Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES
LEYNES,
Petitioners,

RUBEN and MYRNA

G.R. No. 154462

Present:
- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ABAD,* and
PEREZ, JJ.

FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH
21,
BANSALAN,
DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT
TRIAL
COURT,
Promulgated:
BRANCH 1, BANSALAN, DAVAO
DEL
SUR, andSPOUSES
GUALBERTO
&
RENE
CABAHUG-SUPERALES,
Respondents.
January 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the (1)
Resolution[1] dated December 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
4420-UDK, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary

restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction of petitioners spouses Ruben and
Myrna Leynes (spouses Leynes); and (2) Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the
appellate court in the same case, denying the spouses Leynes Motion for
Reconsideration.
This case originated from a Complaint[2] for forcible entry, damages, and
attorneys fees filed by respondents spouses Gualberto and Rene Cabahug Superales
(spouses Superales) against the spouses Leynes before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC), Branch 1 of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, and docketed as
Civil Case No. 471 (2000)-B. The Complaint alleged the following material facts:
3. That the [spouses Superales] were the actual occupants and possessors,
being lawful owners of that certain parcel of a residential lot within the Nebrada
Subd., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, known as Lot No. 2423-B-5-K-2, Psd-11-050478,
being a portion of lot 2423-B-5-K, Psd-11-008104, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-41240, containing an area of Three Hundred Thirty Six (336) Square
Meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Rene Cabahug Superales, in the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Davao del Sur;
xxxx
4. That sometime in February 2000, the [spouses Leynes] through force,
stealth and strategy encroached upon and occupied a portion of the [spouses
Superales] titled property consisting of 76 square meters, more or less, dispossessed
the [spouses Superales] and constructed therein a comfort room as an extension of
their house without first obtaining the required building permit from the Municipal
Engineers Office, of Bansalan, Davao del Sur;
5. That the [spouses Superales] promptly called the attention of the [spouses
Leynes] and protested their intrusion into their property but notwithstanding their
protestations the [spouses Leynes] continued on their construction and occupation
of a portion of the [spouses Superales] property;
6. That the [spouses Superales] reported to the Barangay Captain of Brgy.
Poblacion, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, the [spouses Leynes] encroachment on their
titled property and the illegal construction being made on a portion of their property
and their complaint was docketed as Brgy. Case No. 1649;
7. That Amicable Settlement of the dispute was however, repudiated by the
[spouses Leynes] when they refused to recognized the relocation survey conducted
on the property of the [spouses Superales] and prevented the [spouses Superales]
surveyor from planting monuments on the boundary between the [spouses
Superales] and the [spouses Leynes] lot;

xxxx
8. That as per relocation survey conducted, the [spouses Leynes] have
encroached and occupied a total of Seventy Six (76) Square Meters, of the [spouses
Superales] titled property, thereby reducing the area of the [spouses Superales] lot
from 336 Square Meters, more or less to 260 Square Meters, more or less;
xxxx
9. That the [spouses Superales] also complained to the Municipal Engineers
Office in order to stop the illegal construction undertaken by the [spouses Leynes],
but [spouses Superales] complaint fell on deaf ears as no action has been taken by
the Municipal Engineers Office on the said illegal construction;
xxxx
10. That the [spouses Leynes] have unlawfully occupied and are
continuously occupying illegally a portion of the [spouses Superales] property
consisting of 76 Square Meters, thereby denying the [spouses Superales] the use
and enjoyment of the said property being unlawfully withheld by the [spouses
Leynes];
11. That the [spouses Superales] must be promptly restored to the full and
peaceful possession of the portion of 76 Square Meters, of their property taken
forcibly and illegally by the [spouses Leynes], by ordering the [spouses Leynes] to
remove and/or demolish their construction and improvements erected on the lot of
the [spouses Superales], and should they fail or refuse to do so, [spouses Superales]
be given the authority to cause the removal of the [spouses Leynes] improvements
at the expense of the [spouses Superales];
12. That in the meantime that the [spouses Leynes] are occupying a portion
of the [spouses Superales] property, [spouses Leynes] be made to pay the [spouses
Superales] the amount of P500.00 per month as reasonable rental for the property
until they shall have restored the property to the full and peaceful possession of the
[spouses Superales].[3]

Summons together with a copy of the aforementioned Complaint was served

on the spouses Leynes on May 10, 2000, giving them ten (10) days from receipt
within which to file their answer pursuant to Section 6 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The 10-day period for the filing of the spouses Leynes answer prescribed
on May 20, 2000, a Saturday.

