Case Study Analysis of

AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN

(Rank/Name)
SWPC Class 25-01
Small Group __10__
Date: Month, Day, Year
AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN 1979-1989 SGT Kauffmann, Austin Small Group _10_

Individual Case Study Analysis of AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN 1979-1989

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet-Afghan War was a protracted armed conflict between the Soviet-backed

Afghan government and the Mujahidin. The conflict lasted from 1979 to 1989. The

fundamental cause of the conflict was from 1979 to 1989 was the enforcement of

Soviet-style communism by a Soviet-backed Afghan government. These new

communist reforms challenged Afghanistan's deep-rooted traditional and Islamic values,

sparking widespread opposition. This fundamental difference in ideals, compounded by

Soviet political and military domination, led to an insurgent uprising by the Mujahidin,

seeking to reclaim their land and defend their Islamic way of life. The resistance

culminated at the level of Insurgency and was resolved by radicalization. This individual

case study analysis will review the causality, organization, evolution, and culmination of

the Soviet-Afghan War, and analyze the success or failure of the competitors in

addressing core issues and mobilizing key target audiences for or against the

resistance.

RED IS FOR GUIDANCE. REMOVE ALL RED TEXT FROM FINAL PAPER

Section 2. PRELIMINARY STATE ANALYSIS (~ 2 pages)

2.a. Conflict Conditions.

The Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989 was shaped and driven by multiple factors

and conditions throughout the conflict. Four key conditions from the exploitable

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conditions framework played major roles. These conditions are Multiple Sovereignties,

Mobilizing Ideologies, Divided Societies, and Ineffective Government. These factors

drove the actions of both the ruling party and the resistance, eventually leading to the

Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan government.

Ruling parties’ perspective

From the perspective of the Afghan Government, multiple sovereignties was a

major challenge. The government wanted to gain control over the entire country but was

unable to, they were held to only control the major urban areas. While the Mujahidin

held on to control of the rural areas where they had immense influence. The

government only held control of about 20% of the regions, degrading its influence on the

country. While the Mujahidin-controlled areas such as the Panjshir Valley created

parallel powers that disrupted the government and weakened its control.

The government promoted mobilizing ideologies founded on Soviet communist

values. They included reforms such as land redistribution and women’s rights. However,

these reforms were unpopular among Afghanistan’s Islamic population, especially in

rural areas, where they were seen as an attack on traditional and religious values. This

ideological difference further alienated the population and made it difficult for the

government to gain widespread support.

Afghanistan’s divided society also complicated the government's efforts to govern

effectively. The country’s ethnic and tribal divisions, including Pashtuns, Tajiks,

Hazaras, and Uzbeks, added to the government's struggle to create a unified base of

support. Many of these groups saw the Soviet-backed government as foreign and

oppressive, which deepened the resistance against the government.

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Finally, ineffective governance greatly affected the Afghan government which

was dependent on Soviet support. The government's inability to provide and connect

with the Afghan people led to its ineffectiveness. It relied on the Soviets to maintain

control, but even with this support, it could not stop the growing influence of the

Mujahideen, ultimately leading to its collapse.

Resistance perspective

Multiple sovereignties worked to the advantage of the Mujahidin. This allowed

them to control the rural areas where they were able to build local power structures and

wage their guerilla war against the government and Soviets. In doing so they were able

to resist the government's control and operate independently in strongholds like the

Panjshir valley.

Mobilizing ideologies united the Mujahidin framing the conflict as a holy war

against the atheist communist Soviet-backed government. This was a crucial aspect in

rallying support both domestically and internationally. From both the rural populations

and also like the US, Pakistan, and Saudia Arabia.

The divided society in Afghanistan also worked in the Mujahidin’s favor. Although

there were different factions within the resistance they were united by the shared goals

of ridding Afghanistan of the Soviet ideals and troops. They also used ethnic and tribal

grievances to build support across the country.

Finally, the ineffective government played to the effectiveness of the Mujahidin.

The inability of the government to provide for most of the country allowed the Mujahidin

to paint themselves as the true defenders of Afghanistan and Islam.

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2.b. Conflict Chronology.

 1973: Mohammed Daoud seizes power via a coup. Overthrowing the Afghan

monarchy and establishing a republic that aligns with communist views

deepening Soviet influence.

