AN APPROACH NOTE

ON
BUILDING SAFETY BEHAVIOUR AND CONCIOUS ACTS OF
SAFETY ACROSS THE ORGANIZATION

CONSIDER THIS!

“90% or more of the accidents are due to unsafe human acts or

behaviours”

“50% of the unsafe behaviours are identified or noticeable at any

plant at any given point of time”

“25% to 30% of safety awareness is lacking amongst employees,

which gets reflected in their unsafe behaviours”

Submitted by: Hero Mindmine Institute Ltd

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Industry is becoming increasingly aware of the importance of taking human factors into account
in safety management, particularly in the industries where human operations dominate.
Accidents are commonly attributed to at-risk behaviour or human error. When accidents are
investigated, many of the systemic causal factors are human in their origins, eg: inadequate
training, bad design or poor safety culture.

Behaviour-based safety programs have become a popular approach to managing the people
issues in safety.

WHAT IS BEHAVIOUR-BASED SAFETY?

Behaviour-based safety approaches have become a popular way of managing the people side
of safety. The approach was originally developed in the USA. It revolves around what motivates
and reinforces people’s behaviour. Basically it was recognised that the rewards for behaving
unsafely often outweigh the rewards for safe behaviour. For example, common rewards that
increase the likelihood of behaving unsafely include:

“The boss congratulated me for getting the job done faster”

“I met my production target in a shorter amount of time, so I could take a longer break”
“It’s easier to do it this way and I didn’t get hurt”.

When people experience these sorts of rewards for unsafe behaviour, they will be more likely to
behave that way the next time around. This is why short -cuts can often become the norm, with
phrases like “That’s just the way things are done around here” being commonplace.

Behaviour-based safety programs attempt to address the balance of rewards for behaviour by
increasing rewards for safe behaviour and decreasing rewards for at-risk behaviour. Traditional
behaviour-based safety programs attempt to achieve this objective by:

a. Educating people in the workplace about safe and unsafe behaviour

b. Using peers and supervisors to observe worker activities
c. Isolating target behaviours
d. Providing various forms of feedback to individuals and groups in order to positively
change safety-related attitudes and behaviours.

This feedback usually comes in the form of praise and recognition from peers and/or
supervisors.

The fundamental concern about traditional behaviour-based safety programs is that to some
extent, they assume that we always have a choice as to whether to behave safely or unsafely.
For example, there is an underlying assumption that if haul truck drivers speed or drive
recklessly, it is because they choose to do so. Behaviour-based safety programs suggest that if
an individual was rewarded for safe behaviour then safer driving would occur.

However, speeding or erratic driving can also be a result of a number of other factors that are
not necessarily under a person’s control, such as fatigue, poor vehicle design or a culture of
production before safety. Therefore, behaviour-based safety programs should not simply focus
on individual behaviour change. They need to simultaneously address individual behaviour,
systemic factors that contribute to unsafe acts and organisational culture. While this conceptual
transition is beginning to occur (Manuele, 2000), many industries are still struggling with putting

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these new approaches into practice. We illustrate our approach to behaviour-based safety that
attempts to overcome this and other problems associated with traditional approaches to
behaviour-based safety.

FACTORS BEHIND PROGRAM SUCCESS

The implementation of a successful behaviour-based safety program is reliant of a number of

factors. Here we outline the principles that we believe are crucial to program success. We use
examples from the case study above to demonstrate practical strategies for achieving these
objectives. Where relevant, we also demonstrate how these principles improve on many of the
traditional approaches to behaviour-based safety and why the approach that we took in the
manufacturing industry might also be a beneficial approach to managing the people-related
safety issues in other industries.

1. Establish workforce acceptance and commitment to the program.

A behaviour-based safety program is all about effecting change in an organization. Managing

the change process is a critical success factor for any new program introduced into the
workplace.

The challenge of the change process can be met in several ways. Essentially what is sought is
workforce acceptance and commitment to the process. A central aim is to get workers to buy-in
to the program and see the benefits for themselves. This can be achieved in a number of ways.
Firstly, involving workforce representatives in the design of the program enables them to feel as
though they have control in the outcome and enables them to have a sense of ownership of the
program. These representatives form a steering committee. These representatives become
active advocates of the program, so selection of representatives who have credibility and
influence at shop-floor level is important.