The spouses Leynes filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May 22, 2000,
and their Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer with attached Answer with
Counterclaim the day after, on May 23, 2000. The spouses Leynes explained that
they were not able to file their Answer with Counterclaim on May 20, 2000, even
though there were court employees on duty that Saturday, because they had to serve
first a copy of said pleading on the spouses Superales counsel, whose office was
located in Davao City. Davao City is approximately one-hour ride by bus from Digos
City. The spouses Leynes added that they were not even sure if the office of the
spouses Superales counsel was open on Saturdays.[4]
The spouses Superales opposed the spouses Leynes Motion to Admit
Belatedly Filed Answer contending that the answer should have been filed within 10
days from receipt of a copy of the complaint; and the spouses Leynes motion to
admit is in the nature of a motion for extension of time to file an answer, which is a
prohibited pleading in summary proceedings. The spouses Superales further pointed
out that the spouses Leynes motion to admit was not set for hearing and was, thus,
a pro forma motion which should be denied outright.
The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion for Judgment
on May 23, 2000, in which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes failed to file
their answer to the Complaint within the prescribed period, then judgment could now
be rendered based on the evidence and allegations contained in the Complaint.
On May 29, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Judgment denying the spouses
Leynes Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and resolving Civil Case No. 471
(2000)-B entirely in the spouses Superales favor. Said MCTC judgment reads:
This treats the ex-parte motion for judgment filed by Atty. Rogelio E.
Sarsaba, counsel for the [spouses Superales] alleging in substance that the last day
of filing of answer for the [spouses Leynes] was on May 20, 2000 and [the spouses
Leynes] did not file any. Be it noted on such date although it was Saturday the Court
was opened and Court personnel, Benedicta Abagon and Anastacia Vale were
present at that time to receive cases and motions filed in Court. On May 22, 2000
[spouses Leynes] filed [their] answer which answer was filed out of the time
prescribed by law. Under Section 7 of Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
law provides: Should the defendants fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to

what is prayed for therein. The Court, may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 3 (c), Rule 9 if
there are two or more defendants.
From the foregoing facts, the [spouses Leynes] really failed to answer the
complaint within the period prescribed by law, which period under the rules cannot
be extended.
WHEREFORE, the ex-parte motion for judgment filed by the [spouses
Superales] is hereby APPROVED, AND judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
[spouses Leynes]:
1. To remove their construction and/or improvements on the 76
square meters lot belonging to the [spouses Superales] and
surrendered (sic) the same area promptly and peacefully to the
[spouses Superales];
2. To pay the [spouses Superales] the amount of P500.00 per
month as reasonable rentals of the 76 square meters lot occupied
by the [spouses Leynes] from February 2000 until the said area
shall have been delivered to the full possession and control of
[the spouses Superales] in the concept of damages;
3. To pay the [spouses Superales] the sum of P4,000.00 as
reimbursement for the cost of the survey and the relocation of
[the spouses Superales] property; and
4. To pay the [spouses Superales] the sum of P15,000.00 as
reimbursement for attorney fees.[5]

Aggrieved, the spouses Leynes appealed the foregoing MCTC Judgment to

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 of Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Their appeal
was docketed as Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00). In its Decision dated July 9, 2001,
the RTC affirmed the appealed MCTC Judgment, ruling thus:
The lower court was right when it did not allow or entertain the belatedly
filed Answer with Counterclaim of the [spouses Leynes]. The Motion to Admit
Belated Answer partakes of a motion for extension of time to file pleading which
is not allowed as explicitly provided in Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. Since the law on this matter is unambiguous, unequivocal, its
application is imperative.

