20
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2.2 Thermal Protection
The thermal protection system for the X-20 was a major challenge for the structural designer
as well as the metallurgist. The structure was designed to achieve an equilibrium heating
condition during the entry wherein the heat being generated was radiated back to space.
Unlike the ablative or heat sink concepts, this design placed no time constraints on the entry.
It was expected that the vehicle would be reusable with only minor refurbishment between
flights. New materials were developed and tested to withstand the predicted wing leading-
edge temperatures of over 3000 degrees Fahrenheit (F). Coated Molybdenum alloy panels
were used on the wing leading edge and Coated Columbium alloy panels were used on the
lower surface. A special nose cap composed of Zirconia rods imbedded in graphite was
developed to withstand the 4200-degree F temperatures expected at the nose of the vehicle.
The upper surfaces, where temperatures were expected to be about 1000 degrees F, were
constructed primarily of Rene 41, a steel alloy. Each external surface panel overlapped the
adjoining panel like shingles on a roof. This allowed adjacent panels that were experiencing
different temperatures to expand and move relative to each other without causing buckling
and possible burn-through.
The internal load carrying structure was also Rene 41. The high temperature, radiative
panels on the wing leading edges and lower surfaces were backed with a ceramic wool-like
insulation to reduce the heat transfer to the internal structure. There were two major
concerns regarding this type of structure: (1) Could the exotic materials be produced, and
then manufactured into a practical structure, and (2) Could the internal loads and deformation
of the structure caused by the heat be accurately predicted?
The wide range of L/Ds (and therefore wide range of angles of attack) that were being
sought meant that the thermal protection system for each individual location on the glider had
to be designed for the worst-case heating environment. The nose cap and wing leading edges
received the highest heating at low angle of attack (high L/D) while the bottom of the wing
and control surfaces received their highest heating at high angle of attack (low L/D).
2.3 Flight Control and Guidance
The X-20 flight control surfaces were standard for a delta winged airplane. The vehicle was
equipped with two elevons at the wing trailing edges for pitch and roll control and two
rudders at the rear of the two tip fins for yaw control. The surfaces were operated by an
analog, triply-redundant, self-adaptive, fly-by-wire flight control system. Pilot inputs were
accomplished by a side-arm control stick and rudder pedals similar to those used in the X-15.
Although the glider was statically stable throughout the entry, the aerodynamic damping was
expected to be very light, thus a complex control system was necessary. A reaction control
system (small rockets used to control vehicle attitude in space) was merged with the
aerodynamic controls for periods of operation in space and during the early phase of entry.
An inertial platform provided the basic information for the entry guidance system. An
oscilloscope in the cockpit was used in conjunction with a mechanical film overlay system to
present information to the pilot. Two display modes were available. The primary display
showed the "footprint," that is, the position of the glider relative to the available landing sites,
and allowed the pilot to select the best L/D and bank angle to reach the desired site. The
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large size of the footprint allowed the pilot to select an alternate landing site even after
initiation of the entry (Figure A-8). The second display mode showed the current
temperature margins for various critical external locations on the glider. The overlays
changed automatically with velocity during the entry and showed the continual reduction in
the size of the footprint as energy was dissipated (Figure A-9).
Figure A-9: Flight Integrator Overlay, X-20
The flight control and guidance concepts were tested extensively in fixed-base analog
simulators, both at Edwards and at Boeing, a lesson learned from the X-15 program. (Pilot
comments regarding the X-20 simulator are included in Appendix B.)
An idea that evolved during the X-20 program was the potential use of the pilot to control the
Titan III booster during the ascent phase of flight. Simulator studies performed at Boeing
and on the centrifuge at Johnsville, Pennsylvania, showed that the pilot could quite easily
provide control inputs to the booster autopilot based on the glider guidance displays. This
could have provided the necessary guidance redundancy without complicating the
booster/glider interface (Reference Hoey, 1965).
135
2.4 Other Subsystems
Since the temperature of the external surface of the X-20 would stabilize at very high values,
it was necessary to provide an internal, double-walled compartment for the cockpit,
instrumentation and other operating subsystems.
The crew escape system for the X-20 went through an interesting evolution. Four solid
rockets were installed directly behind the glider in the interstage structure when it was on the
booster. All four rockets could be ignited instantly by the pilot at any time from before lift-
off to the point of booster separation. The entire glider would then separate from, and
quickly accelerate away from, the booster. The concept was similar to the escape towers
used on all of the NASA manned launches prior to Space Shuttle, except that the rockets
were behind the vehicle rather than on a tower above it. From the launch pad the escape
rockets could boost the glider vertically to an altitude of nearly a thousand feet. There a half
loop and turn could be performed to a landing on the nearby "skid strip" at Cape Canaveral.
Assigned X-20 pilots at Edwards practiced these maneuvers in an F5D aircraft. They pulled
up to a vertical climb from a low altitude over the lakebed, then retarded the power and
completed the glider-like landing. During boosted ascent the escape rockets could separate
the entire glider from an exploding or burning booster. The escape rockets were also planned
to be used as primary propulsion during a B-52 air-launch program. They would boost the
glider to a slightly supersonic speed in order to explore the gliders transonic flight
characteristics.
For the remainder of the flight, following booster separation, the initial glider design would
have used an escape capsule. This capsule consisted of the forward segment of the glider
including the cockpit and some subsystems. When escape was initiated during reentry, the
capsule was designed to trim itself to an acceptable angle and perform a low L/D lifting
reentry to a predetermined altitude at which a parachute would deploy. As the design of the
glider and capsule proceeded, the complexity and added weight of the escape system become
more critical. The sharp pitch-up that accompanied the capsule separation was also expected
to incapacitate the pilot for some period of time. A decision to make the reaction control
system in the capsule redundant led to a counter-proposal to reduce the glider control system
redundancy from three to two systems. It became obvious that the design team was
attempting to create "an airplane within an airplane," and that overall safety would be
enhanced by concentrating the redundancy and backup systems toward the successful
recovery of the glider itself. As a result, the escape capsule was replaced with a standard
ejection seat for low altitude escape only.
The X-20 carried a protective heat and glare shield over the forward window of the cockpit
which was to be jettisoned at about Mach 3, after entry and before landing.
Since standard tires would have been very difficult to protect within the hot structure, the
landing gear consisted of two wire-brush skids at the rear of the aircraft and a nose "dish" at
the front. The landing gear were to be extended just before touchdown, a technique used
successfully in the X-15 program. The X-20 had no ground steering capability. It was
expected that the higher friction of the aft wire-brush skids compared to the friction at the
nose "dish" would help maintain a stable and straight slide-out.
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3.0 Configuration Reassessment (Phase Alpha)
A major program reassessment was initiated in late 1962. NASA and several contractors
(including Martin) had conducted preliminary wind tunnel tests at high Mach number on
several lifting body configurations with maximum entry L/Ds of 1.0 to 1.4. There was a
strong opinion that these configurations would be quicker to build than the winged X-20
because standard internal structural materials with ablative heat shields could be used. In
addition, a lifting body would have more usefulness as a space supply vehicle due to its
higher volumetric efficiency. Land-ability of these vehicles was still an open question.
Lifting body supporters criticized the X-20 as being an inefficient entry configuration and
cited the heavy thermal protection system, unnecessary wings, and low payload fraction.
These comments ignored the fact that the glider design did not attempt to optimize payload
fraction. The design was aimed at gathering research data from which to optimize future
entry vehicle designs; a similar philosophy had been used to select the X-15 configuration.
Proponents of the X-20 felt that the lifting body principle had a very limited capability for
lifting entry research and that the major refurbishment of the heat shield required after each
flight would greatly impact the potential operational capability. Responsible for most of the
funding for the X-20, the Air Force continued to stress the requirement for high cross-range
and thus argued to continue the X-20 as an entry research program.
The assessment team recognized that the winged X-20 design was more technically
challenging than the more expedient approach of the lifting bodies, but also recognized that
the X-20 had been under detailed design for several years whereas the lifting body detailed
design had not yet begun. The decision was made to continue with the winged X-20 glider
concept.
4.0 Program Cancellation
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara cancelled the X-20 Dyna Soar program in
December of 1963. He reasoned that the immediate need for evaluating mans usefulness in
space could be accelerated by reallocating funds to the Air Force Manned Orbiting
Laboratory (MOL) program, which was to use the Gemini capsule for the manned entries.
Lifting entry research was to be continued using small unmanned test vehicles such as the
ASSET program (Aerothermodynamic/elastic Structural Systems Environmental Tests,
already underway, described in Section 4.4) and a new lifting body research effort called
START (Spacecraft Technology and Advanced Reentry Test, described in section 6.2.1 ). In
1969 McNamara also cancelled the MOL program thus ending all Air Force attempts to
identify a military role for man in space (Reference Geiger as quoted by Hallion, Vol. I,
1987).
4.1 Status at Cancellation
At the time of the X-20 program cancellation nearly all of the engineering drawings for the
glider had been completed. For the first vehicle, construction of the pressurized
compartment for the pilot and subsystems was essentially complete. The wing spars, vertical
tail spars, and fuselage primary structure were in the final assembly jig.
137
A complete, fixed-base piloted simulator was operating at Boeing in Seattle, Washington. It
was capable of simulating the entire mission from lift-off to landing. A pilot-in-the-loop
centrifuge program simulating the boost phase had been successfully completed at the Naval
Air Development Center at Johnsville, Pennsylvania. Following completion of the centrifuge
program, the X-20 centrifuge cockpit was shipped to the Air Force Flight Test Center
(AFFTC) Simulator Laboratory at Edwards and was used in an all-analog piloted simulation
of the entry. This simulation was operating at the AFFTC where research flight test planning
was under way. The AFFTC simulation capability was being expanded to become an orbital,
full mission simulator.
When the X-20 was cancelled, the first developmental launch of the Titan III (without any
payload) was approximately a year away. The first air-launched glide flight of the X-20 from
a B-52 was about a year and a half away, and the first boosted flight of the combined Titan
III and X-20 was about 2 1/2 years away.
4.2 Known Problems
Several known technical problems or expected delays were on the horizon at program
termination in late 1963. None of these were considered major hurdles by the X-20 team
members at the time, but their true impact will never be known.
(1) The manufacturing department at Boeing was undergoing a major learning process trying
to develop methods for forming, fastening, drilling, and otherwise working with the exotic
high temperature materials (Coated Columbium, Coated Molybdenum, Rene 41). This
necessary learning process was causing delays in the glider assembly.
(2) Recent tests had shown that the landing gear brushes and nose plate were inadequate for
landings on concrete runways due to excessive wear and inadequate tracking stability.
Alternate concepts were under development.
(3) Some relatively minor structural problems existed at the interface between the glider and
the booster, but a much more serious problem was related to the glider/booster aerodynamics.
The winged surfaces of the glider, mounted at the forward end of the booster, created a large
static instability during the early phase of boosted flight through the atmosphere. The
addition of fins at the rear end of the booster would regain the static stability (as proposed on
the Titan II version). Wind tunnel tests, however, uncovered some unexpected aerodynamic
interference effects between the forward wing and the aft fins; this interference negated the
effectiveness of the aft fins. The added weight of the fins was also undesirable. Increasing
the control capability of the rocket nozzles allowed the instability to be properly controlled
without the added fins. This change introduced excessive structural loads in the booster and
also in the glider/booster interstage structure. At program termination, a solution was still
being sought. (The lifting body concepts eliminated, or at least minimized, this destabilizing
effect since the overall vehicle width would have been about the same as the diameter of the
booster.)
138
(4) The piloted approach and landing capability of the X-20 were not in question due to the
similarity to the X-15 landings. The decision had been made that the first boosted flight
would be unmanned. The ability to accomplish a steep, high speed, gliding approach and
flare automatically, without a pilot on board, was a new challenge. Many in the flight test
community believed that the drone technology that was under development would be
inadequate.
4.3 Assigned Pilots
Six test pilots had been selected for the program. They were in training and they were
directly participating in the cockpit and systems design process at Boeing (Figure A-10). The
designated pilots were:
Maj. James W. Wood
Maj. Henry C. Gordon
Maj. William J. Knight
Maj. Albert H. Crews
Maj. Russell L. Rogers
Milton O. Thompson
USAF (Chief pilot)
USAF
USAF
USAF
USAF
NASA
X-15 pilots Neil Armstrong and William Dana (both of NASA) also participated as
engineering test pilots supporting the X-20 development.
139
Figure A-10: Assigned Pilots for the X-20 Dyna Soar
140
4.4 Enduring Legacies of Dyna Soar
Several of the systems that were developed for the X-20 program found a place in the
continued technology advance of the early 1960s.
(1) The ASSET program was initiated by the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory
(AFFDL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) in 1961. The goals were to validate
some of the critical technologies needed for lifting entry, and to support the Dyna Soar
program (It was, however, funded separately from the Dyna Soar program). McDonnell
Aircraft was to build and flight test an unmanned vehicle with a representative nose cap and
heat shield to validate the "hot structure" design concept. Designed to accomplish a lifting
reentry, the vehicle represented the forward 4 feet of the X-20 glider in most respects (Figure
A-11). The nose cap, leading edges, lower surfaces, and upper surfaces were of the same
material and design as the X-20. Six vehicles were built and tested between September 1963
and March 1965 (mostly after cancellation of the X-20 program). They were launched from
either Thor or Thor/Delta rockets from Cape Canaveral, and they reached conditions which
were very close to the peak heating environment for the X-20. One vehicle was lost as a
result of a booster malfunction. The remaining five vehicles survived the reentry and
transmitted research data to ground receiving stations as planned. Three of the successfully
launched vehicles were equipped with recovery systems but only one vehicle was actually
recovered. It is on display at the Air Force Museum at WPAFB. Although this program
received little attention at the time, its success validated the X-20 "hot structure" thermal
protection concept (Reference Hallion, Vol. I, 1987).