Another good strategy for getting workers to buy-in to the program is to get them to generate
their own ideas as to the benefits that can be realized with the introduction of a behaviour based
safety program. This can be done as part of the behaviour-based safety program training

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sessions. Asking the workforce to generate the advantages of the program increases the
likelihood that they truly believe in the value of it, rather than simply being told.

Once the program has been implemented, commitment can be enhanced by the careful
provision of prizes or rewards. There is much dispute over the pro’s and con’s of rewards given
for safety. The downside is that rewards may trivialize safety and represent safety as a “game”
rather than as a core value. However, with behaviour-based safety programs, rewards may be
useful in acknowledging the identification of a very serious hazard or acknowledging an
excellent recommendation for a way to eliminate a hazard (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). It rewards
critical thinking and thoughtful involvement.

Finally, emphasis should be placed on the proactive nature of the program. It is important to
show the workforce that this program enlists the expertise of every person in the workplace in
detecting and correcting the causes of injury before they occur.

2. Ensure that the program is applicable to your organisation and its unique
characteristics.

Industries and organizations vary considerably in the type of work that is conducted, the way it
is carried out, the organizational structure and the culture of the workforce. There are also
specific workforce factors, such as level of literacy and cultural background that also need to be
carefully considered in the design or selection of a suitable behaviour-based safety program.

Three factors are critical to ensure the applicability of the program to your organization.
Firstly, the need for pre-assessment of the characteristics and culture of your organization
should not be underestimated. This will guide your selection of the type of behaviour-based
safety program and development of specific goals and objectives that you want to achieve with
the program.

Secondly, engaging the workforce in actively designing the program is important in ensuring that
the workforce will accept and use the program. A taskforce or committee made up of a cross-
section of representative employees is recommended. Actively involve your workforce in the
design of the specific characteristics of the program, e.g. what is going to be observed, who is
going to observe, how is the information going to be fed back to the workers, can we integrate
the process with other systems and processes in place, and so on.

Thirdly, every organization has certain tasks when safety is habitually violated. For example,
working on certain machinery without turning it off, walking across a conveyor that is active.
These habits occur because taking a particular risk saves time or energy but causes no
personal injury. Workers will repeat this behaviour over and over until eventually this behaviour
becomes habit – behaviour that is chosen so quickly that it is an unconscious decision. The
danger emerges when a set of circumstances arise that makes this behaviour more risky than
usual (e.g. Equipment jams or protective devices fail). The barriers that usually prevent common
behaviours from causing injury are no longer present. This is when an injury occurs which
usually takes everyone by surprise. Accidents are not random but arise from the nature and
function of the organization.

Therefore, the unique characteristics of the organization need to be taken into account to
determine what are the behavioural factors prevalent in this particular organization that need to
be considered. Those subtle, convenient and seemingly safe behaviours need to be identified

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as they form a fundamental part of ensuring that your behaviour-based safety program is
relevant to your workplace.

3. A holistic approach to addressing at-risk behavior

Traditional behaviour-based safety approaches attempt to change worker behaviour.

Targeting specific behaviour is a good start. As discussed, traditional approaches to behaviour-

based safety focus their efforts here by rewarding safe behaviour. While this can result in some
success, it is still not the complete picture.

It appears that many workplaces using these programs are much more likely not to address the
hazards and systemic factors that are often the root cause of unsafe acts (Ref). Human factors
thought process has moved on from the old idea that our systems would be safe “were it not for
the erratic behaviour of some unreliable people (bad apples) in it” (Dekker, 2002).

The behaviour-based safety program must simultaneously address the specific behaviours and
systemic factors that contribute to at-risk behaviour. In some ways, traditional behaviour based
safety programs have placed too much emphasis on behaviour-change. This has been criticised
as “turning the hierarchy of controls upside down, contradicting one of the most widely accepted
concepts in injury and illness prevention” (Howe, 1998, p.6). Most approaches to behaviour-
based safety include references to studies from the DuPont Company which indicate that the
“causes” of most industrial accidents (up to 96% in some studies) are the “unsafe acts” of
workers. According to these studies, very few industrial accidents are caused by “unsafe
conditions”. Our approach recognises the need to address safety from both perspectives: the
unsafe act and the precursors that contribute to this unsafe act.

