Ed Ling 2002

30 May 2002 9:52 AR AR163-09.tex AR163-09.
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10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140942
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:197–220

doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140942
Copyright °
c 2002 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
MATHEMATICS IN SOCIOLOGY
Christofer R. Edling
Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden;
e-mail: cedling@sociology.su.se
Access provided by University of Maryland - Baltimore County on 01/08/15. For personal use only.
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002.28:197-220. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Key Words mathematical models, rational choice, social mechanisms, social

process, social structure
■ Abstract Since mathematical sociology was firmly established in the 1960s, it has
grown tremendously. Today it has an impressive scope and deals with topical problems
of social structure and social change. A distinctive feature of today’s use of mathematics
in sociology is the movement toward a synthesis between process, structure, and action.
In combination with an increased attention to social mechanisms and the problems
of causality and temporality, this synthesis can add to its relevance for sociology in
general. The article presents recent advances and major sociological research streams
in contemporary sociology that involve the application of mathematics, logic, and
computer modeling.
INTRODUCTION
In this article I present the use of mathematics in contemporary sociology by

pointing out recent advances and highlighting some major sociological research
streams in which mathematics is used intensively. The overview is selective and
by no means exhaustive. One restriction is important to mention. A special char-
acteristic of the mathematical approach to sociological problems is that it involves
many scholars from outside the sociology discipline. Such examples include John
Harsanyi (1976), Anatol Rapoport (1983), and Herbert Simon (1957), three influ-
ential scholars who have conducted research over an extended period of time in
areas highly relevant to sociology.1 However, I have decided to concentrate on work
by sociologists only. Most of the references are to books and journals of sociology.
The decision to keep the text free of equations has two rationales. First, I believe
that a presentation of the use of mathematics in sociology deserves to be presented
in a widely accessible format, and second, even if kept at minimum, a fruitful
1
Among these three, Harsanyi actually held a PhD in philosophy with minors in sociology
from the University of Budapest. Before emigrating in 1950, he was employed at the Univer-
sity Institute of Sociology in the same city. According to his own account, the “conceptual
and mathematical elegance” of economics made him switch when he had to study for a new
degree in Australia in the early 1950s (Frängsmyr 1995).
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technical discussion of the work presented here would require considerably more
space than is available.
I refer to the subject area under review interchangeably as mathematical so-
ciology, mathematics in sociology, the mathematical approach to sociology, etc.
A reason for this is that the label mathematical sociology is a bit problematic. In
many sciences, physics for instance, the mathematical is a meta-theoretical activity
that develops principles for modeling and analyzes consistency of theories. In so-
ciology, however, theory is not widely associated with any sort of mathematics
or formalization. Therefore, mathematical sociology has become a wide umbrella
for a heterogeneous field using mathematics, logic, and computer simulation to

illustrate and solve sociological problems (Feld 1997a). It is a heterogeneous field
in the same sense that sociology at large is. It includes all possible types of subjects
and areas, and it utilizes the whole range of possible methodological techniques for
empirical testing. In addition, it is also heterogeneous in the type of mathematics,
logic, and computational procedures applied to the various problems. This is not
to say that sociology avails itself of an exceptionally broad range of mathemat-
ics, but the fact is that two sociologists approaching the social world by means
of mathematics may have very little in common in terms of the approach and the
models they use, even though they share a fundamental formal inclination (also,
see the discussion in Freese 1980).
The use of mathematics to solve and illuminate questions about society can be
dated at least back to the eighteenth-century French philosopher de Condorcet,
who did work on probability and decision-making. Modern mathematical soci-
ology however, was born in the late 1940s to mid-1950s; classic texts include
Karlsson (1958), Lazarsfeld (1954), and Rashevsky (1951). The approach really
gained impetus in the 1960s, the classic being Coleman’s (1964) Introduction to
Mathematical Sociology. Thus, since around the middle of the century just past,
a number of sociologists have come to describe themselves as mathematical soci-
ologists. As the label makes plain, these scholars are sociologists who in one way
or another apply mathematics to sociology. Mathematical sociology has had some
success, but counted in number of adherents, it has remained quite small: In July
2001, the mathematical sociology section of the American Sociological Associa-
tion had 185 members. It remains an important and vital activity, however, and the
main impression has to be that mathematical sociology has grown tremendously
over the past 30 years. Lately, we have even witnessed a sort of revitalization of the
field, much of it through the growth of social network analysis (Hummon & Carley
1993, Doreian & Stokman 1997), and the emergence of computational modeling
(Hummon & Fararo 1995, Prietula et al. 1998, Gilbert & Troitzsch 1999). Even
though the last major review was written in the mid-1970s (Sørensen 1978), both
the journal Sociological Forum (1997, vol. 12, no. 1) and Sociological Theory
(2000, vol. 18, no. 3) recently featured special issues in which prominent scholars
reflected on and discussed the role of mathematics in sociology (see Abell 2000,
Berger 2000, Fararo 1997, 2000, Feld 1997a,b, Jasso 1997, Heise 2000, Lieberson
1997, Skvoretz 2000, White 1997, 2000).
MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 199
THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN SOCIOLOGY

The presentation of mathematical tools is not part of the presentation of theory or
methods in sociological textbooks, and it has been a long time since a textbook
on mathematical sociology has appeared. The last broad introductory text written
by sociologists appeared more than 25 years ago (Leik & Meeker 1975). Today it
might not even be feasible to put together an encyclopedic textbook of the sort that
Fararo (1973) wrote in the early 1970s because of the sheer amount of sociology and
mathematics that would have to go into it. Even though there are recent introductory
texts on selected areas (Bradley & Meek 1986), and introductory texts aimed at
mathematics undergraduates (Beltrami 1993), the student who wants an up-to-date
introduction to the use of mathematics in sociology has to turn to research papers

