RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)

RP v.
CA (149 SCRA 351)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals 1 in CA G.R. No. 37417-R, dated 3 April 1974, reversing the decision of the
then Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered private respondent Nielson & Co.,
Inc. to pay the Government the amount of P11,496.00 as ad valorem tax, occupation
fees, additional residence tax and 25% surcharge for late payment, for the years 1949
to 1952, and costs of suit, and of the resolution of the respondent Court, dated 31 May
1974, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision of 3 April 1974.
1. In a demand letter, dated 16 July 1955 (Exhibit A), the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue assessed private respondent deficiency taxes for the
years 1949 to 1952, totalling P14,449.00.
2. Petitioner reiterated its demand upon private respondent for payment of
said amount, per letters dated 24 April 1956 (Exhibit D), 19 September 1956
(Exhibit E) and 9 February 1960 (Exhibit F).
3. Private respondent did not contest the assessment in the Court of Tax
Appeals.
4. On the theory that the assessment had become final and executory,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the said amount against private
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Manila, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 42911. However, for failure to serve summons
upon private respondent, the complaint was dismissed, without prejudice,
in the Court's order dated 30 June 1961.
5. On motion, the order of dismissal was set aside, at the same time giving
petitioner sixty (60) days within which to serve summons upon private
respondent.
6. For failure anew to serve summons, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued
an order dated 4 October 1962 dismissing Civil Case No. 42911 without
prejudice. The order of dismissal became final on 5 November 1962.
7. On 15 November 1962, the complaint against private respondent for collection of
the same tax was refiled, but the same was erroneously docketed as Civil Case
No. 42911, the same case previously dismissed without prejudice.
8. Without correcting this error, another complaint was filed on 26 November
1963, docketed as Civil Case No. 55817, the subject matter of the present
appeal.
9. As herein earlier stated, the Court a quo rendered a decision against the
private respondent.
10. On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration which
was likewise denied by said Court in a resolution dated 31 May 1974. Hence, this
petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LETTER OF
ASSESSMENT DATED JULY 16, 1955, EXHIBIT "A," WAS RECEIVED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THE MAIL PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8, RULE 13 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LETTER
ASSESSMENT DATED JULY 16, 1955, HAVING BEEN DULY DIRECTED AND
MAILED WAS RECEIVED IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF THE MAIL AND THAT
OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
III
THAT, ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE LETTER DATED JULY 16,
1955 (EXHIBIT "A") CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN ASSESSMENT, ON THE
THEORY THAT THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
LETTER OF THE DEPUTY COLLECTOR (NOW DEPUTY COMMISSIONER) OF
INTERNAL REVENUE DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 1956 (EXHIBIT "E") IS ITSELF AN
ASSESSMENT WHICH WAS DULY RECEIVED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Relying on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 13 and Section 5, paragraphs m & v. Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner claims that the demand letter of 16 July
1955 showed an imprint indicating that the original thereof was released and mailed on
4 August 1955 by the Chief, Records Section of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
that the original letter was not returned to said Bureau; thus, said demand letter must be
considered to have been received by the private respondent. 3 According to petitioner, if
service is made by ordinary mail, unless the actual date of receipt is shown, service is
deemed complete and effective upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing. 4 As
the letter of demand dated 16 July 1955 was actually mailed to private respondent,
there arises the presumption that the letter was received by private respondent in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. 5 More so, where private respondent did not offer
any evidence, except the self-serving testimony of its witness, that it had not received
the original copy of the demand letter dated 16 July 1955.
We do not agree with petitioner's above contentions. As correctly observed by

the respondent court in its appealed decision, while the contention of petitioner is
correct that a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary
course of mail, stilt this is merely a disputable presumption, subject to
controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon
the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed
received by the addressee. Thus:
Appellee contends that per Exhibit A, the notice was released and mailed to the
appellant by the BIR on Aug. 4, 1955 under the signature of the Chief, Records Section,
Office; that since the original thereof was not returned to the appellee, the presumption
is that the appellant received the mailed notice. This is correct, but this being merely a
mere disputable presumption, the same is subject to controversion, and a direct denial
of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was received by the addressee. The appellee, however,
argues that since notice was rc-,Ieased and mailed and the fact of its release was
admitted by the appellant the admission is proof that he received the mailed notice of
assessment. We do not think so. It is true the Court a quo made such a finding of fact,
but as pointed out by the appehant in its brief, and as borne out by the records, no such
admission was ever made by the appellant in the answer or in any other pleading, or in
any declaration, oral or documentary before the trial court. We note that the appellee
has not met this challenge, and after a review of the records, we find appeflant's
assertion well-taken. 7
Since petitioner has not adduced proof that private respondent had in fact
received the demand letter of 16 July 1955, it cannot be assumed that private
respondent received said letter. Records, however, show that petitioner wrote
private respondent a follow-up letter dated 19 September 1956, reiterating its
demand for the payment of taxes as originally demanded in petitioner's letter
dated 16 July 1955. This follow-up letter is considered a notice of assessment in
itself which was duly received by private respondent in accordance with its own
admission.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the assessment is appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. The
taxpayer's failure to appeal in due time, as in the case at bar, makes the
assessment in question final, executory and demandable. Thus, private
respondent is now barred from disputing the correctness of the assessment or
from invoking any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the
merits. 10
In Mamburao Lumber Co. vs. Republic, 11 this Court further said:
In a suit for collection of internal revenue taxes, as in this case, where the assessment
has already become final and executory, the action to collect is akin to an action to
enforce a judgment. No inquiry can be made therein as to the merits of the original case
or the justness of the judgment relied upon. ...
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is hereby reversed. The decision of the Court a
quo is hereby reinstated. No costs.
RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)