As James Reason suggests “free will is an illusion because of range of actions is always limited
by the local circumstances” (1997). Workers need to be trained in understanding the factors that
contribute to human error. Following the widely accepted Reason Model of Error (Reason,
1997), there needs to be a distinction between wilful at-risk behaviour versus behaviour that
stems from underlying systemic issues such as:

 Organizational culture, e.g. A culture of complacency, production before safety.

 Management decisions
 Fatigue due to shift structures
 Poor workplace design
 Inadequate tools and equipment
 Time Pressure
 Inadequate Training

Training needs to focus on hazard perception as well as behaviour-observation techniques.

The data from observations should be capitalized on. It provides an excellent way of being able
to identify patterns or systemic issues contributing to at-risk behaviour in the workplace.

Good use of this data can guide where safety efforts and resources are targeted.

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4. Ensure appropriate infrastructure to support the program

If the system that is developed fails to fit users' work practices, then it will be underused and
unlikely to facilitate cultural change (Tavistock Institute, UK)

The Tavistock Institute in England developed the Sociotechnical Systems approach to

managing change (Trist, 1981). It was first developed in the 1930’s in the mining industry in the
UK. It acknowledges that people are a core part of organizations and looks at ensuring that
structures and processes in the workplace are aligned or matched with people, in order to
maximize efficiency and job satisfaction. This is a central principle for managing the smooth
integration of a behaviour-based safety program into the workplace. Careful thought needs to be
directed towards ensuring that there are appropriate structures and processes in place to
support rather than impede the behaviour-based safety program. For example:
 Avenues for communication and feedback.
 Data collection and management processes, i.e. a centralized database.
 Clear definition of roles and responsibilities

There needs to be user-friendly procedures for observation, lodging forms, giving feedback,
following up on identified hazards, and so on. The integration of the people with the system
should be seamless.
Another point to make is that management are key players in the process (Cook & McSween,
2000). Managers across all levels must receive targeted training in their specific role in the
behaviour-based safety program. At the middle management level, their role in the behaviour-
based safety process centres around:
 Detecting glitches in the system and resolving these.
 Maintaining workforce motivation and commitment to the process
 Leading by example and actively “walking the talk”.

Specific training is required for this level of the organization acknowledging that they are the
lynchpin in the process.

5. Establish long-term sustained success.

The ultimate aim of any behaviour-based safety program is to develop and sustain a positive
safety culture. Many programs appear promising to begin with, but once the initial momentum
slows down, they do not result in sustained change.

It is important to assess safety culture to begin with and develop goals and objectives for the
desired culture. The gaps between current and desired culture guide the design of the
behaviour-based safety program as a way of actively addressing these weaknesses. It is
equally important to conduct follow-up assessments to determine what aspects of safety
performance and safety culture have improved and where areas for further improvement are
evident.

In order to achieve sustained culture change, one of the key proponents of behaviour-based
safety programs has acknowledged that it is important to start “small” and allow employees time
to get used to an observation and feedback process before adding too much complexity
(DePasquale & Geller, 1999). We achieved this by developing hazard cluster categories (e.g.

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People, Process and Plant related) rather than identifying specific target behaviours. In the next
phase, critical behaviours within these clusters can be defined and this is best driven by the
workforce.

It is important that the program is aligned with current systems and processes and ways of
doing things. If the program is too far removed from other management systems, it increases
the likelihood that the program will not be sustained over a long period of time. A good way of
maintaining continuous improvement and avoiding the program becoming “flavour of last month”
is to write key performance indicators associated with the program into management
performance appraisals.

Finally, the bottom line is that behaviour-based safety programs need to demonstrate return on
investment. We need to be able to measure and track safety performance improvements.
Difficulties with measuring safety are beginning to be overcome, by using a combination of
measures that not only track poor safety performance (eg. LTI rates) but also track system
health (e.g. Safety Culture) (Dumsa, et al, in press). The initial pre-assessment of safety is vital
in being able to demonstrate improvements from baseline performance as a result of the
behaviour-based safety intervention.

