Teaching Thinking Skill

Teaching
Thinking Skills
Also available in the Key Debates in Educational Policy Series
Special Educational Needs, Mary Warnock and Brahm Norwich,

edited by Lorella Terzi
Educational Equality, Harry Brighouse, Kenneth R. Howe and
James Tooley, edited by Graham Haydon
Teaching
Thinking Skills
2nd Edition
Stephen Johnson
and Harvey Siegel
Edited by
Christopher Winch
Key Debates in Educational Policy

Continuum International Publishing Group
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© Christopher Winch; © Part 1, Stephen Johnson; © Part 2 Harvey

Siegel 2010
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or
retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the
publishers.
Stephen Johnson and Harvey Siegel have asserted their right under the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors
of this work.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: 978-1-4411-8656-0 (paperback)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Johnson, Stephen.
Teaching thinking skills/Stephen Johnson and Harvey Siegel; edited
by Christopher Winch.
p. cm.–(Key debates in educational policy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4411-8656-0 (pbk.)
1. Thought and thinking–Study and teaching. I. Siegel, Harvey, 1952-
II. Winch, Christopher. III. Title.
LB1590.3.J65 2010
370.15'2–dc22 2009045433
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India

Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group
Contents
Series Editor’s Preface – Key Debates in

Educational Policy vii
Foreword xi
Christopher Winch
The policy background in the United Kingdom xiv
1 Teaching Thinking Skills 1

Stephen Johnson
1. The argument 1
2. Present interest in thinking skills 2
3. Thinking as a skill 7
4. General transferability 13
5. Conceptual errors 20
6. The direct teaching of thinking and the
importance of content 25
7. Thinking as mental processes 28
8. Examples of general thinking skills 32
9. The dangers 36
10. Conclusion 42
References 47
2 On Thinking Skills 51
Harvey Siegel
1. Introduction 51
2. Problems with thinking of thinking as a skill 54
3. ‘The myth of general transferability’ 61
4. The ‘direct’ teaching of thinking and
content/subject matter knowledge 75
vi Contents
5. Mental processes and general

thinking skills 78
6. The educational dangers of thinking
of thinking in terms of skills 80
7. Conclusion 82
References 83
Further reading 84
Afterword 85
Christopher Winch
1. Skills 88
2. Skills and transferability 96
3. The question of efﬁcacy 101
4. What is thinking? 103
5. Mental processes 104
6. A summary of Johnson’s claims 107
7. Reasoning 109
8. The role of philosophy 112
9. Reason and argument 113
10. Inductive arguments 120
11. Concluding remarks 122
References 123
Index 125
Series Editor’s Preface – Key
Debates in Educational Policy
IMPACT pamphlets were launched in 1999 as an initiative of the

Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Their aim was to
bring philosophical perspectives to bear on UK education policy,
and they have been written by leading general philosophers or phi-
losophers of education. At the time of writing, 18 have been
published.
They deal with a variety of issues relating to policy within the
field of education. Some have focused on controversial aspects of
current government policy such as those by Andrew Davis on
assessment, Harry Brighouse on disparities in secondary education,
Mary Warnock on changes in provision for pupils with special
educational needs and Colin Richards on school inspection. Others,
such as those by Michael Luntley on performance related pay
and by Christopher Winch on vocational education and training,
have been critical of new policy initiatives. Yet others have been
concerned with the organization and content of the school cur-
riculum. These have included pamphlets by Kevin Williams on the
teaching of foreign languages, Steve Bramall and John White
on Curriculum 2000, David Archard on sex education, Stephen
Johnson on thinking skills, Graham Haydon on personal, social
and health education, and John Gingell on the visual arts.
The launch of each pamphlet has been accompanied by a sym-
posium for policy makers and others at which issues raised in the
pamphlets have been further explored. These have been attended
by government ministers, opposition spokespersons, other MPs,
representatives from the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority,
employers organizations, trades unions and teachers’ professional
viii Series Editor’s Preface
organizations as well as members of think tanks, academics and

journalists.
Some of the original pamphlets have made a lasting impression
on the world of education policy and have, in addition, sparked
debates in both the policy and academic worlds. They have revealed
a hunger for dealing with certain topics in a philosophically
oriented way because it has been felt that the original pamphlet
initiated a debate in a mode of thinking about educational issues
that needs and deserves to be taken a lot further. The Key Debates
in Educational Policy series aims to take some of these debates
further by selecting from those original Impact pamphlets whose
influence continues to be keenly felt and either reproducing or
expanding them to take account of the most recent developments
in the area with which they deal. In addition, each of the original
pamphlets receives a lengthy reply by a distinguished figure in the
area who takes issue with the main arguments of the original pam-
phlet. Each of the Key Debates volumes also contains a substantial
foreword and/or afterword by an academic with strong interests in
the area under discussion, which gives the context and provides
extensive commentary on the questions under discussion and the
arguments of the original author and his/her respondent.
There are a number of reasons for doing this. Philosophical
techniques applied to policy issues can be very powerful tools for
clarifying questions and developing arguments based on ethical,
aesthetic, political and epistemological positions. Philosophical
argumentation is, however, by its nature, controversial and con-
tested. There is rarely, if ever, one side to a philosophical question.
The fact that the Impact pamphlets have often aroused lively debate
and controversy is testament to this. There has been a desire for a
more rounded version of the debate to be presented in a format
accessible to those who do not have a formal philosophical
background but who find philosophical argumentation about
educational issues to be useful in developing their own ideas.
This series aims to cater for this audience while also presenting
Series Editor’s Preface ix
rigorous argumentation that can also appeal to a more specialist
audience.
It is hoped that each volume in this series will provide an intro-
duction and set the scene to each topic and give the readership
a splendid example of philosophical argumentation concerning a
complex and important educational issue.
This page intentionally left blank
Foreword
Christopher Winch
This volume is about one of the most important educational issues

that has been debated for many years on either side of the Atlantic.
Both authors have made important contributions to the debate
about thinking skills. Stephen Johnson’s work is best known through
his Impact pamphlet ‘Teaching Thinking Skills’, published by the
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain in 2000, as well
as various articles on the issue. Harvey Siegel has a long record
of advocacy for the teaching of thinking skills in both books and
articles and is especially well-known in the USA and Canada. They
are both among the most distinguished contemporary contribu-
tors to this debate and it is a great opportunity for the interested
public to be able to appreciate arguments of the highest quality on
both sides of the debate.
One of the main questions that this volume is concerned with is
the existence or otherwise of thinking skills. Whether or not they
exist, the issues that they raise are considered to be very important,
both by their proponents and their opponents. I will try and explain
why. The proposed teaching of thinking skills (on the assumption
that there are such things), whether it be in schools, colleges or
universities, is thought to be important for two reasons relevant to
education. The first is to do with the aims of education: to be able
to think ably is thought to be a valued attribute of an educated
person and one that the education system should strive to develop.
I do not think that either of our contributors would dissent from
this view. The second is to do with pedagogic efficacy, or the claim
that the teaching of thinking skills is an efficient way of promoting
learning and understanding of a wide range of subjects. There is
undoubtedly more dispute over the contention that such skills
xii Foreword
can be taught, or, more controversially, over whether they can be

taught in such a way that they can subsequently be applied to a
range of subject matters. More radically, it is questioned whether
such general or transferable skills actually exist. It is on these latter
two issues, and especially on the last issue that the debate in this
volume is largely centred.
To take the issue of educational aims first: it is often thought
that, in a democratic society, where the public is reasonably
well-informed about political matters and individuals are expected
to be able to chart their own courses in life, the ability to think
about all kinds of concerns through in an independent way is an
essential attribute and one to be cultivated, at least indirectly, if not
directly, within the education system. It does not follow directly
from such a claim that general or transferable thinking skills are
a prerequisite, but it at least gives some grounds for supposing
this to be the case. The reason would be that in the case of public
affairs it is necessary for citizens to make informed decisions about
matters pertaining to the welfare of their society about which they
do not necessarily possess specialist knowledge. They will either
have to acquire specialist knowledge about such matters as the
law, economics or physical geography for example or they will
need to be able to understand and to make an intelligent appraisal
of the arguments for and against positions adopted by lobby groups
and public figures. The first possibility, we may take it, is highly
unlikely even for highly educated people, as most will not have the
time to do so, even if they have the inclination. Indeed, it is rare
to find politicians with extensive or even any specialist knowledge
of a subject relevant to the conduct of public affairs. In this type
of case, to be more precise, they will need to equip themselves
with powers of critical reasoning, which may be considered to be a
subspecies of thinking skills.
In the case of conduct of one’s own personal affairs and, more
particularly in the matter of charting one’s own course in life, the
ability to think sensibly and intelligently about one’s personal,
Foreword xiii
financial, family and career affairs would seem to be highly desir-
able and something that one’s education should make a significant
contribution towards equipping one for. Even more than with the
case of making informed judgements about public affairs, the need
to be able to make informed judgements about one’s personal
affairs and those of individuals close to oneself would seem to be
highly desirable and an expected outcome of any education in a
modern society that would be worthy of the name ‘education’.
Even more than with the case of public affairs the need to be able
to make informed judgements about matters of career, finance,
relationships and one’s own abilities in relation to a wide variety of
circumstances and across a wide variety of subject matters seems
to be highly desirable. And again, as with public affairs, the need to
make informed judgements about matters concerning which one
is not a specialist seems to be highly desirable, to put it mildly. The
presumed desirability of teaching thinking skills that are general
or transferable (or both) as a major aim of education, seems to be
unanswerable.
The second issue, of pedagogic efficacy, is currently the focus
of curriculum reform in England. The teaching of thinking skills,
it is held, is valuable because it enables someone who has acquired
those skills to become a more effective learner in more than
one and, hopefully, many different subject matters. The ability to
acquire and deploy thinking skills is, then, one important aspect of
the widely proclaimed educational virtue of being able to learn
how to learn, which in effect gives a student, or anyone engaged
in learning, considerable autonomy in the sense that they should
be able to acquire knowledge and understanding across a whole
range of subject matters with relatively little pedagogic interven-
tion. This claim of pedagogic efficacy is one where different kinds
of claims are made, which are often difficult to evaluate. Perhaps
the most difficult of these relates to the extent to which acquiring
thinking skills enables one to dispense with learning and under-
standing the content of different subject areas. There is little doubt
xiv Foreword
that suspicion of such claims is one of the factors motivating

Johnson’s critique of the teaching of thinking skills. On the other
hand, it is possible to claim that the acquisition of thinking skills
will enable one to learn how to learn more effectively without
at the same time committing oneself to the view that there is a
short cut to the ‘hard way’ of learning to master a subject. An
alternative claim might be that the deployment of thinking skills
in one’s learning together with mastery of the subject is likely to
produce a more thorough grasp of the subject than learning the
subject matter without the benefit of thinking skills. It should be
noted that there is nothing in Siegel’s contribution that should lead
us to suppose that he is inclined to take the former view.
The very way in which the debate on the usefulness or other-
wise of thinking skills has been formulated itself causes difficulties
which may be unnecessary complications of the issues involved. It
is a major part of the purpose of the afterword to try and remove
these complications where this is possible in order to try and make
more precise the points of agreement and disagreement between
Johnson and Siegel. The difficulties relate to both the terms
‘thinking’ and ‘skill’, both of which raise philosophical problems.
The policy background in the United

Kingdom
The idea that there is an important place in the curriculum for the
general development of mental powers is not new. In the United
Kingdom, the study of classical languages such as Latin and Greek
was advocated by some, not merely because of the knowledge that
it gave to students of the civilizations that once used those lan-
guages, but because of the powers of logical thinking that their
study was thought to confer on those who had mastered them. The
decline of classics has thus arguably left a lacuna in the curriculum
which the introduction of the teaching of thinking skills may be
able to remedy.
Foreword xv
Although the concepts of thinking skills and critical thinking
have a long history of a place in the school curriculum in North
America, their appearance in the United Kingdom in any signifi-
cant form is more recent. They have appeared since 2000 as cross
curricular threads in the National Curriculum in England and
Wales and also in syllabuses as a formal subject ‘Critical Thinking’
at A level. In the National Curriculum they consist of creative
thinking, enquiry, evaluation, information processing and reasoning.
These headings are then subdivided, thus reasoning consists of the
following abilities: giving reasons for opinions/actions, inferring,
making deductions, making informed judgements/decisions and
using precise language to reason. Although it is not stated that
such abilities can be applied to different subject matters, one can
infer that this is intended to be the case. If they were supposed to
be different abilities in different contexts there would be no point
in grouping them together as distinct, non-subject specific, abili-
ties. There is little doubt that Johnson would object to these skills
and their components in their entirety and would argue that none
of them make sense without a specification of the subject matter
to which they apply. For him, a non-subject specific, general, or
transferable set of thinking skills or thinking abilities makes no
sense and the search for one is in vain. This aspect of the National
Curriculum would, therefore, on this view, be better if it did
not exist.
However, the fact that it does exist is a testimony to the great
faith that many, including governments, have in the existence of
general and/or transferable thinking skills, in the possibility of
teaching them and in their efficacy in promoting learning and
understanding. This faith appears to be of quite a strong form,
that any thinking skill acquired in one subject can be applied in
another, given a certain threshold of knowledge in each subject. So
Johnson’s position and that set out in the National Curriculum
seem to be diametrically opposed to each other. The national
curriculum documentation recognizes that teachers will need
xvi Foreword
guidance in teaching these thinking skills within their own subjects

and gives explicit guidance as to how this is to be done in the form
of brief case studies about particular subjects.
The stage is thus set for an assessment of whether such an
approach is worthwhile and, more generally, whether thinking
skills merit a place on the curriculum. Harvey Siegel adopts a posi-
tion markedly more supportive of the general thrust of thinking
skills programmes than does Johnson, although, as will be evident
to the reader, there are important points of similarity between
the two. How serious the differences are and whether or not they
are reconcilable is a question that the reader will probably wish
to ponder. In addition, the terms of the debate raise a number of
issues, not just for those concerned with thinking skills per se but
more broadly for those concerned with the role of thinking in
professional and vocational activities and with the extent to which
abilities are broad or narrow, transferable or non-transferable.
I address some of these broader concerns, as well as taking up
specific issues from this debate in a lengthy afterword to this
exchange. The reader is advised to read the volume in sequence,
making use of the afterword if he or she wishes to pursue some
of the issues raised in greater depth.
Teaching Thinking Skills 1
Stephen Johnson
Chapter Outline
1. The argument 1
2. Present interest in thinking skills 2
3. Thinking as a skill 7
4. General transferability 13
5. Conceptual errors 20
importance of content 25
7. Thinking as mental processes 28
8. Examples of general thinking skills 32
9. The dangers 36
10. Conclusion 42
References 47
1. The argument
The Government in Britain is taking a keen interest in the
development of thinking skills. An early indication of and impetus
to this interest was the Government’s commissioning of the From
Thinking Skills to Thinking Classrooms report. The influence of this
2 Teaching Thinking Skills
report has been such that thinking skill are now part of the National
Curriculum and Critical Thinking Skills is a popular Advanced
Level subject.
However, treating thinking as a skill is based on serious and
educationally damaging misconceptions:
1. The appeal of thinking skills rests largely on the view that they are
generally transferable. This view is mistaken.
2. The myth of general transferability rests upon a number of fallacies and
conceptual errors.
3. The direct approach to teaching thinking can lead to knowledge playing
a subsidiary role and even being seen as an impediment.
4. ‘Mental processes’ are dubious entities and access to them is highly pro-
blematic. They support the myth of general transferability and encourage
a checklist approach to thinking.
5. Suggested examples of general thinking skills do not stand up to
examination.
6. Thinking skills present dangers: the disparagement of knowledge, the
impersonalizing and neutralizing of thought, the neglect of truth, and
the computerization of thought.
The inclusion of thinking skills in the National Curriculum is

thus hasty and ill-considered. It is also inconsistent with a curricu-
lum that treats subjects as self-contained units. A thorough ground-
ing in curriculum areas of knowledge is therefore recommended,
together with developing certain habits of mind.
2. Present interest in thinking skills

Recently the British Government has taken a direct interest in the
teaching of thinking skills.
‘The Government regard thinking as a key part of the national

curriculum,’ stated the Department for Education and Employment
(Hansard, 1 July 1999). ‘Pupils to learn how to think’, announced
The Guardian (6 January 2000). Well this seems as surprising as a
sermon against sin. Who would not want children to be taught
how to think? However, when The Guardian goes on to say that
‘All pupils are to be taught thinking skills,’ the project begins to
raise questions. When general thinking skills are being proposed,
we have moved from truism to controversy.
Many educationalists, however, believe that there are general
thinking skills. Such skills are thought to be non-subject specific
and generally transferable. I address two main questions: are
objections to general thinking skills sufficiently powerful to cast
serious doubt on their educational value and even on their exis-
tence? Are there educational dangers in characterizing thinking
in terms of such skills?
No doubt many earlier generations of teachers wanted their
pupils to become better at thinking, but they did not employ the
notion of general thinking skills. Why then is this notion so much
in vogue at present? First, skills are viewed as having a simplicity
and objectivity which renders them readily identifiable and easily
broken down into component sub-skills. Skills seem to answer
the many demands made on education: that teaching must be
more efficient and effective; that students must be assessed in a
more fine-grained way; that the educational emphasis must be
placed on the quantifiable, the instrumental and the vocationally
useful. Secondly, there is currently the expectation that all phases
of education will equip students with general transferable skills,
and general thinking skills are high on this particular agenda.
Consequently, in teaching there is pressure to move from the
transmission of knowledge to the teaching of supposed intellectual
skills such as thinking.
The UK Government’s Standards Site dates the huge growth of
interest in the teaching of thinking skills from the publication in
1999 of a Department for Education and Skills (DfEE) report
by Dr Carol McGuinness: From Thinking Skills to Thinking
Classrooms: a review and evaluation of approaches for developing

pupils’ thinking (hereafter the McGuinness Report):
Since the review by Carol McGuinness in 1999 and the explicit

inclusion of thinking skills in the National Curriculum, interest in the
teaching of thinking skills has burgeoned in the UK. (DfES, 2008)
The Schools Standards Minister welcomed the McGuinness Report

as ‘this excellent report’ and claimed that it had shown that for
pupils to think they must be ‘taught explicitly’ how to do it and
that ‘emphasising the quality of thinking processes and thinking
skills is a means of raising standards.’
The Government speedily acted on this Report. Within a few
months, the Secretary of State for Education announced that all
children were to be taught thinking skills. Thinking skills were
included in the National Curriculum. Materials on thinking skills
were developed for the National Key Stage 3 Strategy. This was
followed by thinking skills initiatives such as Teaching and Learning
in the Foundation Subjects (DfES, 2004b) and Leading in Learning
(DfES, 2005). Furthermore, thinking skills are now an important
part of the Primary National Strategy (DfES, 2004a), and the influ-
ence of the McGuinness Report can be seen in the development
of a database of thinking skills resources for primary schools on
the Government’s Standards Site (DfES, 2008). Rarely, if ever, has
so concise a report had so considerable an influence on educational
policy. This tide of enthusiasm for thinking skills has also been felt
in the post-statutory sector where it has raised Critical Thinking
Skills to a very popular Advanced Level examination subject (at AS
and, more recently, at A2 level).
i. The McGuinness Report

The author of the report is the former director of the Activating
Children’s Thinking Skills project funded by the Northern Ireland
Council for Curriculum, Examination and Assessment. As this
report continues to provide the Government with its main aca-
demic authority on the theoretical foundation for teaching thinking
skills, I use it as a platform for my discussion. I shall, therefore, be
considering some of the report’s key conclusions: that thinking
is best conceived of as a skill; that thinking skills should be made
explicit; that students must be explicitly and directly taught
thinking skills; that transfer is crucially important; that students
should make explicit, and reflect upon, their own thought pro-
cesses and cognitive strategies (a metacognitive approach); and that
‘considerable evaluation work remains to be done’ (McGuinness
Report, p. 1).
McGuinness highlights the need for thinking skills programmes
to have a ‘strong theoretical underpinning’ (p. 1). I would suggest
that part of the evaluation work remaining to be done is an enquiry
into the theoretical underpinning of the McGuinness Report
itself. This includes: construing thinking as a skill, the conviction
that thinking is a matter of processing information, and belief in
general thinking skills, such as analysing and hypothesizing.
McGuinness outlines three main approaches to teaching think-
ing: the general, the subject-specific and the infusion approach.
The general approach maintains, according to McGuinness, that
‘cognitive development is driven by a general central processor and
that intervention at this level will have widespread effects across
many thinking domains’ (p. 7). All programmes adopting this
approach aim to develop general information processing abilities,
but whereas some are context-free, employing specially designed
materials (e.g., Somerset Thinking Skills Course, Blagg et al., 1988;
Mentis and Dunn-Bernstein, M., 2008)), others target general
cognitive development from within particular subject areas (e.g.,
Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education (CASE), see
Shayer and Adey, 2002). The subject-specific approach aims to
enhance thinking within domain-specific contexts; an example of
this is the Thinking through History project (Fisher, 2002), which also
features general problem-solving and emphasizes metacognition.
Finally, we have the approach personally favoured by McGuinness,

the infusion method. It is generic in character, but seeks to embed
thinking skills within curricular areas by utilizing opportunities
for developing general thinking skills within curriculum subjects.
As my main concern is with general thinking skills, it would
seem that the general approach is most obviously germane. The
infusion method, however, is also highly relevant here, as it appears
to use subject content merely as convenient hooks on which to
hang general thinking skills. For, as McGuinness puts it, ‘this
approach does have a generic character, it seeks to embed thinking
skills . . . and exploit naturally occurring opportunities for deve-
loping thinking within the ordinary curriculum’ (p. 19). So, with
the infusion approach, contexts within the curriculum are identi-
fied where general thinking skills can be developed. As for the
aptness of the term ‘infusion’, McGuinness states that, according
to the dictionary, ‘to infuse’ means to ‘introduce into one thing
a second which gives it extra life, vigour and a new significance’
(p. 19). It would appear from this that thinking skills are not seen
as integral to a subject, but are to be introduced ‘from the outside’.
These observations also hold for the subject-specific approaches,
where the main focus is also general thinking skills.
McGuinness’s classification has been reorganized by the British
Government’s Standards Site database. Here the thinking skills pro-
grammes are grouped in the following three categories: Cognitive
Intervention (e.g., Feuerstein’s and other psychological theories),
Brain-based Approaches (e.g., de Bono) and Philosophical Appro-
aches (e.g., Lipman). There is considerable overlap between these
and ‘[t]here are clear similarities in each of the categories’ (DfES,
2008, p. 3).
In whatever way the different programmes are categorized
the dominant paradigm is that of information processing (see
McGuinness Report, p. 4), with an emphasis on learners reflecting
on, and articulating, their cognitive strategies. The primacy of pro-
cess, rather than content, is stressed, as is the importance attached
to experts making their mental processes explicit. Furthermore, all
the programmes try to teach certain general thinking skills. These
shared aspects are consistent with the view that thinking is a skill,
a proposition I now examine.
3. Thinking as a skill
Treating thinking as a skill can create educational dangers.
There is no doubt the McGuinness Report raises many important

issues. The report says that one of its main purposes is to analyse
what is currently understood by the term ‘thinking skills’ (p. 1). It
is acknowledged that some people have misgivings about the term
‘skill’ being applied to thinking, but the report insists that seeing
thinking as a skill has ‘both theoretical and instructional force’
(p. 4). McGuinness believes that ‘much of what we know about skill
learning can be usefully applied to developing thinking’ (p. 5).
But it is an important question whether thinking is miscon-
ceived as a skill and an important further question whether if it is,
this misconception is innocuous or pernicious – might it, for
instance, lead to inappropriate pedagogy?
Robert Fisher’s book, Teaching Children to Think, carries an
epigraph from Ryle: ‘All lessons are lessons in thinking.’ Fisher
neglects, however, to point out that Ryle thought that teaching
thinking skills would be plainly ‘ridiculous’ (1979, p. 66). Fisher
continues: ‘We teach children many skills, physical skills, social
skills, expressive skills, linguistic and mathematical skills, why
not thinking skills?’ (1990, p. x). Fisher’s question is apparently
rhetorical for it is never referred to again, much less addressed.
One possible response to the question, ‘Why not teach thinking
skills?’ would be to pose a series of related questions: Why not
teach wisdom skills? Why not teach originality skills? Why not
teach good judgement skills? Why not teach accuracy skills
or truth-seeking skills?
Mention of ‘accuracy’ and ‘truth-seeking’ bring to mind a dan-

ger in seeing thinking as a skill. For with a skill, the failure to
exhibit it does not in itself count against its possession. It would be
wrong to conclude that X could not ride a bicycle simply because
X fails to take the opportunity to ride a bicycle, for one can be said
to possess a skill that, once acquired, one does not choose to exer-
cise – though it is true that some skills may atrophy if not used.
This lack of connection between possession and performance in
the case of skills contrasts with personal qualities, virtues and
aspects of character, for to possess a virtue, for example, is to be
disposed to act in a certain way. This is because there is a close
relationship between possessing aspects of character and exercis-
ing them. So failure to exercise a virtue (given the opportunity) on
any particular occasion will count against, though not completely
refute, the claim that one has that virtue. I am not here concerned
with the question of verification or behavioural evidence, but with
the logical connection between possessing a characteristic and
exercising it. My point may be illustrated by considering two
claims: (a) I have the skill of swimming but, despite opportunities,
I’ve chosen not to exercise it for 30 years; and (b) I have the virtue
of kindness but, despite opportunities, I’ve chosen not to exercise
it for 30 years.
This lack of entailment between possession and performance
is connected with the notion that skills are peripheral to the
personality. By calling thinking a skill we may lose sight of the
dispositional side of thinking, overlooking that thinking is con-
tinuous with our humanity and constitutive of it. That some
personal qualities and capacities are integral to the personality is
related to questions of commitment to truth and the relationship
between knowledge, virtue and education.
There are other ways of differentiating between skills, virtues
and knowledge. One emerges from the question: if skills are
associated with performing an action, how are we to pick out the
range of verbs that are appropriate to this sort of action? I would
propose that a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of
something being a skill is that it must make good linguistic sense to
tell someone to do it. This imperative-based test would exclude
from being skills such educationally crucial concepts as ‘knowl-
edge’, ‘belief ’, ‘understanding’ and ‘appreciation’.
An apparent difficulty for this argument is presented by the
virtues and such imperative mood verb phrases as ‘be honest,’ or
‘be kind.’ In such cases, however, it is not an action that is being
named, therefore no skill is indicated; the imperative here indicates
the manner in which some action should be performed. I would
also suggest that in many cases such imperatives are an elliptical
way of giving an instruction to act in a particular way. If a lawyer
advises you to ‘Be honest,’ he may well mean ‘Tell the truth.’
Similarly, ‘Be kind’, might mean ‘Give him some money.’
Scheffler proposes another method of differentiating. His test is
not based on the imperative, but on the interrogative. In answers
to the question ‘What are you doing?’ it makes good sense to reply,
‘I am swimming,’ or ‘I am typing,’ but not ‘I am knowing’, or ‘I am
believing’. Scheffler concludes from this that ‘As in the case of
understanding and appreciation . . . knowing does not seem to
fit performance, activity or skill categories at all’ (1965, p. 27).
I believe that Scheffler’s approach could also be used to differenti-
ate between virtues and skills, though Scheffler himself does not
use it in this way. For instance, if in reply to the question ‘What are
you doing?’ someone replied ‘I am being honest’ or ‘I am being
kind,’ then, although they may be telling the truth, there is a sense
in which they are not telling you what they are doing.
Despite the difficulties, McGuinness insists on treating thinking
as a skill. The reasons given for this reveal much about the concep-
tion of thinking held by those who advocate teaching thinking.
And as this is the conception that is enshrined in the National
Curriculum, it is important to examine these reasons.
(a) ‘it places thinking firmly on the side of ‘knowing-how’ rather than
‘knowing that’ (p. 4)
But this distinction between know-how and know-that can be

educationally unhelpful. It may, for instance, divorce beliefs from
actions, and drive a wedge between mental processes, which are
taken to be active, and knowledge, which is taken to be inert.
We will encounter this passivity-grounded and reductive view of
propositional knowledge later for it is consistent with the infor-
mation-processing model of the brain, which is such a dominant
paradigm in many thinking skills programmes. In contrast to this
inert view, the standard analysis of propositional knowledge is
that such knowledge requires a belief and hence understanding,
the belief being based upon a rationale the force of which is
appreciated by the knower.
Placing ‘thinking firmly on the side of know-how’ also seems
inappropriate in the case of thinking when it is remembered that
to have mastered a skill usually means to be able to exercise it
without thinking. Barrow considers skill to be only ‘minimally
involved with understanding’ (1987, pp. 190–191). Scheffler takes
the same line, for after stating that ‘knowing how to represents the
possession of a skill’ (1965, p. 92, original italics), he adds that
knowing how is applicable in cases ‘where repeated trial, or prac-
tice, is thought relevant to performance and where it is carried out
under minimal conditions of understanding’ (p. 93). Both Barrow
and Scheffler are saying you can have a skill without understanding
the theories that may underpin it; one can ride a bicycle, for exam-
ple, without understanding theories which explain why one does
not fall off. The fact that the exercise of a skill does not necessarily
require thought is illustrated by Thomas Hardy’s lines in The
Dynasts:
Like a knitter drowsed,

