Civil law

Possible Questions and Answers

Based on Chair’s Cases

Article 19. CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS CALTEX

PHILIPPINES, INC. v. LEO Z. MENDOZA G.R. Nos. 211533 & 212071, June 19, 2019, En
Banc (Caguioa, J.)
Brother, sons, daughters, granddaughters, grandsons of Pascasio, the family patriarch, organized
the 90th birthday party of Pascasio. Pascasio was nowhere to be found in his 90th birthday
celebration. They continuously called Adelaida but they were not able to contact her. Almost 200
guests were at the venue waiting for Pascasio to come. The siblings deemed it proper to continue
the celebration even without the birthday celebrant himself. The next day, they went to ask
Adelaida her reason why Pascasio was not able to attend the birthday celebration. Adelaida
reasoned that Pascasio did not want to go to the party. When asked why Adelaida broke her
commitment to bring Pascasio to the party, Adelaida uttered the words, "I am the wife." The filed
a complaint for damages against Adelaida. In response, Adelaida rebutted the allegations of the
respondents by saying that she was not privy to the respondents' planned birthday celebration for
Pascasio. She also said that she deemed it wise to spare Pascasio of the embarrassment and
humiliation of defecating and urinating without regard to the people around him brought about
by his advanced age.
Adelaida intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to the birthday celebration prepared
by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of the Civil Code on the principle of abuse of
right. Her failure to observe good faith in the exercise of her right as the wife of Pascasio
caused loss and injury on the part of the respondents, for which they must be compensated
by way of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Entries in the Civil Registry and Clerical Error Law (R.A. No. 9048, as amended)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CHARLIE MINTAS FELIX,
A.K.A. SHIRLEY MINTAS FELIX, RESPONDENT.
1. Respondent's birth certificate was registered twice. In his first birth certificate, which was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon (LCR- Itogon), Benguet, respondent's
first name was erroneously registered as "Shirley" instead of "Charlie" his father's
surname was erroneously spelled as "Filex" instead of "Felix" and his gender was
erroneously entered as "'female" instead of "male" A second birth certificate was
subsequently registered containing all the correct entries, but the same was filed with the
Local Civil Registrar of Carrangalan (LCR-Carrangalan), Nueva Ecija. Respondent thus
filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court, La
Trinidad, Benguet (RTC) in 2007 seeking to correct the erroneous entries in his first birth
certificate (filed with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet) and to cancel his second birth certificate
(filed with the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija).

A. Does the RTC has jurisdiction to order the correction of entries in

respondent's first birth certificate?
- The RTC has jurisdiction to order the correction of entries in respondent's
first birth certificate.
B. Does the RTC has jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija to
cancel respondent's second birth certificate?
- RTC likewise has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of respondent's
second birth certificate on file with the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija.
- Respondent's direct resort to a judicial procedure is correct because to
pursue an administrative procedure for the clerical correction of
respondent's first name and his father's surname and a judicial procedure
for the correction of his sex would amount to splitting of causes of action.
- The correction of respondent's first name and of his father's surname are
clerical in nature and fall under R.A. 9048.
- The correction of respondent's sex and the cancellation of respondent's
second birth certificate do not fall under R.A. 9048.
- CAGIOUA: I submit, however, my own view that a person compelled by
the foregoing rules to file two or more separate petitions (i.e.,
administrative and judicial) to effect the desired corrections or
cancellations may, in the interest of substantial justice, file a single
petition for correction/cancellation of entries under Rule 108, provided
that all interested parties, including the concerned civil registrars and/or
the civil registrar general, as the case may be, are duly notified.

Presumptive death of absent spouse under the Family Code

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. REMAR A.
QUIÑONEZ, RESPONDENT.

Remar and Lovelyn got married on 1997. Sometime in 2001, Lovelyn go on a

three-month vacation in Manila to visit some relatives. The communication
between the spouses ceased altogether. Someone informed Remar that his
wife was then already cohabiting with another man and would no longer be
coming back out of shame. On November 2003, lovely visited their children
but Remar failed to see her. On the summer of 2004, Remar filed for a leave
from work to look for his wife in Manila. He went to Batangas along with his
aunt, as well as to Cavite with Lovelyn's aunt, yet they were not able to find
her. On February 27, 2013, after almost ten (10) years of trying to know about
the whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile Remar filed a
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death before the RTC. Is there a
 sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of Lovelyn's presumptive
death.

- No. There is no sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of

Lovelyn’s presumptive death. To comply with the requirement of well-
founded belief, the present spouse must prove that belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort. Here, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of
the search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have gone.
Remar never sought the help of the authorities to locate Lovelyn during
her ten (10)year disappearance. He merely engaged in a "passive search"
and not “strict standard approach” as required by jurisprudence.