in selected areas. Several useful collections exist. For example, the volume by
Szmatka et al. (1997) can be read as a nice, not very technical introduction to the use
of mathematics in sociology. The book contains papers on the role of mathematics
in sociological research and its relation to theory, as well as applied mathematical
models in the areas of status and networks. The book is also interesting because
it brings together a vast sociological research stream, the accumulated results of
more than 30 years of work. Contributors would probably claim that this unity
in advanced research could not have been accomplished without the language of
mathematics (Berger 2000). Other, slightly more demanding collections on topical
problems such as solidarity (Doreian & Fararo 1998) and the evolution of social
networks (Doreian & Stokman 1997) have recently been compiled. A general text
that concentrates on theory is Sociological Theories in Progress (Berger et al.
1989). This is the third volume of a series of three (Berger et al. 1966, 1972) that
gives a nice illustration of the development of formal theory in sociology over
several decades.
As I hope to show, mathematics may be fruitfully used to address sociological
problems. Of course, the discussion about the utility of formalization in sociology
is on-going (see Wilson 1984). Ever since the birth of the discipline, sociology has
been haunted by the chasm between science and literature (Lepenies 1988). There
is no reason why people who believe that sociology belongs to the arts should
embrace the use of mathematics in sociology (though mathematics has aesthetic
qualities). However, also among sociologists who subscribe to the idea that so-
ciology belong to the sciences, there is a diffused skepticism toward the use of
mathematics. I think this is partly because mathematics is falsely associated with
a vulgar version of the natural sciences. It is true that the ideas of a unified science
have inspired some sociologists to use mathematics, but even these efforts have
always been very sensitive to the particularities of sociology and social science
(e.g., Fararo 1989). But for most scholars who use mathematics to do sociology,
this use is only for clarity and precision. Indeed, Herbert Simon (1957, p. 89),
commenting on his own work on the theories of Festinger (Simon 1957, ch. 7)
and Homans (Simon 1957, ch. 6), claims “that the mathematical translation is
itself a substantive contribution to the theory,” and that “[m]athematics has become
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the dominant language of the natural sciences not because it is quantitative—a

common delusion—but primarily because it permits clear and rigorous reasoning
about phenomena too complex to be handled in words.” And Patrick Doreian,
long-time editor of the Journal of Mathematical Sociology, puts it in the following
way. “Mathematics is a language, and all that mathematical sociology means to
me is that sociological ideas are expressed in mathematical terms, and that we try
and take advantage of using the mathematics. I don’t see mathematics as being
that special, at least in my own work”.∗ If one takes this view, that mathematics
is a language, it is reasonable to claim that there is nothing about mathematics in
itself that would make it a hindrance to success. Still, one could ask whether it is
a language that is appropriate in all of sociology. According to Philip Bonacich,
there may be areas where it is more difficult to formalize, fields “where the mathe-
matics is not well developed or no one has thought about what kind of mathematics
to use. Mathematical sociology is still a very open area, in which there is still a
lot of room for discovery in terms of what kinds of mathematics can be used.
So, I wouldn’t say about anything, for example culture, that mathematics can’t
be used. It just hasn’t been done yet” (Interview). This idea—that if anything
meaningful at all can be said about society, there are no grounds for claiming
that it cannot be done with mathematics—we find already in Lazarsfeld (1954).
However, everyday language and mathematics are not the same, and in the trans-
lation the risk of losing touch is always present, because, in the words of Thomas
Fararo:
We always know more than we can say. And we always can say more than
we can really formally put down in more exacting terms. So as you go further
and further from the fundamental intuitions in the interest of being logical and
mathematical, you can potentially lose contact with the governing intuitions.
But the main gain would be to try to bring the mathematics back into, and as
close as possible to the basic intuitions of the field. Trying to represent those
intuitions in some way. [. . .] You know, you think sociologically, and then you
think mathematically. But these are often hard to fit together. The mathematics
enforces a discipline that the other discipline doesn’t really value in the same
way. It has its own forms of rigor but they’re not the same. To bring those
two into conjunction has always been the sort of thing that I thought of as
important.∗
When reflecting upon this “translation problem,” it is important to note, as did
Bonacich in the quotation above, that mathematics, and sociology for that matter,
is an evolving discipline. In consequence, we have to realize first that there is
an immensely large number of combinations to be tried out between sociological
intuition and the mathematics at hand. Without more scholars investigating these
combinations, we will never know the limits of formalization. Second, there will
be new mathematics tomorrow that can and will be put in the service of sociology.
∗
This is quoted from an interview conducted by the author. See acknowledgments.
This is further stressed by Harrison White, who “cannot imagine that the successes
we want to have will ever be achieved without any mathematics. It’s bound to be
there. But it’s a subtle matter because the mathematics we need might not be the
mathematics we have at the moment. I’ve always been interested in quite different
kinds of mathematics. Most people don’t realize that mathematicians are always
throwing up new kinds of maths” (Interview).
White (1997) has advised sociologists to scan the mathematical literature for
good ideas and to take advantage of the great mathematical advances made during
the twentieth century (see Casti 1997, 2000 for a popular account). There is much
to pick from, and so far sociologists have used only a little of it. Novel sociological
insight can be gained simply by applying existing mathematics in a new way
(Heise 2000, Skvoretz 2000). Much of the recent substantive and methodological
progress in economic sociology (Burt 1992) and organizational sociology (Hannan
& Freeman 1989), for example, is due to the application of mathematics to the goal
of increasing our understanding of social phenomena. And if one needs examples
of enduring contributions from mathematical sociology, lasting and increasing
interest in structural analyses of social networks, innovation diffusion, and debates
over the concept of rational man are convincing.
Various approaches can be taken to classify the use of mathematics in sociology
(see Coleman 1964, Berger et al. 1962, Allen 1981). In the most recent major re-
view of mathematical models in sociology, Sørensen (1978) made the distinction
between models of structure and models of process. Structure and process involve
different sorts of mathematics as well as different sorts of substantive questions
(but see Hernes 1976 for an early discussion of combining the analysis of struc-
ture and process). This distinction follows a more extensive survey by Sørensen
& Sørensen (1977) in which they distinguished between four different classes of
models: stochastic models for social processes, deterministic models for social
processes, models of structure, and purposive actor models. I follow Sørensen &
Sørensen’s outline and keep the discussion under three headings: structure, process,
and actor. But, as becomes evident, a distinctive feature of today’s use of math-
ematics in sociology is that it is increasingly difficult to keep process, structure,
and action separated.
A second important change since the late 1970s is the growing use of com-
puter simulations as an alternative to mathematical models (Gilbert & Troitzsch
1999). Although the distinction is not always clear-cut, it brings to the fore the
difference between experimentation and analytical solutions. Traditionally you
construct a mathematical model for a problem and then solve the model analyti-
cally. This means that every problem has an exact solution. The more complicated
the problem, and the more equations are involved, the harder to solve the model
analytically. Eventually, the model becomes so complicated it cannot be solved
analytically, in which case the modeler opts for the second best, which is to find
a numerical solution by testing a large number of different initial conditions and
calculating the answers. The next logical step is to construct a computer program
that has all the parts that the modeler believes are important, and then to run the
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program, again with a broad variation in initial conditions. The outcome from the
computer program is analyzed with the preferred technique, as would be any other
sociological data. The analytically solvable model and the computer simulation
model are the two endpoints on the model spectrum, but they should be regarded
as complementary. However, as Kathleen Carley notes, computer simulations may
prove to be a new entry into the field of mathematical sociology. “The mathemat-
ical part is in a funny way harder for most people than computer modeling, and I
think that that’s going to be even more true five years from now. In part because
our high schools are lousy teaching maths, they’re much better teaching computer
science: and the kids love it. They think this is cool. [. . .] So we may ironically
be better off in a math perspective, when we get people to kind of backtrack it
through computer science” (Interview).

