Flores vs. CA Case Digest
Flores vs. CA Case Digest
Flores vs. CA Case Digest
Facts: Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest
number of votes for kagawad in the elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay Poblacion,
Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
6679, providing in part as follows —
Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted barangay which
shall be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected
by the registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains the highest number
of votes shall be the punong barangay . . . .
His election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, who placed second (1 vote difference). MTC sustained
Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as
stray from the latter's total. Flores appealed to RTC, who affirmed the decision in toto. Flores then went
to COMELEC but his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to
review the decision of the regional trial court, basing on the following provision:
Sec. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the proper
municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the result of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within (30) days after the filing thereof. The
decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt
of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.
SolGen, on behalf of the Government, interposed that because the MTC being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been appealed directly to the Commission on Elections and not to
the Regional Trial Court of Abra, based on the following provision:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Issue: Whether the RTC or the COMELEC has jurisdiction over review of decision
Ruling: Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the regional trial court, must be
declared unconstitutional. In taking this step, the Court does not disregard the fact that the petitioner
was only acting in accordance with the said law when he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute specifically directed in
its Section 9 which, at the time the appeal was made, was considered constitutional. In fairness to him
therefore, we shall consider his appeal to the Commission on Elections as having been made directly
from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, disregarding the detour to the Regional Trial
Court.
Note: No discussion was made by the Supreme Court regarding why it is unconstitutional, but it
made reference to the case of Luison vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-10916, May 20, 1957. According to
SC: It is recalled that in the case of Luison v. Garcia, 4 respondent Garcia's certificate of
candidacy was declared invalid by the Commission on Elections for non-compliance with the
statutory requirements. What he did was appeal to the court of first instance, which held that the
certificate was merely defective but not altogether null and void. Garcia continued his candidacy
on the strength of this ruling and was subsequently proclaimed elected, thereafter assuming
office as municipal mayor.
In sustaining the quo warranto petition filed against him by Luison, this Court declared that all
the votes cast for Garcia should have been rejected as stray because he did not have a valid
certificate of candidacy. The action of the Commission on Elections should have been appealed
not to the court of first instance but to the Supreme Court as required by the 1935 Constitution.
Since this was not done, the resolution of the Commission on Elections rejecting Garcia's
certificate remained valid on the date of the election and rendered all votes cast for him as stray.
The doctrine in that case, although laid down under the 1935 Constitution, is still controlling
under the present charter as the interpretation by this Court of Article IX-C, Section 2(2).
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the regional
trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.