Marriages solemnized abroad and foreign divorce

CYNTHIA A. GALAPON, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married in the City of
Manila, Philippines. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and ended with
a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed
in a Korean Court, Cynthia filed before the RTC a Petition for the Judicial
Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. OSG argues that the divorce decree in question
is not one "obtained by the alien or Filipino spouse alone but one obtained at the
instance of both spouses." Hence, the OSG insists that Article 26(2) simply
cannot apply to Cynthia. Should the petition be granted.
- The Petition should be granted. Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages
where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii)
obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained
solely by the Filipino spouse. Here, Cynthia and Park obtained a joint
valid divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea.
Hence, the petition should be granted.

ARTICLE 147 FAMILY CODE

SIMON R. PATERNO, PETITIONER, VS. DINA MARIE LOMONGO PATERNO,
RESPONDENT.

The petitioner and the respondent were married on December 27, 1987. After
living together for about a decade, the petitioner left the family abode in June
1998. On June 9, 2000, petitioner filed a petition before the RTC seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to the respondent on the ground of the
latter's psychological incapacity. This was granted by Branch 144 of RTC Makati
in a Decision dated March 11, 2005, where both parties were adjudged to be
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations to each other. The
March 11, 2005 Decision had attained finality. A House and lot in Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa City and a Condominium unit in Rockwell, Makati City;
were purchased during the parties' union, the mortgage payments for these
properties have been made after they separated in fact solely from petitioner’s
exclusive funds. Respondent argued that despite already being separated de facto,
as long as a couple remains married (in paper), pending a court declaration of
nullity of their union, all the properties gained by each in the meantime before the
judicial declaration will be included in the co-ownership regime. Respondent also
directed petitioner Simon R. Paterno to increase the monthly support to
P250,000.00. Their three daughters already attained the age of majority.
Are Ayala Alabang house and the Rockwell condominium included in the co-
ownership regime? If yes, how are these properties should be partitioned between
the parties?
- No. Equal sharing of the entire properties is not possible in this scenario
since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were still being
amortized when the parties' separated. As such, respondent's equal share
shall only pertain to the paid portion before their separation, for in this
peculiar kind of co-ownership. The partnership is considered terminated
upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue said relations. If the
allegation of the respondent that the payments for the amortizations of
these properties were taken from their common funds, then the respondent
would have an equal share in such portions because the payments made
therefor were actually taken from the co-ownership.
- It must be borne in mind that the presumption that the properties are co-
owned and thus must be shared equally is not conclusive but merely
disputable. The petitioner may rebut the presumption by presenting proof
that the properties, although acquired during the period of their
cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work and
industry. In such a case, the properties shall belong solely to the petitioner.
If the respondent is able to present proof that she contributed through her
salary, income, work or industry in the acquisition of the properties, the
parties' share shall be in proportion to their contributions. In the event that
the respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary, income,
work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and maintained
the family and the household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of
the contributions made by the petitioner. However, equal sharing of the
entire properties is not possible.
Should the petition to increase support be granted?
Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual
support between the spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage
void becomes final and executory. As the parties' marriage was declared
void on March 11, 2005, petitioner was only obliged to support, after such
date, their three children, Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita.

According to the petition, at the time the assailed Order of the RTC dated
November 29, 2011 was issued, two of their three daughters already
attained the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent ceased to have
the authority to claim support in their behalf. In increasing the amount of
support due from petitioner based on the needs of all three children, the
RTC gravely abused its discretion.
It is also to be noted that the instant petition was filed in 2014. Since then,
the parties' youngest daughter had likewise reached the age of majority. In
view of this change in circumstance, petitioner can no longer be obliged to
pay P250,000.00 to respondent. This is without prejudice to petitioner's
liability for support in arrears, if any, and for any subsisting obligation to
provide support directly to his daughters.

NICXON L. PEREZ, JR.,• PETITIONER, VS. AVEGAIL PEREZ-

SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR. SENERPIDA,
RESPONDENT.
Spouses Eliodoro and Adelita Perez were the registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7396. After
their marriage on December 10, 1975, Adelita executed a Renunciation
and Waiver of Rights (RWR) of the same property in favor of her husband
Eliodoro. Eliodoro donated the said parcel of land to Nicxon without the
conformity of Adelita. Eliodoro filed against Adelita a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Eliodoro and
Adelita void ab initio. The Marriage Nullity Decision became final and
executory as of July 6, 2005.
What is the property regime of Eliodoro and Adelita ?
Article 147 of the Family Code is the applicable provision and the rules on
co-ownership govern the property acquired during the cohabitation or
"common law" marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita. It must be noted that the
subject property was registered in the names of Eliodoro and Adelita, as
spouses, and there being no proof to the contrary, the subject property is
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and was owned in equal shares by them pursuant to Article 147.