Wherefore, the judgment rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is

hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of monthly rental for
the Seventy-Six (76) square meter-lot be reduced from P500.00 to P200.00.[6]

The spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration in which
they sought the recall of the Decision dated July 9, 2001 and the remand of the case
to the MCTC for trial on the merits. However, the RTC, in a Resolution also
strangely dated July 9, 2001, refused to reconsider its earlier decision. The RTC
stressed that:
This case falls under the Rules on Summary Procedure. As such, the answer
should be filed within ten (10) days from the service of summons and must be
served on the plaintiff.
The [spouses Leynes], in filing a Motion to Admit Belated Answer in effect
admitted that their Answer was filed out of time. Having made that admission, they
may no longer be heard to claim otherwise.
Wherefore, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
[7]

denied.

On October 11, 2001, the spouses Superales filed with the RTC a Motion for
Execution pursuant to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court [8] which
provides for the immediate execution of the RTC judgment against the defendant
notwithstanding further appeal of the same before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court. Expectedly, the spouses Leynes opposed the spouses Superales
Motion for Execution.
The spouses Leynes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court
of Appeals on November 17, 2001. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
4420-UDK.
In its Resolution dated December 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the spouses Leynes petition outright for being the wrong remedy and for failure to
state the material dates. The appellate court explicated that:

(1) It is a wrong remedy. Under the heading Timeliness Of This Petition [spouses
Leynes] alleged that the petition is directed against the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21 in Bansalan, Davao del Sur in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. This case originated from the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur (docketed as Civil Case
No. 471 [2000]-B where, herein Respondents, Spouses Gualberto and Rene
Superales filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Petitioners, Spouses
Ruben and Myrna Leynes. If that be so, then the correct and appropriate mode
of review should be appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules. Under paragraph 4 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, an appeal
taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
(2) Upon the other hand, if the present petition for certiorari were to be regarded
as the correct or appropriate remedy (which it is not) still it is procedurally
flawed because [the spouses Leynes] violated the amendment introduced to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules, as amended, by Supreme Court Circular
No. 39-98, effective September 11, 1998, which states as follows --Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements --xxxx
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the
material dates showing when notice of judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Here, [the spouses Leynes] did not indicate just when it was that they
received the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration that they
allegedly filed with the RTC of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21, on August 18,
2001, the resolution whereon, denying their motion for reconsideration was
allegedly strangely dated July 9, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the present petition must be denied due course and
consequently DISMISSED. Needless to say, inasmuch as the prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is merely an adjunct to the
main petition, the same must be pro tanto DENIED.[9]

On January 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the spouses Superales
Motion for Execution. The RTC observed that the Court of Appeals did not issue a
TRO as prayed for by the spouses Leynes in their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420UDK. Instead, the RTC referred to the Resolution dated December 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals dismissing outright the spouses Leynes petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 4420-UDK.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution on February 2, 2002, for
the satisfaction of its Decision dated July 9, 2001.
On February 11, 2002, the spouses Leynes filed with the RTC a Manifestation
with motion to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of execution,
considering their pending Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. In its
Order dated February 15, 2002, the RTC directed the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Execution until said trial court has resolved the
spouses Leynes latest motion.
In a Resolution dated May 7, 2002, the Court of Appeals found no reason to
modify or overturn its earlier Resolution dated December 20, 2001, which dismissed
the spouses Leynes petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. The dispositive portion
of said Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit, must be
as it hereby is DENIED. Accordingly, the appended Petition for Certiorari is
ordered expunged from the records, and the enclosed Postal Money Orders Nos. J
7318284 and B 2678220, both dated 19 November 2001, in the amount of P500.00
and P1,000.00, respectively, posted at the Ateneo University, Davao City, payable
to the clerk of court of this Court from a certain Ruben Leynes, are hereby ordered
returned to the sender/payee.[10]

Not long thereafter, on May 13, 2002, the RTC issued an Order resolving the
issue of execution of its Decision dated July 8, 2001. The RTC reasoned that:
[I]n an ejectment case, the appellate court which affirms a decision brought before
it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the guise of an execution of the affirmed

decision. The only exception to that is when said appellate court grants an execution
pending appeal.
xxxx
Considering that this does not involve a motion for execution pending
appeal, this Court (sitting as an appellate court) cannot decree its execution.[11]

