INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, 2007

VOL 15, NO 1, 59-84

The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the
Philippines

Shamsuddin L. Taya*

Abstract: This study analyses the political strategies pursued by the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), over time, to liberate the the Bangsamoro
homeland and its people from the control of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP). Using data from policy statements, speeches, peace
agreements and interviews with informed people, the study examines the
strengthening of the organisation of the MILF and the widening of its
diplomatic offensive and found these to be effective. The creation of committees
served as vehicles for the MILF to reach the masses and thus ensure their
support for the liberation movement. The diplomatic offensive through the
peace talks internationalised the Bangsamoro cause as a legitimate liberation
movement without being labelled a terrorist organisation.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the political strategies of the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), over time, to liberate the
Bangsamoro homeland from the control of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Strategies are not simply pieces
of papers or documents but are ways of thinking about how one’s
organisation works.1 Political strategies are well-designed political
plans in an effort to promote and advance the political interests of
any organisation. This study examines the nature of the MILF
strategies and their effectiveness in furthering the Bangsamoro cause.
After a brief introduction to the origin and development of the
Bangsamoro movement, the study analyses its political strategies
which include the strengthening of the organization and the widening
of its diplomatic offensive.
∗Dr. Shamsuddin L. Taya is Lecturer, Department of International Affairs, Universiti
Utara Malaysia, Kedah, Malaysia. E-mail: shamsuddintaya@yahoo.com
 60 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

Background to the Movement

-
The Bangsamoro homeland is the second largest island of the
Philippines. It has a total land area of 10,199,886 hectares, or 34
per cent of the Philippine’s total land area. The Bangsamoro (the
Moro nation) is a generic name for the 13-ethno linguistic Muslim
tribes in the Southern Philippines. Their exact number is not known
because of an apparent statistical genocide against them by the GRP.
Nevertheless, their estimated population is about six million and
they are found in every major island of the Southern Philippines.
They share a distinct culture and speak different dialects. They are
varied in social formation but share a common belief in Islam. They
are the Islamised Malays of the Southern Philippines.
The main policy of the GRP regarding the Bangsamoro and other
indigenous people in Southern Philippines is their political integration
and cultural assimilation into the mainstream of the Christian-
Filipinos national life. This policy, indeed, was initiated and
implemented by the Americans (1898-1946) in the Bangsamoro
homeland. Thus, the current policy of the GRP is an extension of
the US policy towards the Bangsamoro people and their homeland
which is fiercely resisted by the Muslims.
The Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination and freedom has
had a long history dating back to the Spanish colonialism. The
Spanish all-out war policy against the Bangsamoro was characterised
by depopulation of settlements and the destruction of plantation.
This was fierecely resisted by the Bangsamoro in every part of the
Southern Philippines. Consequently, “the Bangsamoro was never
totally conquered, with extensive areas remaining in their hands,
free of alien control.” 2 With pride in their cultural heritage, the
Bangsamoro resisted foreign domination and continued their struggle
when Spain ceded the Philippine Island (Luzon and Visayas regions),
including the Bangsamoro territory to the United States in 1898.
Finally, when the United States granted Philippine independence in
1946, the Bangsamoro continued to resist the newly born Philippine’s
rule that escalated into widespread conflict in the 1970s. The
immediate reasons for the conflict was the increasing massacres,
genocides and other atrocities committed against the Bangsamoro
by the Philippine Government and its backed Christian Militia
(ILAGA) in the Southern Philippines during the late 1960s.
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 61

The Jabidah Massacre was the starting point when Datu Udtog
Matalam, a former governor of the Cotabato Empire, staged a
rebellion in 1968 and eventually founded the Mindanao
Independence Movement (MIM) two months after the incident in
Corridor. The longstanding tensions between the Bangsamoro and
the Christian communities escalated. Already in competition over
land, economic resources and political power, the Bangsamoro
became increasingly alarmed by the immigration of Christians from
the north, which had made them a minority in their own land.3 The
resentment against the Philippine Government eventually led to the
creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).4
The MNLF as a movement for Bangsamoro self-determination
survived for decades and resisted the forces of the GRP. In 1973,
the GRP deployed 80 per cent of its combat forces against the
Bangsamoro killing an estimated 50,000 people. From 1972 to 1976,
an estimated 150,000 Bangsamoro were killed, more than 500,000
were forced to seek refuge in Sabah, Malaysia, and more than one
million were rendered homeless and destitute in the Southern
Philippines. 5 The MNLF leadership, however, succumbed to
pressures from its foreign supporters, i.e., the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) and, more specifically, the Libyan and Saudi
Arabian governments. As a result, the MNLF signed a Peace
Agreement with GRP known as the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. This
sparked internal divisions among the MNLF splintering it in many
factions. MNLF gradually lost its earlier vigour and momentum.
With the decline and even collapse of the MNLF, a new
Bangsamoro independence movement emerged as a successor to
the MNLF, known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the MILF,
led by Salamat Hashim, and after his death in 2003 by Murad
Ebrahim. Initially, the MILF advocated a moderate and conciliatory
approach toward the GRP but soon it hardened its position.
The MILF has multiple goals in its struggle against the Manila
government and its agents. One, the MILF demands independence
from the GRP. The movement insists that it will not accept any
solution to the problems of the Bangsamoro short of independence.
This goal is the result of the Bangsamoro’s frustration and anger
against the injustice, oppression and deprivation of the Bangsamoro
by the GRP and the Christian-Filipino settlers in the Southern
 62 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

Philippines. Two, the MILF aspires to establish an Islamic state and

- government. The Camp Abu Bakre As-Siddique, established during
the three decades of struggle, serves as a model of an Islamic polity
based on their religion and culture. The final goal of the MILF is to
make the word of God supreme in all aspects of life.
To achieve the above goals, the MILF has adopted military,
economic and political strategies. The political strategies include
strengthening of the organisation by creating committees to reach
to the grass roots. The other aspect of the strategy is diplomatic
offensive to enlist support from the international political system.