Is the RWR executed by Adelita in favor of Eliodoro valid?

The RWR is void pursuant to Article 87 of the Family Code, which
provides: ART. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Is the DoD executed by Eliodoro in favor of Nicxon valid?
Article 147 creates an exception in the special co-ownership, it recognizes
between parties living together as husband and wife. As long as the
cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition inter vivos
of such undivided share can be validly made by one party without the
consent of the other.
Given the above express prohibition of a party to the cohabitation to
encumber or alienate by acts inter vivos even his or her share in the
property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other party until after the termination thereof under
Article 147, then the donation of any property acquired during the
cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other can only be but
void. The rules on ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on
the undivided share of the disposing party. The donation is simply void.

Michael and Judith were separated in fact for many years. During their
separation de facto, Judith had a relation with Sanjamen, with whom she
cohabited and had a child named Abbygail. When Sanjamen died, Judith,
on behalf of Abbygail, filed an action for compulsory recognition of the
latter as the illegitimate child of the of Sanjamen for the purpose of
partaking in the latter’s vast estate.
What is the status of Abbygail?
Under the law, who is the father, of Abbygail?
Judith, during the subsistence of her marriage with her first husband
Michael, married Jinan. Thereafter, upon petition of Jinan, the second
marriage was declared void for being bigamous and the common child of
Judith and Jinan named Janina was declared to be illegitimate child RTC.
The custody of Janina was awarded to Judith while Jinan was granted
visitation right.
Is the visitorial right granted to Jinan proper?
What is the status of Janina, and under the law who is the father of the
same.

Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos filed a petition for change of name

under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court seeking to change his surname from
"Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live Birth. Her mother, Lovely
Guzman married Patrick Santos, who, in turn, legally adopted petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's name was changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman" to
"Francis Luigi G. Santos." He filed the instant petition in order to avoid
confusion, to show his sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to
Bong Revilla and to the Revillas, and to ensure that his records show his
true identity as Bong Revilla's son. The held that petitioner should have
availed himself of the adversarial proceeding under Rule l 08 instead of
the "summary proceeding" under Rule 103 as allowing petitioner to
change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would constitute a change
in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate.
Did petitioner correctly avail of Rule 103 petition for change of name?
Yes. Petitioner correctly availed of a Rule 103 petition for change of
name. Petitioner merely desires to change and replace his surname
"Santos" with the surname "Revilla" avoid confusion, to show his sincere
and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla Jr. and to the
Revillas, and to show that he accepts and embraces his true identity. He
does not seek to correct any clerical or substantial error in his birth
certificate or to effect any changes in his status as an adopted child of
Patrick Santos. He does not allege or identify any erroneous entry that
requires substantial rectification or cancellation. change of surname under
Rule 103 does not necessarily result in a change of petitioner's status, i.e.,
from legitimate to illegitimate
Is there a compelling reason to grant the change of surname?
There is no compelling reason to grant the change of surname. petitioner,
as the legally adopted child of Patrick Santos, properly bears the surname
"Santos". An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. While
petitioner may factually identify and associate with his biological father
and his family, he remains to be the legitimate son of Patrick Santos by
virtue of the adoption. The latter and not the former is thus his true legal
identity. the compelling reason how such change of name is necessary to
show his lineage as a Revilla is not clearly established. There is no
question that petitioner may file the instant petition, but change of name is
a privilege and not a right. And as such, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. In the case at hand, although petitioner did not deny his
legitimacy, he failed to show proper and reasonable cause to justify the
change sought or any compelling reason which may justify the change. A
petitioner's convenience can never be a ground for a change of name
Convenience cannot be considered as one of, or a recognized ground for
change of name

In Wong, petitioner alleged and proved that he was severely prejudiced by

the use of the surname "Wong," which embarrassed and isolated him from
friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in
reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community. He
alleged and proved that the continued use of said surname hampered his
business and social life. "From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of
his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee
was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the
embarrassment and ridicule his family name 'Wong' brings in his dealings
with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a
Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and
business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state
or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs
of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life,
is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-
22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17,
1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to
improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or of other persons (Calderon
vs. Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this
case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other
persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.
 No similar compelling reason was alleged nor proved in this case. A
sincere desire to associate oneself to a certain person or family, without
more, does not justify a change of surname. In view of the foregoing, the
Petition must be denied.

