AMhara and Ormom Conflict at North Shoa

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Political Science Thesis and Dissertations
2020-09-22
INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BETWEEN
AMHARA AND OROMO
COMMUNITIES IN ATAYE TOWN,
NORTH SHOA ZONE OF AMHARA REGION
JEMAL, SEID
http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/11221
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BAHIR DAR UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

BETWEEN AMHARA AND OROMO COMMUNITIES IN ATAYE TOWN,
BY
JEMAL SEID MOHAMMED
JULY, 2020
BAHIR DAR, ETHIOPIA
i
STUDIES

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
BY
JEMAL SEID MOHAMMED
ADVISOR
BEWUKETU DIRES (PhD CANDIDATE)
JULY, 2020
BAHIR DAR, ETHIOPIA
ii
© 2020 Jemal Seid
July, 2020
iii
OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
STUDIES

BY
JEMAL SEID MOHAMMED
Approved by Board of Examiners:
__________________________ _________________ __________________

Chair Person’s Name Signature Date
__________________________ ________________ _________________

Internal examiner’s Name Signature Date
___________________________ __________________ __________________

External examiner’s Name Signature Date
iv
Declaration
I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis, entitled Inter-ethnic relations and conflict
management between Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye town, North Shoa Zone of
Amhara Region, is my original work and has not been submitted and presented for any degree
award or any other purpose in this University or any other University. All materials, secondary
or primary used for the study have been appropriately cited and acknowledged.
Name Signature Date
Jemal Seid ___________ _________________
This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the

candidate.
Name Signature Date
Bewuketu Dires (PhD Candidate) ____________ ______________
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Table of Contents
Contents Pages
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... i
List of Appendices ................................................................................................ iv
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................... v
Definition of Terms .............................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgment ................................................................................................. vii
Abstract .............................................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................. 1
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Background of the Study ..................................................................................................1
1.2. Statement of the Problem..................................................................................................3
1.3. Objectives of the Study .....................................................................................................6
1.3.1. General Objective ......................................................................................................6
1.3.2. Specific Objectives ....................................................................................................6
1.4. Research Questions ..........................................................................................................6
1.5. Scope of the Study ............................................................................................................6
1.6. Research Methodology .....................................................................................................7
1.6.1. Research Design ........................................................................................................7
1.6.2. Sampling Design and Technique ................................................................................9
1.6.3. Sources of Data........................................................................................................ 10
1.6.4. Methods of Data Collection ..................................................................................... 10
1.6.5. Selection of Field Assistants .................................................................................... 12
1.6.6. Fieldwork Experiences............................................................................................. 13
1.6.7. Method of Data Analysis ......................................................................................... 14
1.7. Limitations of the Study ................................................................................................. 14
1.8. Significance of the Study ................................................................................................ 15
1.9. Ethical considerations ..................................................................................................... 16
1.10. Trustworthiness of the Research ................................................................................... 16
1.11. Operational Definitions................................................................................................. 16
1.12. Organization of the Study ............................................................................................. 17
i
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................18
Review of Related Literature .............................................................................18
Introduction ........................................................................................................18
2.1. Conceptual Clarifications ............................................................................................... 18
2.1.1. Ethnicity .................................................................................................................. 18
2.1.2. Ethnic Identity ......................................................................................................... 19
2.1.3. Ethnic Group ........................................................................................................... 20
2.1.4. Ethnic Conflict......................................................................................................... 21
2.1.5. Inter-Ethnic Relations .............................................................................................. 22
2.2. Theories of Ethnicity and Ethnic-conflict........................................................................ 23
2.2.1. Primordialism Theory .............................................................................................. 23
2.2.2. Instrumentalist Theory ............................................................................................. 24
2.2.3. Constructivist Theory............................................................................................... 25
2.3. Theoretical Framework................................................................................................... 26
2.4. Nature, Categories and Consequences of Ethnic Conflict ................................................ 29
2.4.1. Nature of Ethnic Conflict ......................................................................................... 29
2.4.2. Categories of Ethnic Conflict ................................................................................... 31
2.4.3. Causes of Ethnic Conflict......................................................................................... 33
2.4.4. Impacts of Ethnic Conflict ....................................................................................... 35
2.5. Prevention, Managing and Resolution Mechanisms of Ethnic Conflict ........................... 37
2.5.1. Conflict Prevention .................................................................................................. 37
2.5.2. Conflict Management ............................................................................................... 38
2.5. 3. Conflict Resolution ................................................................................................. 38
2.6. An Overview of Ethnicity, Inter-Ethnic Relation and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia ........... 39
2.6.1 Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups in Ethiopian ................................................................. 39
2.6.2. Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ethiopia ............................................................................ 43
2.6.3. Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia....................................................................................... 44
2.6.3.1. Causes of Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia .................................................................. 45
2.6.4. Ethnic Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia ................................................... 47
2.7. Indigenous Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia ..................... 49
2.7.1. Indigenous Conflict Resolution Systems in Amhara Community ............................. 50
2.7.2. Indigenous Conflict Resolution Systems in Oromo Community ............................... 51
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CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................54
Brief History of Amhara and Oromo People ....................................................54
Introduction ........................................................................................................54
3.1. Amhara People ............................................................................................................... 54
3.2. Oromo People................................................................................................................. 58
3.3. The Ataye Town ............................................................................................................. 62
CHAPTER FOUR...............................................................................................65
Historical Review of Inter-Ethnic Relations between Amhara and Oromo
Communities in Ataye Town ..............................................................................65
Introduction ........................................................................................................65
4.1. During Haile Selassie I Regime ...................................................................................... 65
4.2. During Derg Regime ...................................................................................................... 69
4.3. During EPRDF Government (1991-2018)....................................................................... 71
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................75
Post-2018 Ethnic Conflict and Inter-Ethnic Relations between Amhara and
Oromo Communities in Ataye Town .................................................................75
Introduction ........................................................................................................75
5.1. Post-2018: Violent Conflicts in Ataye Town................................................................... 75
5.2. The 2019: Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Ataye Town .............................................................. 77
5.2.1. Nature of the Conflict .............................................................................................. 77
5.2.2. The Causes of the Conflict ....................................................................................... 79
5.2.3. Impacts of the Conflict............................................................................................. 86
5.2.4. The Conflict Management and Resolution Process ................................................... 89
5.3. The Nature of Current Inter-Ethnic relation between Amhara and Oromo Communities in
Ataye Town........................................................................................................................... 92
CHAPTER SIX ...................................................................................................94
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations ..................................................94
6.1. Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................... 94
6.2. Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 96
References ............................................................................................................98
Appendices .........................................................................................................110
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List of Appendices
Appendix A: Interview and FGD guide questions………………………………………….…110
Appendix B: List of key informants, government officials, academicians, FGD participants and
field assistants………………………………………………………………………….……….112
Appendix C: Map of the study area………………………………………………………….…115
Appendix D: A diagram that shows the historical inter-ethnic relation and conflict between
Amhara and Oromo community in Ataye town………………………………………………...116
Appendix E: A sample which shows the members of the peace committee and the role of
Shimglina in settling the 2019 conflict…………………………………………………………117
Appendix F: A photo that shows the members of the elder’s peace committee and guests attained
on reconciliation program at Ataye town public stadium……………………………………..119
Appendix G: Certificate award for one of the members of the elder peace committee for his
effort and contribution in handling and resolving the conflict…………………………………120
iv
List of Acronyms
AAPO All Amhara People Organization
ADP Amhara Democratic Party
AEPO All Ethiopian People Organization
ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANRS Amhara National Regional State
EPC Elder Peace Committee
EPDM Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESM Ethiopian Student Movement
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD Focus Group Discussion
GPS Global Positioning Satellite System
IUD Institute of Urban Development
KPA Kebele Peasant Association
NaMA National Movement of Amhara
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
PM Prime Minister
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front
YPC Youth Peace Committee
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Definition of Terms
Abbagar -----an elder person who considered as a lawyer and arbitrator
Awuraja-----imperial sub-provincial district made up of several Woreda
Balabat-----local feudal lords and landowners during emperors
Dega -------coldest and highland area
Derg--------the Military Council ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991
Equb--------traditional saving institution that serves as forced saving instruments
Gada--------traditional administrative system of the Oromo people
Iddir---traditional saving institution that gives services in case of emergencies and happiness
Irq-----Amharic translation of the term-reconciliation
Kebele----the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopian local government structure
Kolla------hottest and lowland area
Oromara----the Coalition group of Amhara and Oromo during the reform since 2018
Shimglina-----customary ways of conflict resolution mechanism process by elderly persons
Waaqeffannaa-----the traditional Oromo religion
Weina dega--------neither hot nor cold.
Woreda----------an administrative unit higher than kebele and below Zone
Yabat Hager Hig-----common customary law
Yehager Shimagile-----community elders in Amhara community, selecting by the community to
solve social problems like conflicts
Zone-----------administrative level of the federating units below the level of Regional State
vi
Acknowledgment
This study wouldn’t have been completed without the help of Almighty God and a great many
people. First and foremost, I want to give my thanks to Almighty God. Then, I want to give my
greatest and heartfelt thanks to my advisor, Bewuketu Dires (Ph.D. Candidate), not only for his
academic and professional guidance and assistance but also for his continuous follow-up, critical
and timely comments throughout the work of this thesis. Likewise, I am grateful to Mohammed
Yimam (Assistance professor), Abayneh Atnafu and Jemal Seid for their constructive comments.
I would like to extend my thanks and respect to all my families for their support. I would like to
express my thanks to my field assistants, informants and FGD participants for their cooperation
and hospitality. A huge thanks also go to all my friends, Ibrahim Ahmed, Ahmed Muhye,
Birhanu Bitew and others who have shared their thoughts and understanding of the topic with me
and all their contributions and appreciations. Lastly, I extend my deep gratitude to Wolkite
University for sponsoring me.
vii
Abstract
Inter-ethnic relations may have cordial and constructive nature in certain cases; in other cases,
it can be violent, conflictual and destructive. The main objective of this study was to examine the
nature of inter-ethnic relations and conflict management between Amhara and Oromo
communities in Ataye town, North Shoa Zone of Amhara region. To achieve this objective, the
study employed a qualitative research approach and case study design. The study used primary
and secondary sources. Primary data was collected through in-depth interviews, FGDs and
personal observation. To select key informants and FGD discussants, non-probable sampling,
particularly purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed. The thematic analysis
method was applied to analyze the collected data. The finding of the study shows that, before
1991, Amhara and Oromo communities had cordial relations in Ataye town. There was not
violent ethnic conflict despite some sporadic conflicts related to grazing land, cattle riding and
tradition around the town. After 1991, the two communities were separated into two woredas.
From 1991-2018, their relation has been weak compared to the past. After the 2018 political
reform, their relation has been conflictual. In March 2019, violent ethnic conflict occured
between two ethnically mobilized actors-Amhara and Oromo, in Ataye town. The politicization of
ethnicity was the main root cause of the conflict. Besides, the manipulation of ethnicity by ethnic
entrepreneurs; the weakness of local government; the conspiracy of former local government
officials; the illegal trafficking of arms; the claim over Ataye town; and uncertainty were the
major causes. Moreover, the Militia training given by Ephrata Gidim woreda was the main
immediate cause. However, the conflict was resolved by local elders through Shimgillina.
Currently, the relation between the two communities in Ataye town is on the way to a peaceful
situation. But still, they have distrust and suspecting towards each other. In a nutshell, their
ethnic difference by itself was not a cause for violent ethnic conflict and hostile inter-ethnic
relations between Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye town, rather it has been politicized
and instrumentalized.
Key Words: Amhara, Oromo, Ataye, community, ethnicity, ethnic conflict, ethnic group, inter-
ethnic relation,
viii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
This chapter presents the introductory parts of the thesis including the general background of the
study, statement of the problem, objectives, basic research questions, and scope of the study. It
also contains the methodological procedures that guide the overall process of the research work,
including research design, sampling, methods of data collection, and data analysis. The chapter
also shows the limitation that challenged the researcher, trustworthiness, and ethical
consideration.
1.1. Background of the Study

Conflict dates from the beginning of human history and will probably never end (Jeong, 2008).
Conflicts between ethnic groups are one of the most destructive and devastating forms of conflict
(Arcan, 2014). At the beginning of the third millennium, the world and humankind are still
suffering due to conflicts between ethnic groups (Arcan, 2014).
Ethiopia is an ancient African state with a rich tradition of religious types, mores, and folkways
whose roots are deeply embedded into a history of over two thousand years. The fact makes the
country a mosaic of peoples and cultures at the heart of the Horn of Africa (Tigist, 2014).
Diversified ethnic groups in Ethiopia, has experienced many things together that makes them
have to cordial inter-ethnic relations such as economic interdependence through trade, inter-
ethnic marriage, common cultural practices, and narration of a myth of common ancestry
(Birhanu, 2018). Since ancient times, the people of Ethiopia have been in closer interaction. The
scope and dimension of this interaction seem to have been broadened as a result of the Oromo
expansion of the 16th Century that brought them face to face with various peoples of the region.
The Amhara people were one of the people with whom the Oromo people came into contact.
Since then the two peoples have been interacting in various aspects (Oljira, 2011).
Despite the existence of amicable ethnic relations, the history of the Ethiopian state is the history
of conflict with varying dimensions based on class, religious and regional sentiments (Merera,
2006). As history tells, various conflicts in Ethiopia between different interest groups for
economic or political gains usually led to massive damage (Tigist, 2014). Specifically, much of
the history of Ethiopia can be viewed as a struggle between the Amhara and the Oromo,
1
compared to which the chronicles of the dynastic struggle of the petty northern chiefdoms, which
have so preoccupied historians (Baxter, 1978). The two communities have conflicted for
centuries (Iaccino, 2016). The Oromo people historically compete with the Amhara ethnic group
to control lands (Bekele, 2019). Historical rivalry for power between the Amhara and Oromo
played an important role. The rivalries were aggravated among others by the central government
attempts to exploit the situation for its advantages. By favoring one group to the other at different
times, the government incited communal tension (Zelalem, 2017).
Despite the pre-1992 period, which there were traditionally manifested relations and conflicts,
the post-1992 new structure and political atmosphere overwhelmingly affected the inter and
intra-ethnic relations and alliances as a whole (Mesfin, 2006). Empirically, Ethiopia has been
experiencing the deadliest inter-ethnic conflicts since the day of the inception of ethnic
federalism than ever. The period has also witnessed ethnic-based violence in many parts of the
state (Dagnachew, 2018). The arrangements have facilitated the opportunity for ethnic-based
conflicts to prevail in Ethiopia (Beshah, 2018).
Violent inter-ethnic conflicts erupted occasionally over 27 years, but they were usually brought
under control and seemed relatively low in intensity (Semir, 2019). Now a day people in
different parts of the country are suffering from violent conflicts emanated from human fault
lines, ethnicity, and religion (Dagnachew, 2018). Moreover, in Ethiopia, today, contending
nationalisms exist in the face of institutional fragility and incoherence. The outcome is the
proliferation of violent conflicts across the country (Semir,2019). Particularly, the Amhara and
Oromo groups, though previously allied to oust the TPLF1, are now squabbling over government
appointments and land disputes (Faleg, 2019).
Recently, the Kemise conflict is worth elaborating on here as it represents not only a violent
inter-nationalist struggle but also a struggle involving minorities within minorities. The Amhara
Region constitutionally guarantees zonal autonomy to Oromo minorities. Through the Oromo
Special Zone, the Oromo have exercised autonomy for the past 27 years. But with the new
dispensation of politics, Oromo and Amhara issues became a source of intense friction. While
1
TPLF was organized in 1975 by the Tigrayan youth. The principal aim of TPLF was liberation of Tigray. As a
political strategy to enter into the territories beyond Tigray. The Front changed its name to EPRDF in 1989 by
creating surrogate parties from other ethnolinguistic groups (Vaughan, 2003).
2
the Oromo felt an imminent threat of subjugation by the Amhara, the Amhara felt the need to
contain the threat of rising Oromo nationalism in their homeland, and to protect their minorities
within the Oromo minority (Semir, 2019).
1.2. Statement of the Problem

All around the world, violent conflicts create tragic stories of human death and destruction. Most
of these conflicts are described as ethnic and are explained within both cultural and ethnic
contexts (Arcan, 2014). Ethnic interest conflicts seem to be common in all ethnically
heterogeneous countries of the world, but the nature of such conflicts varies greatly from
peaceful competition between ethnic groups to violent clashes, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and
genocide (Vanhanen, 2012).
Most countries across the globe are ethnically pluralistic societies. While ethnic diversity by
itself need not generate ethnic conflict, it is evident that ethnicity can be exploited and
manipulated enough to generate social conflict, especially in the developing world. African
societies that have experienced serious and armed ethnic conflicts internally in the post-colonial
era. It is ethnically a conflict-ridden continent. Ethnic conflict is a disease afflicting many
African countries; instability and violence are the symptoms (Kokole, 1996). Inter-ethnic
relations in Africa are constrained by various problems. The manifestations of such constrained
relations in the form of co-operation, interdependence, suspicion, and tension influence the
nature of political discourses of identity. In certain cases, ethnic relations have been so bad. In
other cases, cordial inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic relations have resulted in peoples' economic
growth, political stability as well as their social development (Kakai, 2000).
Being one of the most diverse nations in the world, Ethiopia is not an exception to be free from
ethnic conflicts due to its weak political structures and mal governance (Muhabie, 2015). There
have been quite a several ethnic conflicts in various parts of Ethiopia and for generations, violent
conflicts have been a serious threat to development and stability in various communities. Though
accurate statistics are hard to come by, various reports and testimonials in all regional states have
been witness to frequent violent conflicts that have claimed the lives of thousands of people and
accounted for the destruction of public properties (Kanani et al., 2005).
3
Although Ethiopia is not new to ethnic-based conflicts, their scale and intensity in the short time
since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali’s rise to power have been alarming. The rise in violent
ethnic conflict in Ethiopia in recent years can largely be linked to the sharp increase in militant
ethnic nationalism2 against a backdrop of state and party fragility (Semir, 2019:1). Dozens of
people have been killed, many more injured, and over a million people displaced since April
2018 due to rising ethnic violence (Peebles, 2019). Ethnic tensions and displacement of people
continue as ethnic groups have kept conflicts alive in many border areas of the country in pursuit
of greater self-determination and autonomy under a reformed federal system (Faleg, 2019). This
has led to a massive displacement of people. Inter-ethnic violence that year caused almost 2.9
million new displacements (Semir, 2019).
The current ethnocentric view of nationalism has contributed to gain the momentum of the
intensity, frequency, nature as well as the spillover effect of violent ethnic conflict in the country.
The levels of ethnic conflict and violence that we are witnessing today in different parts of the
country, has eroded the historical peaceful coexistence of different Ethiopian ethnic groups and
eventually resulted in the displacement and death of Hundreds and Thousands of innocent
Ethiopians (Mekonnen, 2019).
In the area of understudy, Ataye town, different ethnic groups, particularly Amhara and Oromo
communities live together for long times. Recently, after the 2018 political reform3 in Ethiopia,
the two local ethnic groups of Amhara and Oromo have come to ethnic conflicts in Ataye town.
According to Hayalnesh (2019), the areas affected by the violence include localities leading to
Kemise, the administrative center of the Oromo community administrative zone, such as Ataye
and Karakore towns and Efrata and Gedem Wereda. Colonel Tesfaye Ayalew of the ministry of
defense gave no clear answer when asked to explain the cause of the violence and said it will be
investigated together with local authorities and communities.
2
Ethnic nationalism is a sentiment or movement that creates a sense of belongingness, loyalty, and devotion based
on ethnic group’s common culture, language, history, territory, or race. It focuses on the preservation of the identity,
solidarity, and tradition of the ethnic group and respect of the right of that ethnic group (Assefa, 2019).
3
Political reform means reforming power, the ways it’s exercised and reforming the decision-making process itself.
It aimed at radicalizing democracy to tackle inequality and exclusion, promote diversity, and foster participation by
ordinary citizens, thus, what is needed is a reform that can widen people’s possibilities and opportunities to
participate in politics (Antonio, 2009).
4
So, the area becomes one of the areas that attract the researcher and the issue needs investigation.
In addition to this, the conflict could affect the socio-economic aspects, the general social
security, and the inter-ethnic relation of the two communities. This problem provoked the mind
of the researcher to examine the nature of inter-ethnic relations and conflict management
between Amhara and Oromo communities in the case of Ataye town. However, the researcher
gives more emphasis on the 2019 ethnic conflict.
Several research works were conducted on ethnic relations, ethnic conflict and conflict
management in Ethiopia. From those, Zelalem wrote an article in 2017. His’s article examines
the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Gidda and Kiremu districts, located on the western edge
of the northern plateau of Ethiopia in East Wollega, Oromia Regional State, from a historical
perspective. His paper tried to shed light on changing trends of inter-ethnic relations among
diverse communities inhabiting the two districts.
The second research was conducted by Asebe in 2007, entitled ‘Ethnicity and Inter-ethnic
Relations: the ‘Ethiopian experiment and the case of the Guji and Gedeo’. His study deals with
ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations in the African context, with particular emphasis on the new
‘Ethiopian experiment of ethnic politics. Another research was conducted by Bantayehu in 2016,
entitled inter-ethnic conflict in South-Western Ethiopia: the case of Alle and Konso. His research
emphasized on common ethnic identity and self-governance recognition. However, those above
studies were conducted out of the Amhara region. Moreover, the above studies were conducted
before the 2018 political reform. However, this study tries to examine the pre and post-reform
relations by focusing on the 2019 ethnic conflict.
In the previous year, Belete Haileyes conducted research on the imperatives of Oromo-Amhara
elites' cooperation for democratic reform in Ethiopia. His study focused on the cooperation of the
two ethnic group elites. But this thesis focuses on the relations of the two communities. It
focuses on the Amhara region, specifically on the Ataye town of ethnic conflict, relations, and
conflict management between Amhara and Oromo ethnic communities. Above all, the problem
of ethnic conflict and hostile inter-ethnic relations is a serious problem until now in Ethiopia,
especially between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. Moreover, as far as this case is concerned,
there are not accessible previous studies related to this study, particularly, in Ataye town.
Therefore, this research intended to contribute to filling the existing knowledge gap on Amhara
5
and Oromo communities’ relations and conflict management, with special emphasis on Ataye
town.
1.3. Objectives of the Study

1.3.1. General Objective
The main objective of this study was to examine the nature of inter-ethnic relations and conflict
management between Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye town, North Shoa Zone of
Amhara region.
1.3.2. Specific Objectives

Based on the above main objective, this study has the following specific objectives:
1. To explore the nature of the ethnic conflict between Amhara and Oromo communities in
Ataye town,
2. To identify the major causes of the conflict between the two communities,
3. To examine the impacts of the ethnic conflict on the study area,
4. To assess the management and resolution process of the existed ethnic conflict in Ataye,
5. To examine the nature of the current inter-ethnic relation of the two communities in the
town.
1.4. Research Questions

This research attempts to provide answers to the following questions.
1. What was the nature of the ethnic conflict between Amhara and Oromo communities in
Ataye Town?
2. What were the major causes of the conflict between the two communities in Ataye town?
3. What were/are the impacts of the ethnic conflict on the study area?
4. How the existing ethnic conflicts could have been managed and resolved?
5. What is the nature of the current inter-ethnic relation of the two communities in the
town?
1.5. Scope of the Study

The scope of this study was delimited to examine inter-ethnic relations and conflict management
between Amhara and Oromo communities only in the Amhara region of North Shoa Zone,
6
particularly in Ataye town. The study tried to assess the conflictual and cordial relations of the
two communities during the three successive regimes. However, the researcher gives more
emphasis on the 2019 ethnic conflict, by focusing on nature, the major causes, and the impacts of
ethnic conflict in the study area. It also tries to assess the management and resolution process of
the existed ethnic conflict. Besides, this study examines the nature of the current inter-ethnic
relation of the two communities in the town. Geographically, this study was delimited to the
Ataye town of Ephrata Gidim Woreda of North Shoa Zone, ANRS. The study area was selected
because, in 2019, there was a violent ethnic conflict between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups
in the town.
1.6. Research Methodology

This research applied a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research seeks to understand a
given research problem or topic from the perspectives of the local population it involves.
Qualitative research is especially effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the
values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts of particular populations. It provides information
about the human side of an issue that is, the often-contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions,
emotions, and relationships of individuals. It also effective in identifying intangible factors, such
as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion. Qualitative research
can help us to interpret and better understand the complex reality of a given situation (Mack et
al., 2005). This approach is common whenever people are the focus of the study, particularly
small groups or individuals (Walliman, 2006). It is an approach for exploring and understanding
the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2014).
According to Hancock et al. (2007), qualitative research helps us to understand the social world
in which we live and why things are the way they are, and it seeks to answer questions about
why people behave the way they do, how people are affected by the events that go on around
them, how and why cultures and practices have developed in the way they have. Accordingly,
qualitative research was employed in this research to investigate ethnic relations and conflict
management systems of Amhara and Oromo communities in the Ataye town.
1.6.1. Research Design

To achieve the objectives of the research, as well as answering the research questions, the
researcher employed a case study research design. A case study is a qualitative research design in
7
which the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more
individuals. The cases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed
information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained time (Creswell, 2014).
The strength of this design is its ability to discover a wide variety of social, cultural, and political
factors potentially related to the phenomenon of interest that may not be known in advance
(Bhattacherjee, 2012).
The case study method is a very popular form of qualitative study and involves a careful and
complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an institution, a cultural
group, or even the entire community (Kothari, 1990). In most cases, a case study method selects
a small geographical area or a very limited number of individuals as the subjects of study. Case
studies, in their true essence, explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomena through
detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships
(Zainal, 2007). The researcher employed a qualitative case study research design because, the
researcher used various sources of information for data triangulation such as interviews, FGD,
and observation. Therefore, a case study design was desirable for this study.
In line with a case study, the study was a kind of interpretive case study. Through an interpretive
case study, the researcher aims to interpret the data by developing conceptual categories,
supporting or challenging the assumptions made regarding them (McDonough, 1997 cited in
Zainal, 2007). The researcher would arrive at an interpretation of a phenomenon by developing
(subjective) meanings of social events or actions. Interpretive research helps us to achieve an
understanding of the actions of people in social circumstances and situations. Interpretive studies
require the researcher to go beyond simply describing or explaining what a phenomenon is, to
also interpret the phenomenon for the reader. The basic aim of the interpretive model is to
develop a more complete understanding of social relationships (McNabb, 2015).
According to Creswell (2009), qualitative research is a form of interpretive inquiry in which

researchers interpret what they see, hear, and understand. The researcher will inculcate the feelings,
opinions, and ideas of the participants and will provide interpretation and evaluation for it. The
qualitative approach deploys a wide range of interpretive methods to understand the worlds of
participants surrounding them. The researcher used this strategy to understand the issues under
investigation from the perspective of the members of the two ethnic communities. Hence, the
8
researcher aimed to conduct an in-depth and interpretive understanding of the nature of the ethnic
conflict, relations and conflict resolution between the Amhara and Oromo communities, investigate
the views, opinions, and perspectives of the participants on what they understand and how they
explain an overall nature of inter-ethnic relations between Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye
town.
1.6.2. Sampling Design and Technique