Strengthening the Organisation

The movement for independence and self determination in the
Southern Philippines is generally attributed to the desire of many
Bangsamoro to create their own institutions to replenish social,
psychological, and cultural values that could not find fulfilment in
the larger Philippine society. In the Bangsamoro separatist politics,
distinct organisations and cultural practices were developed to
compensate for disenchantment with the existing antagonistic socio-
political and cultural order. Politically, economically, culturally and
socially, the Bangsamoro were/are deprived and burdened with a
deep feeling of socio-economic and political inferiority. Many
Bangsamoro live in desolation and squalor, beset by every known
kind of social pathology. To make things worse, the Manila political
and military leaders went back on their pledges to grant the South
an autonomous government (ARMM) which is responsive to the
people’s aspirations and free from corruption. The 2005 election
for ARMM was characterized by vote-rigging, vote buying and
political bullying by powerful clans like the Ampatuan and others.6
For instance, in a Lanao del Sur town, armed personnel took the
ballot boxes from helpless teachers and returned them later all filled
up. The teachers, as revealed by Patricio P. Diaz, told a Commission
on Elections that it was a choice between saving their lives and
giving the ballot boxes to be stuffed in by the GRP agents.7 Election
rigging, corruption and other political vices are common in the
Philippines generally, and Southern Philippines in particular.
ARMM proved to be corrupt in the post election period and thus
contributed to the worsening of the situation rather than solving the
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 63

problems of the Bangsamoro. In this situation, critics said that the

ARMM was irrelevant to the region’s problems.8 It was suggested
from many quarters that the GRP must look for other political options
to address the sentiments and aspirations of the people in the region
for the sake of development and progress.
The Bangsamoro response to the lack of political dispensation,
economic deprivation and social degradation was both non-violent
and violent. One response was the establishment of its own
governmental structure to replace the existing GRP’s political
organisation in the region. This called for the strengthening of the
MILF’s organization for a legitimate cause. According to Mohagher
Iqbal, the legitimate causes of the MILF’s struggle against the GRP
are their grievances over the loss of their freedom, occupation of
the Bangsamoro homeland and genocidal attacks against their very
existence as people. 9 He claims that the MILF is a mass based
organisation articulating and representing the sentiments and
aspirations of the Bangsamoro.10 The mass appeal of the MILF is
due to its political strategy of creating systematic, task-oriented and
friendly committees.
The MILF established political organisations from the Central
Committee to the Barangay (village, the smallest political unit in the
Philippines) levels in order to fulfil those socio-economic, cultural
and political aspirations which were long desired, but long denied
by the Manila regime and its agents. It was an attempt to control
those areas that the MILF and the Bangsamoro claimed as theirs.
The movement called this structure Political Committee Set-ups. It
was headed by the MILF Vice Chairman for Political Affairs, Ghazali
Jaafar. The Committee Set-ups were similar to the Philippine local
government structures. These set-ups include the central, provincial,
municipal and barangay committees, but these did not follow the
GRP’s political boundaries. Al Haj Murad claimed that the MILF
organised committees covered about eighty per cent of the
Bangsamoro areas.11 However, on the ground, it seemed that the
MILF’s control over those areas was not well-defined. But the major
issue here on the part of the MILF was not only a question of setting
up committees, but a question of its effective control over those
areas where the liberation movement established its structures of
government or what it called Committee Set-ups.
 64 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

The Central Committee is the highest policy-making body of the

- MILF. The members of the Central Committee represent all sectors
of the Bangsamoro such as tribal, religious, professional, farmers
and student leaders. The seven members of the Jihad Executive
Council run the day-to-day affairs on behalf of the much larger
Central Committee. Prior to 2000, most of the MILF’s six-division
standing forces occupied fixed positions in defence of its camps,
the largest of which were the Camp Abu Bakre As-Siddique and the
Busrah which stretched across several municipalities. These served
both as models of the Islamic community to come and as symbols
of the legitimate resistance spearheaded by the movement. This
strategy provided for ease of communication and a relatively
cohesive command structure. However, with the loss of the lower
portion of the Camp Abu Bakre As-Siddique in July 2000 the large
standing units previously based there, the General Headquarters and
National Guard Divisions, became unsustainable and were
reorganized into smaller formations, mostly re-assigned to positions
in the provinces of North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Lanao del
Norte.
The Central Committee usually meets at least twice a year.
However, in case of emergency, the MILF could call a session to
discuss issues confronting the movement. The MILF Central
Committee emphasises the primacy of Islam as a guiding principle
of the liberation movement and implements Islamic principles in all
aspects. It argues that it is the duty of all the Bangsamoro to follow
and support the activities of the MILF in its pursuit of establishing a
dawlah IslÉmiyyah in the Southern Philippines. Thus, the MILF is
considered an Islamic oriented organization with Islamic courts to
settle disputes, shËrÉ to arrive at major decisions and jihÉd as a
collective responsibility of all Muslims.12 Iqbal expressed these when
he insisted that the MILF is an Islamic, mass-based organisation
where jihÉd is obligatory for all the Bangsamoro.13
The MILF also has its provincial governments managing the
affairs of provinces under its control or influence all over the Southern
Philippines. Provincial Committees are created to implement policies
and carry out the organisational programmes in the MILF controlled
areas or areas of their influence, Iqbal argued. 14 The provincial
committees that evolved over time include: Kotawato Provincial
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 65

Committee, Biwang Provincial Committee, Rajah Buwayan

Provincial Committee, Basilan Provincial Committee, Sarangani
Provincial Committee, Davao Provincial Committee, Sulu Provincial
Committee, Zamboanga Provincial Committee, Lanao del Sur
Committee and Lanao del Norte Provincial Committee. These
committees are headed by provincial chairmen recommended by
different sectors in the provinces after consultation and finally
approved by the Central Committee. In the appointment of these
provincial chairmen, the MILF would consult their respective areas.
Those committees were accountable to the Central Committee.
At the municipal levels, the MILF also organised municipal
governmental structures which were called Municipal Committees.
These committees are patterned along the existing municipal
government structures of the Philippine government. These
Municipal committees are to replace the political structures of the
GRP in areas under the control of the MILF or under its sphere of
influence. In the creation of these structures, the MILF took into
consideration the Bangsamoro’s culture, traditions, practices and
religion. The municipal chairmen are recommended by the provincial
chairmen after due consultation with different sectors in the
municipalities and are subject to the approval of the Central
Committee. According to Dawan, this strategy aims at replacing the
GRP’s political, economic and military control over the Bangsamoro
homeland at the grass roots level.15
The municipal chairmen are responsible to implement the policies
of the MILF in their controlled municipalities or in their respective
spheres of influence. They are assisted by the Internal Security Force
(ISF). At every municipal level, there exists one ISF company
assigned to maintain security and order in the respective
municipalities. They carry out the intelligence gathering activities
at the barangay levels and report them to the municipal committees,
then to the provincial committees and finally to the Central
Committee.
At the Barangay level, the MILF organised barangay government
structures known as Barangay Committees. They are similar to the
current GRP’s government structures at the barangay level. However,
as claimed by Atty Paduman, the MILF structures are based mainly
on the principles of Islam. 16 The MILF leadership wants to make
 66 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