 1978: The Saur revolution. A coup by the Peoples Democratic Party of

Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrows Daoud. Creating a communist government.

Reforms like land redistribution and changes in women's rights face resistance

from rural conservative Afghans.

 December 1979: Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. They help install Babrak

Karmal as the leader of the Afghan government. This begins the rise in the

Mujahidin’s resistance escalation.

 1980: The Mujahidin begin to organize into factions gaining support from

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the US. They begin to use the rugged terrain of rural

Afghanistan to wage a guerilla war against the Soviets and the Afghan army.

 1982: Soviets launch attacks across Afghanistan trying to suppress the growing

Mujahidin insurgency. Soviet troops struggle to gain control of rural areas despite

their overwhelming superiority.

 1984: Increased foreign aid comes to Mujahidin in the form of weapons and

funding from the United States through the Pakistani ISI. This boosts the

effectiveness of the Mujahidin resistance.

 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev becomes leader of the Soviet Union and Mujahidin

creates an alliance with Pakistan. Gorbachev begins discussing withdrawal from

Afghanistan.

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 1986: Babrak Karmal is replaced by Najibullah as leader of the Afghan

government. He launches the “National Reconciliation” policy to win Mujahidin's

favor, and it fails.

 1986: In September the Unites States provided stinger missiles to Mujahidin

marking a major turn point in the conflict as the Soviets lost their air superiority.

 1988: The Geneva Accords are signed beginning the pull-out of Soviet forces

from Afghanistan. This is the beginning of the end of direct Soviet involvement in

Afghanistan.

 1989: The last of the soviet troops pull out by February leaving the Afghan

government to fight the Mujahidin alone.

 1992: The Mujahidin capture Kabul overthrowing the Soviet-backed Najibullah

government. This is the end of communist rule. Infighting within Mujahidin

factions continues.

Section 3. INCIPIENT STATE ANALYSIS (~2 pages)

3.a. Birth of the Resistance.

The Birth and Momentum of the Mujahidin

In the late 1970s was the birth of the Mujahidin. This was in response to the

emplacement of the Soviet-backed Afghan government enforcing communist values

and laws over the traditionally Islamic Afghan people by the PDPA. The momentum of

the Mujahidin resistance was reinforced by Soviet-style reforms such as land

redistribution, and changes to women's rights. This was viewed as a direct attack on the

Afghan people and their traditional Islamic ideals.

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Leadership and Core Grievances

The leadership of Mujahidin was comprised of local religious leaders (ulema),

tribal leaders, and students of Islam. There were two main groups within the resistance

the Traditionalists, and the Fundamentalists. There were also some unorganized Shia

groups backed by Iran. Some of the main figureheads were Sibghatullah Mujadidi

leader of the National Liberation Front (NLF) from the traditionalist group. Also,

Burhanuddin Rabbani leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan or JIA, and

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar leader of Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) from the fundamentalist

groups. There also was Ahmad Shah Massoud who was a crucial military leader and

strategist.

Mujahidin’s core grievances were that the Soviet communist reforms were un-

Islamic and threatened the Afghan way of life. Specifically, the reforms of traditional

gender roles, such as women having the right to choose who they married and bride

price caps, and the land redistribution reforms.

Stated Objectives

The main objective of the Mujahidin was to rid Afghanistan of its Soviet occupiers

and overthrow the Soviet-backed communist Afghan government. The two main

factions, traditionists, and fundamentalists though they shared this main objective had

secondary objectives that varied. The traditionalists were fine to return to the pre-

communist status quo, while the fundamentalists also wanted a new Islamic state based

on Sharia law.

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Organization of Components of the Movement

The underground component was the resistance organizing in secret typically

operating out of Pakistan where they had bases. This is where leaders like Hekmatyar

and Rabbani planned their strategies.

The armed component contained guerilla-style forces using the rugged

mountainous terrain to their advantage to fight off Soviet forces. Forces like Ahmad

Shah Masoud’s excelled in ambush tactics and mobile warfare targeting government

targets and soviet forces.

The auxiliary/public component would use their local support networks, running

their bases out of tribal and religious structures. They mainly relied on their family ties,

local clergy, and village elders to recruit their fighters and stockpile and disseminate

their resources. This was derived from the traditional Afghan way of governance.