Figure A-11: ASSET Vehicle Configuration
141
(2) The fly-by-wire flight control system designed for the X-20 had been successfully
demonstrated on an F-101 test bed aircraft. Even before cancellation of the X-20 program, the
control system design (known as the MH-96 Flight Control System) was adapted to the X-15
mission and was installed in the #3 X-15 . The features of the system, including the autopilot
and the merging of aerodynamic and reaction controls, were demonstrated on many successful
X-15 flights. The pilots stated that the MH-96 system provided a significant improvement in
the airplanes reliability and safety, as well as a reduction in pilot workload. The success of this
system led to the development of a similar self-adaptive, triply-redundant, analog system for the
F-111 fighter-bomber aircraft.
(3) A special instrumentation system under development for the X-20 flight test program
became the first Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) airborne instrumentation system. It was well
along in development at the time of X-20 cancellation. The NASA FRC at Edwards recognized
the potential value of this system and continued support of its development. The hardware,
known as the CT77 Instrumentation System, was used on all the lifting body programs as well
as on many other research programs conducted at FRC in the 1960s and 1970s.
(4) The Inertial Guidance System that was developed for the X-20 program also found its way
into the X-15 program, where it provided a major improvement in accuracy for the later high-
altitude flights.
(5) The X-20 laid much of the ground work for the crew escape philosophy which is used in the
Space Shuttle today. The decision to dispense with the escape capsule on the X-20 glider
recognized that it was not practical to provide an escape mode for all aspects of a space flight.
This philosophy was first accepted on the X-15, which was equipped with a rocket ejection seat.
The seat was designed for successful ejections below approximately Mach 4 and 100,000 feet
even though the aircraft could attain speeds above Mach 6 and altitudes above 250,000 feet.
The probability of a need to escape from the higher altitudes and speeds was considered so
remote by the designers and the procuring government agencies, that the additional weight, cost
and complexity of a sophisticated escape system was not warranted. This philosophy has been
carried through all U.S. manned space programs to date, including the Space Shuttle. In case of
an emergency, the entry vehicle itself is considered the primary method for returning the crew to
subsonic speeds. Design safety features, usually in the form of system redundancy, are
incorporated in the entry vehicle to insure that it can function following most high-probability
space emergencies.
(6) The booster man-rating concept was first addressed during the X-20 program. The smaller
rocket engines which were developed to fly the early research airplanes contained sensors which
automatically stopped the engine if an unsafe condition was detected. The pilot would then
glide to a landing and the flight would be repeated on another day. For a single or twin-engine
ICBM class booster, such as the Atlas or Titan, shutting down an engine after lift-off would
have been disastrous. The escape towers and escape rockets used on the early manned flights of
these boosters were designed to fly the manned vehicle away from the booster in the event of a
fire or explosion. Later boosters designed to carry manned payloads incorporated various levels
of redundancy and fail safety in the control and guidance systems and also multiple rocket
engines which would allow the mission to continue even after the loss of one engine. One
engine failed during the boost phase of Apollo 13, but the boost was completed successfully.
Although the X-20 did plan to use an abort rocket, the program highlighted the need to merge
the airplane and booster man-rating philosophies.
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Appendix B
Pilot Comments
Lifting Body Handling Qualities
The X-20 Simulator
by Robert G. Hoey June 1994
The X-20 never reached the flight test phase. The only prediction of the potential handling
qualities of this vehicle were through the engineering simulators that were in use at the time
of program cancellation. Although I was a stability and control engineer and not a test pilot,
I had accrued many hours in the X-20 simulators both at Edwards and at Boeing. (I also held
a Private pilots license.)
There was ample wind tunnel data obtained on the X-20 glider configuration from Mach 20
to landing. There was, however, suspicion of the shock tunnels and other data sources for
data above Mach 8 as well as in the prediction of real-gas effects at altitudes above 200,000
feet.
The Minneapolis-Honeywell, analog, fly-by-wire flight control system (which evolved into
the MH-96 system flown on the X-15) was a very advanced concept in 1960 and
incorporated a self-adaptive feature. This concept adjusted various parameters within the
electronics to force the handling characteristics of the vehicle to remain essentially constant
even though flight conditions were changing. One insidious aspect of the self-adaptive
feature was its ability to mask a gradual degradation of handling qualities until the flight
control system had reached its ultimate limits. The loss of control which followed was then
very abrupt and usually unrecoverable.
At hypersonic speeds (above Mach 5) the X-20 was trimmable over an angle of attack range
of 15 to 55 degrees. The windshield cover was to be in place until the vehicle was below
Mach 4, so visibility during entry was limited to the two small side windows (a little like
Lindbergh's "Spirit of St. Louis"). Piloting was done strictly using the instruments with no
reference to the outside until the windshield cover was blown off.
The large angle of attack range of the vehicle raised an interesting discussion relative to the
most suitable use of the rudder pedals and lateral stick deflections by the pilot. The normal
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fighter-type concept was to mix the controls such that lateral stick deflections produced a roll
about the flight path of the vehicle. The rudder pedals were not used except for cross-wind
landings. At 55 degrees angle of attack in the X-20, however, the pilot was well aware of the
extreme nose-high attitude and, to some pilots, it was more natural to use the rudder pedals to
"yaw" the fuselage to the desired bank angle rather than use lateral stick deflections. The
decision was made to continue with the standard fighter-type control of lateral stick for bank
angle control. This philosophy has been retained on the Space Shuttle Orbiter which uses a
40-degree angle of attack during entry.
The X-20 simulator had excellent handling qualities when the control system was functioning
normally. The reaction control rockets were blended with the aerodynamic control surfaces
during the early phase of the entry. The vehicle response to control inputs was very slow
during this early phase of the entry. As soon as the aerodynamic controls became effective
on their own (at about 15 pounds per square foot dynamic pressure), all three axes of the
reaction control rockets were disengaged. The control response gradually improved until the
dynamic pressure reached about 50 pounds per square foot at about Mach 20, then remained
the same until the vehicle reached subsonic speeds. Vehicle response during most of the
entry was more like a cargo airplane than a small, fighter-like research airplane.
Subsonically the X-20 simulator became much more responsive. Handling qualities were
excellent and much like the X-15. A speed brake capability was provided by flaring both
rudders outboard. Speedbrake capability was shown to be necessary for landing accuracy
during the X-15 program.
Unlike the Space Shuttle, the X-20 was statically stable in all axes during the entire entry.
Malfunctions, or pilot selection, could place the flight control system in a "manual-direct"
mode in any, or all axes. While in this mode, stick deflections produced direct and
proportional motion of control surfaces with no electronic sensing or assistance. The
manual-direct mode produced marginal handling qualities. The vehicle was neutrally
damped in all axes and any small disturbance initiated an oscillation that was very difficult to
stop. If the oscillations were allowed to become too large, the heating limits would be
exceeded on the control surfaces. If only one axis was disengaged, a successful entry could
be performed, but it required the full concentration of the pilot.
As the angle of attack was reduced below 20 degrees at high Mach numbers, the longitudinal
stability and elevator effectiveness gradually deteriorated. Below about 13 degrees angle of
attack the simulator would exhibit an uncontrollable "tuck" and heating and load limits
would be exceeded very quickly. Maximum L/D was at 18 degrees angle of attack so there
was little reason to fly intentionally into this region. This gradual deterioration was evident
to the pilot if he was slowly reducing angle of attack in the manual direct mode, but was
masked by the flight control system if it was fully engaged and final loss of control was very
abrupt.
The energy management task also created a moderately high pilot workload. The large range
of L/D's available to the X-20 pilot allowed him to merely monitor the energy situation until
fairly late in the entry (about Mach 10). Simulation studies on the Edwards simulation
showed that the test pilots could establish a series of selected bank angles and angles of
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attack, and stabilize at each condition for data gathering purposes during the initial phase of
entry. While performing these tests, they were able to simultaneously monitor the energy
management task so as to keep the desired landing site within the vehicle's capability. They
could choose to stop doing tests at any time and concentrate on the energy management task
of flying to the selected landing site.
Considering the strong probability that the aerodynamics and operation of subsystems would
NOT have been exactly as predicted, the pilot work load during an X-20 entry would have
been very high. (On the first X-15 flight after installation of the MH-96 control system, all
three axes failed to the manual-direct mode at launch. All were successfully reset, but the
pitch axis tripped, and was reset, 16 more times by pilot Neil Armstrong before landing.)
End: Hoey
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Bruce Peterson and the M2-F2
The M2-F1, HL-10, and the M2-F2
by Bruce Peterson May 1994
The M2-F1 Handling Qualities
The M2-F1 had a conventional canopy design, a nose window, and a left side window on the
forward fuselage. The transparencies had fairly good optical qualities although the nose
window had a fairly small field of view. The left side window was generally used only for
space positioning during left hand turns. The flight profiles were set up so that all major
turning was to the left.
When the aircraft was towed, either by ground tow vehicles or airplane (C-47), the primary
viewing was through the canopy. When the aircraft was rotated to the takeoff position, the
nose window was the primary source of visibility. The curvature of the nose window and the
limited field of view decreased the pilots ability to see attitude changes and hampered depth
perception. When being towed by the C-47, the M2-F1 took off before the C-47 so as to stay
out of the slipstream of the C-47 and to have good visibility of the tow aircraft through the
nose window.
As I recall, the tow speed was about 95 knots. We towed to altitudes as high as 14,000 ft
MSL (about 12,000 feet above the ground). When reaching the correct altitude and position
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over the ground, we lined up directly behind, and about 50 to 75 feet above the tow aircraft.
This minimized lateral or directional transients and kept us out of the tow aircraft slipstream
when the tow rope was released. Immediately after release a turn was made, usually to the
left, to keep out of the turbulence from the tow plane.
The test maneuvers were then flown. On completion of the tests, the aircraft was on final
approach. Pre-flare airspeed was about 110 knots and the flare to landing started about 300
feet above the lakebed. During the flare, viewing was transferred from the canopy to the
nose window. That was when depth perception became somewhat more difficult. This fact
contributed to at least one hard landing.
Directional control of the M2-F1 on the ground was accomplished through the use of
differential braking when the nose wheel was on the ground, and with rudders with the nose
off the ground. Once airborne heading control was accomplished with the lateral stick which
controlled the outboard lateral control surfaces. Rudder was not used due to lag in control
response and the high roll-to-sideslip characteristics.
The M2-F1 also had adverse yaw due to lateral stick inputs. Coupled with this was the high
roll-to-sideslip characteristic. This caused an interesting control response: If you wished to
turn left, you would apply left stick. The immediate aircraft reaction was a slight left yaw
and right roll. After about one second the lateral control would overcome the roll due to
sideslip and the aircraft would then roll to the left, as commanded. This characteristic was
particularly noticeable while being towed. During towing the pilot gain is high, that is the
pilot tries to make corrections as quickly as possible. The tendency was to correct for the
initial roll that was in the wrong (uncommanded) direction. If you fell into this trap you
could be in a lateral directional pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) very quickly. In fact, I
believe that is why one pilot did lose control and ended up doing a complete roll while on
tow. He did this on both of his tows from behind the C-47. In both cases he released from
tow and landed safely. This pilot had very fast reactions which caused the PIO. Once off
tow this characteristic was not so disconcerting since pilot gain was reduced and the aircraft
only appeared to have a slight lag to lateral control inputs.
The M2-F1 in free flight had fairly good handling characteristics. Pitch control was positive
and well damped. Steady state sideslips could be accomplished smoothly, although it
required high pilot concentration. Control harmony between lateral and directional control
was good if controls were applied slowly and smoothly. Level flight sideslips were
accomplished to the maximum when lateral and directional controls were both at their
maximum deflections.
The main landing gear used regular light aircraft wheels and brakes. The shock absorbers
were Sears automotive shocks. These were filled with 90-weight oil to give them the desired
shock absorbing characteristics for typical summer temperatures. In December 1963, on a
cold day, a hard landing was made. The shock absorbers were very stiff due to the cold
temperature. This combination caused both of the main wheels to break off on landing.
Fortunately both wheels failed at the same time allowing the M2-F1 to decelerate rapidly, but
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straight ahead. No braking was required! On subsequent flights the shocks were replaced
with bungee cords.
The aircraft had a small solid rocket engine to provide thrust to help in landing if extra
energy was needed. This rocket provided about 250 pounds of thrust for about 10 seconds.
The thrust vector was through the M2-F1's center of gravity. The ignition of the rocket
motor caused almost no transients and the motor performed as expected. This engine was
tested on ground taxi tests and in-flight during landing approaches. The rocket was used on
two occasions to extend the flight time following emergency releases from the tow plane at
low altitude.
The flight tests of the M2-F1 gave confidence that the heavy weight Lifting Body Program
was feasible from a handling qualities, flight controls, and approach and landing (low L/D)
standpoint. The M2-F1 program solved one part of the puzzle regarding the feasibility of
using a Lifting Body for a space reentry vehicle to achieve a preplanned horizontal landing.
The HL-10 Handling Qualities
These pilot comments are limited to the configuration of the HL-10 on its first flight only.
After the first flight the aircraft outboard fins were redesigned to remedy some of the
problems observed on the first flight of the HL-10.
The HL-10 had a canopy that was conformal with the aerodynamic mold line. Forward of
the canopy bow there was a conformal transparency. The blunt nose was entirely transparent
and fairly close to the pilot. This arrangement gave the pilot a good field of view. The shape
of the nose window caused a visual distortion so that the pilot was closer to the runway than
visually perceived. This problem occurred during the landing flare when the pilot transferred
his vision from the canopy to the nose window. A true perception of altitude did not occur
until the aircraft reached a very low altitude.
The first launch of the HL-10 (December 22, 1966) from the B-52 was at 45,000 ft and .65
Mach No. The launch was very positive with only a slight roll and yaw excursion. The
aircraft was well trimmed in all three axes. Immediately after launch a high frequency
vibration was noted that increased in severity as speed increased. It appeared obvious the
problem was in the flight control system. The ground station, which was monitoring many
aircraft parameters through a telemetry system, identified the problem as a limit cycle in the
yaw axis. The pilot had control of the gain on all of these flight control axes in the cockpit.