sure that the word of God is implemented in areas which they claim
- to be under their control or sphere of influence in the region. The
Barangay Chairmen are recommended by the Municipal Chairmen
after consultation with the different sectors in those particular areas,
and, are subject to the approval of the Central Committee. This is in
conformity with their aim of establishing a state and government on
the basis of Islam. Barangay committees are backed by the
organization’s military force, the ISF, which helps the committees
in implementing the MILF’s policies, programmes and other
activities. In every barangay, there is one ISF platoon which is
responsible for peace and order.17 They carry out mainly police work.
The MILF barangay officers, with the help of the ISF, try to ensure
that the Qur’Én and the Sunnah are implemented in their respective
barangays.
The committee formation strategy apparently is successful in
mobilising mass support for the MILF. Hence, it is justified for Iqbal
to claim that the MLIF is truly a mass based organization.18 One
evidence of the mass support is the intelligence gathering activity
carried out by the people voluntarily. The Armed Forces of the
Philippine (AFP) faces serious difficulty in gathering information
from the MILF controlled areas because most of the local population
refuse to cooperate with them. The mass support enjoyed by MILF
is largely due to its emphasis on Islamic symbols and substance of
the liberation movement.
Another proof of the MILF’s mass appeal comes from the three-
day General Consultation gathering it organised from May 29 to
May 31, 2005, at Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. It was
attended by hundreds of thousands of Bangsamoro and some foreign
dignitaries. Astonished at such a massive support for the MILF and
its leadership, many foreign dignitaries wondered about the expenses
incurred by the movement. Interestingly, MILF spent one million
pesos (US$ 18,000) for such a mammoth gathering.19 Muhammad
Ameen, Chairman of the General Consultation Secretariat, is of the
opinion that the success of the three-day affair was due largely to
the strong organisation of the MILF that had its foundation at the
village level throughout Mindanao.20 He also claimed that this was
reflective of the strength of the leadership of the MILF under the
chairmanship of Al Haj Murad Ebrahim.21
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 67

While it is true that there is relative unity within the MILF,

however, differences and struggle for power did occur along tribal
and religious lines. The struggle for power among the high ranking
members of the MILF was observed during the chairmanship of
Sheikh Salamat Hashim. While no one challenged Hashim as the
chairman of the organization, the question of succession after his
death was secretly discussed by some contenders for the leadership
of the liberation movement. According to one analyst:
Hashim’s death was soon followed by reports of growing
factionalism in the MILF. There was a struggle for power
along tribal lines (Maguindanaon versus Maranao). The
Maranao wanted Alim Abdulaziz Mimbantas, a graduate of
Al-Azhar University (B.A. 1974), to be Hashim’s successor
instead of Al Haj Murad as the chairman of the MILF. As Vice
Chairman for Internal Affairs, Mimbantas, was one of the
most trusted of Hashim’s three key lieutenants, controlling
the MILF’s Internal Security Force (ISF), its local intelligence
network, and the chairman’s Praetorian Guard, the Internal
Brigade. However, Mimbantas did not possess the extensive
personal contacts in the Muslim world or depth of religious
learning which were central to the founding chairman’s
prestige. Nor, as a pure ethnic Maranao, can he bridge the
tribal divisions within the movement in the same way as
Hashim, whose father was Maguindanaon, and mother
Maranao/Iranun.22
In general, it seems that the Maguindanaon and Tausug tribes were
reluctant to accept the leadership of the Maranao tribe whom they
had ruled throughout history. The Tausug and the Maguinanaon
tribes, unlike the Maranao, had all along supplied leaders to rule the
Sultanate of Sulu and the Sultanate of Maguindanao, respectively.
Despite tribal feelings, these tribes were united because of the
common goal of liberation. Sheikh Salamat Hashim managed to
strengthen the organisation, the MILF, on the basis of Islam.
Mimbantas had strong support among the Maranao ÑulamÉÒ –
many led by Hashim’s Al-Azhar classmate, Mahid Mutilan (former
vice governor of the ARMM and a governor of Lanao del Sur) and
from the more militant Maranao field commanders. However, his
personal armed following was probably less than five thousand.
This pales into insignificance when it is compared to not less than
 68 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

20,000 freedom fighters loyal to Al Haj Murad.23 Additionally, Al

- Haj Murad was Hashim’s long-standing Vice Chairman for Military
Affairs and was supported by both religious and professional field
commanders and rank and file of Bangsamoro Islamic Armed forces,
especially those from his fellow Maguindanaon tribe. He was also
fully supported by other tribes (such as the Yakan and Kalagan
tribes). The Maguindanaon tribe was the most dominant force within
the movement’s Central Committee, in general, and the Jihad
Executive Council in particular, which was the ultimate decision-
making unit of the MILF.
Al Haj Murad’s gradual elevation to the top position of the MILF
began when he replaced Commander Ali “Cassius Clay” Sansaluna
as military affairs chairman of the MNLF’s Kutawato Revolutionary
Committee (KRC). Commander Clay, who was in charge of procuring
weapons through the Sabah-based MNLF chief Nur Misuari, was
assassinated by a bodyguard in June 1974, probably as a result of
rivalry with the KRC’s political affairs chairman, Commander Amirel
“Ronnie” Malaguiok, a Top 90 batch mate. When Malaguiok
surrendered to the government in April 1980, scuttling nascent
negotiations with the then Marcos regime and receiving a high
political post in return, Al Haj Murad took his place as overall
chairman of the KRC. Al Haj Murad’s personal popularity did much
to help Hashim and the organisation which suffered from
Malaguiok’s defection.
In 2003, on Hashim’s death, Alim Abdul Aziz Mimbantas
voluntarily withdrew from the chairmanship of the organisation in
favour of Al Haj Murad and that made the transition smooth.
Eventually, Mimbantas gained Al Haj Murad’s former post of
overseeing military affairs, while Al Haj Murad assumed the overall
leadership with the support of other prominent and influential figures
of the organisation, like Ghazali Jaafar and Sheikh Omar Pasigan,
all ethnic Maguindanaon. Jafaar was in charge of Political Affairs
and was thus very influential in the organisation.
As Grand MuftÊ of Kutawato, Pasigan was also an influential
elderly figure in the Central Committee, handling DaÑwah Committee
or Islamic Outreach. This relationship helped bring many
Maguindanaon ÑulamÉÒ into Al Haj Murad’s camp. A significant
check on Mimbantas’ power as the new Vice Chairman for Military
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 69