Even if it is possible, it is not necessary to collect data from everyone in a community to get
valid findings. In qualitative research, only a sample (that is, a subset) of a population is selected
for any given study (Mack et al., 2005). The researcher selected key informants and FGD
participants from Amhara and Oromo, including other ethnic communities. To make the sample
representative, sample participants were selected from different key sections of the community
on both sides purposely.
Sample participants for the fieldwork parts of this research were selected based on non-
probability sampling, particularly purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques. The
idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites (or documents or
material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question
(Creswell, 2014). Key informants, including from local elders (Yehager Shimaglie); government
officials from both Zone and Woreda officials such administrators, security officers, and
communication officers; youth peace committee members, religious leaders, academicians, and
field assistants were selected by purposive sampling technique. Besides, focus group discussants
were selected by purposive and snowball sampling from all sections of the community of the two
sides. The researcher selected FGD discussants from teachers, merchants, youths, residents,
students, and others. While selecting sample participants, the researcher considered their ethnic
group, knowledge, academic status and their position in the society.
For triangulation, the researcher also selected key informants from third or out of the two
communities through employing a snowball sampling technique, because of the sensitivity of the
issue and those key informants were out of Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. According to
Bhattacherjee (2012), in snowball sampling, you start by identifying a few respondents that
match the criteria for inclusion in your study and then ask them to recommend others they know
who also meet your selection criteria. Also, the researcher selected old aged key informants
9
through the snowball sampling technique to get the relevant data related to the past conflictual
and cordial relations of the two communities in the study area.
1.6.3. Sources of Data

The researcher collected qualitative data4 from different sources that would be analyzed qualitatively
in the text. The researcher used both primary and secondary data sources. In this research basically,
the primary data source is employed to gather first-hand information to achieve the objectives of the
research. For this purpose, primary data was collected from key informants and focus group
discussants from Amhara and Oromo communities. The researcher also used secondary sources of
data such as books, journal articles, MA theses, Ph.D. dissertations, reports and other materials.
1.6.4. Methods of Data Collection

To conduct this study, the researcher employed a qualitative data collection method. The
researcher collected primary data through the semi-structured interview from key informants, focus
group discussants, and personal observation. The researcher also collected secondary data from
written and unwritten materials which are supportive of primary data. The researcher discusses
the methods applied to collect data as follows.
1. Interview: the researcher used a semi-structured interview5 data collection method to collect
primary data from key informants. According to Hancock et al. (2007), in a semi-structured
interview, the interviewer has the freedom to probe the interviewee to elaborate on an original
response or to follow a line of inquiry introduced by the interviewee. The semi-structured
interview is possibly the most common qualitative research data gathering method.
A total of 33 interviews were conducted with key informants. Out of a total 33 interviews, 7
interviews were conducted with local elders from both sides, 2 with youth peace committee from
both sides, 3 with other ethnic groups, 3 with religious leaders, 11 with government officials
from both sides at different levels, 4 with academicians, and finally, 3 interviews were conducted
with field assistants. The researcher collected data from those informants until the data reaches
its saturation point.
4
Qualitative data refers to some collection of words, symbols, pictures, or other nonnumeric records, materials, or
artifacts that are collected by a researcher and have relevance to the social group under study (McNabb, 2015).
5
Semi-structured interview is atype of interview, by which, the interviewer uses a set of predetermined questions
and the respondents answer in their own words. Some interviewers use a topic guide that serves as a checklist to
ensure that all respondents provide information on the same topics (Easwaramoorthy & Zarinpoush, 2006).
10
Old aged key informants from both ethnic communities including other ethnic groups were
interviewed to get information on longstanding relations of the two ethnic groups in the area. The
researcher also would interview with key local elders (Yehager Shimagile) from both sides and
religious leaders from Orthodox Christian, Muslim and Protestant religious institutions to collect
data related to the nature and the causes of the conflicts and to collect data about the role of the
elders in handling the conflict and their roles in conflict resolution processes. It believed that
religious leaders could give unbiased information about any issues more than other common
individuals.
The researcher also interviewed with academicians of the area to get data related to nature,
causes and impacts of the conflict, and the current inter-ethnic relation of the two ethnic groups.
The researcher also interviewed with the Woreda and Zonal governmental officials from both
sides to get data related to the nature, causes, and impacts of the conflict. However, the
researcher mainly focused on local key informants and FGD discussants to collect data, because
the local informants have firsthand information and they physically appeared on the place during
the conflict time. However, the Zonal informants are giving responses based on the report of the
local government.
Besides this, the researcher interviewed key informants of other ethnic groups. Because it
believed that the neutral individuals or groups can give unbiased information and those Argobba
communities were live long times together with the two communities in Ataye town.
Additionally, the researcher interviewed with field assistance from Amhara, Oromo and Argobba
ethnic groups. All of this enabled the researcher to get sufficient information to crosscheck the
data. Younger key informants from youth peace committees of both sides were interviewed to
know the nature and causes of the conflict and to know their feeling towards another sider in
their current inter-ethnic relation.
2. Focus Group Discussions: The researcher also used the FGD method to collect detailed data
about the issue under study. Focus groups6 are a qualitative data collection method effective in
helping researchers learn the social norms of a community or subgroup, as well as the range of
perspectives that exist within that community or subgroup (Mack et al., 2005). This technique
6
A focus group is a qualitative data collection method in which one or two researchers and several participants meet
as a group to discuss a given research topic (Mack et al., 2005).
11
helped to learn about commonly shared values, experiences, norms, and attitudes towards others
and self (Abreham, 2015).
Two focus group discussions were held, one each with a group from the two sides. Each focus
group discussion consisted of eight members treated differently based on their language. Two
focus group discussions have been organized with each ethnic group and discussions have been
conducted in a separate schedule to make discussions free and the participants could express
their views and opinions freely. According to Hancock et al. (2007), the members of each focus
group should usually have something in common characteristics that are important to the topic of
investigation. By doing so, the researcher could collect data related to the nature, causes, and
impacts of the conflict. In addition to this, FGD participants could state detail about the role of
the elders. Moreover, the researcher could collect detailed data from FGD participants related to
the nature of the current inter-ethnic relation of the two communities in the town.
3. Observation: Observing participants in situations is more valid: it is possible to see how they
behave. Observation can also produce data for verifying or nullifying information provided in
face to face encounters (Hancock et al., 2007). The researcher could observe the interaction of
the two communities in their common markets, in the markets that located in Amhara and Oromo
communities only, in hotels, restaurants, and bars, also in common tea and coffee places for
more than a month to understand the current inter-ethnic relations between Amhara and Oromo
communities in Ataye town.
1.6.5. Selection of Field Assistants

In conducting this study, having a field assistant was very important and necessary. The field
assistants were nominated from Amhara, Oromo, and Argobba communities based on their
ethnic background, their willingness, and their social and ethical acceptance in their respective
communities. The researcher selected three field assistants from those three ethnic groups. Since
all ethnic groups live in Ataye town could speak and communicate with the Amharic language.
So, the researcher would have to not find a translator. The researcher needs individuals from
those ethnic groups to assist him to create trust among the key interviewees and FGD discussants
because the issue was sensitive and it may cause insecurity. Moreover, the field assistants had a
great role for the researcher by contacting key informants physically or through telephone and
facilitating face to face interviews with key interviewees and FGD participation in both sides.
12
1.6.6. Fieldwork Experiences
After the approval of the proposal of this research, the researcher made all essential preparation
in order to go to the study area to collect data. The interview and FGD guides were prepared in
Amharic and English languages. Then after, the research advisor and other classmates of the
study commented and corrected the guiding instrument, the researcher went to the study area i.e.
Ataye town. The fieldwork took more than one month, from March 13 to April 15/2020 because
of the Coronavirus. Primary, the researcher went to the Ataye town administration and discussed
with security officers in order to get permission as the issue was a hot issue. They permitted to
collect data from any members of the community including them after they saw the letter, the
researcher was given from Bahir Dar University. Firstly, the researcher selected field assistants
with the help of indicators. Since the researcher could live for two years in the town previously.
So, it was not difficult to get field assistants for the researcher.
After selecting those field assistants, the researcher immediately started to select FGD
participants with the help of field assistants. However, some suspected the researcher as
government agents come to spy the communities. The field assistants and researcher, however,
convinced them and they became voluntary for participation. After selecting and organizing the
participants in the Amhara community, the researcher conducted FGD with those selected
participants well. The next day, in the same way, the researcher also conducted FGD
participation with selected participants on the side of the Oromo community. However, the
researcher was challenged to get and select FGD participants from Oromo communities.
However, through the help of a field assistant, the researcher could get participants. But that was
impossible to get female participants. On both sides, the researcher conducted a focus group
discussion by keeping their social distance well.
The researcher traveled to all parts of the study area to contact with key informants in the next
days. However, that was not more challenging to get key informants in local areas, unlike FGD
participants. For successive days of March 2020, the researcher could collect data from all
expected key informants like local elders, academicians, youth peace committees, local
governmental officials, religious leaders from both sides of the local community, and individuals
from other ethnic groups with the help of field assistances.
13
However, Corona (COVID-19) was the main challenge that faced the researcher. For an
undefined time, the government has prohibited any movement from woreda to woreda. Because
of this, the researcher would pause collecting data for a week. Finally, the researcher could
collect data from Zonal government officials of the two communities. After the researcher would
return to Bahir Dar, he conducted a telephone interview with some key informants, those who
leave out from Ataye town to other areas during the conflict, in order to get further data related
to the nature, causes, and impacts of the conflict. Since the researcher could get their phone
number from the field assistants and the communities.
1.6.7. Method of Data Analysis

Data analysis in qualitative research will precede hand-in-hand with other parts of developing the
qualitative study, namely, the data collection and the write-up of findings (Creswell, 2014). For this
study, the researcher employed a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis7 (TA) is an accessible,
flexible, and increasingly popular method of qualitative data analysis. TA is a method for
systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into, patterns of meaning (themes) across
a dataset. Through focusing on meaning across a dataset, TA allows the researcher to see and make
sense of collective or shared meanings and experiences (Braun and Clarke, 2012).
The data collected from both the primary and secondary sources analyzed thematically based on
the objectives and questions of the study. The qualitative data collected from interviewees
through semi-structured interviews, FGD, observation, and documents were structured into
themes and patterns and analyzed through careful interpretation of meanings and contents to
have a clear analysis based on the established objectives and questions. So, the researcher
employed thematic analysis methods of data analysis.
1.7. Limitations of the Study

Throughout data collection, it was not an easy task for the researcher to get the necessary data
from research participants, because of the sensitiveness of the issue. Moreover, the researcher
was challenged by Corona (COVID-19) virus. The main challenge was the interruption of
transport facilities. However, the researcher tried to collect data immediately while the virus has
7
A thematic analysis is one that looks across all the data to identify the common issues that recur, and identify the
main themes that summarize all the views you have collected (Brikci and Green, 2007).
14
existed in Ethiopia. Firstly, the researcher has conducted FGD to collect data while the
researcher arrived in the study area.
After a week, the government prohibited and closed transportation and other movements. Due to
this, the researcher delayed collecting data from Zonal government officials for undefined times.
So, the researcher tried to collect data through the telephone, but they were not volunteering.
After a week, the researcher tried to get them physically. Another challenge was, some
informants, even some government officials did not volunteer to record their voices. This was a
challenging task to take all their response on paper. In addition to this, some informants and
participants would give biased data from both communities. Thus, the researcher excluded some
data after triangulation made through interviews with neutral other ethnic groups and FGD on
both sides. Also, on the side of Oromo communities, it was impossible to get female participants
in FGD, so, the researcher conducted FGD only with male participants. Yet, with the help of
field assistance and through telephone communication with key informants, the researcher could
collect necessary data.
Related to materials, the researcher was challenged in finding written materials related to the
nature of the historical cordial and conflictual relations of Amhara and Oromo communities,
specifically in the case of Ataye town. There were not accessible written materials related to the
relations of the two communities in Ataye town. Because of that, primary sources were mainly
employed to discuss the historical relations of the two communities during the three successive
regimes in the case of Ataye town.
1.8. Significance of the Study

By assessing the inter-ethnic relations and conflict management between Amhara and Oromo
communities in the case of Ataye town, this study provides the following significances.
Primarily, the study enables the researcher to have a full understanding about the nature of
historical relations of Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye town; Secondly, the issue of
ethnic conflict is a critical issue and it is the current problem for overall affairs of the state, this
study serves as an indicator for the existing government to give focuses and to take
measurements; Thirdly, this study serves as a standing point for further researchers related to the
issue of ethnic relations, ethnic conflict and conflict management in the study area. It also serves
15
as a document for anyone who needs to understand the nature of inter-ethnic relations between
Amhara and Oromo communities and their conflict management system in Ataye town.
1.9. Ethical considerations

The researcher should be guided by research ethics which is universally accepted. Hence, the
researchers would respect the dignity of all research participants so as not to use them simply as
a means to achieve research objectives. To confirm this ethical principle, the researcher relayed
on the principle of informed consent by informing the purpose of the study. Since the issue is to
some extent sensitive, the researcher was confidential to the informants for whatever information
they provide. Added to this, the researcher used codes instead of using the name of the
participants to secure their privacy. Secondary sources used in this study were properly cited and
acknowledged to avoid plagiarism. Besides, an effort was made to avoid bias and to become
objective as possible.
1.10. The Trustworthiness of the Research

To ensure the quality of research, some steps have been taken to enhance the trustworthiness of
the study found. The credibility and dependability of the research were assured by using multiple
methods. For instance, the researcher used different data collection methods to cross-check the
credibility of the data that was collected from the participants. That is for what the social
researchers called data triangulation. Moreover, throughout the study, peer reviewers and advisor
were contacted to minimize errors in conducting the research.
1.11. Operational Definitions

For clarity and to make specific, the researcher defines some key terms which have been used
throughout this study like:
Ethnicity: It refers to the behavior and feeling (about oneself and others) that supposedly
emanates from membership of an ethnic group (Hizkias, 1996).
Community: A group of people in a given time and place.
Ethnic Identity: It refers to the reality and the process through which people identify themselves
and are identified by others as members of a specific ethnic group (Levinson, 1994).
16
Ethnic Group (Community): A group of peoples, that members share a common name, a
believed common descent, elements of a shared culture (most often language or religion),
common historical memories, and attachment to a particular territory (Smith,1986). In this study,
the researcher mostly used the terms ethnic group and ethnic community interchangeably.
Ethnic Conflict: It is a conflict between two or more ethnic groups which is caused by different
factors, but the conflict is defined in ethnic terms (Cordell & Wolf, 2011).
1.12. Organization of the Study

This thesis was organized into six chapters. The first chapter would provide the general
background of the study, problem statement, objectives, research questions, scope and
methodological aspects such as research design, sampling, methods of data collection, and data
analysis. In addition to this, it contains the limitation of the study, the significance of the study,
the selection of field assistants, fieldwork experiences, trustworthiness, and ethical consideration.
The second chapter covers the conceptual and theoretical perspectives and debates on conflict,
ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, inter-ethnic relations, and causes of ethnic
conflicts and its management and resolution mechanisms. This chapter also covers an overview
of ethnicity, inter-ethnic relation, and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. In chapter three, this thesis
would discuss the history of Amhara and Oromo and their socio, economic, and political
relations; and it describes the study area.
Chapter four covered assessing the nature of ethnic conflicts and inter-ethnic relations between
Amhara and Oromo communities during the three successive regimes in Ataye town (study
area). Chapter five of the research tries to discuss and analyze the nature of the post-2018 inter-
ethnic conflict and ethnic relations between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups in the case of
Ataye town. The last chapter produced a summary of findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the research.
17
CHAPTER TWO
Review of Related Literature
Introduction
This chapter provides the conceptual clarifications and theoretical perspectives of ethnic conflict
and inter-ethnic relations. The first part of the chapter presents the conceptual clarification of
ethnicity, ethnic identity, ethnic group, ethnic conflict, and inter-ethnic relation. The second
section discusses the theoretical perspectives that link to ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and causes of
inter-ethnic conflict. The third section discusses on theoretical framework i.e. which and why
theories are applicable for this thesis. The fourth section deals with the nature, categories, causes
and influences of ethnic conflict, and prevention, managing, and resolution mechanisms of ethnic
conflict. The fifth part of this chapter discusses an overview of ethnicity, ethnic groups, ethnic
conflict, and inter-ethnic relations in Ethiopia and it includes dealing with ethnic federalism and
ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. It also discusses the indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in
Ethiopia by focusing on Amhara and Oromo communities.
2.1. Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.1. Ethnicity
Ethnicity itself is full of ambiguity and difficult to define. Ethnicity is a dynamic concept
encompassing both subjective and objective elements (Rupesinghe, 1996). It is not a fixed
condition but a historical process that was derived from and profoundly shaped and influenced
by the cultural, social, economic, and political forces (Patrick, 2011). Therefore, ethnicity has
been conceptualized in different ways (Vanhanen, 2012).
The origin of the term ethnicity goes back to the Greek word for nation, ‘ethnos’. In Ancient
Greek this was used to describe a community of common descent-in other words, ‘ethnos’ is
used to describe a kinship group linked by ties of blood (Wolff, 2006). It also refers to the
behavior and feeling (about oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from membership of
an ethnic group (Hizkias, 1996). Ethnicity also refers to a cultural interpretation of descent and
historical tradition by a group of people, as opposed to others, and expressed in a certain
behavioral or cultural style. It is often only one part of a person's or group's social identity, but is
18
articulated in situations of conflict such as conquest, incorporation or marginalization, and is
often consciously appropriated in a political sense by a collectivity (Abbink, 1997).
In most cases, ethnicity is defined as either membership to a group of people who share
primordial elements, such as common language, common ancestry, and feeling of solidarity. Or
it is a membership to an imagined community created and manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs
(Dagnachew, 2018). Ethnicity is a social relationship among ethnic groups. The relationship
among the ethnic groups, being either in a form of conflictual or non-conflictual (Paulos, 1994).
According to Westin (2010), ethnicity is an umbrella concept, denoting the specific quality
characterizing a people’s understanding of itself as a collective. It is about identities, categories,
groups, collectives, and relations. It is a collective identity. It is emotionally and cognitively
significant to the individual and ascribed by self and others. It is about the sense of belonging, in
many cases a people with common language, traditions and in some cases also territory.
2.1.2. Ethnic Identity

Identity is a complicated concept. There are numerous characteristics, beliefs, values, etc. that
are important to identity formation and maintenance (Wemlinger, 2008). Ethnic identity is based
on socially sanctioned cultural differences. Consequently, it implies shared opinions regarding
the origin (Javakhishvili and Sarjveladze, 2007). Ethnic identity refers to the reality and the
process through which people identify themselves and are identified by others as members of a
specific ethnic group. Ethnic identity involves self-identification as a member of an ethnic group
and external ascription by others (Levinson, 1994).
There are several elements of identity that are often shared within ethnic groups. These include a
sense of shared history and common ancestry, the recognition of a homeland or place of common
origin, and strong political solidarity (Wemlinger, 2008:66). Ethnic identity is formed by
both tangible and intangible characteristics. Tangible characteristics, such as shared culture or
common visible physical traits, are important because they contribute to the group’s feeling of
identity, solidarity, and uniqueness (Reuter, 2017).
Individuals mobilized based on identities will probably be deeply engaged with their common
history and perceive their group identities as somewhat fixed. And elites will use these identities
in order for them to mobilize political support (Rorbaek, 2016). Most people have multiple
19
identities that are either nested (as subgroups within larger groups) or overlapping. Identities do
sometimes change, with new ones emerging and old ones disappearing, especially in times of
crisis (Kaufman, 2011).
2.1.3. Ethnic Group

The definition of ethnic groups and the distinction between people based on ethnic criteria is
difficult, inconsistent, and confusing. A commonly used definition is that an ethnic group is a
collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry,
language, and culture (Hizkias, 1996). An ethnic group is a population whose members identify
themselves with each other based on common heritage and predecessors, common culture,
behavioral patterns, language, or religion (Javakhishvili and Sarjveladze, 2007).
According to Henderson (2010), an ethnic group is a group of people sharing a distinctive and
enduring collective identity based on common cultural traits such as ethnicity, language, religion,
or race, and perceptions of the common heritage shared experiences, and often common destiny.
For Smith (1986), a group is an ethnic group if its members share the following traits: a common
name, a believed common descent, elements of a shared culture (most often language or
religion), common historical memories, and attachment to a particular territory.
The crucial fact is that the members of an ethnic group are aware of their sense of belonging to
the group. In other words, for the ethnic group, the concept of “us” will be understood regarding
the concept of “them”. Therefore, the ethnic groups are constantly surrounded by two sets of
dynamic forces: a set of internal forces leading to the stability and firmness of we-ness, and a set
of external forces leading to the establishment and identification of they-ness (Hashemi, et al.,
2017). It is generally agreed that membership in an ethnic group is a question of definition
emanating from an interaction between self-definition and definitions given by other groups
(Abbas, 2014).
In ethnic conflict research, the terms ethnic group, communal group, ethnic community, people,
and minority are mostly used interchangeably. Ethnic communities show signs of solidarity and
self-awareness, which are often expressed by the name the group gives itself (Reuter, 2017).
According to Matsievsky (2000), six criteria must be met, before a group can be called an ethnic
community. First, the group must have a name for itself; Second, the people in the group must
20
believe in a common ancestry. Third, the members of the group must share historical memories,
often myth or legend passed from generation to generation by word of mouth. Fourth, the group
must have a shared culture, generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws,
customs, institutions, dress even food. Fifth, the group must feel an attachment to a piece of
territory. Lastly, the people of the group must have a sense of their common ethnicity, that is the
group must be self-aware.
2.1.4. Ethnic Conflict

Scholars have expressed many kinds of academic explanations for ethnic conflict, but it has been
difficult for them to agree on any common explanation. According to Amare (2013), the
controversy of ethnicity and ethnic group is not limited to the concept of ethnicity alone; it
further extends to inter-ethnic conflict, since there are no standard parameters or clearly defined
demarcations in identifying one ethnic group from the other.
In its narrow meaning, ethnic conflict is a dispute between two or more ethnic communities. In a
very broad sense, ethnic conflict describes disputes between ethnic groups, nationalities, nations,
nation-states, as well as ethnic majorities and minorities in multiethnic societies which often are
not only ethnic in character but sometimes go beyond the meaning of the term ethnic
(Matsievsky, 2000).
According to Cordell and Wolff (2011), ethnic conflicts are one particular form of conflict: that
in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in
which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of the ethnic distinctions. Whatever the
concrete issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its
dissatisfaction in ethnic terms. As Sajid (2018), an ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or
more rival ethnic groups. While the origin of the conflict may be political, social, economic or
religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for the survival of their group within
society.
According to Bantayehu (2016), inter-ethnic conflict is a conflict by which the primary line of
confrontation is ethnic markers. In ethnic conflict whatever the cause, ethnic groups confronted
each other with special emphasis on their ethnic identity. Moreover, for inter-ethnic conflict to
21
happen two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity within a common political and
socio-economic territory.
Generally, ethnic, or interethnic conflict refers to disputes between contending groups who
identify themselves primarily based on ethnic criteria and who make group claims to resources
based on their collective rights. Ethnic criteria may include perceptions of shared culture,
nationality, language, religion, and race (Henderson, 2010). A conflict is ethnic only if the sides
involved are distinguished primarily based on ethnicity (Kaufman, 2011).
2.1.5. Inter-Ethnic Relations

The concept of inter-ethnic relations comprises a broad range of encounters, between people and
groups of diverse origins, taking place in contemporary societies. However, inter-ethnic relations
could be understood to encompass processes of social inclusion, referred to under various
headings such as incorporation, insertion, acculturation, assimilation, integration, and even
absorption. In other words, inter-ethnic relations may refer to the rigid preservation of national,
cultural, and religious boundaries between groups and collectives on the one hand, and to
processes of cultural development, innovation, and societal transformation on the other. Broadly
speaking, inter-ethnic relations may be understood as concerning failed or successful forms of
diversity management (Westin, 2010).
Since, inter-group relation refers to how people who belong to social groups or categories
perceive, think about, feel about, and act towards and interact with people in other groups. Inter-
ethnic relations also refer to how ethnic groups view, treat, and interact with one another. Inter-
ethnic relations are often competitive and fraught with conflict and exploitation and
characterized by hostility, intolerance, and prejudice. One of the greatest challenges faced by
humanity is to reduce intergroup conflict and exploitation, and banish intolerance and prejudice,
and to build cooperation, tolerance, and social harmony (Hogg, 2013).
Ethnic relations encompass highly varied, complex forms of social relations where attachment to
cultural differences is paramount (Darity, 2008). The basis of ethnic relations is the presence and
interaction of members of different ethnic groups (Levinson, 1994) by which the exchange of
cultural information (Javakhishvili and Sarjveladze, 2007). As a social phenomenon, ethnicity
manifests itself as an expression of interethnic relations. These relations have developed
22
historically, blending colonial, racial, cultural, and class dimensions, under complex
circumstances (Mohammadzadeh, 2016). Once serious and widespread violence between ethnic
groups has been part of the conflict, historically or today, ethnic relations will be fraught,
characterized by deep mistrust, enmity, or perhaps desire for vengeance (Avruch, 2016).
2.2. Theories of Ethnicity and Ethnic-conflict