Whose fingers play in skilled unmindfulness (Hardy, 1931, pt.i).
In other words, in some cases one may exercise a skill without
concentrating on, or perhaps even being consciously aware of,
what one is doing.
(b) It focuses attention on ‘being explicit about components of the

skill’ (p. 5)
It is often believed that skills can be analysed into sub-skills, or

components, and that these components can be sequentially and
hierarchically organized. This would appear inappropriate in the
case of thinking and may have a baleful influence if it leads to
unsuitable approaches to encouraging intelligent thinking: ‘Come
young master Einstein, enough of these flashes of insight, think
things through stage by stage.’
Perhaps the most telling argument against this reductive view of
skills is that it does not even apply to many model cases of skill,
such as crafts and sports, let alone those areas that are far more
problematic as far as skill-talk is concerned. The footballer David
Beckham doesn’t go through a checklist covering positioning of
feet, body angle, follow-through and the like in order to centre the
ball. If he did, he wouldn’t be David Beckham. Similarly physical
and practical skills of any complexity cannot be adequately taught
by breaking each skill down into components: teaching ‘parts’ is
no guarantee that the learner acquires the whole. Although it is
possible to analyse a physical skill into more basic components,
the whole is usually greater than the sum of these components.
Consequently, it is difficult to imagine how someone could be
taught to ride a bicycle, for instance, by breaking the skill of cycling
down into components, whatever they might be, and then learning
each component separately.
Although my central argument is that a reductionist approach
to teaching skills is likely to be unsuccessful in many important
cases, because mastery of the so-called ‘sub-skills’ still leaves
the learner well short of mastering the whole, as a rider to this
argument I also wish to attack the view often held by these reduc-
tionists that teaching rules and principles is essential. Learning
principles that describe the physics of cycling, for example, need
not help us to learn how to ride a bicycle. One could give a lengthy,
technical description of the rules that a cyclist could be said to be
observing, but the cyclist could not consciously apply these rules.
She could not, for instance, under normal circumstances, calcu-
late the ratio of unbalance over the square of her speed and then
adjust the curvature of her path in proportion to it; cyclists don’t
have the time or, in most cases, the mathematical ability.
Getting students to become conscious of underlying rules or
principles may even distract from the execution of a skill. Indeed,
in many cases focusing attention on the details will paralyse a
performer – in golf this is known as ‘paralysis by analysis’. It is like
the centipede immobilized by the question, ‘pray, which leg goes
after which?’ Or consider the pianist who ruins her performance
by thinking of what she is doing with her fingers.
(c) It stresses ‘learning by observing and modelling’ (p. 5)
While observing and modelling might be useful ways of trying

to emulate carpenters or gardeners, this won’t work with thinkers;
thoughts, unlike a carpenter’s work at the lathe, are private. We
cannot observe a thinker’s thinking skills! But it isn’t just a matter
of privacy; it is also the failure of models to capture the reality of
our thoughts. Although expert carpenters may go through the
same stages in making the same type of article – such that a stan-
dard flow chart of the construction process could be produced – it
is unlikely that the thoughts of expert thinkers will fit a common
model, even if they reach the same conclusion. For instance, there
is no mental process of remembering common to all acts of mem-
ory. Norman Malcolm gives the example of remembering putting
one’s keys in the kitchen drawer – one may remember in several
ways: 1. Mentally retrace steps and get a mental image of putting
the keys in the drawer; 2. Nothing occurs to you, ask yourself and
exclaim ‘the kitchen drawer’; 3. Asked while deep in conversation,
you point to the drawer; 4. Writing a letter you walk to the drawer
and take out the keys while composing the next sentence; 5. With-
out hesitation you answer directly. There would not appear to
be any uniform process of memory.
(d) It points out ‘the importance of practice’ (p. 5)
de Bono also has no doubt that thinking ‘is a skill that can be
improved by practice’ (1978, p. 45). This is the ‘training of mental
muscles’ approach we will encounter again when we come to the
influence of faculty psychology. de Bono provides a good example
of this when he recommends ‘thinking about simple things where
you get answers. In that way you will build up your skills in think-
ing’ (1996, p. 253). But the arithmetical circuit-training of simple
sums seems to prepare one only for simple sums.
Practice seems appropriate in the case of a skill where one can
decide to exercise the skill and then monitor and control it with
respect to a known end-product. This is less clearly the case in the
area of the intellect, for one cannot choose to understand some-
thing – we can neither initiate nor control it. In addition, thinking
will often not have a known end-product; it will often lead to more
questions or deeper perplexity.
Another reason given by McGuinness for regarding thinking
as a skill is that it underlines ‘the importance of . . . transfer of
learning’ (p. 5). But a skill might have a severely restricted range
of application. McGuinness must, therefore, have in mind general
transferable skills. Indeed, if such ‘skills’ as thinking were not
thought to have general transferability they would lose much of
their educational attraction.
4. General transferability
Much of the educational appeal of thinking skills stems from a
mistaken belief in their general transferability.
McGuinness says that ‘maximising the transfer of learning beyond

the context in which it was learned is at the heart of the matter’
(p. 8). In many ways this is indeed the crux of the issue: are there
domain independent thinking skills? Many believe that there are.
Scriven, for example, speaks of Critical Thinking as ‘a finite set of
skills in using a finite set of tools’ (1990, p. xi), skills that, he claims,
‘can . . . be taught without the need for delving into vast subject
matters’ (p. x). Such skills offers the huge educational bonus of
being able to, for example, solve problems in many or every domain
without the chore of the detailed learning of specific content.
Furthermore, not being tied to content would help these skills
to avoid obsolescence, and being generally transferable would
make these skills very useful in the workplace.
Yet in a minimal and trivial sense all skills are transferable in so
far as all skills can be repeated in relevantly similar circumstances –
this may be referred to as ‘portability’. But are thinking skills
especially transferable?
The idea of transfer itself is far more problematic than is gen-
erally recognized. Transfer depends not only on there being an
appropriate similarity between contexts, but also on this similarity
being perceived by the person transferring the skill.
Nelson Goodman, writing of the elusive nature of the notion
of similarity, says: ‘whether two actions are instances of the same
behaviour depends upon how we take them’ (1970, p. 22). In other
words, judgements about the sameness of human performances
require a ‘theory’ in the sense of being in need of some interpre-
tation or explanation. Wittgenstein says that a student has been
taught to understand when he can independently continue with a
sequence or procedure, ‘If he succeeds he exclaims: ‘Now I can go
on!’ (1958, p. 59). Wittgenstein’s point about being able to con-
tinue with a sequence or procedure requires the application of a
particular rule. But, as Kripke explains, after, for example, the
sequence 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . ‘an indefinite number of rules . . . are com-
patible with any such finite initial segment’, so he concludes that
there is no such thing as ‘the unique appropriate next number’
(1993, p. 18). Any interpretation will need to include the beliefs and
intentions of the agent, as well as the social settings. In some social
settings, for example, the correct continuation of the sequence 2, 4,
6, 8, is ‘who do we appreciate’! As Lave and Wenger have observed,
activities and tasks ‘do not exist in isolation; they are part of a
broader system of relations in which they have meaning. These
systems of relations arise out of and are reproduced and developed
within social communities’ (1991, p. 53). So, as Davis points out,
what is to count as ‘same again’ ‘usually cannot be gleaned from
a consideration of the performance detached from its context
and the meaning attached to it by the agent, and her community’
(1996, p. 14). As may be appreciated from this, the difficulties
these issues raise for the transfer of skills become particularly acute
for skills claiming to enjoy general transferability to all, or most,
contexts.
With respect to thinking skills, one aspect of the context will
be the domain of knowledge in which one is operating. I am not,
of course, arguing that domains of knowledge are hermetically
sealed. Between domains there are complex connections and
shared concepts. In opposing the general transferability of think-
ing skills one could simply observe that whether or not aesthetics
and physics are well connected or barely connected domains, there
is little evidence to suggest that studying classical ballet or Titian
are sufficient or necessary or even useful in becoming a rocket
scientist.
General transferable skills raise high expectations, but also
create the sort of doubts expressed by many researchers. Perkins,
for example, after examining a number of studies, observed that
they provided no support for the existence of such skills; he con-
cluded: ‘It is easy to extend this list of negatives and “don’t knows”,
but I have no firm positives to add’ (1985, p. 348). Singley and
Anderson also failed to discover any general transfer of cognitive
skills and summarized their findings: ‘Besides this spate of negative
evidence, there has been no positive evidence of general transfer’

(1989, p. 25). Later Singley writes that ‘nearly a century of research
in psychology has generated a depressing lack of evidence for the
notion of general transfer’ (1995, p. 69). Besides the difficulty of
proving a negative, what sustains belief in these skills? Anderson
offers an explanation: ‘one reason why general transfer keeps rising
from the grave is that it is such an attractive proposition for
psychologists and educators alike’ (1993, p. 25). Such skills are
simply too good not to be true.
But what theories might underpin the idea of general transfer?
I briefly examine three theories and consider the extent to which
they might support general transferable thinking skills.
i. Faculty psychology
Faculty psychology is the theory that the mind is divided up into
separate powers or faculties. Despite seemingly devastating criti-
cism (see, for example, James (1890)), this theory has proved to
be remarkably resilient. The theory loses every intellectual battle,
but survives and, apart from dropping the word ‘faculty’, seems to
escape scot-free.
One of the places to which this theory has escaped is the area of
thinking skills. The exploded theory of faculty psychology under-
pins notions of general powers of the mind and the existence of
general thinking skills such as observation, judgement, imagina-
tion and critical thinking. This leads to the view that someone
can think critically, solve problems or be imaginative, regardless
of context or situation.
The learning theory developed on the basis of faculty psycho-
logy was that of formal discipline. This theory maintains that
faculties, such as imagination, reasoning or memory, are like men-
tal muscles that can be built up by undertaking the appropriate
tasks. Formal discipline is so called because it maintains that the
form of studies, rather than their content, imparts mental training.
Hence, in many thinking skills programmes any subject matter
may be chosen as long as it exercises certain generic abilities. The
City and Guilds Diploma of Vocational Education, for example,
contains the ‘general skill’ of ‘Making Decisions’, and this, we are
told, can be taught by using any content the teacher wishes (City
and Guilds, 1991, p. 74).
The main fault with this theory is assuming that for each of a
whole range of mentalistic verbs there exists a particular faculty,
a particular part of a person’s mind, which is exercised whenever a
sentence involving the verb can be applied to that person. Yet surely
the fact that I doubt (wonder, speculate, conjecture . . .), does
not mean I am exercising my faculty of doubting (wondering,
speculating, conjecturing . . .).
It is the theory of faculty psychology that helps to underpin
notions of general powers of the mind and the existence of general
thinking skills, such as, observation, judgement, imagination, cri-
tical thinking and creativity. This leads to the view that someone
can think critically, solve problems or be imaginative simpliciter,
regardless of context.
ii. Identical elements

According to this theory, in order for learned responses to be
transferred there have to be identical elements between the two
situations. This reveals a certain naiveté with regard to the notion
of ‘identity’. As I have indicated, even the less rigorous notion of
‘similarity’ can be elusive. The difficulties of stereotyping mathe-
matical ability for example, on the basis of the similarity of
operations, have been illustrated by Ruthven (1988).
If identical elements do occur in two learning situations it
is maintained that transfer would be automatic. Of course, any
failure to transfer could always elicit the response that identical
elements could not have been involved, but on this basis the thesis
could become trivial and of little or no educational relevance.
In the USA, a generation of curriculum planners adopted this
approach. On this model there are three steps in constructing a
curriculum: (1) divide life into major activities, (2) analyse these
activities into specific skills, (3) make these skills your behavioural
objectives (see Bobbitt, 1926, p. 9).
This approach to finding the common skills needed to live a
socially and economically useful life bears a striking resemblance
to the methods used in Britain to establish skills designated as
‘basic’ or ‘core’. Examples of such skills are: ‘Find out facts about
things that have gone wrong,’ ‘Decide when action is required,’
‘Decide how to make the best of an awkward situation,’ and
‘Manipulate objects or materials’ (MSC, 1984, p. 37), ‘making deci-
sions’ and ‘weighing up pros and cons’ (McGuinness Report, p. 5).
But of course there is no common skill involved in, for example,
finding out how a marriage has gone wrong, how an engine has
gone wrong, or how a philosophical argument has gone wrong.
iii. Information processing

The final theory of learning transfer emanates from cognitive
psychology. This theory proposes that the brain is an information
processor, and that there are three sets of components: input,
output and control. It is argued that it is the control strategy or
general plan that is important in transfer. This approach is promi-
nent in the McGuinness Report and in a number of educational
programmes that aim to teach general thinking skills, for example,
Instrumental Enrichment (Feuerstein et al., 1980).
Goal-setting is often considered to be a good example of this
approach, and McGuinness has ‘setting up goals and sub goals’ as
a thinking skill (p. 5). But what general plan could control all
goal-setting? In the absence of guidance we could speculate: goals
should be as clear as possible; never choose goals that are impos-
sible except where pursuing the impossible itself is a goal; a goal is
impossible if the means are impossible; before selecting goals
decide on your priorities; select goals which, if achieved, would
best satisfy your priorities. Such principles are, of course, in the
main, vacuous. But such vacuity is frequently encountered in the
area of thinking skills. Consider, for instance, the occupational
information site onetcenter. Here we find problem solving skills
defined as ‘developed capacities used to solve novel, ill-defined
problems in real-world settings’. Problem solving skills are then
said to involve ‘identifying complex problems and reviewing related
information to develop and evaluate options and implement
solutions’ (onetcenter, 2008). Employers would surely be deluding
themselves if they believed that such empty truisms could help in
selecting, for instance, the best chemical engineer, chef or teacher.
This highlights a pervasive and intractable problem for all general
thinking skills and for the information-processing model of trans-
fer in particular: as the generality of the principles increases, their
usefulness and effectiveness decrease.
This approach raises the question of what in turn controls the
control strategy and thus opens up the prospect of infinite regress.
As Ryle (1949, p. 31) notes, if we had to plan what to think before
thinking it we would never think at all, because this planning
would itself need to be thought about, which would need planning,
which would itself need . . . and so on.
Finally, this theory raises a question concerning the status of
these strategies. Are they created techniques or heuristics like, for
instance, a mnemonic, or are they processes that go on in the brain?
Sternberg writes that the ‘status of these classification schemes is
not entirely clear at the present time’ (1982, p. 7). However, in his
own work Sternberg claims to have discovered a number of general
processes that are involved in thinking. But I would contend that
Sternberg did not so much discover these processes as postulate
them on the basis of what he thought was involved in solving a
problem. The danger is that of assuming that processes are going
on in us by reading back from a product of some sort to the idea
that certain mental processes must have occurred – an example of
faulty thinking if ever there was one.
5. Conceptual errors
The myth of the general transferability of thinking skills may rest upon
certain fallacies.
Philosophers have long realized that common linguistic usage may

lead us into the ontological error of assuming the existence of non-
existent entities or properties, or at least of ascribing to them an
inaccurate ontological status. Anselm of Canterbury, for example,
observed that ‘many things are said to be something or other
according to the form of the spoken expression, which in fact are
not anything: we just speak about them as we do really existing
things’ (cited in Henry, 1984. p. 12). I now concentrate on four,
often interconnected, conceptual errors prevalent in discussions
about general thinking skills.
i. Reification
Reification is the act of wrongly treating X as if it were a thing.
There might, however, be nothing wrong with treating lots of
things as things, but it is important to treat them as the right sorts
of things. One example of this error that is germane to our present
inquiry is that, although we can refer to ‘thinking’, there is no
such thing as ‘thinking’ tout court. This is because ‘think’ takes an
indirect object.
Another example of reification of particular relevance here is
moving from the properly adverbial or adjectival to the improperly
substantive. It is often assumed that if X can do Y skilfully, there
must be a skill of Y-ing and that X has it. For example, because it is
meaningful to talk of someone who thinks well as being a skilful
thinker, we are tempted to believe that there is a ‘skill’ to be identi-
fied, isolated and trained for. Thus there is in effect a jump from
talk of performing an action well or successfully to the existence
of some specific, discrete skill or skills possessed by and exercised
by the performer, the very name of which is given, or at least
suggested, in the description of the successful performance. This
can have the unfortunate consequence of classing as skills activities
and attributes that are ill suited to such a description. This error
may be illustrated by de Bono’s claim: ‘Manifestly thinking is a
skill in as much as thinking can be performed skilfully’ (de Bono,
1978, p. 45).
ii. Essentialism
Essentialists in this area believe that just as acid has the power to
turn litmus red or a magnet has the power to attract iron filings
because of some underlying structure, so the ability to solve pro-
blems or to think critically is explicable in terms of underlying
structures of the mind or brain. Hence, Norris writes:
to say that someone has critical thinking ability is to make a claim

about a mental power which that person possesses. Mental powers,
in turn, arise from mental structures and processes in the same way
that physical powers (magnetism is an example) arise from internal
structures and processes of physical objects (1990, p. 68).
But transferring this idea from inorganic substances to human

intellectual abilities can have unfortunate results. It may lead to
motivation, beliefs, desires and context being ignored. Further-
more, general labels such as ‘problem-solving’ or ‘critical thinking’
gain a spurious unity and precision. Finally, this idea makes it
difficult to explain how someone with the mental power of critical
thinking could ever fail to think critically, in the same way as it
would be difficult to explain why a magnet failed to attract iron
filings or why an acid didn’t turn litmus red.
iii. Naming fallacy

This fallacy is committed by supposing the existence of a general
skill or ability X, from the existence of a general label or category,
X. In other words, because we have a general name which can be
correctly applied to a range of activities, then it is assumed that
there must be a general skill corresponding to that general name.

For instance, because there is the general label of, say, ‘evaluating’
then there must be a general skill of evaluating.
I believe this fallacy may play a role in some defences of general
thinking skills (see Siegel, 1990, pp. 76–77 and Bailin and Siegel,
2003, p. 184). Siegel says that a conception of thinking ‘must be
possible, on pain of inability to identify all specific acts as acts
of thinking’. Ryle, however, argues that some concepts, such as
‘working’ and ‘thinking’, are polymorphous, in that there need
be nothing in common between different examples of thinking.
He writes:
There is no general answer to the question ‘What does thinking

consist of?’ There are hosts of widely different sorts of toilings and
idlings, engaging in any one of which is thinking. Yet there need
be nothing going on in one of them, such that something else of
the same species or genus must be going on in another of them.
(cited by Urmson, 1970, p. 250)
Wittgenstein uses a different approach to show that there need be

nothing in common between all examples of a concept such as
thinking. In his notion of family resemblance he states that, in the
case of games, for example, ‘you will not find something common
to all, but similarities, relationships’ (1958, p. 31); instead of a
common feature running through all instances of a concept, there
is a network of overlapping similarities. Such a concept is best
illustrated by giving a range of examples rather than looking for
general features.
I assume that if Ryle or Wittgenstein is right then those arguing
for general thinking skills on the basis that all examples of thinking
have common features would have a problem.
However, even if we put these arguments to one side, it does
not follow that being able to define ‘thinking’ entitles us to suppose
the existence of general skills of thinking. The proper use of the
concept ‘thinking’ will take note of the fact that we can only think
about something; there must be some object of thought. Consider
as an analogy the concept ‘wanting’: there are criteria for the proper
use of the concept ‘wanting’, one of which is that the verb ‘want’
cannot be used properly unless something is wanted, but this does
not mean that everything that wants, wants the same thing.
Siegel’s argument for general thinking skills seems to move from
the characterization of a concept which need not entail existence
(consider, for example, fairies, or hobgoblins) to the existence of a
general activity which, even if it is a verb that applies to human
beings, may not be possible (e.g., levitating or becoming invisible)
and thence to the existence of certain skills. But general human
activities do not necessarily involve skills (grieving or believing,
for example).
So because we can recognize specific acts as acts of ‘judging’, or
‘being accurate’, it does not follow that there are corresponding
general skills, such that we could coherently claim to be able to
teach a person judging skills or accuracy skills simpliciter.
An analogy capturing the complexity and polymorphous nature
of ‘thinking’ would be ‘working’, but who could claim to teach the
general skills of working? Siegel supports his argument with an
analogy between cycling and thinking, pointing out that we can
teach people general skills of cycling (1990, p. 77). This, however,
is not very convincing, partly for the reasons given earlier for not
regarding thinking as a skill, and partly because cycling is, in fact,
a very specific activity rather than a general one, with an obvious
and limited set of standards and criteria of effectiveness. Moreover,
bicycles seem much more alike than, for instance, areas of critical
thought such as chemistry and aesthetics.
In fact, the most Siegel could claim from his analogy would be
a degree of transferability, but only in the trivial sense that all skills
and abilities are transferable in that they are repeatable in rele-
vantly similar circumstances. Therefore, if repeatability were a cri-
terion for generality, then all skills and abilities would be general,
as repeatability is the criterion for possessing any skill or ability.
The analogy would be somewhat stronger if Siegel were saying

that if one can ride a bicycle one has the skills necessary for riding
a horse, a surf-board and a punch, as riding is a general activity of
which cycling is but one specific example. Unfortunately for Siegel,
however, this strengthening of the analogy would be purchased at
the cost of increased implausibility.
iv. Generalizing fallacy

This error consists in putting a task competence under the heading
of a wider, perhaps an extremely wide, task descriptor and assum-
ing that if a person has mastered the task competence then, ipso
facto, she can do whatever falls under the wider descriptor. So, if a
person has mastered a task competence X, say that of knowing how
to use a tin opener, and X falls under a broader and more general
heading Y, say of using a device for opening things or even using a
tool, then the person can do whatever falls under Y, that is, the
person can use any device that opens things or even can use all
tools. This fallacy involves at least two errors. First, there is the
naming fallacy, which, as we have seen, assumes that because a gen-
eral category of activities can be named then there exists a corre-
sponding inclusive skill. Secondly, it is assumed that to master one
or a few skills that fall within this general category means that one
simply has the general skill and all it encompasses. Such reasoning,
if not corrected, can be seen to justify a move from the original task
competence into situations that are relevantly, even extravagantly,
dissimilar. This fallacious move helps account for the crucial role
‘skills’ play in youth training and pre-vocational education; for
training in such skills would fit trainees for an incredibly wide
range of tasks and occupations. The Core Skills Programme of the
Youth Training Scheme (MSC, 1984) provides some examples:
‘Decision making, e.g., decide which category something belongs
to.’ Also, see the ‘general skill,’ of ‘decision making’ cited on page 17
above (City and Guilds, 1991). A more recent example is the present
so-called Key Skill of ‘working with others’ (Qualifications and
Curriculum Authority, 2008a).
All three theories of transfer may encourage people to accept
as correct the generalizing fallacy. Faculty psychology proposes
that because a number of activities fall under one broad faculty
heading, for example ‘creativity’, then there is some transfer
between creativity on a football pitch and creativity in the physics
laboratory. The identical elements theory has a proclivity to clas-
sify tasks on the basis of a very wide common element. In practice
this has led to absurd claims such as those who can use kitchen
knives have acquired the wider general transferable skill of ‘cutting
with one blade’ (FEU, 1982, p. 72). Beware of brain surgeons
who trained as lumberjacks! Finally, the theory that relies on the
existence of general strategies proposes that there is such a thing
as, for example, problem-solving simpliciter (see Qualifications
and Curriculum Authority, 2008a). Thus there could appear to be
some transfer between finding what is wrong with an inoperative
washing machine and spotting the flaw in an invalid syllogism.
Such strategies and processes are thought, once again, to be too
good not to be true, as they seem to promise the educational holy
grail of generalizability.
Moving on from the general transferability of thinking skills,
let us now consider the proposal that thinking skills should be
taught directly.

importance of content
In pursuit of the direct teaching of thinking, knowledge is viewed not
only as subsidiary but as an actual impediment.
Many supporters of thinking skills believe that ‘If students are

to become better thinkers . . . then they must be taught explicitly
how to do it. We cannot suppose that they will spontaneously learn
how to think from teaching science or mathematics or history’
(McGuinness Report, p. 4, my italics). One wonders how good, or
even competent, thinkers of the past managed to develop without

the purportedly essential benefit of being explicitly taught how
to think. But let us now proceed to consider the contention
that thinking skills should constitute a learning objective in them-
selves and that teachers should be encouraged to teach thinking
directly.
According to Fisher, despite the heterogeneity of the thinking
skills movement, one objective is common: ‘to improve reasoning
skills and critical thinking skills by direct methods’ (Fisher, 1989,
p. 39, original italics). Yet it is not clear if it is believed that thinking
skills can best be taught, or perhaps can only be taught, by such
methods, though good thinkers who have never been through a
‘direct’ approach obviously falsify the latter suggestion. What is
certain, however, is that it is believed that thinking can be taught
by methods specifically designed for that purpose and taught
independently of any particular content.
By being independent of any specific content, I mean that each
thinking skill is thought not to be tied to any particular content,
or restricted to any particular subject. It would not, of course, be
possible to teach such skills without any content or examples being
used at all, but there is no necessity for content from this subject or
that; the skills are in a sense free-floating, as indeed they have to be
if they are to be subject-independent. Furthermore, some thinking
skills programmes use highly abstract material. Cottrell’s book,
for example, uses only abstract patterns for assessing the ‘thinking
skills’ of comparing and sequencing (2005, pp. 18–19).
The aspect of this so-called direct approach that I highlight
here, and develop later, is the devaluing of knowledge. This deva-
luation can be seen in the following statement, which occurs in
a discussion of the need for discrete courses on thinking:
If the primary aim of education is conceived to be the promotion

of children’s thinking, then knowledge acquisition has to assume a
subsidiary status and thinking must not be taught only as a sub-
component of other activities. (Coles and Robinson, 1989, p. 16)
In fact, it is suggested that when it comes to teaching thinking,
subject knowledge gets in the way. McGuinness, for example, says
that generic thinking skills ‘may get lost in the midst of subject-
knowledge-based teaching’ (p. 8). Beyer agrees that concentrating
on subject knowledge ‘so obscures the skills of how to engage
in thinking . . . that students simply fail to master these skills’
(1985, p. 297). de Bono writes, ‘knowledge has its own internal
momentum which makes it difficult to pay attention to, or develop,
thinking skills’ (1978, p. 15). By contrast, a concern for knowledge
can, it seems, be energizing and inspiring, and, indeed, the concep-
tion of thinking I would advocate is one that is sensitive to and
energized by detailed content.
‘Detail’ may, indeed, serve as a shibboleth in this area; does it
evoke Gradgrindian drudgery or a Blakean delight in ‘the holiness
of the minute particular’? It is my belief that detailed content is
not only an essential part of education, but should also be a source
of pleasure. For, as Nabokov puts it:
In art as in science there is no delight without the detail . . .