Affairs that reflected ethnic-based factional manoeuvring was the

separation of his position from that of Chief of Staff of the MILF
armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). While
these positions were concurrent throughout Al Haj Murad’s tenure
as Vice-chairman, the new Chief of Staff was Sammy Al-Mansour
(Sammy Gambar), another ethnic Maguindanaon, who was
previously Murad’s Deputy Chief of Staff. Mimbantas’s previous
position as Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs, meanwhile, appeared
to have been left vacant and the ISF was consolidated as an integral
part of the regular BIAF, thus coming under the command of Al Haj
Murad and Gambar.

Diplomatic Offensive
The MILF leadership realised the importance of diplomacy in their
struggle for the liberation of the Bangsamoro homeland. There was
internal disagreement on this issue. Some members of the MILF
Central Committee opposed the GRP-MILF peace talks. However,
majority of the members saw peace negotiations as an opportunity
for them to present their positions to the international community
and thus clear those misperceptions and other adverse images
portrayed by their enemies in general, and the GRP and its agents,
in particular. To these members, according to Michael Mastura,
isolation from the international community, more specifically, from
the OIC would not serve the interest of the movement.24
The movement started its diplomatic offensive through peace
talks from the 1990s. The MILF leadership took this opportunity to
present its position in relation to the GRP and the world community.
The first opportunity for the MILF to bring the Bangsamoro issue to
the attention of the world was during the time of President Corazon
C. Aquino. The Aquino administration tried to negotiate with the
MILF, but that attempt was only short-lived because Aquino’s
administration was pre-occupied with the MNLF, the then dominant
Bangsamoro insurgent group. The GRP at that time considered the
MILF as a push-over group and, therefore, of not much significance.
However, President V. Ramos who succeeded Aquino, started
engaging the MILF in his bid to solve the Bangsamoro problem.
Ramos created the GRP peace panel to negotiate with the MILF.
This peace process was intensified as a result of the Buldon tension
 70 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

that frightened both parties (the GRP and MILF) lest the tension
- might develop out of control. The GRP ordered its peace negotiators
to initiate contact with MILF in order to discuss those issues that
have the potential of leading them to a dangerous and destructive
war. The MILF responded positively to this peace overture by the
Ramos administration.
However, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s “Rambo Approach”
brought the situation to a deadlock. Estrada, in his bid to resolve the
Bangsamoro liberation movement, declared an all-out-war against
the liberation movement and captured and occupied many of the
MILF camps. According to Sheikh Salamat Hashim, the GRP attacked
all verified MILF camps like the Camp Uthman in December 1999,
the Camps Omar and Badre in January-February 2000, the Camp
Bilal in March 2000, the Camp Abu Bakre in April 2000 and the
Camp Bushra in May 2000.25 The then Philippine Defence Secretary,
Orlanda Mercado, justified these military attacks by the Manila
government by saying that the problem in Southern Philippines was
a military problem, and, therefore, it needed a military solution.26 In
the face of such adversary, the MILF had no alternative but to respond
by declaring an all-out jihÉd policy in 2000.
The GRP strategy of all-out war was meant to weaken, and
ultimately, destroy the MILF capabilities. Estrada’s all-out offensive
against the MILF caused unparalleled major displacement, greater
polarization of the Bangsamoro homeland along confessional lines,
and economic disaster. Dr. Tahir Sulaik, a Provincial Health Officer
of Maguindanao, reported in May 2000 that in Maguindanao
Province alone, there were about 180,000 individuals (belonging to
34,109 families) who were displaced, of whom 36,663 women,
children and adults were suffering from different ailments in poor
evacuation centres. 27 There was almost a total erosion of
Bangsamoro’s faith in the peace process. There was a deadlock
because both parties adopted irreconcilable positions by setting
conditions for the resumption of the peace talks, and consequently,
trust and confidence which had been built through years were gone.
At the end, both parties had set unnecessary conditions that served
as a stumbling block to the already stalled peace talks. Peace
advocates tried their best to bring the two parties to the negotiating
table and resolve their differences but their efforts were of no avail.
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 71

According to Mercado, the MILF had set conditions that included a

recognition of all previous agreements signed by the GRP and the
MILF. It also insisted that all future GRP-MILF peace talks be held
outside the country with third party’s mediation. “The GRP insisted
that the MILF must drop its secessionist goal, restrain its terrorist
acts and surrender its guns. The MILF must also agree to autonomy
as the political solution to end decades of rebellion in the region.”28
However, Estrada was ousted and jailed by his own deputy, Gloria
M. Arroyo, who replaced her predecessor’s all-out-war policy with
an all-out-peace policy. Arroyo called the MILF to resolve its
differences with GRP by diplomatic and peaceful means. The MILF
responded by setting conditions for the resumption of the stalled
peace talks. As pointed earlier, those conditions included a full
recognition of all previous agreements, holding the GRP-MILF peace
talks outside the country and the involvement or participation of the
OIC member-states such as Malaysia, Libya and others as a party to
witness any future agreements that the GRP and the MILF would
enter into. The Arroyo administration accepted those conditions
which paved the way for the resumption of the stalled peace talks.
Since 2001, the GRP and MILF peace panels reached substantive
agreements. The Agreement on the General Framework for the
Resumption of the GRP-MILF peace talks was inked at Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia on March 24, 2001. In this accord, the two parties
agreed on several points, the most important of which are:
the resumption of the GRP-MILF peace talks immediately
after the signing of that agreement; commitment to honour,
respect and implement all past agreements by the GRP and
the MILF; both parties agreed to negotiate with sincerity
and mutual trust, justice and freedom and respect for the
identity, culture and aspirations of all peoples in the Southern
Philippines.29
The MILF leadership considered these agreed upon points as a great
achievement for several reasons. For one, it satisfied the MILF
leadership demand for a third party or parties to mediate their peace
talks with the GRP because they realized that without the involvement
of a third party, the Manila government could easily renege and
even violate all its past agreements with the MILF. President Estrada’s
non-recognition of all the previous GRP-MILF’s peace agreements
 72 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