The yaw gain was lowered and the major vibration went away.
The ground station also noted a small amplitude limit cycle in the pitch axis but this was not
as apparent to the pilot. Several pitch control gains were made during the flight as directed
by the ground station. Pitch sensitivity was high, and increased with speed.
One of the planned maneuvers during the flight was to do a practice landing flare at altitude
to give confidence that the actual flare to landing would not present a problem. As the
aircraft slowed and as the nose came up toward a landing attitude, the aircraft did not respond
properly to roll commands. The stick ended up full left and aft with the aircraft not
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responding. The nose was pushed over and normal roll control returned. The reason for this
problem was not determined by the pilot or the ground station.
The pilot immediately decided that the only way he could make a successful landing was to
keep the angle of attack low (high speed) and land before lateral (roll) control and possibly
pitch control was lost. The planned preflare airspeed was about 300 knots indicated airspeed
(KIAS). The pilot nosed over early in the approach to get airspeed up to about 340 KIAS, so
that the handling qualities could be evaluated while altitude and time were still available to
make an ejection if the aircraft became unflyable. Pitch limit cycle again appeared and the
pitch gain again reduced. Pitch control became very sensitive but remained manageable. The
landing flare was initiated at about 320 KIAS. The flare was competed at about 30 feet
altitude. The final part of the flare had a small, but abrupt, nose up command when the pilot
realized he was closer to the ground than he thought he was earlier in the flare. He put the
gear down at higher than planned speed, so he could land before any loss of control. Landing
was at about 280 KIAS. The aircraft became slightly airborne after initial landing probably
due to the pitch sensitivity. Landing rollout and braking was as expected. Flight time was 3
minutes and 9 seconds.
The problem of the limit cycle was shortly solved. Control effectiveness was higher than
predicted by wind tunnel testing. There was a feedback through the SAS (stability
augmentation system). This problem was solved by reducing SAS gains and altering the
filters in the SAS electronics. The problem of stick sensitivity was solved by a simple
reduction in the stick-to-elevator gearing.
The reason for the loss of lateral and pitch control at high angles of attack was difficult to
determine. A great deal of analysis of the data was required. The final conclusion was that
there was an airflow separation over the control surfaces at the higher angles of attack
(AOA). This caused the loss of hinge moment (control effectiveness) and thus loss of
control. The problem was isolated to flow separation over the outboard vertical fins. The fix
to the problem was to add camber to the outboard vertical fins. This modification was
accomplished along with changes in the flight control system and the second flight of the
HL-10 was flown on March 15, 1968. All of the changes were successful and the HL-10
landed with no problems.

The M2-F2 Handling Qualities
The M2-F2 canopy was a bubble above the mold line of the basic aerodynamic shape. The
cockpit was farther forward than the M2-F1. The M2-F2 also had a nose window that was
needed for the final approach and landing. This combination gave the pilot reasonably good
vision in all phases of flight. Unlike the HL-10, forward visibility through the window did
not give an allusion of higher-than-actual altitude above the ground.
Upon launch from the B-52 at 45,000 feet and .65 Mach number, a roll and yaw excursion
occurred that was very brief. The launch was very positive. The aircraft flew very much as
wind tunnel tests, T-33 variable stability tests, and simulation had predicted. The only
exception was the low angle of attack characteristics.
149
Flight tests with the variable stability T-33 (CALSPAN) showed a lateral directional
instability at low angle of attack during the approach to landing. However, this problem
occurred when the aircraft was just outside the flight envelope of "valid simulation". It was
thought that the automatic (and pilot adjustable) aileron-to-rudder interconnect would
compensate for this problem. This problem did show up on several flights. On at least one
flight, the problem was deemed to be a mis-setting of the aileron /rudder interconnect. The
"slight" lateral directional instability showed up on other flights at low angle of attack during
landing approach.
On May 10, 1967, flight 16 of the M2-F2, the flight was to be terminated with a lower angle
of attack on final approach than had been previously flown. As the angle of attack was
lowered, the nose suddenly moved right (then thought to be wind shear affects brought about
by a sudden increase of wind from the west on the lakebed ). The pilot applied left rudder to
bring the nose left, but encountered a severe lateral-directional oscillation. These oscillations
caused the pilot to slam his head on the canopy, dazing him. The pilot knew he had to
increase angle of attack to recover, but had to do it so he would be wings level on recovery to
accomplish a landing. Recovery was made, but the designated runway was off-line, and no
altitude was available to make a correction. A rescue helicopter was hovering at the new
point of intended landing, and the pilot called the helicopter to move west. The pilot fired
the emergency landing rockets to give him more time to execute the landing and to land
under or just behind the helicopter. Since runway markers were no longer available, depth
perception was a problem. Either due to the lack of depth perception or the rotor wash of the
helicopter, the M2-F2 was closer to the lakebed than perceived. The landing gear was
lowered, but one gear door struck the lake bed before the landing gear was fully extended.
This caused the M2-F2 to roll and tumble a number of times before coming to rest inverted
on the lake bed.
The pilot was severely injured, as was the M2-F2.
The M2-F2 was rebuilt as the M2-F3. The major modification was the addition of a middle
vertical tail to resolve the lateral-directional problem.
End: Peterson
The HL-10, M2-F3, X-24A, and X-24B
By John Manke July 1994
The following handling qualities evaluations are based on my 42 flights in the four lifting
bodies: 10 in the HL-10, 12 in the X-24A, 4 in the M2-F3, and 16 in the X-24B.
The primary similarities between the 4 vehicles are:
1) Performance parameters such as: L/D, maximum Mach number, maximum altitude, angle
of attack range, approach and landing airspeeds and altitudes, were very similar.
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2) They all utilized two basic flight control configurations: a subsonic configuration and a
transonic configuration. To provide adequate stability and control at transonic speeds and
above, the control surfaces are wedged open in the transonic configuration. It was
characterized by high drag, with a maximum L/D too low to be able to successfully perform
a power off, horizontal landing. Subsonically, the control surfaces could be boat-tailed to
reduce drag and provide an L/D that was adequate for approach and landing. This
"configuration change" is well documented in other parts of this report.
3) They all flew the same basic trajectories.
Basic Lifting Body Trajectories
The first few flights in each of the lifting body programs were glide flights. A glide flight
consisted of carrying the lifting body to a predetermined altitude under the wing of a B-52
bomber, releasing and gliding to a lakebed landing. The rocket engine was not utilized
during the glide flights, consequently, the maximum Mach number of about 0.75, and total
flight time of approximately 4 minutes, were minimal. The glide flights were made to
provide a cautious expansion of the Mach envelope, to optimize the energy management
task, and to provide pilot and system checkouts under optimum conditions.
For a powered flight "word picture", I will describe a typical X-24B powered flight.
Immediately after launching from the B-52 at about 0.7 Mach number and 45,000 feet, the
pilot began the rocket engine-light sequence. The pilot could select two, three, or four thrust
chambers, depending on the planned profile requirements. One chamber did not provide
sufficient thrust to maintain level flight.
During the first 70 to 80 seconds of the flight, the pilot's primary control parameters were
angle of attack and pitch attitude. Generally, the initial rotation was at as high an angle of
attack as possible commensurate with adequate handling qualities. This was to get the
aircraft out of the dense atmosphere as quickly as possible and into higher altitudes where
rocket engines are most effective. Typical pitch attitudes during climb out were in the 45 to
55 degree range. At approximately 0.7 Mach number the pilot would reconfigure the aircraft
to the transonic configuration. Before reaching 0.9 Mach number, usually at an altitude
between 60,000 ft. and 65,000 ft., angle of attack was reduced somewhat to stay clear of a
known area of reduced lateral-directional stability. At about 1.2 Mach number, a pushover to
a programmed low angle of attack was initiated to allow the aircraft to accelerate to the
planned maximum Mach number for the flight.
The powered portion of the flight was terminated either by a pilot-actuated engine shutdown
or fuel burnout, depending on the desired maximum Mach number. On a typical flight,
shutdown occurred at about Mach 1.7 and at an altitude of approximately 70,000 feet, after
132 seconds of rocket burn time.
After engine shutdown, the glide descent portion of the profile began. It was during this
portion of the flight that the majority of the flight test data was gathered, because the aircraft
was free of power effects. This portion of the flight, from shutdown to the beginning of the
approach and landing phase was of about 3 minutes duration, so you can appreciate the
151
necessity of comprehensive pre-flight planning to best utilize this short time period. Because
of the rapid deceleration after shutdown, the duration of prime data time, which is defined as
the time during which the vehicle flies above the maximum Mach number previously
investigated, was usually only 10 to 15 seconds. The primary piloting task after shutdown
was to arrive at planned Mach number and angle of attack combinations and perform stability
and control, performance, or structural loads determination maneuvers as required. Because
of the high drag of this type vehicle, it was not possible to stabilize at the higher Mach
numbers. The data had to be acquired while passing through the desired test points. At some
of the lower Mach numbers, approximately Mach 1.1 and below, we could occasionally
stabilize for 5 to 10 seconds. The maneuvers performed by the pilot for data acquisition
purposes consisted primarily of the following: rudder doublets followed by aileron doublets
for lateral-directional stability and control, pitch pulses for longitudinal stability and control,
slow pushover-pullups for lift and drag and trim data, steady state sideslips and slow sideslip
sweeps for pressures and loads data. In addition to the maneuvers, the pilot performed
energy management tasks as required.
At approximately 30,000 feet, the pilot reconfigured the aircraft to the subsonic configuration
to provide a L/D range sufficient for approach and landing. At about 24,000 ft., the pilot
began a 180 degree approach attaining 280 to 300 KIAS on the final glide slope. The flare
was begun at about 1000 feet above the surface and touchdown occurred about 25 seconds
later at about 180 to 200 KIAS. Total flight time for a powered flight was 7 to 8 minutes.
Profiles for the other lifting bodies were similar except for event timing and engine burn
times.
The piloting task was very busy and required considerable concentration and pre-flight
training. I was never able to look out of the cockpit and enjoy the scenery until reaching the
altitude to begin the approach and landing phase.Typical time in the fixed base simulators
averaged about 20 hours per flight. In addition we flew 10 to 15 flights in an F-104 aircraft
configured to represent the particular vehicle L/D characteristics during the approach and
landing phase. The following handling qualities comments are all based on the piloting tasks
required to fly the profiles just described.
HL-10 and X-24A Handling Qualities
Since the HL-10, X-24A, and the M2-F3 are generally similar in planform and basic shape,
and exhibit many aerodynamic similarities, I will loosely group them together. However, the
M2-F3 comments will be more focused, as my four flights were done at the latter part of the
program after much of the early development had been completed.
General Flight Behavior
In general, lifting body vehicles fly like conventional aircraft, although they do not behave
like their winged counterparts in every detail. In the subsonic configuration, the HL-10
handling qualities were as good as or better than those of most current fighter aircraft. In this
configuration with dampers on, pilot ratings indicate that pilot compensation was not
required for adequate performance. With all dampers off, the HL-10 handled better than an
F-104 airplane with its dampers off. The HL-10 did exhibit an area of high pitch sensitivity
in the approach. This will be discussed in more detail later. In the subsonic configuration,
the X-24A exhibited some lateral-directional problems during the first few flights, mostly
152
associated with upsets due to turbulence. Control system modifications and changes in roll
and yaw damper gains improved the handling qualities so that they were as good as the HL-
10 vehicle. In fact, the longitudinal handling qualities of the X-24A were superior to those of
the HL-10 during the approach and landing. It should be mentioned here that these lateral-
directional upsets due to turbulence were of considerable concern to the pilots early in the
program. The culprit was the extremely high dihedral effect characteristic of these shapes,
somewhere in the range of 5 to 10 times that of the conventional fighter aircraft that we were
flying at the time. After we tamed the excursions somewhat with control systems
modifications and, through experience, realized that the aircraft would not "un-cork", we
learned to live with it and not to be unduly concerned. The experience factor in dealing with
unconventional aircraft has a profound effect on pilot perceptions. When the hair on the back
of your neck goes up, you tend to be highly critical of the situation; however, once you
realize that vehicle response is not life threatening, you are able to ignore the problem and fly
right through it. Our initial impressions of these vehicles were obviously based on our
experiences flying conventional fighter aircraft. Anything radically different tended to raise
a red flag until the condition was thoroughly analyzed.
For the HL-10 in the transonic configuration, handling qualities did not change significantly
with increasing Mach number, except that damping seemed to decrease somewhat.
Dampers-on handling qualities were superb. With dampers off, the HL-10 handling qualities
were surprisingly good. Considerable maneuvering was performed, and numerous
configuration changes were made with all dampers off. Pilot ratings indicated that
considerable pilot compensation was required for desired performance but was primarily a
nuisance factor. All pilots believed that the vehicle was completely flyable with the dampers
off in this configuration, and that a mission could be completed successfully. Typical pilot
comments indicated that with the dampers off, the vehicle had high control sensitivity in the
roll axis and particularly good damping in the pitch axis. In the transonic configuration, the
primary difference between the X-24A and the HL-10 was that the X-24A had considerably
lower roll response than the HL-10, however, the response was considered adequate for the
mission. Because of the extremely high dihedral effect of the X-24A, small angles of
sideslip excursions frequently produced nuisance type roll inputs.
Longitudinal Handling Characteristics
In general, the longitudinal handling qualities of the HL-10 and the X-24A were conventional
except for a few trim change problems that seem to be inherent to this class of vehicle. The
M2-F3 had some serious shortcomings during rotation after launch; these will be discussed
later. One of the major concerns, before the HL-10 was flown in the transonic configuration,
was the predicted large longitudinal trim change resulting from transitioning between the
subsonic and transonic configurations. Simulation studies had indicated that relatively large
excursions in angle of attack and normal acceleration would occur during the transition
because of the large change required in longitudinal stick position. The studies also indicated
that the best technique would be to change configuration in several steps. We were
pleasantly surprised in flight, as maintaining a constant angle of attack during the
configuration change was no problem. We were able to maintain nearly constant angle of
attack despite the large change in longitudinal stick position in the 5 seconds it took to
reconfigure the vehicle. Additionally, we found that the best technique was to change the
153
configuration in one continuous motion. Apparently, the motion and visual cues in actual
flight significantly reduced the piloting task.