All ‘general ideas’ (so easily acquired, so profitably resold) must
necessarily remain but worn out passports allowing their bearers
shortcuts from one area of ignorance to another.
In my advocacy of content, I would argue that appropriate, detailed,

subject-specific knowledge renders thinking skills redundant. In
order to illustrate this redundancy theory, consider the popular
general thinking skill of ‘comparing’ (see, for example, McGuinness
Report, p. 5; Baumfield, 2001, p. 9; Cottrell, 2005, pp. 17–18). In
order to make a comparison one needs appropriate knowledge
of what is to be compared, awareness of the appropriate frame of
reference and awareness of the appropriate criteria. For complete-
ness, I would add the need for motivation to carry out the com-
parison. These three epistemic requirements are likely to be so
specific as to have little or no relevance to many other comparisons
that one wishes to make. Moreover, given that someone has the
motivation, identifies the frame of reference, knows what criteria

are relevant and has the appropriate knowledge, what sense could
be made of them stating that they cannot make the comparison
because they lack the skill? In fact, there is no work for the
supposed skill of comparing to do.
I suspect that those who argue for a general skill of ‘comparing’
are committing the error we noted earlier when considering the
naming fallacy. For even if we concede that whenever the concept
‘comparing’ is properly used, a particular set of conditions will
need to be satisfied, it does not follow that there is a corresponding
general thinking skill of comparing. Those who say that it does
follow are committing themselves to innumerable general think-
ing skills, such as understanding, believing, knowing, judging,
imagining, concluding and theorizing. After all, if the concepts
of ‘understanding’, ‘believing’, etc. each have a set of conditions
for their proper use, then, by parity of reasoning, there must be
corresponding general thinking skills. Such a multiplication of
entities surely cries out for Occam’s razor.
Rather than accept the importance of content, proponents of
thinking skills tend to separate content from process and then
concentrate on process. They do this because they believe that
thinking comprises a number of processes; this is something to
which I now turn.
7. Thinking as mental processes

Mental processes are probably illusory; they are certainly elusive. What
is true is that belief in them can be educationally harmful.
Most supporters of thinking skills analyse thinking in terms of

mental processes. Cottrell, for example, in her popular book on
critical thinking, says learning to think critically ‘means using
mental processes such as attention, categorisation, selection, and
judgement’ (2005, p. 1). These hypothetical mental events are
arrived at by the dubious means of reading backwards from the
performance of a task. This approach makes the naming fallacy
an ever-present pitfall. For whether we are engaged in chemical
analysis or we are analysing a poem, or a chess problem, it may
be thought that we are engaged in one and the same process.
Furthermore, under the influence of the generalizing fallacy, men-
tal processes mistakenly encourage the idea of general transfer-
ability. The assumption here is that if a student could be taught
to analyse chemical formulae, then she will be able to analyse
poems, arguments, etc., etc.
Faith in mental processes also supports the belief (previously
encountered in section 2) that thinking can be reduced to a set
of pre-specified steps. One of the dangers of this step-by-step
approach is that it gets in the way of flashes of insight, leaps, jumps,
speculation and the like that are part and parcel of human inquiry.
A thinking-skills Newton would have said, ‘curse that apple for
interrupting my checklist’.
Yet even in very narrow areas of activity (e.g., cooking), such an
approach is no guarantee of success. There will always be the need
to know what is to count as being relevant (cook until brown – but
how brown is brown?) and what it means to get it right (add
sugar slowly – but how slowly?). In other words, there must be an
understanding of the criteria and standards of a particular activity
and these will vary from activity to activity, hence, it is highly
unlikely that generic steps or procedures will be appropriate across
a range of situations. Of course, it may be possible to find some
general prescription that might cover a heterogeneous set of pro-
blems, such as ‘identify your goal’, but when considering a problem
with one’s marriage, a broken washing machine or an abstruse
passage from Hegel, any common set of procedures will surely
comprise truistic platitudes of little or no practical worth, as when
de Bono recommends ‘the operation “Consider All Factors” which
we will call CAF’ (1978, p. 50). It is not procedures that are impor-
tant but knowing what is to count as a good reason or a relevant
factor within your particular sphere of activity, and this is a matter

of having subject-specific knowledge.
Those who believe that thinking can be analysed in terms of
mental processes recommend that children become aware of their
own mental processes; a recommendation I now consider.
i. Being explicit about mental processes

An essential element in the dominant metacognitive approach to
thinking skills is that children should make their thought processes
explicit. Throughout the McGuinness Report, and in Government
pronouncements too, it is stressed that thinking processes must be
made explicit and must be reflected on. Thus, McGuinness says,
‘developing thinking requires that children make their own thought
processes more explicit thus enabling them to reflect upon their
strategies’ (p. 5). But what are students supposed to detect and
make explicit by means of such introspection? Even a leading
cognitive psychologist expresses some doubts: ‘if thought is to be
defined as information processing that underlies problem-solving,
reasoning and decision making, then surprisingly little of this
appears to be accessible through introspection’ (Evans, 1995, p. 75).
There seems no direct introspective access to what McGuinness
calls ‘higher order thinking’ processes (p. 8). In fact, there may be
no processes to introspect and make explicit. Despite this, thinking
skills programmes insist that it is important for experts, as well
as children, to make their thought processes explicit.
ii. Experts’ thinking

The McGuinness Report states that, ‘powerful learning environ-
ments may be powerful precisely because they require the experts
to externalise the mental processes they are using’ (p. 16). However,
research workers in Artificial Intelligence have found (e.g., Chase
and Simon, 1973) that thinking expertly within an area may not
consist of possessing even subject-specific strategies, but consists
in acquiring a vast repertoire of knowledge of typical cases and
in being able to recognize a current situation as being similar to
those cases. There is certainly much research (see, for example,
Hunt, 1989) to support the view that intelligent thinking is not a
formal matter but that what is important is possession of detailed
subject-specific knowledge. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus put it, ‘The
expert is simply not following any rules . . . he is recognising
thousands of special cases’ (1985, p. 108).
Certainly there are no rules or processes for having new ideas.
For this, it is necessary to make informed, intelligent guesses. On
this basis, what prevents thinking from being a set of skills is that
making correct guesses about the unknown cannot be reduced
to the operation of known techniques. Imagination is essential
here; imagination based on sound knowledge and understanding
of the subject, not on general mental processes or metacognitive
strategies.
I do, however, have reservations about the formula: novice plus
detailed, specific subject knowledge equals expert thinker in that
subject. To this simple formula I would add certain virtues, dis-
positions and circumstances in relation to the particular subject,
such as, respect for the subject and its traditions, concern for truth,
respect for evidence, patience, determination, insight, imagina-
tion, willingness to conjecture, confidence and time, and this list
is in no way complete. Still, notwithstanding my reservations
about the simple formula, it is questionable whether anyone
lacking the elements just listed would acquire the requisite subject
knowledge in the first place.
But if the case for specialized knowledge for specialized pro-
blems is conceded, what role is left for general thinking skills? It
may be argued that general thinking skills are necessary for the
development of experts’ specialized thinking which then becomes
automatic and so does not figure consciously in the expert’s thought
processes. However, while experts do things like ‘defining and clari-
fying problems’ and ‘setting priorities’ (McGuinness Report, p. 5),
there are no corresponding general thinking skills, any more than

there are general thinking skills of ‘making accurate judgements’ or
‘deciding what has gone wrong’. There is, then, nothing for experts
to employ automatically, and nothing for them to make explicit.
Experts saying, ‘Now I’m observing, and now I’m hypothesising,’ is
as useful as, ‘Now I’m diagnosing, and now I’m prescribing.’
Even if it were to be conceded that experts did employ thinking
skills, and that it was possible to make these explicit, it still would
not follow that what is going on in the expert’s mind would be
helpful to the novice – rather than an irrelevance or even a hin-
drance – and that such processes are generalizable, rather than
idiosyncratic. Suppose an expert did say, ‘And now I’m paying
attention to the details.’ This would be no help to the novice. After
all, the novice doesn’t know what details are relevant. Finally,
those who recommend this approach need to justify the move
from is to ought: from how experts think, to how learners ought to
think.
The McGuinness Report’s first aim was to get to grips with what
is understood by ‘thinking skills’ (p. 1). Considerable confusion
remains however. Is a thinking skill a personal attribute, an act,
an outcome of behaviour, a feature of a task, a mental strategy or
a mental power? In hope of some clarification, in the following
section I examine a number of proposed examples of thinking
skills.
8. Examples of general thinking skills

Proposed examples of general thinking skills support the view that
there are no such things.
McGuinness tells us that there are ‘several general taxonomies’ of

thinking skills and goes on to say:
Examples of the different kinds of thinking are: sequencing

and ordering information; sorting, classifying, grouping; analysing,
identifying part/whole relationships, comparing and contrasting;
making predictions and hypothesising; drawing conclusions, giving
reasons for conclusions; distinguishing fact from opinion; deter-
mining bias and checking the reliability of evidence; generating
new ideas and brainstorming; relating cause and effect, designing
a fair test; defining and clarifying problems, thinking up different
solutions, setting up goals and sub-goals; testing solutions and
evaluating outcomes; planning and monitoring progress towards a
goal, revising plans; making decisions, setting priorities, weighing
up pros and cons. (p. 5)
This list of thinking skills is based on the one given by Schwartz

and Parks (1994), and has been used by a number of other propo-
nents of thinking skills, for example Smith (2002). Smith considers
that all thinking skills approaches (e.g., Instrumental Enrichment
(Feuerstein), CASE (Adey & Shayer), CORT (de Bono), Philoso-
phy for Children (Lipman), and Accelerated Learning (Smith)) are
trying to develop the skills in the above list. But in what sense
are these examples of ‘different kinds of thinking’, and what would
be the educational value of identifying opportunities to exercise
them across the curriculum? The naming fallacy is at work here.
It is true that there are conditions for the correct application
of concepts such as comparing (e.g., considering the similarity
or dissimilarity of two things), but that does not mean that there
is a corresponding unitary thinking skill. In Physical Education
we could get the children to watch and compare two forward-rolls;
in history we could get the children to read and compare two
accounts of the General Strike; in food technology we could get
children to taste and compare two soufflés. The children in these
three lessons would not, however, be using the same one mental
ability and, therefore, there could be no transfer between these
different examples of comparing. In other words, it is unlikely
that the same transferable skill is being employed when one com-
pares the brain to a computer or one’s love to a summer’s day.
Let us now consider some other proposed examples of general
thinking skills.
i. ‘Distinguishing fact from opinion’

How do we teach children to distinguish fact from opinion, as
McGuinness and others want? Cottrell tells us that an opinion is a
belief ‘which is not based on proof or substantial evidence’ (2005,
p. 141). On the other hand, Cottrell says facts can be proved. Rather
confusingly, she adds that ‘as knowledge of an area increases, facts
can later be disproved.’ (Ibid.) The main problem here is that the
distinction between fact and opinion is (like Cottrell) confused, for
while facts are true, some opinions are also true, and while there
cannot be an opinion without someone who believes it, many facts
are also objects of belief. Perhaps those who try to draw a fact/
opinion distinction are seeking to differentiate between facts that
are known to be true, that is, facts supported by evidence, and
opinions. But, then, many opinions are based on evidence. Maybe
the difference lies in the quality of the evidence, which would call
for principles of quality assessment. As a way out of these difficul-
ties, McGuinness might recommend getting experts to articulate
how they distinguish between known facts and matters of opinion
in their areas of expertise. But how would experts make such a
distinction? By relying on their subject-specific knowledge? This
may seem the obvious answer, and one which wouldn’t please the
thinking skills lobby, but, in fact, many experts would question the
distinction with which they are confronted. Instead of ‘known fact’,
for instance, they may talk of present paradigms, the hypothesis
which has best withstood attempts at falsification, the theory that
best fits the data, the theory with the greatest explanatory power,
the theory that best coheres with previous findings, the theory that
exhibits the most elegance and simplicity and so on. Furthermore,
Kuhn is probably correct in his claim that there is no algorithm for
choosing a theory. Experts, I suspect, are not as McGuinness wants
them to be. In short, even if we go along with the distinction drawn,
there is no general litmus test for truth and falsity, or for known
fact and what is merely believed.
ii. Observation
Observation was claimed to be a general thinking skill as long ago
as 1978 (DES, Primary Education in England), and is still being
advocated (e.g., Higgins and Baumfield, 1998, p. 394 and Cottrell,
2005, p. 4 who claims that critical thinking involves developing
the thinking skill of observation). But is observation a general skill?
Philosophers and psychologists stress the role of one’s interests
and/or knowledge in what one observes, while others emphasize
the influence of one’s values, personality and emotions. All of
which, without entailing subjectivism, stresses the individualism
and the particularity, not the generality, of observation. Further-
more, as Dearden argues, ‘being generally observant seems . . . to
be self-contradictory, since to be observant is to be attentive
to some specific but easily missed feature in a scene which is
always infinite in its variety of descriptions’ (1984, pp. 81–82)
So, while I do not claim the very idea of general thinking skills
is contradictory, maybe some examples can be rejected a priori.
iii. ‘Checking the Reliability of Evidence’

McGuinness proposes ‘checking the reliability of evidence’ as a
general thinking skill, but the fact that people regularly display
astuteness, even brilliance in evaluating evidence in one field, but
are abysmal, even non-starters, in others, may tell against claims of
generality and transferability here. The point is that evidence is
theory-dependent; nothing can be selected or checked as evidence
without a prior theory or hypothesis, or at least criteria for what
counts as evidence in a particular domain. So, do these evidence-
checking ‘skills’ bring with them the logically prior, bonus general
thinking skill of being able to hypothesize across domains? How
desirable; how improbable. Improbable or not, McGuinness includes
‘making predictions and hypothesising’ in her ‘general taxonomy
of thinking’ (p. 5).
Maybe the Generalizing Fallacy is again at work, prompting the

conclusion that if someone can check evidence in one murder case,
then she has the wider skill of checking evidence in any criminal
investigation or, wider still and wider, the skill of checking evidence
anywhere and everywhere.
iv. ‘Being systematic’

Another general thinking skill mentioned by McGuinness, and
included in other lists of such skills (e.g., Higgins and Baumfield,
1998, p. 394), is that of ‘being systematic’. This illustrates another
error common in this area and one I considered earlier: confusing
a disposition, virtue or personality trait with a skill. Central to
being systematic is being disposed to act in certain ways, but one
may have a skill without being inclined to exercise it. Others who
are guilty of this confusion include Pratzner, who has listed as
‘transferable skills’, ‘kindness’, ‘honesty’ and ‘loyalty’ (1978, p. 7),
and Wallis, who lists ‘self-confidence’ and ‘coping with uncertainty’
(1996, p. 3).
I believe the objections to general thinking skills are sufficiently
powerful to cast serious doubt on their educational value and even
on their existence. I now consider more particularly the educa-
tional dangers of characterizing thinking in terms of such skills.
9. The dangers
The present preoccupation with thinking skills is educationally
dangerous.
The thinking skills movement rightly takes the opportunity to

castigate the teaching of inert facts (the ‘Trivial Pursuits’ view
of knowledge) and procedures divorced from their rationale or
application (e.g., that a2 – b2 = (a + b) (a – b) can be applied to a
problem such as 172 – 132). The problem is that this disparagement
is extended to all subject knowledge.
i. Disparagement of subject knowledge
There is a real danger that subject knowledge will be seen as
nothing more than material on which to practise skills, or even as
something that gets in the way of the real business of education:
thinking skills.
Subject knowledge, however, is far more important than those
who espouse thinking skills can allow. The truth is that errors
committed in making judgements come in many forms. Some,
probably most, are factual and need to be rectified by supplying
learners with, or enabling them to acquire, the correct informa-
tion. Some errors are the result of failure to appreciate the force
of appropriate credentials for a belief. Other errors may occur
because of an inability to follow specific procedures, such as a
historian incorrectly implementing radiocarbon dating methods.
But of course all of these are closely associated with subjects and,
therefore, will be subject-specific. One cannot divorce thinking
from the content of what is being thought about. Subject matter
will largely determine what is to count as good thinking in any
particular area. Furthermore, subject-specific content will develop
mental abilities that are peculiar to that subject.
One common misconception in this area involves confusing
knowledge with isolated bits of information. Professor Sir Graham
Hills tells us ‘heads crammed with knowledge are no longer as
desirable as they once were. Such is the power of databases and
information networks that knowledge is instantly accessible at the
press of a button’ (The Guardian 18 September 1990). A more
recent example is provided by Mike Cresswell, head of Britain’s
largest examination board. He said that exams were increasingly
designed to test thinking skills and to reduce the amount of knowl-
edge students need. The reason he gave for this was that ‘there is
so much information that is rapidly accessible.’ Mr Cresswell added
that ‘the more important skills’ concern ‘what you do with the
information, how you process it’ (Daily Telegraph, 16 August 2008).
This is the computer programmer’s view of knowledge as inert
data that have to be manipulated and worked on. This miscon-

ception allows skills, conceived of as being active, practical and
useful, to be favourably contrasted with knowledge, which is
represented as being passive, theoretical and inert. But knowledge
is not inert; it is actively involved in the way a person sees and
interacts with the world. There is another sense in which such
knowledge must not be ‘inert’, in that it should involve commit-
ment and caring; it is a matter of being on the inside of and appre-
ciating a form of thought, as opposed to viewing it externally and
with detachment. The issue of detachment raises another threat
posed by thinking skills: the depersonalizing and neutralizing of
thought, to which I now turn.
ii. Thinking as impersonal and value-neutral

de Bono, writing of his teaching thinking course, says, ‘The aim is
to produce a “detached” thinking skill so that the thinker can use
his skill in the most effective way. A thinker ought to be able to say,
“My thinking on this is not very good,” or “My thinking perform-
ance is poor in this area,” without feeling that his ego is threatened’
(de Bono, 1978, p. 52). But thinking is not an incidental skill like
being able to swim. Thinking is constitutive of our humanity and
of who we are, and is related to a commitment to truth. At stake
here are the complex connections between knowledge, virtue and
education. Thinking skills are often presented as tools, thus empha-
sizing their separation from our dispositions, our values and our
personality; tools reveal little about the nature of those who use
them. However, thought, knowledge and one’s orientation towards
the world are connected. The self needs an integrated perspective
in which there is a harmony of thought and action in the light
of morality. This is threatened if thinking is reduced to a set of
impersonal techniques.
Most thinking skills programmes are reductive and instru-
mental. They concentrate in the main on the logical assessment of
arguments and means-ends reasoning in which the goals are given.
In fact, ends and values present difficulties for thinking skills
courses. In his highly influential paper on critical thinking skills,
Robert Ennis writes: ‘the judging of value statements is deliberately
excluded’ (1962, p. 84). Despite appreciating the importance of
values, Ennis found it impossible to incorporate them into his
‘pure skills’ conception of critical thinking. The exclusion of values
obviously weakens the concept; the ability to think critically about
ends and values in particular subject areas is a most desirable and
important educational objective and an indispensable attribute
for any critical thinker.
Most proponents of thinking skills exhibit the same sort of
ethical detachment. de Bono, for example, writes, ‘in teaching
thinking skills one is not trying to teach morals’ (de Bono, 1978,
p. 69). de Bono then declares that right thinking is quite separate
from right living. However, as Socrates stressed, teachers should
not be indifferent to the uses others may put what they have been
taught. Indeed, for Socrates, to educate was to be committed to the
moral improvement of one’s students, to bring them into the light
of the knowledge of what is right and good. Without a concern
for values, thinking skills may merely enable students to produce
sophistical rationalizations in support of their prejudices.
This concern for values should embrace the intellectual virtues.
The present enthusiasm for teaching thinking could provide a
welcome opportunity to focus upon these. McGuinness gestures in
this direction when she says, ‘Developing higher order thinking
may have as much to do with creating a disposition to be a good
thinker as it has to do with acquiring specific skills’ (p. 6). Unfor-
tunately this point is not developed; unfortunate, but foreseeable
given McGuinness’s strong support for a skills approach. An impe-
diment to such an approach embracing the intellectual virtues is
its apparent lack of enthusiasm for truth.
iii. A lack of enthusiasm for truth

As far as I can see the McGuinness Report does not contain the
word ‘truth’. This may be the result of the report’s commitment to
constructivism: the view that ‘knowledge is actively created and
constructed by learners’ (p. 5). If, however, knowledge is true belief

for which we have appropriate credentials, then we cannot simply
construct knowledge as we wish. It is, however, a common feature
of courses in thinking skills that they eschew any commitment
to truth. It is claimed, for example, that the use of thinking skills
does ‘not require the determination of the truth of a complex
informational issue’ (Quinn, 1994, p. 108), and that the outcome
of thinking skills will not involve ‘determining the truth of issues’
(Ibid.). Yet, this lack of enthusiasm for truth is, I suspect, more
pragmatic than metaphysical. For whereas it may seem plausible to
argue for the thinking skill of spotting logical fallacies, the notion
of there being a general transferable skill of truth-spotting or
truth-discovering is much less credible.
There is also a lack of engagement with truth in the currently
popular Advanced Level subject, Critical Thinking Skills. Practitio-
ners to whom I have spoken consider the course to be little more
than English comprehension exercises. They also complain that
students are discouraged from speculating or going beyond the
given information (see OCR Examiners’ Report, June 2006, for
example question 22). The type of thinking encouraged by Critical
Thinking Skills seems to be destructive rather than constructive
and critical of arguments rather than of premises or conclusions. It
encourages the view that intelligent thinking is synonymous with
logical thinking. For as one textbook puts it, ‘to think critically
means that we are able to think in a logical fashion – in straight
lines, as it were’ (Jones, 1997, p. 2). Argument is considered to
be the essence of thinking, and yet our thinking is often not argu-
mentative or rule-bound. In fact, much of our intelligent thinking
is intuitive, creative and speculative. As regards truth, Miller is
surely right in his assertion that ‘only those who are impressed by
style rather that substance could be convinced by an argument,
rather than by what it is the premises assert’ (2005, p. 66). What
should persuade us of the truth of the conclusion is the truth of
the premises.
Computers, of course, are not concerned with the truth of the
data they manipulate, and the computerization of thought is the
final danger I highlight.
iv. The computerization of thought

Many of my misgivings about thinking skills may be summarized
as worries about the computerization of thought. Cognitive psy-
chologists like McGuinness tend to view the brain as a computer.
Computers manipulate data according to rules; problems must be
explicitly defined and broken down, and then procedures applied.
This model of thought can lead to the illusion that all intelligent
thinking is logical and rule-governed.
Human thought and behaviour doesn’t fit this model. Much
of our thinking is intuitive and speculative. And even if some
behaviour can be described as if it is rule-following, the proposed
underlying rules play no part in the behaviour. In order to catch
a ball that is bounced off a wall, I don’t need to know the rule:
go to the point where the angle of incidence is equal to the angle
of reflection in a plane where the flatness of the trajectory is a
function of the impact velocity divided by the coefficient of
friction. Nor is such a calculation going on as an implicit mental
process. Psychoanalysis, so far as I know, cannot get ball-catchers
to relate this rule under hypnosis.
Another difficulty with this model is the notion of explicitly
defining a problem. A definition will use language (with its inevi-
table ambiguities) which will pick out some salient aspects but
leave others implicit. Furthermore, a computer would need to
consider all possible implications of an act, both intended and
unintended, and then differentiate between relevant and irrelevant
implications. Fortunately, we do not think mechanistically but
intuitively. Logic is of no use here; it is by understanding content
and context that we have insights concerning what is reasonable or
likely. There is a parallel with understanding a foreign language
where ‘the great thing is to learn to cut out the alternative meanings
which are logically possible; you are always liable to bring them up
till you have “grasped the spirit” of the language, and then you
know they aren’t meant’ (Empson, 1977, p. 13). Unfortunately,
there is no general thinking skill of grasping the spirit of things.
The computer model of thought increases the danger that
content will be misrepresented as data to be atomized into com-
ponents and manipulated into whatever construction the thinker
wishes. Hence, thinking skills, and those who possess them, are
seen to be external to the content upon which thinking skills are
deployed. This separates not only process from content, but also
thinker from context and so from the world. I argue for a very
different orientation: that form and order are not imposed upon,
but emerge from content and context. We should strive for a
sensitive and receptive engagement with content.
Finally, as an example of how this model of thought is anti-
thetical to educationally important activities, we may consider
conversation. Conversation is particularly apt as it is also a fruitful
metaphor for education itself. Oakeshott refers to conversation
as ‘an unrehearsed intellectual adventure’ (1962, p. 198). It is not
merely about sending and receiving information. Conversation
doesn’t shuffle and manipulate information; it enables something
new to be created. In this way conversation can change the way
that participants see the world and how they see and feel about
themselves and each other.
10. Conclusion
Some of the most important elements of our thought and nature are
dismissed.
The Government’s inclusion of thinking skills in the National