Recruitment

Most of the recruiting came from rural Afghan tribes that had the same beliefs.

Religious beliefs played a major role in recruiting since the conflict was painted as a

holy war in defense of Islam. There was also the aspect of protection and material

incentives such as weapons that gained a lot of traction with these communities. There

were also the refugees in Pakistan where religious schools were built to indoctrinate

and train young men to join the jihad cause.

Sources of External Support

Material support came from many countries such as The United States, Pakistan,

Saudia Arabia, and Iran supplying arms training and funds. A large turning point in this

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support came during the Reagan administration with a major boost in funding, and also

the stinger missiles which allowed the Mujahidin to counter the Soviet air superiority.

Ideological support came from individuals and movements like Saudi Wahhabism and

the Muslim Brotherhood. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also played a large

role in guiding the strategic resistance of the Soviets and channeling foreign aid. As for

political support, Pakistan gave the Mujahidin haven within its borders for its leadership

to operate and establish training camps. This was crucial for their development and

survival against the Soviets.

Message, Identity Branding, and Reinforcement of messaging

The Mujahidin branded themselves as the defenders of Islam. This allowed them

to achieve not only domestic but also international support. By creating an identity as

warriors of faith they were able to gain sympathy and support from foreign entities and

the Muslim world. They achieved this by painting their struggle as a righteous cause

against an atheist foreign enemy.

They were able to reinforce their messaging by using Islamic rhetoric in their

communications to frame their fight as a holy war. They also captured and publicized

key victories such as successful ambushes, downing Soviet aircraft, and taking down

government targets to inspire more recruits and strengthen their cause.

3.b. Ruling Party Efforts to Counter the Resistance

Addressing Core Grievances and Party Narrative

The Afghan government failed to address the deeply rooted Islamic and

traditional beliefs of its people. The government's communist reforms only strengthened

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the resistance of its people. The PDPA’s narrative focused on a socialist, modern state

pushing for equality and progress by way of state control did not work. This narrative

only alienated most of the Afghan population who viewed this as an on their religious

and cultural ways of life.

Key Actions Taken and External Support

In response to the resistance they received, the government launched Military

operations backed by the Soviets. They did this through sweeping offensives through

Mujahidin-controlled areas, airstrikes, and bombings. They also used scorched earth

tactics destroying infrastructure, crops, and homes in areas they believed Mujahidin

fighters to be. They also tried distributing propaganda that were focused on the benefit

of their social programs.

As for external support, the Soviets provided a massive amount of material and

military support to the government. This included weapons, military advisors, and tens

of thousands of troops. With this support, it only strengthened the narrative of foreign

occupation to the population and the resistance forces.

Impact on the Resistance

The actions taken by the Afghan government strengthened the Mujahidin

resistance rather than weakening it. The heavy military strikes drove more recruits to

fight for the resistance's cause. These strikes killed many civilians increasing the

resentment the people had for the government. Along with the government's Soviet-

backed narrative on modernization and socialist reforms that failed the address the core

grievances of the population, the Mujahidin only gained more internal and external

support.

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3.c. Conflict Party Narrative Comparison and Contrast

Afghan government

The Afghan government was Soviet aligned leading with socialist modernization

views. They painted the conflict as a struggle to modernize and progress Afghanistan.

The government promoted its policies as necessary for creating a socialist Afghanistan

and breaking the power of feudal tribal systems. The Government focused on the urban

elite and younger generations for their target audience. They aimed to weaken the tribal

leadership in hopes of building loyalty to themselves.

Mujahidin Resistance

The Mujahidin painted the conflict as a holy war for the survival of their religious

and cultural ways of life. They stated they were the defenders of Islam and Afghan

sovereignty from atheist foreign occupiers. The target audience they focused on was

the rural populations, tribal leaders, and religious figureheads. They used Islamic

rhetoric to resonate with their target audience and gain traction.

Section 4. INSURGENCY / CRISIS STATE ANALYSIS (~2 pages)

4.a. Transition to Crisis.

Government Repression and External Support

From the beginning of the PDPA rule over the Afghan people, they did not have

the support of their support. Especially with them being backed by the Soviets and

enforcing progressive communist ideas. They then began employing harsh tactics

against the Afghan people such as mass arrests, executions, and bombing of civilian

areas that were thought to be harboring fighters where many civilians were killed. These

actions created a fertile environment for an armed resistance to be formed.