The configuration change for the X-24A was not a problem at all. In this vehicle, the rudder
wedge position was biased automatically as a function of deflection of the upper flaps to
significantly reduce the trim change. The rudder bias provided a pitching moment that
counteracted the pitching moment of the flaps.HL-10 simulation studies indicated a sizable
pitch trim change in the Mach range of 0.95 to 1.0, but also indicated that this region would
be traversed at a rate that would present no great piloting problem. In flight, however, most
of the trim change occurred in a much smaller Mach number range, between 0.97 and0.96.
During the deceleration phase of the flight, this Mach range was crossed so rapidly that the
trim change appeared to me as a constant speed pitchup - which immediately got my
undivided attention! With more experience, we found that there was an optimum angle of
attack that could be used to minimize the pitchup problem. In addition, the time of onset
could be predicted accurately, therefore, on later flights the pitchup never came as a surprise.
This area was eventually traversed with the pitch damper off with no significant problems.
One of the lessons learned was that wind-tunnel data should be obtained at very close
intervals near Mach 1 in order to have the best information possible with which to analyze
any transonic trim change.
During the powered flight portion of the HL-10 program, no significant trim change due to
rocket engine thrust was detected. The X-24A vehicle, on the other hand, exhibited a marked
pitch-up trim change with engine thrust. Computations indicated that a misalignment of
approximately 7 inches between the rocket engine centerline and the vehicle center of gravity
would be required to account for the flight-measured trim change. However, precise
measurements indicated a misalignment of less than 2 inches. We were never able to
conclusively account for the effect, however, it was suspected that aerodynamic effects
resulting from the engine exhaust plume contributed significantly to the problem. In
powered flight, the X-24A exhaust plume was deflected upward in rooster tail fashion.
Because it was a nose-up trim change, the upward deflected plume is probably significant.
Effects such as this are virtually impossible to predict prior to flight. As a result of this trim
change with thrust, the low angles of attack originally predicted during powered flight could
not be attained. The X-24A also exhibited a marked change in directional stability with
power. This will be commented on later.
An undesirable characteristic of the M2-F2, M2-F3, and the X-24A, in the category of a trim
change, was a substantial nose-down pitching moment at landing gear extension. In all
lifting body flights the landing gear was extended just before touchdown. The reason for this
was that the landing-gear-down configuration drastically reduced the L/D ratio and could
very easily compromise the final approach portion of the landing pattern. Because of this
gear transient, touchdown on one of the early M2-F2 flights occurred less than 1 second after
gear extension. This particular characteristic caused us pilots a great deal of concern,
particularly on our first few flights. We eventually learned to partially compensate for the
effect by leading with aft stick motion, but even then it was considered unsatisfactory. For
an operational vehicle, this would have to be remedied. The gear transient of the HL-10 was
not objectionable.
154
The longitudinal handling qualities on the early flights of the HL-10 vehicle demonstrated a
pilot-induced-oscillation (PIO) tendency. The reason for this was that we originally thought
we would require 60 degrees of elevon throw to provide adequate pitch control throughout
the flight envelope. Total stick throw for this deflection was only 9 inches. After the first
flight, it was apparent that the gearing ratio had to be decreased. Flight data indicated that
only 38 degrees of total elevator travel would be necessary to cover the required Mach/angle-
of-attack envelope. We tried several ranges of gearing ratios before we arrived at a
satisfactory one. The final configuration was non-linear to provide the lower gearing required
for landing and, at the same time, provide for the elevator range required for supersonic trim.
The final configuration required about 2 inches of longitudinal stick deflection for approach
and landing. The first flight required less than 1 inch! Even with the final gearing, we found
the vehicle to be quite sensitive during the landing phase, but it was acceptable. It should be
pointed out that these changes to the control system were possible only because the original
design provided the mechanism with which the control system could be modified quickly.
This built-in flexibility was a feature of all the lifting bodies, a real credit to the systems
designers!
Lateral-Directional Handling Characteristics
The HL-10, X-24A, and M2-F3 have many similar lateral-directional characteristics. They
have relatively high dihedral effect and low rolling moments of inertia, and they may have
relatively low directional stability. Natural roll damping, normally provided by wings, was
conspicuously absent. The lateral control surfaces were necessarily quite close to the rolling
axis and were relatively ineffective. Due to the large dihedral effect, the rolling moment
caused by a rudder deflection could very often be larger than the rolling moment that could
be produced by the ailerons. These effects combined to produce some unusual dynamic
lateral responses to control inputs and turbulence. As the X-24A flight envelope was
expanded beyond Mach 1, a completely unexpected phenomenon developed - the rocket
engine had a pronounced effect on vehicle directional stability. At mid-range angles of
attack, static directional stability was less than zero. From a piloting standpoint this did not
pose a big problem other than to make the aircraft appear to be sluggish, and occasionally, to
require a modest amount of aileron to keep wings level. This phenomenon would disappear
at engine shut down.
Another area of concern from a piloting standpoint in the X-24A was an apparent roll
reversal that occurred in the transonic region at moderate angles of attack. When I first
encountered it in flight, it was a bit disconcerting even though it had been predicted. It was
quite easily overcome by judicious use of the rudder for roll control. Fortunately the
designers had built in the capability to provide for a rudder-to-aileron interconnect that, when
ratioed properly, completely eliminated the problem. The interconnect was also used on the
M2-F2, but was not required on the HL-10 and the M2-F3.
M2-F3 Handling Qualities
This report is based on the four flights that I flew in the M2-F3. Because of the low number
of flights flown and the fact that they came at the end of the program, this is not intended to
be a comprehensive documentation of the M2-F3 flight characteristics. I've divided it into
155
three parts based on control system configuration: I. The Basic Airplane; II. The Command
Augmentation System (CAS); and III. The Reaction Augmentation System (RAS).
I. The Basic Airplane
The most difficult and most disconcerting part of each flight was the constant angle of attack
portion of the initial rotation just after launch. The shape of the elevator angle versus angle
of attack curve was such that almost any angle of attack was possible with any given elevator
setting. This, coupled with large trim changes with Mach number in the transonic range,
made precise control of angle of attack during this portion of the flight impossible. Adequate
performance required an excessive amount of pilot compensation. Further compounding the
situation was the knowledge that a pitch-up existed if angle of attack was allowed to exceed a
certain value. I was certainly not satisfied with my ability to maintain a relatively constant
angle of attack during rotation. At low angles of attack, the longitudinal characteristics were
much better, with a comment that pilot compensation was not a factor in achieving desired
performance.
Supersonically, the M2-F3 was similar to the X-24A in that things seemed to smooth out and
the handling qualities were, in general,very good. As in the X-24A the control sensitivity
decreases considerably when supersonic, this did not present a problem, in fact, it made for a
very pleasant flying airplane.
In general, during the launch, rotation, and climb phase of the flight, the lateral-directional
axes were never a concern and received high pilot ratings. Because of the difficulty in
performing the pitch task during the boost portion of the flight, very little time was allowed
to assess lateral-directional handling qualities. A testimony to the excellent lateral-
directional characteristics is the fact that they could be ignored while concentrating on the
pitch task.
Occasionally during the climb, I would get a spurious "wing" drop for no apparent reason.
This same phenomenon occurred very frequently on the X-24A. It would seem that the
theory that the "wing" drops are caused by climbing through wind shears is indeed a correct
explanation.
A closer look at lateral-directional characteristics was allowed after engine shutdown. With
SAS on, they were outstanding. With SAS off and at low angle of attack, roll sensitivity was
very high, reminiscent of the X-24A. In this configuration it was very easy to get into a PIO.
I felt that desired performance in this area required excessive pilot compensation. Rudder
sensitivity was very low in all areas tested, but since rudder was never utilized by the pilot
except to perform pulses, this was not considered a problem. Because of the large pitch trim
change experienced during the configuration change, this portion of the flight for all lifting
bodies had been approached cautiously. Of the three lifting bodies, the M2-F2 exhibited the
least troublesome characteristics. As with the HL-10 and X-24A, the M2-F3 exhibited
excellent handling qualities and flight characteristics during the approach and landing. Since
the approach L/D was a bit lower in the M2-F3, the approach pattern altitudes were
somewhat higher, but with the excellent simulation afforded by the F-104's, it presented no
problems. The "riding qualities" in turbulence were better in the M2-F3 than in the other two
156
lifting bodies. The response to turbulence was not nearly as quick as in the other two, instead
it responded more like an F-104 in that it was manifested primarily as normal acceleration
inputs rather than rapid roll inputs as in the X-24A.
All final approaches were flown with plenty of energy (300 KIAS or more) to insure
adequate time from flare to touchdown. My 4 approaches were very comfortable. Visibility
was considered good using just the canopy and not the nose window. Depth perception
during the last 5 feet was not too good, but was considered adequate. I did notice a tendency
for a slight PIO after gear deployment, but not severe enough to be of concern. All
touchdowns were smooth with the roll out reminiscent of the X-24A except for less
directional control both aerodynamically and with wheel brakes.
II. The Command Augmentation System
The Command Augmentation System (CAS) and its associated angle-of-attack hold feature
were welcomed additions to the aircraft. A CAS is particularly effective in an aircraft that
experiences so many pitch trim changes with Mach number as does the M2-F3.
On my CAS evaluation flight, an essentially hands-off boost (in pitch) was flown. The
aircraft was rotated to 14 degrees angle of attack at which point the angle-of-attack hold was
engaged. With no pilot inputs, angle of attack was observed to drift more than desired, + or -
1/2 degree. If I had not been prepared for this, it may have been disconcerting, especially
when the angle of attack drifted above 14 degrees. Apparently this was the bandidth of the
angle-of-attack hold feature and once I realized this, my apprehension disappeared. As the
aircraft reached 40 degrees pitch angle, the angle-of-attack hold was disengaged. With no
pilot input, and thus a 0 pitch rate commanded, the CAS held the aircraft at precisely 40
degrees. The rate command loop appeared to be much tighter than the angle-of-attack hold
loop. I rated this portion of the flight considerably higher than I had rated the basic aircraft
for the same task. Another area in which the angle-of-attack hold feature was particularly
useful was the configuration change. As previously mentioned, the pitch trim change is very
large when the aircraft is reconfigured. On my CAS flight a "hands off" configuration
change was performed utilizing angle-of-attack hold. I rated the task very high.
The mechanization of the angle-of-attack hold system had one glaring deficiency. The side
controller had to be in a "hard-to-find" detent located at the stick center position. If the stick
was not in the detent, angle-of-attack hold could not be engaged. Because of the very narrow
detent and the low break-out forces, the detent was very difficult to find and to hold,
particularly during dynamic situations such as during turns and during situations that required
both pitch and roll inputs to the side stick. The use of pressure suit gloves further
compounded the problem. My first attempt to use angle-of-attack hold in a positioning turn
required considerable pilot compensation to perform the task. I was forced to disengage the
hold mode and concentrate on the task at hand. I found that experience and practice in the
simulator with a pressure suit glove alleviated the problem somewhat, but it still was not
satisfactory. From the time after the configuration change through the landing, the control
task became similar to that encountered in conventional aircraft flying; that is, precise control
of angle of attack is not a requirement. Under these conditions the angle-of-attack hold
feature used in conjunction with the rate command of the CAS provided a near ideal control
157
system. With rate command alone, if the stick is centered, the pitch rate commanded is 0.
This means that in an unpowered vehicle, in all probability, angle of attack and thus airspeed
will be changing. This would require constant attention of the pilot to stay on top of the
situation. If on the other hand, angle-of-attack hold is engaged whenever the stick is
centered, the pilot knows exactly what the aircraft is going to do, and consequently, he can
direct some of his attention to other tasks such as the "housekeeping" chores necessary to
prepare for landing. It was this aspect of the CAS/angle-of-attack hold combination that I
felt offered the greatest promise.
III. The Reaction Augmentation System
One of the most interesting aspects of my exposure to the M2-F3 was the utilization of the
Reaction Augmentation System (RAS) in the pitch axis. The pitch RAS was used as a
substitute or replacement for the normal pitch SAS. It is significant that the pitch axis was
the most challenging axis of the M2-F3 and that there were certain areas that it was felt that
with 0 pitch damping, successful completion of a flight would be questionable. On my last
flight, RAS was used as the only pitch damping through many of these questionable areas.
At worst, I felt it was equivalent to about 1/2 the normal SAS gain. In some areas, I would be
hard pressed to determine the difference between the RAS and an optimized SAS. I felt that I
would have no qualms about landing the aircraft utilizing only RAS in the pitch axis. This
was significant, as it was universally felt that a successful landing without pitch SAS would
be very questionable.
As on my SAS M2-F3 flights, the most difficult control task occurred during the boost.
Although we had RAS damping, it must be remembered that longitudinal trim was still
aerodynamic through elevator position, consequently, the piloting task was still monumental
in attempting to keep up with the many transonic trim changes. I felt that the damping was
not as good on this flight during the boost as it had been on my SAS flight, but it must be
remembered that I had estimated the SAS pitch gain to be over twice that of the RAS. The
configuration change utilizing RAS was great and received a very high pilot rating.
The four flights went extremely well and presented no surprises. This was due almost
entirely to a superb simulation and an excellent pre-flight briefing by the M2-F3 project pilot
and project engineer.
X-24B Handling Qualities
This discussion format will be a bit different, as I will, for the most part, compare the X-24B
handling qualities with the other vehicles. Two major differences between the X-24B and
the other vehicles were: (1) unlike the others, the X-24B had ailerons, consequently,
adequate roll control power in all flight regimes, and (2) it did not have the very high
dihedral effect of the other three, in fact, its dihedral effect was lower than that of many
winged aircraft.