Curriculum is surely ill-thought out and hasty. As the McGuinness
Report itself cautions, ‘considerable evaluation work remains to
be done’ (p. 1). Even supporters and exponents of thinking skills
disagree about what these entities are and how they can be taught.
As an example, consider Alister Smith who is, according to the
Times Educational Supplement, ‘the guru of Accelerated Learning’,
and has three of his books on the Government’s list of recom-
mended resources for teaching thinking. But, despite being a lead-
ing player in the thinking skills game, Smith responds to his own
question: ‘can thinking skills be taught – is it worth the effort?’ by
saying, ‘the current research evidence as to how and when and for
what duration is confused and, I would argue, contaminated by
poor controls’ (2002, p. 2). This present account, in keeping with
other writings and research findings, raises doubts about the
educational value of thinking skills and their very existence. For
instance, the Teaching Thinking Skills Report to the Scottish Execu-
tive, after noting that ‘evaluation studies are inconclusive’ (Wilson,
2000, p. 39), concluded that ‘Given the paucity of evidence, it
would, perhaps, be fairer to conclude that “the jury is still out on
this particular issue”’ (Ibid.). Also consider Roy van den Brink-
Budgen, a former Chief Examiner in Critical Thinking, who has
developed assessment materials for critical thinking skills for
over 20 years and is the author of very popular books on the
subject. He too has expressed doubts about whether thinking skills
are generalizable. In November 2006 he said, regarding general
thinking skills, ‘we should retain some scepticism until the
evidence is more than anecdotal’ (2006, p. 4).
As well as being over-hasty, there is also an inconsistency in
the National Curriculum embracing thinking skills. The National
Curriculum is founded upon subjects viewed as self-contained
units, whereas the thinking skills movement is dismissive of such
subject autonomy. In fact, there is often hostility towards subject
areas or domains. The movement encourages the view that we
need to learn to think in general, that such thinking can be taught
without content specificity and, indeed, that school subjects, with
their accumulated knowledge and practices, run counter to such
teaching. In the end this could lead to a forced marriage that can’t
last: the promotion of thinking for oneself joined with the pro-
mulgation of ignorance. You may have met the progeny of such
a coupling. Enough said.
Regrettably, it is not just the importance of school subjects
that is dismissed by supporters of thinking skills, but also some of
the most important elements of our thought and nature. These
include truth, knowledge, understanding and values. By reducing
thinking to a checklist of skills, a vital fact is ignored: that educa-
tion should engage with the personality of both teacher and taught,
and that teaching is not a technology but a moral activity involving
complex relationships which are in principle irreducible and
unpredictable.
What, then, are the implications of this inquiry for curriculum
planning? McGuinness believes that ‘higher order thinking’ will
not be developed by ‘subject knowledge-based teaching’ (1990,
p. 301). If true, McGuinness’s belief would make earlier genera-
tions of competent thinkers, let alone great thinkers of the past,
educational miracles – millions of intellectual Lazaruses. But there
is no need to jettison curricula that emphasize subject knowledge
for the sake of producing good thinkers. On the contrary, such
curricula are the only ones that will produce good thinkers, because
thinking is always thinking about something in particular and
within a particular context. The National Curriculum is correct,
therefore, to emphasize the importance of content, context and
subject-based abilities, that is, to stress subject knowledge, both
propositional and procedural.
Curriculum subjects embody traditions of inquiry (Oakeshott’s
‘conversations of mankind’) and important concepts, ideas and
procedures for exploring and understanding experience. The
National Curriculum provides the opportunity for the sort of
thinking and understanding I advocate. In the teaching of mathe-
matics, for instance, there is an emphasis on grasping the ‘language’
of mathematics: understanding mathematical ideas and concepts.
As another example let us consider science. The National
Curriculum recognizes that in order to develop thinking in science
it is necessary to be initiated into a particular style of thinking.
This requires knowledge of scientific facts, theories and techniques.
There is also the need to know classificatory rules and standards of
evaluation, and to appreciate the quality and purpose of scientific
explanations.
The National Curriculum for science (Qualifications and
Curriculum Authority, 2008b) begins by talking about science
exciting ‘pupils’ curiosity about phenomena and events in the
world around them’, and goes on to say that science ‘satisfies this
curiosity with knowledge’. Some of this knowledge will be propo-
sitional as in Key Stage 1, Sc1: Light and sound – ‘Pupils should be
taught that sounds travel away from sources, getting fainter as they
do so’; or in Key Stage 2, Sc2: Life processes and living things –
‘Pupils should be taught that the heart acts as a pump to circulate
the blood through vessels around the body.’ Other knowledge will
be more procedural, as in Key Stage 1, Sc1: Scientific enquiry,
where ‘pupils are taught to ask questions [for example, ‘How?’
‘Why?’ ‘What will happen if . . .?’] and decide how they might find
answers to them’; and in Key stage 2, Sc1: Scientific enquiry, which
states that pupils should be taught to consider evidence, evaluate,
observe and hypothesize. But these are not presented as general
skills; they are scientific abilities taught within specific scientific
contexts and employing ‘scientific knowledge and understanding’.
Are there any aspects of the general thinking skills approach
that could be compatible with a curriculum based on subject
knowledge? One possibility might be if metacognition, instead of
concentrating on mental strategies employed to manipulate con-
tent, could focus on self-monitoring directed towards developing
certain habits of mind; concerning a general spirit of thinking,
rather than general thinking skills. Some of the intellectual virtues
I have in mind are: respect for truth; concern for accuracy;
openness and charity towards different ideas, while maintaining a
critical spirit; determination; willingness to conjecture; patience
with the frustrations and longueur of learning and confidence
to question authorities and tackle difficult questions. Dearden
(1984, p. 106) gives other examples, including: ‘humility to recog-

nise a need to learn, restraining one’s natural passion for certainty,
and controlling one’s natural impulsiveness to believe what is
immediately congenial to believe’.
What then of Philosophy? Well, this critique is philosophical
and Philosophy is thought by some to provide general thinking
skills (see, for example, Fisher, ch. 6, 1990). Can I reconcile my
belief in the benefits of Philosophy with my criticism of general
thinking skills? Or am I rather like an atheist who believes in
miracles?
The answer is that the benefits of Philosophy can be supported
without recourse to the problematic notion of general thinking
skills, by stressing Philosophy’s breadth. Philosophy courses should
involve coming to appreciate the different kinds of reasonings,
assumptions and problems that operate in different areas. Some
problems, for instance, overlap a number of areas. Take the distinc-
tion between facts and values; students who have studied this
problem may be justified in feeling that they can say something
about a problem in ethics, aesthetics or politics.
If Philosophy is to help in this way it needs to be broad and
it needs to look at problems that occur in different fields. The high
degree of abstraction required here probably makes this type of
Philosophy unsuitable for schoolchildren, though perhaps it could
be tackled in the sixth form. Younger children should concentrate
on gaining a thorough grounding in the main curriculum areas.
This is necessary because the context-dependency of problems
means that without detailed subject-specific knowledge even the
most rounded of philosophers will not be able to tackle them.
Philosophy, then, is not a general admission ticket to any area
of knowledge; an understanding of the area under consideration
is essential. There again, a subject must have philosophical aspects
in order for any philosophical critique to gain purchase. In short,
Philosophy does not provide the equivalent of intellectual bus
passes to all areas. It doesn’t even provide passes to all its own
parts – a philosopher of science may have little or nothing to
contribute to a discussion on aesthetics. Still, as Philosophy oper-
ates at a high level of generality, it is likely that most areas will
have elements that come within the purview of Philosophy, but
some will have more than others. Hence, Philosophy will have
more to say about thinking than plumbing. So don’t phone a
philosopher if your water pipes burst.
Yet this apparent lack of immediate practicality should not
be seen as a weakness or as a reason for dismissing philosophical
criticism. Sound curricular proposals should be able to withstand
philosophic scrutiny. It is my conclusion that recent curricular
recommendations concerning general thinking skills cannot with-
stand such scrutiny. The least that learners deserve is that they are
not forced to pursue courses that assume entities which have not
been adequately accounted for or whose existence has not been
adequately established.
Of course we want students to think imaginatively, creatively
and to solve problems. But, as Whitehead observed, ‘education is a
patient process of the mastery of details, minute by minute, hour
by hour, day by day. There is no royal road to learning through
an airy path of brilliant generalisations’ (1959, p. 10) or, we could
add, by supposed general thinking skills, even with government
endorsement.
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On Thinking Skills 2
Harvey Siegel
Chapter Outline
1. Introduction 51
2. Problems with thinking of thinking as a skill 54
3. ‘The myth of general transferability’ 61
4. The ‘direct’ teaching of thinking and content/subject
matter knowledge 75
5. Mental processes and general thinking skills 78
6. The educational dangers of thinking of thinking
in terms of skills 80
7. Conclusion 82
References 83
Further reading 84
1. Introduction
The topic of ‘thinking skills’ is complex, with several interwoven
layers. Are there any such things as thinking skills? If so, are they
rightly thought of as skills, or rather as abilities, dispositions, habits
of mind or something else? Are they the sort of thing that can be
taught? Are they subject-specific, or more general? Are they more
or less important educationally than subject-matter knowledge?

Stephen Johnson’s chapter treats all these questions and more.
While I have considerable sympathy with much of Johnson’s
discussion, I worry that it is based far too heavily on the British
government’s understanding of thinking skills as manifested in
the British National Curriculum and its supporting documents.
I agree with much of Johnson’s critique of that understanding,
including his trenchant criticisms of both the language used in its
articulation and the policies flowing from it. But one must distin-
guish philosophical questions about the existence and character
of thinking skills from the particular understanding of thinking
skills manifested in the policies and implementation of the British
National Curriculum. In what follows I try to draw the relevant
distinctions and articulate and assess the relevant claims, theses
and policy recommendations. On many of them I agree with
Johnson’s assessments, though not always for the same reasons.
I should note that I am not British, and have at best only a pass-
ing acquaintance with the British educational establishment. So
much of what I say may be seen by some readers as the reactions of
an uninformed outsider. There is considerable truth in this charge.
Still, as the questions raised go beyond Britain’s borders, perhaps
an outsider’s perspective is not wholly out of place.
I note in passing that some philosophers might think it rather
easy, philosophically uninteresting, and so not worthwhile to criti-
cize the ‘theoretical underpinning’ (Johnson 2010, p. 5 – all unteth-
ered page references below are to this work) of government reports
written by non-philosophers. I mention this objection just in order
to dismiss it: if indeed an influential policy document rests on
untenable philosophical assumptions, presuppositions or substan-
tive theses, it is surely important to point this out, and it equally
surely falls within the purview of philosophers of education to
demonstrate that untenability and to expose and critique the prob-
lematic policies that flow from it.
Johnson’s critique is multifaceted, and it will be worthwhile
to lay it out briefly and in broad strokes first before discussing
particular criticisms and issues in more detail. His main announced
target is thinking skills, but there are many ancillary others: trans-
ferability, generalizability, mental processes, an unwise lack of atten-
tion to knowledge in curricula that emphasize skills, and of course
thinking itself and various approaches to teaching (for) it. Johnson
sensibly focuses to a large extent on the influential McGuinness
Report (DFEE 1999) – ‘[r]arely, if ever, has so concise a report had
so considerable an influence on educational policy’ (p. 4) – and
some of its ‘key conclusions: that thinking is best conceived of as
a skill; that thinking skills should be made explicit; that students
must be explicitly and directly taught thinking skills; that transfer
is crucially important; [and] that students should make explicit,
and reflect upon, their own thought processes and cognitive strate-
gies (a metacognitive approach)’ (p. 5). He sets out to challenge
particular ‘theoretical underpinnings’ of the report, calling into
question the report’s ‘construing thinking as a skill, the conviction
that thinking is a matter of processing information, and belief in
general thinking skills, such as analysing and hypothesizing’ (p. 5).
According to Johnson’s analysis of the conception of thinking
‘enshrined in the National Curriculum’ (p. 9), thinking is conceived
by the contemporary official British educational establishment as
a skill and/or a mental process that is, at least to a significant extent,
general and transferable. So conceived, educational efforts aimed
at enhancing student thinking should focus on teaching students
thinking skills explicitly and directly, and encouraging students to
reflect, meta-cognitively, upon their own thinking. On this picture,
skills are active, while knowledge is passive and inert; skills are
analysable into sub-components; and explicit educational atten-
tion to these skills and sub-skills can enhance student thinking.
Johnson challenges this entire conception, and I take up the several
features just listed in what follows. A considerable portion of
his critique concerns the pedagogical recommendations of the
McGuinness report. In particular, Johnson challenges the claims
that in teaching students how to think well, thinking skills should
be made explicit; that students should be taught thinking skills
explicitly and directly; and that students should make explicit, and
reflect upon, their own thought processes and cognitive strategies.
All these matters, both metaphysical and pedagogical, are taken
up below.
In the course of examining Johnson’s critique, I briefly defend
my own positive view – which I think falls between the enthusiastic
embrace of general thinking skills in the National Curriculum
that Johnson effectively criticizes, and Johnson’s strong rejection
of such skills – according to which there are indeed some educa-
tionally important thinking/reasoning skills or abilities, that are
general in the sense that they can be applied to many diverse
situations and subject matters.
2. Problems with thinking of

thinking as a skill
One thing to note at the outset: if thinking is a skill, it’s not a single
skill, as Johnson’s examples of the candidate skills of analysing and
hypothesizing, cited above, make clear. While Johnson sometimes
writes as though his target is the single skill, thinking, it is clear
both that that target admits of a plural rendering and that Johnson
frequently has the plural rendering in his sights, and I henceforth
proceed on the assumption that it is the idea of thinking as a set of
distinct skills that Johnson sets out to challenge. When, following
Johnson, I use or mention ‘thinking skill’ in the singular, I hope the
reader will take it as convenient shorthand for the plural ‘thinking
skills’.
Johnson’s objections to thinking of thinking as a skill are both
metaphysical (there aren’t any; whatever thinking is, it’s not a skill)
and pedagogical. They include the following:
(i) Unlike virtues and character traits, failure to exhibit a skill does not
indicate a lack of that skill. (One may have the skills of swimming,
bicycle riding and potato peeling, but for any number of reasons fail
to exercise them, either on a given occasion or systemically over
time.) Virtues, character traits and dispositions are different: failure
to exhibit them in appropriate circumstances counts against one’s
having them. If one fails to manifest kindness or generosity, or fails
to seek evidence against one’s cherished beliefs, either in given
instances or systematically, one’s claim to have them – to be kind,
generous, or disposed to seek contrary evidence – may be legiti-
mately called into question. (p. 8)
Niceties aside, I agree with Johnson here. But what has this got
to do with thinking skills? The worry is ultimately pedagogical: that
if we think of thinking as a skill, ‘we may lose sight of the disposi-
tional side of thinking, overlooking that thinking is continuous with
our humanity and constitutive of it’ (p. 8). I agree that this would
be a bad thing. But of course to say that we may lose sight of this
is not to say that we will or must lose sight of it. As Johnson puts
it, this is an ‘educational danger’ (p. 7), and it is open to the advo-
cate of thinking skills to take the worry on board without giving up
the idea that thinking is a skill. She can simply say ‘thinking is a
skill, but let’s not forget that it also has a dispositional side.’ It must
be admitted that if the ‘dispositional side of thinking’ is acknowl-
edged by that advocate, and if skills and dispositions are thought
to be fundamentally distinct and non-overlapping, then she cannot
hold that thinking is only or wholly a matter of skill. But this still
leaves the advocate with plenty of options: she can deny that think-
ing of thinking as a skill precludes acknowledgement of its disposi-
tional side; she can acknowledge the danger Johnson mentions
and make room for avoiding it in her account and/or in her peda-
gogical and policy recommendations; and so on. So Johnson’s
point, while I think correct, is by itself not yet determinative. Per-
haps more seriously, we should ask why virtues have entered the
discussion at all. Is Johnson suggesting that instead of thinking of
thinking as a skill, we should think of it as a virtue? This would of
course be a very large (and on the face of it implausible) claim, in
need of much development, clarification and defence.
(ii) Johnson considers imperative and interrogative ‘linguistic tests’ for

distinguishing between skills, virtues and knowledge. Taking up the
imperative test first, he writes: ‘I would propose that a necessary,

though not a sufficient, condition of something being a skill is that
it must make good linguistic sense to tell someone to do it’ (p. 9).
Johnson suggests that since it does not make good linguistic
sense to tell someone to know, believe, understand or appreciate
something, these cannot (according to this test) be rightly regarded
as skills. Whether or not this test is a good one, though, ‘thinking’
is not on Johnson’s list, and whether or not it might be rightly
put on the list is open to debate, since it does seem to make good
linguistic sense when a parent tells a child to ‘think about what
you’ve done,’ ‘think about how doing that will make Johnny feel,’
‘think how happy you’ll be if you put in the effort and make the
team (or honour role),’ ‘don’t be discouraged, think positively,’ etc.
There are subtleties lurking here, not least because relevant distinc-
tions can be drawn between ‘thinking about’ and ‘thinking that’.
Nevertheless, Johnson’s imperative test is inconclusive until we
can see our way clear to adding ‘thinking’ to his list of non-actions/
non-skills.
He next considers Scheffler’s interrogative test: ‘in answers to the
question “What are you doing?” it makes good [linguistic] sense to
reply, “I am swimming”, or “I am typing”, but not “I am knowing”,
or “I am believing”’ (p. 9). Notice again that ‘thinking’ is not on
the list of activities ruled out from being skills by Scheffler’s test.
Moreover, it seems perfectly fine, linguistically, to answer the
question with ‘I am thinking (e.g., about how best to respond to
Johnson’s point about Scheffler’s test).’ So again, these linguistic
tests seem inconclusive: they seem to permit thinking of thinking as
a skill.
(iii) The McGuinness Report’s conception of thinking as a skill ‘places

thinking firmly on the side of “knowing-how” rather than “know-
ing that”’ (p. 10), which distinction, Johnson argues, ‘can be edu-
cationally unhelpful’, in that it ‘may . . . divorce beliefs from actions,
and drive a wedge between mental processes, which are taken to
be active, and knowledge, which is taken to be inert’ (p. 10). John-
son points out that ‘this passivity-grounded and reductive view of
propositional knowledge’ is ‘consistent with the information-
processing model of the brain, which is such a dominant paradigm
in many thinking skills programmes’ (p. 10). We shall return to
Johnson’s objections to viewing thinking in terms of mental proc-
esses and information processing below.
In addition to separating belief from action and mental processes
from knowledge, Johnson also objects to thinking of thinking
as a skill on the grounds that the exercise of skills typically requires
neither thinking nor understanding, and indeed, that ‘to have mas-
tered a skill usually means to be able to exercise it without thinking’
(p. 10). One can and typically does ride a bicycle skilfully without
thinking about exercising the skill, and one can and typically does
ride skilfully without understanding the relevant physics.
These objections – that an active thinking vs. passive knowledge
distinction may be educationally unhelpful; and that the exercise of
a skill typically does not involve thinking, and so it seems inappro-
priate to think of thinking itself as such a skill (‘she exercised her
thinking skills without thinking,’ or, more dramatically, ‘she thought
without thinking’) – are I think once again inconclusive. The first is
inconclusive because that the distinction may be educationally
unhelpful is well short of is or must be unhelpful; the advocate of
thinking skills is open, as earlier, to remain an advocate but either
reject the accompanying distinction or accept it but take it on board
and endeavour to avoid the possible unhelpful educational conse-
quences. It is, moreover, unclear just how this distinction may be
educationally unhelpful: what specifically is unhelpful about it? For
example, does it really require a complete divorce of beliefs from
actions? The second difficulty can be avoided in at least two
ways: our advocate of thinking skills can point out that while many
skills (e.g., bicycle riding) typically do not involve thinking, thinking
skills, unlike the others, do; or that just as bicycle riding doesn’t
require thinking about riding, exercising one’s thinking skills
(e.g., while solving a maths problem) doesn’t require thinking about
that exercise, but only about the mathematics involved in the prob-
lem about which one is thinking. While there is clearly much more
that can be said here, the objections do seem inconclusive as they
stand.
(iv) Johnson worries about the ‘baleful influence’ (p. 11) of focusing on
sequentially and hierarchically organized sub-skills that might be
encouraged by thinking of thinking as a skill. For one thing, such an

approach ‘does not even apply to many model cases of skill, such as
crafts and sports’ – his example here is David Beckham, who ‘doesn’t
go through a checklist covering positioning of feet, body angle,
follow through and the like in order to centre the ball. If he did,
he wouldn’t be David Beckham’. More generally, ‘physical and
practical skills of any complexity cannot be adequately taught by
breaking each skill down into components: teaching “parts” is no
guarantee that the learner acquires the whole’ (p. 11). For another,
teaching rules and principles governing the execution of skills is
not necessary for student acquisition of the skill, and may often be
educationally counterproductive: bicycle riding may depend upon
the laws of physics, but it would be a pedagogical mistake to teach
children to ride their bikes by teaching them the relevant physics
and encouraging them to apply that understanding of physics to
their cycling.
Both these points are worthwhile, although their bearing on the
teaching of thinking skills is unclear, just because it is so far unclear
how similar thinking skills (if there are such) are to crafts and sports
skills like those involved in football playing and bicycle riding. While
I won’t dwell on this point, it does seem possible for the advocate
of thinking skills to avoid these worries simply by distinguishing
between thinking skills and other sorts of skills. And I should note
that these worries don’t seem to challenge the existence of thinking
skills as such, but rather the wisdom of particular ways of teaching
for them.
(v) The apparent dissimilarity between thinking skills and other sorts
of skills just mentioned motivates Johnson’s next objection: that
unlike the skills of carpenters and gardeners, those of thinkers
cannot be learned by observation and modelling (p. 12). This is not
just because our thoughts are private; it is also because mental
processes (if there are such) are not uniform and consistent in
the way that, say, processes of joining and planting might be.
Johnson uses the example of memory: ‘there is no mental process
of remembering common to all acts of memory’ (pp. 12–13). Here
the target of critique is not thinking of thinking as a skill, but rather
thinking of thinking as composed of mental processes. We take up
the question of mental processes below. Here I would point out
just that remembering seems less apt an example than
purported thinking skills or mental processes such as analysing or
hypothesizing.
(vi) Johnson also objects to the idea, promulgated by both the

McGuinness Report and thinkers such as Edward de Bono, that
thinking is a skill that can be improved by practice. Here the worry
is that while practice ‘seems appropriate in the case of a skill where
one can decide to exercise the skill and then monitor and control
it with respect to a known end-product’ (p. 13), that appropriateness
is problematic when applied to thinking because (a) ‘in the area of
the intellect’ it is not obvious that one can decide to do this:
‘one cannot choose to understand something – we can neither
initiate nor control it,’ and (b) ‘thinking will often not have a
known end-product; it will often lead to more questions or deeper
perplexity’ (p. 13). As earlier, both points have merit, but their ability
to challenge the idea that thinking is a skill is limited. The first is a
correct point about understanding, but is not obviously correct
when made about thinking, since we do seem able to choose to
initiate thinking (‘OK, my break is over; time to start thinking
again about Johnson’s critique of thinking skills.’). The second is
also correct, but it is unclear why the open-endedness of some
thinking counts as a reason for thinking that thinking can’t or won’t
be improved by practice. (Student: ‘After working hard on my phi-
losophy course this term, I seem to be better at identifying, analys-
ing and evaluating arguments, and at coming up with telling coun-
ter-examples, than I was at the start of term. My ability to think
philosophically has been improved by lots of practice at philosophi-
cal thinking.’) So again, Johnson’s critical points, though correct,
seem inconclusive.
What is the upshot of these several points? I think that many of

Johnson’s critical points are correct, but I’m less sure of their force
as criticisms of the idea that thinking is rightly thought of in terms
of skill. Johnson is clearly right that thinking is in several crucial
respects quite unlike the skills involved in footballing, bicycling,
carpentry, gardening and the like. Does this mean that thinking
is not a skilled activity, or that thinking, if a skill, must be (for
example) unthinking, etc.? These consequences do not seem to
follow. Moreover, there is a more expansive understanding of
thinking skills, according to which they are best seen not as
unthinking processes, but rather as abilities that admit of normative
evaluation (Bailin 1998, Bailin et. al. 1999, Bailin and Siegel 2003).
Johnson and I are in the main agreed that thinking skills cannot
be plausibly understood as particular ‘private’ mental processes
or ‘inner’ entities. We are also agreed that it makes good sense to
speak of thinking skills adverbially and adjectivally, as indicating
thinking that is skilful in that it meets relevant criteria governing
quality. The untoward associations between ‘skills’ and both
unthinking habitual behaviours/mindless routines and unten-
able private mental processes can be severed, I think and hope,
by speaking not of skills but of abilities, where such abilities are
measures of the quality of a thinker’s thinking. But in the end,
whether we use the word ‘skills’ or the word ‘abilities’, the impor-
tant point – on which Johnson and I are agreed – is that it is the
quality of thinking that matters, and that when speaking of a
thinker’s thinking skills/abilities, we are referring not to any
dubious private mental entities or processes, or unthinking habit-
ual behaviours or mindless routines, but rather to the quality – the
skilfulness – of that thinking, that is, the degree to which it meets
relevant criteria (Bailin and Siegel 2003, p. 183).
Suppose for a moment that the case for this alternative concep-
tion of thinking skills can be compellingly made. Would this mean
that Johnson’s critique of the conception of thinking skills advanced
in the McGuinness Report fails? Not at all. I think that Johnson’s
critique of that conception is powerfully made and in important
respects completely telling. I am happy to join with Johnson in
rejecting it. Nevertheless, I hope that the alternative conception of
thinking skills just mentioned both makes philosophical sense and
holds educational promise.
3. ‘The myth of general transferability’