The theoretical perspectives would be based on the existing theories on ethnicity and ethnic
conflict. Academicians observe ethnicity and ethnic conflict from different views and literature
on the causes of ethnic conflict covers several competing theories. The researcher discusses the
major theories of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and its causes as follows.
2.2.1. Primordialism Theory

Primordialism (essentialism by some authors) is the oldest theory of the three categories, dates
back to the 1950s and 1960s. Primordialists in their analysis claim, ethnicity refers to the
condition of belonging to a certain group based on common primordial ties such as kinship,
language, culture, customs, and religion. They argue that ethnic conflict is one aspect of ethnic
heterogeneity as ethnicity is an aspect of human existence (Dagnachew, 2018).
Primordialism emphasizes that ethnic identification is based on so-called ‘primordial’

attachments to a group or culture. At its most extreme, this emphasizes that ethnicity is an innate,
fundamental, essential aspect of human existence, and it focuses on allegedly fixed cultural
markers and givens (language, physical traits, culinary traditions, historical memories, and
symbols) (Abreham, 2015). This position assumes that ethnicities and identities are given at
birth, unchangeable, and that differences between groups cause conflict (Leach et al., 2008).
Ethnicity is an inherent characteristic forming a basis for group (ethnic/national) perception.
Some disciplines believe that ethnicity has biological roots and that group ethnic identity is
passed from one generation to another (Javakhishvili and Sarjveladze, 2007). Consequently, the
argument defines ethnicity in terms of natural existence which, is not changed with changing
situations (Daniel, 2015).
Primordialists assume that relationships within groups are more peaceful, orderly, and supportive
while relationships with out-groups are conflictual, anarchic, and destructive. Primordialists
insist that ethnic similarity leads to cooperation and ethnic difference leads to interethnic conflict
23
(Henderson, 2010; Juma and Simiyu, 2019). According to the primordialism theory, primordial
groups such as ethnicities, clans, or racial groups are major actors in a polity within which
culture, economy, and social life are organized. Therefore, it is in primordialism belief that
ethnic conflict essentially spirals from differences in ethnic identities (Juma and Simiyu, 2019).
Interethnic conflict is a result of inherent differences between ethnic groups who naturally feel
amity for their own ethnic group and enmity for those outside their ethnic group (Henderson,
2010; Juma & Simiyu, 2019).
According to the primordialist, violent conflicts result from natural divisions between groups,
based on ethnicity, history, language, religion, and cultural tradition (Magnusson, 2017). Hostile
inter-ethnic relations are the result of the emotional ties of blood or ancient hatred rather than
rational calculus. Enmities are based on intrinsic differences of race, religion or culture
(Rudolph, 2006). The group drives to increase or maintain status relative to other groups is the
dynamic that causes ethnic conflict, according to primordialism. It argued, they worry-about
their group's position within society (Parsneau, 1996).
2.2.2. Instrumentalist Theory

Instrumentalists suggest that ethnicity is socially constructed and does not derive from any
natural division of humankind, and it maintains that inter-ethnic conflict is more a result of elite
manipulation than any inherent tendency for dissimilar ethnic groups to be more prone to conflict
(Henderson, 2010), ethnicity is not a natural cultural residue but a consciously crafted
ideological creation, and ethnic conflicts result from the manipulations of the (radical) elite who
incite and distort ethnic/nationalist consciousness into an instrument to pursue their personal
ambitions (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013).
Instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is constructed by particular individuals, elite or group driven
by competition for political power, economic benefits, social status, or other objectives and
motives. The main argument is that ethnicity is flexible and unstable; circumstances can shape or
change the symbolic and social boundaries that define the ethnic group. This school emphasizes
the socio-political function of ethnicity. The force of ethnicity is due to the manipulation of
myths and symbols by political leaders who try to mobilize individuals and ethnic groups in
order to reach their own goals and political ambitions (Daniel, 2015). They also believed that
dominant groups use ethnicity to their political benefit (Leach et al., 2008).
24
According to instrumentalism, cultural forms, values, and practices of a given ethnic group then
become resources or means for the elite to mobilize members of the group in competition for
political power and economic advantage: a strongly utilitarian view of ethnicity (Abreham,
2015). Accordingly, ethnic conflict is initiated by elites seeking their own selfish goals (ethnic
entrepreneurs) (Magnusson, 2017). If conditions favor organization along ethnic lines, elites
activate their own ethnic identities to gain positions of economic advantage or political power or
fight for a separate society in which they can hold these positions (Parsneau, 1996).
The instrumentalists posit that interethnic conflict does not emerge from any natural division of
groups into nations but is the result of elite manipulation of communal appeals in pursuit of their
own interests. They conclude that cultural difference does not necessitate conflict, it only makes
it easier for elites to move their societies closer to hostility and rivalry. They emphasize the
instances of positive orientation toward out-groups prevalent throughout social intercourse. In
sum, instrumentalists focus on the social construction of ethnicity and the role of elite
manipulation of cultural differences as important factors in interethnic conflict (Henderson,
2010).
2.2.3. Constructivist Theory

According to the constructivist, ethnicity is not a primordial characteristic of society, but it is the
result of creative social acts constructing an ethnic identity by selecting ethnic markers such as
language, culture, history, and religion. Such ethnic identity construction is the result of both
internal and external processes. Individuals or groups do not belong to a particular ethnic group
on a permanent basis hence; they have multiple ethnic identities (Daniel, 2015). Ethnicity,
constructivists argue, is an essentially social phenomenon and constructed through social
interactions. Ethnicity is based on collective experiences and memoirs. They also emphasize the
impact of ideas and prevailing discourses in society, assuming that they reflect and shape
people’s interests and beliefs and modify the behavior of social and political actors. Ethnic
conflict in this approach is explained by interactions between agents, structure, and institutions
(Nasong’o, 2015; Magnusson, 2017).
According to this theory, ethnic conflict is the manufacture of concrete historical processes, and
these pressures in history affect relations between ethnic groups causing antagonism among them
(Essay, 2018). Institutions play an important role in causing ethnic conflict when, as a
25
consequence of a major structural change, they are no longer able to regulate inter-ethnic
relations and thus control the conflict potential of ethnicity/ethnic emotions. The institutional
approach focuses on institutions and political system as explanations of ethnic conflict, or the
lack of it. The type and nature of the political system/regime are essential in determining the type
of institutions in the society and inter-ethnic arrangements. Institutions and the political system
are thus considered both the cause and the solution to the ethnic problem (Blagojevic, 2004:55).
2.3. Theoretical Framework
By analyzing the above theories, this thesis applied instrumentalism and constructivism theories.
Because of the following reasons, the primordialist theory was not applied for this thesis.
Ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African conflicts but a lever used by politicians to
mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, and resources. While the ethnic group is the
predominant means of social identity formation in Africa, most ethnic groups in Africa coexist
peacefully with high degrees of mixing through interethnic marriage, economic partnerships, and
shared values. Peoples do not kill each other because of ethnic differences; they kill each other
when these differences are promoted as the barrier to advancement and opportunity (Aapengnuo,
2010).
It is never true that two individuals or groups come into conflict merely because A. has one
ethnic identity and B. has another. Ethnic identities can generate conflict by associating different
groups with different interests. For example, ethnicity generates conflict when ethnic groups are
differentiated by language, and then disputes about the use of language, especially in government
and education, tend to line up across ethnic divides (Kaufman, 2011). Ethnicities in and of
themselves are not problematic. The problem emerges when they are instrumentalized and used
by individuals especially the political elite (Nasong’o, 2015). According to Haider (2014), most
recent authors argue ethnic, religious, or cultural identities do not condemn people to fight
against each other and are usually not the main issues and reasons for conflict. In situations of
exclusion and discrimination, the salience of group identity can be a deciding factor in whether
groups can be mobilized to violence.
Ethnicity in Ethiopia is not constituted for some essentialist factors but from having interacted
over time. People are adapting their identities to changes in circumstances; some may even
26
transcend existing boundaries and shift their identities. There has been greater intermarriage,
assimilation, and adoption across ethnic groups. Cleavages among groups are not clear-cutting.
People are/were open to the influence of others; ethnic relations are/ were fluid and dynamic
(Dagnachew, 2018). All people have multiple identities that are expressed differently in different
circumstances (Hizkias, 1996). On this line, this is true in the case of the Amhara and Oromo
community, because there are individuals, from Amhara's father and Oromo mothers, and vice
versa. In this case, how, those individuals can follow an ethnic line to find their pure primordial
ethnic identity?
The mere existence of diversified ethnic groups or primordial sentiment is not the cause of
hostile inter-ethnic relations. Rather, it is the manipulation of such differences by political elites
to achieve economic, ideological and political goals that strained inter-ethnic relations in
Ethiopia (Birhanu, 2018). Ethnic conflicts in the country were/are results of the group’s
comparison against the other in terms of different positions. It is, therefore, misleading to argue
ethnicity in Ethiopia is based on primordial ties (Dagnachew, 2018). Specifically, Abbink (2006)
emphasized that:
The fact of ethnolinguistic diversity in itself is of course not a factor that generates
violent conflict, but minority elite action often mobilizes on this basis, and the
formalization of ethnic identity, by nature fluid and manipulability, leads to entrenching
it as an ideology with primordial traits (p.393).
According to Birhanu (2007), it is misleading to describe the rise of ethnic bias and prejudice in
Ethiopia with primordial attachment since the ordinary people is not ethnically organized to
preserve and glorify their primordial identity. The newly emerged notion of otherness created an
ethnic boundary between the self and others which was not the culture of Ethiopian in its past
history. This boundary is not the result of primordial characters but is ethnic entrepreneurs. It is
the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians and ethnic elites which creates hostile inter-ethnic
relations rather than a primordial attachment. Therefore, for this thesis, the primordialist
approach is not appropriate.
Since, instrumentalists claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts
(Mohammadzadeh, 2016). Ethnic differences lead to ethnic conflict when ethnic differences are
politicized for personal or group interests. In the contemporary world, ethnic diversity leads to
27
ethnic conflict when ethnic identities are constructed and instrumentalized by different actors
(Bantayehu, 2016). In most cases, the reason for the conflict is not ethnicity in itself. Issues have
been ethnicized because ethnic discourse provides the appropriate and most gainful language at
the moment (Aalen, 2006).
The political entrepreneur’s approach to explaining the causes of ethnic conflict is closely related
to the institutional approach. Politicians who use ethnicity to their advantage can successfully
operate only within those institutional arrangements that support/allow such practice or are
unable to prevent it. The success of political entrepreneurs in mobilizing ethnic groups into
violent conflict depends on the strength of the existing state institutions. The political
mobilization of ethnic identities results in ethnic intolerance and competition over resources and
rights-which, if unresolved, can lead to violent conflict. Under difficult economic conditions,
high unemployment, and poor prospects for the future, people feel victimized and blame their
misfortune on other ethnic groups. This leads to inter-ethnic competition (Blagojevic, 2009).
According to Bekalu (2017), ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on ethnicity, but rather on the
politicization of ethnic identity by self-seeking politicians. The federal structure which is based
on ethnicity contributes to ethnic tensions and conflicts, widening the disparities among the
ethnic groups. Ethnic politics generates hostility amongst Ethiopia's different ethnic groups that
hinders group interaction and entails ethnic conflicts. Due to the policy of the ruling party,
mutual suspicion and hostility causing ethnic cleansing and conflict are bound to emerge even at
present.
As Dagnachew (2018), changes brought by ethnic federalism. In the last two decades, it is
observed that the salience of ethnicity in Ethiopian politics led to both necessary and unnecessary
competition in various activities among ethnic groups of the country, and the existing market
economic policy of the state with uneven distribution of natural resources in the country.
According to Semir (2019), a paradoxically implemented federal system contributed to the
proliferation of nationalisms of various sorts. Ethnic nationalists mobilized their constituencies
both within and outside the framework established by the regime.
Local elites tend to contribute to the escalation of some kind of conflict for the purpose of
securing better access to coveted resources, opportunities, and powers (Tsegaye, 2010).
According to Semahegn (2012), inter-ethnic relations became more and more hostile, the
28
prejudice of people to other ethnic groups is increasing and clear tensions are emerging due to
the institutionalization of ethnicity. The researcher believed that the recently formed an ethnic
boundary between the self and others which was not the culture of Ethiopia in its long history. Of
causes of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, as Bahru (2008) distinguished over-centralization,
marginalization, deliberate elite’s exploitations, and competitions for scarce resources as major
ones.
Ethnicity is the major or sometimes the only organizing criteria for ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.
However, ethnic federalism has not resolved the national question from the fact that ethnic
conflicts are widened, transformed from the national to lower structural levels. The competitive
and hostile inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relationships are increasing from time to time especially
with the ambition to control the administrative boundaries and government budgets in addition to
land and natural resources (Muhabie, 2015).
Indeed, ethnic or religious identities are not everyone’s primary reference in their sense of self,
and nor do they condemn one to always fight against the other, but it would be wrong to argue
that identity plays no role in ethnic/religious conflicts. Ethnic entrepreneurs would not be able to
mobilize communities if there was no shared sense of identity and, above all, if there were no
grievances to build on (Baldwin et al., 2007). Birhanu (2018:108), concluded in his study that
“the mere existence of ethnic difference is not a cause for hostile inter-ethnic relations unless
manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for political and economic motives”. Thus, standing from
the above arguments, the researcher would have framed this thesis based on instrumentalist and
constructivist theories.
2.4. Nature, Categories and Consequences of Ethnic Conflict

2.4.1. Nature of Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic conflicts are complex, multifaceted, and multilayered; this makes them difficult to
resolve. It tends to be multilayered, involving political, economic, cultural, and social aspects of
society (Albert et al., 2012). Without a doubt, ethnic conflict is a complex and dynamic
phenomenon. Some of the factors that cause people to engage in violence rather than to seek
peaceful accommodation of their disputes might be more enduring, but the scale, frequency,
intensity, and consequences of such violence has been subject to great variation (Cordell and
Wolff, 2011).
29
Like all forms of social conflict, ethnic conflict reflects strained relationships between the parties
involved. Some conflicts are explicitly manifested while others are not, as their forms range from
the private experiences of anger, frustration, contempt, to public pronouncements of ethnic slurs
and violent confrontations. Each society, each locates, and each incident further adds a unique
set of historical situations and psychological twists, making it difficult to generalize and to easily
understand the nature of the ethnic conflict, whether is it simply an irrational action caused by
factors or there is certain rationality in ethnic conflict (Matsievsky, 2000).
Ethnic conflict can be violent or nonviolent and would take different forms (Paulos, 1994; Sajid,
2018). Violent Conflicts8 are characterized by a total breakdown of law, security, and community
structures, with gross human rights violations perpetrated against civilian populations (Fentaw
and Yonas, 2013). The scope of violent ethnic conflict varies from demonstrations, riots, strikes,
and destruction of property to attacks on persons, violent clashes between ethnic groups, or
between an ethnic group and the government forces, arrests, killing of people, rebellions,
terrorism, forceful deportation of people, ethnic guerrilla wars, separatist wars, ethnic civil wars,
ethnic cleansings, and genocides (Vanhanen, 2012).
Ethnic conflict is not a natural or inevitable phenomenon. It has caused in human choices and
actions predicated upon individually and collectively subjective perceptions of reality (Cordell
and Wolff, 2011). Conflicts between competing ethnic groups mainly border on identity and are
thus believed to be intractable. Moreover, once conflicts break out, ethnic identities and hatred
tend to become cemented in ways that make cooperation and coexistence between the groups
even more difficult, and these are the conflicts that are likely to recur over time (Juma and
Simiyu, 2019).
Ethnic conflicts are expressed in many forms. The discrimination and repression of some ethnic
groups, the establishment of interest organizations and political parties along ethnic lines, as well
as violent clashes between ethnic groups or between some ethnic groups and the government
indicate the existence of ethnic conflicts. However, the significance and intensity of ethnic
conflicts may vary considerably depending on the share of the population involved in ethnic
conflicts and on the forms of ethnic conflict. A particular conflict can be classified as an ethnic
8
Violent conflict is defined as the use or threat of physical act carried out by an Individual (s) or a group of people
within a geographical enclave against another individual(s) or a group of people and or property, with the intent to
cause injury or death to person(s) and/ or damage or destruction to property (Diba, 2015).
30
conflict if ethnic elements have a clearly visible role in the conflict. In ethnic conflicts, the
principal contenders are ethnic groups or members of ethnic groups, and conflicts seem to reflect
ethnic animosities (Vanhanen, 2012).
The conflict is usually not about ethnic differences themselves, but over political, economic,
social, cultural, or territorial matters (Reuter, 2017). Ethnic differences do not always translate
into open conflicts. Others are not only difficult to manage, but they sometimes turn violent,
create widespread instability and lead to loss of life. Although many ethnic conflicts erupt
spontaneously, most need political entrepreneurs or mobilizers, a network of organizations, and
discourse (or set of principles or ideas) to activate them (Bangura, 1994).
2.4.2. Categories of Ethnic Conflict

Different scholars distinguished ethnic conflict into different categories. The researcher
discussed the major categories of ethnic conflict as follow:
1.Separatist movements or separatism: Separatist movements9 advocate for greater

sovereignty for their members, believing instead that they should exercise more control over
their political, economic, or cultural affairs than the national states in which they live (Gupta,
2013). The beginning of the separatism movement can start under two conditions: firstly, the
discrimination of ethnic minority, secondly, active national political elite (Ryabinin, 2017).
Separatist types of conflicts can take secession or internal autonomy form. Secessionist conflicts
resonate with highly charged discourses of us versus them and a fanatical commitment to achieve
the desired separation (Bangura, 1994).
Today a great number of countries can face a problem of separatism movement due to the
activation of ethnic minorities. There is no doubt that separatism is based on nationalism that is
the driving force of such processes and events. The separatism movements are fed by the identity
factor that in turn is based on nationalism (Ryabinin, 2017).
2. Internal rivalry for autonomy, political power, or territorial control: Violence occurs as
part of a conflict between ethnic groups in one nation or between an ethnic group and the
government over access to and control of economic resources, political power, territory, or
9
Separationist movement is the movement for territorial secession of this or that part of the country with the purpose
of formation of a new state or receiving a certain degree of autonomy as for language, religion and national issues
(Ryabinin, 2017).
31
political autonomy within the nation. When the goals of the group seeking autonomy or more
power or wealth seem unattainable, they may shift their goal to separatism (Levinson, 1994).
Most ethnic conflicts in the world are of this type, where ethnic groups pursue their claims
within an existing state structure. The aim is not to create an alternative state but to either capture
the existing state or improve access to it. The frustration of this goal may lead, however, to
demands for secession or autonomy (Bangura, 1994).
3. Irredentist: Violence occurs as part of an attempt by ethnic groups or nations to regain or
retain territory on the basis of an alleged ancestral or historical right to the territory. Often the
territory is controlled by another nation but is located adjacent to, and the population is mainly
of, the ethnic group dominant in the nation seeking ownership. Irredentist conflicts are very
common today and are often the result of national boundaries established during colonial times
or by other causes. These boundaries often ignored existing ethnic boundaries and claims by
local groups to their ethnic homelands (Levinson, 1994).
4. Struggles of indigenous peoples: This type of conflict is relating to the rights of indigenous
peoples and revolves around land issues and the protection of indigenous cultures and languages.
It was primarily, about land and the preservation of their cultures (Bangura, 1994). Conflicts
affecting indigenous peoples can often be traced back to long-standing historical injustices and
discrimination. Land disputes are frequently the root cause of conflict as indigenous peoples are
faced with dominant and powerful political and economic interests who use the state institutions
(e.g., police, military, courts) and state laws to seek control over their lands and exploit their
resources (Corpuz, 2017).
5. Survival: Violence occurs as part of an attempt by a national government to forcibly

assimilate, harm, remove, or drive out an ethnic minority or deprive them of social, religious,
political, or economic rights granted other residents of the nation. While most such conflicts in
the world today are mainly nonviolent, these conflicts have the potential to explode into violence
in many nations around the world (Levinson, 1994).
6. Minority rights: Minority rights struggles focus either on the rights of minority groups to
form autonomous governments in the territories where they constitute a majority or on special
measures to protect their culture, language and religion where they do not form a majority, as
well as on equal treatment in the allocation of national resources and government offices
32
(Bangura, 1994). Minority group10 strength is an additional factor that contributes to the
emergence of inter-ethnic conflict (Matsievsky, 2000).
2.4.3. Causes of Ethnic Conflict

There is no single cause for ethnic conflict. Rather, it is a result of the interplay of many factors
(Dagne, 2009:19). In this regard, Blagojevic (2009), stated that:
Ethnic conflict is caused by a combination of factors: a major structural change, ethnic

emotions stemming from historical memories of grievances, manipulation of ethnicity by
political entrepreneurs, institutional factors that facilitate ethnic intolerance, and
competition over resources and rights. For him, all those five factors must be present for
ethnic conflict to occur (p.21).
The researcher discussed the major causes of ethnic conflict as follows:
1. Political and institutional factors: Political power can be considered as a vital factor for
generating ethnic conflict. In this regard, discriminatory government policies play a significant
role in aggravating ethnic conflicts. Political domination and a desire for persisting control of
political power; the non-participatory approach of political systems as well as the lack of
democratization have further contributed to the insecurity (Dagne, 2009).
State weakness can create conditions for violent conflict. Political institutions that are unable to
manage differing group interests peacefully, to provide adequate guarantees of group protection,
or to accommodate growing demands for political participation, can fracture societies.
Uncertainty and collective fears of the future stemming from state weakness (Haider, 2014).
State institutions and structures that reflect ethnic diversity and respect for minority rights,
power-sharing, and checks and balances reduce the perception of injustice and insecurity that
facilitates ethnic mobilization. In a society, where justice cannot be obtained through public
institutions, groups are more likely to resort to violence for resolving their grievances
(Aapengnuo, 2010). Another political and institutional factor is elite power struggles and
political exclusion. The domination of access to state structures and resources by any one leader,
group, or political party to the exclusion of others exacerbates social divisions. It may provide
10
Minority is a group of people who believe they have a common identity, based on culture/ethnicity, language or
religion, which is different from that of a majority group around them (Baldwin et al., 2007).
33
incentives for excluded leaders to mobilize groups to protest and engage in violent rebellion
(Haider, 2014). Political entrepreneurs, in their quest for power, mobilize ethnic constituencies
by promoting inter-ethnic animosities using the rhetorical weapons of blame, fear, and hate.
Major structural change and the institutional inability to regulate inter-ethnic relations provide a
perfect condition in which political entrepreneurs can manipulate ethnic emotions in order to
mobilize groups for their own political purposes (Blagojevic, 2009).
Another factor is identity politics. Identity politics can be used by both dominant and
marginalized groups to articulate exclusion and discontent. Also, breakdown in social contract11
and corruption is another factor. Corruption undermines public trust in government, exacerbates
inequalities in wealth, and increases socio-economic grievances. The inability of states to
provide basic services, including justice and security, to all its citizens reduces state legitimacy
and trust in state institutions, weakening or breaking the social contract (Haider, 2014).
2. Socio-economic factors: Political exclusion should be combined with discriminatory

economic policies and exploitation to produce ethnic tension. Conflict takes place where some
groups attempt to benefit themselves at the expense of others. This happens either when power
holders distribute resources among different ethnic communities unfairly or when an ethnic
group attempts to occupy the territory of its neighboring group without the consent of the
community concerned to allow it some access to the available economic resource (Dagne, 2009).
Inequalities that align with cultural, ethnic, or religious identities (horizontal inequalities) are
more likely to result in violence (Haider, 2014). Socioeconomic disparities along ethnic lines can
cause deep-seated anger and resentment that often fuel conflict (Albert et al., 2012). Under
difficult economic conditions, high unemployment, and poor prospects for the future, people feel
victimized and blame their misfortune on other ethnic groups. This leads to inter-ethnic
competition (Blagojevic, 2009). Poverty may contribute to or sustain conflict through its
association with perceived injustices and forms of exclusion between groups (Haider, 2014). In
addition, population growth is another factor that raises rather than decreases the probability of
ethnic violence (Vanhanen, 2012).
11
A social contract is a framework of rules that governs state-society relations and the distribution of resources,
rights and responsibilities in an organized society (Haider, 2014).
34
3. Cultural factors: A state’s policy toward its cultural groups may dampen or increase the
likelihood of interethnic conflict. Discriminatory and repressive policies aimed at indigenous
groups are likely to exacerbate interethnic tensions (Henderson, 2010). Cultural domination,
together with political suppression, is considered as a major source of the clash (Dagne, 2009).
When ethnic groups are differentiated by language, then disputes about the use of language,
especially in government and education, tend to line up across ethnic divides. When ethnic
groups are differentiated by religion, disputes over the role of religion and the influence of
religious values on public policy tend to arise (Kaufman, 2011).
4. Historical factors: Ethnic conflicts usually have deep roots in historical narratives and events
that are remembered and framed differently, sometimes radically different, by the conflicting
parties. History is rewritten by each group to reflect the current conflict from its viewpoint,
which often focuses on the injustices perpetrated by the other group (Albert, et al., 2012).
Besides, a history of ethnic discrimination, previous interethnic conflict, the teaching of
ethnocentric history, and the popularization of ethnic discrimination in the media are warning
signs of interethnic conflict. The best predictor of future inter-ethnic conflict is previous
interethnic conflict (Henderson, 2010). The historic-cultural alienation of ethnic communities
includes factors such as historical territorial disputes; certain tragic historical memories which
can lead to ethnophobia (such as the memories of the genocide), linguistic and confessional
distinctions. This general historical background to present-day inter-ethnic relations can lead to
conflicts (Payin, 1996).
2.4.4. Impacts of Ethnic Conflict