Most classifications of mathematical sociology, including that of Sørensen
& Sørensen (1977), points to the use of mathematics in constructing theoreti-
cal models of social phenomena. Even though many mathematical sociologists
are using and sometimes even develop quantitative methods, they often point out
explicitly that the use of mathematics in sociology should not be equated with
statistics (Meeker & Leik 2000). In practice, the distinction between using mathe-
matics in theoretical and in statistical model construction is fuzzy. For example, a
linear regression model can very well be used as a theoretical model, although this
is seldom done. Rather it is used because linear regression makes for a straight-
forward way to obtain parameter estimates from statistical data (see Sørensen
1998 for a critique). However, an important point is that the use of mathematics
in sociology is not about giving a quantitative approach to data preference over a
qualitative approach. Because arithmetic and statistics involve mathematics, many
believe this to be the case. In formal theory there need not be any use of quantifica-
tion or even testing, and some of the classic (Lorrain & White 1971, White 1963)
and recent (Abell 1987) works of mathematical sociology involve no statistics and
little quantification.
At the same time it would be wrong not to acknowledge that statistical mod-
eling is the area within sociology in which mathematics has the strongest im-
pact on the field as a whole. The kind of statistical tools now available for doing
network analysis (Wasserman & Faust 1994), event-history analysis (Blossfeld
& Rohwer 1995), and hierarchical linear modeling (Snijders & Bosker 1999), for
example, are pushing contemporary sociology to new levels of sophistication. This
is partly because easy-to-use software packages are available that allow even the
most mathematically inept sociologist to define and estimate statistical models. No
such software packages are yet available for formal theory development (although
there are several intuitive software packages for basic dynamic simulation and
agent-based modeling, and modern mathematics packages do much to simplify
mathematical analysis).
Theoretical model building is an act of balancing realism, generality, and pre-
cision, in which one will have to stand back in favor of the others (Levins 1966).
Mathematical sociology is often accused of sacrificing realism for precision. To
some extent this critique is justified, but as has already been implied, it is not
surprising because precision is what attracts many of the proponents of the field.
Moreover, the way to manage this balancing act is not agreed upon. Fararo (1989)
argues that realism is the driving force in model construction: We build the model
because there is something there to be modeled, and models are deliberately con-
structed as representations of the real world. Obviously, model building is about
making idealizations of a complex reality by using simplifying, and sometimes
false, assumptions. However, few sociologists would base their models on obvi-
ously false assumptions if it meant distorting the essential feature of the problem.
As a consequence, we also find among mathematical sociologists skepticism to-

ward parts of economics. When I discussed this with Peter Abell, he said:
If I look at contemporary economics, for instance, I’m sometimes worried

about the extent to which technical facility is so highly rated that people can
spend their time immersed in the technical problems and lose sight of the fact
that we’re really trying to understand a complex world. They have to simplify
the world that they want to look at to such a degree that one sometimes wonders
whether it’s worthwhile. I would not like sociology to take that direction.
I think the great strength of sociology, if it has any strength, is that it has tried
to take empirical complexity seriously, and hasn’t done what some parts of
economics have done, and I think we should preserve that (Interview).
Still, the issue is delicate. I would prefer a sociological model to be general
enough to explain social phenomena across time and space. In addition sociological
models should be precise, or else they cannot serve as hypothesis generators and
consistency checkers in any substantial way; and those are two important functions
for theoretical models (Carley 1997). Consequently it can be argued that realism
will have to give way to generality and precision. Such a modeling paradigm is
characterized by the expectation “that many of the unrealistic assumptions will
cancel each other, that small deviations from realism result in small deviations in
the conclusions, and that, in any case, the way in which nature departs from theory
will suggest where future complications will be useful” (Levins 1966, p. 422).
All the work presented in the following three sections is motivated by the urge
to understand social phenomena, and the authors try to reach this understanding
through precise and general models.
PROCESS
The mathematics of social processes can be broadly divided into stochastic models
and deterministic models. For examples of the former see Bartholomew (1982),
for the latter see Epstein (1997). In a deterministic process we can fully determine
its future state if we know the current state of the process. If we are dealing with a
stochastic process, on the other hand, its future state can only be predicted from the
present with some probability. Deterministic processes are described by differential
204 EDLING
(or difference) equations. The main tool for describing stochastic processes is the
stationary Markov process, of which the Poison process and Brownian motion
are variants (differential equations are used in constructing stochastic models as
well as to model change in probability distributions). The use of process models in
sociology derives from Coleman’s (1964) Introduction to Mathematical Sociology.
For example, that book had a major impact on the development of event-history
techniques in sociology (Blossfeld & Rohwer 1995, Tuma & Hannan 1984).
Variants of Markov processes have been extensively used to model the so-
cial mobility of individuals (Stewman 1976). Examples of recent models in that
direction are a structural model of employment (Montgomery 1994) and an empir-

ically oriented analysis of the effect of divorce on personal efficacy (Yamaguchi
1996). Other models involving Markov processes include models of voluntary