Thus, the RTC decreed:

Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin, that is, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (Br. 001) Bansalan-Magsaysay with which the
motion for execution shall be filed.[12]

On May 17, 2002, the spouses Leynes received a copy of the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated May 7, 2002 denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the
dismissal of their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK. Thereafter, on July 17,
2002, the spouses Leynes filed the instant Petition for Certiorari charging the Court
of Appeals, as well as the RTC and the MCTC, with grave abuse of discretion,
particularly committed as follows:
I

IN DISMISSING [the spouses Leynes] EARLIER PETITION, THE COURT OF

APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CONSIDERING
THAT IT DENIED THE PETITION ON A MERE TECHNICALITY WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE NOVEL AND HIGHLY
MERITORIOUS.
II
THE MCTC BRANCH 1 AND THE RTC BRANCH 21 BOTH COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED TO ADMIT [the spouses Leynes] ANSWER
AND RULING THAT SINCE THE LAST DAY FOR FILING [the spouses
Leynes] ANSWER FELL ON A SATURDAY, THE SAME SHOULD HAVE
BEEN FILED ON THE SAID DAY SINCE THERE WERE COURT
PERSONNEL ON DUTY.
III

THE MCTC BRANCH 1 AND THE RTC BRANCH 21 COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED TO ADMIT [the spouses Superales]
COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
SAME WAS FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR FROM ITS SUPPOSED
HAPPENING.[13]

Procedural Matters
The Court of Appeals dismissed the spouses Leynes Petition for Certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK for being the wrong mode of appeal and for failure to
state a material date.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 clearly lays down the proper modes of
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the RTCs:
3. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, appeals
by certiorari will not lie with the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from
Regional Trial Courts may be taken:
a) by writ of error (ordinary appeal) where the appealed judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the regional trial court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; or
b) by petition for review where the judgment was rendered by the
regional trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
The mode of appeal in either instance is entirely distinct from an appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
4. Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed. (Emphases ours.)

The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00) in its appellate
jurisdiction. Hence, the RTC Decision dated July 9, 2001, which affirmed the MCTC
Judgment of May 29, 2000 against the spouses Leynes, and Resolution inadvertently
also dated July 9, 2001, which denied the spouses Leynes Motion for
Reconsideration, should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The spouses Leynes, however, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.
Lapanday Holdings Corp.,[14] we presented the following discourse distinguishing
between an appeal (whether an ordinary appeal or a petition for review) and a
petition for certiorari, to wit:
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited
to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ
is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC,
we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit

in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the

original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ
of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law or the
facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the
findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the
remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over
the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original
suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was
not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In
contrast, the parties to a petition forcertiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby
becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the
Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original
action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower
court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for
review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of
the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than
sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from
the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also

that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the
law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy
if Appeal Is Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.[15]

The remedy of appeal to the Court of Appeals was available to the spouses
Leynes, only that they failed to avail of it in time. This much is clear from the
following explanation of the counsel for the spouses Leynes:
10. Until the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court Branch 21, [the
spouses Leynes] were represented by their former counsel of record, Atty.
Christopher Abarilla. Aggrieved by the way their case was handled by their former
counsel of record, [the spouses Leynes] engaged the services of the undersigned
Counsel in the second week of November 2001 for the purpose of elevating their
case to the Court of Appeals. Since no other remedy under the Rules of Court
was no longer available to [the spouses Leynes] because the 15-day period
within which to file a Certiorari under Rule 42 had already lapsed, recourse
under Rule 65 was instead resorted to as there was no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by which [the spouses
Leynes] could question the assailed decisions of both the lower court and the RTC
Branch 21.[16] (Emphasis ours.)