The consequences of ethnic violence are always negative, affecting above all the civilian
population in, and beyond, the areas in which conflict occurs. The most extreme, in terms of their
humanitarian consequences are ethnic cleansing and genocide (Cordell and Wolff, 2011).
According to Dagne (2009), the adverse effects of violent ethnic conflict could be categorized
into political, economic and socio-cultural factors. The researcher discussed those major
categorized effects of ethnic-conflict as follows.
1. Political effects: Ethnic conflict affects political governance. It impacts negatively on the rule
of law, state capacity, and democratic political processes. Corruption and criminality often take
root, and the influence of military actors rises. Politically excluded groups are increasingly
35
marginalized and targeted (Haider, 2014). The political effects of ethnic conflict can be seen at
two levels. The first is the weakening and possible collapse of the central government. Another
political effect could be in extreme cases, the disintegration of the country totally (Dagne, 2009).
2. Socio-economic effects: Ethnic conflict destroys the very bases of development:

environmental resources, economic infrastructure, and the social and civic ties that permit and
sustain development. When there is violent conflict in a country resources would be shifted to
cover the expense of the war. The productive labor force will be drained to the war front and
hence production and productivity decline. In a country where there is violent conflict, no
tourism and incomes are associated with tourism. Trade and other social and civil institutions
either completely or partially cease their services as a result of which life become costly and
terrible. It also destroys people’s social and private property and trigger unemployment in the
area (Dagne, 2009).
Ethnic conflict leads to destructions of infrastructure, capital stock and household assets,
investment declines, and household and national incomes will drop. It causes disrupt and destroy
families and community life. It will result in massive displacements and losses of life and
property. Conflict disrupts social relations and can result in social dislocation, and a decline in
interpersonal and communal group trust. While social capital 12 within a group may be
strengthened, social capital across groups is weakened by the destruction of the norms and values
that underlie cooperation. In addition to this, many war-affected persons suffer from post-
traumatic stress syndrome, which contributes to poor mental and physical health, reduced quality
of life, and in some cases, greater difficulties in work, education and family life-and increased
violent behavior (Haider, 2014).
3. Human rights abuses: Violent conflict results from and produces a breakdown in law and
order and the perpetuation of human rights abuses on a mass scale. Violent conflict results in loss
of life, disablement, rape and sexual violence, displacement and forced migration, the spread of
famine (Dagne, 2009; Haider, 2014).
12
Social capital refers to the norms, values and institutions that govern social relations and bond communities
together, as well as the bridges between communal groups and the state (Haider, 2014).
36
2.5. Prevention, Managing and Resolution Mechanisms of Ethnic Conflict
2.5.1. Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention is an activity undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times over the
short term to medium term that seeks to identify situations that could produce violent conflict, to
reduce manifest tensions, to prevent existing tensions from escalating into violence and to
remove sources of danger before violence results. It refers to activities occurring before the
outbreak of open violent conflict (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013).
Conflict prevention requires careful monitoring of indicators of rising tensions and taking
measures to ease them (Haider, 2014). Different scholars forwarded different types of preventive
approaches which are important to preventive ethnic conflicts. According to Aapengnuo (2010),
building unifying institutional structures, reinforcing positive social norms and early response
(value of addressing conflict issues sooner rather than later) were the major preventive
approaches of ethnic conflict.
Prevention approaches are generally classified as direct/operational prevention and structural

prevention, although there is often overlap. Direct/operational prevention approach refers to
short term actions taken to prevent the often-imminent escalation of potential conflict (e.g.
confidence-building measures, sanctions, etc.) (Haider, 2014). Those are measures to address
immediate crises and employing forceful measures such as deploying peacekeepers to a region
(Anderlini and Stanski, 2004).
Structural conflict prevention (root causes prevention) comprises long term interventions that
aim to transform key socio-economic, political and institutional factors that if left unaddressed,
could lead to violent conflict in the future. This includes addressing inequality, exclusion and
marginalization; developing social capital and social cohesion; promoting livelihoods, local
development and economic opportunities; and promoting legitimate and equitable political,
justice and security institutions (Haider, 2014). It also include activities like preventive
disarmament- seeks to reduce the number of small arms in conflict-prone regions. Besides, it
involves activities such as good governance, democratization, integration of ethnic groups and
minorities, constructing dialog between communal groups, restructuring the police and military
forces, strengthening and mainstreaming human rights, and creating and institutionalizing
prevention culture (Arcan, 2014).
37
2.5.2. Conflict Management
Conflict management is an activity, undertaken to limit, mitigate and contain open conflict. In
particular, it refers to actions that aim to control and handle conflict in order to limit its negative
effects and bring it to an end and to prevent the vertical (i.e. intensification of violence) or
horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflict. It applies to actions on all
levels and tracks (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013).
The primary purpose of conflict management is to slow, or stop the escalation of violence and to
create conditions that are conducive to peaceful reconciliation between the warring parties.
Accordingly, conflict management is understood as a dynamic social process, in which external
and internal actors employ an array of strategies to reduce the rival parties’ economic, political
and humanitarian costs and enhance their mutual benefits through cooperation and compromise
(Siniver, 2011).
2.5. 3. Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is an activity, undertaken over the short term and medium term dealing with,
and aiming at overcoming, the deep-rooted causes of conflict, including the structural,
behavioral, or attitudinal aspects of the conflict. The process focuses more on the relationships
between the parties than the content of a specific outcome (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013). Ethnic
conflict resolution of any sort seeks to address ethnic conflicts in their own social, political, and
cultural context (Avruch, 2016).
2.5.3.1. Methods of Conflict Resolution

In conflict resolution, third parties, those neutral or indifferent entities, play an indispensable role
in filling the communication gap between the conflicting parties. Nevertheless, the third party is
not always neutral. Scholars consider different management and settlement practices, including
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013).
1. Negotiation: It is the process whereby parties seek to settle or resolve their conflicts by
themselves (Ikyase and Olisah, 2014). The key actors in a negotiation are the negotiators
themselves (Bezawit, 2012). It is a discussion between two or more people who want to solve
their disagreements, decide what to do, or make a bargain (Arora, 2015). Accordingly,
negotiation is one of the conflict resolution mechanisms, by which the conflicting parties
38
discussing and reach an agreement and resolve their dispute themselves without the interference
of the third party.
2. Mediation: Mediation is a process of conflict resolution in which a third party with the ability
to offer incentives and withdraw privileges intervenes to help parties find a solution which they
cannot find by themselves (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013). It is a method with the help of a neutral
person agreed upon by both parties. The person should be a person of integrity and acceptable by
both parties involved in a dispute. The mediator can be a person, institute, country, or joint
country (Bezawit, 2012). The job of mediators is to help people communicate clearly and
negotiate effectively. Mediators do not give legal advice, take sides, impose solutions or make
decisions about resolutions (Arora, 2015).
3. Arbitration: It this method, that disputing parties agree on an impartial third party-an
individual or a group-to hear both sides and resolve the issue. Arbitration is often used as a way
to settle contract disputes (Fentaw and Yonas, 2013). It the most common these days, is a formal
proceeding that uses one or more neutrals to listen to the evidence and render a decision. The
decision by the arbitrator may be binding or non-binding (Arora, 2015).
4. Conciliation: uses a third person who is asked to help people reach an amicable resolution of
their dispute. The conciliator cannot impose a settlement upon the parties and generally interacts
with the parties separately (Arora, 2015).
5. Litigation: is a legal dispute resolution mechanism by which argued in the court of law.
Attorneys help negotiate a resolution, or a judge or jury makes a decision. The people directly
involved in the dispute have little control or no control over the process or outcome. It is entirely
left on the attorneys to represent their clients and get the best outcome for them (Arora, 2015).
2.6. An Overview of Ethnicity, Inter-Ethnic Relation and Ethnic Conflict in

Ethiopia
2.6.1 Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups in Ethiopian
Hence, ethnicity in Ethiopia is an enormously complex concept. It is a matter of categorical
ascription and shaped by historical, social and political contexts of relational space. Ethnicity is
not constituted for some essentialist factors but from having interacted over time. No ethnic
entity has been untouched by others. Groups in existence in the twentieth century are biological
39
and social amalgams of several preexisting entities. Nonetheless, such mixing led to the
formation of groups that think of themselves and are considered by others as different
(Dagnachew, 2018).
Centuries of migration and interaction between groups of people have created a complex pattern
of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, dispersed within broad geographical variations.
Nobody knows exactly how many ethnic groups and minorities there are in Ethiopia. One can
safely assume, however, that over 80 groups have distinct cultural traditions and languages. The
languages of Ethiopia reflect ethnic diversity and belong to several different language groups
(Tronvoll, 2000), which make the country designated as a museum of peoples (Mekonnen,
2019). Ethnically, the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo are Ethiopia’s largest groups (Gillespie,
2003).
From the historical perspective, the politicization of ethnicity can be traced back to the debate
arising from within the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) during the 1960s and early 1970s
(Joireman,1997). However, before the 1974 revolution, the discourse on identity, nationality, and
ethnicity was severely restricted as sometimes seen as treason. The discussion was initiated by
the student movement and has been very divisive. Within the student movement ethnicity and
identity took center stage in the debate, which in many ways was the forerunner of the future
polity (Mackonen, 2008).
Since the 1960s, latent ethnic consciousness has been reactivated and converted into a potent
political force in Ethiopian politics. Diverse ethnic groups, political actors, and liberation
movements in the country have used ethnicity for political mobilization and to organize
resistance against forms of injustice. By the late 1960s, the question of nationalities had begun to
lead the political agendas of ethnic-based social movements. These movements contributed to
the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and toppled the military regime in 1991 (Asebe, 2012). It was
starting the final periods of the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie; ethnicity has started to be a
major political instrument for the elites in competition for state power and resource. At this
moment the ethnic groups were also started to be mobilized for this opportunistic purpose
(Paulos, 1994).
Ethnicity in Ethiopia reached political maturity during the reign of the military regime, and all
political forces that emerged during that troubled period were obliged to take account of this
40
phenomenon. The main reason was the growth and politicization of the intelligentsia among
subordinate ethnic groups (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Though ethnicity was hardly
recognized officially by the Mengistu regime, nearly all the liberation movements from the time
of the 1974 revolution onwards came to be formed on the basis of nationalist complaints
(Joireman,1997).
During both Emperor and the Derg regimes, ethnic groups, cultures and languages were clearly
ranked and ethnic movements oppressed. Inequality based on ethnic affinity has been a part of
Ethiopian governance since the establishment of the modern state at the end of the 19th century,
and the Amhara has been perceived as the ruling group. The Ethiopian national identity was
therefore intrinsically linked to the Amhara. But despite Amhara dominance, Ethiopia was
considered a successful nation-state (Clapham, 1988).
According to Abebaw (2014), during the Derg regime, the domination of the Amhara ethnic
group was not as visible as it was in the imperial regime but the government’s high positions
were filled by Amharaized people, not merely Amhara. Although the military government
allowed using some other languages in mass media and national literacy campaign, Amharic
continued as a dominant language both in administration and education sectors.
Compared to the imperial and the Derg regimes, the EPRDF-led government has empowered
ethnic groups in many areas of linguistic, religious, and cultural aspects. Even though the clear
domination of one ethnic group has vanished, and diversity and equality of ethnic groups are
constitutionally ensured, it is believed that there is still implicit domination of one ethnic group-
Tigre ethnic group. What makes this domination different is that it doesn’t promote cultural
assimilation which was the typical feature of the imperial regime. Its domination is more of
political than cultural (Abebaw, 2014).
Ethnicity has been utilized as an instrument of political mobilization, as a license for access to
state resources, and is used in the process of competition over resources (Asebe, 2012). After the
ethnic-based federal system introduced into the country, ethnicity has become the pillar of the
political, social and economic discussions among not only politicians but also the people as a
whole (Abebaw, 2014).
41
The new regime creating artificial regions and strengthening ethnic divisions. Yet granting
power to specific allied ethnic groups within each region. However, ethnic lines are often not
clearly defined and so the new constitution there is virtually attempting to create ethnic groups
(Ehrlich, 1999). Taking into account the presence of more than 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the
most ethnic groups do not have their regional state but are a minority in one of the regional states
(Beken, 2009).
In the FDRE constitution, ethnic group is labeled as ‘Nation, Nationality and Peoples’ (in
Amharic, behieroch, behiereseboch, ena hezboch). These terms are a predominant one in the
current Ethiopian political and constitutional legal rhetoric. Ethnic groups in Ethiopia can be
defined as people with their own common culture or custom, language, identity, psyche, and
contiguous territory. The constitution provides a single definition and no distinction is made
between these distinct terms Nation, Nationality and People (Temesgen, 2019). Since the whole
population of the federation is seen as composed of nations, nationalities and peoples, it means
that every citizen must belong to an ethnic group and define themselves along ethnic lines
(Aalen, 2006).
In this study, the term ethnic group would be used instead of using the FDRE constitutional term
of “Nation, Nationality and People”. The 1995 FDRE constitution stated that:
A nation, nationality or people for this Constitution, is a group of people who have or
share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of
language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological make-up, and
who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (Art. 39(5)).
Also, the terms ethnic group and an ethnic community would be used interchangeably to refer a
group of individuals who share the same language as the first language like Amharic or Afan-
Oromo, cultural characteristics and territorial origin, which distinguish them from members of
other groups. As Matsievsky (2000), an ethnic community is a group of people, who publicly
recognize their corresponding origin, which differentiates them from other members of the
population.
In contemporary Ethiopia, the discourse of ethnicity has become strongly politicized, more so
than ever before, and has created realities that did not previously exist (Abbink, 1997).
42
Nowadays, ethnic groups in Ethiopia are well aware of their distinctiveness not only in terms of
ethnolinguistic attributes but also in terms of territoriality. Boundaries are officially set, aligning
them to different territorial units of administrative regions (Zelalem, 2017). Individuals are
pulled together by their ethnicity, and consider it important to show solidarity and loyalty to their
‘brothers and sisters’ in times of uncertainty (Semir, 2019).
2.6.2. Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ethiopia

Zelalem (2017) stated that:
Inter-ethnic relations in Ethiopia have always been complex and dynamic. As home to
diverse ethnic groups with differing livelihood strategies and diverging social
institutions, this country is beset with the fluidity of relations, shifting allegiances, as well
as building and breaking alliances. Yet, the amplitude of political temperature at the
center seems to play a decisive role in the making or breaking of these relations at all
levels: center and periphery (p.1).
Since, Ethiopia is a mosaic of more than eighty ethnic groups, with varying cultures, languages,
and belief systems. These ethnic groups and cultures, however, developed several common
values and learned to live together with a measure of harmony and mutual tolerance, although
punctuated by intermittent clashes (Abreham, 2015). The diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic
group in the country has been co-existed in harmony for centuries (Mekonnen, 2019).
Varied ethnic groups in Ethiopia, has practiced many things together that makes them to have
cordial inter-ethnic relations such as economic interdependence through trade, inter-ethnic
marriage, common cultural practices, and narration of a myth of common ancestry. The Amhara
and Tigray ethnic groups from northern parts of Ethiopia has migrated into the resourceful
Southern parts of Ethiopia in search of the better living condition under the Dreg’s resettlement
program. This has resulted in the intermixing of such ethnic groups to the indigenous ethnic
groups (Birhanu, 2018). With the coming of EPRDF13 to political power in 1991, ethnicity is
formalized as an instrument of the state organization to positively address the past intrastate
conflicts and ethnic inequality. However, despite the adoption of ethnic federalism as a panacea
13
The birth of the EPRDF is intimately linked with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Consequently the
whole system was dominated by TPLF, which is comprised of elites from the Tigray region.
43
to inter-ethnic problems, the recent inter and intra-ethnic affair in the state appears to challenge
the interdependence and togetherness of people (Dagnachew, 2018). Contemporary ethnic
relations in Ethiopia are by and large masked and shaped by resource interests. Consequently,
they are fluid and rapidly shifting depending upon the changing resource interest and power
relations showing the instrumentality of ethnicity itself (Zelalem, 2017).
2.6.3. Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia

Ethnic groups and ethnic conflicts are everywhere (Kaufman, 2011). In Ethiopia, for example,
the history of ethnic conflicts during the 20th C is often presented frequently by the insurgent
groups and even by the EPRDF14 government. The conflict between the group occurs either
because of the rage of the dominated group against the dominators in history who are currently
minorities and may be weaker, or the fact that the former dominant group owns the best of the
community’s resources as compared to the majority because of their past political power and
opportunity (Dagne, 2009).
During the imperial era, the primary source of conflict was the endless rivalry between the
monarchy in the center and the regional nobility. With the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974,
the nationalist liberation movements came to replace the nobility as regional forces (Alemayehu,
2009). The modern ethnic-based conflict has taken wing during the final days of the reign of
Haile Selassie. The conflict was between the elite who control the state power and the new
educated elite. The factor that gives impetus for the conflict was control over the fully
centralized and modernized state, which domineer the means of production and distribution of
material and social resources (Paulos, 1994).
A conflict situation was intensified during the military regime. This was the period that attests to
the climax of the ethnic formula. The ethnic factor was impossible to be regulated. This was
because, on the one hand, the dominant elites who control the state were adamant to not share
power and resource, and on the other hand the ethnic elite were resolute to have access to the
power and resource. There was nothing to bridge this gap except the long and protracted war
(Paulos, 1994).
14
EPRDF was the dominant party which imposes its ideology without proper consultations and deliberations with
competing forces (Abbink, 2006).
44
The Transitional government has proposed 'self-determination up to and including secession.
The basis for proposing the measure seems to emanate from the conception of ethnic conflict
from the cultural pluralist and uneven development lines of analysis as well as from the
consideration that the society was deeply divided (Paulos, 1994). From the perspective of the
new government, ethnicity was seen both as a potent force for political mobilization and a
medium for conflict regulation. It was assumed that the decentralization of political power along
ethnic lines would resolve long-standing inter-ethnic tensions and promote new social cohesion.
Contrary to this, there surfaced a perspective that viewed politicized ethnicity as the basis for
worsening inter-ethnic relations in the country (Zelalem, 2017). The redefinition of Ethiopia
along ethnic lines has created conflicts of its own, especially over the demarcation of the
territories of the different federal units (Abbink, 2006).
In the current situation, people are being pitted against each other. Neighbors who have coexisted
peacefully for decades, if not centuries, are being encouraged by official government policy to
emphasize their ethnic differences. Age-old relationships between peoples, intermarriages,
cultural interactions and continuities, are in peril of being disrupted or wrenched apart. In some
areas, violent conflict has broken out between members of different ethnic groups in attempts to
draw their own ethnic boundaries or claim territories that were considered common in the past
(Hizkias, 1996). Nowadays, the patterns of relationship between regional majority and settler
minorities and individuals experience acute change. As a result, the majority vs. minority
tensions often run into open confrontations and violence in every regional state (Temesgen,
2019).
2.6.3.1. Causes of Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been experiencing the deadliest intra-state conflicts-history of Ethiopia is a history
of conflicts (Dagnachew, 2018). The histories of root causes of the conflicts in Ethiopia have
complex political, social, and economic and cultural dimensions. The history of ethnic conflict in
Ethiopia has both the characteristics of structural and cultural violence throughout the historical
process of modern state formation of the country, which characterized by war, forceful
assimilation and consolidation (Mekonnen, 2019). The historical assimilation and adaption
processes in Ethiopia often took place violently especially during the periods of the Ethiopian
Emperors. As a result, the contemporary Ethiopians have developed ethnic prejudices and
45
stereotypes that lead them to generalize that ethnic conflict arises solely from ethnic differences
or ethnic antagonisms created unjust historical relations that existed among the different ethnic
groups (Lubo, 2012).
In Ethiopia, prolonged social conflicts have been the result of competition over the control of
state machinery, which is a guarantor of access to necessary resources of survival. This means
that power holders, particularly during the imperial regimes, rewarded the members of their
ethnic group by providing them access to economic resources at the expense of the other ethnic
communities. In the same vein, the unfair distribution of rural land during the imperial Ethiopia
that had been a vital cause for tension between the northern settlers and political authorities and
the masses of southern peoples can be taken as illustrative (Dagne, 2009).
According to Hizkias (1996), previously, the country’s major civil wars were between the central
government and various insurgency groups bearing the names of ethnic groups. As Mekonnen
(2019), the politicization of ethnicity and post-1991 EPRDF’s ethnocentric federal system of
governance shifted the historic resource-driven clan conflict to politically sponsored and
politically driven violent ethnic conflict.
In 1991 the new ruling party, the EPRDF, remapped the Ethiopian state along ethnic lines. These
political arrangements have contributed to the emergence and intensification of nationalist
mobilization. Ethnic mobilization has reached unprecedented levels, with all sides mutually
antagonistic and on a more or less open playing field. This is bound to lead to major violent
conflicts (Semir, 2019). Ethnic politics in the country is the main catalyst for the ethnic tensions
and conflicts among ethnic groups (Abebaw, 2014). The new political arrangement can be taken
as an aggravating and complicating factor behind other issues in the course of ethnic conflicts
(Dagnachew, 2018). Many of the conflicts that emerged at local and regional levels and related
to the federal restructuring of the country could be referred to as autonomy conflicts15 (Asnake,
2009).
Ethnicity has been identified by many as a major cause of conflict. Currently, the region’s ethnic
groups indeed have their prejudices and stereotypes about each other. But these attitudes have
15
Autonomy conflicts refer to those conflicts that emerge on a range of issues such as self-determination/secession,
the politics of resource sharing, political power, representation, identity, citizenship, ethnic and regional boundary
and others (Asnake, 2009:4).
46
not normally turned into conflict at the people-to-people level unless manipulated and organized
by political leaders. Elite’s find ethnic prejudices and stereotypes fertile ground in which they
can easily cultivate support for their political and economic aspirations (Hizkias, 1996). Article
39 of the Ethiopian Constitution and its primordial definition of ethnic identities may in itself
stimulate ethnic entrepreneurship, make previously flexible ethnic categories fixed and rigid and
create ethnic tensions (Aalen, 2006).
The majority of conflicts in rural Ethiopia emerged from disputes on land and on boundaries of
districts (woredas) and zones between the newly defined ethnic or linguistic groups (in Amharic:
behereseboch). The majority of conflicts now dubbed ethnic in Ethiopia are about boundaries
between territorialized ethnic groups. Fights about identity are being waged in order to establish
the borders of districts and zones, and the identity professed by local people is the deciding
element (Abbink, 2006).
As an economic dimension, the majority of Ethiopian people livelihood is reliant on the

agricultural, pastoral and agro-pastoral economy, resources like land water, grazing and pasture
are an important foundation of survival for almost all ethnic community in Ethiopia. The scarcity
of this resource coupled with, mismanagement, unemployment, poverty, drought, and
environmental degradation has been one of the root causes of violent ethnic conflict between
different ethnic groups in Ethiopia (Mekonnen, 2019). Moreover, unequal development and
fiscal imbalances among the regions of the country have re-reinforced the poverty of the
country’s various ethnic groups (Alemayehu, 2009).
The feeling of relative deprivation also can be cited as the major factor behind ethnic conflicts in
Ethiopia, particularly between Tigrayans and others. Still, the state cannot resolve problems
associated with the equal sharing of political and economic resources. TPLF did not take a lesson
from the past system that it was organized to fight against the unfair distribution of resources and
political positions (Dagnachew, 2018).
2.6.4. Ethnic Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, Ethnic federalism was formally introduced in 1995. The main rationale is the
promotion of the cultural and political status of the nations that were historically marginalized
(Yoseph, 2019). The EPRDF justified the introduction of ethnic federalism by the aim of curbing
ethnic conflicts and maintaining a united Ethiopia (Aalen, 2006). It could be used as an
47
instrument of managing the complex ethnolinguistic diversity of the country and reduce
conflicts. Despite this, ethnic conflicts are still critical challenges in the country. In fact, the
record of federalism regarding ethnic conflict is a mixed one. On the one hand, it led to the
recognition of the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups in the country. On the other
hand, it appears to have transformed and generated localized ethnic conflicts (Abbink, 2006: 390
in Asnake, 2009).
According to Aalen (2006), some achievements regarding the rights of minorities have been
made since the introduction of ethnic federalism. Previously neglected or oppressed minorities
have gained confidence in their own language and culture and have obtained their own
administration. The majority of the Ethiopian people have the chance to speak their own
language in education and administration and are, at least in theory, able to take part in
governmental affairs in their ethnic community like never before. Major attainment for people in
their everyday life is that when they take a case to court, they are able to follow the procedures in
their own language.
However, as Merkineh (2018), the implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has remained
problematic and ineffective and it seems a fragile and perilous experiment that puts a big
challenge on the management of diversity in the country. Asebe (2012), argued that:
…there are evident gaps between the theoretical framing and the promises of ethnic
federalism and the lived realities at the local level, particularly in areas of addressing
inter-ethnic conflicts, self-government, access, and utilization of resources and issues of
autonomy. In practice, inter-regional relations, conflict resolution strategies, and issues
related to self-government were centrally regulated rather than locally addressed (p.32).
Even if it was aimed at finding a resolution to ethnic conflicts, it led to the changing of arenas of
conflicts by decentralizing them and also generated new localized interethnic conflicts (Asnake,
2009). The arrangement fuels ethnic conflicts and encouraging disintegration than stabilizing and
maintaining the unity of the state (Dagnachew, 2018). The recent inter and intra-ethnic affair in
the state appears to challenge the interdependence and togetherness of people (Dagnachew,
2018). Conflicts associated with issues related to self-determination/secession, the politics of
resource sharing, political power, representation, identity, citizenship, ethnic and regional
boundaries, and others are increasing from time to time in Ethiopia. The drawing of boundaries
48
led to the generation of violent conflicts among various ethnic groups and almost in all border
areas of regional states (Adegehe, 2009 in Merkineh, 2018).
Now a day people in different parts of the country are suffering from violent conflicts emanated
from human fault lines, ethnicity and religion. However, the existing dynamics of ethnicity and
ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia is not merely the result of ethnic federalism rather the interplay of
various factors and it is contextual. Ethnic federalism is only a single factor among many others
(Dagnachew, 2018). It should nevertheless be noted that ethnic federalism itself is not the cause
of inter-ethnic conflicts in post-1991 Ethiopia. Rather, conflicts resulted from ethnic
entrepreneurs appropriating ethnicity for parochial political interests and scuttling genuine
federalization of power and access to resources (Asebe, 2012).
2.7. Indigenous Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia

Indigenous conflict resolution is one of the most prominent methods of conflict resolution in
many countries especially in developing nations (Bamlak, 2013). The conflicting parties are the
main actor in the resolution process because the existence of the system depends on the presence
of conflicting parties. If conflicting parties were not there, it would not be possible to have a
system of indigenous conflict resolution (Daniel, 2016). The conflicting parties frankly engage in
discussions on conflict extinction and in the search for a solution that would bring mutual
benefit. During the process to solve the conflict, a third party can be invited to lead the process;
in any case, the process to solve the dispute is public, and the participation of individuals or
groups in the process and the approval of its results is voluntary (Bamlak, 2013).
Ethiopia is the home of various ethnic groups. Almost all ethnic groups have developed their
own indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution with certain peculiar features. These features,
which comprise social traditions, values, norms, beliefs, rules, and laws, communicated and
accepted among the respective communities for peaceful co-existence (Daniel, 2016).
The conflict management mechanism currently in use at State and local government levels is
customary conflict resolution mechanisms. These mechanisms have a significant role in
resolving intractable inter-ethnic conflicts and improving inter-cultural relationships between
different ethnic groups within a State or among different States (Alemayehu, 2009). Most of the
Ethiopian people solve their conflicts at local levels. In the culture of every human society,
49
various traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution have been utilized before and after the
introduction of modern legal systems (Negari, 2018).
However, indigenous conflict resolution mechanism was given little attention/ recognition by
Ethiopian regimes in the past. But this does not mean that they were never used at the local level.
People used them at the local level but the attention the imperial and the Derg regime has given
to indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms was very minimal. In contrast, the current FDRE
government has provided constitutional recognition to the indigenous conflict resolution
mechanism and institutions in Ethiopia (Kanani et al., 2005). The Constitution provides the
framework for the independent validity of non-state or unofficial laws such as customary and
religious laws in some fields of social activity. Both formal and informal legal pluralism are
discernible in Ethiopia (Alemayehu, 2009).
Currently, different nations in Ethiopia have their own traditional way of resolving conflicts
(Kanani et al., 2005). To name but a few of the nonofficial forums in Ethiopia: The Shemagelle
(community elders) and the Family Council in Tigray and Amhara, the Luba Basa in Oromia, the
Xeer in Somalia, the Shari’a courts, and the church tribunals (Alemayehu, 2009). In this study,
the researcher focuses only on the Amhara and Oromo community indigenous informal
institutions of conflict resolution mechanisms.
2.7.1. Indigenous Conflict Resolution Systems in Amhara Community

1.Shimiglina: In many of the Amhara region, the main indigenous conflict resolution mechanism
is Shimgelina (Bamlak, 2013). This system involves collective elders who hear both sides of the
stories and pass decisions that benefit both parties (Beshah, 2019). Shimgilina and Eriq is a
method of settling disputes through mediation and conciliation. Handling conflicts by the
mediation of elders, religious fathers, and prominent community figures are a usual occurrence.
Prominently Shimglina as an indigenous institution of the rural Amhara community resolving
conflict through the eriq (reconciliation) is the common practice. It is the assembly of Yehager
Shimagille (elders’ council of the land) by which the services of a third party are used as a means
of helping the conflicting parties to minimize the extent of their differences and disagreements,
and arrive at an amicable settlement. Shimglina, as the most prominent institution, has always
been employed to settle serious disagreements that rapture to threaten peaceful relationships
50
among/ between friends, neighbors, spouses, and communities. It is indigenous and has a long
evolution within the history of the rural Amhara people (Kanani et al., 2005).
According to Bezawit (2012), in society when people clash or if someone kills, they gather to
discuss on the issue. Then they call both parties to discuss the issue and give their judgment. A
person who committed a crime joins the community through the elders and takes his punishment.
When there is a conflict between two individuals or two groups, some of the elders go to one
party and some to the other. They talk to each party and convince them to make peace between
them. After the case had been solved, if one of the parties ignored the judgment of the elders and
go back to make trouble again, then he will be forbidden from different social involvements.
The law, the Shimagles apply is known as Yabat Hager Hig (law of the father’s land). It is a law
that is inherited from our fathers and forefathers. It is a set of norms created as a distinct system
for actors by actors who involve in it. It is not static but flexible. It is transmitted from generation
to generation by word of mouth. It is articulated, neither defined nor formalized. But it is
inextricably entwined with the religious, the cultural, the political, and the socio-economic
structure of rural communities (Kanani et al., 2005).
Shimglina is voluntary. Although it is sometimes initiated by friends, neighbors, kin groups or

the elders themselves, continuity in Shimglina needs a voluntary basis. It is also informal.
Members use day-to-day language and it is conducted at a private place. Shemgelena is primarily
patrimonial; it is a male-dominated institution. The participation of women in Shimglina is
insignificant in Amhara rural areas. Nonetheless, women can participate in Shimglinaas
witnesses or representing their own case (Kanani et al., 2005).
2.7.2. Indigenous Conflict Resolution Systems in Oromo Community

The Oromo people have a well-developed philosophical system that influences their social,
economic, cultural and political affairs. The Oromo indigenous philosophy teaches the need to
continuously seek nagaa (peace), fayya (health), and tasgabbi (social order) with humans and the
natural world as well as the divine. Oromo institutions work together to ensure the security and
safety of the Oromo people and maintain the internal peace and stability and social order; and
harmony with the natural environment, neighboring people, and divine power (Begna, 2012).
51
Oromo people have four developed, widely used and effective indigenous mechanisms for the
prevention and resolution of conflicts; these are Ilafi Ilamee mechanism (negotiation or
compromising mechanisms), Jarsumma mechanism (reconciliation administered by the
community elders); Gada system mechanisms (judicial, administrative and political
mechanisms) and Waqefanna system mechanism (religious adjudication). These indigenous
mechanisms have been used for the prevention and resolution of conflicts with the central
government of Ethiopia; Conflicts with the peoples living in their neighborhoods and conflicts
within themselves. These Oromo indigenous mechanisms are popular and they are widely used
in almost all Oromo Land (Bamlak, 2013). The main indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms
in the Oromo community are discussed as follows.
1. Gada System: This dispute resolution system is practiced amongst Oromos in Ethiopia and
northern Kenya. Geda system is similar to the Shimgilina conflict resolution mechanism,
however, it has a different process. Unlike Shimgilina who randomly selects elders who take
responsibility for justice and reconciliation, the Gedaa system has structured the elder’s
succession process every eight years. The reconciliation process involves elderly judges seated to
adjudicate under the tree called dhaddacha. During the process of adjudication, elders sit in
accordance with their seniority of age and knowledge of customary laws of Oromo people. The
Geda system is often used to resolve the dispute between individuals within a society (Beshah,
2018).
According to the Gada age-grade system, individuals in the age range of 40- 48 are called Luba
and are considered to be elders with a social responsibility of keeping peace and stability within
the local community (Bezawit, 2012). The term office for traditional Oromo judges is one gada,
i.e. eight years. After that period, they retire and serve as jarsa (community elder) (Kanani et al.,
2005).
Oromo women also have a great role in solving conflicts among Oromo clans. When two Oromo
clans enter into a prolonged civil war, Oromo women have a great role and power to intervene
and request for reconciliation by using the Siqe. Oromos also believe that women have the right
and power to reconcile Oromo people with their God, Waqa (Kanani et al., 2005).
52
2. Jaarsumma16: It is one model of a traditional conflict resolution mechanism among Oromo
people. It is the process of conflict management involving individual clans within and outside the
community. It is basically handled by the council of elders in the community and thus associated
with the Gadaa system, and called Jaarsummaa in some localities. The term jaarsa is the Oromo
version of elder, and thus jaarsummaa, is the process of reconciliation between conflicting
individuals or groups by a group of jaarsaas (elders). The processes held under a tree (Kanani et
al., 2005).
3. The Luba Basa: The Luba Basa, in the main Oromo language, Borona, means setting free,
and it involves the integration of traditionally despised groups into the Oromo, thereby avoiding
a potential conflict that might otherwise arise out of contempt for those groups (Alemayehu,
2009). Luba Basa often involves elders as trusted and respected mediators who reconcile
conflicting groups and settle disputes. It prevents conflicts over control of critical resources such
as grazing water, pasture, or land from diffusing into violence (Edward, 1990 in Alemayehu,
2009).
4. The Moggasaa Institution: It is a method of Oromo ethnic integration with other ethnic
groups and means of solving various problems with neighboring ethnic groups. It used to serve
the Oromo people in resolving local conflicts since medieval times during their large-scale of
expansion into different areas and continued until recently. The formalities used to be regulated
and conducted according to the Oromo customary law. In the socio-political relationship of
Tulamaa Oromo with other their neighbor’s peoples, Moggasaa Institution had played significant
roles in peacemaking and settlement (Negari, 2018).
16
Jaarsummaa -literal meaning, the process of reconciliation between conflicting individuals or groups by a group
of Jaarsaas (Kanani et al., 2005).
53
CHAPTER THREE
Brief History of Amhara and Oromo People
Introduction
This chapter of the thesis focused on the overall history and origin of Amhara and Oromo
peoples. The first and the second part of this chapter provides a general insight on the historical
background on the origin of Amhara and Oromo peoples, their socio-economic, political, and
cultural life respectively based on the secondary sources. The third section of this chapter
describes the study area i.e. about Ataye town and the community.
3.1. Amhara People

There is a disagreement among scholars and politicians on the meaning and origin of Amhara,
despite some sort of consensus on the historical location. According to Mackonen (2008), the
term Amhara is ambiguous in referring to class, ethnic, cultural, or geographical boundaries. The
derivation of the name Amhar is also contested among scholars. Despite to this disagreement,
historians, scholars, and politicians forward their points of view regarding the origin, meaning,
and identity of Amhara. The leading views of scholars discuss as follows.
Kassate Berhan Tessema, in his Amharic dictionary (1951 EC) claims that the word Amhara
comes from the Ethiopian word amari, meaning pleasing, agreeable, beautiful and gracious (as
cited in Mackonen, 2008). Other scholars see it as an ethnic name, claim that it derives from
Ge’ez, meaning free people (or am, meaning people, and hara, meaning free or soldier)
(Mackonen, 2008). Mengistu Hailemariam also tried to define the term Amhara on a televised
speech in 1991, shortly before the collapse of his government, saying that Amhara consists of a
Hebrew term am, which means people, and hara that means mountain. He then argues that
Amhara means people who live under the mountain (cited in Mackonen, 2008). Amhara is the
name of the tribal group from the northwestern corn of Ethiopia which is coincident with the old
kingdom of Abyssinia (Baxter, 1978).
The term Amhara changed its meaning depending on local conditions. In many contexts, it just
signified a Christian. The practice of conversion to Christianity involved taking a new, Christian
(baptismal) name, usually a biblical Ge’ez or Amhara name. In the border areas between Wollo
and North Shoa, along the escarpment where Amhara people had been exposed to Muslim
54
influence for a prolonged period, the term Amhara signifies today a Christian, while a Muslim of
the same ethnic, cultural and language background would not be considered an Amhara
(Pausewang, 2005). However, according to Abinet (2017), in reality, there are millions of
Muslim Amharas in the four provinces of Gondar, Gojam, Wollo, and Shewa. The Amhara
Muslim community is believed to be more than thirteen hundred years old and share the same
social values with the Amhara Orthodox community.
The term Amhara has a variety of confusing definitions and descriptions, although Amhara exists
as an identity, it represents multiple ethnicities with a varied national consciousness. However,
some reject this concept and argue that Amhara exists as a distinctive ethnic group with a
specifically located boundary. Amhara identity has been shaped throughout the centuries by
migration, intermarriage, language, and culture compositions with other ethnic groups. The
soldiers of the kings of those days did not only originate from Amhara communities. In addition,
the Oromo migrations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries played a significant role in
shaping the identity of today’s Amhara (Mackonen, 2008). The group diffused in different parts
of the country through migration, resettlement program of the military regime (1974-1991) and
marital relations with other ethnic groups (Birhanu, 2019). According to Dagnachew (2018),
people of the Amhara ethnic group are available everywhere in the regions of Ethiopia. Since the
introduction of the ethnic-based arrangement, the Amhara ethnic group faced a threat in many
parts of the state.
According to Pausewang (2005), there are today two different and quite distinct groups and
identities attached to the name Amhara. Amhara peasants understood-and still understand-
Amhara as their (local) culture, their way of life, and their identity, just like Oromo or Gurage or
Sidama peasants are conscious of theirs. Quite distinct from this is the identity of the urban,
generally, well educated, ethnically mixed, assimilated cultural Amhara, who understand
themselves as Ethiopians with an Amhara language.
A heated debate took place in Addis Ababa on the question of the existence of the Amhara as a
distinct ethnic group in 1992-1993. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Andreas Eshete have
argued that as long as the Amharic language exists, Amhara exists as an ethnic group. Thus, the
Amhara should thus be treated as a distinct ethnic group with a certain ethnic territory of its own.
This interpretation may work for the rural Amhara in some parts of Ethiopia. However, a group
55
of scholars from Addis Ababa University, led by Mesfin Woldemariam, has claimed that
Amhara is the center of the Ethiopian nation and should be allowed to live freely in any part of
the country without any restricted boundary. Unfortunately, this debate ended without
clarification of the identity of Amhara (Chernetsov, 1993; Mackonen, 2008).
Related to their historical and political status, Amhara expansion started at the end of the 13th
century and presently, they live in large areas of central Ethiopia (Biasutti, 1967; Kaplan et al.,
1971; Levine, 1974; Shack, 1974, cited in Tartaglia et al.,1996). They were increasingly
powerful people who took their name from their region, Amhara, which was located south of the
Zagwe. In the year 1270, an Amhara noble, Yekuno Amlak, drove out the last Zagwe ruler and
proclaimed himself king. The new dynasty that Yekuno Amlak founded came to be known as the
“Solomonic” dynasty. Amhara became the geographical and political center of the Christian
kingdom under Yekuno Amlak (Gillespie, 2003).
The Amhara’s central position in the highlands, their extension into the country’s urban
settlements, their role in the construction of the state apparatus, and the official status of the
Amharic language all mean that they are sometimes seen as equivalent to the Ethiopian people
per se. Their prime position is rooted in an age-old process that began in the fourteenth century
with the emergence of the Christian Solomonic dynasty in Beta Amhara (corresponding to the
southern part of today’s Wollo region). The kings of Amhara gradually imposed their language
and political mores on the territories under their sovereignty. Although learned clerical culture
was expressed and transmitted through the written Geez language, the status of Amharic as the
official language of the state was reinforced, expanded and modernized under the reigns of
emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassie I (Levine, 1965; Messing, 1985; Leslau and Kane, 2001
in Ficquet and Dereje, 2014).
Amhara identity can be defined from the ethnic perspective at the level of consciousness. In
recent times, the nationalism of Amhara has been Pan-Ethiopian nationalism. With the end of
Amhara domination in 1991, this particular, Amhara version of Pan-Ethiopian nationalism was
undermined by official politicization of ethnicity (Mackonen, 2008). Pressurized to identify as
56
ethnicity, urban Amhara group17 adopted in early 1992 the name All Amhara People’s
Organization18 (AAPO) for the newly founded political organization under Prof. Asrat
Woldeyes. On the other side of the political spectrum, the Amhara National Democratic
Movement (ANDM) repeated the same assumption. Organized by the TPLF-dominated EPRDF
in the years before the overthrow of the military government, ANDM became the official party
representing the Amhara as one group. In effect, the Amhara peasants were and are the last
ethnic group without any political organization and representation, as both AAPO and ANDM
represent urban Amhara views, but claim to speak for all Amhara. AAPO, moreover, is
sometimes assumed to speak for all nationalistic Ethiopians. Consequently, it has recently re-
organized itself into the All Ethiopian Unity Party-without abandoning its claim to represent the
Amhara-both urban and rural (Pausewang, 2005).
But, now time the rise of Amhara nationalism is becoming the predominant point of discussion
among members of its regional cleavages and scholars. It can be argued that a strong sentiment
of belongingness and membership to Amhara ethnic identity is being developed (Dagnachew,
2018). Recently situations have greatly changed. The Amhara nationalism, which was renowned
since 2016, lead to the establishment of an Amhara based ethnic party, National Movement of
Amhara (NaMA) in 2018. It was formed on the basis of national oppression thesis and advocates
the free movement of Amhara nationals in every corner of Ethiopia (Bekele, 2019).
As a point, the Amhara people are Ethiopia's second-largest ethnic group and inhabit the Amhara
region and the northern and central parts of the country, situated in the present-day Wollo,
Gojjam, Gondar and Shewa provinces (Iaccino, 2016; Birhanu, 2019). They mainly speak
Amharic, which has a Semitic origin and is related to Geʿez, the language used in sacred
literature in the Orthodox Church. Until the 1990s Amharic was the official language of Ethiopia
and is still one of the most spoken in the country. The majority of Amhara practice Christianity
and the Orthodox Church plays a central role in the community. The Amhara are mainly farmers
and cultivate maize, wheat, barley, sorghum, and teff (Iaccino,2016). Now, the Amhara National
17
Urban Amhara group consisted the urban, educated, ethnically mixed Amhara, understand themselves to be the
progressive elites, the people destined to be the leaders in Ethiopia. After 1975, and especially after 1991, they
developed a strong tendency towards identifying themselves as Ethiopians (Pausewang, 2005).
18
The term All Amhara People’s Organization, was adopted as a compromise formula to identify this group within
an ethnically structured federation. It is in fact not the identity of all Amhara -but of all urban elites speaking
Amarñña, regardless of their ethnic origin (Pausewang, 2005).
57
Regional State is one of the nine regional states of the Federal Democratic Republic (FDRE).
The region shares borders with the region in the North, Afar, and Oromia regions in the East and
the South, and also the Benishangul region and the Sudan Republic in the West (BoFED, 2004,
in Dereje, 2019).
3.2. Oromo People

The ethnic identity of the Oromo, the same as that of any other social grouping for that matter, is
multidimensional and fluid. This is evident in the extended and varied geographical area that the
Oromo inhabit, the various ecological systems, ways of living, religions, and belief systems that
the people have adopted, and in the linguistic and other cultural variations the different Oromo
(sub) groupings exhibit (Abreham, 2015).
Millions of people in Oromia, Ethiopia, and the Oromo speaking inhabitants of Northern Kenya
claim that they descended from a common ancestor known as Oromo or Orma. The Oromo
identity is rooted in common representative institutions like Gadaa and Qaalluu, the same
cosmology and system of thought despite conversion to Islam and Christianity, the same patterns
of kinship organization as well as a mutually intelligible common language (Afaan Oromoo)
(Abbas, 2014).
Historians have traditionally identified the homeland of the Oromo as the Horn of Africa
(Wemlinger, 2008). According to Yates (2013), the Oromo people have been in the Horn of
Africa for the last several centuries, if not more than millennia. They have been historically
organized by the Gada system; traditionally they have worshipped Waqa, spoke Afan Oromo, a
Cushitic language, and were been able to assimilate into and to assimilate other ethnic groups in
the Horn of Africa.
The oral traditions of the Oromo hold that their homeland is southcentral Ethiopia, in or near the
Borana area. Other traditions place their origin in the area of Mount Wolabo, thirty miles east of
Lake Abaya and north of Borana, while yet another place of origin is Bahrgamo, identified as the
region around Lake Abaya (Wemlinger, 2008). According to Abraham (2015), the original
homeland of the Oromo is around the present-day administrative zone of Borana, in the southern
part of Ethiopia. The Oromo had been living in the Borana area before they migrated to settle in
the vast land they occupy today.
58
Before their great population movement, the Oromo might have constituted a single and coherent
group. When they came into intense contact with the Christians and Muslims during the 16th
century, they were already divided into two groups, Borana and Barentu, which moved from
their original homeland towards west and northeast respectively (Abbas, 2014). The Borana
oriented their migration towards central, western, and southern regions. The Barentu expanded in
eastern and northern directions (Ficquet and Dereje, 2014). The two groups of Oromo were, the
descendants of the senior and junior sons of Oromo, respectively. The descendants of Borana are
eleven, while that of Baarentuu is five (Abreham, 2015).
According to Tronvoll (2008), there are five main groups of Oromo: 1) The western Oromo live
mainly in the Wollega area and are settled, agriculturists. 2)The northern Oromo live in Shoa and
some areas of Wollo and are more integrated into the Amhara cultural sphere than other Oromo.
The northern Oromo are generally bilingual and speak both Amharic and Oromiffa, and most of
them follow Orthodox Christianity. Some pockets of Oromo are also found as far north as
Tigray. 3) The southern Oromo consists of smaller sub-groups without any regional cohesion.
Many are pastoralists and have a semi-nomadic lifestyle. 4) The eastern Oromo lives in the
Harerge area and in the towns of Harar and Dire Dawa. They have strong links to the Arab world
through ancient trade routes and the practice of Islam. 5) The last Oromo grouping is the Borana,
considered by many to be the ‘original’ Oromo. They live in the southernmost part of Ethiopia
and across the Kenyan border.
Elements of the original Oromo culture and language, by extension the Oromo identity, were
also maintained by a large number of people inhabiting the southern Wollo and northern Shoa
areas, and the administrative zone of Oromia around Kemissie town within the Amhara Regional
State. The Tulama, also known as Shoa Oromo, is made up of many named tribes inhabiting
large parts of the present-day Eastern, Western, and Southern Shoa administrative zones of
Oromia, the former Shoa province of modern Ethiopia, initially inhabited by the Amhara. The
Tulema are divided into four major tribal groupings, namely, Dachi, Bacho, Konno, and Jille,
each of which in turn is subdivided into several clans (gosa) (Abreham, 2015). Around the study
area of Ataye, the Jille Timuga Oromos were inhabited, particularly, in the town those Oromos
were living with Amhara and they are mixed with Amhara in some aspects of their life.
59
The Oromo economic system generally relies on a combination of cultivation of various crops
and keeping different types of life stock (Daniel, 2014). They practiced agriculture, particularly
highland crops like barley which played a very important role in rituals and ceremonies and
created a stable diet for a long period of time and perhaps before the population movement of the
16th century, they were predominantly cattle breeders (Haberland (nd) cited in Abbas, 2014).
Historically, the Oromo expansion started during Emperor Tsirse Dingil (1563-1597) in the
second half of the 16th century (Bezawit, 2012). In the course of their movement, the Oromo
interactions and integrations with the ethnic groups were shaped. The great Oromo expansion
from the southern highland of Ethiopia that began at the beginning of the 16th century, and had
come to end of the 18th century, led to serious of contacts between groups of Semitics, Omotic,
Cushitic and Nilo-Saharan speakers with different ways of life i.e. pastoralist vs. agriculturalists,
and as well as Christian vs. non-Christian (Negari, 2018).
The Oromo began to move into northern Ethiopia after fighting between the Sultanate of Adal
and the Christian Solomonite kingdom, in the 16th century, weakened both groups and gave the
Oromo an opening to relocate (Wemlinger, 2008). In the course of their movements, the Oromo
people seem to have developed the Moggasaa Institution19 that served them to integrate the
diverse communities who neighbored with them. Which had to permanently settle, along with
their ethnic neighbors, in the early days of their expansion and settlement particularly on the
Shewa plateau, the Tulamaa branch of the Oromo had devised the Moggasaa Institution with
their neighbors. The main factors which accelerated the interactions and integrations of the
Oromo with and into the medieval Christian kingdom were socio-cultural adoption known as
Moggasaa Institution. It accelerated the non-Oromo integration to their people (Negari, 2018).
There are several aspects of Oromo culture that have been important tools in maintaining their
cultural identity. The one that plays most prominently in most academic discussions of the
Oromo is the gada system20. From the 16th century to the 19th century, the Oromo used religious
ritual and their social structure through the gada system as expressions of their shared identity,
and they used to maintain a sense of corporate identity and although it did not equate to political
19
Moggasaa is a system or it is a customary institution, by which non-Oromo are accommodated into the Oromo
social organizations, given accessibility of resources, social security and protection against enemies. A person, who
is given such an opportunity, is considered as Oromo (Negari, 2018)
20
Gada system refers to system of classes (Luba) that succeed each other every eight years in assuming military,
economic and ritual responsibilities (Kanani et al., 2005).
60
power it provided a vehicle for them to maintain control over their own identities (Wemlinger,
2008). The gada is a system of social organization based on generation-sets and age-sets as well
as an egalitarian administrative system, whereby a nine-member presidium assuming the
leadership is elected on the basis of adult male suffrage, and who serve a fixed term of eight
years as representatives of the age-class of middle-aged males. The qallu is the high priest and
spiritual leader in Oromo traditional religion (Abreham, 2015).
The gade-system often labeled “egalitarian and republican,” involved the division of all the male
members of a tribe into age-groups arranged in five grades; each grade lasting for a period of
eight years. All the males initiated together constituted a distinct group, the gada. This group
then passed collectively from one grade to the next every eight years. Each gada when it reached
the fifth grade, luba, exercised communal governing authority over the whole tribe for a period
of eight years. From amongst members of the luba were elected the representative officials who
acted in its name. The most important of them were the abba boku (“Father of the Sceptar”),
sometimes also called the abba gada (“Father of the Gada”), and the abba dula (“Father of
War”). The abba boku held the highest rank as the paramount chief who presided over tribal
assemblies and proclaimed the decisions arrived at. The abba dula was the leader of the warriors
of the tribes in times of war and was responsible for executing decisions reached at tribal
meetings (ElAmin, 2009).
The Oromo, now constitutes the largest ethnic group of the population spread over a large region
of the country; followed by the Amhara (Peebles, 2019). They are represented in the regional and
federal governments by a new political party (Baylis, 2004). The Oromia regional state is one of
the biggest and a predominant ethnic region in the country. The Oromia regional state bordered
by Afar, Amhara and Benshangul/Gumuz regional states in the north, Kenya in the south, Somali
regional state in the east, the Republic of Sudan and the state of Benishangul/gumuz in the west,
the State of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' and the state of Gambella in the south.
At present, the region consists of 12 administrative zones and 180 woredas (Mekonnen, 2019).
Under the TPLF regime the Oromo people, like other ethnic groups, including the Amhara and
ethnic Somali, were persecuted, falsely arrested, tortured and murdered, women raped. Oromo
people, particularly young Oromo men played a key part in the protest movement that swept
61
across the country from 2015, culminating in the collapse of the previous regime. Now, for the
first time, they have an Oromo government (Peebles, 2019).
3.3. The Ataye Town

