Power Clarke
Power Clarke
Power Clarke
Session
Power / Thruster
Abstract
Total blackouts have occurred on vessels that operate either with a common power system configuration
or with the power system split into two or more independent power systems. It is more prevalent in the
former configuration. In the latter configuration, internal and external common cause failures are often the
cause rather than individual equipment failures.
Not all causes of vessel blackout can be recovered from i.e. there may be some scenarios where
recovery will not succeed even if it operates correctly. Success depends on whether the common cause
failure that initiated the blackout remains active.
Where recovery includes restart of generators, drives, major consumers and auxiliary services, the success
of blackout recovery often depends on the absence of active lockout functions on the Main Switchboards,
thruster drives restart time etc.
The primary aim of this paper is to:
Review the various blackout recovery test procedures that are sometimes performed as part of annual
trials and to evaluate their effectiveness in replicating a real blackout condition
Present an additional test procedure that could be performed to improve the effectiveness of Blackout
Recovery Testing
Investigate the impact that any additional blackout recovery tests would have on equipment longevity
Identify system components and methodologies that could be incorporated into existing and future
designs to facilitate blackout recovery tests Build To Test.
The additional test proposed herein is considered as an enhancement of the existing tests that may already
be performed as part of blackout recovery testing. Furthermore, the tests are not aimed specifically at any
particular equipment manufacturer as the tests aim to replicate failures that could be experienced on any
vessel regardless of equipment manufacture and design. However, the implementation of the test circuit
may vary depending on the equipment type.
Introduction
The common causes of a blackout are often a result of equipment or common system failures and in some
cases due to operator error. However, the way in which a power system blacks out, can be broken down
into two main groups:
a) Power system operating as a common system (bus-ties and transfer feeders / cable
interconnectors closed)
b) Power system operating as multiple independent systems (bus-ties or transfer feeders / cable
interconnectors open)
With a common power system configuration, any of the following causes could cause a complete power
system blackout:
a) Failure to over voltage / excitation on one generator causing multiple generators to trip on over
voltage protection or field failure protection.
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b) Failure to over speed / over frequency on one generator causing multiple generators to trip on
reverse power protection and the faulty generator tripping on over frequency protection or engine
over speed.
c) A severe load sharing imbalance (kW or kVAr) caused by one generator taking the entire load
then tripping on over current can cause other generators to trip on under frequency or under
voltage as they support the additional sudden application of load
d) Low speed caused by common fuel contamination problem leading to tripping on under
frequency.
e) Low engine speed caused by combustion air starvation
f) Tripping of multiple generators on overcurrent due to crash synchronisation or inadvertent
connection of a stationary generator.
g) Tripping of multiple generators on reverse power or over frequency due to excessive regeneration
from industrial load
h) Tripping of multiple generators on overload or low frequency due to overload in plant or lack of
generating capacity.
i) Over speed due to ingestion of combustible gas.
j) Failure of a bus-tie or interconnector to open when 1st stage protection operates
k) Failure of common auxiliary systems such as fuel or cooling etc.
For a multiple split bus power system configuration, a total blackout is only likely to occur due to the
following:
a) Lack of generating capacity in surviving plant when DP control system and industrial consumers
transfer load to surviving power systems.
b) Low speed caused by common fuel contamination problem leading to tripping on under
frequency.
c) Tripping of multiple generators on overload or low frequency due to overload in plant or lack of
generating capacity
d) Tripping of multiple generators on overcurrent due to crash synchronisation when the single bus
tie between two independent switchboards closes (out of sync).
e) Low engine speed caused by combustion air starvation
f) Over speed due to ingestion of combustible gas.
g) Although the primary power system is considered as two or more independent systems, an
incorrect configuration of a particular auxiliary system could result in a total blackout.
h) Auto-changeover of systems from one power plant to another as a result of a blackout could
transfer the fault to healthy system
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d) Failure of the propulsion / thruster drives to re-connect to the system due to their premagnetization supply being out of synchronism with the main switchboard.
e) Insufficient validation of the PMS blackout recovery sequence at the design / test phase.
f) Incorrect configuration of the auxiliary system preventing the main system from recovering.
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Depending on the damping and the control of the system, this oscillation may occur for a short
duration post fault. It is during this time all of the protective systems associated with the healthy
switchboards must remain inoperative. However if they were to blackout, the healthy systems
should be available to recover as part of the blackout recovery sequence.
For each test performed, the blackout recovery should evaluate the ability of essential systems including
the propulsion / thruster drives to reconnect to the system (and available for DP control where applicable),
paying particular interest to VFD pre-charge / pre-magnetization supplies which may be operating
asynchronously from the main power system.
Figure 2 below illustrates the voltage and frequency excursions that can occur during short circuit
conditions leading up to a power system blackout.