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The resistance gained local support following the heinous actions and

misrepresentation by the government. Then came the external support as the

resistance painted this conflict as foreign oppression. This external support came from

countries such as Pakistan, the United States, and Saudia Arabia in the form of

weapons, training, and funding. This helped to boost the effectiveness and start the shift

of a loosely organized resistance into an armed insurgency able to fight in more

sustained combat.

Leadership and Regional Safe Havens

Key leaders within the resistance played major roles in organizing the resistance

into a more effective fighting force. Leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud, and

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar helped to establish regional strongholds to hold off and fight the

Soviets from the mountainous terrain. From this mountainous terrain, they became well-

versed in guerilla tactics such as ambushes and other hit-and-run tactics.

With this leadership, they were able to create safe-haven bases in neighboring

Pakistan. Here they could regroup, be trained, and receive supplies from external

sources. From here The Pakistani ISI was able to supply them with stinger missiles that

they received later in the fight as part of The United States Operation Cyclone where

the CIA supplied the missiles to the resistance through the hands of Pakistan.

4.b. Resistance Approach.

Military Capabilities

From the rugged mountainous terrain, the Mujahidin were to conduct smaller hit-

and-run style tactics which played to their strengths being a smaller less equipped force.

In adopting this decentralized, guerilla warfare-style fighting they were able to counter

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the much larger and more well-equipped Soviet force. These smaller mobile units

allowed for sabotage operations as well.

Some of the successes of these guerilla tactics were things like disrupting Soviet

supply lines, demoralizing the enemy, and maintaining control of the rural areas of the

country. As for some of the failures, the decentralized nature of the resistance created

some conflicts between the goals and operations of different factions. Resulting in

ineffective coordination at times, for example, different factions would pursue their own

local goal within their regions making it difficult to ever mount large-scale operations on

their enemies.

Informational and Ideological Capabilities

The Ideological narrative that the Mujahidin used was strongly rooted in Islamic

principles. This appealed largely to their rural conservative population. In doing this they

were able to paint this conflict as a Jihad against their Soviet invaders. They were able

to use mosques and madrassas as gathering points to spread their message and recruit

fighters as well a stronger support from the local populations.

One of the successes that came from this is that their Jihad narrative was to

gather not only Afghans to fight for their cause but also foreign fighters as well. They

were able to recruit a large number of fighters as well as gain support from other Islamic

countries like Saudia Arabia, and Pakistan. As for failure, they cut off some of the

Afghan population in the urban areas where the socialist grasp of the government was

able to take hold.

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AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN 1979-1989 SGT Kauffmann, Austin Small Group _10_

Economic Capabilities

Most of the economic growth and funding came from external sources to the

resistance and some local support networks. Pakistan played a huge role in this as they

channeled the United States and Saudi aid to the resistance. As for the local support,

resources were collected from the rural populations as a form of informal tax to help

fund the operations.

Success-wise the external funding that they were able to raise and receive gave them

what they needed to mount the offensives that they did against the Soviets and

government. Especially the stinger missiles they received from the US’s CIA during

Operation Cyclone. Other than that, they received more advanced weaponry, food, and

medical supplies, allowing them to be more effective. As for failure on their part, they

became dependent on external support which led to hoarding and disputes over the

supplies between factions at points.

Matching Narrative and Actions

In most areas, they were able to match their narratives to their action in the

conflict. Their Jihad narrative was successful in recruiting fighters and local support to

their cause as well as attracting foreign support, and their successes against the

Soviets helped reinforce this narrative that they were the defenders of Afghanistan.

4.c. Ruling Party Approach.

Military Capabilities

The Soviet-backed Afghan government mainly relied on conventional tactics.

Engaging in large-scale military operations, airstrikes, and slow-moving ground

assaults. They did this by utilizing the Soviet's helicopters, tanks, and artillery.

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As for successes they were able to maintain control of the urban areas within the

country such as Kabul and other large cities. They were also to regain some of the

Mujahidin-controlled areas outside the cities as well. As for failures they were unable to

control the rural areas, also with their airstrikes and bombing they killed many of the

civilian populace increasing discontent for the government in turn increasing support for

the resistance.