that led to his all-out war policy against the MILF was GRP’s failure
- to meet its commitments and obligations towards the international
community in general, and the Bangsamoro in particular. This was
a good lesson for the MILF leadership. Henceforth, the MILF
leadership insisted on the presence of a third party to witness
agreements that would be concluded in future. As a result, the OIC
through some of its member-states like Malaysia, Libya, Brunei and
others were actively facilitating the resolution of the conflict in the
region. Since then, the MILF had intensified its diplomatic offensive
in order to advance and protect its interests as a liberation movement.
Another significant development was the agreement concluded
by the two parties that was signed in Tripoli, Libya, on June 22,
2001 known as the Agreement on Peace between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front. The GRP and the MILF’s peace panels agreed in principle on
three major points: security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain
aspects. The great achievement in this agreement on the part of the
MILF was the rehabilitation aspect. The agreement stipulated that
the MILF “shall determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and
development projects in conflict affected areas.” This led to the
creation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), an
independent agency, free from government’s interference.
The GRP wanted the BDA to be under its control but the MILF
insisted on its independence. This was a very contentious issue, but
in the end, the GRP conceded the MILF demand. Dr. Danda Juanday
was appointed the Executive Director, Project Management Office
of the agency. Thus, the BDA was a unique development agency
controlled by the liberation movement or insurgents, but recognized
by the international community, including the GRP. In fact, it is hard
to find a precedent for this case. It is unimaginable for a sovereign
state like the Philippines to have no control or authority over a
development agency, BDA, on its soil run by the “insurgents,” the
MILF.
The BDA had grown to embrace the larger issues of community
development and advocacy for the poor in its mission and vision of
helping the Bangsamoro and other communities in the Southern
Philippines to build sustainable future. Dr. Juanday revealed the plans
of the BDA for capacity building, relief, rehabilitation and
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 73

development mandate and other priority concerns.30 He also said

that the priority of the BDA was to conduct values transformation
training, using the recently development BDA module, in the locality
and then to its partners in the conflict-affected communities.31 For
the MILF leadership, the establishment of the BDA was a great
achievement because they could receive foreign funds and manage
them for their own development without the GRP’s interference.
Another significant agreement was Implementing Guidelines on
Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace signed
by both parties on August 7, 2001, at Putrajaya, Malaysia. 32 The
agreement involved a third party (OIC) to observe and monitor the
implementation of all GRP-MILF’s peace agreements. There was
progress because the GRP at least partially observed and implemented
some of those agreements like cessation of hostilities. According to
Maulana Alonto, the Implementing Guidelines of the Security Aspect
of this Agreement provided the mechanism that clearly defined and
outlined the peremptory Do’s and Don’ts that both parties to the
agreement must conform with to ensure that armed hostilities do
not get out of hand or, at best, do not recur.33
As stated, Malaysia was involved in the peace process. Malaysia
is keen to see a stable Philippines. Domestic problems in the
Philippines would have regional spill over effect that would
destabilise the region and affect Malaysia as it would be forced to
deal with the influx of refugees pouring into the state of Sabah,
neighbouring Philippines. An investment benefit was also a reason
that encouraged ASEAN member-states to seek a stable and peaceful
region. There were also several Joint Statements and Communiqués
like the Joint Communiqué on May 6, 2002, at Cyberjaya, Malaysia
and the Joint Statement on March 28, 2003, at Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, and others, but most of these were not implemented.
However, what is important here is that both parties were ready to
engage in diplomacy and thus solve their differences through
peaceful means.
The MILF’s diplomatic offensive had several advantages. First,
though the problem was far from resolved, at least the movement
managed to internationalise the Bangsamoro issue and thus exposed
the GRP’s insincerity and unwillingness to reach a just,
comprehensive and lasting peace in the Southern Philippines. The
 74 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

OIC through its member-states, particularly Malaysia, Brunei and

- Libya, witnessed the lack of political will on the part of the Manila
political and military leadership to settle the problems in the Southern
Philippines. Many times the GRP and the AFP refused to implement
the provisions signed in agreements, joint statements and
communiqués. To Lingga breach of the agreement in reality meant
the GRP’s denial of the right of the Bangsamoro to freedom and
independence. 34
However, the MILF leadership continued to intensify its
diplomatic offensive. It tried to engage all international actors,
including the United States. The Arroyo administration tried its best
to brand MILF as a terrorist organisation. President Arroyo, had
ordered the AFP to attack the MILF’s position at Buliok Complex in
Pikit, North Cotabato, before her scheduled meeting with President
George Bush Jr. on February 2003. According to Dawan, the motive
behind this attack was to convince the United States of the urgency
to include the MILF in its list as a terrorist group.35 To convince the
United States about the alleged connection and cooperation between
the MILF and the terrorist groups like JI, ASG and al-Qaeda, the
GRP and its military agent, AFP, tried to fabricate evidences needed
to bolster their claims. In fact, the Magdalo group, which staged a
failed rebellion in 2003 against the government, accused Arroyo’s
administration and its top military generals, more specifically, former
Defence Secretary, General Angelo Reyes, for a number of bombings,
including the Davao bombing, which killed dozens of innocent
people. They tried to attribute these acts to the MILF to destroy its
image and credibility as a liberation movement in the eyes of the
international community.36
In response, the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim sent a letter,
in 2003, to the U.S. President, George W. Bush, explaining the MILF
as a liberation movement and its stand on the campaign against
terrorism spearheaded by the U.S. His letter had the salutary effect
in that the United States agreed not to include the MILF in the list of
terrorist organizations. As Lingga stated:
The GRP asked the United States to include the MILF in its
list as a terrorist organization, but the Bush administration
excluded it, because prior to President Arroyo’s visit to the
White House, the MILF wrote to President Bush explaining
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 75