association (McPherson 1981) and the emergence of network ties (Fararo &
Skvoretz 1986). Another fascinating application is Padgett’s (1981) analysis of
the budget process. The vacancy chain model (Chase 1991), pioneered by White
(1970), is an interesting example of the clever use of simple stochastic mod-
els for mobility where structural positions move rather than people. Sørensen
(1977) formulated a model for status attainment based on the idea of vacancy
competition. For a related application to organizational attainment, see Hedström
(1992). In the case of vacancy chains, it is the novel use of old mathematics (by
turning the process upside down) rather than new or refined mathematics that is
striking.
Historically, stochastic models have been used more frequently than determinis-
tic ones in sociology. There are several reasons for this, one being that sociologists
in general regard deterministic models as suspect, another that Coleman’s (1964)
textbook dealt with stochastic process models. Third, with stochastic process mod-
els, change in discrete variables can be modeled directly. As most sociological data
are discrete, this property seems very attractive (see, e.g., Tuma & Hannan 1984).
As far as the basic mathematics goes, the distinction is quite appropriate. A deter-
ministic model deals with change in variables, and a stochastic model deals with
change in probability distributions. But it is unclear whether the distinction matters
that much in sociological application. Techniques for estimating continuous deter-
ministic models with discrete data are easily derived (Huckfeldt et al. 1982, Tuma
& Hannan 1984), and stochastic components can be incorporated into differential
equations.
Many of the deterministic dynamic models that utilize differential equations
of interest to sociologists are found in epidemiology and biology (Murray 1993),
and in the literature on innovation diffusion (Mahajan & Peterson 1985). An in-
teresting analysis of diffusion models and their relationship with event-history
models is given by Diekmann (1989), and Granovetter & Soong (1983) provide
a central discussion of threshold models of diffusion. Examples of sociological
analyses that translate models from epidemiology and biology more directly in-
clude models of membership competition (McPherson 1983), street gang growth
(Crane et al. 2000), and church growth (Hayward 1999). Some limitations of such
models are analyzed in an evolutionary model of group formation (Dittrich et al.

2000). Deterministic models are also the building blocks for models of chaos and
catastrophe (Brown 1995). These have been enthusiastically reviewed, but few
interesting applications have been suggested, possibly because they are hard to
test without a very large number of data points (Williams 1997), which is seldom
available in sociological data-sets.
One of the most successful process-oriented research programs in contempo-
rary sociology has been organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1989). This
approach borrows from evolutionary biology and ecology, and draws largely upon
the idea of selection. It is at least partly mathematically based. Most of the basic
theory has been developed using deterministic models of population dynamics that
are translated into an organizational context. The general idea is that organizations
compete for resources in niche space and that the survival of an organization is
contingent upon the organizational environment. Although organizational ecology
originated from an interest in organizational dynamics, it quickly grew into a sta-
tistically inclined organizational demography (see Carroll & Hannan 2000). Given
the empirical nature of sociology, it is not surprising that the greatest impact of
organizational ecology on sociology as a whole is the event-history models derived
by Hannan & Freeman (1989) to analyze organizational founding and death rates
based on empirical data. There has been some work on the theoretical backbone of
organizational ecology (Hannan 1991), including a microsimulation on the niche
concept (Hannan & Ranger-Moore 1990). In addition, the theoretical apparatus
has been scrutinized by means of first-order logic (Peli et al. 1994) to derive novel
implications (Vermeulen & Bruggeman 2001) and to check for logical consistency
(Bruggeman 1997, Hannan 1998).
Related approaches to organizational dynamics include elaborations on the
niche concept (McPherson 1983), individual level analysis of membership selec-
tion (McPherson & Ranger-Moore 1991) influenced by complexity theory (Butts
2001, Kauffman 1995), and computer simulations of organizational adaptation
(Carley & Svoboda 1996). Interestingly, the research on organizational dynamics
is one of the few modern sociological research programs that has opened up a de-
bate with the biological and ecological sciences, a debate much more in evidence
in the early days of sociology (but see Boorman & Levitt 1980). Although the
issue here is the ecology of types of organizations (Hannan & Freeman 1989) or
organizational members (McPherson & Ranger-Moore 1991), which can hardly
be equated with animal or plant species, it is interesting to note the leverage
gained in organizational analysis by incorporating and modifying a few simple
ideas from ecology. In parallel, we should make note of the renewed interest in
evolutionary theory that has revitalized current economics (Weibull 1995). Such
cross-disciplinary exchanges are healthy, and it can be argued that the common
language of mathematics facilitates them.
A weakness of the models discussed in this section is that they do not allow
for much individual heterogeneity. This is mainly due to the way the mathemat-
ics works. Modeling true heterogeneity means adding a new equation for each
206 EDLING
individual. Even with moderately large social systems, this quickly becomes cum-
bersome. This approach to modeling processes is therefore best left for macropro-
cesses and for the analysis of aggregate data. Stemming partly from this critique of
homogeneous models, we have witnessed a growing interest in microlevel process
models. The broad research tradition of group processes (Szmatka et al. 1997),
discussed in the structure section, and the application of agent-based models, dis-
cussed in the section on purposive actors, can also be regarded as process-oriented
activities. In these models, however, the process itself is represented not directly
by one or few equations, but as an outcome of social interaction over time.
STRUCTURE
Put crudely, modern mathematical sociology has two fathers, James Coleman
and Harrison White. Coleman (1964) pioneered process models, and later rational
choice theory (Coleman 1990); White (1963, 1970) pioneered models of structure.
Of course, White has also studied actors and interests (e.g., White 1992), but
these have never been given the same explicit mathematical treatment as have his
analyses of social structure. Both of these authors’ imprint on contemporary work
is still clearly recognizable, but at the present, White’s network models exercise
the more dramatic influence on mathematical sociology.
When Sørensen (1978) surveyed the field, models of social process dominated
mathematical sociology, but structural analysis, or social network analysis, was
just about to burst forth. Since 1978, social network analysis has had a dedicated
journal called Social Networks, edited by sociologist Linton Freeman, that hosts
contributions mostly from sociologists, anthropologists, and mathematicians. At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, this is undoubtedly the theoretical area in
which mathematics is most forcefully put to work. In contrast to the mathematics of
processes, the mathematics of structure has been partly developed as an answer to
problems in the social sciences (Harary et al. 1965). There are few such examples
in mathematics, but this also holds true for utility theory and game theory discussed
in the next section. Large bodies of social network analysis have been criticized for
being theoretically underdeveloped. And indeed, much of the work that is reported
in the journal Social Networks can be categorized as methods and statistics. I con-
centrate here on the parts of social network research that have theoretical ambitions.
Social network analysis (Burt 1980, Wasserman & Faust 1994) always entails
the representation of actors and/or objects linked together either by social connec-
tions (e.g., two persons are friends or enemies) or shared experience (e.g., they go
to the same school). Graph theory and matrix algebra are typically used. Modern
classics of the first kind include White’s (1963) analysis of kinship structure. An
example of the second is the work on structural roles (Boorman & White 1976,
Lorrain & White 1971, White et al. 1976). This work initiated a continuing stream
of further work on block modeling (Borgatti 1992, Robins et al. 2001) and structural
equivalence (Batagelj et al. 1992, Doreian 1988). What White and collaborators
proposed is a way of identifying structure by a systematic search for the absence