We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is not available where the
aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary
course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two
remedies are mutually exclusive.[17] The special civil action of certiorari cannot be
used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.[18]

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals held, the spouses Leynes Petition

for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 4420-UDK failed to comply with the requirement
under Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that a petition for certiorari should
indicate material dates, such as when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was
received. The spouses Leynes did not refute that their Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals did not state the date they received a copy of the RTC
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. That the said Resolution was
strangely dated July 9, 2001, the same date as the RTC Decision sought to be
reconsidered, is immaterial. The timeliness of the filing by the spouses Leynes of
their petition before the Court of Appeals is determined from the date they received
the challenged RTC resolution and not the date the RTC issued the same.
Seeking recourse from this Court, the spouses Leynes once more filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The spouses Leynes yet
again availed themselves of the wrong remedy.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals
is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of
the appellate process over the original case. A special civil action under Rule 65 is
an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper
remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.[19]
Nevertheless, we bear in mind that the acceptance of a petition
for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court.The provisions of the Rules of Court, which are
technical rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations. Where a rigid
application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in

a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our power to suspend the

rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.[20]
We pronounced in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[21] that:
All things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's Petition based on a procedural faux
pax. While a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy,
there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the
proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should
have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure
and yielded to consideration of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that
strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay,
if not a miscarriage of justice.[22] (Emphases ours.)

Given the peculiar circumstances extant in the case at bar, the dismissal of the
spouses Leynes Petition for Certiorari would result in the miscarriage of
justice. The spouses Leynes were unjustly declared in default by the MCTC and
deprived of the opportunity to present arguments and evidence to counter the spouses
Superales Complaint. Hence, we are accepting and giving due course to the spouses
Leynes petition in the interests of substantial justice and equity.
Reglementary Period

The MCTC rendered its Judgment dated May 29, 2000 ex parte, declaring the
spouses Leynes in default for their failure to file their answer to the spouses
Superales Complaint within the reglementary period for doing so. According to the
MCTC, the spouses Leynes only had until May 20, 2000 to file an answer; and
although May 20, 2000 was a Saturday, the court was open and court personnel
Benedicta Abagon and Anastacia Vale were present at that time to receive cases and
motions filed with the court.
We disagree.
Sections 6, Rule 70 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure gives
a defendant 10 days from service of summons to file his/her answer:
Section 6. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the
plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and
compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered
barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

In computing said 10-day period, we resort to Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins
to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
(Emphases ours.)

We emphasized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,[23] that

non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) are excluded from the
counting of the period only when the last day of the period falls on such days. Rule
22 does not provide for any other circumstance in which non-working days would
affect the counting of a prescribed period.

The spouses Leynes were served with the summons on May 10, 2000. The
last day of the 10-day period within which the spouses Leynes should have filed
their answer, May 20, 2000, fell on a Saturday. The next working day was May 22,
2000, a Monday, on which the spouses Leynes did file their Answer with
Counterclaim. Based on the aforequoted rules, the spouses Leynes answer was filed
within the reglementary period, and they were not in default. The MCTC should not
have rendered an ex parte Judgment against them.
Court personnel were at the MCTC on May 20, 2000, a Saturday, in
compliance with the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-99, on Strict
Observance of Working Hours and Disciplinary Action for Absenteeism and
Tardiness, which took effect on February 1, 1999. Pertinent provisions of said
circular are reproduced below:
A. Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall assign by rotation, Judges
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in multiple
sala stations within their respective territorial areas, to be on duty on Saturdays
from 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M., assisted by a skeletal force, also on
rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.
xxxx
B. Court offices, (e.g., Office of the Clerk) and units which deal directly with
the public, such as receiving, process-serving and cashiers units, shall maintain
a skeletal force on Saturdays from 8:00 A.M. to noon, and from 12:30 P.M. to
4:30 P.M. Those assigned to work on Saturdays shall be notified of their
assignment at least three days in advance. An employee so assigned shall have
a full day-off the following week, on a day to be specified by the Justice/Judge
concerned. (Manual for Clerk of Courts, Chapter II, Section A, 1) (Emphases
ours.)