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Excitation Interruption
An interruption to the excitation on a generator is a potential method of simulating voltage and frequency
transients that could occur prior to a blackout and hence verifying the ability of the vessels power system
to successfully recover from any blackout that may occur as a result of either an equipment failure or a
system fault. This test can be effective in two ways:
a) When applied to a generator that is single running on the main bus, the interruption is seen as a
genuine power system outage
By implementing a test, which does not solely rely on the tripping of the generator circuit
breaker, the busbar will suffer a realistic collapse in volts and potentially a transient frequency
increase due to a reduction in generator output power. The under voltage protection or other
protective functions would operate in this instance to trip the generator circuit breaker and
associated bus ties / interconnectors. The blackout recovery would commence thereafter. This test
will potentially demonstrate that that the power plant, including its auxiliary systems are tolerant
to the transient voltage and frequency variations experienced and as such can recover as part of
the blackout recovery sequence.
b) When a generator is operating in parallel with another generator, the power system could be
arranged so that the loss of excitation on one generator causes the generator to trip on under
excitation and subsequently resulting in the remaining online generator tripping on overcurrent or
other protective functions. It may be that the generator protective settings will need to be
temporarily modified to achieve the desired generator trip scenario. However, with careful
planning, this test could simulate a voltage depression and hence frequency variation on the
power system prior to and subsequently after the first generator tripping. Again such a test will
potentially demonstrate that that the power plant, including its auxiliary systems are tolerant to
the transient voltage and frequency variations experienced and as such can recover as part of the
blackout recovery sequence.
Note:
As with all brushless generators installed on vessels, the exciter field connects to the main
generator winding via a set of rotating diodes. With this configuration, it is not possible to assist
in the removal of the main field voltage due to the blocking effects of the rotating diodes.
However, real-time site data shown in Figure 3 demonstrates that by interrupting the generator
excitation on a brushless generator, the rate-of-change of generator output voltage that can be
achieved is sufficient to replicate voltage (and hence frequency) excursions, which would occur
prior to the blackout.
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Freq. increase at
the instant of loss
of excitation
Loss of excitation
at t=4.05s
Figure 3 Voltage and frequency during loss of excitation on one generator whilst operating in parallel
Test Implementation
It is recognized that the tests discussed in this paper should be performed in a controlled manner, with
essential services fed from an islanded switchboard that will not be affected by the test. Once confidence
has been established that a given test has been successful, a calculated decision should be made whether
to repeat the test with the system configured in a more representative vessel configuration to further
validate the blackout recovery.
Excitation Interruption
The excitation interruption test involves adapting the AVR excitation output circuit for one (or more)
generator(s). This can be achieved in a number of ways depending on the AVR type and the control
circuit. This will need to be checked on a case-by-case basis.
a) Operating the AVR in Automatic Mode and by simulating an excitation trip signal from the
generator protection relay at the AVR panel. The simulated protection trip interrupts the generator
PMG power supply to the AVR, interrupts the AVR output to the generator exciter and introduces
the field discharge resistor in the generator exciter field circuit. The resistor provides a path for
the generator exciter field current to be discharged whilst having the desirable effect of reducing
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the L/R time constant of the exciter field, which in turn helps remove the stored energy from the
exciter.
For the test to be effective i.e. to allow the voltage and hence frequency disturbance to occur for
the duration permitted by the generator protection, it may be necessary to disable or disconnect
the AVR protection alarms where installed (e.g. watchdog) to prevent an unwanted, instantaneous
trip of the generator circuit breaker.
b) Operating the AVR in manual field current regulator (FCR) control and introducing a separate
field discharge resistor to rapidly discharge the generator exciter field. An additional contactor or
similar may be required to achieve this. This contactor will also allow for remote operation of the
circuit.
When operating the AVR in manual control it will be first necessary to stabilize active and
reactive power on the respective main busbar before switching the AVR from automatic to
manual control.
For this test to be effective, it will be necessary to stabilize the vessel load as far as practically
possible prior to selecting the generator AVR to manual control to ensure acceptable reactive
power load sharing is maintained. However, the method of reactive (kVAr) load sharing
implemented on the vessel would need to be evaluated before safely enabling manual control.
Figure 4 shows how a typical generator exciter field circuit can be modified implement the test circuit and
Figure 5 shows how the test circuit could be implemented practically. In this case, the generator excitation
system will be configured for manual excitation (FCR) control.
TC-1
FDR
FSC
+
PMG
Input
AVR
Excitation Output
Power
Supply
FSC
TC-2
TC-3
Generator
Exciter Field
TR2
TR1
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Test Box
Auto
Manual
Test
Generator
Exciter
FDR
PMG
3
AVR
PMG Input
Excitation Output
FSC
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Function
System / Equipment
fault (Protection Trip)?
Operator Error?
PMS Fault?