Interestingly, an example of the link between good safety performance and good organizational
performance is evidenced by Paul O’Neill, the former CEO of Alcoa in the U.S. His overall
leadership strategy was to make safety improvements. His principle was that when
organizations function at a high level in safety, many positive things follow, including
improvements in morale, communication and a sense of cohesiveness within the organization.
These factors are commonly attributed to high performing organization’s (Peters & Waterman,
1982; Senge, 1990). Some findings from research reveal that there are many important side
benefits of behaviour-based safety that improve general organizational functioning. Some of
these include: improved employee awareness, culture, communications, involvement, quality
and productivity (Krause, 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has illustrated an approach to behaviour-based safety that was undertaken in the
manufacturing industry. The approach has overcome many of the problems associated with
more traditional approaches to behaviour-based safety. We believe that this approach holds a
lot of promise for your industry. Many organizations face similar problems to manufacturing sites
with respect to managing people issues in safety. There appears to be a requirement for a
program that better integrates behaviour observation and change with strategies for managing
human error and it’s causal factors. There also appears to be a need for a program that is both
accessible and acceptable across the entire workforce.

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Program: Behavioural Based Safety.

Audience: Executive to Senior Level

Location: Client Site.

Duration: 2 DAYS – Customizable

DAY-1

SESSION LEARNING OBJECTIVES METHODOLOGY TIME

To get to know each

other and the trainer
well.
Set norms for Workshop Instructor led
Welcome Introduction 09:00-09:45
List down the outline of Training &
& ice-breaker
the programme. Activity
List down the
expectations from the
programme
Role and
Interactive
Responsibilities
Presentation
Safety-A systematic The Bhopal Gas 09:45-11:00
Discussion
Transformation Tragedy-Case Study
Assessment
Safety-A systematic
Case Study
Transformation
TEA/COFFEE BREAK (15 MINUTES)-11:00-11:15

BBS Concepts
Five core functions of
Integrated Safety
Management Interactive
Behavioural Based 11:15-11:45
Seven guiding principles Presentation
Safety
of Integrated Safety Role Play
Management
The pros and cons of
implementing BBS
Safety Survey by
H.L.Kaila(2009)
Survey Findings
Interactive
BBS Checklist
Presentation
Safety Survey of What does an 11:45-13:00
Activity
Indian Organisations organisation gain from
actively caring
Some problems in
observing and giving
feedback process
LUNCH BREAK (45 MINUTES)-13:00-13:45

Safety Survey of Why a BBS observer Interactive 13:45-14:30

Indian Organisations may fail in observation Presentation
and feedback process Activity
Some problems in
developing BBS

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 SESSION LEARNING OBJECTIVES METHODOLOGY TIME

checklist
Problems in
implementing BBS
TEA/COFFEE BREAK (15 MINUTES)-15:15-15:30

Desirable action plan in

launching BBS Interactive
Safety Survey of 14:30-15:15
BBs implementation Presentation
Indian Organisations
An Indian experience on Activity
BBS
Significance of Attitude
Attitude and Interactive 15:30- 16:00
and Behaviour with
Behaviour Presentation
examples
Implementing the
behaviour based
approach
Attitude and Using a 21 day habit Interactive 16:00-16:30
Behaviour formation theory and Presentation
reinforcement theory
Major Causes of
accidents

Summarising the Group Activity and 16:30 to 17:00

Learning of the Day
Session Discussion

Summarising the 17:45:18:00

Summary of the day Group Activity
learning’s from the day
END OF DAY-1

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 DAY-2

SESSION LEARNING OBJECTIVES METHODOLOGY TIME

To revisit the
Recap of day-1 previous days Group Activity 09:00-09:30
learning

Controlling the
Interactive
unsafe attitude and
Employees Presentation,
behaviour 09:30-11:00
behaviour and Activities
Strategies to correct
attitude Video Based
unsafe employee
Discussion
acts

TEA/COFFEE BREAK (15 MINUTES)-11:00-11:15

Safety culture- Interactive

Safety Culture concept Presentation 11:15-13:00
Safety culture model Activities

LUNCH BREAK (45 MINUTES)-13:00-13:45

Importance and
responsibility of Interactive
Safety Culture Safety culture Presentation 13:45-15:30
Key attributes of Activities
sound safety culture

TEA/COFFEE BREAK (15 MINUTES)-15:30-15:45

Critical factors of Interactive

safety climate Presentation 15:45-17:30
Safety Climate
Critical facts of Workbook
safety climate Role Play

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 Personal Action Prepare individual
Plan safety pledge card Individual Exercise 17:30-18:00
Feedback & Close Participant feedback

END OF WORKSHOP

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About Hero Mindmine Institute Limited

In 2000, Hero Corporate Service Limited gave its learning and development division a distinct
identity under the name of Hero Mindmine institute Limited. Today, Hero Mind mine is one of the
India’s premier and leading brands for Training and Development services to multinational
corporations, Indian blue-chip clients and Government and has grown with a countrywide
network of offices and learning centers and a dedicated team of over 200 professionals.