Subsonic Configuration Handling Qualities
The X-24B, in this flight regime exhibited better handling qualities than any of the other
lifting bodies, evidenced by very high pilot ratings. It was flown in this region with all
dampers off quite frequently. With all dampers off it showed only a slight degradation in
158
pilot ratings. On one occasion, I flew the entire approach pattern, except for the flare and
landing, with all dampers off. My post flight comment was, "It just flew like a champ." In
fact, if you put somebody in the airplane who hadnt flown it before, and had him fly it with
dampers off in this configuration, I dont think hed tell you that the airplane even needed
dampers. Thats the sort of feeling I got. The degradation in handling and riding qualities in
turbulence during approach and landing with the other 3 lifting bodies was a continuing
problem. The X-24B, on the other hand, exhibited absolutely superb handling and riding
qualities during this phase. The primary reason for this was the much lower dihedral effect.
Even when flying in significant levels of turbulence, the X-24B received very high pilot
ratings.
Transonic Configuration Handling Qualities
The transonic range provided the most surprises and offered the biggest challenge to the
stability and control experts and to the pilots. The major cause of the problems experienced
in the transonic and supersonic flight regimes was a significant reduction in lateral-
directional stability derivatives with the rocket engine running. This effect was expected to a
degree, as we had experienced it to some extent with the X-24A. This effect manifested
itself as non-periodic sideslip excursions in the transonic Mach range, and also at Mach
numbers above 1.3. On my first exposure to it, I was not sure whether the aircraft was going
to diverge in sideslip. The only thing that kept me from shutting down the rocket engine was
the fact that I had excellent rudder response, thus I was able to maintain sideslip to a
reasonable value. The major drawback to this was that I was devoting a considerable amount
of attention and time to the lateral-directional task that would normally be spent controlling
the profile. I rated this condition quite low and indicated that extensive pilot compensation
was required for adequate performance. As previously mentioned, aircraft of this type
occasionally show dramatic changes in aerodynamic characteristics with very small changes
in Mach number and angle of attack in this transonic region. The next flight showed that by
decreasing angle of attack by only 2 degrees in this region, the handling qualities were very
acceptable. Although this did have an effect on total performance, we were able to continue
with our envelope expansion flights by using a reduced angle of attack above Mach 1.3.
Later in the program, a control system modification in the form of a lateral acceleration
feedback loop, and increased confidence in the basic stability of the aircraft, allowed us to fly
through this area at the higher angles of attack.
Another characteristic of the X-24B, as well as the other lifting bodies, was the large
longitudinal trim change and decrease in elevator authority as the aircraft accelerated beyond
Mach 0.95. The trim change increased the piloting task considerably, since constant
attention was required to precisely control angle of attack during this portion of the flight.
The reduced elevator authority drastically limited the angle of attack that could be
investigated above Mach 1. For example, for the X-24B, the total available angle of attack
range at Mach 1.6 was considerably less than one-half that available at Mach 0.5. In spite of
these irregularities, the X-24B was considered a superb flying machine in the transonic and
supersonic ranges.
159
Concluding Remarks
From my standpoint as a research pilot, the lifting body programs were extremely interesting,
challenging and highly successful. As a project pilot, Ive attempted to extract what I would
consider the salient features responsible for these successes. I will call them "Guides to
Success," and I highly recommend them for any advanced flight vehicle program:
(1)Built-in Control System Flexibility
There are always unpredicted problems, and it is much simpler to change a gain setting than
to redesign and rebuild a control system in an existing aircraft.
(2) Intelligent Wind Tunnel Data Analysis
This is probably the most important. The backbone of any high performance research flight
vehicle program is the flight simulator. It is the primary tool for pre-flight planning and pilot
training. The accuracy of a simulator is only as good as the wind tunnel data and subsequent
flight data that is loaded into its memory banks. Wind tunnel data, by themselves, do not
begin to tell the story of a flight vehicle. It is the interpretation of these data by engineers,
highly experienced in the flight characteristics of the vehicle type, that insures a high fidelity
simulation. These unique interpretations techniques are not learned from text books or from
conventional aircraft technology, they must be developed by experience in vehicle type. Our
X-24B simulation was, unquestionably, the best of its time. The reason for this was that
most of the aerodynamicists responsible for interpreting X-24B wind tunnel data and
programming it into the simulator, were involved with the three previous lifting body
programs. Some even worked with the X-15 program.
(3) Early Integration of the Pilot into the Program
The complete integration of the pilot into the program at the earliest possible time is
essential. Handling qualities specifications relate and integrate a variety of experience and
background and, therefore, form a useful guide to a designer. However, they dont answer
many crucial design questions. If the proper simulation techniques are used, a team of
experienced test pilots, working with engineers, can establish the best compromises, of which
there will be many, of basic stability, control, and augmentation tradeoffs for specific
missions. In all such studies, a careful estimate of possible uncertainties in critical stability
and control parameters should be made and the design decision should be based on the most
pessimistic derivatives. This philosophy was utilized throughout the lifting body programs
and, in my opinion, the results have been outstanding.
160
Appendix C
Lifting Body Flight Log
Part One: Light Weight; M2-F1
Key to Flight Nomenclature
Light Weight M2-F1
ABT Airborne time J. R. Vensel (JRV) Chief of Operations
FF Free Flight P. F. Bikle (PFB) Director of Center
GRD Ground M. O. Thompson (MOT) Test Pilot
LDG Landing D. E. Beeler (DEB) Deputy Director
P/C-47 Car & Air Tow

Heavy Weight Lifting Bodies: M2-F2, M2-F3, HL-10, X-24A, X-24B
FLIGHT Flight Number Identification
Example: M-11-18
M Vehicle Type
-11
-18
M = M2-F2 or M2-F3
H = HL-10
X = X-24A
B = X-24B
Sequential number of launches for vehicle
(C = planned captive) (A = aborted
launch)
Sequential number of captive flight
attempts for vehicle
Mmax
Hmax
BURN
Maximum Mach number achieved on the flight
Maximum Altitude achieved on the flight
Rocket engine burn time in seconds
161
Part One: Light Weight Lifting Body Flight Log (M2-F1)
DATE *GRD
TOW
AIR
TOW
PILOT ABT
SEC
FF
SEC
VEHICLE TOW-VEHICLE PILOT REMARKS
3/1/63 2 THOMPSON NONE NONE PONTIAC First Ground Tow
4/5/63 11 THOMPSON 0:00:36 NONE PONTIAC First Airborne Time
4/22/63 9 THOMPSON 0:01:15 NONE PONTIAC
4/23/63 10 THOMPSON 0:10:50 0:00:13 PONTIAC First Free Flight
4/29/63 5 THOMPSON 0:02:00 0:00:02 PONTIAC
5/8/63 2 THOMPSON 0:04:00 0:00:04 PONTIAC Demo. Mr.
Seamans
7/15/63 3 THOMPSON NONE NONE PONTIAC
8/16/63 1 THOMPSON 0:19:30 0:02:00 C-47 MALLICK/DANA First Air Tow
8/27/63 2 THOMPSON 0:01:09 NONE PONTIAC
8/28/63 1 THOMPSON 0:22:09 0:22:09 C-47 MALLICK/DANA
10/7/63 1 THOMPSON 0:32:22 0:01:26 C-47 BUTCHART/DANA
10/9/63 1 THOMPSON 0:43:29 0:01:51 C-47 HAISE/McKAY
10/15/63 1 THOMPSON 0:20:00 0:02:20 C-47 BUTCHART/?
10/23/63 1 THOMPSON 0:53:00 0:03:00 C-47 BUTCHART/McKAY
10/25/63 2 THOMPSON 0:24:40 0:03:52 C-47 BUTCHART/MALLICK
11/8/63 3 THOMPSON 1:10:00 0:07:45 C-47 MALLICK/McKAY/BUTCH
11/12/63 12 PETERSON NONE NONE PONTIAC No Lift Offs
11/12/63 11 MALLICK NONE NONE PONTIAC
11/12/63 11 YEAGER NONE NONE PONTIAC
11/13/63 8 PETERSON 0:05:00 NONE PONTIAC
11/13/63 10 YEAGER 0:10:00 NONE PONTIAC
11/14/63 8 YEAGER 0:05:30 0:00:14 PONTIAC
11/14/63 6 PETERSON 0:04:00 0:00:11 PONTIAC
11/14/63 14 MALLICK 0:09:00 0:00:19 PONTIAC
12/2/63 9 PETERSON 0:09:00 0:00:27 PONTIAC
12/2/63 4 YEAGER 0:04:20 0:00:12 PONTIAC
12/2/63 7 MALLICK 0:07:00 0:00:21 PONTIAC
12/3/63 1 THOMPSON 0:12:00 0:01:00 C-47 DANA/MALLICK
12/3/63 1 YEAGER 0:13:40 0:01:35 C-47 DANA/MALLICK
12/3/63 2 PETERSON 0:28:40 0:00:00 C-47 DANA/MALLICK Broke Main
Wheels
1/27/64 3 THOMPSON PONTIAC
1/27/64 3 PETERSON 0:02:00 PONTIAC
1/29/64 2 THOMPSON C-47 DANA/McKAY
1/29/64 2 PETERSON 0:22:00 0:04:44 C-47 DANA/McKAY
1/29/64 2 YEAGER C-47 DANA/McKAY
1/30/64 2 YEAGER C-47 DANA/McKAY
1/30/64 2 MALLICK C-47 DANA/McKAY
2/6/64 10 SORLIE 0:10:00 0:00:10 PONTIAC
2/6/64 10 WOOD 0:10:00 0:00:10 PONTIAC
2/10/64 10 SORLIE 0:10:00 0:00:10 PONTIAC
2/10/64 9 SORLIE 0:09:00 0:00:09 PONTIAC
162
Light Weight Lifting Body Flight Log (M2-F1) (Continued)
DATE *GRD
TOW
AIR
TOW
PILOT ABT
SEC
FF
SEC
2/28/64 2 THOMPSON C-47 BUTCHART/PETERSON
3/18/64 AIR TOWS SCHEDULED CANCELLED C-47 HAD DIFFICULTIES
3/30/64 1 PETERSON 0:24:00 0:02:25 C-47 BUTCHART/KLUEVER Fired Lnding Rocket
4/9/64 2 THOMPSON C-47 BTUCHART/KLUEVER
4/9/64 3 PETERSON 1:21:00 0:08:00 C-47 BUTCHART//KLUEVER
5/19/64 2 PETERSON 0:36:00 0:04:08 C-47 BUTCHART/McKAY Rocket Ldg Assist
6/3/64 1 THOMPSON C-47 DANA/PETERSON
No Date AIR TOWS CANCELLED BECAUSE OF WINDS
7/24/64 3 PETERSON 0:56:00 0:06:50 C-47 DANA/HAISE 2- Flts Rockets used
8/18/64 1 THOMPSON C-47 DANA/PETERSON
8/21/64 4 THOMPSON C-47 DANA/HAISE/WALKER
1/22/65 THOMPSON PONTIAC Note # 1
1/26/65 DANA PONTIAC Note # 1
2/15/65 DANA PONTIAC Note #2 Ldg Rockets Fired
2/16/65 1 THOMPSON C-47 DANA/PETERSON Airspeed Calib.