its positions as a liberation movement with respect to the

issue of the United States’ campaign against terror.37
MILF continued to negotiate with the GRP through the involvement
of the third party in order to avoid political isolation from the
international community.
The leaders of MILF understood that isolation from the
international arena would damage its image and credibility in the
eyes of the international community as a liberation movement. Thus,
instead of isolation, the MILF opted and thus started engaging with
international actors. The MILF leadership wanted to show to the
world community its readiness to settle its differences with the GRP
through peaceful and diplomatic means. It responded positively in
2001 when the OIC (through its member-states like Malaysia and
Libya), upon the request of the GRP, called upon the MILF to return
to the negotiating table to resolve its differences with the GRP.38
One significant development for the MILF was the Fourth Round
of Exploratory Talks at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on February 7 and
8, 2004. Here, the two parties agreed on Malaysian Advance Party
Mission Preparatory to the Deployment of the OIC International
Monitoring Team. The Malaysian Advance Team arrived on March
22, 2004 and toured the MILF’s camps in the Southern Philippines.
This signified the readiness of the GRP to implement the terms of
agreement signed earlier. Prior to the deployment of the IMT,
agreements signed by the GRP and the MILF were mostly violated
with the two parties accusing each other for the violation. They
would resort to media propaganda to malign each other. The GRP
had an upper-hand because it had greater access to the local and
international media. In this respect, Hashim stated that,
… from the Marcos’ dictatorship to the Aquino and early
part of Ramos’ administrations, the GRP managed to conceal
the untold atrocities perpetrated by the barbarous AFP against
the Bangsamoro. These included: the burning of houses,
schools and mosques; desecration of the Holy Qur’Én; killing
of children, women and the aged; destruction and looting of
the Bangsamoro properties and the destruction of plantations
and farms, etc.39
The mediation of the OIC, more specifically, the active participation
of Malaysia and Libya, in the solution to the conflict in the Southern
 76 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

Philippines made the GRP and its military agent, AFP, realise the
- negative implications of their non-compliance of agreements signed
by the two parties. The GRP was left with no option but to cooperate
with the third party mediators. According to Iqbal, Malaysia took an
active part in trying to resolve the conflict in the Southern Philippines
largely because the conflict had the potential of disrupting regional
political and economic development.40
Malaysia had a bargaining power in relation to the GRP. First,
the GRP needed Malaysia to bring the Bangsamoro independence
movements and the MILF to the negotiating table. It seems the MILF
leadership trusted and listened to the Malaysian leadership. This is
due to the identity of religion, shared historical experience and
cultural similarities. The MILF also wanted Malaysia’s involvement
to prove the insincerity of GRP, should it renege on the agreement
or promise it has made, to resolve the conflict.
However, the MILF leadership understood Malaysia’s dilemma
of supporting the Bangsamoro independence struggle and of
adhering to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in domestic
issues, especially if it involved the issues, of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the ASEAN member-states. Malaysia stated that it
could not support any move of minorities in the region, including
the Bangsamoro if it touches upon the issues of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of any ASEAN member-states. Knowing the
possible implication of the ASEAN principle, on the very interest of
the liberation movement, the MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad did not
mention independence in his May 2005 speech opening the two-
day MILF general consultation in Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao. This is despite the knowledge of every one that the
MILF was struggling for a separate Islamic state.41 Wadi argued:
That the MILF leadership does not want to jeopardize the
peace negotiations at a time when things are moving with
relative ease. So, as far as the MILF is concerned, you don’t
go around saying such sensitive words as “independence”
at this point of time. The GRP is known to prefer a solution
to the Mindanao problem that falls within the framework of
the Philippine Constitution.42
Wadi, however, described Chairman Al Haj Murad as a modernist
compared to the late MILF founding Chairman, Sheikh Salamat
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 77

Hashim. “When you say modernist,” Wadi explained, “you are

talking about someone who is more open to certain compromises.”
Thus, MILF compromised and the GRP responded likewise. For
instance, the GRP earlier insisted that any negotiation with the MILF
must be on the basis of the Philippine Constitution which was to be
the point of reference. However, the MILF refused to negotiate with
GRP under the framework of the Philippine Constitution insisting
that it did not recognize the Philippine Constitution. The MILF
insisted that the only viable and acceptable solution to the
Bangsamoro problem is independence. It refused to talk about
autonomy as it would never accept a resolution short of
independence. The GRP, in turn, was willing to compromise on
everything short of independence. However, the GRP kept silent on
the issue of the Philippine Constitution and the MILF agreed not to
bring the issue of independence during negotiation. The MILF,
according to Hashim, “for the meantime”
agreed to continue the negotiation without exposing the
issue of independence in lieu of the GRP’s silence on the
Philippine Constitution as a point of reference on the
negotiating table.43
The GRP was forced to compromise on the issue of third parties’
involvement in anticipation of achieving political stability in the
Southern Philippines that might bring economic opportunities to the
region. Such a compromise and the acceptance of foreign
involvement or interference in resolving the conflict were due to
regionalization or globalisation of the conflict.
The MILF, though engaged the international community and
resorted to diplomacy in resolving their differences with the GRP,
was prudent enough not to rely solely upon international support.
They realised the necessity of conducting diplomacy and enter
negotiation with the GRP on the basis of strength. They may be
sidelined if they are not considered as a power to reckon with. Hence,
while pursuing diplomacy, they strengthened their military
capabilities and adopted the fight-negotiate-fight-negotiate strategy.
In 2004, they intensified the fortification of their camps all over the
Bangsamoro homeland.44 Perhaps, the MILF leadership realized that
war was an extension of diplomacy. As Dawan puts it, “if you want
peace, prepare for war.”45
 78 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

However, the MILF’s faith in the importance of diplomacy and

- political means in resolving its differences with the GRP is
unassailable. In August 2005, Mohagher Iqbal, MILF chief peace
negotiator, reminded the Bangsamoro that the best way to solve the
conflict in the region was through a negotiated political settlement.
He argued that “resolving the problem through negotiation is
bloodless and everybody is a winner.” He disagreed with the classical
revolutionary argument that only armed struggle could offer genuine
liberation to the people. He argued that freedom through war was
suitable for the nineteenth century which was characterised by the
culture of war to resolve conflict as in Vietnam and Cambodia. “The
21st Century is declared by the United Nations as era of the culture
of peace.”46 Nevertheless, the MILF has to be vigilant and careful in
dealing with the GRP, a government with a record of not complying
with commitments made in various peace agreements.