Facts:
11. In a demand letter, dated 16 July 1955 (Exhibit A), the CIR assessed Nielson
Comp. Inc deficiency taxes for the years 1949 to 1952.
12. CIR again, sent demand letters for the payment of taxes dated 24 of april 1956;
19 of September 1956 and 9 of February 1960.
13. Private respondent did not contest the assessment in the Court of Tax Appeals.
14. On the theory that the assessment had become final and executory, petitioner
filed a complaint for collection of the said amount against private respondent with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
15. The defense of the appellee is that they never received the original copy of the
demand letter dated 16 of july 1955. The appellant on the other hand contend
that if service is made by ordinary mail, unless the actual date of receipt is
shown, service is deemed complete and effective upon the expiration of five (5)
days after mailing. As the letter of demand dated 16 July 1955 was actually
mailed to private respondent, there arises the presumption, according to the
appellant that the letter was received by private respondent in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
16. The trial court rendered a decision against the private respondent.
17. On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration which
was likewise denied by said Court in a resolution dated 31 May 1974. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the it could be presumed that the appellee received the demand letter.
Ruling:
No, while the contention of petitioner is correct that a mailed letter is deemed received
by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, still this is merely a disputable
presumption, subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts
the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter
was indeed received by the addressee.
Since petitioner has not adduced proof that private respondent had in fact received the
demand letter of 16 July 1955, it cannot be assumed that private respondent received
said letter. Records, however, show that petitioner wrote private respondent a follow-up
letter dated 19 September 1956, reiterating its demand for the payment of taxes as
originally demanded in petitioner's letter dated 16 July 1955. This follow-up letter is
considered a notice of assessment in itself which was duly received by private
respondent in accordance with its own admission.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the assessment is appealable to the Court of
Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. The taxpayer's failure to
appeal in due time, as in the case at bar, makes the assessment in question final,
executory and demandable. Thus, private respondent is now barred from disputing the
correctness of the assessment or from invoking any defense that would reopen the
question of its liability on the merits.
RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)
Facts:
1. In a demand letter, dated 16 July 1955 (Exhibit A), the CIR assessed
Nielson Comp. Inc deficiency taxes for the years 1949 to 1952. (FIRST
LETTER)
2. CIR again, sent demand letters for the payment of taxes dated 24 of april
1956; 19 of September 1956 and 9 of February 1960. (Next 3 letters)
3. Private respondent did not contest the assessment
4. On the theory that the assessment had become final and executory,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the said amount against
private respondent with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
5. The defense of the appellee is that they never received the original copy
of the demand letter dated 16 of july 1955.
6. The appellant on the other hand contend that if service is made by

ordinary mail, unless the actual date of receipt is shown, service is
deemed complete and effective upon the expiration of five (5) days after
mailing. As the letter of demand dated 16 July 1955 was actually mailed
to private respondent, there arises the presumption, according to the
appellant that the letter was received by private respondent in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
Issue:
Whether or not the it could be presumed that the appellee received the demand
letter.
Ruling:
No, while the contention of petitioner is correct that a mailed letter is deemed
received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, still this is merely a
disputable presumption, subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the
receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
Since petitioner has not adduced proof that private respondent had in fact
received the demand letter of 16 July 1955, it cannot be assumed that private
respondent received said letter. Records, however, show that petitioner wrote
private respondent a follow-up letter dated 19 September 1956, reiterating its
demand for the payment of taxes as originally demanded in petitioner's letter
dated 16 July 1955. This follow-up letter is considered a notice of assessment in
itself which was duly received by private respondent in accordance with its own
admission.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the assessment is appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. The
taxpayer's failure to appeal in due time, as in the case at bar, makes the
assessment in question final, executory and demandable. Thus, private
respondent is now barred from disputing the correctness of the assessment or
from invoking any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the
merits.

RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)

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RP v.

CA (149 SCRA 351)

1. In a demand letter, dated 16 July 1955 (Exhibit A), the Commissioner of

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE

We do not agree with petitioner's above contentions. As correctly observed by

In Mamburao Lumber Co. vs. Republic, 11 this Court further said:

RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)

RP v. CA (149 SCRA 351)

3. Private respondent did not contest the assessment

6. The appellant on the other hand contend that if service is made by

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