2/24/65 1 THOMPSON PONTIAC Note # 2
4/15/65 4 SORLIE 0:04:00 0:00:08 PONTIAC
5/27/65 4 THOMPSON C-47 BUTCHART/HAISE
5/27/65 3 SORLIE 1:10:00 0:06:00 C-47 BUTCHART/PETERSON
5/28/65 1 THOMPSON C-47 HAISE/PETERSON
5/28/65 2 SORLIE 0:40:30 0:04:30 C-47 PETERSON/HAISE
6/18/65 GENTRY PONTIAC Note # 4
7/14/65 GENTRY PONTIAC Note # 5 Thompson Assisted
7/16/65 1 THOMPSON C-47 HAISE/KLUEVER
7/16/65 1 DANA C-47 HAISE/KLUEVER
7/16/65 1 GENTRY 0:00:09 C-47 HAISE/KLUEVER
8/30/65 3 THOMPSON C-47 PETERSON/HAISE
8/31/65 1 1 THOMPSON P/C-47 HAISE/PETERSON
10/6/65 2 THOMPSON C-47 PETERSON/HAISE
10/8/65 1 THOMPSON C-47 HAISE/PETERSON
3/28/66 2 THOMPSON C-47 PETERSON/BUTCHART
4/22/66 HAISE PONTIAC
4/22/66 ENGLE PONTIAC
7/21/66 GENTRY PONTIAC
163
Light Weight Lifting Body Flight Log (M2-F1) (Continued)
DATE *GRD
TOW
AIR
TOW
PILOT ABT
SEC
FF
SEC
8/4/66 1 PETERSON 0:22:00 0:02:00 C-47 BUTCHART/FULTON
8/5/66 3 PETERSON 0:48:00 0:04:00 C-47 BUTCHART/FULTON
8/16/66 1 GENTRY C-47 BUTCHART/FULTON 2
ND
SLOW ROLL
8/18/66 PROJECT CANCELLED BY JRV PFB MOT DEB
Walter Whiteside drove the Pontiac for all Ground Tows
Notes:
All Note 1s: Total 44 car tows; number of flights per pilot unknown
All Note 5s: Total car tows and number of flights per pilot unknown
Compiled by Betty Love
164
Part Two: HEAVY WEIGHT LIFTING BODY FLIGHT LOG
(CHRONOLGY)
FLIGHT DATE PILOT Mmax Hmax BURN REMARKS
M-C-1 10/21/65 Unmanned Systems Checkout Gear Up
M-C-2 10/21/65 Unmanned Systems Checkout Gear Down
M-C-3 3/23/66 Thompson In flight Gear Extension
M-C-4 5/26/66 Thompson Systems Checkout
M-A-7 7/11/66 Thompson Landing Rocket Malfunction
M-1-8 7/12/66 Thompson 0.646 45.0 First Lifting Body Free-flight
M-2-9 7/19/66 Thompson 0.598 45.0
M-3-10 8/12/66 Thompson 0.619 45.0
M-4-11 8/24/66 Thompson 0.676 45.0
M-5-12 9/2/66 Thompson 0.707 45.0 Thompsons last L/B flight
M-6-13 9/16/66 Peterson 0.705 45.0 Petersons 1
st
L/B flight
M-7-14 9/20/66 Sorlie 0.635 45.0 Sorlies L/B flight
M-8-15 9/22/66 Peterson 0.661 45.0
M-9-16 9/28/66 Sorlie 0.672 45.0
M-10-17 10/5/66 Sorlie 0.615 45.0 Sorlies last L/B flight
M-11-18 10/12/66 Gentry 0.662 45.0 Gentrys 1
st
L/B flight
M-12-19 10/26/66 Gentry 0.605 45.0
M-13-20 11/14/66 Gentry 0.681 45.0
M-14-21 11/21/66 Gentry 0.695 45.0
H- C- 1 Peterson Numbered, not flown
H- C 2 12/20/66 Peterson Systems Checkout
H- 1- 3 12/22/66 Peterson 0.693 45.0 Limit Cycle/Flow Separation
M-A-22 4/10/67 Gentry SAS Malfunction
M-15-23 5/2/67 Gentry 0.623 45.0
M-16-24 5/10/67 Peterson 0.612 45.0 Petersons last/Landing Accident
H- C 4 2/29/68 Gentry Systems Checkout Mod II
H- 2- 5 3/15/68 Gentry 0.609 45.0 Mod II-Gentrys 1
st
HL-10 flight
H- 3- 6 4/3/68 Gentry 0.690 45.0
H- A- 7 4/23/68 Gentry Winds too high
H- 4- 8 4/25/68 Gentry 0.697 45.0
H- 5- 9 5/3/68 Gentry 0.688 45.0
H- 6-10 5/16/68 Gentry 0.678 45.0
H- 7-11 5/28/68 Manke 0.657 45.0 Mankes 1
st
L/B flight
H- 8-12 6/11/68 Manke 0.635 45.0
H- 9-13 6/21/68 Gentry 0.637 45.0
165
HEAVY WEIGHT LIFTING BODY FLIGHT LOG (CHRONOLGY)
(Continued)
H- C-14 8/22/68 Manke Engine Systems Checkout
H- C-15 8/30/68 Gentry Engine Systems Checkout
H- A-16 9/4/68 Gentry Pitch Back-up Malfunction
H-10-17 9/24/68 Gentry 0.682 45.0
H-11-18 10/3/68 Manke 0.714 45.0
H- A-19 10/22/68 Gentry Source Too Low to Drop
H-12-20 10/23/68 Gentry 0.666 39.7 019.4 1st Pwr, Eng Malf, Rosamond
Landing
H-13-21 11/13/68 Manke 0.840 42.6 186.1 3 tries to light
H-14-24 12/9/68 Gentry 0.870 47.4 181.1
H- A-25 1/10/69 Manke Low Release Pressure
H- A-26 1/17/69 Manke Igniter test malfunction
X- C- 1 4/4/69 Gentry Systems Checkout
X- 1- 2 4/17/69 Gentry 0.718 45.0 H.Q. Problems
H-15-27 4/17/69 Manke 0. 994 52.7 170.1
H-16-28 4/25/69 Dana 0.701 45.0 Dana's 1st L/B/ flight
X- 2- 3 5/8/69 Gentry 0.693 45.0 H.Q. Problems
H-17-29 5/9/69 Manke 1.127 53.3 158.2 1st Supersonic L/B flight
H-18-30 5/20/69 Dana 0.904 49.1 185.9
H-19-31 5/28/69 Manke 1.236 62.2 116.2
H-20-32 6/6/69 Hoag 0.665 45.0 Hoag's 1st L/B flight
H-21-33 6/19/69 Manke 1.398 64.1 117.5
H-22-34 7/23/69 Dana 1.271 63.8 116.1
H-23-35 8/6/69 Manke 1.540 76.1 092.9
X- A- 4 8/8/69 Gentry TM Power Supply
H- A-36 8/15/69 Dana Igniter test malfunction
X- 3- 5 8/21/69 Gentry 0.718 40.0
X- A- 6 8/29/69 Gentry SAS Status lites in Control Room
H-24-37 9/3/69 Dana 1.446 78.0 089.5
X- 4- 7 9/9/69 Gentry 0.594 40.0
H- A-38 9/16/69 Manke Weather
H-25-39 9/18/69 Manke 1.256 79.2 074.9
X- 5- 8 9/24/69 Gentry 0.596 40.0
H-26-40 9/30/69 Hoag 0.924 53.8 172.6
X- A- 9 10/15/69 Manke Weather
166
(Continued)
X- 6-10 10/22/69 Manke 0.587 40.0 Mankes 1
st
X-24 flight
H-27-41 10/27/69 Dana 1.577 60.6 089.0
H-28-42 11/3/69 Hoag 1.396 64.1 097.3
X- 7-11 11/13/69 Gentry 0.646 45.0
H-29-43 11/17/69 Dana 1.594 64.6 087.3
H-30-44 11/21/69 Hoag 1.432 79.3 089.0
X- 8-12 11/25/69 Gentry 0.685 45.0
H- A-45 12/11/69 Dana Weather
H-31-46 12/12/69 Dana 1.310 80.0 088.3
H-32-47 1/19/70 Hoag 1.310 86.7 083.3
H-33-48 1/26/70 Dana 1.351 87.7 086.8
H-34-49 2/18/70 Hoag 1.861 67.3 091.3 Fastest L/B flight
X- C-13 2/20/70 Gentry Full fuel Systems Checkout
X- A-13 2/20/70 Gentry Instrumentation
X- 9-14 2/24/70 Gentry 0.771 47.0
H- A-50 2/26/70 Dana Elevon flap Asymmetry Switch
H-35-51 2/27/70 Dana 1.314 90.3 086.3 Highest L/B flight
X-10-15 3/19/70 Gentry 0.865 44.4 154.9 1
st
Powered X-24 flight
X-11-16 4/2/70 Manke 0.866 58.7 158.7
X-12-17 4/22/70 Gentry 0.925 57.7 134.4
X-13-18 5/14/70 Manke 0.748 44.6 252.3 Only 2 chambers lit
M- C-25 5/22/70 Dana F3 Systems Checkout
M-17-26 6/2/70 Dana 0.688 45.0 1
st
M2-F3 flight
H-36-52 6/11/70 Hoag 0.744 45.0 044.2 L/D powered approach
X-14-19 6/17/70 Manke 0.990 61.0 128.4
H-37-53 7/17/70 Hoag 0.733 45.0 060.4 Hoags last/HL-10s last flight
M-18-27 7/21/70 Dana 0.660 45.0
X-15-20 7/28/70 Gentry 0.938 58.1 123.1
X-16-21 8/11/70 Manke 0.986 63.9 137.8
X-17-22 8/26/70 Gentry 0.694 41.5 215.0 Only 2 chambers lit
X-18-23 10/14/70 Manke 1.186 67.9 125.4 1
st
Supersonic X-24 flight
X-19-24 10/27/70 Manke 1.357 71.4 135.3 Highest X-24 flight
M-19-28 11/2/70 Dana 0.630 45.0
X-20-25 11/20/70 Gentry 1.370 67.6 121.6
M-20-29 11/25/70 Dana 0.809 51.9 079.6 1st M2 -F3 powered flight
X-21-26 1/21/71 Manke 1.030 57.9 195.0 Alpha gage failure
X-22-27 2/4/71 Powell 0.659 45.0 Powell's 1st L/B flight
167
(Continued)
M-21-30 2/9/71 Gentry 0.707 45.0 Gentry's 1st M2/Last L/B flights
X-23-28 2/18/71 Manke 1.511 67.4 138.6
M-22-31 2/26/71 Dana 0.773 45.0 119.4 Only 2 chambers lit, jettison fire
X-24-29 3/8/71 Powell 1.002 56.9 185.6
X-25-30 3/29/71 Manke 1.600 70.5 135.7 Fastest X-24 flight
X- A-31 4/22/71 Powell Weather
X-26-32 5/12/71 Powell 1.389 70.9 139.9 Delayed light
X-27-33 5/25/71 Manke 1.191 65.3 189.6 Only 3 chambers lit
M- C-32 6/1/71 Dana Gear Mod checkout
X-28-34 6/4/71 Manke 0.817 54.4 264.2 Only 2 chambers lit/last X-24 A flight
M- C-33 7/1/71 Dana Gear Mod checkout
M-23-34 7/23/71 Dana 0.930 60.5 110.4
M-24-35 8/9/71 Dana 0.974 62.0 109.6
M- A-36 8/23/71 Dana Lox vent valve stuck
M-25-37 8/25/71 Dana 1.095 67.3 113.0 1st Supersonic M2-F3 flight
M-26-38 9/24/71 Dana 0.728 42.0 007.0 Engine malf, fire, Rosamond landing
M-27-39 11/15/71 Dana 0.739 45.0 New jettison location checkout
M-28-40 12/1/71 Dana 1.274 70.8 103.4
M-29-41 12/16/71 Dana 0.811 46.8 180.3 Only 2 chambers lit
M- C- 42 7/7/72 Dana Gear Mod checkout
M- A-43 7/12/72 Dana Roll CAS malfunction
M- A-44 7/24/72 Dana TM interference by F-111
M-30-45 7/25/72 Dana 0.989 60.9 135.7 1st CAS flight
M-31-46 8/11/72 Dana 1.101 67.2 090.5
M-32-47 8/24/72 Dana 1.266 66.7 091.5
M-33-48 9/12/72 Dana 0.880 46.0 182.8 Engine malfunction, small fire
M-34-49 9/27/72 Dana 1.340 66.7 095.0
M-35-50 10/5/72 Dana 1.370 66.3 091.9 100th Lifting Body Flight
M-36-51 10/19/72 Manke 0.905 47.1 162.6 Manke's 1st M2-F3 flight
M-37-52 11/1/72 Manke 1.213 71.3 094.5
M-38-53 11/9/72 Powell 0.906 46.8 159.4 Powell's 1st M2-F3 flight
M-39-54 11/21/72 Manke 1.435 66.7 096.7 Planned Rosamond Landing
M-40-55 11/29/72 Powell 1.348 67.5 095.1
M-41-56 12/6/72 Powell !.191 68.3 090.1 Planned Rosamond Landing
168
(Continued)
M-42-57 12/13/72 Dana 1.613 66.7 099.9 Fastest M2/Used L/D Rockets
M-43-58 12/20/72 Manke 1.294 71.5 093.7 Highest and last M2-F3 flight
B- C- 1 7/19/73 Manke Systems checkout
B- A- 2 7/24/73 Manke SAS Gyros
B- 1- 3 8/1/73 Manke 0.640 40.0
B- 2- 4 8/17/73 Manke 0.650 45.0
B- 3- 5 8/31/73 Manke 0.716 45.0
B- 4- 6 9/18/73 Manke 0.687 45.0
B- C- 7 10/3/73 Love Pilot checkout
B- A- 8 10/4/73 Love Rudder throwboards left on
B- 5- 9 10/4/73 Love 0.704 45.0 Love's 1st L/B flight
B- C-10 10/30/73 Manke Full Fuel Systems checkout
B- A-11 10/31/73 Manke Igniter Malfunction
B- A-12 11/13/73 Manke Weather
B- 6-13 11/15/73 Manke 0.930 53.1 151.7 1st X-24B Powered Flight
B- 7-14 12/12/73 Manke 0.987 63.1 132.5
B- 8-15 2/15/74 Love 0.696 45.0
B- 9-16 3/5/74 Manke 1.086 60.7 117.5
B- A-17 3/19/74 Love Weather
B- A-18 4/22/74 Love TV fire in B-52
B- A-19 4/23/74 Love B-52 Lox System
B- C-20 4/25/74 Love Aileron mod checkout
B-10-21 4/30/74 Love 0.876 52.0 143.8 Love's 1st powered flight
B-11-22 5/24/74 Manke 1.140 56.0 156.9 No lite #1, 1st overdrive flight
B-12-23 6/14/74 Love 1.228 65.4 106.9
B-13-24 6/28/74 Manke 1.391 68.2 118.2
B-14-25 8/8/74 Love 1.541 73.4 130.6 Pump oscillations
B-15-26 8/29/74 Manke 1.098 72.4 108.6 Fuel tank split/Early B/O
B-16-27 10/25/74 Love 1.752 72.2 135.5 Max. speed/X-24B flight
B-17-28 11/15/74 Manke 1.615 72.1 141.0 Lox cav'n, relite on #1 and #3
B-18-29 12/17/74 Love 1.585 68.8 134.2
B-19-30 1/14/75 Manke 1.748 72.8 135.9
B- A-31 1/31/75 Love Weather
B-20-32 3/20/75 Love 1.443 70.4 119.3
B-21-33 4/18/75 Manke 1.204 57.9 154.6 Faulty igniter on #3 chamber
B-22-34 5/6/75 Love 1.444 73.4 137.2 42K launch/B-52 engine #3
B-23-35 5/22/75 Manke 1.633 74.1 135.8
169
(Continued)
B-24-36 6/6/75 Love 1.677 72.1 135.1
B- A-37 6/24/75 Manke Winds
B-25-38 6/25/75 Manke 1.343 58.0 125.0
B-26-39 7/15/75 Love 1.585 69.5 132.5
B-27-40 8/5/75 Manke 1.190 57.0 154.7 1st Runway Ldg/Manke's last flight
B-28-41 8/20/75 Love 1.548 71.1 134.0 Runway Landing/Love's last flight
B-29-42 9/9/75 Dana 1.481 69.7 127.6 Two tries on #1 chamber
B-30-43 9/23/75 Dana 1.157 56.8 152.1 Last Rocket flight/Dana's last flight
B-31-44 10/9/75 Enevoldson 0.705 45.3 Enevoldson's 1st L/B flight
B-32-45 10/21/75 Scobee 0.696 45.0 Scobee's 1st L/B flight
B-33-46 11/3/75 McMurtry 0.702 45.3 McMurtry's 1st L/B flight
B-34-47 11/12/75 Enevoldson 0.702 45.0 Enevoldson's last L/B flight
B-35-48 11/19/75 Scobee 0.700 45.0 Scobee's last L/B flight
B-36-49 11/26/75 McMurtry 0.713 44.8 McMurtry's last L/B flight/Last X-
24B flight
Mmax= 1.861
Vmax= 1800.3 fps
Hmax= 90.3 K ft
Qmax= 371.7 psf
Total Flight Time = 13:45:22.1
Total Burn Time = 3:05:42.5
Total Time @ M > 1.0 = 1:02:55.8
Compiled by Jack Kolf
170
Appendix D
AFFTC/NASA Memorandum of Understanding
171
172
173
174
Appendix E
List of Lifting Body Personnel
Last Name First Name Position Aircraft Organization
Anderson Art Mechanic HL-10 DFRC
Anderson Herb Ops. Engineer HL-10 DFRC
Anderton Maj. Frank Performance
Engineer
X-20 AFFTC
Archie Maj. Charles Flight Test
Engineer
X-24A AFFTC
Armstrong Johnny AF Project
Manager.