The study area, Ataye town is part of North Shewa21 Zone, found in Amhara regional state. The
town is located towards the Northern direction of Addis Ababa-the the capital city of Ethiopia-
with a distance of 276 km and North-eastern direction from Debre-Brehan-the administrative
town of North Shewa Zone-with a distance of 130 km. Also, Ataye town is located at the
distance of 836 km from Bahir Dar town-the the administrative town of Amhara regional state,
the way through Addis Ababa and 610 km the way through Dessie- the administrative town of
South Wollo Zone. Ataye town is bordered with Woredas of Oromia Special Zone (Kemissie) in
the North and East. Amhara kebeles of the Ephrata Gidim Woreda were found in the West,
South, and the North (partially) part of the town of Ataye.22
Climatologically, the area (Ephrata Gidim woreda) consists of three major agro-climatic zones
such as Daga (22%) Woyina Dega (62%) and Kolla (16%). However, the climate of the town is
almost Kolla (hot). Economically, several dwellers of the town are involved in crop farming. The
types of crops cultivate include teff, maize, onion, sorghum, etc. They also produce fruits like
banana, orange, mango, papaya, and others widely. In addition to this, many households in Ataye
town keep livestock to supplement their income and dietary status. In net shall, the largest
portion of the community of the town in the total urban employment is related to agriculture and
related activities. Trade and catering services constitute the second-largest economic activity in
urban employment which reflects the importance of the town as the collection and distribution
center of agriculture and industrial goods (IUD, 2002).
Historically, before the formation of the town of Ataye in 1964/5, the area was covered by dense
forests. However, the surrounding areas were farmland owned by the then feudal local lords
(Balabat) from the Amhara and Oromo communities. The immediate cause behind the
establishment of Ataye town was the earthquake that struck at Karakore23 in 1961. Then the town
21
North Shäwa, is located in the heartland of the country. It is a region where the embryo of the-Empire state‖ of
Ethiopia was conceived by the efforts of early Shäwan Chiefs who were the ancestors of Emperor Menilek, the
veteran of the battle of Adwa (Dechasa, 2015).
22
Ephra Gidim Woreda culture and tourism office.
23
Karakore was an administrative center of the then woreda before the establishment of Ataye town.
62
was shifted from Karakora to Southward, through the selection of the appropriate site by the then
local feudal lords and for approval of the government officials. Before the establishment of the
town, Sudanese were settled on the area (currently called Sudan Sefer). After Ataye was the
selected and approved as appropriate place, the town was established around 1964/5 and become
the center of Yifatna Timuga Awaraja-one of the 11 Shoa sub-provinces, which consists of six
Woredas including Ephrata Jille woreda- the center was Ataye; Mafud woreda-Debre Sina;
Kewot woreda-Shewarobit; Buremodayito woreda-Debel-Afar; Gemiza woreda-Majete, and
Artuma Fursi woreda-Adabela (IUD, 2002).
In 1965, Dejazmach Asfaw G/Amanuel, the then governor of Jara Awaraja transferred his
town from Artuma to the newly established town of Ataye and re-named Yifatna Timuga
Awuraja, Then, Fitawurari Mamo Beshe was appointed by Emperor Haile Selassie I as the ruler
of the Awuraja. After the establishment of Ataye town and been as Awaraja administrative
center, the number of settlers grew steadily, as a result of which the town went on expanding.
Since, the name and the center of the Awuraja was continued until 1990 (IUD, 2002).
The name of Ataye town is said to have derived from the name of the river Ataye, that flows
through the town. The Oromo claims that “Ataye” to be an Oromo word. However, the exact
meaning is not clearly identified. However, some Oromo elders associated the meaning of Ataye
with the river as “Ataye means twins river” related to the river that crosses the town. At times,
the town was renamed as “Effeson” which, was done on the order from Ras Mesfin Sileshi, the
then viceroy of Shewa province. The name was originated from the name of a small village,
which is located in the Amhara highland region (Immediately to the west part of Ataye town).
The name of the town continued until the Derg as Effeson. During the Derg time, the name of
the town was renamed to Ataye. However, the name Effeson served as an alternative name, and
currently, the town has once again assumed its former name, Ataye (IUD, 2002).
Since the early settlers of the area were the Jille Oromos of whom the Wara-Abo and Wara-
Kereyu are the dominant clans. Under those clans, there are different sub-clans such as henna,
Nole, Gota, Nuroja, Wobensa, Dabessa, Dugufuru, Furci, etc. Other than the Oromo, there are
also Amhara and Argobba settlers in and around the town. The Amhara’s are said to have
migrated from the neighboring highland areas of Ataye. Eventually, they have become
permanent settlers of the present town and its vicinity. In the 1950s (E.C), some Amhara settlers
63
from the province of Wollo came and settled in the Ataye area. These settlers, particularly those
who came from Wollo, are known by the indigenous Oromos as ‘Sedecha’ which meaning is not
clearly identified (IUD, 2002).
The Argobba communities are also among the settlers of the region and they are active in
business activities. Most of the early businessmen who opened retail shops in the town were
people of this origin. Moreover, Ataye has become a commercial as well as the service center of
the Afar people for they found at a distance of a few kilometers from this town. Thus, Ataye has
become a place where people of cultures meet; which on the other hand makes a mosaic of
various cultures. There are archeologically significant sites located 21 km to the west of Ataye
town, and one typical example of this could be the monoliths of Gadilo Meda24 locally known as
‘Ye-Mushira Dingayoch’, literary meaning ‘stones of couples’. These monoliths could attract
researchers and visitors (IUD, 2002).
Currently, Ataye town contains a total of three kebeles. In those kebeles, communities live
together from different ethnic groups. There are about eight ethnic groups in Ataye town. Among
those ethnic groups, Amhara holds the highest numbers. Amhara communities reside more in
kebele two and three. The second ethnic group is Oromo, who is residing more in kebele one.
Argobba and Tigray communities are other ethnic groups that reside in all kebeles. Regarding the
religious composition of the community of Ataye town, the dominant religion is Orthodox
Christian, followed by the Muslim religion. In addition to this, Protestant, Catholic, and other
religions believers reside in the town (IUD, 2002).
24
The word seems to be a fusion of both the Amharic and Oromic terms, which according to some Oromo elders
meaning “immigrant”. Gadilo Meda was a battle of war between Nigus Menelik II and Bezabih; at, Bezabih was
defeated by Nigus Menelik II.
64
CHAPTER FOUR
Historical Review of Inter-Ethnic Relations between Amhara and Oromo
Communities in Ataye Town
Introduction
This chapter discusses the nature of historical inter-ethnic relations of Amhara and Oromo
ethnic-communities in Ataye town during Emperor Haile Selassie I regime, during Derg and
EPRDF government. Assessing the previous historical inter-ethnic relations of the two ethnic
communities has its importance to understand the current ethnic-based conflicts which existed in
Ataye town since 2019. Thus, the researcher tried to assess the cordial and conflictual socio-
economic, political and cultural relations of the two ethnic communities in Ataye town during
the three successive regimes.
However, there are no accessible historical documents and recent studies that show the relations
between the two communities in the study area. Therefore, the researcher conducted a deep
interview with the well-knows elders and the local academicians who know the history of the
two communities and the town to get accurate information.
Since the unification of the Ethiopian state came into being through the two people collaborated
with king Minilik II. Together the Amhara and the Oromo people were serious challenges for the
Italian invaders of Ethiopia (Dereje, 2019). Modern Ethiopia rests on a combination of the two
largest ethnic groups-the Amhara and the Oromo in Shoa. Menelik II, who extended Shoa’s
power over the entire country and those accomplishments include not only the victory of Adwa,
but most of the activities that set Ethiopia on a firm path towards modernization had many
Oromo societies (Henze, 1985). Even the present change in the country was the result of the two
people’s resistance (Dereje, 2019).
4.1. During Haile Selassie I Regime

Before the establishment of Ataye town, the area was covered by forests, and half portion of the
areas was farmland, owned by the then feudal local lords (Balabat) from the Amhara and Oromo
communities. Mainly, the western areas were ruled by Amhara local lords and the eastern part of
the current town was ruled by the Oromo local lords. The Amhara community was mainly
agrarians and settled around the highland and cold areas, while Oromo were mainly pastoralists
65
and some were mixed agrarians, settled on the lowland and hot areas, and they follow rivers to
access of water for their cattle’s. However, the highlander Amhara was plow land in hot areas
near to the Oromo community, and the Oromo community also move with their cattle to access
grass and water in times of drought and sunny months into the Amhara community freely.25
Around 1964/5, Ataye town was established and become the center of Yifatna Timuga Awaraja.
Since both Amhara and Oromo local lords and the communities had a great contribution to the
establishment of the town and further developments.26 According to a key informant,27 the name
of the then woreda was Ephrata Jille, ruled by Fitawurari Gebre Medihin (former Fitawurari
Dungo Umer, who is one of the Oromo local feudal lord (balabat), baptized by the
Emperor). After the establishment of Ataye town, many agrarian Amhara community
immediately flow and settled near and into the town. The Oromo, an agro-pastoral people,
mainly settled near to the surrounding mountain of the town and also some in the town. In time,
individuals from other and near rural areas of Amhara, Oromo, Argobba, and other ethnic
communities displaced and settled near and in the town due to the establishment of important
institutions in the town like school, health center, financial institution, municipality, market, and
other infrastructural facilities. Because of this, different communities from different ethnic
backgrounds come together and their political, socio-economic, and cultural interactions become
stronger.
Relatively, during and after the establishment of the town, the majority of the community settled
in the town was from Amhara and the Oromo ethnic communities. The two people have a long
historical bond, interdependence, and cooperation, friendship in socio-economic aspects. The
two ethnic groups were exchange goods and services in their place of homes and they transact in
a common market. Moreover, the two communities were cooperating on weeding and weeping
(death) ceremony and other social activities. Also, they cooperated in production labors.
Especially, after the agrarian Amhara’s collected their crop, the Oromo community have been
releasing their cattle on the land of those Amhara crop residues freely. Sometimes, from Amhara
Community, young boys concealed as a cowherd in the Oromo community, even if the person
25
Interview with AKI-1, Ataye, 27th March, 2020; OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
26
Interview with AKI-1, Ataye, 27th March, 2020.
27
OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
66
stays for long years, he would marry with an Oromo and form a family.28 The residents of the
area have a long memory of peaceful relations among the two ethnic group communities. One of
the key informants explained his memory as follow:
During the autumn season, youth laborers from the two communities were working with
farmers of the two communities to collect their crops. And their cattle have been utilizing
the postharvest crop residues together. Mainly, Oromo cattle used to graze on Amhara
lands because of mainly the Oromo community was pastoralist (OtKI-1, Ataye, 1st April
2020).
Beyond this, the two ethnic communities were intermarriage with each other. For example, a
woman widowed from the then local Oromo feudal was married to the Amhara feudal lord
named Kegnazmach Feleke. She had four children from him.29 According to Negari (2018),
more intimate relationships among different ethnic groups in Ethiopia have been formed through
the process of intermarriage. Intermarriage has long been a means of solidifying relations in
Ethiopia.
Despite those strong relations that existed between Amhara and Oromo ethnic community, there
were some conflictual relations between individuals of the two ethnic communities during
Emperor Haile Selassie I regimes around the Ataye area. Tradition, grazing land, and rustler
were the major causes that led to Amhara and Oromo individuals to conflict, during that time.30
One of the key informants stated the then culture of that community as follows:
Killer man would be considered as a hero by his family and the community and he would
get great pride during that time. When the Oromo killed Amhara, he called the killer
(Amara geday), also when Amhara killed the Oromo, he called ‘Galla31 geday’32 (OtKI-
1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020).
Another cause of the clash between Amhara and Oromo communities was grazing land.
Especially during drought time and sunny months, those pastoralist Oromos were moving in all
28
Interview with OKI-2, Ataye, 31th March, 2020.
29
Interview with OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
30
Interview with AKI-1, Ataye, 27th March, 2020; OtKI-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
31
The term Galla is used in the early texts instead of the name Oromo. This is a term that was only used by
outsiders to identify the Oromo and was never used by the Oromo (Wemlinger, 2008).
32
However, the then tradition ceased to exists now.
67
directions to get fertile grassland and water for their cattle. Sometimes they clashed with Amhara
farmers who had cattle. In addition to this, occasionally, individuals from the two communities
engaged in a rustling (cattle riding) activity. Individuals could ride cattle from the corral,
especially at night time through the dark, and at a time of cloudy climate from mountain areas,
and there was a response by those who lost their cattle by doing the same thing. Sometimes
Oromo pastoralists released their cattle on those Amhara grazing land and crops. Because of that,
Amhara farmers steered the cattle of Oromo. That caused conflict between Amhara and Oromo
individual farmers during that time.33
However, those conflicts could not consider ethnic group conflicts. The conflicts were between
individuals (like inter-personal), but from Amhara and Oromo ethnic communities because of
tradition, grazing land, rustler, and other minor causes. During the then time, conflicts have been
resolving through indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. The respected elders from the two
communities, religious leaders and Abbagar34 have come together and they could make a
discussion about the issue and they decide to compensate for those injured individuals, return the
cattle’s for the owner if the case was a rustle and finally, they made a reconciliation among the
conflicting parties based on the culture of the community.35 Generally, based on the above
information, much of the conflicts arising during Emperor Haile Selassie I regime, in the study
area were related to traditional beliefs, grazing land, and rustle.
Politically, during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie I regime, the Oromo community was an
attempt to assimilated through different mechanisms, according to the key informant (one of the
grandson of the then feudal lords).36 The then Oromo landlords (balabatoch) were forced to
accept Christianity and baptized. According to him, if the Oromo was converted to Christianity,
they were allowed to have been landlords and work with the system. If they did not, they were
demoted to be tenants on their land. For example, Mohammed Dungo Omer who is one of the
Oromo local feudal lord (balabat) baptized by the Emperor, and renamed as Geber Medihn. As
33
34
Abbagar is an elder person who is considered as lawyer and arbitrator. Conflicts, murder, theft and other social
problems were settling by him and his supportive elders. It is common around North Shoe and Wollo Amhara and
Oromo Muslim communities and his decision were obligatory. If someone who refused the decision of Abbagar, he
will face discrimination from the society (OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020).
35
36
68
Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003), the distribution of power in the imperial state was based on an
ethnic calculus that gave a near monopoly to the Amhara, or Amharicized, ruling class.
4.2. During Derg Regime

The Haile Selassie regime was deposed in 1974. It was a revolutionary situation which resulted
in dismantling the regime. The protests and demands, by the citizens in the major urban areas,
during the final period of the Emperor, were administrative reforms, the removal of higher
officials alleged to be corrupt and unjust, and improvements of wages and working conditions.
The other critical questions, like ‘land to the tiller’ and others were raised by the newly educated
elite (Paulos, 1994).
During the revolution, both Amhara and Oromo communities in Ataye town, come together and
protested and revolted against the feudal system. Finally, the Emperor was overthrown from his
throne. The Derg acknowledged and implemented land to the tiller question and all those former
tenants were being landowners. After the establishment of the town, the majority of surrounding
areas of the town have been farmland, plowed by those new settlers near and in the town. But the
land was possessed by those local feudal lords (balabat). The Derg land reform37 could offer a
chance to those tenants to possess the land that they plow before.38 By abolishing then feudal
class who claimed suzerainty over the land and the settlers, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, it equalized
all the land tillers and indiscriminately allotted the land to the users irrespective of their ethnic
background and place of settlement. It also freed the vast tracts of unsettled land previously
under the possession of landlords and all who wished to settle and work on it obtained free
access (Zelalem, 2017).
The Derg arranged many former Amhara and Oromo Kebeles together into one Woreda when he
arranged the Kebele Peasant Association (KPA), to create a strong bond among the Amhara and
Oromo ethnic communities. For example, in Ephratana Jille Woreda (the study area)-from one
hundred seven Kebeles, eighteen kebeles have been the Oromo community; in Gemza (currently
Majete) Woreda- from twenty-three kebeles, eight kebeles have been also from Oromo
community. Farmers from those Kebeles were meeting together on conferences and other issues.
37
The 1975 land reform was the military regimes measure of nationalizing both rural and urban land(Andargachew,
1990).
38
Telephone interview with AKI-5, 3rd May, 2020; OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
69
Due to that, the relation of the two communities would become stronger during the Derg time
than the precede.39 The Derg tried to provide a house with a low price, by building a common
habitation of Kebele houses for the Amhara and Oromo communities, especially from those, who
have low-level economic status, to live together. Then, the relation of the two communities has
been strong and intensified in socio-economic, political, and cultural aspects. Especially in social
life, they tie-up in Iddir, they spend the day on weeding and weeping together. The two,
including other communities, also could campaign together on different activities based on the
program of the Derg development campaign (Edget Behibret Zemecha) in 1975.40
Moreover, the two communities are tied through blood relations. It was/is difficult to get pure
Amhara or pure Oromo in the Ataye community, except those public servants, who come
recently from other areas.41 This argument was supported by Henze’s (1985) view as follow:
In Shoa, pure Amhara cannot find today only in isolated northern regions, such as Menz
and Tegulet. All other Shoa Amhara have a sizable Oromo strain in their ancestry. Some
Shoa Oromo have abandoned their original ethnic identity and regarded themselves as
Amhara. As the Shoan kingdom expanded from the late eighteen century onward, it
gained dynamism from Amhara-Oromo fusion (PP.11-2).
In their political relation, during the Derg regime, there was no discrimination based on ethnic
and religious differences in the local administrative activities, rather the system was given
priority for those individuals who should have strong patriotic feeling towards his/her country
Ethiopia (Ethiopia First-Ethiopia Tikidem), and who have more educated and supported Marxist-
Leninist ideology. However, informants insisted that in Haile Selassie I regime, the Oromo
community was not gotten education access as Amhara community, even from Amhara those
royal family and feudal families were accessed education. It had its own effect and created a gap
between the two groups in the ruling activities of the Derg. However, there was a great
difference between Haile Selassie I and the Mengistu regime related to Amhara and Oromo
status and relations. During the Derg, the two relations have become stronger than ever.42
39
40
Interview with AKI-4, Debre Berhan, 3rd May, 2020.
41
Interview with AAc-1, Ataye, 26th March; OAc-1, Ataye, 31st March, 2020.
42
Interview with OtKI-1, Ataye, 1st of April, 2020.
70
During the Derg regime, like that of the emperor regime, sometimes, there was an inter-personal
conflict between Amhara and Oromo communities related to cattle rustle and grazing land.
However, after the coming of the Derg to power, the killing of Amhara or Oromo each other’s
related to tradition might be a criminal offense. Both communities have become more educated
and they abstained from committing these types of traditional activities. During the Derg time,
despite minor inter-personal conflicts, there were no conflicts between Amhara and Oromo
communities in the study area.43 On this line, Paulos (1994:59), underlined in his thesis that
“during the Derg period, there were no large-scale fighting and bloodletting between one ethnic
group against another ethnic group”.
4.3. During EPRDF Government (1991-2018)

Assessing 27 years of cordial and conflictual inter-ethnic relations between Amhara and Oromo
communities is also important to understand the violent conflict that occurred between the two
ethnic communities since 2019 in the Ataye town. According to key informants44, following the
EPRDF government come to power, the previous administrative structure was rearranged.
According to them, the former administrative provinces and sub-provinces were changed and
replaced by ethnic-based zones and woredas. As Hizkias (1996), after Mengistu’s overthrow in
1991, the map of the country was redrawn, eliminating the old multi-ethnic administrative
provinces of the country and replacing them with ethnic regions and zones.
After the EPRDF government controlled the power, Ephrata and Jille were separated from the
former Ephrata Jille woreda and established their own independent Woreda, named Ephrata
Gidim and Jille Timuga Woreda respectively. Ephrata Gidim Woreda arranged together with
Amhara woredas of North Shoa Zone, whereas Jille Timuga was established as Woreda with
Oromo Nationality special Zone in Amhara region. Politically, those formerly merged Amhara
and Oromo kebeles were separated and the Amhara kebeles were adjusted in Ephrata Gidim
Woreda, while those former Oromo kebeles assigned to Jille Timuga Woreda and other woredas
of Oromo Nationality special Zone.45
43
Interview with OKI-2, Ataye, 31st March, 2020.
44
Interview with OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020, Ataye; AAc-2, Ataye, 26th March, 2020.
45
Interview with AKI-1, Ataye, 27th of March, 2020; OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
71
However, in the town, there are Oromos they stayed still at their former place and live with the
Amhara community. The two communities continue their socio, economic and other relations,
and cooperation even if they were separated politically. Those Oromos settled around the town
of Ataye, those who live in the town, even those who live in Jille Timuga Woreda, have socio-
economic relations with their neighbor Amhara community. They share a common market in
Ataye and Senbetee towns; and both Amhara and Oromo communities would share sugar, oil,
powder and other benefits from their common local economic institutions irrespective of their
ethnic differences; they use a common clinic and hospital, and they also learn in common
schools together in Ataye and Senbete towns. Moreover, the two communities link through Iddir,
marriage, and other social institutions; they spend the day on weeding and weeping and eating
together. They could communicate with Amharic and even some Amhara can speak Afan
Oromo.46
Due to their long-time interaction and communication, Amhara and Oromo communities can
communicate through the Amharic language similarly. Almost, it is difficult to differentiate who
is Amhara or Oromo through their language usages of Amharic. The Oromo community uses
Afan Oromo as their first language and use Amharic as the second language, and they practice
the Oromo culture as well.47 As Hizkias (1996), where groups have interacted for a long time,
there are situations where people might have overlaps in one of the ethnic criteria (religion,
language, culture, or ancestry) but lack commonalities in the rest. As Tronvoll’s (2000), there has
been a long process of inter-ethnic integration in Ethiopia so much, so that today a considerable
proportion of the Ethiopian people have a mixed ethnic background. According to the key
informant48, Amhara and Oromo communities are a mixed community. Due to this, it is difficult
to make a clear ethnic boundary between the two ethnic groups in the town, because there are
individuals from both ethnic groups having a mixed identity.
46
Interview with AAC-2, Ataye. 26th March, 2020.
47
Interview with AAc-1, Ataye, 26th March, 2020.
48
Intriew with OKI-3, Ataye, 29th March, 2020.
72
In clothing, mainly, male Oromo’s wearing an apron49, however, it is common in Ataye town
that someone can see a person from the Amhara community wearing an apron, because of the
hotness of the weather condition.
Religiously, there are Orthodox Christian followers mainly from Amhara and some from
Oromos; also, the Oromos were mainly Muslims and there are many Muslim Amhara in the
town.50 According to Abebaw (2014), in the Ethiopian context, individuals who belong to the
same ethnic group may have different religious backgrounds, and individuals who belong to the
same religious group may have different ethnic backgrounds.
However, the former political relation of the two communities was ceased after the coming of the
EPRDF government in 1991. Post-1991, the political issues of the Amhara and Oromo
community were determined in their respective ethnic based administrative woredas and zones.
The political issue and their participation of the Amhara community are only in their respective
Woreda of Ephrata Gidim, whereas the Oromo is in Jille Timuga woreda. Previously, especially
in the Derg regime, Ataye town was the center of the then Yifatna Timuga Awaraja which
consists of many ethnic communities, mainly Amhara and Oromo. Currently, the two
communities relate only in economic (market), and social aspects. Sometimes, Oromo youths
blame and asked to participate in political issues of the town, but those government officials
were not willing to allow them, because of the existence of an ethnic-based administrative
system. Currently, those Oromos who live in Ataye town are not willing to participate and
engage in administrative and political issues in the town, because they feel that this was not their
respective ethnic woreda.51 One key informant expressed his feeling about this issue as follow:
Those Oromo who lives in the town focused on economic activities rather than political
issues and activities. Even those educated youths from Oromo communities have not
willing to be employed in the administrative and political activities of the town, rather
they search in other Oromo woredas and areas. This problem was one of the drawbacks
of the existed ethnic based administrative system. There is not a suitable condition for
those youths from both communities to engage and participate freely in political issues,
49
Apron- A kind of cloth, mainly common in hot and lowland areas of North Shoa and Wollo communities, males
(mainly) have wearing it instead of trouser.
50
FGDA-7, Ataye, 15th March, 2020.
51
Interview with OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd of April, 2020; ZGOA-2, Debre Birhan, 3rd April, 2020.
73
even in work employment opportunities outside of their respective Woredas (FA-3, Ataye,
27th March, 2020).
Recently, the ethnic gap between Amhara and Oromo communities has become wider than ever
in Ataye and the surrounding communities, due to the politicization of ethnicity and the growth
of extreme nationalism on both sides. Ethnicity is used as an instrument for political gain by
political elites.52 Particularly, in the post-2018 political reform in Ethiopia, the ethnic line
between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups becoming wider in Ataye town. Ethnic inter-group
divergent and negative attitudes towards each other develop. Us and they become more obvious
between the two-ethnic community. Ethnic entrepreneurs and nationalists from the two sides
narrated negative histories towards each other. Since TPLF officials narrate Amhara as colonizer
and oppressor in former Emperors. Due to this, the negative feeling with Oromo communities
towards Amhara could develop.53 Since the TPLF came to power in 1991, it stayed at the helm
of power by pitching different ethnic groups against each other mainly the Amhara against the
Oromo and vice versa (Bafkane, 2018).
However, Amhara and Oromo youths supported the 2018 political reform together by using the
common coalition word of Oromo and Amhara-Oromara54 in Ataye town55. At a reform time, the
two-coordination was reflected through the coalition word of Oromara. Strengthening the
Oromara movement is proved to be the way forward to undoing TPLF’s dominance and
eventually for removing the dictatorial regime form power (Bafkane, 2018). However, the
Oromara political relation of the two ethnic group would not live long post-reform due to
different reasons which separate the two communities again politically.56 The Amhara and
Oromo groups, though previously allied to eject the TPLF, are now squabbling over government
appointments and land disputes (Faleg, 2019). According to Semir (2019), Amhara and Oromo
activists and politicians had collaborated in order to sideline the TPLF but soon failed to
continue the warmth of their relationship.
52
Interview with AAc-2, Ataye, 26th March, 2020; OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
53
Interview with OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd of April, 2020.
54
The term Oromara is a currently coined concept that shows the sociocultural, political and economic relationship
between the Amhara and Oromo society (Dereje,2019).
55
Interview with FA-3, Ataye, 27th March, 2020.
56
Interview with OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd of April, 2020.
74
CHAPTER FIVE
Post-2018 Ethnic Conflict and Inter-Ethnic Relations between Amhara and
Oromo Communities in Ataye Town
Introduction
This chapter tries to discuss and analyze the post-2018 inter-ethnic relations and conflict
management system between Amhara and Oromo communities in the case of Ataye town. The
analysis and discussions are present under topics shaped in line with the objectives of the study.
Those topics are the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts of the two ethnic groups in Ataye town; the
causes and impacts of the conflict; the conflict management and resolution processes; and lastly,
the current inter-ethnic relations of the two ethnic communities in Ataye town. Moreover, under
this chapter, the basic research questions will get answers and the objectives of the study will
address.
5.1. Post-2018: Violent Conflicts in Ataye Town