In 2004, Hero Mind mine forged a strategic alliance with Team Productivity Consultants Limited,
a training company with more than 20 years of experience and track record of working in India
and Asia Pacific market. Under the alliance, Team Productivity and Hero Mind mine combined
their intellectual property, talent pool and business relationships to create a strong learning
outsourcing entity that could provide end to end services to its clients.

Hero Mind mine is also networked with the global Training and Development community through
its relationship with ISTD (Indian Society for Training and Development) and ARTDO (Asia
Pacific Regional Training and Development Organization) International. Our distinctive training
methodology, content and delivery systems clearly manifests itself in better quality and
enhanced productivity for our clients. Our team has trained over 150,000 professionals in India
and Asia Pacific region.

ADVISORY BOARD

Hero Mind mine has an Advisory Board of eminent visionaries of India to help it in its mission.
These include Mr. N. R. Narayana Murthy, Chairman and Chief Mentor, Infosys; Mr. Deepak
Parekh, Chairman HDFC; Dr. R.A. Mashelkar, Director General C.S.I.R.; Mr. Analjit Singh,
Chairman Max Group; Mr. Raman Roy, Chairman and Managing Director, Wipro Spectramind;
Dr. Vinaysheel Gautam, Professor of management, IIT Delhi and Founder Director IIM
Kozhikode.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF OUR SERVICES

Hero Mind mine’s distinctive proposition is built around a set of core fundamentals:
 Exceptional people
 Rigorous processes
 Rich intellectual capital
 An integrative approach to solutions
 A robust infrastructure backbone.

These together provide our clients an unmatched advantage: whether it is a bespoke, focused
intervention or large-scale deployments in the area of training and development services.

Working with Hero Mind mine provides our clients access to internationally benchmarked
courseware and intellectual capital developed with global partners as well as through extensive
internal research. Our dedicated content development team and resources allow us to provide a

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very high level of customization in our training programs. As a full services training and
development organization, Hero Mind mine uniquely follows an integrative approach to solutions
– preferring to work as a partner in success than a vendor of off-the-shelf services.

Critical Knowledge of Tools and Procedures

In order to ensure a holistic approach, the training must include both - motivation related inputs
to develop ownership mindset, and knowledge related inputs particularly regarding the rules,
procedures and tools relating to key areas of their job. It has been observed that many times it
is the lack of complete knowledge with employees that manifests itself in frustration and even
incorrect handling of situations and hence leading employee disengagement. Therefore, we
propose a program that addresses the key elements of all three: (K)nowledge, (S)kills and
(A)ttitude to develop the required competency in being an effective Manager.

Use Creative Techniques of Content Delivery and Create Tailored Content

Developing an engaging, impactful and targeted program integrating aspects of knowledge,
Skills and Attitude requires creativity and expertise in instructional design. Strong instructional
design ensures that the program does not remain an “information dump” or a “feel good”
experience but actually achieves learning and change. Recent research in this area has led to
development of several learning tools and instructional strategies for adult learners. These
include use of simulations, multimedia, job-aids and facilitation techniques.

Our deep expertise and capability with developing content for ourselves as well as global
organizations allows us to uniquely craft and tailor state-of-the-art training content suited to
specific client organization and participants.

Follow ‘Spiral’ Reinforcement Methodology

Our proposed methodology follows ‘spiral’ reinforcement, which mirrors the way the human
mind learns. Research has shown that the impact of learning is much higher when participants
are exposed to same concepts repeatedly with increasing degree of complexity rather than in a
onetime burst. The program is designed to move spirally between concepts (K, S and A) with
interweaving of inputs and on the job coaching.

1. Content 1. Reaction
2. Delivery 2. Transfer
Outcome
3. Learning
Evaluation
4. Results

Input Output

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