X-24A, X-24B AFFTC
Armstrong Neil Test Pilot F104 landing
simulator
DFRC
Arnold Bill RMD On-Site
Rep.
All Thiokol
Ash Lt. Lawrence Performance
Engineer
X-24A AFFTC
Bacon Don Engineer HL-10 DFRC
Barnicki Roger Pressure Suits M2-F2, HL-10,
X-24A, X-24B
DFRC
Barstow Bill X-24B DFRC
Barto LeRoy X-24A DFRC
Basko Bill X-24A DFRC
Bergner Chet Crew Member X-24A, X-24B DFRC
Bikle Paul Director, Dryden All DFRC
Billeter Orion Elec. M2-F2 DFRC
Blair Richard Instrument Tech HL-10 DFRC
Boss Dick Mfg. Manager X-24B Martin
Brandt Jerry AF Propulsion
Engr.
ALL AFFTC
Briegleb Gus Sailplane
Designer
M2-F1(shell) Self
Browne Ed Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
175
List of Lifting Body Personnel (Continued)
Bruno John Inst. M2-F2 DFRC
Buchart Stan DC-3, B-52 Pilot M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10, X-24A,
X-24B
DFRC
Cates Jack SAS M2-F2 DFRC
Caw Larry HL-10 DFRC
Clifton Bill Instr. Engineer X-24A, X-24B DFRC
Cochrane John Contractor Rep X-24A, X-24B Martin
Cosenza Joe Prog. Mgr. ASSET, X-20 AFFDL
Cox Mel X-24A, X-24B DFRC
Curtis Howard Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Dana Bill Test Pilot M2-F1, M2-F3,
HL-10, X-24B,
C-47
DFRC
DeGeer Merle Ops. Engineer M2-F2 DFRC
DeMar Norm Ops. Engineer X-24A, X-24B DFRC
Draper Al AFFDL Branch
Chief
X-20, X-24A, X-
24B
AFFDL
Durrett Capt. John Flight Test
Engineer
M2-F2 AFFTC
Edwards John HL-10 DFRC
Eldredge Dick Chief Designer M2-F1 DFRC
Enevoldson Einer Test Pilot X-24B DFRC
Engle Capt. Joe Test Pilot M2-F1 AFFTC
Fulton Fitz B-52 Pilot M2-F2, HL-10,
X-24A, X-24B
DFRC
Garcia Dave Instr. Engineer HL-10 DFRC
Garrabrant Dan M2-F3 DFRC
Gentry Capt. Jerry Test Pilot M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10, X-24A
AFFTC
Green Bob Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Greenfield Lowell HL-10 DFRC
Gordon James Inspector X-24B DFRC
Greishaber Al Instr. Technician X-24A, X-24B DFRC
Grogan Mike Lndg. Gear
Loads
X-24B AFFDL
Haise Fred Test Pilot M2-F1, C-47 DFRC
176
Hamilton Emmett Mechanic,
Pontiac
M2-F1 DFRC
Hamilton Grierson Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Haney Lt. Pat HL-10 AFFTC
Hankins Jim X-24A DFRC
Harer Dick Program
Manager
X-15,M2-F2 AFFTC
Harris Al Electrician HL-10 DFRC
Hoag Major Pete Test Pilot HL-10 AFFTC
Hoey Robert AF Program
Manager
X-20, M2-F2, X-
24A, X-24B
AFFTC
Horton Vic Ops. Engineer ALL DFRC
Iliff Ken Engineer M2-F2 DFRC
Kellog Ray Electronic M2-F2 DFRC
Kempell DFRC
LaVern DFRC
King DFRC
Kirsten Paul Stability & Ctrl
Engr
X-24A, X-24B AFFTC
Klein Richard Hardware
Designer
M2-F1 DFRC
Kluever Lt. Col. Jack Test Pilot C-47 ARMY
Koch Berwin Flight Planner M2-F2, HL-10 DFRC
Kolf Jack Flight Planner M2-F2, HL-10 DFRC
Kotfilm Ron Sperry Rand X-24A Sperry
Lamar Bill Program
Manager
X-20 DFRC
Laub Georgene Engineer HL-10 DFRC
Lawhead Arden Instr. Engineer M2-F2, HL-10 DFRC
Layton Gary Program
Manager
M2-F2, HL-10 DFRC
LePage William Crew Member M2-F2 Crew
Chief, M2-F3
DFRC
Link Bill Inspector M2-F2 DFRC
Linn Charles Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Lockwood Millar Electrician M2-F2 DFRC
Lowder Ernie Models M2-F1 DFRC
Little Mary Chief, Data
Analysis
M2-F2, HL-10,
X-24A, X-24B
DFRC
177
Love Lt. Col. Mike Test Pilot X-24B AFFTC
Lovett Bill Mechanic HL-10 DFRC
Maag Jay X-24A DFRC
Mallick Don Test Pilot M2-F1, C-47 DFRC
Manke John Test Pilot M2-F3, HL-10,
X-24A, X-24B
DFRC
Martin Wade AF Rocket Shop All AFFTC
McMurtry Tom Test Pilot X-24B AFFTC
McTigue John NASA Program
Mgr.
M2-F2, HL-10 DFRC
Mersereau Bill Mechanic HL-10 DFRC
Mingelle Ed Plexiglass
canopy
M2-F1 DFRC
Moore Gaston Inspector X-24B DFRC
Moshier Bob Martin X-24A Martin
Multhopp Hans Designer X-24A Martin
Nagy Chris Stability & Ctrl
Engr.
X-24A, X-24B AFFTC
Nichols George Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Orahood John Hardware
Designer
M2-F1 DFRC
Painter Wen Research
Engineer
M2-F2, HL-10,
X-24A
DFRC
Peterson Bruce Test Pilot M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10
DFRC
Powell Major Cecil Test Pilot M2-F3, X-24A AFFTC
Rampy Capt. John ?? M2-F3 AFFTC
Reed Dale NASA Program
Mgr.
M2-F1 DFRC
Reeves John Inspector M2-F2 DFRC
Reedy Jerry ?? M2-F3 DFRC
Retelle Capt. John Flight Test
Engineer
X-24A AFFTC
Richardson Dave Performance
Engr.
X-24A, X-24B AFFTC
Rickey John Aerodynamics X-24A Martin
Ridale Jack Martin ?? X-24A Martin
Russell Charlie Crew Chief X-24A, X-24B,
Hl-10
DFRC
178
Russell Jack B-52 Launch
Panel
M2-F2, HL-10,
X-24A, X-24B
DFRC
Ruttle Jack Contractor Rep X-24A, X-24B Martin
Ryan Bertha Research Engr. M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10, X-24A
DFRC
Saltzman Ed Research Engr. M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10, X-24A
DFRC
Sanderson Ken Range/Instrumen
t.
X-20 NASA
Schofield Lyle Aero Heating X-20 AFFTC
Scobee Major Dick Test Pilot X-24B AFFTC
Scoville Lt. Col. Curt Program
Manager
START, X-24A SSD
Selegan Dave Research
Engineer
X-24A, X-24B AFFDL
Shuler Billy Fabrication M2-F1 DFRC
Shimp Lt. Jerry USAF ?? HL-10 AFFTC
Sittlerle George Ops Engineer HL-10 DFRC
Smith Harriet Research
Engineer
M2-F1 DFRC
Sorlie Major Don Test Pilot M2-F1, M2-F2 AFFTC
Sparks Ralph Shops M2-F1 DFRC
Stewart Al Battery Shop All DFRC
Struz Larry ?? HL-10 DFRC
Szuwalski Bill ?? M2-F3 DFRC
Taylor Larry Flight Controls M2-F1 DFRC
Thompson Milt Test Pilot M2-F1, M2-F2 DFRC
Vensel Joe Chief of
Operations
M2-F1, M2-F2,
HL-10, X-24A,
X-24B
DFRC
Veith Bob Instrumentation M2-F2 DFRC
Wesesky Jack Program
Manager
X-20 AFFTC
Whiteside Walter (Whitey) Asst to Chief of
Ops
M2-F1 DFRC
Wilson Jerry AF Rocket Shop All AFFTC
Wood Major James Test Pilot M2-F1 AFFTC
Yeager Lt. Col. Chuck Test Pilot M2-F1 AFFTC
Zima Bill Program
Manager
X-24A, X-24B AFFDL
179
Glossary
A3-4
Martin designation for early lifting body shape.
Ablation
Thermal process where surface melts or vaporizes at high
temperature.
Ablator
Surface material which will be subject to ablation.
Active cooling
Cooling system which circulates a heat-conductive fluid
between a hot region and a cool region.
AF or USAF Air Force or United States Air Force
AFB
Air Force Base
analog computer
A simulator computer which solves equations of motion using
analogous electrical circuits.
Apollo
NASA program to land a man on the moon and return him to
earth.
ARC
Ames Research Center (NASA)
ASD
Aeronautical Systems Division (Air Force)
ballistic
Subject only to the forces of gravity and drag.
Ballistic Coefficient
Weight divided by the quantity drag coefficient times frontal
area. (W/CD*A)
bank angle
Angle between the plane of the wings and the horizon.
base area
Non-streamlined, bluff area at the rear of a vehicle.
boat-tail
A reduction in cross-section toward the rear of a vehicle.
C-130
Four-engine, turboprop-powered cargo airplane.
capsule
A self-contained device capable of safely entering the earth's
atmosphere.
CD
Drag coefficient. A non-dimensional parameter for measuring
drag.
180
Glossary (Continued)
center of gravity
An imaginary location within an object which identifies its
center of mass.
ceramic tiles
Small blocks of rigid material (primarily silica) that are poor
conductors of heat.
CL
Lift coefficient. A non-dimensional parameter for measuring
lift.
CLS/W
Lift coefficient divided by wing loading. A non-dimensional
parameter that allows the glide performance of several aircraft
to be compared at the same airspeed.
control laws
The relationship between the pilot's commands and the actual
control surface movements of a flight control system.
cross-range
The distance that can be achieved during entry in a direction
perpendicular to the starting flight direction.
Decoupled Mode
An entry concept that uses a different deceleration method for
entry than for landing.
delta wing
A wing that has a triangular shape when viewed from above.
DOD
Department of Defense
drag
A force which resists motion that is produced by friction with
the atmosphere.
Dyna Soar
Short for Dynamic Soaring. Name of a boost-glide research
program that was cancelled in 1963 before the first flight.
eyeballs-in
A descriptive term used to identify the direction of a force due
to acceleration.
F-11F-1F
Navy fighter aircraft built by Grumman
F5D
Navy fighter aircraft built by Douglas
FDL-7
Seventh entry design created at the Flight Dynamics
Laboratory (Air Force)
FDL-8
Eighth entry design created at the Flight Dynamics Laboratory
(Air Force)
181
flight path
The path of a moving object, usually measured in the vertical
plane relative to the horizon.
fly-by-wire
A flight control concept that uses only electrical signals
between the pilot's stick and the control surfaces.
frontal area
The area of an object as projected onto a plane perpendicular to
the flight direction.
HYPER 3
A light weight, unmanned vehicle built by NASA FRC and
patterned after the FDL-7 shape.
LaRC
Langley Research Center (NASA).
L/D
Lift to Drag ratio.
lift
A force on an object produced by aerodynamic reaction with
the atmosphere,and which acts perpendicular to the flight
direction.
Mach number
The ratio of an object's speed to the speed of sound.
Mercury
First U.S.manned space capsule program.
MSL
Mean sea level.
NACA
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
non-receding,
charring ablator
A type of ablator that maintains its external dimensions while
ablating.
operational
In the context of routine, repeatable flights; airline-like
operation.
overdrive
Slang term used to describe the 14 percent increase in thrust
that was available on the X-24B rocket engine.
PILOT
PIloted LOw speed Test. Early name for the X-24A program.
Pregnant Guppy
A one-of-a-kind C-97 cargo airplane which had been modified
to carry oversize cargo.
182
PRIME
Precision Recovery Including Maneuvering Entry. Early
designation for the SV-5D or X-23 program.
projected area
The area of an object as projected onto a horizontal plane
parallel with the flight direction.
PSTS
Propulsion System Test Stand.
Radiative cooling
Cooling system which radiates heat away from the hot surface.
retrofire
Rocket engine ignition for a short time; designed to reduce
speed of an orbiting object and to initiate entry.
Rogallo Wing
A wing-like parachute design which enables the parachuting
object to move forward as well as to descend.
SAMSO
Space And Missile Systems Organization (Air Force).
second generation
vehicle
A vehicle which has benefited from the previous design,
development and testing of a similar vehicle.
self adaptive
A flight control concept which samples, then alters, internal
electronic signals to compensate for changing flight conditions.
semi-ballistic
Subject to a small lift force in addition to the predominant
forces of drag and gravity.
side-arm controller
A two or three axis control stick mounted on the side of the
cockpit and operated by the pilots wrist movements.
simulator
A partial aircraft cockpit connected to an electronic computer
which allows a pilot to simulate flying an airplane.