Administrative Circular No. 2-99 should not affect the manner by which
periods set by the rules or the courts are computed under Rule 22, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court.Administrative Circular No. 2-99 is an administrative issuance signed
by then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide to govern the attendance of judiciary
officials and employees. It cannot amend or take precedence over the Rules of Court,
duly approved by the Court en banc and published for the information of and
compliance by the public. In fact, Administrative Circular No. 2-99 itself states that

it supersedes and modifies accordingly any previous Orders or Circulars on the

matter, but not the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Administrative Circular No. 2-99 requires certain trial court judges
and employees to be present on Saturdays primarily to act on petitions for bail and
other urgent matters. We fail to see an answer to a complaint for forcible entry as
among such urgent matters that would have required filing by the party and action
by the court not a day later. In addition, Administrative Circular No. 2-99 directs the
Office of the Clerk of Court to maintain a skeletal force on Saturdays. Civil Case
No. 471 (2000)-B, the spouses Superales complaint for forcible entry against the
spouses Leynes, was already raffled to and pending before the MCTC-Branch 1 of
Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur; thus, the answer and other pleadings in said
case should already be filed with the said Branch and not with the Office of the Clerk
of Court. There is no showing that the Office of the Branch Clerk of Court was also
open on May 20, 2000.
MCTC Jurisdiction
We do not subscribe, however, to the spouses Leynes argument that the
spouses Superales Complaint for forcible entry had already prescribed.
Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives
or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)

In forcible entry cases, the action must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land. In paragraph 4 of their Complaint, the spouses

Superales alleged that the spouses Leynes, through force, stealth, and strategy,
encroached upon and occupied a portion of the spouses Superales titled property,
consisting of 76 square meters, sometime inFebruary 2000. The spouses Superales
already filed their Complaint for forcible entry, damages, and attorneys fees, three
months thereafter, in May 2000.
Even so, the MCTC rendered judgment against the spouses Leynes ex
parte. The spouses Leynes Answer with Counterclaim was not admitted by the
MCTC and they had no opportunity to present evidence in support of their defenses.
The spouses Leynes averred before us that:
48. It is clear from the language of the law that [the spouses Superales]
cause of action accrued from the very moment they found in 1995 that [the spouses
Leynes] buildings allegedly intruded into their supposed property when they
acquired title over the same. But for the next five years or so, [the spouses
Superales] never raised a howl of protest over the alleged encroachment. Not
having acted on their rights within the limits stipulated under the law, then the
complaint for Forcible Entry should also be considered as belatedly filed before the
MCTC Branch.
49. [The spouses Superales], however, have been very careful to allege that
[the spouses Leynes] structures were built in the year 2000 to enable them to get
around the prescriptive period imposed by the Rules. But the truth is, and the same
could have been very well established had a trial on the merits proceeded, the
comfort rooms were built in 1985 and the bunkhouse followed two years later. [The
spouses Superales] then were not yet claimants or possessors of the land they now
say is theirs. In 1995 when they surreptitiously acquired title over Jose Cabahugs
property, they contested for the first time, the location of [the spouses Leynes]
buildings. Yet, after having done so, [the spouses Superales] never filed the
complaint for Forcible Entry within the one (1) year period as mandated. At the
onset therefore, [the spouses Superales] cause of action was already tainted with a
serious congenital infirmity which, had a trial been convened, would have
necessarily resulted in the unwarranted complaint against [the spouses Leynes].[24]

These averments obviously involve factual matters which the spouses Leynes
must back up with evidence. We cannot rule on the same since this Court is not a
trier of facts.Consequently, it is only prudent that the case be remanded to the MCTC
for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The ex parte Judgment dated

May 29, 2000 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 1 of BansalanMagsaysay, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. 471 (2000)-B, is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court which is DIRECTED to
admit the Answer with Counterclaim of the spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes and
accordingly conduct further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Per Raffle dated January 10, 2011.

Rollo, pp. 23-24; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Mariano C. del Castillo (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), concurring.
[2]
Id. at 45-50.
[3]
Id. at 45-47.
[4]
Id. at 6.
[5]
Id. at 64-65.
[6]
Id. at 67.
[7]
Id. at 73.
[8]
Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[10]
Id. at 33.
[11]
Id. at 94.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 10-11.
[14]
479 Phil. 768 (2004).
[15]
Id. at 778-783.
[16]
Rollo, p. 7.
[17]
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 420 (2005).
[18]
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205, 216.
[19]
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 783, 791 (2002).
[20]
Tan v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., G.R. No. 148420, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 115, 120-121.
[1]

[21]

G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348.

Id. at 367-368.
[23]
G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 168.
[24]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[22]