of social ties. The same logic underlies Burt’s (1992) influential idea of strategic
use of the “structural holes” of a network. Of related interest is Butts’s recent
theoretical work on network complexity (Butts 2000, 2001).
Network analysts have taken on classic sociological ideas, such as Simmel’s
on the duality of group and individual (Breiger 1974, 1990), as well as everyday
puzzles such as the “class size paradox” (Feld 1991). A contemporary idea that
has been more extensively elaborated is Granovetter’s (1973) thesis about tie-
strength. Granovetter proposed that infrequent social contacts, called weak ties,
such as those to old schoolmates and brief acquaintances, can be very important
transmitters of crucial information on job vacancies and that weak ties are as
important as the strong ties we have to partners, close friends, and relatives. For
example, job seekers’ minimum acceptable wage has been included in a formal
model (Montgomery 1992), and implications from strong- and weak-tie interaction
on unemployment have been analyzed (Montgomery 1994). In an ongoing effort
toward theoretical unification, Fararo & Skvoretz (1987) suggested an embedding
of the weak-tie hypothesis into biased net theory (see Skvoretz 1990).
Expectation-states theory (Zelditch & Berger 1985) and closely related Group
Processes (Szmatka et al. 1997), both in themselves formal and mathematical
approaches with many ramifications (Berger 2000), constitute a long-standing re-
search program that has gained vigor from formal structural analysis. The core
of this tradition of small group research deals with the idea that inequality in
face-to-face interaction is determined by the relative status of group members. In-
tegrated with social network analysis under the name E-state Structuralism (Fararo
& Skvoretz 1986, Skvoretz & Fararo 1996, Skvoretz et al. 1996), the emergence of
network structure can now be investigated from the point of view of individuals’
expectations. This approach to social network evolution, and several others, are
included in a volume by Doreian & Stokman (1997) that testifies to the increased
attention paid to the emergence and evolution of social networks by network an-
alysts. Thus, the critique that social network analysis is too static is beginning to
attract serious attention from social network analysts.
A sustained line of research in structural analysis is Friedkin & Johnsen’s theory
of social influence (Friedkin & Johnsen 1990, 1997), recently compiled into an
exemplary book containing parts on the theory, measurement, and analysis of
social influence (Friedkin 1998). In a sense this project is the opposite of E-state
Structuralism because it looks at the effect of social structure on interpersonal
(dis)agreement through interpersonal social influence. This work investigates the
classic problem of social differentiation from a social-psychological perspective by
utilizing many ideas, including structural role analysis (White et al. 1976) and spa-
tially structured social influence (Marsden & Friedkin 1993). Although perhaps pri-
marily concerned with experimentation, Network Exchange theory (Willer 1999)
is another body of research on social structure that examines interpersonal rela-
tions and provides a synthesis between network analysis and exchange theory, with
an almost exclusive focus on power relations (Cook & Yamagishi 1992). Other
208 EDLING
analyses of power in networks incorporate individual decision-making (Bonacich

1999, Yamaguchi 2000) and interests (Whitmeyer 1997).
With a few exceptions—work applying random and biased-net theory being
one (see Skvoretz 1983, 1990), sociologists have mainly concentrated their efforts
on rather small social structures. Normally, network size does not exceed 150–
200 actors and is often considerably smaller. This can be explained partly by the
strong impact from small groups research. And until quite recently, computational
limitations posed a genuine obstacle. Contemporary analysis of the small-world
phenomenon (Kochen 1989) demonstrates that theoretical analysis can be under-
taken with large graphs as well, due largely to powerful computers. Watts (1999)
concentrated on the dynamic implications of network structure and demonstrated
that even small variations in local network structure are utterly important for global
dynamics. This work brings together ideas of tie-strength and previous work on
random nets, and these hold much promise for future development of structural
analysis.
PURPOSIVE ACTOR MODELS AND BEYOND
As previously mentioned, the various uses of mathematics in sociology have grown

tremendously during the past several decades. This is also true with respect to
purposive actor theory, or rational choice theory, as it is more often called. For a long
time, sociologists regarded rational choice theory strictly as an economics activity.
In their extensive review of mathematical sociology, Sørensen & Sørensen (1977)
listed Coleman’s (1973) early work on collective action as the only sociological
contribution. Fararo (1973) dedicated one part of his textbook on mathematical
sociology to game theory but remained rather uncertain about its significance.
Sørensen (1978) speculated that such models would become more widely used in
the future, but he did not discuss purposive actor applications at all in his review of
mathematical models in sociology because of their insignificance at the time.2 Of
course, this is no longer the case. In the late 1980s Coleman founded the journal
Rationality and Society, which has continued to publish rational choice sociology.
Rational choice theory starts from the simplifying and universal assumption
that social actors strive in all situations to optimize the outcome of their actions, as
they see it. For a review of sociological applications of this simple idea, see Voss
& Abraham (2000). If formulated in terms of utility theory, the idea of rational
choice gains a tremendous deductive power. Coleman’s (1990) Foundations of So-
cial Theory is the most thorough introduction to sociological rational choice anal-
ysis, and Coleman & Fararo (1992) provides further discussion of pros and cons.
The second part of Foundations contains a mathematical presentation of the theory.
2
When the Journal of Mathematical Sociology published some of its first papers on game
theory in 1977, the editor felt obliged to reassure his readers that it was not his intention to
turn the journal into one dedicated to game theory (Hinich M, Laing J, Lieberman B. 1977).
Editor’s comment. J. Mathematical Sociology 5:149–50.
Among other things, the book has spurred a fruitful contemporary debate on trust
and social capital.
Sociologists working within a rational-choice framework have conducted
formal analyses of problems such as addiction (Skog 1997), collective action
(Heckathorn 1998, Oliver 1993), power (Yamaguchi 2000), and educational choice
(Breen & Goldthorpe 1997). Sociologists have also been interested in trying to
model formally the way in which people acquire the beliefs upon which they act.
Examples include applying Bayesian updating to models of learning (Breen 1999)
and the spread of panic (Butts 1998). Related examples include the volunteer’s
dilemma (Diekmann 1993), threshold models of collective behavior (Braun 1995,

Granovetter & Soong 1983), and Critical Mass Theory (Marwell & Oliver 1993,
Oliver et al. 1985).