As stated by the key informant57, until 2018, violence was not raised in Ataye town. However,
due to different factors, violence has happened in the town after the 2018 political reform of
Ethiopia. According to informants58, violence has existed three times in the town of Ataye. The
first violent happened from July 6-7, 2018. Before that, youths had arranged a program of a
peaceful demonstration on June 23, 2018, to support the new Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed59
and the reform. However, the local government was not willing to give permission and
recognition to have a demonstration on that day. After a week, as other areas of the country,
youths from Amhara and Oromo communities including other ethnic groups in the town and the
surrounding areas together conducted a peaceful demonstration on July 1, 2018. However, the
local government didn’t support and participate in the demonstration. The Oromara coalition
group believed that those former local government leaders were support TPLF and they oppose
the reform. Because of that reason, the youths become anger.
Moreover, for a long time, questions are raised related to public services like electric power,
clean water, and lack of good governance in the town. Youths were felt that the former local
57
Interview with WGOA-2, Ataye, 30th March, 2020.
58
Interview with WGOA-1, Ataye, 22nd March, 2020; AKI-4, Ataye, 24th March, 2020.
59
Dr. Abiy Ahmed is the current prime minister of Ethiopia, following the abrupt end of the former Pm.
Hailemariam Desalegn as of February, 2017.
75
government officials were corrupted and they could not support the reform, because the reform
not allowed them to stay on power and they fear their corrupted activities are exposed and it
leads to prison them.60
After a few days of the demonstration, on July 6, 2018, youths from Karakore come to Ataye
town and protested against the local government violently and attacked the government
institutions and officials. Immediately, the youths caught and arrested by polices. On the next
day, the Oromo youths come from Jille Timuga woreda to force the local government of Ataye
in order to release the arrested Amhara youths. Both Oromo and Amhara youths-‘Oromara’ said
loudly together “Amhara Kegna; Oromo Kegna” and attacked the government institutions
violently. Firstly, they forced the polices to release the Amhara youths and so that the prisoners
were released. Then, they killed the polices and they entered into government institutions and
changed the current National Flag with emblem-free smooth green, yellow, and red-colored flag.
Then, the protest was finally converted to plunder activity. They looted a huge number of guns
from police stations, computers and other government equipment from government institutions
of both Woredas.61
The second violent was existed for three continuous days, (from March 6-8,2019) between
Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups- it was inter-ethnic conflict. The conflict was between Amhara
and Oromo. It will discuss detail in the next topic. Five months later, another violence erupted on
October 5, 2020, between the Oromo group and Government Special Force. After March 2019
ethnic conflict, the town was administered under the command post until the problem was solved
and the conflict was settled. Based on the declaration of the command post, ‘anybody who holds
arms cannot move until five km distances away from the town left and right side except the
government security forces’, to avoid any means of violence. However, on October 5, 2020, a
young Oromo boy violated the declaration and he was moving in the town with his arms. The
police ordered him to capitulate, but he was not obedient to respect the order. Then, the police
shootdown him. Immediately, the Oromo group come into the town and the violence erupted
again for the third time in Ataye town. But the conflict was not between the two communities,
rather, it was between the Oromo group and the government security forces. It was attempted to
60
61
Interview with FA-3, Ataye, 27th March, 2020.
76
attack the government security forces to leave out of the area. Although, one person lost his life
and more than three persons were wounded.62
5.2. The 2019: Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Ataye Town

Post the reform, the above-stated acts of violence have occurred in Ataye town. However, the
researcher focuses detail on the second conflicts, because the objectives of the study focus on
and related to ethnic conflict.
5.2.1. Nature of the Conflict

The 2019 conflict was the first violent ethnic conflict that provoked after the establishment of the
63
town. According to FGD of the two communities, before the conflict, there was propaganda
propagated from both sides of the two communities through social media, even personally.
Based on that information, both sides were prepared and Organize their respective ethnic groups
implicitly and explicitly for a month. On both sides, each individual bought guns, even the
surrounding farmers sold their animals to buy guns. Finally, on March 6, 2019 (the day was a
market day, at the two communities come together) the conflict began at kebele one of Ataye
town.
On April 6, 2019, 15 days later of training, the woreda has been prepared for gratulation new
Militias64 at Ataye public stadium. Before an hour of starting the graduation ceremony, an
individual popped around the bus station in the town. Immediately, the conflict started between
the two ethnic groups. In a moment, the members of the two communities flow to the conflicting
area. In a short time, the violence was expanded. Those Militias were directly engaging in the
conflict.65 The conflict was stopped after three days of fired and shut between the two ethnic
groups.66
The conflict has been political nature and it was inter-group conflict type. The main actors in the
conflict were only Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups, living in the town
have not participated in the conflict. Also, any other ethnic communities out of the two ethnic
62
Interview with WGOA-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020; AKI-4, Ataye, 24th March, 2020.
63
FGDA-1,2,3,4,5,7&8, Ataye, 15th march, 2020; FGDO-1,3,4,5,7&8, Ataye, 16th March, 2020.
64
Militias are civilians trained as soldiers but not part of the regular army.
65
66
Interview with OtKI-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
77
communities and their property were not affected by the conflicts.67 In addition to this, the nature
of the conflict was explained by one of the key informants of other ethnic groups as follow:
The conflict was existed for three successive days, from March 6-8,2019. In the afternoon
of the first day, the Oromo group collected in the eastern part of the town. Then the
Oromo group entered into the town after the first firearm was popped in the town. After a
moment, they started to shoots on those Amhara by entering the house. Those trained
Militias were engaged in the conflict directly by raising their arms. The conflict was
serious and violent, and seeming formal war. At night, there was a rumble and gunshot in
the town. Many Amhara were killed at night of that day in the town. On the second day,
the surrounding areas Amhara with those Amhara live in the town come together and
faced the Oromo group and the conflict becomes more serious and violent. On its
escalated level, both ethnic group members fled towards the conflicting area to support
their ethnic partners. Later on, elders from both sides interfered between the two groups
to stop the conflict. Also, federal police, Regional Special Force, and Military force
intervened between them to stop the conflict and the conflict was given up. After that day,
the Regional Special Force and army forces are remaining in the town to keep the
security of the community for undefined times (OtKI-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020).
The data obtained from the key informant68also supports the above explanation stated by another
ethnic group key informant. Accordingly, the March 2019 conflict was ethnic conflict, the
conflict has existed between the two ethnic groups only. The looted properties were only from
the two communities. More than three and four ethnic groups live in town, but their properties
were not looted except Amhara and Oromo communities. The government official informant69,
also explained that the second conflict has existed between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups,
which was violent ethnic conflict, mainly caused by political propaganda done by ethnic
entrepreneurs and illegal arms trafficking merchants to get benefits and profit from the existing
ethnic conflict.
67
68
Interview with WGOA-2, 30th March, 2020 Ataye; AAc-2, Ataye, 26th March, 2020.
69
Interview with ZGOA-2, Debre Berhan, 3rd April, 2020; WGOO-1, Senbete, 22nd March,2020.
78
5.2.2. The Causes of the Conflict
The cause of conflict can vary from case to case in different places and times. Ethnic conflict is
caused by several interrelated factors, which vary depending on the nature of circumstances in a
given situation (Daniel, 2015). Inter-ethnic conflicts emerge from a myriad of factors that can be
deep-rooted and long-lasting between various communities (Juma and Simiyu, 2019). Key
informants of elders and religious leaders, government officials, academicians and FGD
participants illustrated different factors that were caused for the existed ethnic conflict in Ataye
town in 2019. The researcher discusses the major causes of the existed conflict as follows.
5.2.2.1. Political causes

The 2019 ethnic conflict raised in Ataye town was mainly caused by political factors.
One of the main and core long-rooted political cause was the introduction of ethnic
federalism in post-1991 and its institutional arrangement. It separates politically Amhara and
Oromo communities from their common Woreda administration of Ephrata Jille. The federal
structure made the ethnic boundaries between the two ethnic communities, and it created a gap in
their togetherness. Eventually, they diverge more and more ethnically.70 The Ethiopian
government has adopted ethnic federalism as a new approach to accommodate diversity since
1991, the recent condition of intra and inter-ethnic affairs appears to challenge the long-held
interdependence and togetherness of the people in the country (Dagnachew, 2018). The more the
society is divided along ethnic lines the more vulnerable to ethnic mobilizations and ethnic
conflict (Bantayehu, 2016).
According to academician informant71, the new federal structure left a large number of Oromo
individuals residing in the Amhara community; also, a large number of Amhara are left in the
Oromo community. Due to this those Oromos or Amhara’s become minority. Specifically, those
Oromo communities settled in Ataye town in pre-1991 stayed and still they are living in the
town. Institutionally, they are Amhara, even they have an Amhara identification card, but they
were Oromo ethnically. They have not a participant in any political and administrative issues in
the town. Due to this, they feel as and treated as a minority and excluded and dominated.
According to Hone (2019), in Ethiopia, people who live in a particular region are dominated by a
70
71
Interview with OAc-1, Ataye, 31st March, 2020.
79
particular ethnolinguistic group. As Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003), within multi-ethnic zones and
states, locally dominant groups have, and will undoubtedly continue to attempt to suppress
smaller groups to achieve local or regional hegemony.
Another cause of the conflict was the activities of ethnic entrepreneurs72 and ethnic nationalists
in both sides and former government officials. As Alemseged (2004), political entrepreneurs who
present themselves as champions of their communal groups exaggerate and manipulate the
identity fear for their own advantages. According to the response of the interviewee73, the
arrangement of ethnic-based federalism of Ethiopia itself creates a conducive environment for
ethnic political entrepreneurs and ethnic nationalists to use ethnic identity as an instrument to
politicize and organize ethnic groups to achieve their political and economic goals. In the Oromo
side, they propagated that “Amhara was standing to drive out Oromo from this area; the Oromo
Nationality special Zone will scrap and Amhara nationalists started a movement to change the
name of Kemissie to Midre Gegni”. On the side of Amhara, they also propagated that the Oromo
(specifically OLF) armed group will come from Wollega in near future time to invade the area to
remove Amhara from Ataye town and the surrounding areas and they will force the Amhara
Christian community to change his religion and to snip his loop. In addition to this, TPLF
narrated for 27 years as the Oromo was an oppressed group by Amhara in the past emperors.
Because of this, the Oromo community developed ill-feeling towards Amhara in Ataye town. It
was another cause of the conflict
Besides, the two communities were motivated to conflict by extreme ethnic nationalists from
both sides. Ethnic nationalism was grown extremely in both ethnic groups. ‘Amhara first’
‘Oromo first’ arrogance antagonism existence motivated by ethnic nationalists from both sides
was taken as a crucial cause in the current inter-ethnic conflict in the case of Ataye town.74
According to Semir (2019), many of Ethiopia’s contemporary conflicts have roots in recent
history and involve ethno-nationalist mobilizations.
Based on the above arguments, ethnic differences between Amhara and Oromo communities by
itself can’t be taken as the cause of the conflict between the two ethnic groups in the case of
72
Ethnic entrepreneurs are local elites who use the constitutional status of ethnic groups to pursue political,
economic and ideological goals (Aalen, 2006).
73
Interview with FA-2, Ataye, 1st April, 2020; OAc-1, Ataye, 31st March, 2020.
74
Interview with FA-2, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
80
Ataye, rather it caused by the institutional arrangement and implementation of the federal
structure since 1991; and the manipulation of Amhara and Oromo identity by ethnic
entrepreneurs. As the researcher discussed in the theoretical framework of this study, the ethnic
conflict raised in Ataye was not caused by the mere presence of ethnic differences between the
two communities. But, it is related to institutional problems and instrumentalization of ethnicity.
The movement started by Amhara youth to establish Amhara Youth Association75 (AYA) in
Kemissie town was considered as the immediate cause of the ethnic conflict of Ataye town. This
issue was considered by Oromo nationalists as one a way of undoing the Oromo Nationality
special Zone. Oromo nationalists propagated the issue in all areas of the Oromo community. One
day before the program of establishment day of AYA in Kemissie, the conflict was raised in
Ataye.76
At the same time, Ephratana Gidim woreda was started training for new nominated Militia forces
at Ataye town public stadium. It was the main and immediate cause of the conflict between
Amhara and the Oromo ethnic group. After the first violence existed in the Ataye town in July
2018, the Woreda needed additional Militia forces to keep the security of the town. For that
purpose, the woreda prepared training for newly nominated Militia based on the permission of
the regional government. But the training was given only by Epharat Gidim woreda, it excluded
Jille Timuga woreda. It creates resentment in Jille woreda officials and the communities. They
had a question that “why the training was permitted only for Ephrata woreda?”77
The training was given for 950 Militias at Ataye Public Stadium for 15 days. However, those
new Militia forces were nominated from Amhara and Oromo ethnic communities only from
Ephrata Gidim woreda. Moreover, the main problem was the slogan used by the trainee after
they finish their daily training. They said that “we have to stand to war, we are Amhara”. The
slogan was not giving comfort for those Oromo trainees, and they left out from the training
immediately. Those Oromo trainees were returned to their community and informed about the
issue. The training was considered by the Oromos as the preparation of Amhara to attack
Oromos. This information was propagated in areas of the Oromo communities including in
75
Amhara Youth Association (AYA)- an association tried to established by Amhara youths in Kemissie, in order to
maintain the rights of Amhara community in the area (FA-2, Ataye, 1st April, 2020).
76
Interview with FA-2, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
77
Interview with WGO-1, Senbete, 3rd April, 2020; ZGOO-2, Kemissie,5th April ,2020.
81
Ataye town. After that day, the Oromo was organized informally and prepared their arms to
defend themselves. The conflict erupted on the day of the graduation ceremony of those Militias
on April 6, 2019.78
The data obtained from FGD79, indicate that the former corrupt woreda government officials
have their own role for the existed conflict between the two communities. Post the reform, the
Oromara group stands against the local former leaders related to corruption and lack of good
governance. Because of this, the former political leaders tried to convert the attention of the
youth’s protest by converting conflict from government-society (vertical conflict) to inter-ethnic
conflict (horizontal conflict). As Hinder (2014), in some cases, ruling groups may resort to
violence to prolong their rule and maintain opportunities for corruption. Because, according to
Aalen (2006), as long as ethnic tensions remain on the local level, it does not threaten the current
regime. Most FGD participants stated that “for consolidation their power base and achieving
their own political interests, the former political leaders of the two woredas done everything
between Amhara and Oromo”. It had a role in the existed conflict. However, those leaders who
motivated the two ethnic communities to the conflict were identified and arrested, but they are
released now through mercy after the two communities are reconciled.
Besides this, the two communities have common political problems. The two woreda officials
failed to communicate on their common political issues and they never tried to converge the two
communities in cooperative activities in 27 years of rule, rather, they tried to diverge the two
communities. This situation makes wider the political gap between the two sides. In addition to
this, the local political governors from the two ethnic groups did not really think for the benefit
of the community, rather they think for their own power and advantages.80
Another factor was the weakness of the local government to control every activity and to keep
the rule of law and security in the town since the 2018 political reform. In Ataye, before and
during the conflict, the local government became weak to prevent the conflict; and unable to take
immediate action during the conflict, made the conflict more violence.81 According to Semir
(2019), recently, EPRDF has not only lost its ability to manage a stable political transition but
78
.Interview with AKI-4, Ataye, 24th March, 2020; FA-2, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
79
FGDA-1, 2, 3, 5, 6& 7, Ataye, 15th March, 2020.
80
81
FGDA-2,3&4, Ataye, 15th March, 2020.
82
has become a source of conflict itself. In this sense, it has contributed significantly to the
proliferation of violence in the country. As Hinder (2014), the most vulnerable states to ethnic
conflicts are those in the political transition. Besides to this, according to FGD participants of the
two sides, the existence of weak local security forces in both woredas had its own factor for the
existed ethnic conflict. The police force in both woredas could not control any violent indicators
in their town.
Another political cause was related to the claim over the town of Ataye. Since both Amhara and
Oromo communities were established the town together during the regime of Emperor Haile
Selassie I. Also, they live together as one community with one woreda until the coming of the
EPRDF government. Because of this, Oromos claims that the surrounding areas and the town
were Oromo’s homeland. On the opposing side, the Amhara Community also claim the town
since the majority was Amhara.82 According to Hizkias (1996), in some areas, violent conflict
has broken out between members of different ethnic groups in attempts to draw their own ethnic
boundaries or claim territories that were considered common in the past.
According to respondents83, the claim over Ataye town has become stronger in post-reform time
and after the first violence occurred in the town. After the coming of Dr. Abiy Ahmed as a PM, a
sense of Oromo victory was spread across the Oromo community of the area. The Oromo
nationalists propagated the feeling of victory by saying “it is our time; it is Oromo’s time”. So, it
was time to return the town and the area for Oromo. Oromo feels that Ataye town was taken by
Amhara through the approval of TPLF leaders in post-1991. In the previous regimes, the area
was ruled by Oromo leaders. They claim strongly over the town and the surrounding areas by
using the names of the place as references. The name of the places in the surrounding areas
including the name of the town Ataye was named by Afaan Oromo word. However, Amhara’s
also assigned and interpret the name of the places in Amharic word, and they feel that it was the
Amhara region.
Almost all FGD participants84 reflected that the illicit and indiscriminate proliferation of small
arms in Ataye town and the surrounding areas was another main cause of the conflict. Both
82
83
Interview with OtKI-1, Ataye,1st April, 2020.
84
FGDA, Ataye, 15th March, 2020; FGDO, Ataye, 16th March, 2020.
83
ethnic groups deposited many small arms both legally and illicit, spread widely across all areas.
The trafficking and wide availability of these arms fueled the conflict.
In near time forwards, the two ethnic groups would come to arms competitions informally.
Since, there have a huge number of arms in the Oromo communities previously, because they are
mainly pastoralists.85 In the post-2018 political reform, gun ownership has escalated in the
surrounding areas including in the town. Mainly, individuals are engaging in illegal arms
trafficking from both Amhara and Oromo communities. Those individuals propagate negative
propaganda on both sides to sell their arms. The same propaganda was propagated and spread
from those gun merchants and political entrepreneurs. Those Amhara illegal gun merchants said,
“Oromo was Organized to invade Amhara, so you have to arms”. Also, in the Oromo side, those
individuals said: “Amhara was standing to drive out Oromo from these areas”. This motivated
the community to have small arms, and a huge number of arms are bought and sold at an
expensive price. That was because they have developed a sense of insecurity. Finally, the two
ethnic groups could enter into conflict simply, because they have arms on their hand.86
The Militia training by Ephrata Gidim woreda and the proliferation of small arms in the Oromo
community could create uncertainty or security dilemmas87 in the two communities. According
to government official informants88, the two ethnic groups fear each other’s and they lost their
past mutual trust. The proliferation of small arms in the hands of the Oromo community created
fear in the Amhara community. Also, the training given for those Amhara Militias could create
fear in the Oromo community. Mainly, the fear was created, aggravated, and propagated by
illegal merchants of arms and ethnic elites. According to Semir (2019), the effort by some groups
to enhance their security creates insecurity in other groups. Intense competition sometimes
results in violent conflicts, and even those resolved peacefully have no guarantee of holding for
long.
As a key informant89, the fear that developed in the two communities pressed them to mobilize
their groups and raise arms to defend themselves from the threat, because the local government
85
86
FGDA-2,3,4,5&8, Ataye, 15th March, 2020; Interview with WGOA-2, Ataye, 30th March, 2020.
87
Security dilemmas occur when one actor fearing the potentially hostile behavior of another, initiates a power
build-up to maintain its security (Semir, 2019).
88
89
84
unable to protect them from any illegal threat. According to Haider (2014), uncertainty and
collective fear of the future stemming from state weakness. As Semir (2019), many ethnic actors
in recent conflicts have expressed fear of others as a reason for their own ethnic mobilization and
weaponization. According to Nasong’o (2015), mobilization is used for offensive or defensive
purposes or in response to threats or opportunities.
Related to this problem, the legal permission of the government for the community to have
weapons and arms also have factors for the conflict. Before a few months of the conflict,
specifically from December 2018 up to January 2019, the government permit to have arms for
the community. It is possible to say that, almost all members of the communities in both ethnic
groups tried to have arms with a license. Since, the area is one of the prominent areas that have a
huge number of weapons, because the area was directly related to the Afar region in the east part.
The availability of weapons on the hands of the community makes easy the events to be
conflictual.90
Social media has also its own role in aggravating the conflict. To achieve their goal, political
elites and other agents used different ideologies and propagated propaganda through social media
and other means on both sides. Those ethnic entrepreneurs post hatred views and opinions
through social media to the society to create and aggravate the conflict. Especially, the youths
accept biased information and simply engage into violence and conflicts.91
5.2.2.2. Economic causes

In addition to the above stated main political factors, economic factors have their own causes for
the existed ethnic conflict in Ataye town. According to FGD participants from both sides,
unemployment and drug addiction have taken as indirect causes for the existed conflict in Ataye
town. Unemployment and drug addiction are the biggest issues that do still not give attention to
any concerned body. Due to this, youths can engage in any violence simply because they stay at
home with their family after graduation and they are idle. They are sensitive more to engage in
violent activities. Even those youths would be the main actors in the conflict. Besides this,
marauder groups also tried to aggravate the conflict directly or indirectly in order to create a
90
FGDA-2,3,4&5, Ataye, 15th March, 2020.
91
Interview with WGOA-2, Ataye, 30th March, 2020; AAc-1, Ataye, 26th March, 2020.
85
suitable condition for them to looting properties from government institutions and wealthy
individuals in the town.
5.2.3. Impacts of the Conflict

Every conflict influences the larger community of the parties in a conflict. The levels of ethnic
conflict and violence that we are witnessing today in different parts of the country, has eroded
the historical peaceful coexistence of different Ethiopian ethnic groups and eventually resulted in
the displacement and death of Hundreds and Thousands of innocent Ethiopians (Mekonnen,
2019). According to the elders, FGD participants, and government officials, the conflict resulted
in socio-economic, political, physical, and psychological impacts on the community. The
researcher discusses the main impacts of the existed conflict on both communities and the town
in general as follows.
5.2.3.1. Political Impacts

According to the response92, the existed conflict caused the breakdown of the rule of law; serious
violation of human rights and peace and order of the town was disrupted for a week. Moreover,
the government lost its trust from the people. The community has not to trust the government,
rather they trust their arms (guns) and their ethnic groups for their security. Because of this, a
huge number of arms flows to the town through illegal arms trafficking from different directions.
It caused a threat to the future security and it will be a means of violence and conflicts in the
future. Also, the two ethnic groups are mobilized strongly than ever. It may be difficult to
manage them for the government in the future. Due to the interruption of the administrative
activities, many tasks were stopped on starting. The conflict also had its own impact on the
reform. Inputs a black pot on the reform. The administrative capacity of the local government
was highly affected, because, many administrative documents of the local government were
burned and looted including computers. The local government officials are overloaded by
rearranging those documents rather than performing administrative activities.
5.2.3.2. Socio-economic impacts

The 2019 ethnic conflict between the two ethnic groups resulted in serious impacts on the
community and the town. It resulted in humanitarian crises that more than 68 individuals lost
their lives from both ethnic groups, and more than 74 persons were wounded, and many
92
86
individuals are physically disabled.93 Moreover, elders and old women were lost their lives in
their houses during the time of conflict, because they could not escape. Private and government
properties were burned, damaged, and looted. More than 140 guns from police stations,
computers, and other government equipment’s looted from government institutions from both
Woredas (in first violence). The conflict also deters the development efforts and stability of the
town. The conflict disrupted economic activities for more than 8 months. It caused disturbance to
families and community life. There are families formed from Amhara and Oromo couples
through marriage. It caused a serious problem during the conflict. Relatively, the Amhara
community was highly impacted by the conflict.94
On March 6, 2019, the conflict was begun at kebele one of Ataye town. The day being the
market day creates a fit condition for those who need the conflicts to arise and aggravate the
conflict easily between the two communities. At a time, the communities and merchants left their
properties in the market to protect their lives. Their property was looted. 95 In three days,
individuals lost their properties and assets estimated more than 20 million birrs, was looted and
damaged from shop and house in the town by well unknown groups. Many houses and shops are
burnet, damaged, and distracted, still, some houses were closed. Specifically, many individuals
looted their electronic shops, supermarkets, and their money from their shops and their house
explicitly. Many public servants leave their work or transfer to other areas, or they trying to
transfer for other areas. Many business shops were destroyed. Many wealthy individuals
interrupted their building and transfer their business activities to other areas. Besides, the area is
considered as unsecured and conflict area, because those individuals leave the town is not
returned and the area was protected by security forces till now.96
The development of the town was stagnated due to the droop out of the trade activities. The
infrastructural and construction activities were interrupted for months. Hotels, restaurants, and
other public service delivery activities were closed. In addition to this, financial and academic
institutions are closed for a week. Some students from the Oromo community were interrupted
from schools because they fear that Amhara students will affect them. Also, those members of
93
Interview with ZGOA-2, Debre Birhan, 3rd April, 2020.
94
95
Interview with WGOA-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
96
87
the community live on a low economic level, relays on the day to day economic activities that
were highly affected. Many Amhara communities were displaced with their families to other
towns like Debre Birhan and Menz areas. Also, some Oromos live in more Amhara areas leave
their house until the two communities were reconciled.97
The conflict also affected the social relation of the two communities highly. Until the
reconciliation, the interactions of the two community was interrupted. Any Amhara or Oromo
could not enter into other areas out of their ethnic community. Also, any Amhara could not enter
into the market of Oromo Area, the reverse was true for any Oromo. Because he/she will kill.98
In addition to this, the conflict created a sense of enmity towards each other among the two
community members. As an informant99, the feeling of the two communities towards each
other’s as “in Amhara family, the father or the mother said that ‘Oromo comes to you’, in order
to bulldoze his/her child”. This was also repeated by another informant 100
that in the Oromo
families also bulldozing their infant children by saying “Amhara comes to you”. Because of this,
children from both sides could not play together now. This issue is not simple. Those children
from both ethnic groups are growing with a sense of enmity towards each other. This will also
create abnormal relation to the next generations of the two communities. According to a key
informant101, one church was burned outside of the town, and materials of the church were taken
by the group in the final days of the conflict. It created a gap between the two religious’
followers in that area. Before, Christians and Muslims had a peaceful and cooperative relation.
5.2.3.3. Psychological impacts