The Future of Peace

Generally, the MILF was satisfied with the results achieved through
peace negotiations. Most of the agreed points were usually
favourable to the MILF. In particular, the MILF was quite contented
with the outcome of the exploratory talks with the GRP held at Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, on September 15 and 16, 2005. According to
the MILF’s peace negotiator, some 90 per cent of their talks revolved
around the proposals of the MILF’s Peace Panel headed by him.47
In a joint statement in early September 2005, negotiators from the
government and the MILF said they had agreed on how a
Bangsamoro homeland would be governed.48 But there was serious
disagreement on the size of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).
The GRP would give only more than six hundred villages, but the
MILF rejected it. The MILF demanded more than one thousand
villages.
However, Dawan was very cautious in the implementation of the
peace deal because “the Manila government has a less than
encouraging track record in implementing peace deals.” 49
Furthermore, given the growing unpopularity of President Arroyo it
would be difficult for her to build a strong consensus on
Bangsamoro’s freedom and self-determination. A comprehensive
deal on the Bangsamoro’s ancestral domain requires legislation and
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 79

amendments to the constitution, which might be difficult for the

weakened Arroyo’s administration to push through.
Nevertheless, some scholars were optimistic that the GRP and
the MILF might sign a Final Peace Agreement by 2007 ending
decades of Bangsamoro liberation movement in the Southern
Philippines. One of the high ranking officers of the MILF who talked
on condition of anonymity said that implementing a peace deal was
likely to prove at least as difficult as reaching the agreement given
the complexity of issues such as land rights and governance of the
Bangsamoro homeland. To these, if one adds the Manila
government’s poor record on implementing previous deals,
optimism about an end to the nearly four decade-old conflict seems
premature. It is clear that there are fundamental differences between
the two parties that need to be resolved.

Summary and Concluding Remarks

The MILF is an offshoot of the MNLF but has emerged as the most
powerful movement struggling for freedom and self-determination
of the Bangsamoro. To mobilise public opinion and endear itself to
the people, it adopted the strategy of strengthening the MILF
organisation through a hierarchy of Committee Set-ups. These
committees were organized from the Central Committee to the
Barangay levels, “to address the sentiments and aspirations of the
Bangsamoro in order to bring them on board.”50 This strategy was
effective in securing mass support for the cause for which the MILF
was struggling. According to some commentators, this strategy made
MILF rely upon the masses for its operation and survival and not
the other way round which is usually the case in elite-based
organisations.
The liberation movement also engaged in a diplomatic offensive
in order to promote its interest and protect its image to the
international community. The MILF leadership was aware of the
negative consequences of isolating itself from the international
community. This strategy effectively thwarted the efforts of the GRP
to label the MILF as a terrorist group rather than a liberation
movement. The MILF simultaneously engaged the international
community to portray itself as a movement aimed at resolving the
issue through peaceful negotiation and of ensuring that the GRP
 80 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

abided by the terms of agreements arrived at various peace

- conferences.
However, efforts by the MILF leadership to engage the
international community would not succeed if they negotiated from
a position of weakness. Hence, they paid sufficient attention to
strengthen its armed wing and fortify its camps with available arms
and ammunitions. To MILF, war was an extension of diplomacy
through a different means. They would respond to arms with arms.
However, their faith in diplomacy and resolution of conflict through
peaceful negotiation remains firm.
Indeed, much has been achieved by the MILF. They succeeded
in impressing upon the international mediators and others the need
for the creation of an independent Bangsamoro nation-state. The
MILF needs to maintain the tempo and create a situation where both
the international and regional actors feel that the MILF is not a force
disrupting regional stability and development. They must convince
the mediators (the OIC member countries, particularly Malaysia,
Libya and Brunei) that their interest will not be impaired by
supporting the MILF cause. The good offices of the international
actors are of utmost importance if the MILF is to succeed in its quest
for the freedom and self-determination of the Bangsamoro people.

Notes
1. Steven Cohen, The Effective Public Manager: Achieving Success in
Government (London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), 122.
2. A. Macapado Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The
Nonviolent Alternative (Marawi City: Office of the President and College
Affairs Mindanao State University, 1994), 49.
3. Salah Jubair, Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny (Kuala Lumpur:
IQ Marin Sdn. Bhd., 1999), 134.
4. Ibid., 135. See also K. Samuel Tan, “The Bangsamoro Struggle,” Opisyal na
Publikasyon ng Universidad ng Pilipinas, Tomo 1, Blg. 7 (Mayo/Hunyo 2000):
6-8 [online] available from http://www.up.edu.ph/forum/2000/06/mayjune/
bangsamoro.htm, accessed November 20, 2004.
5. Mr. Joey Silva, “Fr. Eliseo “Jun” Mercado Jr., OMI” [Online] available from
www.synergos.org/bridgingleadership, accessed May 25, 2007.
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 81