When actors are assumed to pursue actions based on rational choice without
the analysis taking into account the potential actions of other actors, the analysis is
performed within the domain of decision theory. When the outcome of an actor’s
action is also affected by the actions of one or several other actors, the analysis
comes under game theory (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991; for a classic introduction,
see Luce & Raiffa 1957). Strictly speaking, game theory and decision theory are
not that distinct; a decision is also said to be a game against nature, i.e., against
an unintentional actor. The use of game theory is now a major part of modern
economics. Indeed, the only Nobel Prize ever awarded for a contribution to pure
mathematics was the 1994 prize in economics given to John Harsanyi, John Nash,
and Reinhardt Selten for their contributions to game theory. Although the use of
game theory among sociologists has increased over the past 20 years (see Swedberg
2001), it is still not widely used outside of mathematical sociology. This is rather
surprising because the core idea of game theory is that social actors interact, and
that each actor is equally affected, albeit in different ways, by that interaction. The
only way in which a game theoretical analysis differs from Weber’s analysis of
strategic interaction is that it is carried out in a more systematic fashion. This has
been pointed out by Abell (2000), who argued strongly that game theory ought to
have greater influence in sociology.
Even if sociologists are not contributing to the development of game theory per
se, the application of game theory is growing in sociology. Macy & Skvoretz’s
(1998) game theoretical analysis for explaining the emergence of trust in a pop-
ulation of strangers is one in a line of studies using formal game theory to tackle
problems of social dilemmas (Heckathorn 1998, Raub & Snijders 1997, Weesie
& Raub 1996), and the free rider problem (Diekmann 1993). In the continuing
tradition of mathematical sociology, scholars also strive to integrate game the-
ory with other modeling approaches, such as network theory (Markovsky 1997,
Raub & Weesie 1990) and exchange theory (Bienenstock & Bonacich 1997, Braun
1997, Bonacich & Bienenstock 1993). Sociological variations of game theory in-
clude Burns’s work on social rule complexes (Burns & Gomolinska 2000) and
Montgomery’s (1998) work on roles.
Many sociologists are skeptical about rational choice theory and parts of game
theory because of the assumption of utility maximization (see Petersen 1994).
210 EDLING
However, evolutionary game theory (Weibull 1995) is based on the idea that games
are played repeatedly over time, and that the best strategy in a game is determined
not by forward-looking rational anticipation of actions and consequences, but by
consideration of historical traits. Developed in mutual exchange between eco-
nomics and biology, evolutionary game theory offers the same mathematical and
deductive power as classic game theory, but without assuming rational actors.
Evolutionary game models have only recently been incorporated into sociology.
Macy (1996) provides a critical discussion and comparison between evolutionary
games and neural networks, and recently a special section of Sociological Methods
& Research (Pollock 2000) was devoted to evolutionary game theory.

Agent-based modeling (e.g., Axelrod 1997) brings new vigor to models of
agents. In the colorful words of Epstein & Axtell, the basic logic in agent-based
modeling is to “grow artificial societies” from the bottom up (Epstein & Axtell
1996). Schelling’s (1978) classic model of segregation, and Axelrod’s (1984) anal-
ysis of the evolution of cooperation, can serve as templates for agent-based models.
This means starting with a set of agents that use very simple and local behavioral
rules, and then studying the effects of social interaction at a global level. Thus, it
shares with rational-choice models a preference for grounding theoretical models
in the actions of individual actors (Zeggelink et al. 1996b). Hummon (2000) sim-
ulates network dynamics with rational actors embedded in a social network, and
Macy & Skvoretz (1998) use computer simulation to explore their game theoretical
model on the emergence of trust (also see Burt 1999). Other models move beyond
rationality assumptions and start with either very simple or very complicated ac-
tors. In Mark’s (1998) model of differentiation, the simple assumption made about
social actors is that they choose to interact with people who resemble themselves.
The model demonstrates that social differentiation can emerge even if we assume
almost no individual differences. An opposite approach is to build computer mod-
els of social actors in much greater detail, using artificial intelligence (Carley 1996)
and neural networks (Macy 1996). A very useful recent introduction to various
simulation techniques for the social sciences is Gilbert & Troitzsch (1999).
Although the use of mathematics in developing empirical methods is not covered
in this article, the method of comparative narratives (Abell 1987) is a special case.
It is a way of modeling that allows for formal comparison of two or more narratives.
With regard to the comparison, this is undoubtedly a sort of method, and as such it
is not without alternatives. Systematic and formalized analysis of qualitative data
is a small but growing field embracing sequence analysis (Abbott 1992, Abbott
& Tsay 2000), comparative method (Ragin 1987), and models of event structure
(Heise 1989). All of these are mathematical approaches to qualitative analysis
that provide powerful tools for dealing with historical and ethnographic data. The
inclusion of this line of research in this section may or may not be appropriate. The
reason is twofold. First, most event structure, sequence, and comparative narratives
analysis deal with actions, and thus are related to other models of actors. Second,
whereas most of these approaches (naturally) deal with methodological issues,
Abell (1993) has suggested that a closer connection between the narrative method
and game theory is fruitful.3 Abell’s (1987) project has been to formulate semantics
of action that facilitates narrative analysis. The analytical strategy is based on the
formulation of rules that connect sequences of action, and the idea is to provide
a formal language that can be translated into a computer language to facilitate
qualitative analysis. In several ways the approach is related to formal versions of
interpretive sociology presented by Fararo (1989).
DISCUSSION
As has been the case in several previous reviews, I have discussed the use of
mathematics under the rubrics of process, structure, and action. But, as may have
become evident, one salient characteristic of contemporary work is that this dis-
tinction is no longer clear-cut. Social network analysis has brought the concern
about structure into nearly all types of models, and the study of networks is turning
toward the emergence and dissolution of social ties, as well as to the dynamics of
network structure. In these analyses, it is always actors who provide the motion.
In agent-based modeling, process, structure, and action are most clearly brought
into one inseparable representation of society.
As the scope of this review reveals, the mathematical approach to sociology is
topical. Still, the use of mathematics for solving sociological problems is not yet
widespread. Nonetheless, several signs of movement in that direction appeared in
the 1990s. At least three new journals that specialize in mathematical applications
to sociological problems have been created within the past six or seven years. One,
a conventional printed journal (also available online), is called Computational and
Mathematical Organizations Theory and is edited by sociologist Kathleen Carley
at Carnegie Mellon University; the other two are electronic journals: the Journal
of Social Structure, edited by sociologist David Krackhart, also at Carnegie
Mellon, and the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, edited by
sociologist Nigel Gilbert at the Centre for Research on Simulation in the Social
Sciences at the University of Surrey.
The first section for mathematical sociology within the American Sociological
Association (ASA) was founded in the mid-1990s. Today the section counts 185
members, 30% of whom are students.4 It is hard to point to particularly important
3
This is rather controversial, as we would normally prefer to keep the method free from
substantial sociological theory, and then let theory bear on the outcome of our comparisons.
Abell received repeated criticism on this point and others in a special issue of Journal of
Mathematical Sociology (1993, vol. 18, no. 2–3).
4
As of 2001, the mean size of the 42 different member sections in ASA is 427 members
(std. dev. 214), the largest having 967 members and the smallest (in formation) only 96
members. The section for mathematical sociology is among the smallest five in the asso-
ciation. Section members are often members of other sections as well; the most popular
overlaps are memberships in the sections for Social Psychology (62 persons), Rational
Choice (61 persons), Methodology (50 persons), and Theory (40 persons).
212 EDLING
centers or institutional settings. Most sociologists using mathematics are working