In addition to the above political and socio-economic impacts, the conflict affects the two
communities psychologically. Sometimes conflict which starting between individuals will follow
by the ethnic conflict of each of the conflicting individual ethnic groups. The inter-personal
conflict between Amhara and Oromo individuals will change to inter-ethnic group conflict
immediately, due to misinterpreting of causes. This caused stress in youths in their day to day
activities. Youths are afraid of conflict that will be caused by their name because they saw the
damage and impacts of the 2019 ethnic conflicts. Due to this, youths are in fear of conflict
97
98
Interview with WGOO-1, Senbete, 22nd March, 2020.
99
Interview with FA-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
100
Interview with OAc-2, Ataye, 24th March, 2020.
101
Interview with RLO -1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
88
psychologically. In addition to this, before the conflict, the Amhara and Oromo communities are
respected each other’s, however, in post-conflict times, it was eliminated especially among the
youths of the two communities, rather, they fear each other until the two communities coming to
reconciliation. The mutual connection between the two ethnic groups is being eroded. Also,
children saw the assassination of their father or younger brothers directly, they heard the voice of
high arms. It created fear and terror in their mind. Moreover, until now, the two communities
mistrust each other.102
5.2.4. The Conflict Management and Resolution Process

Dagne (2013:24) stated that “conflict is like a contagious disease. Unwise handling of conflict
gives it the opportunity to widespread all of a sudden. If once occurred, the conflict must be
handled at its early stages.” The researcher tried to assess the roles of local government, elders
and religious leaders to prevent, handle, and resolve the conflict raised in Ataye. Also, the
researcher assesses the process of conflict resolution mechanisms to solve the conflict.
Indigeneous conflict resolution mechanisms have a great role in preventing, managing, and
resolving the conflict. Since all the previous disputes arose around Ataye town in the previous
regimes were resolved through traditional mechanisms by elders of the two ethnic groups. Also,
in the 2019 ethnic conflict, elders would have a great role in handling and resolving the conflict
and for the prevailing of relative peace in Ataye town.103
Local elders from both Amhara and Oromo communities were striving to prevent the conflict
before it rised between the two communities. But the local government did not any attempt to
prevent conflicts, even, it failed to support the effort of elders to prevent the conflict. After the
first violence raised in the town, the elders from both communities were trying to avoid any
probability of raising a conflict. Specifically, before some weeks of the ethnic conflict was arise
in Ataye town, the propaganda was propagated widely in both communities. So, the elders and
religious leaders tried to prevent the conflict. The elders from the two communities were come
together and tried to discuss about the propaganda that was propagated in the community. Those
elders announced the local government about the issues, and they tried to discuss it with them to
102
103
Interview with RLM, Ataye, 29th March, 2020.
89
prevent the conflict. While the elders and government officials have been discussing the issues,
the conflict was raised between the two ethnic groups on the next day of their meeting.104
The role of the elders and the reproach towards government officials was stated by one of the
members of the local elders as follow:
Government leaders from both woredas were come together into Ataye town to
discussing on common political issues based on the question of local elders from the two
communities. However, while they have been discussing, they were blaming each other
by raising their past and current mistakes rather than coming to consciousness. Both
woreda leaders were support and favor for their respective ethnic groups rather than
searching for a common and joint resolution to the problems. They could not reach on
mutual agreement and bring a viable solution for the problems. Finally, they proposed to
have another meeting program for the next day in order to have additional participants
from the two sides and to have a broad discussion on the issue. However, two hours later
of that day, the meeting participants returned to their home, the conflict erupted between
the two ethnic groups in Ataye town (OKI-1, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020).
During the time of the conflict, the elders from both sides also tried to stop the conflict by doing
what they could. Since the first violence was stopcock by the elders by holding the national flag
of Ethiopia. Also, in the second violent ethnic conflict, they were decided to sacrifice their life
and they entered into the conflicting area. While they doing this, the military force, special
security forces, and federal policies were arrive at the place, and the conflict was stopped.105
Nine months later of the ethnic conflict, those elders from both communities started again their
activities in order to settle the conflict through Shimgilina. They were come together and
discussed many times informally how they can settle the conflict and how they reconcile the two
communities. Elders from both ethnic communities healed a meeting in Ataye town by inviting
religious leaders from Orthodox Christian, Muslims, Protestants, and some youths from both
sides. Elders have discussed with those invited bodies and they organized a peace committee
104
105
90
consists of more than 20 members including elders, religious leaders, and some youths from both
ethnic groups.106
As elder key informant107, before their discussion, the elders and selected youths collected all
necessary data related to the conflict. The selected elders and religious leaders discussed an
overall issue of the conflict together for a week. During the discussion, elders from both groups
explained the reasons behind the involvement of their community into the conflict. In addition to
this, the elders listed the lost properties in assets and value in their respective ethnic communities
during the conflict. After a week of discussion, the elders reached an agreement, and finally, they
proposed a reconciliation day in order to resolve the conflict. The committee invited residuals
from both woreda kebeles and government officials. Amhara and Oromo communities attained
at Ataye town public stadium on the invitation day from 6 kebeles of Ephrata Gidim Woreda and
24 kebeles of Jille Timuga woreda respectively, on 23, November 2020. On that day, the two
communities were reconciled based on their traditional way. The reconciliation was supported by
the Oath of their respective norms. The elders and religious leaders decided to return the looted
properties one to another in the next months through elders. In the next days, the two
communities offered a gift one to another and they also feed together by preparing a ceremony in
order to return their previous peaceful relation and devotion. Some elders were certified for their
roles from the government body.
However, elders have been challenged by some problems in post reconciliation activities. The
main challenge was how to get those looted properties? It was impossible to get and return
simply the properties that are looted during the time of the conflict. The majority of the
individuals of the communities were looted their Supermarkets and shops. It is impossible to get
those goods and commodities in the communities, because they are consumption goods like oil,
soap, coffee, etc. and they are simply consumed. They only got and returned one Bajaj, Bicycles,
TV, Refringent and cattle of private properties; and 40 arms from 140s and 100 bullets from
more than 800s of government properties. Moreover, the seriousness of the issue and the
106
107
91
carelessness of local government to support those elders and the peace committee have been
more challenging the Shimgillina process.108
5.3. The Nature of Current Inter-Ethnic Relation between Amhara and Oromo
Communities in Ataye Town
According to the respondent109, there is a great difference between the previous and the post-
conflict relation of the two communities in Ataye town. Previously, the two communities were
cooperating economically and socially, despite their political alienation. However, in post-
conflict times, the two communities are living together by tolerating their differences rather than
having a strong relationship. Their trust was eroded and they are suspect towards each other.
However, after the reconciliation, the two communities are coming together in a common market
freely; also, they are using commonly in one hospital, schools, restaurant and Bars, and common
transport services. Any individuals from both communities can move in the town freely. But one
Amhara or Oromo cannot enter in too far areas out of their respective ethnic community. In some
social events in the town, like on death and weeding, they have cooperating. Almost, their social
relation is becoming good in the town. Moreover, the relation will more improve in the future.
The elders have to continue their work for this.110
However, still, those looted properties did not return, only some properties are returned to the
owners. Some individuals were compensated by the government. But it was not satisfactory. This
was a challenge to return the relation to the previous peaceful situation. The problem needs
additional and further works. The peace committee is doing its talks as much as possible to
return the properties. It also pushes the local government to support those individuals affected
heavily to restore from their injury.111
As an informant112, the two woreda governmental officials are communicating every two weeks
after the reconciliation time to make a cordial relation between the two communities. This
cordial political relation is started 28 years later in the current government. They started working
together in order to keep their security, also, they are discussing their common political issues.
108
109
Interview with FA-2, Ataye, 2nd April, 2020.
110
111
112
Interview with WGOA-1, Ataye, 1st April, 2020.
92
Moreover, the woreda officials organized six cluster peace committees to support elders in order
to return the previous peaceful and cordial relation of the two communities. After two weeks of
activities, the committee and officials are evaluating their work. Besides, to curb the existed
conflictual relation between the two communities, it may prevent future conflicts. According to
Vanhanen (2012), it may be possible to avoid ethnic violence by making political compromises
between ethnic groups.
In addition to the above informant reflection, the researcher tried to observe the relation of the
two communities in their common markets, in the markets that located in Amhara and Oromo
communities only, in hotels, restaurants, and bars, also in common tea and coffee places for
more than a month. The researcher observed that the two communities have a peaceful relation
now in those places. The researcher also tried to listen to what they are talking about in tea and
coffee houses for many times in both areas. However, nobody from the two communities is
toking about the happened conflict. Rather, they are talking about other social issues, their day to
day activities, and the current hot issue i.e. Corona. However, they fear and distrust towards each
other until now.
93
CHAPTER SIX
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
In the preceding two chapters, the study tried to analyze and interpret the collected data based on
the research objectives and questions. This chapter discusses the summary of the findings,
conclusion, and recommendations based on the data analyzed. The findings are based on the
objectives of the study. The main objective of this study was to examine the nature of inter-
ethnic relations and conflict management between the Amhara and Oromo community in Ataye
town, North Shoa Zone of Amhara region.
6.1. Summary and Conclusion

The finding of the study shows that the inter-ethnic relation between Amhara and Oromo
community in previous regimes was mainly cordial, smooth, and cooperative in Ataye town.
Historically, there was not a violent ethnic conflict between the Amhara and Oromo ethnic
groups in the town until 2019. Despite their cordial relations, the two communities had sporadic
conflict over grazing land, cattle riding, and traditional caused killing around the town. But,
previous conflicts were not related to any political and ethnic issues. Also, those previous
conflicts were solved simply by local elders based on the norm of the community.
The politicization of ethnicity and the introduction of the post-1991 ethnocentric federal system
separates the two communities politically into two separate woredas. It makes weaker the cordial
relation of the two ethnic communities. Despite this, the two communities could continue their
socio-economic relations in the FDRE government. But, from1991up to 2018, the relation was
becoming weak compared to the past. After the 2018 political reform, the relation between the
two ethnic communities become conflictual due to different factors.
Post-2018 political reform, violence was raised repeatedly in Ataye town. Since the violence has
happened three times in town. The first violent was a protest against the local government,
caused by a lack of good governances and related to questions of public services. It resulted in
the loss of life and destruction of government institutions. The second violence was an ethnic
conflict, which was raised between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. The third violence was
raised between the security force and the Oromo group.
94
In March 2019, violent conflict was raised in Ataye town. The occurred conflict was violent
ethnic conflict, arisen between two ethnically mobilized actors-Amhara and Oromo. Although,
the conflict was not caused by ethnic differences. Because the two communities were living
together for a long time in the town. They also have a strong social bond and they are fused
through marriage. The politicization and institutionalization of ethnicity was the main long-
rooted cause of the conflict. The existed ethnic-based federalism could create a fertile condition
for ethnic entrepreneurs to use ethnicity as an instrument and to mobilize the communities in
their ethnic lines. The claim on Ataye town from both ethnic groups was also another cause,
especially in post-political reform.
In addition to the above, the local government eventually becomes weaker to control and shape
every activity, especially since the reform. Through this condition, the illegal trafficking and
proliferation of arms have increased around and in the town. Related to this, the sense of
uncertainty or security dilemma was another factor. The conspiracy of former local government
officials was another factor. Moreover, the movement of Amhara youth to establish the Amhara
Youth Association in Kemissie and the Militia tearing given by Ephrata Gidim woreda were the
main immediate or trigger causes of the conflict between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups in
Ataye town.
Based on the finding of the study, the two communities have been affected highly by the
happened conflict. Politically, it caused the breakdown of the rule of law; peace and order of the
town were disrupted for a week; the government lost its trust from the people. Moreover, it
caused a serious violation of human rights. It also caused the two ethnic groups to mobilize
strongly than ever and it aggravated the proliferation of arms in the area of the town. It resulted
in humanitarian crises that many individuals lost their lives, wounded, and physically disabled
from both ethnic groups. Private and government properties estimated more than 20 million birrs
was burned, damaged, and looted. The conflict also affects the social relation of the two
communities highly. Until the reconciliation, the interactions of the two community was
interrupted. Psychologically, youths are in fear of conflict and the two communities were suspect
towards each other.
To prevent, manage, and resolve the conflict, the elders and religious institutions have played a
great role. To solve the conflict, elders employed indigenous conflict resolution mechanism,
95
which is known as Shimglina. In order to have effective reconciliation, the elders organized
inclusive peace committees from all sides. Through this committee, elders could reconcile the
two ethnic communities, and they could maintain a relative peace between the two communities.
The nature of the current inter-ethnic relation of the two communities in Ataye town is on the
way of a peaceful situation. They can move freely in the town and use their common market and
service institutions together. But still, they have distrust and suspecting towards each other.
However, the two woredas could start a cordial political relation after 28 years. They start to
work together to keep their security and they also start discussing their common political issues.
In a nutshell, this paper argues that the 2019 violent ethnic conflict of Ataye was the
consequence of long-time ethnic mobilization done by elites from both groups by using the
fertile condition created by the ethnically based federation of 1991. Ethnic difference by itself
was not a cause for violent inter-ethnic conflict and hostile inter-ethnic relations between the two
communities in Ataye town, rather it has been politicized and instrumentalized.
6.2. Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study, the expected recommendations are forwarded. Firstly, every
member of the communities including the government officials has to respect the rule of law.
The local government should re-strengthen its power to enforce peace and control violence and
conflicts. In addition to this, when ethnic conflicts raise, the government should take immediate
action without any delay.
Secondly, the elder’s peace committee needs to have institutional status. Therefore, the local
government has to emphasize to further strengthen the elder’s peace committee and indigenous
conflict resolution mechanisms.
In addition to this, it is better that, the two woredas have to train the common impartial security
forces or Militia. If not, the government has to send impartial security force during the time of
ethnic conflicts. Moreover, the security forces should work for the loyalty of the people and
respect the human and democratic rights of the people.
Besides this, the local government has to control illegal arms trafficking. Both Zonal
governments should work together in order to control over the means of violence by applying a
96
strict rule and practice of gun control. In addition to this, the government has a mechanism to
manage the activities of those extreme ethnic nationalists and ethnic entrepreneurs.
Moreover, the government has to give attention to the questions of the minority groups in both
Zonal and woreda administrations. Power at the local level is centered at the hands of one
majority ethnic groups and those local government officials are thinking only for their respective
ethnic groups. In order to solve this problem and to give a response to the questions and interests
of the minority ethnic group, the government has to inclusive political institutions at local levels.
If those officials in the local government will mix from the two ethnic groups, it is possible to
create a responsible body and agents for minorities on both sides.
In addition to this, the local governments have to discuss with youths and create awareness for
the communities on both sides before starting any hot political activities, especially if the issues
have relating to ethnic issues. Besides, the former local government officials have to change or
they have to change their attitude. The officials have to maintain loyalty to the people on both
sides, not to any particular ethnic or political group.
The communities on both sides also have to evaluate critically the propagandas propagate by
those ethnic entrepreneurs before accepting and acting. Moreover, the communities on both sides
have to criticize and reject the poisonous propagandas of extreme ethnic nationalists and ethnic
entrepreneurs relate to ethnicity and religion. Besides this, the community also has to keep its
culture of tolerance and mutual respect towards each other.
Finally, the researcher would like to indicate the possible direction and areas for future research.
The researcher recommends future researchers to study on: challenges of ethnic federalism on
minority groups at the local level. Another area will be how minority rights can protect at the
local level in the ethnocentric federal system? In addition to this, future researchers will conduct
a study on the causes and, socio-economic and security impacts of the proliferation of small
arms. Also, the researcher points out future researchers to study the challenges and prospects of
resoling ethnic conflicts through customary conflict resolution mechanisms. Ethnic nationalism
and ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society is another study area.
97
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Appendices
Appendix A: Interview and FGD Guide Questions
The purpose of this in-depth interview and FGD guides is to collect data from key informants
and FGD participants in order to examine ethnic conflict and inter-ethnic relations between
Amhara and Oromo communities in the case of Ataye Town.
Note: This research used is a semi-structured interview that other probing questions were raised
throughout the interview session though not mentioned here.
I. Interview questions for government officials
1. What was the nature of the ethnic-conflict that happened in Ataye town in 2019?
2. When and where the conflict was taking place?
3. What was the target of the conflict?
4. What are the causes of the conflict between Amhara and Oromo communities?
5. What are the effects of the conflict socially, economically, politically and psychologically?
6. What was the role of the local government to manage and resolve the conflict?
7. How can manage and resolve the ethnic conflict in the study area?
8. What is the nature of the current inter-ethnic relation between the two communities?
9. What is the plan that you have to handle future ethnic-conflicts?
II. Interview questions for local elders and religious leaders
1. What has the nature of the conflict that happened in Ataye town?
2. What do you think about the main causes of the conflict between the two ethnic groups?
3. Are there other ethnic groups involved in the conflict other than Amhara and Oromo
communities?
4. What was the role of the local government to handle the conflict?
5. What are the effects of the conflict on both communities in the town?
6. What kinds of methods used to identify the problem, manage, and resolve the conflict?
7. What is the nature of the current inter-ethnic relation of the two communities?
III. Interview questions for neutral (Other ethnic groups)
110
1. What seems like the previous inter-ethnic relation of Amhara and Oromo communities in
Ataye?
2. What is the nature of the ethnic-conflict that happened in Ataye town in 2019?
3. Are there only Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups involved in the conflict?
4. What do you think about the main causes of the happened ethnic conflict?
5. What effects have the conflict on both communities and in the town?
6. Currently, what kind of relationship has the two communities?
IV. Interview questions for Old aged local residents and academicians
1. What were the roles of Amhara and Oromo communities in establishing Ataye town?
2. When and where Amhara and Oromo communities started to live together?
3. What was the nature of their inter-ethnic relations during Haile Selassie I and Derg regimes?
4. Which types of conflicts were raising between Amhara and Oromo communities before 1991?
5. What were the causes of the conflicts during that time?
6. How could solve the previously existed conflicts?
7. How can you compare the previous and the post-1991 inter-ethnic relations of the two
communities in the town?
8. What are the differences between the previous and the current conflicts?
9. What are the main causes of the 2019 ethnic conflict in Ataye town?
V. Interview questions for field assistants
2. What are the causes of the conflict?
3. What was the role of the local government and elders to handle and resolve the conflict?
4. How can manage and resolve ethnic conflict?
VI. Guideline Questions for focus group discussions
2. What do you think about the causes of the conflict between the two ethnic groups?
3. What was the effect of conflicts on the community?
4. What was the role of the local government and elders to handle and solve the conflict?
5. How could manage and resolve the ethnic conflict in the study area?
111
Appendix B: List of Key Informants, Government Officials, Academicians, FGD
Participants, and Field Assistants
I. Interviewees with Key informants
No Interviewee Sex Ethnic Education Place of Date of Remark
Code Origin level interview interview
1 AKI-1 M Amhara Certificate Ataye 27th March, 2020 Member of EPC
and gov’t official
during Derg
2 AKI22 M Amhara MA Ataye 26th March, 2020 Member of EPC
3 AKI-3 M Amhara Diploma Ataye 27th March, 2020 Leader of EPC
4 AKI-4 M Amhara 10+2 Ataye 24th March, 2020 Member of YPC
5 AKI-5 M Amhara BA Telephone 3rd May, 2020 Displaced family

Interview
6 OKI1 M Oromo 12 Ataye 2nd April, 2020 Member of EPC
and Grandson of
Feudal lord
7 OKI2 M Oromo Read and Ataye 31st March, 2020 Leader of EPC
write
8 OKI3 M Oromo Read and Senbete 29th March, 2020 Leader of EPC
write
9 OKI4 M Oromo 10+2 Senbete 1st April, 2020 Member of YPC
10 OtKI1 M Argobba BA Ataye 1st April, 2020 _
11 OtKI2 M Argobba Read and Ataye 24th March, 2020 _

write
12 OtKI3 M Tigre Read and Ataye 1st April, 2020 _
write
13 RLO M Amhara 10 Ataye 1st April, 2020 _
14 RLP M Amhara 10+3 Ataye 2nd April, 2020 _
15 RLM M Oromo 8 Ataye 29th March, 2020 _
Key: AKI---Amhara Key informants RLO---Religious leader of Orthodox
OKI---Oromo Key informants RLM—Religious leader of Muslim
OtKI---Other ethnic groups Key informant RLP---- Religious leader of Protestsnt
112
II. Interview with Government Officials
N Interview Sex Ethnic Educati Place of Date of Remark
o. ee code origin on level Interview interview
1 ZGOA1 M Amhara BA Debre Berhan 3rd April, 2020 -
2 ZGOA2 M Amhara BA Debre Berhan 3rd April, 2020 -
3 WGOA1 M Amhara BA Ataye 1st April, 2020 -
4 WGOA2 M Amhara BA Ataye 30th March, 2020 -
7 ZGOO1 M Oromo BA Kemissie 5th April, 2020 -
8 ZGOO2 M Oromo BA Kemissie 5th April, 2020 -
9 WGOO1 M Oromo BA Senbete 22nd March, 2020 -
Key: ZGOA-Zonal Government official of Amhara
ZGOO- Zonal Government official of Oromo
WGOA- Woreda Government officials of Amhara
WGOO- Woreda Government Official of Oromo
III. Interview with academicians

N Intervi Sex Ethnic Educati Place of Date of Remark
o. ewee origin on Interview interview
code level
1 AAC1 M Amhara MA Ataye 26th March, 2020
2 AAC2 M Amhara MA Ataye 26th March, 2020
3 OAC1 M Oromo BA Ataye 31st March, 2020
4 OAC2 M Oromo BA Senbete 24th March, 2020
Key: AAc- Amhara academician
OAc-Oromo Academician
113
IV. FGD participants
No. Interviewe Sex Ethnic Education level Place Date Remark
e code origin
1 FGDA-1 M Amhara BA Ataye 15th March, 2020
2 FGDA-2 M Amhara 10 Ataye 15th March, 2020
3 FGDA-3 M Amhara BA Ataye 15th March, 2020
4 FGDA-4 M Amhara Read & write Ataye 15th March, 2020
6 FGDA-6 F Amhara BA Ataye 15th March, 2020
8 FGDA-8 M Amhara Diploma Ataye 15th March, 2020
9 FGDO-1 M Oromo 8 Ataye 16th March, 2020
13 FGDO-5 M Oromo 10+3 Ataye 16th March, 2020
14 FGDO-6 M Oromo Diploma Ataye 16th March, 2020
16 FGDO-8 M Oromo Read &write Ataye 16th March, 2020
Key: FGDA- Amhara Focus Group discussion Participant
FGDPO-Oromo Focus Group discussion Participant
V. Field assistants
No. Field Se Ethnic Educati Role As Interviewee
assistant x origin on level
code
1 FA1 M Argoba BA Communicate and arrange an interview 2nd April 2020
with Argoba Key informants
2 FA2 M Amhara BA Arranged FGDA participation and 1st April, 2020
communicated and arrange an interview
with Amhara ket informants
3 FA3 M Oromo 10+2 Arranged an interview with Oromo key 27th March, 2020
informants and FGD participation
Key: FA- field assistant
114
Appendix C: Map of the Study Area
Source: Arc GIS 10.3
115
Appendix D: A Diagram that Shows the Historical Inter-Ethnic Relation and
Conflict between Amhara and Oromo Communities in Ataye Town
C C
o or
nf di
li al
ct
ul R
el
R at
el io
at ns
io
ns
116
Appendix E: A Sample Which Shows the Members of Peace Committee and Role of
Shimglina in Settling the 2019 Conflict
117
118
Appendix F: Photo that Shows the Members of Elder’s Peace Committee and
Guests Attained on Reconciliation program at Ataye Town Public Stadium
Source: One of the members of the elder’s peace committee.
119
Appendix G: Certificate Award for One of the Members of Elder Peace Committee
for His Effort and Contribution in Handling and Resolving the Conflict
Source: The certified person
120

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INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Approved by Board of Examiners:

__________________________ _________________ __________________

__________________________ ________________ _________________

___________________________ __________________ __________________

Name Signature Date

Jemal Seid ___________ _________________

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the

Name Signature Date

Bewuketu Dires (PhD Candidate) ____________ ______________

Appendix C: Map of the study area………………………………………………………….…115

1.1. Background of the Study

1.2. Statement of the Problem

1.3. Objectives of the Study

1.3.2. Specific Objectives

1.4. Research Questions

1.5. Scope of the Study

1.6. Research Methodology

1.6.1. Research Design

According to Creswell (2009), qualitative research is a form of interpretive inquiry in which

1.6.2. Sampling Design and Technique

1.6.3. Sources of Data

1.6.4. Methods of Data Collection

1.6.5. Selection of Field Assistants

1.6.7. Method of Data Analysis

1.7. Limitations of the Study

1.8. Significance of the Study

1.9. Ethical considerations

1.10. The Trustworthiness of the Research

1.11. Operational Definitions

Community: A group of people in a given time and place.

1.12. Organization of the Study

2.1. Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.2. Ethnic Identity

2.1.3. Ethnic Group

2.1.4. Ethnic Conflict

2.1.5. Inter-Ethnic Relations

2.2. Theories of Ethnicity and Ethnic-conflict

2.2.1. Primordialism Theory

Primordialism emphasizes that ethnic identification is based on so-called ‘primordial’

2.2.2. Instrumentalist Theory

2.2.3. Constructivist Theory

2.3. Theoretical Framework

2.4. Nature, Categories and Consequences of Ethnic Conflict

2.4.2. Categories of Ethnic Conflict

1.Separatist movements or separatism: Separatist movements9 advocate for greater

5. Survival: Violence occurs as part of an attempt by a national government to forcibly

2.4.3. Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is caused by a combination of factors: a major structural change, ethnic

The researcher discussed the major causes of ethnic conflict as follows:

2. Socio-economic factors: Political exclusion should be combined with discriminatory

2.4.4. Impacts of Ethnic Conflict

2. Socio-economic effects: Ethnic conflict destroys the very bases of development:

__________________ _ __________

__________ _

_______

Jemal Seid _ _______

Bewuketu Dires (PhD Candidate) __