E-Stop Engine
CB Trip
Ramp Volts to
trip Set-point
Ramp Hz to
trip set-point
Excitation
Interruption
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The following section summarizes the expected robustness of the thruster Variable Frequency Drives
(VFD) in tolerating the voltage and frequency excursions that could be experienced during the
aforementioned test.
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a.
Generators
The sudden reduction in excitation voltage will result in the exciter field energy being discharged through
the test circuit discharge resistor. Due to the main field of the generator being fed via a rotating diode
rectifier assembly, there will be no mechanism to rapidly discharge the main field. In this instance, the
rotating diodes will be subjected to significant reverse voltages. Generally, the diodes are selected to
have Repetitive Reverse Blocking Voltage of at least 200% of the maximum (peak) field voltage. On this
basis, no damage or weakening of the rotating diode assemblies following these tests are envisaged.
A reduction in excitation current, may cause an increase in generator PMG voltage (due to regulation),
but the PMG open circuit voltage will have been selected to be less than the maximum input voltage
rating of the AVR (or manual field current regulator).
With any load rejection situation, the generator(s) will be subject to rotor acceleration (the braking effect
of the load torque has been removed), but the load rejection seen by the generators in this instance would
be less than the worst case (full load) rejection that could be experienced by the generators during actual
operation.
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b.
Power / Thruster
Prime Movers
The sudden reduction of load will be managed by the engine fuel control system. In the case of common
rail direct fuel injection engines, this is managed by the fuel injector control and should impose no
significant stress on this system - the injectors will simply reduce to 0% duty cycle on load rejection due
to the over-speed condition of the engine.
For hydraulically actuated governor control systems, there will be some stress applied to the actuator and
fuel linkage, but based on the anticipated active power reduction (and active power application, in the
case of a power swing being invoked) to each generator, this is envisaged as being significantly less than
a full load rejection.
c.
Circuit Breakers
Vacuum circuit breakers at medium voltage are designed to interrupt rated current and rated voltage
without damage. Switching operations at rated conditions can be as high as 10,000 operations before the
vacuum bottles need to be replaced. Due to the very low arc energy, the rapid movement of the arc root
over the contact and to the fact that most of the metal vapor re-condenses on the contact, contact erosion
is extremely small.
Therefore, no premature wear is envisaged to the vacuum circuit breakers by performing these tests.
It is recognized that load switching using vacuum as an insulating medium can cause high voltage spikes
(up to 2 x rated voltage), but all equipment installed (including cables) will have insulation systems rated
for this switching phenomena.
d.
In the case of diode front end (DFE) variable frequency drives with kinetic support functionality, which
are subjected to a rapid depression in network (input) voltage, the control logic within the drive will (if
provided) automatically invoke the kinetic support function to maintain dc link volts. In the event of the
network voltage failing to recover (i.e. in the event of a real blackout) or if there is insufficient kinetic
energy in the thruster motor to support the DC link, the drive will pulse inhibit the output IGBTs and trip
its incoming circuit breaker due to a prolonged DC link under voltage. The impact on the semiconductor
operational life is negligible due to the controlled & coordinated manner of this protection functionality.
A reduction in system frequency, either rapidly or in a controlled ramp, will have negligible effect on the
variable speed drives.
e.
Transformers normally operate within the linear region of their magnetic saturation curve where the core
magnetic permeability is high and the core magnetizing current is low. Energising a transformer that
possesses residual flux in its core can push the core into saturation causing high currents to flow. These
MTS DP Conference - Houston
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currents are known as inrush currents and are not considered as a fault condition. These currents, which
are not too dissimilar in magnitude to short circuit currents, can impose large mechanical stresses on the
transformer primary windings. Generally transformers are designed with sufficient bracing to counteract
these mechanical forces and as such the repeated energization of transformers as part of the blackout
recovery tests should have little effect on transformer longevity.
e.
Summary
It is not expected that any premature wear will occur to main electrical power system components during
the blackout recovery tests described within this paper. The transients imposed are significantly less than
that would occur in the case of a full load rejection to a single generator. However, from a good practice
perspective, it would be recommended that different generator combinations are used for each annual test
to ensure that each generator and its associated protection equipment is configured and reacts the same as
the initial test case.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the various blackout tests presently performed as part of annual trials and has
identified an additional test which involves the interruption of the excitation for connected generator(s) to
simulate power system transients that could occur prior to a blackout. By performing such tests annually
or twice annually, the efficiency of testing would also be improved which will have the desirable effect of
reducing the overall testing time.
Due to the relatively benign nature of these excitation interruption test, this could be performed annually
as part of the annual proving trials programme without affecting equipment life / longevity. These tests
could also compliment any fault ride-through (short-circuit) testing requirements.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution made by Peter Fougere, MTS DP Committee in
producing this paper.
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