Information and Ideological Capabilities

The government utilized state-owned media and propaganda tactics to push its

socialist messaging. They painted the conflict as a battle between modern socialism vs.

those resisting progress. Through these tactics, they sought to reshape the culture of

Afghanistan.

They had successes in the urban areas of Afghanistan gaining some traction with

the younger populations who supported the modernizing ideals. They were also able to

build some loyalty among the urban elites. As for most of the population though they

failed. There was a major disconnect between their social agenda and the rural

populations as it seemed like an attack on their religious beliefs and ways of life.

Economic Capabilities

Like the resistance, the government became reliant on external support. They

received a lot of soviet aid for everything from military aid to administrative aid for

everyday operations. They also aimed to redistribute the land from the large landowners

to poorer communities. This was a move to try to weaken the strong tribal elites.

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Mainly failures came from these tactics though they aimed to gain support from

the poorer populations in doing these land redistributions. Not only was this poorly

executed but it failed to gain any popular support. Also, the heavy reliance on soviet

support left them vulnerable went soviet support was withdrawn.

4.d. External Factors.

External Influence on the Afghan Government

The main external influence that affected the Afghan government was the

Soviets. They not only provided military aid but also economic aid and policy direction

with their new socialist views. The Soviets viewed Afghanistan as a good area to spread

its sphere of influence but also a buffer zone between themselves and the West during

the Cold War times. This was ultimately a failure as the Afghan population viewed their

influence as an attack on their way of life and expelled them.

External Influence on the Mujahidin

One of the most crucial players in the influence of the Mujahidin was Pakistan for

sure. They were the ones to channel The U.S. and Saudi military and economic aid.

Pakistan along with the United States wanted to hinder the advancement of Soviet

influence. Their involvement was most definitely a defining mark on the effectiveness of

the resistance to repel the Soviets and The Soviet-backed Afghan government.

Pakistan allowing Mujahidin to maintain training camps, supplies, and cross-border

sanctuaries in its country was vital to its success in their guerilla-style tactics.

Section 5. RESOLUTION ANALYSIS (~1 page)

5.a. Conflict Resolution Summary.

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Starting in 1988, the Soviets started withdrawing their troops. By February 1989,

all the Soviet forces were gone, leaving the Afghan government without the external

support it was heavily dependent on. The government under Najibullah was unable to

maintain control over the still-supported Mujahidin. The Mujahidin started taking control

of vast areas and by 1992 they had control of Kabul. This led to the collapse of

Najibullah’s government and the Soviet influence within the country. The fall of the

government led to the institutionalization of Mujahidin. They established an interim

government known as the Afghan Interim Government (AIG).

5.b. Outcome for the (Soviet-backed Afghan Government).

After the withdrawal of the Soviets, President Najibullah and the PDPA party

struggled to maintain their power and control. As a last-ditch effort, Najibullah

implemented the National Reconciliation policy to bring some of the more moderate

factions of the Mujahidin into their standing government party. However, this failed with

them having no support anymore from the Soviets. In 1992 when the Mujahidin took

control of Kabul the government fell. Najibullah then went into hiding until 1996 when

the Taliban captured and executed him.

5.c. Conflict Impact on (Afghanistan).

The internal impact on Afghanistan was devastating to the population and

infrastructure of the country. Roughly 1 million Afghans were killed in the Soviet-Afghan

conflict, plus an additional 5 million refugees that were displaced or left the country

altogether. A lot of the rural infrastructure was destroyed, and villages were decimated.

Agriculture production took a huge hit as well with this being one of the targets that

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the Soviets focused on and with most of the farmers that had stopped working to join

the fighting.

Section 6. SUMMARY (~3-4 pages)

6.a. Analysis of Resistance Success or Failure.

The Mujahidin were ultimately successful in achieving their core objectives by

driving the Soviets from Afghanistan and overthrowing the Soviet-backed government.

6.b. Success of Conflict Parties in Addressing Core Issues and Mobilizing Key Target

Audiences. XXXXxxxx

6.c. Factors Most Impacting Outcome. XXXXxxxx

6.d. Losing Party Errors. XXXXxxxx

6.e. Three Observations for the PO Professional. XXXXxxxx.

References

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