Are thinking skills generalizable or generally transferable? Johnson
suggests not just that the McGuinness Report answers in the
affirmative, but moreover that ‘[m]uch of the educational appeal
of thinking skills stems from a mistaken belief in their general
transferability’ (p. 13), so that by undermining their transfer-
ability, the educational appeal of thinking skills will wane. What,
exactly, does ‘transferability’ come to here? Johnson explicates it
(in part) in terms of ‘domain independence’: a skill is generally
transferable if its execution is independent of the domain in which
it is executed (p. 14).
Are there any such generally transferable, domain independent
skills? Consider the skills (if indeed these are rightly thought of
as ‘skills’) of addition and the calculation of probabilities. Both of
these ‘belong’ to specific domains, namely arithmetic and statistics/
probability theory. But once acquired, they seem to be domain
independent in that they can be exercised in a wide range of
domains: If James can add, he can add not only in arithmetic class,
but also in biology and English literature class, and also in the
supermarket and while watching Beckham bend another one into
the net and adding it to his running total of ‘Beckham’s benders’.
Similarly, once Maria can calculate probabilities, she can do so not
just in statistics class but also in her genetics and chemistry classes,
when considering the likelihood and practical implications of
weather conditions while planning her next driving holiday, and
contemplating whether to vote Liberal in the next by-election or
the wisdom of buying a lottery ticket in the upcoming drawing.
Or consider the ability to detect a traditional fallacy like post hoc
ergo propter hoc (‘after this, therefore because of this’). Many
advocates of critical thinking, myself included, have claimed that
this ability is general or domain independent in that once mastered
in a critical thinking class or elsewhere, it can be exercised in any
domain in which the fallacy is manifested: in physics or history
class, but also in assessing a proposed explanation of a surprising

event, the reliability of the brand of car one is contemplating buy-
ing, the wisdom of the candidate one is contemplating supporting,
or the worthiness of the candidate’s party’s platform. These exam-
ples seem enough to establish the prima facie plausibility of the
claim that some skills are generalizable, transferable and domain
independent: they can be applied, exercised, and manifested in
many diverse situations and with respect to many diverse subject
matters.
If they are indeed transferable, it is easy to understand why
educators would want to focus on them: they would hope for a
big pedagogical ‘bang for the buck’, since once taught such skills
and abilities can be exercised in a broad range of domains, both
in and beyond traditional school subjects. This is no doubt the
explanation of McGuinness’ and Scriven’s praise (cited by Johnson,
p. 14) of teaching such generalizable and transferable skills where
one can.
Johnson argues that ‘[t]he idea of transfer itself is far more
problematic than is generally recognized’ (p. 14). What are his
reasons for thinking it problematic? He gives several:
i. Domain-Specific Content: Although this reason is not developed in detail

here, it is I think at the heart of Johnson’s rejection of ‘general transfer-
ability’. His view is that what appear to be general skills are actually
domain-specific, and in two ways: they depend upon domain-specific
content knowledge (so that, for example, my ability to identify an unstated
assumption in an argument in the domain of chemistry depends upon
my knowledge of chemistry); and, in addition, the ability itself is domain-
specific in that if I have the ability to identify unstated assumptions of
arguments in distinct domains, for example chemistry and aesthetics, they
are actually two different skills/abilities: that of identifying the unstated
assumptions of arguments in chemistry, and that of identifying such
assumptions in arguments in aesthetics. In short, and in a slogan: different
domains; different skills. As we proceed through the consideration of
Johnson’s more explicit reasons for doubting the existence of generally
transferable skills next, these two reasons – that the exercise of skills
depends upon domain-specific content knowledge; and that, when
what is apparently the same skill is exercised in two or more different
domains, it is, contrary to appearances, two or more different skills that
are exercised – will be central to the discussion.
ii. Similarity: ‘Transfer depends not only on there being an appropriate
similarity between contexts, but also on this similarity being perceived
by the person transferring the skill’ (p. 14). I am inclined to agree with
Johnson on this point, although I am unsure how self-conscious the
perception in question need be. But it is unclear how damaging this
point is to the ‘general transferability’ case, because it is unclear that any
more is required than a recognition by the thinker that the contexts in
question are such that the skills of addition, calculation of probabilities
or identification of particular fallacies can be applied in each of them.
Johnson correctly notes both important philosophical difficul-

ties, in particular those associated with Wittgenstein’s and Kripke’s
worries about rule-following, and a depressing lack of evidence
from psychology for the existence of generalizable, transferable
skills (pp. 14–16). Despite these difficulties, belief in the existence
of such skills, at least among some scholars, persists. As Johnson
aptly puts it, such skills are, for many, ‘simply too good not to be
true’ (p. 16). He also reviews three psychological theories that
allegedly lend support to the existence of general transferable
thinking skills – ‘faculty psychology’, ‘identical elements’ and ‘infor-
mation processing’ (pp. 16–19) – and concludes that they offer no
such support. He suggests that resistance to the case against gener-
alizable, transferable skills results from conceptual errors, to which
we turn next.
iii. Conceptual Errors: Johnson identifies several ‘conceptual errors’ that give
illicit support to ‘the myth of the general transferability of thinking skills’
(p. 20): reification, essentialism, the naming fallacy, and the generalizing
fallacy. Let us consider them in turn:
a. Reification: Johnson defines reification as ‘the act of wrongly treating
X as if it were a thing. There might, however, be nothing wrong with
treating lots of things as things, but it is important to treat them as the
right sorts of things. One example of this error that is germane to our
present inquiry is that, although we can refer to “thinking”, there is no

such thing as “thinking” tout court. This is because “think” takes an
indirect object’ (p. 20, emphases in original).
It is hard for me to believe that the last, grammatical point could

be dispositive of the metaphysical question. It is also worth noting
that treating thinking as the wrong sort of thing seems never-
theless to treat it as a thing, that is, as something that exists. But
Johnson’s most important claim here is that it is also an instance
of objectionable reification to move ‘from the properly adverbial
or adjectival to the improperly substantive. It is often assumed that
if X can do Y skilfully, there must be a skill of Y-ing and that X has
it. For example, because it is meaningful to talk of someone who
thinks well as being a skilful thinker, we are tempted to believe
that there is a “skill” to be identified, isolated and trained for. Thus
there is in effect a jump from talk of performing an action well
or successfully to the existence of some specific, discrete skill or
skills possessed by and exercised by the performer . . .’ (p. 20).
This is an important point: To take our earlier examples, that
Maggie can add numbers, calculate probabilities and identify
particular fallacies skilfully does not entitle us to infer the existence
of discrete ‘skills’ of addition, probability calculation and fallacy
identification that can be ‘identified, isolated and trained for’. Is
Johnson right about this?
He may well be. But notice what has been built into the issue
here: Johnson’s objection turns out not to involve the positing or
illicitly inferring of a non-existent skill, but rather the inferring of
skills that can be ‘identified, isolated and trained for’. Suppose he
is right that, as a matter of fact, such skills cannot be ‘isolated’ from
other related skills (e.g., addition from subtraction, calculating
probabilities from multiplication, or identifying particular falla-
cies from identifying valid forms of reasoning) or ‘trained for’ in
isolation from those other related skills. This would not touch the
metaphysical issue of the skills’ existence, but rather the pedago-
gical one of developing them in students effectively and efficiently.
Moreover, so understood the point at issue seems a straightfor-
wardly empirical one: how ‘isolatable’ and ‘trainable’ are the skills
in question? This does not seem to be the sort of issue that can be
settled by armchair analysis.
Despite the worries just expressed, however, I am happy to side
with Johnson here, at least for the sake of argument, because we
are agreed on the fundamental point that these so-called skills
are understood most importantly to be adverbial or adjectival
descriptors of desirable student thinking. What we want, as edu-
cators, is to help students to think well: for example, to add (and
subtract), calculate probabilities (and multiply) and identify falla-
cies (and valid forms of reasoning) skilfully. If we are agreed that
that is our educational goal as far as thinking is concerned, the
metaphysical question seems less pressing than Johnson’s discus-
sion suggests.
b. Essentialism: ‘Essentialists in this area believe that just as acid has the
power to turn litmus red or a magnet has the power to attract iron filings
because of some underlying structures, so the ability to solve problems or
to think critically is explicable in terms of underlying structures of the mind
or brain’ (p. 21). Johnson here cites Stephen Norris to this effect, and
objects that ‘transferring this idea from inorganic substances to human
intellectual abilities can have unfortunate results. It may lead to motiva-
tion, beliefs, desires and context being ignored. Furthermore, general
labels such as “problem-solving” or “critical thinking” gain a spurious
unity and precision. Finally, this idea makes it difficult to explain how
someone with the mental power of critical thinking could ever fail to
think critically . . .’ (p. 21).
These objections seem to me inconclusive. Taking the three

critical points in order: First, that the positing of underlying struc-
tures may lead to the ignoring of motivation, beliefs, desires and
context manifestly does not mean or entail that they must or will
in fact be ignored in particular cases. Second, it is not clear why
saying that James has the skill of (for example) identifying unstated
assumptions and explaining this in terms of ‘underlying structures
of the mind or brain’ imparts ‘a spurious unity and precision’,

any more than saying that James ‘identifies unstated assumptions
skillfully’ – a locution that Johnson allows – and explaining this in
the same way imparts a spurious unity and precision. The final
worry concerning explanation seems straightforwardly handled
by distinguishing between the skill/ability to identify unstated
assumptions and the having of the ‘critical spirit’, that is, the atti-
tudes, dispositions, habit of mind and character traits inclining
the thinker in question actually to do so (Siegel 1988). While
I don’t want to either commit myself to or defend ‘essentialism’
about thinking skills here, I don’t see that Johnson’s brief remarks
undermine it.
c. The Naming Fallacy: Johnson says that ‘[t]his fallacy is committed by sup-
posing the existence of a general skill or ability X, from the existence of a
general label or category, X. In other words, because we have a general
name which can be correctly applied to a range of activities, then it is
assumed that there must be a general skill corresponding to that general
name’ (pp. 21–22). Johnson continues: ‘I believe this fallacy may play a
role in some defences of general thinking skills’ (p. 28), singling out my
own allegedly fallacious defence: ‘Siegel says that a conception of think-
ing “must be possible, on pain of inability to identify all specific acts as
acts of thinking”’ (p. 22, citing Siegel 1990, p. 77; ‘of thinking’ italicized
in the original). Being thus placed on the hook, I next defend myself from
the charge that my arguments commit the ‘naming fallacy’.
My defence is simple and straightforward: the quoted passage

asserts that a ‘conception of thinking’ must be possible; it says
nothing about any ‘general skill’ of thinking. My defence of general
skills and abilities does not rest on any ‘naming fallacy’; rather, it
rests on (a) a critique of John McPeck’s argument for his claim that
teaching critical thinking is impossible on conceptual grounds,
and (b) a straightforward empirical claim concerning what we
routinely do:
It makes perfect sense . . . to claim that one teaches CT [critical

thinking], simpliciter, when one means that one helps students to
develop reasoning skills which are general in that they can be
applied to many diverse situations and subject matters . . . This
point is supported, moreover, by the fact that there are readily
identifiable reasoning skills which do not refer to any specific
subject matter, which do apply to diverse situations, and which
are in fact the sort of skill which courses in CT seek to develop.
Skills such as identifying assumptions, tracing relationships between
premises and conclusions, identifying standard fallacies, and so on,
do not require the identification of specific subject matters: such
skills are germane to thinking in subject areas as diverse as physics,
religion, and photography. (Siegel 1990, p. 77)
This passage was originally published more than twenty years ago,
and if I were writing it anew I would no doubt write it somewhat
differently. In particular, I would clarify my use of ‘skill’ and its
relation to the less disputed word ‘ability’, as I have in more recent
publications (and briefly above). Nevertheless, it is apparent that
there is no ‘naming fallacy’ here – I did not argue from ‘there is a
general category, “thinking”,’ to ‘there is a general skill of thinking.’
However, I did argue that there is a legitimate general category,
‘thinking’, and that there must therefore be some possible concep-
tion of thinking insofar as we are able to identify particular specific
acts as acts of thinking. Is this an instance of the ‘naming fallacy’?
Whether or not Johnson thinks so, his text makes clear that there is
in his view something wrong with this argument, and he cites Ryle
and Wittgenstein in his defence (p. 22). But I am unmoved by
the appeal to these two eminences, and reject the latter’s famous
‘family resemblance’ account of particular concepts like that of
‘game’ in favour of Bernard Suits’ analysis of the latter in his
brilliant but little-known The Grasshopper. (Suits 2005; thanks to
Colin McGinn for bringing Suits’ book to my attention.) Johnson
suggests that ‘if Ryle or Wittgenstein is right then those arguing for
general thinking skills on the basis that all examples of thinking
have common features would have a problem’ (p. 22). But that they
do have many things in common is incontrovertible: they all count
as examples of thinking; they all count as mental acts or events of
one sort or another; they all depend on or are manifestations of
particular sorts of brain activity; etc. The question before us is not

whether they have anything in common, which they undeniably
do, but rather: do such commonalities provide a basis for thinking
that there are general thinking skills, and did I argue for the latter
on that basis? I agree with Johnson that the inference is problem-
atic. But it is simply false that I drew this inference, or appealed
to any such argument. One needn’t – and I didn’t – argue for the
existence of general thinking skills ‘on the basis that all examples of
thinking have common features’. In my earlier discussion, cited
above, my first point was aimed at McPeck’s conceptual argument
against the very coherence of (teaching for) general skills of critical
thinking. I then argued for the existence of such skills on the rather
more straightforward basis of pointing to the sort of teaching
many of us do everyday in our introductory philosophy/informal
logic/critical thinking courses. (‘Assignment: Read the following
passages, taken from texts originally appearing in philosophy,
psychology, history, literature, biology and physics textbooks or
journals, as well as from novels and other literary works, popular
magazines and newspaper editorials. For each, identify unstated
assumptions, reconstruct arguments in premise-conclusion form,
state the nature of the relationship between the premises and
conclusions, and evaluate the arguments, identifying any parti-
cular fallacies.’) That we do this suggests that there is something
mistaken about McPeck’s claim that it is impossible to do so, and
with Johnson’s suggestion that doing so requires committing the
‘naming fallacy’. And indeed Johnson’s several criticisms of my
view (pp. 22–24) do not attend to, or even mention, the actual
argument given in the passage cited above and just rehearsed – that
is, the argument by example, that there are in fact some thinking
skills that are general in the sense that they can be applied to many
diverse situations and subject matters – and here are some of
them. Teachers of critical thinking courses endeavour to foster
the development of skills in their students that ‘are general in
that they can be applied to many diverse situations and subject
matters . . . [T]here are readily identifiable reasoning skills which
do not refer to any specific subject matter, which do apply to diverse
situations, and which are in fact the sort of skill which courses
in critical thinking seek to develop. Skills such as identifying
assumptions, tracing relationships between premises and conclu-
sions, identifying standard fallacies, and so on’ (Siegel 1990, p. 77)
are not only in principle teachable, contra McPeck; they are actu-
ally taught in some successful critical thinking courses, and so
indeed exist, contra Johnson. (For empirical evidence on this, see
the references to some empirical literature in Siegel (2008, p. 177).
For discussion of McPeck’s claim that such alleged skills as identi-
fying assumptions are themselves subject-specific, see Siegel (1988,
pp. 20–21), and below.)
Johnson challenges the analogy I drew between thinking and
cycling – again, an analogy drawn in the course of challenging
McPeck’s claim that because specific acts of thinking are always
acts of thinking about something, general thinking skills are on
conceptual grounds impossible and so necessarily non-existent.
Here’s what I wrote back then:
It is not the case that the general activity of thinking is ‘logically

connected to an X,’ any more than the general activity of cycling is
logically connected to any particular bicycle. It is true that any given
act of cycling must be done on some bicycle or other. But it surely
does not follow that the general activity of cycling cannot be
discussed independently of any particular bicycle. Indeed, we can
state, and teach people, general skills of cycling (e.g., ‘Lean to the
left when making a left-hand turn,’ ‘Slow down before cornering,
not during cornering,’ etc.), even though instantiating these maneu-
vers and so exhibiting mastery of the general skills requires some
particular bicycle . . . As with cycling, so with thinking. Thus,
McPeck’s suggestion that teaching CT simpliciter is a conceptual
impossibility is mistaken. As we can teach cycling, so we can teach
CT. (Siegel 1990, p. 77)
Johnson objects to the analogy between cycling and thinking,

as follows: ‘This, however, is not very convincing, partly for the
reasons given earlier for not regarding thinking as a skill, and

partly because cycling is, in fact, a very specific activity rather than
a general one, with an obvious and limited set of standards and
criteria of effectiveness. Moreover, bicycles seem much more alike
than, for instance, areas of critical thought such as chemistry and
aesthetics’ (p. 23).
None of these three reasons are compelling. The first, involving
Johnson’s ‘reasons given earlier for not regarding thinking as a
skill’, is not compelling because those reasons are, as suggested
above, at best inconclusive.
The second reason, that ‘cycling is, in fact, a very specific activity
rather than a general one’, betokens an important potential ambi-
guity. In the earlier citation above, it is clear that when speaking of
‘general thinking skills’ I did not suggest that ‘thinking’ is itself one
general skill, but rather that particular reasoning skills ‘are general
in that they can be applied to many diverse situations and subject
matters’; and in the most recently cited passage I offer as examples
the specific reasoning skills of ‘identifying assumptions, tracing
relationships between premises and conclusions, [and] identifying
standard fallacies’. My claim was and is that such skills as these are
indeed ‘general’ in the sense specified: once acquired, they can be
applied, exercised and manifested in many diverse situations and
with respect to diverse subject matters. Students can, for example,
become skilled at identifying unstated assumptions, and exercise
that ability in quite diverse contexts. Does Johnson really doubt
this? Indeed, I’d wager that he has honed the skill to a considerable
degree himself, and would do very well indeed on the parenthe-
tical, hypothetical ‘assignment’ mentioned above. Johnson’s expli-
cation of ‘general’ in terms of ‘general transferability’ mentioned
above – that is, that a skill is generally transferable if the execution
of it is independent of the domain in which it is executed – seems
to make his use of the term more or less equivalent to mine. If so,
my examples of general skills seem to qualify as generally transfer-
able skills in Johnson’s sense. If so, these general skills are ‘general’
in just the relevant sense – as are the general skills involved in
cycling, for example, regulating one’s speed properly before and
during cornering.
Johnson’s third reason, that bicycles seem more alike than ‘areas
of critical thought such as chemistry and aesthetics’, unfairly
switches from a claim about skills to a claim about ‘areas’. No one
has suggested that chemistry is relevantly like aesthetics. The claim,
rather, is that (for example) identifying unstated assumptions of
arguments, identifying patterns of reasoning in such arguments,
and/or judging the epistemic quality of such arguments, are rele-
vantly similar in the two areas. Johnson has provided no reason
for doubting this – although we will have to face the objection
(made by McPeck 1990, pp. 96–7 and elsewhere) that these seem-
ingly general skills/abilities are in fact not general, but rather
‘domain specific’, not just because their proper exercise in any given
domain depends upon domain-specific knowledge, but because
the skills/abilities themselves differ from domain to domain, so
that (for example) the ability to identify unstated assumptions of
arguments in the domain of chemistry is a different ability than
the ability to identify unstated assumptions of arguments in the
domain of aesthetics. Indeed, I suspect that Johnson might balk
at my attempt to merge our respective senses of ‘general’, and urge
that, for example, the ability to identify unstated assumptions is
not such that its execution is ‘independent of the domain in which
it is executed’. Rather, if my suspicion is correct, that ability is on
Johnson’s view ‘domain relative’: not only might a given student
successfully identify unstated assumptions of arguments in one
domain (e.g., chemistry) but fail to do so in another (for example,
aesthetics); more importantly, when that student successfully
identifies unstated assumptions in the two domains, she is exe-
cuting two distinct, domain-relative skills: identifying unstated
assumptions of arguments in chemistry, and identifying unstated
assumptions of arguments in aesthetics. I concede immediately
that Johnson nowhere asserts this in his text, and my suspicion
may well be mistaken. But whether or not Johnson makes this

move, McPeck certainly does:
Take . . . ‘the ability to recognize underlying assumptions.’ That

this is not a singular ability can be appreciated by considering the
fact that to recognize an underlying assumption in mathematics
requires a different set of skills and abilities from those required
for recognizing them in a political dispute, which are different
again from those required in a scientific dispute. Thus, the phrase
‘ability to recognize underlying assumptions’ does not denote
any singular uniform ability, but rather a wide variety of them.
(McPeck 1990, p. 97)
And so I should next say a word about it.

In fact there is much to say here, in particular concerning the
role of domain-specific knowledge in the exercise of such skills as
that of identifying unstated assumptions. Surely one reason that a
student might successfully identify the unstated assumptions of
arguments in chemistry but fail to do so in arguments in aesthetics
is her knowledge of chemistry and her lack of knowledge of aes-
thetics. I agree with both Johnson and McPeck that subject- or
domain-specific knowledge is often required for the successful
execution of a given skill/ability in a given domain. But is McPeck
right that these are different abilities, or, as he puts it in the passage
just cited, that each ‘requires a different set of skills and abilities’?
I see no reason to think so. Just as my ability to ride a bicycle is not
relative to different bicycles, such that I have one ability to ride my
new blue one, another to ride my old yellow one, and yet another
to ride your green one – it’s all one ability, exercised on different
bicycles – Steve’s ability to identify unstated assumptions is not
one ability when exercised on argument A from chemistry, another
when exercised on argument B from aesthetics, and yet another
when exercised on argument C from the editorial pages concern-
ing some current political matter. Even though Steve’s execution
of his ability to identify unstated assumptions in these different
domains might depend upon his domain-specific knowledge, it is
nevertheless one ability, exercised in different domains and perhaps
utilizing different domain-specific information. (I leave aside the
difficult matter of the individuation of ‘domains’. Suppose Steve
can identify the unstated assumptions of arguments in organic
chemistry, but not in quantum chemistry. Do these then count as
distinct domain-specific abilities? How would one stop the unwel-
come result that the identification of every unstated assumption
amounts to a distinct ability? Is it a different ability every time an
unstated assumption is identified in an argument – that is, is this
ability not just domain-relative but argument-relative? Should we
say similar things about addition: the ability to add one pair of
numbers is one ability, and to add another pair another? Is reading
words with four letters a different ability than reading words
with five? This seems very bad news for teachers of arithmetic
and reading, and is contrary to Johnson’s rejection of the idea that
skills are composed of component micro-skills.) The alternative
seems to lead inexorably to a vast multiplication of skills/abilities,
which seems both contrary to ordinary language and ordinary
thinking (‘he’s a skilled driver’; ‘she’s very good at identifying
unstated assumptions’; ‘he’s a poor reader’; etc.) and troublesome
pedagogically.
I do not see in Johnson’s discussion (or McPeck’s) any good
reason to regard skills/abilities such as those of identifying unstated
assumptions, putting arguments in premise-conclusion form, and
our other examples, as domain- or argument-relative. Rather, we
should regard them as general, in the sense specified above. This
is completely compatible with the point that their successful exe-
cution is often dependent on domain-specific knowledge. Even if
Johnson is right to insist that, for example, the successful execution
of Maggie’s skill at identifying unstated assumptions is domain-
relative, in that Maggie is better at identifying such assumptions
in chemistry than she is in aesthetics (perhaps in part because of
her knowledge of chemistry), it remains nonetheless both that the
skill is separable from the knowledge, at least conceptually; and,
more importantly for present purposes, that the execution of the

skill in chemistry, even if dependent on knowledge of chemistry,
is not thereby a different skill from that of identifying unstated
assumptions in aesthetics.
It is also worth mentioning Ennis’ ‘infusion’ approach to the
teaching of critical thinking, in which principles of critical think-
ing are taught, and skills developed, by explicitly discussing the
principles in the context of the treatment of subject matter content
(Ennis 1989, 1996). Ennis’ approach clearly integrates general
skills/abilities and domain-specific content in a way that raises
doubts about Johnson’s rejection of general, transferable skills.
I conclude that the ‘naming fallacy’ is a red herring. For
one thing, my earlier discussion does not manifest the allegedly
fallacious pattern of reasoning. For another, the passages Johnson
focuses on in his critique are aimed not at establishing the exis-
tence of general thinking skills, but rather at undermining McPeck’s
linguistic/conceptual arguments for the a priori impossibility
of the existence of such skills and of teaching for them. More
importantly, the argument for the existence of general reasoning
skills does not rest on linguistic or grammatical or conceptual
points, but rather on the obvious (and empirically measurable and
measured) existence of specific such skills.
d. The Generalizing Fallacy: ‘This error consists in putting a task competence

under the heading of a wider, perhaps an extremely wide, task descriptor
and assuming that if a person has mastered the task competence then,
ipso facto, she can do whatever falls under the wider descriptor’ (p. 30).
Johnson’s examples, for example, of generalizing from ‘Martin knows
how to use a tin opener’ to ‘Martin knows how to use (all) tools,’ and
from ‘Martin can use a kitchen knife’ to ‘Martin can perform brain
surgery’ are telling; these would clearly be unjustified generalizations.
To the extent that the McGuinness report and other official documents
commit this fallacy, I am happy to join with Johnson in condemning it.
That said, however, the extent to which it is committed in such documents
is unclear. Johnson writes: ‘[T]he theory that relies on the existence of
general strategies proposes that there is such a thing as, for example,
problem-solving simpliciter . . . Thus there could appear to be some
transfer between finding what is wrong with an inoperative washing
machine and spotting the flaw in an invalid syllogism’ (p. 25, last empha-
sis added). Taking this passage at face value, Johnson does not claim
that the report asserts that there is in fact any such transfer. Where, then,
is the fallacy? In any case, if the fallacy is indeed committed, I’m happy
to join in Johnson’s condemnation of it.
There seems to be a degree of talking-past-one-another here,

again involving what counts as ‘general’. My own view is that
various skills, abilities and dispositions of critical thinking are
general in that once acquired, they can be applied, exercised and
manifested in many diverse situations and contexts, with respect
to many diverse subject matters. These include skills/abilities
such as identifying assumptions and reconstructing arguments
in premise-conclusion form, and dispositions such as demanding
reasons for and seeking counter-examples to specific assertions
or claims (Siegel 1988, 1997, ch. 2). These claims of mine seem to
me to be innocent of what Johnson calls the ‘generalising fallacy’.
But Johnson might judge them guilty, on grounds that identifying
assumptions and seeking counter-examples in one domain are
different from identifying assumptions and seeking counter-
examples in other domains. If so, the matter has already been
addressed in the previous section’s discussion of domain-specific
content knowledge.
4. The ‘direct’ teaching of thinking and

content/subject matter knowledge
Are there ‘free-floating’, subject-independent thinking skills, that
is, skills that are not tied to any particular subject, domain, or con-
tent area? If so, should they be taught ‘directly’? (p. 25) Johnson
challenges the latter idea that skills can be taught ‘directly’; his
challenge rests heavily on challenging the free-floatingness or
subject-independence of such skills.
i. Can/should thinking skills be taught

‘directly’?
It is somewhat unclear what Johnson means by the ‘direct’ teaching
of thinking skills; as far as I can tell he means to reject the idea that
such skills can be taught ‘explicitly’, without reference to any sub-
ject matter content or independently of all context (pp. 26–27).
Johnson is clear that his main objection to the ‘direct’ approach to
teaching thinking is its ‘devaluing of knowledge’, and he amasses an
impressive series of quotations from several authors, including
McGuinness, to the effect that ‘knowledge gets in the way’ of the
effective teaching of thinking skills (p. 27). Johnson advocates a
‘conception of thinking . . . that is sensitive to and energized by
detailed content’, and suggests that ‘appropriate, detailed, subject-
specific knowledge renders thinking skills redundant’ (p. 27). He
illustrates his view by considering ‘the popular general thinking
skill of “comparing”’, pointing out that comparing requires ‘appro-
priate knowledge of what is to be compared, awareness of the
appropriate frame of reference and awareness of the appropriate
criteria . . . [as well as] the need for motivation to carry out the
comparison’. His objection is straightforward: ‘These three epis-
temic requirements are likely to be so specific as to have little or
no relevance to many other comparisons that one wishes to make.
Moreover, given that someone has the motivation, identifies the
frame of reference, knows what criteria are relevant and has the
appropriate knowledge, what sense could be made of them stating
that they cannot make the comparison because they lack the
skill? In fact, there is no work for the supposed skill of comparing
to do’ (pp. 27–28).
I have no wish to defend the existence of a general thinking
skill of ‘comparing’, or to defend a ‘direct’ method of teaching it.
But it does seem to me that Johnson’s earlier acceptance of the
idea that we can think more or less skilfully undermines his argu-
ment here. Advocates of the general skill would no doubt reply
to Johnson that the work the supposed skill of comparing would
do, if possessed, is that of enabling thinkers to compare more
skilfully than they would if they lacked the skill, or possessed it
to a lesser degree. It certainly seems possible for a thinker to have
the motivation and meet the epistemic requirements Johnson sets
out, and yet carry out the comparison badly, ineptly, or simply not
maximally well (just as a carpenter may have the motivation and
meet the analogues of Johnson’s epistemic requirements, yet lack
the skill and so fail to make an excellent dovetail joint). If so, there
does seem to be work for the supposed skill to do. As already noted,
I have no wish to join the issue with Johnson over the example
of ‘comparing’. But I would take issue with other skills, such as
those essential to critical thinking that I’ve been using as running
examples throughout (identifying unstated assumptions and valid/
fallacious patterns of reasoning, assessing the epistemic merits of
arguments, etc.). Here Johnson’s claim that knowledge is all seems
to me not just implausible but false, since it is very common for
teachers of critical thinking to have experience of students who
have the relevant knowledge but lack the skill (e.g., of identifying
unstated assumptions), and the quality of whose thinking suffers
as a result.
I should also note that the ‘content knowledge vs. skill’ dicho-
tomy that Johnson’s argument here presupposes is itself problem-
atic. As William Hare has definitively established, advocates of
critical thinking do not in general reject subject matter content
knowledge; rather, they see skills and knowledge as working together
in the development and exercise of the relevant skills and abilities
(Hare 1995; cf. the compelling examples and discussion in Scheffler
1989). If by rejecting the ‘direct’ teaching of thinking skills Johnson
means to reject the idea that such skills can be taught without
reference to any subject matter content whatsoever, or indepen-
dently of all context, I happily join him in rejecting it – on this
point he’ll find few philosophers who would disagree. To teach
students to identify unstated assumptions, for example, one has
to work with examples of arguments containing unstated assump-

tions, and those examples will of course have some content or
other. Nevertheless, once students have acquired some ability to
identify unstated assumptions, that ability is not limited to the
content or context utilized in first acquiring the ability – it can
in principle, and typically in practice, be applied, exercised and
manifested in many diverse situations and subject matters.
ii. Are thinking skills subject-independent?