PROPERTY
ARTICLE 447. BPS on one’s own land with materials belonging to another
BOTH GOOD FAITH
Land Owner have: LOLOY
- 1. Right to appropriate what he has BPS by paying the value of the
materials
- 2. Right to return the materials to OM if the materials can be returned to
the latter in exactly the same form and substance and without causing
injury to the land
BOTH BAD FAITH
- Equals to good faith, abovementioned recourse applies.
LO GOOD FAITH, OM BAD FAITH
- Not governed by 447
- Art. 455 and 449 apply
- OM loses his materials and liable for damages
LO BAD FAITH, OM GOOD FAITH
- 1. Option to demand the values of his material plus damages
- 2. Option to demand the return of his materials in any event even if injury
is caused thereby to the land at the expense of LO, plus damages

ARTICLE 448
BPS with one’s Own Materials on the land of another
BOTH GOOD FAITH
- LO has the option to
o Appropriate as his own the BPS after payment of necessary and
useful expenses
 Pending reimbursement, BP has the right of retention. He
cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of
retention.
 Payment of rentals from the interruption of good faith

o Oblige the BPS to pay the price of the land, if the value of the land
is not considerably more than the value of the BP and the one who
sowed the proper rent.
 If chooses to sell his land, the BP must purchase the land,
otherwise the owner may remove the improvements
thereon.
 If the price of the land is considerably more than the
building or planting, the BP must pa rent to the LO.
 If the price of the land is not considerably more than that of
the building, they may assume the relation of lessor and
lessee.
BOTH BAD FAITH
- Good faith
- LO is given options to
 o Appropriate the improvement for himself after reimbursing the
buyer the necessary and useful expenses
o Sell the land to the buyer, unless the value is considerably more
than that of the improvements, in which case, the builder shall pay
reasoble rent.
LO GOOD FAITH, BPS BAD FAITH
- Right to appropriate whatever has been BPS without need of paying
indemnity plus damages, BPS has no right to a refund of any improvement
built therein.
- Right to demand the demolition even if damages will be caused by the
separation plus damages
- Right to compel the BP to pay the price of the land even if the price of the
land is considerably more than the BP.
LO BAD FAITH, BPS GOOD FAITH
- 1. Option to demand the values of his material plus damages
- 2. Option to demand the return of his materials in any event even if injury
is caused thereby to the land at the expense of LO, plus damages

 BPS refers to one, who not being the owner of the land BPS on that
land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his
title or mode of acquisition.
 It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a
mere tenant, agent, or usufructuary.

Conrado filed an unlawful detainer case against her sister Cecilia to vacate the property
registered in the name of latter. Cecilia refused to comply. She claimed that in 1979, the
subject property was purchased by their mother Rosario. Conrado, however, allegedly
succeeded in registering the property solely in his name. Cecilia alleged that she has been
in possession and cultivation of the subject property for more than 34 years in the concept
of being a co-owner by succession of the subject property and not by tolerance of
respondents and that even assuming they were not co-owners of the subject property,
respondent Conrado never interrupted their possession despite knowledge that petitioners
were building substantial improvements on said lot.
Whether petitioners are builders in good faith?
- Cecilia have the right to retain the subject lot under Article 448 as the
improvements were built with the knowledge and consent of respondents.
- Cecilia have no right to retain possession of the property under Article 448
as they were aware that their tolerated possession could be terminated at
 any time. Thus, they could not have built on the subject property in the
concept of an owner.
- Even assuming that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the subject
property, Article 448 would still be inapplicable. Article 448 may not
generally apply to a co-owner who builds, plants, or sows on a property
owned in common, "for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that
exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-
owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership."
- While petitioners cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, they
constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and
consent of respondents. there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil
Code was applied beyond the recognized and limited definition of good
faith, e.g., cases wherein the builder has constructed improvements on the
land of another with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled therein that
the structures were built in good faith in those cases that the owners knew
and approved of the construction of improvements on the property.
- Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a
builder in good faith, since Cepeda permitted the construction of building
and improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article 448
may be applied in the case at bar.
- Pursuant to the aforementioned article, the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be the same as though both acted in good faith. Therefore,
Article 448 in relation to Articles 54677 and 54878 of the Civil Code
applies.
- Under Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548, respondents as
landowners have the following options: 1) they may appropriate the
improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the value of the
improvements introduced and the necessary, useful and luxurious
expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or 2) they may oblige petitioners to
pay the price of the land, if the value is not considerably more than that
of the improvements and buildings. Should respondents opt to appropriate
the improvements made, however, petitioners may retain the subject lot
until reimbursement for the necessary and useful expenses have been
made.

OBLIGATION AND CONTRACT

Article 19.