Sputnik
The first man-made object to be placed in earth orbit (Soviet
program).
stability
augmentation
Electronic control components designed to augment the
stability of an airplane.
strakes
Wing-like appendages at the aft end of an aircraft that provide
lift or added stability.
SV-5
Basic configuration of reentry vehicle that led to the SV-5P (X-
24A) and SV-5D (PRIME).
183
SV-5J
Jet-powered version of the SV-5 configuration. Two were
built, neither were flown.
test-bed aircraft
A conventional aircraft that has been equipped with some
newly designed internal or external components for in-flight
testing of those components.
Thor-Delta
Two stage rocket booster using a Thor 1st stage and a Delta
2nd stage.
triply redundant
Using three parallel components to accomplish a single
function, with automatic deselection of any faulty component.
tufts
An array of short segments of yarn or string taped to an
aerodynamic surface to allow airflow characteristics to be
observed or photographed.
wedge angle
The angle of the aft control surfaces relative to the flight
direction. Large angles produce shuttlecock-like stability.
wing loading
Vehicle weight divided by the projected area, W/S.
X-24C
A follow-on proposal to the X-24B to test advanced air-
breathing propulsion.
184
Source Essay and Literature of the Field
Source Essay
Most of the information in this document is drawn directly from the authors memory,
fortified by a few key documents on each of the individual vehicles, and validated by peer
review by other program participants. Richard Hallion's excellent series of case studies
published as "The Hypersonic Revolution" in two volumes was used throughout as a source
for information on related programs. Most of the key documents were found in the Research
Projects Office at the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB or in the personal files of
NASA Dryden FRC employees or retirees.
Chapter 1 draws from information in Richard Hallion's "The Hypersonic Revolution" Vol. 1.
It also uses information from Clarence Syvertson's "Aircraft Without Wings" discussing the
early studies at NACA on lifting entry.
Chapter 2 also draws from Richard Hallion's "The Hypersonic Revolution" Vol. 1 along with
several Boeing Technical documents that are retained in the Research Projects Office at
Edwards AFB.
Chapter 3 uses key information from Victor Horton, Richard Eldridge and Richard Klein's
"Flight Determined Low-Speed Lift and Drag Characteristics of the Lightweight M2-F1
Lifting Body", but also relies on first-hand discussions with Dale Reed, the late Milt
Thompson, Bertha Ryan, and flight logs retained at NASA Dryden FRC.
Chapter 4 draws primarily from Capt. John Durrett's summary report on the M2-F2, "Flight
Planning and Conduct of the M2-F2 Glide Flight Program" and Clarence Syvertson's paper
"Aircraft Without Wings" discussing the evolution of the M2 shape. Some of the M2-F3
information was obtained from interviews with Jack Kolf and John Manke.
Chapter 5 relies heavily on the recent work by Robert Kempel, Weneth Painter and Milton
Thompson, "Developing and Flight Testing the HL-10 Lifting Body: A Precursor to the
Space Shuttle" which is an excellent description of the HL-10 program.
Chapters 6 and 7 draw from a series of AF Flight Test Center Technical Reports published in
1971 through 1973 on the X-24A program, and between 1976 and 1977 on the X-24B
program. The primary historical information was extracted from Johnny Armstrong's
summary reports on each program, "Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-24A Research
185
Aircraft Flight Test Program" and "Flight Planning and Conduct of the X-24B Research
Aircraft Flight Test Program".
Chapter 8 attempts to summarize the six primary programs that are discussed in the report. It
also compares the characteristics of the 6 vehicles to each other, and to the Space Shuttle
Orbiter. Space Shuttle information was drawn from personal experience, and was also
extracted from the AFFTC report "Flight Test Results from the Entry and Landing of the
Space Shuttle Orbiter for the First Twelve Orbital Flights." Much of the information on the
effects of ablative surface roughness, although published in parallel with the Lifting Body
Program, was not brought together until after completion of the Lifting Body program. The
information was considered to be directly applicable to the flight test results from the Lifting
Body program, so it was introduced as new material in the Epilogue. Source references for
this material are included in the Epilogue.
Unless otherwise noted, all of the photos in this document were obtained from the NASA
DFRC Photo Office, the AFFTC History Office, or from personal collections.
Some of the graphic figures were prepared by the author as original art work (for example,
Figures 1-1 through 1-6). Some were extracted directly from the documents mentioned
above and modified by the author for clarification (for example, Figures A-8, A-9 and 5-5).
Other graphic figures were created by the author using data contained in one or more of these
same documents (for example, Figures 8-1 and 8-2).

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___. "In-Flight Simulation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Low Speed Handling
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___. "Limit Cycle and Structural Resonance Ground Testing of the DIGITAC II
Aircraft." Memo, June 1980.
___. "Space Shuttle Orbiter Handling Qualities Study for 65 Percent CG and Fixed
Body Flap." Memo, March 1980.
___. "STS-2 Maneuver Evaluation." Memo, August 1981.
Kirsten, Paul W and David F. Richardson and Lt. C. Wilson, USAF. "Predicted and
Flight Test Result of the Performance Stability and Control of the Space Shuttle from
Reentry to Landing." Memo, March 1983.
Nagy, Christopher J. "A Users Guide to the Computer Compatible Tape Interface
Program." Memo, May 1978.
196
Nield, George C., Capt. USAF. "Flight Test Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Carrier
Aircraft." Memo, July 1977.
___. "Space Shuttle Carrier Aircraft Ferry Test Results." Memo, April 1978.
Office of Advanced Manned Vehicles. "Interim Assessment of the space Shuttle
Orbiter Entry and Landing Capabilities--STS-1 through STS-6." Memo, June 1983.
___. "Quick Look Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Third Orbital Flight-
Descent Phase." Memo, May 1982.
___. "Quick Look Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Seventh and Eighth Orbital
Flights--Descent-Phase." Memo, October 1983.
___. "Quick Look Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Fourth Orbital Flight-
Descent Phase." Memo, September 1982.
___. "Quick Look Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Fifth Orbital Flight-
Descent Phase." Memo, December 1992.
___. "Quick Look Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Ninth Orbital Flight."
Memo, January 1984.
Phillips, Paul W. "Aerothermo Study for STS-1 Abort Once Around (AOA) on the
AFFTC Engineering Study Simulator." Memo, January 1981.
___. "Correlation of Space Shuttle Lower Surface Thermocouple Data with Axial
Accelerometer Data in Determining Lower Surface Boundary Layer Transition
During Entry." Memo, August 1983.
___. "Resistance-Capacitance Circuit Analogy to Thermal Conductance and Heat
Capacity." Memo, March 1981.
Richardson, David F. "Contingency Abort Studies with Three SSMEs Failed Using
Shuttle Orbiter Simulation at AFFTC." Memo, February 1981.
___. "Interpretation of space Shuttle Orbiter Aerodynamic Data for the MAP
Simulation." Memo, September 1976.
___. "Recent Updates to the space Shuttle Orbiter Aerodynamic Data Base for the
AFFTC Simulator." Memo, June 1979.
___. "Shuttle Aborts To Rota, Spain." Memo, March 1981.
___. "Space Shuttle Orbiter Simulated Landing Flare Characteristics." Memo, April
1977.
___. "STS-2 Maneuver Plan Development Studies from Shuttle Orbiter Simulation at
AFFTC." Memo, July 1980.
Richardson, David F., and James Hodge, Capt. USAF. "Initial through on the Use of
197
Pushover-Pull-up Maneuvers to Obtain Performance and Heating Data During the
space Shuttle OFT Program." Memo, October 1978.
Simpson. "Effects of Solar Radiation on the Heating Rate of the Space Shuttles Left
OMS Pod Thermocouple No. 9976 During Entry." Memo, July 1983.
Sutton, J. P. "X-24B Landing Loads for Initial Flights." Memo, January 1974.
Woo Yuk, Capt. USAF. "Results of Wind Tunnel Test to Simulate the Space Shuttle
AFRSI Thermal Protection System Failure Environment Experienced on STS-6."
Memo, October 1983.
___. "Updated Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System Pods Heating Model Using
a Quasi Steady-State Data Analysis Technique." Memo, January 1984.

NASA FRC Memoranda
Edwards Air Force Base, California

Dana, William. "Special Tasks or Incidents Night Landings." Memo , 1967.
Lifting Body Project Group, "M2-F3 Flight Review, Flight 30 through Flight 43."
Memo, August 1973.
___. "Results of the First Flight of the HL-10 Lifting Body Vehicle." Memo, July
1967.
NASA-FRC. "Incident Report X-24 Engine Fire." Memo, August 1970.
Pyle, Jon S. "Observation and Examination of the Heat Shield on the Prime SV-5D."
Memo, June 1967.
___. "Preliminary Lift and Drag Results From the Second Flight of the Hl-10
Vehicle." Memo, March 1968.
Thompson, Milton O., William H. Dana. "Flight Simulation of Night Landings of
Lifting Entry Vehicles." Memo, March 1968.
Watts, Joe D. "X-24B Incident Investigation Board." (Incident Involving Inadvertent
Nose Gear Retraction on The X-24B, May 17, 1973.) Memo, May 1973.
198
About the Author
Robert G. Hoey was born in Seattle, Washington. He grew up in Bryn Mawr just south of
Seattle, and attended Renton High School. His interest in aviation started early. At age 12
Bob started building model airplanes. His first paying job was "line boy" at the Renton
airport where he turned most of his earnings into flying lessons. He obtained his private
license at age 16. He attended the University of Washington and received an Aeronautical
Engineering degree in 1955.
Mr. Hoeys professional career started at Edwards Air Force Base in March 1955. As an Air
Force Lieutenant, he served two years at the Air Force Flight Test Center, working as a
Flight Test Engineer in the Fighter Branch of the Engineering Division. He arrived at
Edwards at a time in history when the "century-series" fighters (the first production
supersonic fighters) were in early developmental testing. He worked as an assistant engineer
on the early tests of the F-100, F-101, F-102, F-105 and F-106 fighters. As a Project
Engineer, his first test program was the F-100C Stability and Control program. The project
pilot for the program was Captain Melburn Apt who was later killed in the famous X-2
accident. Bob's second project was the F-104A Stability and Control test program. This time
his project pilot was Captain Ivan Kincheloe who also flew the X-2 and attained an altitude
record of over 126,000 feet. When Bob's
stint was completed in 1957, he remained at Edwards in his same job, but now as an Air
Force Civil Service employee. In 1958 Bob and "Kinch" both moved onto a team that
resulted from the newly-formed AF/NASA X-15 Joint Operating Committee. This team
would test the X-15 that was still under construction at North American. Bob learned to
program and utilize the X-15 flight simulator which was, at that time, a new tool for the
flight test engineer. During 1960 and 1961 he worked with Dick Day, his counterpart at
NASA FRC, to plan the early envelope expansion flights of the X-15. The envelope reached
an altitude of over 250,000 feet and a speed of 4200 miles per hour (Mach 6.1).
Between 1961 and 1963 Mr. Hoey divided his time between the X-15 program and the
emerging Dyna Soar (X-20) program. He was designated as the lead Air Force Stability and
Control Flight Test Engineer on the AF/NASA test team that was being formed to test the X-
20. Upon the demise of the X-20 in late 1963, Bob moved into a supervisory role. He
headed the small group of Air Force engineers that continued to work with NASA FRC on
the X-15, the Lifting Bodies, and several other flight test programs that involved high speed
research (including early AF tests of the SR-71).
In 1975, near the end of the X-24B program, Mr. Hoey returned to the classroom and earned
his Master of Science degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern
California. Upon his return to Edwards in 1976 he was tasked by the AFFTC Commander to
form a new organization within the AFFTC to prepare for the upcoming Space Shuttle
flights. The new organization, the Office of Advanced Manned Vehicles, was responsible for
199
conducting an independent engineering assessment of the reentry and landing aspects of the
Space Shuttle with respect to DOD requirements. Bob's office was also responsible for
overseeing all AFFTC resources required to support Space Shuttle operations at Edwards
(security, range, fire crash and rescue, and airspace control). He was named the 1983
Outstanding Federal Employee of the Year by the Federal Executive Board of Los Angeles in
recognition for this effort. The Space Shuttle support activity was essentially completed in
1985 and the charter and title of Bob's organization was revised. He now headed the Office
of Research Projects. Its primary function was the coordinated support of engineers and test
pilots to several joint AF/NASA test programs (X-29, X-31, AFTI F-16, AFTI F-111 TACT)
and the planning for future one-of-a-kind research test programs (F-15 STOL Fighter, X-30
Aerospace Plane, Boost-Glide Vehicle, F-16 VISTA).
Bob Hoey retired from civil service in 1987. Since then he has worked as a part-time flight
test consultant. In this capacity he supported Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and worked on the testing of one of Burt Rutan's designs, the Advanced
Technology Tactical Transport. He has also used his simulation experience to assist
Kohlman Systems Research in the testing and math-modeling of several small business-class
aircraft for the purpose of creating pilot training simulators.
Bob's interest in aviation extended beyond the workplace. Between 1966 and 1968 he
entered a partnership with another flight test engineer, and they constructed an all-wood
sailplane (BG-12B). Bob attained his Diamond soaring badge in the sailplane in 1970.
Between 1973 and 1979 he constructed a 4-place powered airplane (BD-4) which he is still
flying.
His most recent interest has been in the study of soaring birds to better understand their
method of lateral control without vertical tails. He successfully created a radio-controlled
model of a soaring Raven (without a vertical tail) and reported the results at the 6th AIAA
Biannual Flight Test Conference in 1992.
Bob is married and has two grown children. He resides in Lancaster California where he
continues to monitor the aviation activities at Edwards.
Having actively participated as a flight test engineer in each of the primary programs
addressed in this document (from the X-20 to the Space Shuttle), Mr. Hoey is uniquely
qualified to present the history, discuss the technical aspects, and highlight the lessons
learned from these programs.

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