If there is indeed ‘work for the supposed skill to do’, what should
we say of the subject-independence of such skills? My own view,
as already indicated, is that some such skills – for example, those
of identifying unstated assumptions, or spotting fallacies such as
post hoc ergo propter hoc – are independent of specific subjects
in that the skills, once acquired, can be applied, exercised and
manifested in many diverse situations and with respect to many
diverse subject matters. For example, Matilda might be very good
at identifying unstated assumptions, detecting them easily in
textbooks, newspaper articles, and so on, while Matthew might
be less good at it.
5. Mental processes and general

thinking skills
Is thinking rightly thought of in terms of mental processes?
Johnson doesn’t exactly deny the existence of such processes,
though he is clearly doubtful of their existence, calling such pro-
cesses ‘probably illusory’ (p. 28). But he is very clearly concerned
about pedagogical calamities that might flow from thinking of
thinking in terms of such processes. Consider, for example, the
supposed process of ‘analysis’. Whether or not this is a genuine
process, thinking that it is runs the risk of committing the
naming fallacy, with predictable bad ramifications for teaching
and learning: ‘whether we are engaged in chemical analysis or we
are analysing a poem, or a chess problem, it may be thought that
we are engaged in one and the same process’ (p. 29, emphasis in
original). But these are clearly not instances of one and the same
process. Thinking of thinking in terms of mental processes might
also lead to thinking that ‘thinking can be reduced to a set of pre-
specified steps’, thus leaving no room in our understanding of
thinking for ‘flashes of insight, leaps, jumps, speculation and the
like that are part and parcel of human inquiry’ (p. 29). Since
thinking in terms of mental processes puts us at risk of making
these mistakes, Johnson suggests, we should not think of thinking
in those terms.
A further worry is the advice of advocates of thinking skills that
learners should ‘become aware of their own mental processes’: As
McGuinness puts it, ‘developing thinking requires that children
make their own thought processes more explicit thus enabling
them to reflect upon their strategies’ (p. 30; citation from DFEE,
p. 5). Johnson objects that such processes, even if real, are not
generally accessible through introspection; that experts do not
exercise their expertise by reflecting upon and improving their
strategies, but rather by utilizing vast repertoires of knowledge of
typical cases and recognizing special cases; and that ‘there are no
rules or processes for having new ideas’, for which ‘imagination
based on sound knowledge and understanding of the subject’ is
essential. He also emphasizes the importance for skilled thinking
of several ‘virtues, dispositions and circumstances’, which again
cannot be understood in terms of mental processes. He objects
that even if the existence of mental processes is conceded, their
relevance to the teaching of general thinking skills is doubtful
(p. 44). Finally, Johnson challenges the identification, by psycho-
logists and educationalists, of specific supposed general thinking
skills, arguing in each case that their existence is dubious. He finds
the supposed skills of distinguishing fact from opinion, observa-
tion, checking the reliability of evidence and being systematic,
all problematic (pp. 34–36).
Details aside, I find Johnson’s several criticisms of the pedago-

gical suggestions just mentioned which are alleged to flow from
thinking of skills in terms of mental processes, and his criticisms
of these particular supposed general thinking skills, on the whole
plausible. (See also Bailin’s (1998) criticism of thinking of thinking
in terms of mental processes.) In any case, I have no wish to defend
his targets here. (However, it seems to me that the point about
encouraging students to reflect on their own thinking – which
reflection is I think on the whole quite salutary – can be rendered
in terms that don’t require appeal to problematic processes, and
that, so rendered, educators ought indeed to encourage students
to so reflect.) So I move on to his final thesis, that ‘[t]he present
preoccupation with thinking skills is educationally dangerous’
(p. 36).
6. The educational dangers of thinking of

thinking in terms of skills
Johnson considers four such dangers:
i. Disparagement of Subject Knowledge: ‘There is a real danger that

subject knowledge will be seen as nothing more than material on which
to practice skills, or even as something that gets in the way of the real
business of education: thinking skills’ (p. 37).
I certainly agree with Johnson that knowledge is important,

and if some advocates of thinking skills disparage it, I’m happy to
join with him in condemning such disparagement and standing up
for knowledge (Siegel 1998). But it is not the case that advocates of
thinking skills cannot also acknowledge the importance of subject
knowledge, as Johnson here intimates. As we’ve seen above, some
advocates of thinking skills – especially those philosophers who
advocate the importance of critical thinking, myself included –
urge the importance of both. There is no contradiction in holding
both that subject-specific knowledge is important, and that the
mastery of skills and abilities which are general in that they can be
applied, exercised and manifested in many diverse situations and
subject matters is also important. So this danger seems to me
avoidable, and I join with Johnson in urging its avoidance.
ii. Thinking of Thinking as Impersonal and Value-Neutral: Johnson here cites

de Bono, who urges the production of a ‘detached’ thinking skill so that
students/thinkers will be able to criticize their own thinking without feel-
ing threatened; Johnson objects to such detachment on the grounds
that ‘Thinking is constitutive of our humanity and of who we are,’ and is
not detachable from our dispositions, personalities, virtues and moral and
other values (p. 38). I quite agree with Johnson’s claim about the connec-
tion between our thinking and the rest of us, but I’m not sure I quite grasp
why he rejects de Bono’s call for students to develop the ability to criticize
their own thinking. Surely one can – and in my view should – acknowl-
edge the ‘undetachability’ of thought from actions, values and the like
while simultaneously plumping for the development of student ability to
critically examine their own thinking. As above, the danger of concern to
Johnson here is avoidable, and I join with him in urging its avoidance.
iii. Lack of Enthusiasm for Truth: Here we can be brief: Johnson is right that
truth is important, right that we must not lose sight of it in our educa-
tional endeavours, and right that we need not do so. He happily does
not claim that ‘those who espouse thinking skills’ must disparage truth,
since they manifestly need not; I agree with Johnson that they should
not (Siegel 1998).
iv. The Computerisation of Thought: ‘Many of my misgivings about thinking
skills’, Johnson writes, ‘may be summarized as worries about the compu-
terization of thought. Cognitive psychologists like McGuinness tend to
view the brain as a computer. Computers manipulate data according to
rules; problems must be explicitly defined and broken down, and then
procedures applied. This model of thought can lead to the illusion that all
intelligent thinking is logical and rule-governed . . . Human thought and
behaviour doesn’t fit this model. Much of our thinking is intuitive and
speculative. And even if some behaviour can be described as if it is rule-
following, the proposed underlying rules play no part in the behaviour’
(p. 41, emphasis in original). Johnson objects as well that the ‘computer
model of thought’ requires the explicit defining of problems, the separa-
tion of thinkers from the world, and the replacement of imagination and
creativity with the rule-governed exchange and manipulation of informa-

tion, all of which Johnson regards as problematic (pp. 41–42).
I am sympathetic with several of Johnson’s objections to the

computer model of thought. (Several of the same points are made
in Scheffler 1991.) I would note only that one can be an advocate
of thinking skills without embracing the computer model. So
again, as above, the dangers Johnson here points out can be avoided
by such advocates.
7. Conclusion
It is in the nature of exercises like this one that criticism comes to
the fore; the reader should therefore not be blamed if she comes
away with the impression that my disagreements with Johnson
are severe. In fact, they are not: we agree on much, and our dis-
agreements, though not insignificant, should not obscure the large
overlap in our views.
The main substantive disagreement between us is that con-
cerning generalizability. For the reasons given above, I continue
to hold that it makes perfect sense to think – despite Johnson’s
protestations – that some thinking skills/abilities are generalizable
in that once acquired, they can be applied, exercised and mani-
fested in many diverse situations/contexts and with respect to
many diverse subject matters. It may well be that our apparent
disagreement on this point stems in the end from disparate under-
standings of ‘generalizability’. It is for that reason that I have tried
to be clear about my own understanding of the term. If it turns
out that Johnson’s rejection of general thinking skills is based on a
different understanding of it, our views will then turn out to be
closer still.
The attentive reader will have noticed a recurring theme of my
discussion: that Johnson’s criticisms of thinking skills are often
telling, but that advocates of thinking skills needn’t embrace the
objectionable targets of Johnson’s critique. The key to avoiding
them is resolutely to refrain from thinking of skills, including
thinking skills, in terms of mysterious processes or habitual and
mindless routines, and to insist on understanding skilled thinking
in terms of quality: that is, as thinking that admits of positive
normative evaluation in that it meets relevant criteria (Bailin and
Siegel 2003).
Would this understanding of thinking skills be consistent with
the McGuinness Report, the National Curriculum or the under-
standing of thinking skills promulgated by the British educational
establishment? Here I am content to yield the floor to Johnson and
the many others more familiar with the British educational scene
than me. But I am happy to join with Johnson in condemning the
untenable understanding of thinking skills he rightly criticizes,
and in likewise condemning the many pedagogical sins he identi-
fies, while upholding the importance of the fundamentally norma-
tive dimension of thinking, which is skilled exactly insofar as it is
of a certain quality, that is, that satisfies relevant criteria to an
appropriate degree.
References
Bailin, S. (1998), ‘Education, knowledge and critical thinking’, in D. Carr (ed.),
Education, Knowledge and Truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse. London:
Routledge, pp. 204–220.
Bailin, S., Case, R., Coombs, J. R. and Daniels, L. B. (1999), ‘Conceptualizing critical
thinking’, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31:3, 285–302.
Bailin, S. and H. Siegel (2003), ‘Critical thinking’, in N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith,
and P. Standish (eds), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education. Oxford:
Blackwell, pp. 181–193.
DFEE, (1999), From Thinking Skills to Thinking Classrooms, London: HMSO.
Ennis, R. H. (1989), ‘Critical thinking and subject specificity: Clarification and needed
research’, Educational Researcher, 18:3, 4–10.
—(1996), Critical Thinking, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hare, W. (1995), ‘Content and criticism: The aims of schooling’, Journal of Philosophy
of Education, 29:1, 47–60.
Johnson, S. (2010), ‘Teaching Thinking Skills’, this volume.

McPeck, J. E. (1990), Teaching Critical Thinking. New York: Routledge.
Scheffler, I. (1989), ‘Moral education and the democratic ideal’, reprinted in Scheffler,
Reason and Teaching. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 136–145.
Originally published by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
—(1991), ‘Computers at schools?’, reprinted in Scheffler, In Praise of the Cognitive
Emotions. New York: Routledge, pp. 80–96. Originally published in Teachers
College Record, 87:4 (1986): 513–28.
Siegel, H. (1988), Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education.
London: Routledge.
—(1990), ‘McPeck, informal logic and the nature of critical thinking’, reprinted in
J. E. McPeck, Teaching Critical Thinking, New York: Routledge, pp. 75–85. Originally
published in Philosophy of Education 1985: Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual
Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education
Society, pp. 61–72; also in Siegel 1988, ch. 1.
—(1997), Rationality Redeemed?: Further Dialogues on an Educational Ideal. New York:
Routledge.
—(1998), ‘Knowledge, truth and education’, in D. Carr (ed.), Education, Knowledge
and Truth: Beyond the Postmodern Impasse. London: Routledge, pp. 19–36.
—(2008), ‘Autonomy, critical thinking and the Wittgensteinian legacy: Reflections
on Christopher Winch, Education, Autonomy and Critical Thinking’, Journal of
Philosophy of Education, 42:1, 165–184.
Suits, B. (2005), The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Peterborough, Canada:
Broadview Press. Originally published by University of Toronto Press in 1978.
Further reading
For a recent overview, see also: Jan Sobocan and Leo Groarke, with Ralph H. Johnson
and Frederick S. Ellett, Jr., (eds), Critical Thinking Education and Assessment: Can
Higher Order Thinking Be Tested?, London, Ontario: The Althouse Press, 2009.
Afterword
Christopher Winch
Chapter Outline
1. Skills 88
2. Skills and transferability 96
3. The question of efﬁcacy 101
4. What is thinking? 103
5. Mental processes 104
6. A summary of Johnson’s claims 107
7. Reasoning 109
8. The role of philosophy 112
9. Reason and argument 113
10. Inductive arguments 120
11. Concluding remarks 122
References 123
In this afterword, I attempt to follow up some of the issues raised

in the debate between Johnson and Siegel. In doing so I attempt to
clarify what I take to be some of the points of agreement, as well as
of disagreement, between the two authors and also to follow up
some considerations that were not perhaps considered to be too
86 Afterword
important by them but which have some further practical and

philosophical interest, particularly in relation to our understand-
ing of practical knowledge. The debate about thinking skills is
concerned with the existence or otherwise of a particular kind of
practical ability, call it a ‘thinking skill’ for the moment, although
we shall see that this phrase has various problems associated with
its use. Johnson identifies these supposed abilities as having the
property of being ‘generally transferable’, a term with which Siegel
does not dissent, although, unlike Johnson, he believes that such
abilities do exist. The term implies that an ability being generally
transferable means that it is both general in scope and transferable
in application from one subject or context to another. However,
abilities generally do not fall into the category of being either
generally transferable or particular and non-transferable since it is
evident that, for example, there are many highly specific skills that
can, once learned in one context or in relation to one subject, be
transferred to other contexts or subjects. It could be that all practi-
cal abilities that are general are also transferable, although that
would have to be demonstrated case by case. We should also note
that generality in this context is a relative term: ability A may be
more general (in terms of the range of contexts in which it poten-
tially has an application) than ability B, while ability C may be
more general in this sense than either A or B.
However, thinking skills, if such there be, are not general in the
sense that the ability of a carpenter is more general than the ability
to saw wood. The former consists of a variety of other, more
specific abilities combined, perhaps, with the ability to integrate
various specific skills into the carrying out of particular projects,
like the construction of tables. The carpenter may well be expected
to plan, control, co-ordinate and evaluate his or her work and very
often a successful carpenter will be someone who is said to be
thoughtful about what he or she does. Indeed, one could plausibly
claim that such a carpenter, to the extent that he or she plans,
controls, co-ordinates and evaluates their work, demonstrates the
Afterword 87
ability to think about what they are doing and hence uses thinking
skills.
The carpenter’s work is thus general in the sense that it com-
prises a range of related abilities and skills which have to be brought
together for the successful achievement of a project. However, the
carpenter’s work is also, arguably, general in another sense. If he or
she is successful because they are thoughtful in their work then
that is because such carpenters bring to bear on their work a range
of abilities that, although they are embedded in the activities of
a carpenter, can also be deployed in other kinds of activities.
For example, the ability to plan ahead is not just a valued attribute
of the occupational abilities of carpenters but also of sculptors,
teachers and generals, to mention just a few. Since such abilities,
once acquired, can be employed in a wide variety of activities,
one might claim that to say that they are transferable is to say
much the same thing as to say that they are general.
If, on the other hand, the ability to plan was specific to particu-
lar activities, so that the planning done by a carpenter was different
from that done by a military strategist, one would wish to deny
that planning was general ability, or at least affirm that its general-
ity was restricted. A fortiori it would not be transferable from the
activity of carpentry to that of military strategy. In these cases
abilities which, when exercised, have the potential to occur within
a wide range of other abilities, could be said to be general in a
somewhat different sense to the first as they do, in a sense, infuse
a range of abilities rather than merely being wide in their sphere
of operations. The idea of general transferability/particular non-
transferability might not then be applicable to every activity or
every aspect of an activity, but it could be associated with abilities
which could plausibly be said to be features of other abilities, per-
haps features whose presence enhanced the quality of performance
of the activities associated with those abilities.
But there is a further feature of such abilities which we need to
note. It is not simply that they appear to have the potential to occur
88 Afterword
within the exercise of a range of other abilities but that they also
appear to be incapable of being exercised except within the context
of some particular activity. One cannot plan tout court, for exam-
ple, one must plan something or other, one must be creative with
respect to some medium or other, one must compare one or more
things in some respect or other and so on. It seems then that the
general transfer claim made in relation to thinking abilities has to
be one that maintains that there is sufficient in the planning etc. in
ability of type A to warrant our calling it the same ability when
exercised in an ability of type B. It is not that thinking could be
something done independently of any activity, and which just
happened to be applicable to a range of different types of activities,
but rather it is in the nature of a thinking ability it cannot but be
applied to particular types of activity in order to be instantiated.
So we can see that the claim that a thinking ability is general and
that it is transferable stand or fall together, and that thinking abili-
ties are by their nature implicated in other abilities. This makes
them somewhat different from many of the other abilities that we
are called on to develop and assess and this makes their treatment
rather more complex.
1. Skills
First, it is necessary to consider the term ‘skill’. In the English
language, a skill, which is a form of practical knowledge or know-
how, is conceptually linked to a type of task, such as firing a bow
and arrow, forming a pot, cutting wood etc. So it appears as if a
skill is a kind of ability to perform a task, typically, but by no means
exclusively, a manual task. In fact, the issue is slightly more com-
plicated by an ambiguity in our use of the term ‘skill’. We often
say that ‘so and so has a skill’, implying that the skill is a possession
of that person. But it also makes sense to say that more than one
person has the same skill. In this second sense, a skill is more like a
Afterword 89
technique or way of carrying out a type of task, which can then be
learned and applied by individuals who may then become skilled
in the exercise of that technique and hence acquire that skill as a
personal attribute. A type of task that has varying ranges of appli-
cability and the acquisition of a technique, such as that of sawing
wood, usually means that the possessor of such a skill will be able
to apply it in a range of situations, which is not precisely deter-
minate. Few skills are applicable to only one task or one very
narrowly defined type of task, although some highly specialized
skills fall into this category. In this sense, all skills possess some
degree of generality, although Siegel would distinguish this from
universality, which would imply that a skill could be applied to
any task-type, a claim that few, if any, would wish to make about
any skill. There is, given the link between skill and type of task,
a limitedness about skills to the extent that tasks are very often
limited types of action, usually involving the accomplishment of
a specific and often short-term goal.
Although skills are related to types of task, they also have
varying degrees of generality in their application. Just as some
task-types are more restricted than others in terms of the range
of actions required to accomplish them (the task of governing a
country in contrast to the task of tying my shoe-laces), so some
skills are more restricted than others in the range of actions that
the possessor must perform in order to accomplish them. Thus
the skill of reading can be applied to a wide range of texts in the
relevant language (although by no means necessarily all of them).
Reading typically involves a range of actions which may include
matching written symbols to sounds, decoding written symbols,
grasping literal meaning, inferring beyond the literal meaning in
the text, evaluating what one has understood and enjoying the text,
through the entertainment of stimulating thoughts while reading
it. By contrast, the skill of chiselling wood can only be applied to
certain kinds of wood in certain states so is, in some sense, a less
90 Afterword
general skill than reading, in the sense that it applies to a smaller

range of types of task and necessitates a smaller range of actions
in order to accomplish such tasks successfully.
The concept of transferability is also commonly used in relation
to skills, meaning that a skill mastered in one context can be
employed in another. Thus, my ability to saw wood in a workshop
can be subsequently applied in a forest (perhaps with some modi-
fications to my practice). However, as already noted, it might be
objected that there is no real distinction between generality and
transferability in skills, since the definition of a type of task might
be dependent on context and purpose, so that a skill may appear
to be more or less general according to what one is talking about.
Thus archery could be defined for some purposes as any kind of
shooting with a bow and arrow, or for another, as a skill applied
solely to the use of a longbow in an archery contest. And since
the ability to shoot a longbow in an archery contest would not
necessarily be applicable to say, hunting with a crossbow, it would
not be transferable to such a context either, so the distinction
between generality and transferability appears like a distinction
without a difference. Johnson’s critical characterization of thinking
skills as ‘generally transferable’ might then be apposite, although
it should be noted that Section 7 of his chapter is devoted to gen-
eral thinking skills. He does not, however, distinguish between
general thinking skills and generally transferable thinking skills
and we may assume that both authors are happy with the idea
that the claim that there are general thinking skills is not signifi-
cantly different from the claim that there are generally transferable
thinking skills.
Nevertheless, although one might not wish to distinguish
between general and transferable skills might one not wish to
distinguish between more and less general kinds of practical
ability? To follow up the ability of already discussed ability of a
carpenter, it might be said to be more general than that of some-
one who is merely capable of sawing wood, although both of them
Afterword 91
may be more or less able to transfer the use of the ability to saw
wood from one context to another, from the workshop to the
forest for example. In German, this difference in breadth of practi-
cal ability is recognized in the language. A Fähigkeit in the singular
refers, in the context of vocational education, to an integrated
occupational capacity with a broad scope (Hanf, 2009). For exam-
ple, the bricklayer in Germany is considered to be someone who
is almost a ‘universal construction worker’ whose abilities allow
him or her to undertake a very wide range of independently con-
ducted activities within the industry. The occupational Fähigkeit
of a carpenter is not transferable into another occupation like
plumbing or plastering, for which a separate vocational education
will need to be undertaken.
The individual skills or Fertigkeiten of the bricklayer, on the
other hand, are narrower in scope but are also potentially transfer-
able. For example, the ability to measure length will be useful for
bricklaying but for many other activities as well and will, in this
sense, be both relatively narrow in terms of the types of action
required but, to a considerable degree, transferable.
It is also worth noting one other aspect of broadly conceived
abilities like an occupational Fähigkeit. A carpenter is expected,
not only to carry out the technical activities that are associated
with working with wood, but also to plan, co-ordinate and evalu-
ate his or her work. In other words, certain personal characteristics
are required to successfully practice the occupation of a carpenter,
which include being systematic, working considerately and pro-
ductively with others and having high personal standards. It is
an interesting question as to whether or not such individual char-
acteristics, or virtues, are, once acquired, relatively easily transfer-
able to other kinds of activities. A strong tradition of thinking
about the virtues would, however, claim that this was the case. If
so, it would be the way in which one goes about one’s various
activities that would be transferable to actions, quite possibly of a
completely different type, in other contexts.
92 Afterword
It may well be then that the term ‘skill’ is causing problems

of understanding what the term ‘thinking skills’ actually means.
Siegel himself prefers to talk of ‘abilities that admit of normative
evaluation’ rather than skills in this connection (p. 60), leaving it
open that thinking abilities are general as well as being possibly
transferable, in the sense that they may be quite wide ranging
integrative abilities which may involve a range of integrated
specific skills, as well as other kinds of know-how. Such an ability
may or may not be transferable. To establish that point would
require a separate argument which would need to establish that
the ability in question could be applied in a wide range of circum-
stances and/or to a wide range of subject matters. A generally
transferable ability would then be broad and integrated and
perhaps be related to an activity category such as that of an
occupation, but would also be capable of application in a range
of extra-occupational contexts.
The question would then arise as to whether Johnson’s critique
of the notion of thinking abilities only applies when these are
thought of as thinking skills. Siegel agrees with Johnson that two
connotations of the term ‘skill’ would be quite inappropriate to
all the kinds of abilities that he has in mind. First, in the sense
of unthinking, mindless behaviour when presumably a skill is
exercised in an almost habitual way. In this sense, insofar as the
activity performed scarcely qualifies as an action, it is doubtful
whether one can call it the exercise of a skill. Second, it is also
clear that for neither author is it acceptable to characterize a
thinking skill as nothing more than the exercise of a private
and inscrutable mental process. Nevertheless, Siegel’s thinking
abilities are certainly claimed to be transferable in the sense
that they can be used in a variety of contexts and on a variety
of different subject matters once acquired in a relatively small
number of initial ones. It is plausible to claim also they are general
in the sense that they combine and integrate a range of relatively
specific skills and other kinds of know-how. Neither does Siegel
Afterword 93
exclude the possibility that thinking abilities may be more general
than skills.
Siegel, as we have seen, does not wish to insist on the term
‘skill’ to describe the abilities whose existence and usefulness he
wishes to defend. To what extent does this blunt Johnson’s attack
on thinking skills? It may do to the extent that Johnson’s critique of
thinking skills is focused on the concept of a skill and the reader
will notice that Johnson is concerned to make some criticisms of
the coherence of the idea that one could apply the concept of a skill
to thinking. However, Johnson’s principal targets, as Siegel notes,
are official initiatives of the governments of England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland. But Siegel wants to maintain that
there undoubtedly are thinking abilities. If they are not only skills,
then what else might they be? The English word ‘skill’, as we have
already noted, is in some respects difficult to translate into other
languages. The home of the concept of skill is located, as we have
noted, in manual and co-ordinative dexterities, such as planing,
sawing, balancing or archery as they are applied to certain types of
tasks. Some people, especially philosophers, tend to get uncom-
fortable when the concept of a skill is extended beyond these
primary contexts. The skill of multiplying in one’s head does not
arouse too much controversy: we do not find great difficulty with
the idea of mental skills like this.
Again, some ‘social’ skills such as knowing how to address a
Duke or to eat with a knife and fork at a banquet do not arouse
suspicion when classified as skills. What, however, about the
so-called ‘soft skills’ such as being able to relate to other people in
formal or informal situations? Is there not a danger of misclassify-
ing them as skills as there seems to be an implicit assumption
that, in dealing with other people, we exercise abilities that are
qualitatively like those we employ when shaping blocks of wood
or damming rivers, namely abilities that are applied to bending
inanimate matter to our will? This would seem to be a problem
with thinking skills, as they would normally be exercised to no
94 Afterword
inconsiderable extent on persuading and influencing other people.