in the United States, and they are indeed found in small numbers although in many
universities across the country. Some of the most important people are at Carnegie
Mellon, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Pittsburgh, Harvard, Santa Barbara, South
Carolina, Stanford, and UCLA. Much of the work that goes on at these universities
is represented in this article.
Japanese sociologists are also availing themselves of mathematics (Kosaka
1989), but unfortunately most of this work has to date only been published in
Japanese (see the journal Sociological Theory and Methods). In 2000, the first joint
conference was organized between the Mathematical Sociology section of the

ASA and the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology, so an increased
exchange across the Pacific might be expected in the future.

In Europe the use of mathematics is widespread at the InterUniversity Cen-
ter for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) in the Netherlands. In
particular, scholars at ICS have contributed to game theory (Raub 1988, Raub
& Snijders 1997, Weesie & Raub 1996), network analysis (Snijders 1996, Zeggelink
et al. 1996a), and diffusion (Buskens & Yamaguchi 1999). Other mathematical so-
ciologists who publish in English are scattered all over Europe, in Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and cross-Atlantic ex-
changes in mathematical sociology are well established.
Despite the fact that mathematical sociologists are quite few in number, the
use of mathematics is now an increasingly important aspect of the empirical and
theoretical analysis of social structure and change, as is evident from a quick
glance through recent issues of leading journals such as the American Journal
of Sociology and the American Sociological Review. Sociology will continue to
benefit from this development as it enables a closer exchange with other social and
physical sciences, and with mathematics. Within network analysis this synergistic
relationship between sociology and other sciences is a well-established part of the
tradition, and numerous examples of cross-disciplinary cooperation can be cited
(Freeman 1984).
I have mostly made reference to work done by sociologists, published mainly
for a sociological audience. But mathematics is also an important way of commu-
nicating sociological knowledge to other sciences. If this is not done, there is a
risk that much of sociology will be reinvented by computer scientists, economists,
and physicists. So far, impressive proposals for a social physics (e.g., Helbing
1995, Weidlich & Haag 1983) have not had any impact on sociology, perhaps
because they offer very little sociological insight and very few empirical exam-
ples. But there is some excellent and interesting research being done where one
sometimes gets the feeling that sociology really should be able to contribute more.
In economics, for instance, social norms (Lindbeck et al. 1999) and social inter-
action (Durlauf & Young 2001) are now taken very seriously by leading scholars.
The authors in the volume edited by Durlauf & Young (2001) take a fresh look
at genuinely sociological problems. But without the sociologists! Very recently
physicists have begun to study social networks, and this line of work is likely to
have a great impact on social network analysis. The interest was triggered by a
revisit to the small-world phenomena (Watts 1999, Watts & Strogatz 1998) that
showed that a random network needs very little rewiring to be transferred into a
small-world network, with fundamental consequences for global dynamics. This
work has been continued by physicists doing both theoretical (Amaral et al. 2000,
Barabasi & Albert 1999) and empirical analysis (Newman 2001).
At present the mathematical approach offers only limited hope for unifying
sociological thinking. There are explicit attempts to use mathematics as a means
to unify theory, most notably in Thomas Fararo’s ambitious project to unify so-
ciological theory through formal and mathematical thinking (Fararo 1989, 2001,
Fararo & Butts 1999). In addition, computer simulations are being used to investi-
gate theoretical implications that are hidden in verbally formulated theories (Feld
1997b, Hanneman et al. 1995). Mathematics is often used in sociology to bring to-
gether different theoretical approaches. Montgomery (1998) proposed a marriage
between the idea of embeddedness and role theory by utilizing a version of game
theory in which “players” consist of roles instead of actors. Skvoretz (1983, 1991)
applied biased net theory (Skvoretz 1990) to rephrase Peter Blau’s macrooriented
theory of social structure and inequality, and in so doing Skvoretz added coher-
ence and derived new theoretical implications [further models that draw on this and
other works of Blau are Hedström (1991), McPherson & Ranger-Moore (1991),
and Montgomery (1996)]. Despite these efforts, mathematical sociology will very
likely continue to mirror the rest of sociology and to remain a heterogeneous field
for a long time to come.
Even though the movement toward integration of research and theoretical rea-
soning has been a major trend for some time (Costner 1988), one major critique
that can still be directed against mathematical and formal sociology is that the gap
between models and empirical analysis is too wide. Reducing this gap would cer-
tainly increase the attractiveness of applying mathematics to sociological problems
(Skvoretz 2000), and it would bring theory closer to empirical analysis. Research
debates have recently approached this problem. This is not meant to belittle the
status of theoretical models. Some theories cannot be tested directly. For example,
it is interesting to note that game theoretical analyses of the prisoner’s dilemma
have become common place in the social sciences. Indeed, Axelrod’s (1984) fame
is due to a computer tournament between rather abstract decision algorithms. What
these models do is to propose exact mechanisms that account for social process.
If the explanation proposed by such a model provides insight into an important
phenomenon, then the model is useful despite the fact that some models cannot
be subjected to empirical testing. Still, we have to be aware that testing provides
the only feedback to theory. From a theoretical perspective, there is a discussion
that proposes explicit social mechanisms (Hedström & Swedberg 1998, Skvoretz
1998) to bring predictive and deductive power into sociology. Social mechanisms
are a long-standing interest in mathematical sociology (Karlsson 1958), and this
invitation should be taken seriously. Finally, a call for the use of formal theory to
strengthen statistical analysis (Blossfeld & Prein 1998, Bäckman & Edling 1999,
214 EDLING
Goldthorpe 2000), and a renewed interest in the problems of temporality (Abbott