6. “Votes Sell in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-Tawi,” Luwaran.com Moro
Islamic Liberation Front, 8 August (2005). See also “Indifference Grips ARMM
Election,” Manila Times, August 8, 2005. See also P. Patricio Diaz, “What’s
New?” MindaViews, 15, no. 087 (August 20, 2005).
7. P. Patricio Diaz, “What’s New?”
8. “Indifference Grips ARMM Election,” 1. See also M. Abhoud Syed Lingga,
“Mindanao Peace Process: The Need for New Formula,” Institute of Bangsamoro
Studies (June 4, 2004), 17 [online] available from http://www.yonip.com/main/
articles/peaceprocess.html, accessed November 20, 2004.
9. Interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 17, 2005.
Mohagher Iqbal, known as Salah Jubair, is a trusted associate of both Sheikh
Salamat Hashim and his successor, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. Salah Jubair is the
member of the MILF Central Committee, the Vice Chairman of the MILF
Information Agency and the Chairman of the MILF’s Peace Panels.
10. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. See also “Southern Philippines
Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group
(July 13, 2004), 2 [online] available from www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/
2004/icg-phl-13jul.pdf, accessed November 20, 2004. See also “Malaysia
Lauds MILF on General Consultation,” Maradika: The Official Publication
of the MILF’s Central Committee, 1.
11. Al Haj Murad Ebrahim “A Call to the Muslim Ummah,” Camp Abu Bakre
As-Siddique, Maguindanao, (February 15, 2001), 1.
12. Wan Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of the Southern
Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 195. See also M. Abdullah Hamza, “MILF alternative government,”
Homeland, 4, no. 6 (1997): 5.
13. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. See also D. Marites Vitug, M. Glenda
Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City:
Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular
Democracy, 2000), 151.
14. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author.
15. Salman Dawan, Interview by author, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September
15, 2005. It was stated by Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author.
16. Atty. Guinaid Paduman (A Member of the MILF’s of the Technical
Committee), Interview by author, Camp Abu Bakre As-Siddique, Mindanao,
22 September 2005.
17. D. Marites Vitug, M. Glenda Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion
in Mindanao, 111.
 82 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

18. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author.

-
19. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. It was also mentioned by Salman
Dawan.
20. “Malaysia Lauds MILF on General Consultation,” 1.
21. Ibid.
22. “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,”
9-11.
23. Atty. Guinaid Paduman, Interview by author.
24. Atty. O. Michael Mastura (Former Congressman of Maguindanao and
currently the Member of the MILF’s Peace Panels), Interview by author, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, September 17, 2005. It was also stated by Mohagher Iqbal,
Interview by author. See also Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s
Struggle against Oppression and Colonialism, ed. Nu’ain bin Abdulhaqq
(Mindanao: Agency for Youth Affairs-MILF, 2001), 70-2.
25. Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against Oppression
and Colonialism, 73. This was also mentioned by M. Iqbal.
26. See also Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against
Oppression and Colonialism, 73. It was also mentioned by S. Dawan. It was
also stated by S.A. Lingga, (Chairman of the Ulama-Professional Executive
Committee), Interview, Cotabato City, Interview, September 9, 2005.
27. Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against Oppression
and Colonialism, 73.
28. R. Eliseo Mercado, “The Five Basic Issues Confronting Mindanao vis-â-
vis the Roles Played by the Civil Society,” [Online] available from
www.philsol.nl/fora/NL00a-Mercado.html, accessed September 9, 2006.
29. Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (March 24, 2001), 1-3.
30. “World Vision Explores Partnership with BDA,” [online] available from
www.luwaran.com, accessd August 29, 2005.
31. Ibid.
32. Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace in Putrajaya, Malaysia (August 7, 2001), 1-5. See also
Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (March 24, 2001), 2.
STRATEGIES OF THE MILF IN THE PHILIPPINES/SHAMSUDDIN TAYA 83

33. Maulana Alonto, “Quo Vadis, GRP?” See also M. Abhoud Syed Lingga,
“Mindanao Peace Process: The Need for New Formula,” 24.
34. See “Kazi Mahmood’s interview with Abhoud Syed Lingga,” 1-3 [online]
available from www.islamonline.net, accessed December 18, 2001.
35. Salman Dawan, Interview by author. It was also stated by S.A. Lingga.
36. Abuomair (A MILF Acting Battalion Commander, Maguindanao,
Mindanao), Interview by author, Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2005. See also
Muhair Abdullah, “Linawin Natin: Sa Ngalan ng Kapayapaan at Kaunlaran,”
Maradika: The Official Publication of the MILF’s Central Committee, 4-5.
37. M. Abhoud Syed Lingga, “Mindanao Peace Process: The Need for New
Formula.”
38. Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (March 24, 2001), 1-3.
See also A.M. Syed Lingga, “Muslim Minority in the Philippines,” 20.
39. Salamat Hashim, “Bangsamoro Muslims’ Relations with the Global Muslim
Ummah,” Crescent International Interviewed Salamat Hashim, Leader of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front at his Main Base at Camp Abu Bakre As-
Siddique, Central Mindanao, (April1-15, 1999): 4.
40. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author.
41. Alexander Martin Remollino, “Gov’t-MILF Peace Partly at Hand but Still
Remote,” [online] available from www.luwaran.com, accessed June 27, 2005.
See also “Murad-Peace Partly at Hand in Mindanao,” Maradika: The Official
Publication of the MILF’s Central Committee, 1-3. See also O. Carolyn Arguillas,
“MILF’s Murad to Government: Treat us as Partners,” MindaNews, vol. 4, no.
12 (June 2005): 1-2.
42. Alexander Martin Remollino, “Gov’t-MILF Peace Partly at Hand but Still
Remote,” 2-3. See also Glenda Cheva, “Government Willing to Cha Cha for
Just Peace in Mindanao,” ABSCBN Interactive (September 27, 2005), 1-3.
43. Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against Oppression
and Colonialism, 30. It was stated by M. Iqbal. See also P. Patricio Diaz,
“MILF Rejecting Autonomy,” [online] available from www.luwaran.com,
accessed May 22, 2005.
44. Salam Dawan, Interview by author. This was also stated by Mohagher
Iqbal, Interview by author.
45. Slaman Dawan, Interview by author. See also Salamat Hashim, The
Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against Oppression and Colonialism, 63.
 84 INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 15, NO 1, 2007

46. “Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst, Says MILF,” 2005 [online]
- available from www.luwaran.com, accessed August, 2006. It was mentioned
by mohagher Iqbal. See also O. Carolyn Arguillas, “MILF’s Murad to
Government: Treat us as Partners,” 1-2. See also Glenda Cheva, “Government
Willing to Cha Cha for Just Peace in Mindanao,” 1-3.
47. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. It was also stated by Michael Mastura,
Interview by author.
48. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. See also “Pledge is Sacred, MILF
Says” [online] available from www.luwaran.com, accessed October 16, 2005.
49. Salman Dawan, Interview by author.
50. Mohagher Iqbal, Interview by author. This was also stated by Salman
Dawan, Interview by author.