It is also sometimes thought that skills are value neutral that they
can be applied to any objective, evil or good. It is also sometimes
thought that the possession of skills has no effect on someone’s
character. Yet the ability to think clearly and effectively seems to be
part of a person’s character, just as its absence is also a character
trait.
Concerns such as these fuel the idea that the agenda of the
proponents of thinking skills is the development of the capacity
for technical action uninformed by considerations of value or
character development. This is probably one of the factors that
motivates Siegel to steer clear of the formulation of his central
claims in terms of skills as opposed to abilities. He is surely right to
see the danger in a formulation of what he wants to claim in terms
which either suggest that the ability to engage in generally trans-
ferable thinking is value neutral or has no effect on character
development. For instance, Siegel is clear that a concern for truth
should be central to effective thinking and that certain virtues
such as patience and consideration for one’s interlocutor and a
predisposition towards charitable interpretation of a position are
prerequisites of the possessor of sound thinking abilities. In this
sense Siegel is no advocate of sophistry or the use of argument to
gain one’s ends no matter what these might be, in the manner
of someone like Dionosydorus in Plato’s dialogue Euthydemus
(Plato in Hare and Russell (1970)).
However, it is by no means clear that skills are quite like the
philosophical literature often suggests that they are. It seems that
skills can be exercised with care, with concern for others, with
attention to detail, with a love of excellence and so on. In such
cases, we are dealing with the so-called ‘bourgeois’ (bürgerliche)
virtues, described by Kerschensteiner and contrasted with ‘civic’
(staatsbürgerliche) virtues like courage and generosity (Kerschen-
steiner 1964). If they are exercised in such a way then it is more
difficult to maintain that they are value-neutral. Of course skills
can be misused, but so also can virtues more generally. Even the
Afterword 95
love of justice can arguably be led astray in its exercise by a virtu-
ous person as, for example, Captain Vere in his dealings with Billy
Budd in Melville’s eponymous novel, or in the misguided actions
of a courageous person in a cruel war. Indeed it can be argued that
even some skills require civic virtues: the bomb disposal expert
requires personal courage but also the ability to appreciate the
consequences of his actions on the welfare of other people, for
example. If the exercise of skill or at least the skilful performance of
tasks involves the development and exercise of virtues, then it is not
true to say that the acquisition and the exercise of skills has no
effect on the development of a person’s character. It is far from
clear that a ‘skills approach’ to thinking or to anything else neces-
sarily isolates the agent either from values or from character devel-
opment. I would suggest that the problem with the skills in thinking
skills is that they are tied to types of task rather than to broader
fields of ability, but Siegel appears to recognize that difficulty.
Of course, the common perception that skills have no effect on
character or character development may be one that both some of
the proponents and some of the opponents of the development
of thinking skills may share (for a recent example of this claim
about skills, see Hyland 2008). I suspect that the confusion arises
because a skill in the sense of a personal attribute is identified with
a skill in the sense of a technique or way of carrying out a type of
task. Since the latter is not a property of any person it is, of course,
a mistake to attribute personal characteristics to it. But it is no
mistake to attribute personal characteristics to someone’s exercise
of that technique as skill. If this point is true of skills it is also true
of broader abilities.
Of course it is one thing to pay lip service to the recognition of
values and to the exercise of virtues in the case of skills, but another
thing altogether to have a substantive commitment to the nurture
of those values and virtues. But whether or not that is the case will
need to be determined by the actual commitments of those who
plan and promote ‘thinking skills’ programmes. Johnson’s critique
sounds a warning to those who would neglect these aspects of
96 Afterword
character development in their concern to develop intellectual

ability. Johnson does not criticize Siegel over this matter, but as we
have noted earlier, Johnson’s primary concerns are with proponents
of thinking skills within the British educational establishment.
2. Skills and transferability

I want now to look at some actual examples of the transferability
of skills in order to see how more uncontroversial cases can be used
to understand the claim that ‘thinking skills’ are generally transfer-
able. A good example is English, where children are asked to make
inferences beyond what is literally stated in a text. Given that this
content is part of the attainment target of Reading in the English
part of the English National Curriculum, one may assume that
being able to do these things is either a general or a transferable
ability or is generally transferable.
As a subject, it has to be taught through the use of a subject
matter – one has to be able to read and write about something or
other once one has passed the earliest stages. Very often, the early
stages of learning to read are based on texts whose primary
purpose is pedagogic, to familiarize children with sight-sound
(grapheme-phoneme) correspondences and, on the basis of these,
to be able, first to decode and then to understand text. Thus, on a
skill of grapheme-phoneme decoding and an associated skill of
phoneme blending is built the further skill of decoding, that is
of articulating a sound from a written prompt. One can see here
how some highly specific skills (namely the extraction of grapheme-
phoneme correspondences and the blending of phonemes) are used
to develop a slightly more general skill, namely that of decoding,
which is relevant to a wider range of written subject matter than
pedagogically designed texts. Decoding, still a relative specific
skill, can then be transferred to other texts and can be gradually
developed to deal with texts of increasing complexity, thus becom-
ing more general in the range of its application. Indeed, it and the
Afterword 97
earlier, simpler, skills are also transferable since, having been
acquired through one or more kinds of texts, they can be used in
connection with many others. We can see, therefore, that skills
may have varying ranges of generality, that is, the tasks that they
encompass have relatively broad or narrow scope and that they are
also transferable, that is they can be acquired in one type of task
and then used in another, more or less related, task. It is not always
the case that a transferable skill is also general. For example, a skill
that is only useable in highly specific circumstances in a very
particular type of task, like the use of a particular tool to attach
or detach a component on the engine of a car could be used in a
wide range of circumstances where this task needed to be carried
out, perhaps in different kinds of machinery and thus be specific
but transferable. However, broader abilities such as mastery of an
occupation or, in the example above, that of accomplished reading,
may well be characterizable as both general and transferable,
general in this context being a relative term, certain abilities are
relatively general compared with more specific ones. In this case,
the practice of an occupation or advanced reading involves the
integrated deployment of many different skills and can then be
described as relatively general.
Reading, everyone would agree, is incomplete and of little value
unless it involves understanding of the text which one is reading.
Therefore, one of the abilities that is acquired and developed
through the early stages of learning to read is not just the matching
of seen to sounded words and chunks of text, but the ability to
grasp the sense of what is in the written text. In its most elementary
form this involves being able to explain the literal meaning of sen-
tences in the text; later it will involve being able to reorganize the
meaning for a specific purpose, to make inferences within and
beyond the text, evaluate the quality of aspects of the text and to
develop appreciation of its aesthetic and other qualities (Beard
1990). These abilities may be called skills, but one should be aware
of a difference between them and the earlier mentioned skills of
98 Afterword
decoding. They are relatively broad and arguably unrelated to

specific types of tasks as they can be used across an increasing
variety of different texts and different kinds of text. They build
on and presuppose already existing abilities to reorganize, infer,
evaluate and appreciate that have been, and continue to be deve-
loped in spoken language and finally their successful development
and transfer into application to other texts will depend to no small
degree on vocabulary and subject specific knowledge. However,
there can be little doubt that the ability to read texts is also trans-
ferable to other types of tasks or activities to a greater or lesser
degree, dependent on an individual’s possession of other forms
of know-how and propositional knowledge. One could also say
that reading, once fluency has been acquired, is a general skill as
it is applicable to many different subject matters. In some cases,
therefore, such as with reading or ‘thinking skills’ we may not wish
to distinguish between the generality and the transferability of
abilities.
Someone might wish to object at this point that it is question-
able whether reading is a transferable ability; why not say that
a different ability is exercised each time a different text-type is
encountered, so that when different forms of know-how (e.g.,
words with different roots) and different forms of knowledge (e.g.,
knowledge of hydraulics when reading a plumbing manual) are
encountered, then the difference is sufficiently great for us to say
that a different kind of reading ability is involved? This move is
suggested in Cigman and Davis (2008) when they write:
Do we understand the notion of a ‘specific ability’ which is

not simply an ability to x or y, but is transferable from x to y?
What reason do we have to say (or indeed deny) that the ability
that now manifests as an ability to y is the same ability as that
which formerly manifested as an ability to x? (Davis and Cigman,
2008, op.cit. p.705)
This quotation suggests that there is a problem about the very

notion of transferability. Any ability is an ability of someone to do
Afterword 99
something or other. Since that something or other is specific (it is,
for example, a particular task), it cannot follow that ability to
do task A is the same ability the ability to do task B, even if the
agent can do both. It would thus not follow from Jones’ ability
to read The Lord of the Rings in English that he possessed the ability
to read The Charterhouse of Parma (in English). If Jones were
able to read both this would indicate that he had manifested two
distinct abilities. Notice that this very strong doctrine of non-
transferability is not one held by Johnson, who writes:
. . . Yet in a minimal and trivial sense all skills are transferable in

so far as all skills can be repeated in relevantly similar circumstances
. . . (p. 20)
a property which Johnson refers to as ‘portability’ which appears

to be similar to ‘transferability’ as I am using the term in this after-
word. The position described in the Davis and Cigman quotation
above could be characterized as ‘extreme non-transferability’. In
this respect Johnson expresses the consensus view about how we
are to understand attributions of practical knowledge, namely that
they apply to task or activity types rather than tokens or particular
instances. Abilities thus apply to types of tasks or activities, although
they are manifested in particular tasks and activities when they are
exercised. An ability that was only applicable to one particular task
would not be transferable since, by stipulation, it would be a differ-
ent ability when exercised on a different task. But there is little
warrant in the way in which we talk about skills and abilities for
claiming that abilities apply to individual (token) tasks rather than
types of task, although there may well be debate about the breadth
of a task-type and the range of contexts in which it applies. But
this is only to be expected since our language is often vague and
purpose- and context-dependent in relation to these issues. But if
ability to x is an ability to perform a type of task and if the criteria
of identity for a specific task-type are sufficiently recognized, then
there is little difficulty in maintaining that the ability to x can be
transferred to a range of different situations in which the same
100 Afterword
task-type can be identified. The ability to decode text in English,

for example, can be applied to texts in plumbing, finance and
literature. Provided that we understand that ascribing know-how
to someone is to ascribe to them an ability to carry out an activity
or task of a certain type, then it is relatively unproblematic to talk
of the transfer of, for example, a skill exercised on one particular
task to another. On this point I take it that there is consensus
between Johnson and Siegel.
But talk of transfer can go beyond this, since many activities
consist of integrated systems of sub-activities or subskills and a
skill involved in one type of more complex ability may be capable
of exercise in the same type of task implicated in a different com-
plex activity. In this sense, know-how applicable in one type of
activity may well be transferable to another type of activity, for
example calculation in accountancy to calculation in engineering.
Whether it is transferable directly without the acquisition of some
further knowledge or know-how is a question that needs to be
settled through examination of the detail of each case.
Looking at the analogy between the ability to read and the
ability to think, in the case of reading that we are considering, it is
far from clear that the ability to infer one sentence from another
within a text, or to infer a proposition that is not within the text
from one that is, is generally transferable, as opposed to a relatively
general ability exercisable over a range of cognate subject matters
which nevertheless failed to apply to a significant range of other
subject matters. Given that one may be able to talk in a fairly con-
fident way about the transferability of some inferential abilities
within an academic subject area, for example, it does not follow
that we can be confident about the transferability of that ability
beyond that subject area to another one, or to non-academic
contexts. It is in connection with the issue of the transfer of an
ability from one type of activity or from one subject area to another
that the main points of difference between Johnson and Siegel
emerge.
Afterword 101
The problems in the case of inferring are compounded in the
case of other possible thinking abilities such as comparing, evaluat-
ing or creating. When one compares one thing with another, one
does so in some respect or another and with some purpose in
mind. The discovery of sameness and difference will depend on
what one is comparing and for what purpose one is doing the
comparing. In looking for signs of life, the comparison of a living
human being with a doll would suggest great dissimilarity; in
assessing form and shape, the two might be quite similar, com-
pared with, say a crocodile or a worm. Another consideration is
that comparison may require detailed examination and knowledge
of the items to be compared, for example for a medical doctor
in the examination of healthy and diseased bodily organs. One
cannot expect someone to do this without the relevant background
know-how and propositional knowledge. For these reasons, and
for others Siegel is inclined to agree with Johnson that the ability
to compare, thought of either as a general ability of extremely
broad scope across different subject matters, or as a relatively
specific ability capable of easy transfer to other subject matters, is
to be regarded with some suspicion. Siegel does not specify what
other supposedly very general abilities might be subject to similar
strictures, but one suspects that, where similar considerations to
comparing apply, he would agree with Johnson.
3. The question of efficacy

What do we know of the efficacy of teaching thinking skills within
the National Curriculum? How would one determine whether or
not the teaching of thinking skills had been worthwhile? Would it
relate to increased learning and understanding within a particular
subject, or across more than one subject or would it have broader
effects in terms of the learner’s growing autonomy? The National
Curriculum documentation itself gives little clue as to what it sees
as the desirable outcomes of this specific strand of the curriculum,
102 Afterword
let alone which are more desirable than others. As we have noted,
Siegel does not agree that there are universal abilities – abilities
that are applicable to any kind of subject matter. He does maintain
that there is a set of abilities, broad in scope, which may with rela-
tive ease be transferred, once they have been learned, to other
subject matters and contexts. It is not entirely clear whether or not
Johnson thinks that there are such abilities and, if so, just what
they are. Thus it could be the case that Siegel thinks that there are
some generally transferable abilities and that Johnson thinks that
there are none. More plausibly, they may both agree that there
are some generally transferable abilities but disagree either about
what the set of generally transferable abilities is, or how transfer-
able they are, or both. If the latter is the case then the disagreement
between the two has to be settled through the detailed discussion
of examples and evidence rather than through very general abstract
or logical considerations.
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of thinking skills programmes
is limited. A useful source is Solon (2007) who reviews the extant
literature and reports a small-scale study in which a group of psy-
chology students of similar attainment were divided into a control
and an experimental group. The experimental group was given an
infusion programme of generic critical thinking instruction and
homework while the control group was not. Without detriment to
their post-test performance on a psychology test it was found that
the experimental group made significant gains on the Cornell Z
test as a measure of critical thinking compared with the control
group. Solon acknowledges the limitations of a small-scale (not
purely experimental) study and the need for further work, but
suggests that this study shows that critical thinking can be taught
through infusion methods without detriment to subject instruc-
tion. More empirical work does certainly need to be done and the
results presented here are very interesting, particularly in their
report of non-detriment, which is obviously a concern whenever
curriculum substitution is mooted.
Afterword 103
One may however wonder how to interpret these results as they
relate to critical thinking ability. The experimental group received
instruction in generic (generally transferable) critical thinking
skills and the post-experimental critical thinking instrument, the
Cornell Z test, measured ability in generic critical thinking. Thus
it was established that instruction in generic critical thinking
within the experimental group resulted in statistically significant
increases in test scores in critical thinking skills. This would not,
however, be sufficient to show that the critical thinking skills
thus acquired were transferable. One would need to conduct
further empirical work to establish this in order to ascertain
whether improved critical thinking abilities resulted in improved
understanding and performance in a range of subject matters,
including the subject matter in which the critical thinking pro-
gramme had been embedded. So we cannot say at this stage that
there has been conclusive evidence for the claims of the advocates
of critical thinking skills, although it has become clearer what
kind of evidence needs to be collected in order to establish such
claims.
4. What is thinking?
The concept of a skill poses problems for those who advocate the
development of thinking as a cross-curricular subject. These pro-
blems are mainly concerned with the narrowness of skills and the
fact that they are related to the performance of tasks rather than
to broader types of activity. We want to say (rightly) that thinking
is very often concerned with broader categories of activities than
tasks, for example with the conduct of one’s professional activity
as a whole. But these problems can be resolved by refusing to
confine thinking to skills and by admitting that the adjective
‘thinking’ can be applied to broader categories of agency as well
as to the performance of highly specific tasks. The term ‘thinking’
and its cognates have excited far more philosophical attention
104 Afterword
than ‘skills’ and much of this debate is, not surprisingly, highly
relevant to the issue under consideration in this volume.
Siegel suggests that clarity about thinking abilities is best
achieved by pointing to the kind of teaching that might be done
which would exemplify teaching general thinking abilities (Siegel,
p. 68). This consists of such activities as: identifying unstated
assumptions, reconstructing arguments in premise-conclusion
form, stating the nature of the relationship between the premises
and conclusions, and evaluating the arguments, identifying any
particular fallacies. In other words, Siegel maintains, there are
perfectly ordinary and straightforwardly intelligible examples of
thinking skills, but they do not exclude broader categories of
agency. So it is pretty clear what the focus of Siegel’s advocacy in
respect of thinking skills actually is, as it is largely related to the
development of the ability to understand, analyse, criticize and
construct arguments. Thinking, then, can relate to particular types
of task such as identifying the premises and conclusions of argu-
ments in a particular field, but could be part of a broader activity
such as, for example, developing a critical approach to History.
5. Mental processes
What is not so clear, however, is the characterization of these
abilities as ‘thinking abilities’. Siegel claims that thinking involves
mental acts or events of one sort or another and that such events
‘all depend on or are manifestations of particular sorts of brain
activity’ (pp. 67–68). If the activities described above are cases of
thinking then it would not necessarily follow that they were either
mental (non-physical) events nor manifestations or results of
brain activity, even if they were associated with such processes (see
Hacker 2007 for example). But is thinking a type of mental event?
One point worth noting about the examples above is that they can
take place either publicly as part of a discussion in a social context
or through the solitary writing out, for example, of sentences with
Afterword 105
premises at the top of the page and conclusions at the bottom, they
can be rehearsed in ‘inner speech’ or they can be carried out as
internal acts of judgement, rather like mental arithmetic calcula-
tion. The last case is clearly one where we are inclined to say that
the exercise of the ability involves mental occurrences, but are the
first two or three? All of them are clear examples of intellectual
activity, but are they simply examples of sequences of mental
events? One could maintain that any outward activity like sequ-
encing an argument on paper needs to be accompanied by a mental
sequencing which is a precondition for the one that is done on
paper. But again, this is philosophically controversial and is not
required by the claim that there are generally transferable abilities
of this kind (see Ryle 1949). Neither Johnson nor Siegel seem to
be committed by their arguments to any such claim. Whether or
not one calls such mental events examples of thinking is again not
central to the issue under discussion, since they can be described in
more specific ways. One might begin to be puzzled as to why the
debate about thinking skills has been framed around the concept
of thinking, just as one can be puzzled as to why it has been framed
around skills, as opposed to performing activities like analysing
arguments.
The puzzle is heightened by the realization that one can, for
example, evaluate an argument in a thoughtful or a thoughtless
manner. Indeed, to the extent that doing so is an instance of exer-
cising a skill, one could be said to do so more or less skilfully to
the extent that one did so more or less thoughtfully. At the very
least, being thoughtful about evaluating an argument is, other
things being equal, more likely to lead to success than not being
thoughtful about it. A thoughtful evaluator of arguments will take
care to be accurate, consider alternative interpretations, check his
interpretation with others and try to understand what the person
offering the argument was trying to achieve. One reason why
instruction and practice in the carrying out of such activities is
advocated is because it is believed that it will make evaluators of
106 Afterword
arguments more thoughtful and better at what they are doing. This
is the kernel, as I understand it, of the claim of advocates of the
teaching of ‘thinking skills’.
However, if evaluating an argument is an example of thinking
(however one wishes to characterize thinking), then it seems that
one could think thoughtlessly in the sense that one could fail to
do the good things mentioned above. This is not a particularly
welcome conclusion, even if it is not necessarily disastrous, for
someone who holds that thinking is a mental process, but it does
raise the question as to how important it is for the advocate of the
teaching of thinking abilities to insist that it involves instruction,
training and practice in the exercise of thinking as opposed to,
say, argument analysis.
It is worth noticing a divergence between the concepts of
thought on the one hand and skill on the other in this respect. It is
possible to exercise a skill unskilfully, for example if one is a novice
or one is not taking care of what one is doing. We say, for example,
that Jones laid the brick wall in an untidy manner. It is also true to
say of someone evaluating an argument that they did so inaccu-
rately or in an uncharitable manner. But thinking with little or no
thought seems at the least philosophically odd, while exercising a
skill in an unskilful manner seems less so. To say that someone
analyses arguments carelessly or ineptly, on the other hand, is
certainly not odd.
Fortunately, evaluation of the claims of Siegel and other advo-
cates of the teaching of ‘thinking skills’ does not require the resolu-
tion of such issues, as in an important sense the debate between
them and their critics depends neither on insisting on a common
meaning of the term ‘skill’ nor of ‘thinking’. The debate is rather
about whether a particular range of activities is generally transfer-
able or not and clarity is best served by focusing on this question,
which is what both authors largely confine themselves to. This
strategy has the very welcome consequences of allowing their
readers to eliminate distractions and to focus on the substantial
Afterword 107
issues at stake. It is not clear, therefore, that the debate about
thinking skills is about thinking either, as opposed to the generality
and transferability of certain kinds of abilities.
6. A summary of Johnson’s claims

Johnson’s assault on the teaching of thinking skills is focused on
the claim that the skills advocated by thinking skills enthusiasts do
not exist. Whatever these abilities are, they are poorly character-
ized as ‘skills’ and to say that they involve thinking is also problem-
atic, as thinking is too vague or ramified a concept to be associated
with a particular kind of activity. Johnson does not deny that
people think, nor that some are better at it than others, nor even
that one can be assisted through pedagogic means to become
better at thinking. The important point at issue is whether or not
these abilities have the required general transferability to make it
pedagogically worthwhile to devote time and resources to teaching
them. On this point, Johnson and Siegel beg to differ. One further
point of agreement between the two should be mentioned. Johnson
would deny and Siegel certainly does not claim, that there is a
universal ability of thinking or reasoning which can be applied to
any activity. The dispute is over a much more restricted point,
which concerns whether or not such abilities are generally transfer-
able. Given that universality is excluded the question then rests on
a matter of degree. Is there an ability associated with reasoning
well which is very broad in scope which applies once one acquires
it in a wide range of subject matters, or alternatively, which is,
with little or no extra knowledge, transferable into a wide range of
subjects, or are there no such abilities?
Johnson denies that there are a range of skills that are generally
transferable. These include those set out in the National Curricu-
lum: creative thinking, enquiry, evaluation, information processing
and reasoning. The claim is that there are no such skills or abilities
of a general nature which can be identified independently of the
108 Afterword
subject matters to which they apply or the contexts in which they

are exercised. Thus, although it is possible to apply one’s ability
to evaluate the technique used in painting portraits in oil on suc-
cessive paintings, it is not possible to apply that ability to evaluate
the musical merits of an opera score or the efficiency of a steam
engine. His claim would be that these are distinct abilities because
the types of activity on which they are exercised have too little in
common for it to be possible to identify any substantial element
that they have in common with each other which would make
it worthwhile to teach in such a way as to promote transfer from
one type of activity to another.
It may be doubted whether Johnson is opposed either to the
idea that, within particular subject matters, abilities that can best
be described as creative thinking, evaluation etc. are desirable attri-
butes and should be cultivated by anyone seeking to be proficient,
let alone excellent in the subject that he or she is setting out to
master. The claim would rather be that these abilities are specific
to the subject being studied and that they have limited, if any,
transfer to other areas. Although he does not call on the British
philosopher of education, Paul Hirst and his earlier work on forms
of knowledge, in many ways Hirst’s arguments for the distinctive-
ness of the central concepts, proposition and methods of enquiry
in broadly distinct areas of human knowledge would be congenial
to the case made out by Johnson (Hirst 1974). The proficient
thinker in a particular subject or form of knowledge would, on
this account, be someone who had acquired the ability to think
effectively through immersion in the subject matter, by learning the
skill of, say argument analysis through the study of History.
The most popular alternative view to this, set out by McGuiness
and quoted in Johnson’s contribution, is the infusion approach
which ‘seeks to embed thinking skills within curricular areas by
utilising opportunities for developing general thinking skills within
curriculum subjects’ (Johnson, pp. 5–6). The general abilities are
thus developed within curriculum subjects and transferred to
Afterword 109
others once acquired. Unlike the immersion approach, the target
general abilities are explicitly identified and then applied within
the subject. Since he denies that there are such general abilities he
denies the feasibility of the infusion approach. But, as we have seen,
Siegel is, at the very least, cautious about endorsing the existence of
a range of abilities such as comparing, without examining whether
or not these have the generality that some ascribe to them. Without
getting our authors to mount a detailed examination of each of
these abilities and their possible general transferability it is difficult
to establish the precise degree of agreement and disagreement
between them on this general issue.
7. Reasoning
However, on one particular issue it appears that there are clear and
identifiable differences, namely whether the practice of argument
analysis and evaluation is a generally transferable ability or one
that is of limited or no general transferability. Johnson does not
devote his argument explicitly to this type of ability, but one may
safely assume that it is one of the many kinds of putative thinking
skills that he wishes to deny the existence of.
There are some reasons for thinking that this is a curious place
for sharp divisions between the two authors to emerge. After all,
few deny that the systematization of arguments is a science that
has made significant progress since the time when Aristotle enu-
merated the forms of syllogistic reasoning and particularly since
the work of Gottlob Frege at the end of the nineteenth century
made possible the incorporation of some forms of reasoning into
formal calculi. Even if we ignore the formalization of reasoning,
it is also the case that the informal study of argumentation has
been intensively developed and the classifications of fallacies and
mistakes in informal reasoning have been widely accepted. Indeed,
Johnson himself makes use of them in his arguments against
general thinking skills.
110 Afterword
The study of informal reasoning is different in scope from the

study of its formal counterpart, as a move in a formal calculus may
be allowable in that calculus but useless in the everyday context
of a discussion or argument. For example, the fallacy of begging
the question, which involves making either overtly or covertly, an
assumption which is also the conclusion or part of the conclusion
that one wishes to draw, is generally accepted as a fallacy. Someone
who already presupposes what he seeks to argue for in the premises
of his argument can scarcely expect the assent of his interlocutor
to the argument, since it assumes something that he may not be
inclined to accept, which may possibly be the point of dissension
in a discussion. On the other hand, an argument one of whose
premises is also the conclusion is trivially sound or valid. So the
teaching of reasoning will not be confined to a knowledge of and
facility with arguments which are sound or which are valid, but
will be concerned with whether or not one is entitled or obliged
to accept a conclusion as the result of a particular argument.
Since Johnson’s case is built on the careful construction of his
own arguments it may be asked what the status of these arguments
is and what the scope of their application might be. An interlo-
cutor hostile to Johnson may even pose the following dilemma.
On the one hand, Johnson’s arguments, if they are good ones, are
specific to philosophy and cannot be applied to attempts to justify
the teaching of reasoning made in other disciplinary contexts such
as psychology. On the other hand, if they have a transdisciplinary
application are they not examples of the exercise of just the kind
of ability that Johnson has devoted much effort to denying the
existence of? Johnson identifies four fallacious moves which he
maintains that the proponents of thinking skills are guilty of:
reification, essentialism, naming and generalization. Let us examine
whether they have the kind of general transferability that could
be damaging to Johnson’s case.
Reification involves wrongly treating what is referred to by a
word or a phrase as a thing, on the analogy of a proper name. Thus,
Afterword 111
if one describes Jones as engaged in thinking, there must be an
activity, namely thinking, in which he is engaged. When it is said
that Jones is running, then most would acknowledge, there is a
kind of activity, namely running, that Jones is said to be doing.
Johnson maintains that it does not follow from the fact that an
expression appears to refer to an activity that it does in fact do so,
even though there may be apparently related cases where it does.
Does Johnson here appeal to a general principle whose existence
his argument is concerned to deny, namely a fallacy in reasoning
which can be detected across a range of subject matters? On the
face of it this looks to be so, but it is also clear that Johnson could
mount a defence of his use of the fallacy of reification. Whether
one commits the fallacy depends on the particular examples under
consideration. While to say that there is an activity of running
which Jones is said to be doing when it is asserted that Jones is
running is not to commit the fallacy of reification, to say that there
is an activity of thinking that Jones is doing when it is asserted
that Jones is thinking is to commit that fallacy. Whether or not the
fallacy has been committed will depend on careful conceptual
analysis of the use of the term which appears to indicate an activity.
Whether the surface grammatical form of a verb is misleading us
will need to be established by a detailed philosophical investigation
of thinking. One might ask, for example, whether the fallacy of
reification is being committed when, having noted that Jones is
evaluating an argument, there is an activity that Jones is performing,
namely evaluating an argument.
A similar point could be made about essentialism. One may
concede that while a term designating a physical element refers to
a structural essence (although this is debateable) it does not follow
that a term referring to a human ability refers to a structural
essence. Again, it may be maintained, this will need to be argued on
the specifics of the case before it can be established that the fallacy
of essentialism has been committed. The naming fallacy arises,
according to Johnson, from the fact that it does not follow that a
112 Afterword
general term exists that it refers to, for example, a general ability.
From the truth of ‘Jones is evaluating the applicant’s CV’ it does
not follow that there is a general activity, evaluating that he is cur-
rently engaging in. Again, whether or not an activity is relatively
broad or relatively narrow in scope is one that needs to be con-
sidered on its merits, it is not one that can be settled in general.
Arguably therefore, as in the cases of the other alleged fallacies,
it can be maintained that Johnson is appealing to the need for
conceptual investigation in detail rather than to a generally trans-
ferable principle.
Finally, there is what Johnson calls the generalizing fallacy. If one
knows how to open a tin it does not follow that one knows how
to open things. First, because there is not necessarily any general
activity of opening that can be applied to all sorts of different
objects and secondly because it is false to conclude of some pro-
perty that applies to a specific type of instance (. . . is able to open
a can) that it can be applied to a range of types of activity (. . . is
able to open an X). While it is possible to say that the first aspect
of this fallacy needs to be investigated in detail before we can
accuse anyone of committing it, the second aspect of it looks
like an instance of a much more general principle that we would
recognize as having a wide application, namely that what is true of
one type of task is not necessarily true of all types of tasks. In this
sense then, Johnson might be considered to be appealing to an
ability to identify a particular fallacy that is applicable over a wide
range of contexts and is valid in a wide range of subject matters.
8. The role of philosophy