2001) and causality (Doreian 2001, Goldthorpe 2000, Winship & Morgan 1999)
open up a broad discussion of the utility of mathematical models. This literature
clearly points toward a direction for future work that would not only maintain
the impressive scope of mathematical sociology, but would also further add to its
relevance for sociologists in general.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In 1998–1999 I conducted short interviews with Peter Abell, Philip Bonacich,

Kathleen Carley, Patrick Doreian, Thomas Fararo, and Harrison White, of which
extracts are quoted in the text. I am most grateful to them all for taking the time, and
for being so forthcoming. Peter Hedström, Thomas Fararo, Fredrik Liljeros, Werner
Raub, and one anonymous referee delivered extremely valuable suggestions and
comments on an earlier version. David Bachman provided membership figures for
ASA sections, and Kenneth Kronenberg edited the English of a previous version.
I appreciate that the Sociology Department at Harvard University granted me
library access and desk space during two hot summer months in 2001. Financial
support from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish
Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education is
gratefully acknowledged. I dedicate this article to the vivid memory of Aage B.
Sørensen.
The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org
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P1: FRK
June 10, 2002 12:5 Annual Reviews AR163-FM
Annual Review of Sociology

Volume 28, 2002
CONTENTS
Frontispiece—Stanley Lieberson x
PREFATORY CHAPTER
Barking Up the Wrong Branch: Scientific Alternatives to the Current

Model of Sociological Science, Stanley Lieberson and Freda B. Lynn 1
THEORY AND METHODS
From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based
Modeling, Michael W. Macy and Robert Willer 143
Mathematics in Sociology, Christofer R. Edling 197
Global Ethnography, Zsuzsa Gille and Seán Ó Riain 271
Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual
Framework, Barbara Wejnert 297
Assessing “Neighborhood Effects”: Social Processes and New
Directions in Research, Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff,
and Thomas Gannon-Rowley 443
The Changing Faces of Methodological Individualism, Lars Udehn 479
SOCIAL PROCESSES
Violence in Social Life, Mary R. Jackman 387
INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE
Welfare Reform: How Do We Measure Success? Daniel T. Lichter
and Rukamalie Jayakody 117
The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and
Assessment, Mansoor Moaddel 359
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
Financial Markets, Money, and Banking, Lisa A. Keister 39
Comparative Research on Women’s Employment, Tanja van der Lippe
and Liset van Dijk 221
DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION
Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility, Yanjie Bian 91
v
P1: FRK
June 10, 2002 12:5 Annual Reviews AR163-FM
vi CONTENTS
The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, Michèle Lamont

and Virág Molnár 167
Race, Gender, and Authority in the Workplace: Theory and
Research, Ryan A. Smith 509
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
Reconsidering the Effects of Sibling Configuration: Recent
Advances and Challenges, Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell,
Regina Werum, and Scott Carter 243

Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies, Jimy M. Sanders 327
POLICY
Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy, John L. Campbell 21
New Economics of Sociological Criminology, Bill McCarthy 417
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
The Sociology of Intellectuals, Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens 63
INDEXES
Subject Index 543
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 19–28 565
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 19–28 568
ERRATA
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology chapters
(if any, 1997 to the present) may be found at http://soc.annualreviews.org/

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30 May 2002 9:52 AR AR163-09.tex AR163-09.

SGM LaTeX2e(2002/01/18) P1: GJB

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:197–220

Key Words mathematical models, rational choice, social mechanisms, social

In this article I present the use of mathematics in contemporary sociology by

for a heterogeneous field using mathematics, logic, and computer simulation to

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 199

THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN SOCIOLOGY

introduction to the use of mathematics in sociology has to turn to research papers

the dominant language of the natural sciences not because it is quantitative—a

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 201

through computer science” (Interview).

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 203

As a consequence, we also find among mathematical sociologists skepticism to-

If I look at contemporary economics, for instance, I’m sometimes worried

direction are a structural model of employment (Montgomery 1994) and an empir-

1996). Other models involving Markov processes include models of voluntary

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 205

models are analyzed in an evolutionary model of group formation (Dittrich et al.

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 207

proposed is a way of identifying structure by a systematic search for the absence

analyses of power in networks incorporate individual decision-making (Bonacich

PURPOSIVE ACTOR MODELS AND BEYOND

As previously mentioned, the various uses of mathematics in sociology have grown

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 209

dilemma (Diekmann 1993), threshold models of collective behavior (Braun 1995,

Oliver et al. 1985).

& Research (Pollock 2000) was devoted to evolutionary game theory.

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 211

centers or institutional settings. Most sociologists using mathematics are working

conference was organized between the Mathematical Sociology section of the

exchange across the Pacific might be expected in the future.

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 213

Goldthorpe 2000), and a renewed interest in the problems of temporality (Abbott

In 1998–1999 I conducted short interviews with Peter Abell, Philip Bonacich,

The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 215

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 217

bridge Univ. Press. xix, 231 pp. Dordrecht: Reidel

193–205 Heckathorn DD. 1998. Collective action, social

Japan. J. Math. Sociol. 14:217–22 McPherson JM. 1983. An ecology of affiliation.

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 219

control in federal budgetary decision mak- Skvoretz J. 1983. Salience, heterogeneity,

Pollock G. 2000. Special section on evolu- Netw. 13:275–300

demic xx, 578 pp. Theory 18:505–9

Annual Review of Sociology

Barking Up the Wrong Branch: Scientific Alternatives to the Current

The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, Michèle Lamont

Regina Werum, and Scott Carter 243

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