Johnson and Siegel largely, although by no means exclusively,
deploy philosophical arguments in support of their positions.
Philosophical techniques such as conceptual analysis (to which
both authors are committed), are thought to be applicable across
a range of different subject matters. Conceptual analysis involves
detailed investigation of the ways in which concepts are used,
Afterword 113
preferably without preconceptions as to what such an investigation
might yield. Furthermore, even analytically minded philosophers
disagree about the nature and even the purpose of conceptual
analysis. However, the very fact that the potential scope of con-
ceptual analysis is very broad and the fact that the techniques
involved, although often specialized, are applicable to a wide range
of contexts, makes it look like a kind of ‘thinking skill’ that might
be of considerable use. Don’t we have, then, an argument for the
teaching of a certain kind of philosophy as a set of techniques of
wide applicability? If this is the case then perhaps Johnson and
Siegel could agree on a philosophy syllabus that could be used
within the secondary stage of education alongside the more tradi-
tional subjects. It would not involve the positing of such vague
and somewhat vacuous general abilities such as being creative,
comparing, evaluating etc., but would focus on the virtues of
clear, detailed and systematic thinking. Johnson acknowledges this
but points out that successful philosophical engagement involves
detailed knowledge of the area under consideration. It is no good
debating aesthetics if one has no knowledge of or feeling for works
of art for example. Nevertheless, since both Siegel and Johnson
could sign up to this proposition we could urge them to consider
whether or not philosophy could have a role on the secondary
curriculum alongside other well-established subjects which would
provide some of the detailed subject knowledge necessary for
effective philosophical reflection.
9. Reason and argument

We saw that the case that Siegel really wanted to defend was that of
the efficacy of argument analysis (and, presumably, synthesis). The
ability to construct and to deconstruct arguments would, for him,
be a prime and very valuable example of a thinking ability that
should be cultivated in the school and college curriculum. It is not
being suggested that one can reason effectively without having a
good grasp of the subject matter under consideration. The claim
114 Afterword
made is rather that given good subject knowledge and given

acquisition of the ability to analyse and synthesize arguments,
learning can, other things being equal, take place more effectively
with the latter in addition than with the former alone. Is this
contestable?
In order to address the question it is necessary to ask what an
argument is. Here we straightaway encounter an ambiguity. In
one sense an argument is a kind of conversational encounter that
articulates difference of opinion between one or more people in
which one party attempts to persuade the others that they should
hold a certain belief on the basis of certain reasons. In order to
make sense of and evaluate the claims made by different parties
who engage in such conversational activities, it is frequently neces-
sary to render their claims and the supporting reasons for those
claims in a structured form, in which the claim offered is identified
as the conclusion, the beliefs which are appealed to as starting
point are the premises and the steps between premises and conclu-
sion as the intermediate steps (there may or may not be any of
these). Such structures of propositions, whereby conclusions are
supported by premises and intermediate steps are also called
‘arguments’. Different structures will emerge from such attempts.
At their simplest, they will reveal an argument within an ongoing
conversation or discussion whose various stages are punctuated
by the challenges of an interlocutor, whose objections then have
to be addressed. In more complex situations one may well find two
rival arguments being offered within an ongoing discussion or
conversation.
The situation is usually more straightforward in formal genres
such as making a speech because the structure of the argument
is made relatively clear. The same goes for arguments set out in
written form. But since most arguments are presented in everyday
conversational life, the ability to recognize, extract and evaluate
arguments is an important social and cognitive ability or family
of abilities.
Afterword 115
Argument analysis will, then involve extraction of the argu-
ments from spoken exchanges or from passages of text where this
is necessary, followed by an evaluation of whether or not they
support their conclusions (bearing in mind that this is not merely
a matter of formal validity – see below). However, this is likely
to be a complicated business which involves a range of abilities
and attitudes which are often hard to maintain in complex and
sometimes conflict-ridden situations. Nevertheless, it is plausible
to maintain that such abilities and attitudes may be of consider-
able value in all aspects of our lives, ranging from the domestic
to the vocational and, in the context of the educational aim of
autonomy, to be highly prized.
However, Argument Analysis (in which I include Argument
Identification) is a complicated matter. This is for a number of
reasons:
(1) Conversations or written texts often do not fully articulate the arguments
that are embedded in them, for reasons of brevity, competitiveness and
the taking for granted of background assumptions.
(2) It is one thing to ascertain that there is an argument embedded within a
discussion or a text; it is another to determine what the nature of that
argument is and to secure agreement with one’s interlocutor(s) what
the nature of that argument is.
(3) There is often considerable disagreement about how arguments should
be analysed, which includes disagreement about what kind of arguments
they are.
Point (1) may not necessarily be a problem for Argument Analysis,

so much as one of its main teaching objectives. Indeed, Siegel
makes it clear that locating hidden premises (and presumably
hidden intermediate steps) in arguments is precisely something
that someone committed to teaching thinking skills should be
concerned to develop. Nevertheless, the ability to do so may well
depend on considerable detailed knowledge of the subject area
under consideration. This does not necessarily put the infusion
approach under pressure but indicates that there is not necessarily
116 Afterword
any short cut to inferential ability within a subject matter without

a thorough acquaintance with that subject matter.
Point (2) raises more complex issues. It is likely to be the case
that a discussion about the quality or otherwise of an argument
presented may change into a discussion about which argument
is being presented. On one interpretation an argument may be
a good one, on another it may not. How one characterizes an
argument may, then, be a complex issue not subject to a ready
resolution. This may be a technical issue to do with how one
should interpret certain complex sentences for example, it may
be to do with the identification of implicit premises, or it may be
to do with one interlocutor’s willingness or otherwise to give
the benefit of the doubt to a co-disputant in the interpretation
of the argument.
In most cases, arguments are evaluated in respect of their form
or their structural characteristics. This means that one has to iden-
tify the form under which the argument is offered.
Point (3) raises a further and more complex issue which is
closely related to point (2). This concerns the extent to which it is
possible to identify the form of the argument independently of
the subject matter with which it is concerned. The form of an
argument is obtained by removing phrases from some of the con-
stituent phrases of the argument and substituting variable letters
for them. Two or more arguments that share the same form will
be equally as bad or as good as each other in terms of providing a
justification of the conclusions on the basis of the premises. This
may seem like an abstruse point but it is of importance in the most
ordinary contexts of argument evaluation.
Take a famous example of the analysis of everyday reasoning,
one of the encounters between Larry and Charles M in a recording
of a street corner discussion related by Labov (1969). Simplifying
slightly, the position is this. Larry asserts that
An when people be sayin’ if you good you goin’ to heaven an’ if

you bad you goin’ to hell, that’s bullshit. Good or bad you goin’ to
hell anyway.
Afterword 117
It has been argued, for example by Cooper (1984), that Larry has
implicitly contradicted himself by asserting first that it is false
that if you are bad that you are going to hell and then saying that
good or bad, you are going to hell, in which case if you are bad
you are going to hell. But it can be argued that Larry is denying
the whole sentence not each of its parts. He is not saying that it is
false that if you are good then you are going to heaven and it is
false that if you are bad then you are going to hell, but rather
saying that the whole story of the form ‘if you are good then you
are going to heaven and if you are bad you are going to hell’ is false.
To adapt the language of logicians the ‘bullshit’ operator has, as its
scope the whole conjunctive sentence, it is not applied separately
to each of its conjuncts. And if this is so, Larry is consistent. He
asserts that the whole story is false and makes an alternative,
non-contradictory claim. Whether or not this argument is about
the afterlife or about anything else, it is as good or as bad as the
form under which it is offered. Siegel would probably wish to say
that the interlocutor of someone offering such an argument if
he wants to understand him is bound to adopt the interpretation
which is most likely to make the argument being offered a good
one rather than a bad one. The problem might be, however, that
even with a good disposition it may actually be quite difficult to
identify just what the form of the argument is.
As it turns out, on one charitable interpretation Larry’s com-
plete argument can be shown to be formally valid. It is, on this
reading, an argument whose validity does not depend on the infer-
ential potential of terms related to any particular subject matter
like ‘heaven’ or ‘hell’, but on terms that occur in any subject matter:
‘and’, ‘not’, ‘if . . . then . . . ’ etc. Arguments offered under such a
form never lead from true premises to false conclusions. It does
thus seem as if at least some of the arguments offered in the course
of everyday discussions seem to depend on non subject-specific
logical considerations. It would be natural to assume that someone
with the appropriate training in logic, and with the appropriate
set of dispositions for engaging in argument analysis would be
118 Afterword
able to evaluate arguments offered in many different subject

matters. On this account it would seem that Siegel’s version of
Thinking Skills would have some educational value, since if this
example is at all representative, non-subject specific reasoning
skills have an application.
Unfortunately, and not surprisingly matters, are not that simple.
Not all arguments can be assessed for their formal validity or inva-
lidity. This remains the case even when such arguments can be clas-
sified as deductive, when their validity requires that the truth of their
premises is incompatible with the falsity of their conclusions. Thus
This brick is red all over
Therefore,
This brick is not green
is valid because it cannot be the case that it is true that this brick is
red and false that it is not green. We understand the inference,
however, because of our grasp of the inferential relationships that
hold between words expressing colour concepts. More generally, it
is plausible to say that many arguments have this feature, whether
their subject matter is specialist or non-specialist. And, if that is so,
instruction in how to identify and evaluate arguments that, when
put forward are claimed to be formally valid in the sense outlined
above, will be as useful as the number of arguments of this kind are
prevalent. The answer to this question is that we do not know. One
way of responding to this claim is to suggest that the argument
above contains a suppressed premise:
Anything that is red all over is not green
so that the whole Argument will read:

Anything that is red all over is not green
Therefore,
which makes it a formally valid deductive argument.

Afterword 119
It is highly questionable, however, that we learn to handle the
conceptual relationships within a field such as colour concepts in
this way. We do not notice that nothing that is red all over is also
green by observing lots of red things, and inductively concluding
the truth of the major premise, but by grasping the conceptual
relationships within the field of colour concepts through being
taught how to use colour concepts and then using them ourselves.
If it were nothing more than a matter of observation then we may
be continually waiting for an example of something red all over to
be green as well in order to determine whether we could be certain
that the argument proved the conclusion. But anyone who held
this or who acted as if it were true would be rightly considered
not to have obtained a comprehensive grasp of the field of colour
concepts. This suggests that the principle of inference that leads
us from

to
is the rule of inference which applies in the field of colour concepts

to the effect that nothing that is red all over is, or can be, green.
Therefore, our grasp of this inference and of many other subject-
dependent inferences is not wholly or partly dependent on formal
logical laws but on material subject dependent inferences, where it
is the inferential relationships between, in this example, colour
concepts that is important, not the ‘logical operators’ such as
‘not . . .’ ‘. . . and . . .’ or ‘if . . . then . . .’. Knowing the syllogistic form
that makes the argument above with the extra premise valid will
not generally help someone to handle arguments that involve a
grasp of colour concepts if that person does not already have
a grasp of those concepts. If he does, grasp of the syllogistic form
will not make him any more adept in handling those types of
arguments.
120 Afterword
However, Siegel gives us no reason to suppose that the develop-

ment of reasoning abilities that apply across subjects is dependent on
the ability to convert material mode inferences to formal mode ones.
His interest seems to lie in the teaching and development of princi-
ples that apply equally well to formal and material mode arguments.
10. Inductive arguments

However, many arguments are inductive rather than deductive. It is
possible for this type of argument to be good (sound) but for it to
have true premises and a false conclusion, although to the degree
that the argument is in fact sound this possibility will be reduced.
Some also hold that inductive arguments are also context sensitive,
meaning that the subject matter with which they deal can affect
their degree of soundness or unsoundness. This is because the
degree of risk that one is prepared to tolerate in moving from true
premises to false conclusions will vary from one subject matter to
another. For example, although the following argument is usually
taken to be sound, the one following it is not:
99 per cent of the apples from the barrel are not rotten.
This apple is from the barrel.
Therefore, this apple is not rotten.
because the risks to one’s health in moving from true premises to a

false conclusion are relatively small, this is not the case with
99 per cent of Ruritanian Airways flights reach their destination.

F666 is a Ruritanian Airways flight.
Therefore, F666 will reach its destination.
Because the risk to one’s health that follows from a false conclusion
if one is considering taking the flight is not acceptable.
Inductive arguments also have a property that logicians call
non-monotonicity, that is their soundness is affected by the addition
of new premises. For example,
Afterword 121
0.0001 per cent of the population were asked about their voting
intentions at the next general election.
51 per cent of these said that they intend to vote Conservative.
Therefore, the Conservatives will win the next general election.
is, on the face of it, unsound inductive argument. If, however, we

add the premise
The 0.0001 per cent asked were a random stratified sample of the
electors.
to the argument above, we would be inclined to accept the argu-

ment as sound. This suggests that filling in more of the context
has a significant bearing on the soundness or otherwise of an
argument and that, therefore, knowledge of context and of subject
matter is a factor affecting our ability to assess the soundness of
inductive arguments.
This may seem like a decisive point in favour of the subject
dependence of reasoning skills and hence of the necessity of
teaching subject principles prior to the teaching of transferable
reasoning principles. In this sense the pervasive nature of inductive
arguments seems to count in favour of Johnson’s thesis and against
Siegel’s. This would, however, be too quick a response, since even
though inductive reasoning is both pervasive in terms of the range
of subject matters in which it is used and inductive arguments
are also, it is argued, to a degree dependent on the subject matter
under consideration for their soundness, it does not follow either
that there are no subject independent principles of inductive
reasoning nor that they cannot be taught. Indeed, the existence
of textbooks (e.g., Salmon 1984; Hacking 2001) that deal with the
principles of inductive logic count against this claim.
Just as it would be wrong to think that Siegel holds that one
cannot apply generic reasoning skills to arguments in the material
mode, so it would also be wrong to think that he holds this of
inductive arguments.
122 Afterword
11. Concluding remarks

Having narrowed down the differences of opinion between Johnson
and Siegel on the existence of thinking skills and the efficacy of
teaching them to differences concerning (largely) the existence
of context and subject independent principles of reasoning and
the pedagogical efficacy of teaching them, it will now be helpful to
see where matters stand in relation to their respective claims.
(1) There is good evidence that context and subject independent argumenta-
tion is used in everyday as well as in specialist contexts. What we do
not know with any precision is how prevalent the use of such forms
of argumentation is.
(2) It is also clear that there is widespread use of subject-dependent deduc-
tive reasoning in everyday contexts although again it is not clear to what
extent this is the case.
(3) The use of inductive argumentation is very widespread.
The debate seems to be about, not so much whether such forms

of argument exist, but rather about their frequency and about
whether, to the extent that there are subject-independent princi-
ples of reasoning (and both Johnson and Siegel seem to be agreed
that there are), it is pedagogically productive to devote time and
effort to teaching them rather than something else. It is hard to see
how this could be a purely philosophical or conceptual question
rather than one to which some of the answers at least will come
from empirical research. However, this is an important result
and one which has been arrived at through patient philosophical
argument which can itself clear the way to framing the kinds of
investigations which may or may not lead to further curriculum
development. The arguments of neither of the two authors in this
volume, however, warrant the wholesale introduction of thinking
skills programmes without a very careful consideration of their
scope and limits and the evidence of their success in small-scale
studies.
Afterword 123
References
Beard, R. (1990), Developing Reading 3-13, London: Hodder.
Cigman, R. and Davis, A. (2008), ‘Commentary (on Section 6, Learners, Teachers and
Reflection)’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Special Issue on New Philosophies of
Learning, 42, 3–4: 705–707.
Cooper, D. (1984), ‘Labov, Larry and Charles’, Oxford Review of Education, 10, 2:
177–192.
Hanf, G. (2009), National Report on German Vocational Education and Training, http://
www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/education/research/projects/eurvoc.html
Johnson, S. (2010), Teaching Thinking Skills, in Winch, C. (ed.) Teaching Thinking Skills,
London, Continuum.
Hacker, P. M. S. (2007), Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, Oxford: Blackwell.
Hacking, I. (2001), An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hare, R. M. and Russell, D. A. (eds) (1970), The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 2, London:
Oxford University Press.
Hirst, P. (1974), Knowledge and the Curriculum, London: Routledge.
Hyland, T. (2008)‚ ‘Reductionist Trends in Education and Training for Work: Skills,
Competences and Work-Based Learning’ in P. Gonon, K. Kraus, J. Oelkers, S. Stolz
(eds), Work, Education and Employability, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 129–146.
Kerschensteiner, G. ([1901] 1964)‚ ‘Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung für der deutschen
Jugend’ in Ausgewählte Pädagogische Texte, Band 1, Paderborn: Ferdinand
Schöningh.
Labov, W. (1969), ‘The Logic of Non-Standard English’, in Giglioli, P-P. (ed.) (1972)
Language and Social Context, London, Penguin, pp. 179-215.
Ryle, G. (1949), The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
Salmon, W. (1984), Logic (3rd Ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Solon, T. (2007)‚ ‘Generic Critical Thinking Infusion and Course Content Learning’,
Journal of Instructional Psychology, June 2007, pp. 95–109.
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Index
abilities that admit of normative computer model of thought 42, 81, 82

evaluation 60, 92 conclusion 33, 36, 40, 67–70, 73
Advanced Level Subject 2, 40 Cooper, David 117, 123
aims of education xi, xiii, 5, 11–12, Cornell Z test 102, 103
21, 66, 99 Cottrell, S. 26–8, 34, 35, 48
analyzing counter-examples 59, 75
Anderson, J. R. 15, 16, 47, 50 critical reasoning xii, xiii
Anselm of Canterbury 20 creativity 17, 25, 82
appreciate, appreciating xi, 9, 10, 15, curriculum, including English
37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 56, 95, 98 National Curriculum vii,
argument analysis 106, 108, 109, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9,
113, 115, 117 17, 18, 24, 25, 33, 42, 43,
assumptions 46, 52, 62, 65, 66–75, 44–6, 52–4, 83, 96, 101–2,
77–8, 104, 115 107–8, 113, 122,
Bailin, Sharon 22, 48, 60, 80, 83 Davis, Andrew vii, 15, 48, 98, 99, 123
Bailin, Sharon; Siegel, Harvey 22, 83 De Bono, Edward 6, 13, 21, 27, 29,
Barrow, Robin 10, 47 33, 38, 39, 48, 59, 81
Baumfield, V. 27, 35, 36, 47, 49 Dearden, Robert 35, 45, 48
begging the question 110 deductive argument 118
Beyer, B. 27, 47 Department for Education and
Bobbitt, F. 18, 48 Skills (DfES) 3
Brain-based Approaches 6 domain specific knowledge 71–3
Dreyfus, Herbert 31, 48
character 8, 54, 55, 66, 94–6 Dreyfus, Stuart 31, 48
Chase, W. G. 30
Cigman, Ruth 98, 99, 123 Empson, W. 42, 48
Cognitive Acceleration through Ennis, Robert 39, 48, 74, 83
Science Education (CASE) 5 enquiry xv, 5, 45, 107–8
Cognitive Intervention 6 essentialism 21, 63, 66, 110, 111
Coles, A. 26 evaluation xv, 4, 5, 42–3, 45, 60, 83,
comparing 26–8, 33, 76, 77, 101, 92, 106–9, 115–16
109, 113 Evans, J. St. B. T. 30, 48
126 Index
faculty psychology 13, 16, 17, 25, 63 knowledge 110, 113

Fähigkeit 91 Kripke, Saul 14, 49, 63
Fallacy 21–2, 24–5, 28–9, 33, 36, 61, Kuhn, Herman 34
63–8, 74–5, 78, 110–12
Post hoc ergo propter hoc 61 Labov, William 116, 123
Fertigkeit 91 Lave, Jean 15, 49
Feuerstein, R. 6, 18, 33 Learning how to learn xiii, xiv
Fisher, Robert 5, 7, 26, 46, 48, 49 Lipman, Matthew 6, 33
formally valid 117, 118 logic 41, 50, 117, 121, 123
logical thinking xiv, 40
generalizability 25, 53, 82
generalizing fallacy 24, 25, 29, 36, mastery of a subject xiv
63, 74, 112 material inference 119–21
Goodman, Nelson 14, 49 McGuinness, Carol 3, 6, 7, 13, 14,
government xv, 1–3, 5–6, 30, 42, 43, 27, 34–6, 39, 41, 44, 49, 62,
47, 52, 93 76, 79, 81, 108
report 3–7, 18, 25, 27, 30–2, 39,
Hacker, P. M. S. 104, 123 42, 53, 56, 59–61, 74, 83
Hacking, Ian 121, 123 McPeck, John 49, 50, 66, 68, 69, 71–4
Hanf, Georg 91, 123 Mental processes 2, 7, 10, 19, 28–31,
Hare, William 77, 83, 123 53, 56–60, 78–80, 104
Higgins, Stephen 35, 36, 49 metacognition 5, 45, 49
Hirst, Paul 108, 123 Miller, D. W. 40
Hunt, G. M. K. 31, 49
Hyland, Terry 95, 123 Nabokov, V. 27
hypothesizing 5, 53, 54, 59 National Curriculum xv, 2, 4, 9, 42,
43–5, 50, 52–4, 83, 96, 101,
imagining, imagination 28, 16, 17, 107
31, 79, 82 National Strategy 4, 48
immersion 108, 109 Key Stage Three 4
inductive argument 120–2 Primary 4
inferring xv, 64, 89, 101 Norris, Stephen 21, 65
information processing xv, 5–6, 10,
18–19, 30, 56–7, 63, 107 Oakeshott, Michael 42, 44
infusion 5, 6, 74, 102, 108, 109, onetcenter 19
115, 123
pedagogic efficacy 11, 13,
James, William 16, 49, 61 pedagogy 23
Johnson, Stephen vii, xi, xiv, xv, xvi, Perkins, D. N. 16
52–84 philosophical approaches 6
Jones, H. M. 40, 56, 49 Philosophy 33, 46, 47, 59, 68, 110,
112, 113
Kerschensteiner, Georg 94, 123 Plato 94
Knowing how, know-how 10, 24, 56, portability 14, 99
93, 92, 98, 100, 101 Pratzner, F. C. 36
Index 127
premise 40, 67–70, 73, 75, 104, 105, Sternberg, R. J. 19, 20
110, 114–21 subject xiv, xv, xvi, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14,
problem solving 5, 19, 21, 25, 30, 16, 26, 27, 31, 36–7, 39,
65, 75 40, 43–6, 48, 52, 54, 62,
67, 68–70, 72, 74–83, 86, 92,
Qualifications and Curriculum 96, 98, 100–3, 107–9, 111,
Authority (QCA) vii, 24, 113–22
25, 45 subjectivism 35
Quinn, Victor 40 Suits, Bernard 67
reading 73, 89, 90, 96–8, 100 task 15, 16, 24, 25, 29, 32, 74,
reasoning xii, xv, 16, 24, 26, 28, 30, 38, 88–90, 93, 95, 97–100, 103,
46, 54, 64–5, 67, 69–71, 74, 77, 104, 112
107, 109–12, 116, 118, 120–2 task-type 89, 99, 100
reification 20, 63, 64, 110, 111 technique viii, 19, 31, 38, 45, 89, 95,
Robinson, W. D. 26 108, 112, 113
rule-following 41, 63, 81 Thinking through History project 5,
Ruthven, K. 17 49
Ryle, Gilbert 7, 19, 22, 67, 105 truth 2, 7, 9, 31, 34–41, 44–5, 52, 81,
83, 94, 112, 118–19
Salmon, Wesley 121
Scheffler, Israel 9, 10, 56, 78, 82 understand, understanding xi, xiii,
Schwartz, R. and Parks, D. 33 xv, 9, 10, 13, 14, 28, 29,
Scriven, Michael 14, 62 31, 41, 44, 45, 52, 56–60, 62,
Siegel, Harvey xi, xiv, xvi, 22–4, 60, 79, 92, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104,
66, 67, 69, 75, 80, 81, 83, 85, 117
86, 89, 92–6, 100–2, 104–7, universal, universality 89, 91, 102,
109, 112, 113, 116–18, 120–2 107
Simon, H. A. 30
Singley, M. K. 15, 16 value 3, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 46,
skills 81, 94, 95
general and/or transferable xii, 3, value-neutral 38, 81, 94
12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 36, 38, Van den Brink-Budgen, Roy 43
49, 62, 63, 74, 79, 90 virtue 8, 9, 31, 36, 38, 39, 45, 54–6,
intellectual 79, 81, 91, 94, 95, 113
Smith, R. 33, 43
Socrates 39 Wenger, Etienne 15, 49
Solon, Tom 102 Whitehead, Alfred North 47
specialist and subject-specific Wilson, V. 43
knowledge xii, 30, 31, 34, Wittgenstein, Ludwig 14, 22,
36–7, 46, 51 63, 67

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Teaching

Special Educational Needs, Mary Warnock and Brahm Norwich,

Key Debates in Educational Policy

© Christopher Winch; © Part 1, Stephen Johnson; © Part 2 Harvey

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978-1-4411-8656-0 (paperback)

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Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India

Series Editor’s Preface – Key Debates in

1 Teaching Thinking Skills 1

5. Mental processes and general

IMPACT pamphlets were launched in 1999 as an initiative of the

organizations as well as members of think tanks, academics and

This volume is about one of the most important educational issues

can be taught, or, more controversially, over whether they can be

that suspicion of such claims is one of the factors motivating

The policy background in the United

guidance in teaching these thinking skills within their own subjects

The inclusion of thinking skills in the National Curriculum is

2. Present interest in thinking skills

‘The Government regard thinking as a key part of the national

Classrooms: a review and evaluation of approaches for developing

Since the review by Carol McGuinness in 1999 and the explicit

The Schools Standards Minister welcomed the McGuinness Report

i. The McGuinness Report

Finally, we have the approach personally favoured by McGuinness,

There is no doubt the McGuinness Report raises many important

Mention of ‘accuracy’ and ‘truth-seeking’ bring to mind a dan-

But this distinction between know-how and know-that can be

Like a knitter drowsed,

(b) It focuses attention on ‘being explicit about components of the

It is often believed that skills can be analysed into sub-skills, or

(c) It stresses ‘learning by observing and modelling’ (p. 5)

While observing and modelling might be useful ways of trying

(d) It points out ‘the importance of practice’ (p. 5)

McGuinness says that ‘maximising the transfer of learning beyond

evidence, there has been no positive evidence of general transfer’

ii. Identical elements

iii. Information processing

Philosophers have long realized that common linguistic usage may

to say that someone has critical thinking ability is to make a claim

But transferring this idea from inorganic substances to human

iii. Naming fallacy

there must be a general skill corresponding to that general name.

There is no general answer to the question ‘What does thinking

Wittgenstein uses a different approach to show that there need be

The analogy would be somewhat stronger if Siegel were saying

iv. Generalizing fallacy

6. The direct teaching of thinking and the

Many supporters of thinking skills believe that ‘If students are

even competent, thinkers of the past managed to develop without

If the primary aim of education is conceived to be the promotion

In art as in science there is no delight without the detail . . .

In my advocacy of content, I would argue that appropriate, detailed,

motivation, identifies the frame of reference, knows what criteria

7. Thinking as mental processes

Most supporters of thinking skills analyse thinking in terms of

factor within your particular sphere of activity, and this is a matter

i. Being explicit about mental processes