Fani Willis Trump Case Filing
Fani Willis Trump Case Filing
Fani Willis Trump Case Filing
BROWN,
MARKLE and WATKINS, JJ.
BROWN, Judge.
Trump, Cathleen Latham, Rudolph Giuliani, Jeffrey Clark, and Harrison Floyd
their motion to dismiss the indictment and granting, in part, their motions to
disqualify the Atlanta Judicial Circuit District Attorney Fani Willis (“DA Willis”) and
her office. Collectively, the appellants assert numerous grounds to reverse the trial
court’s order, including that the trial court imposed an improper remedy after
resulting from “specific conduct, [impacting] more than a mere ‘nebulous’ public
the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court’s order in its totality, including the
imposition of an alternative remedy requiring that either DA Willis, along with the
whole of her office, step aside and refer the case to the Prosecuting Attorneys’
(“SADA Wade”) withdraw from the case. Importantly, the State has not filed a cross-
appeal asserting that the trial court’s finding of this appearance of impropriety should
be reversed. Accordingly, whether the evidence presented to the trial court adequately
supported, under the appropriate standard of review on appeal, its finding of the
2
existence of an appearance of impropriety is not before this Court. Instead, we must
determine whether the remedy fashioned by the trial court for this undisputed finding
appellants. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it was and therefore
reverse the trial court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to disqualify. We affirm,
Motion to Disqualify in Special Grand Jury Proceeding. On January 24, 2022, the
Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County impaneled a special grand jury,
at the request of DA Willis, “for the purpose of investigating the facts and
the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia[,]” including “the decision by the State
Willis served as the “legal advisor” to the special grand jury, which began receiving
evidence in June of 2022. Around the same time, DA Willis hosted and headlined a
fundraiser for an opposition candidate against Burt Jones in a lieutenant governor race.
After she later publicly identified Jones as a “target” of the grand jury’s investigation,
he and eleven other alternate electors sought to disqualify DA Willis and her office
3
based upon an actual conflict of interest. The superior court overseeing the special
grand jury proceeding disqualified DA Willis and her office from any further criminal
investigation or prosecution of Jones based upon “a plain — and actual and untenable
The superior court denied the motion to disqualify filed by the remaining alternate
electors because they failed to show an actual conflict of interest with DA Willis or any
member of her prosecution team. Its order did not explicitly address the appearance
of impropriety as a ground to disqualify. After the special grand jury issued its final
report recommending criminal charges against the appellants (and others), it was
4
Motion to Disqualify Following Indictment. On August 14, 2023, DA Willis
secured the RICO indictment against the appellants (and ten others). On January 8,
2024, Roman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and disqualify DA Willis, her
office, and SADA Wade from further prosecuting this case on alleged grounds of
between DA Willis and SADA Wade, along with an alleged personal financial interest
in the case. After DA Willis spoke publicly in a church service on Sunday, January 14,
2024, the other appellants also filed motions seeking dismissal and disqualification on
connection with the church speech and various other extrajudicial statements.
The Trial Court’s Order. On March 15, 2024, the trial court entered its order on
5
a half days of testimony, during which the Defendants were provided an
opportunity to subpoena and introduce whatever relevant and material
evidence they could muster,[1] the [c]ourt finds that the Defendants
failed to meet their burden of proving that the District Attorney acquired
an actual conflict of interest in this case through her personal
relationship and recurring travels with her lead prosecutor. The other
alleged grounds for disqualification, including forensic misconduct, are
also denied. However, the established record now highlights a significant
appearance of impropriety that infects the current structure of the
prosecution team — an appearance that must be removed through the
State’s selection of one of two options. . . . The District Attorney may
choose to step aside, along with the whole of her office, and refer the
prosecution to the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council for reassignment. See
OCGA § 15-18-5. Alternatively, SADA Wade can withdraw, allowing the
District Attorney, the Defendants, and the public to move forward
without his presence or remuneration distracting from and potentially
compromising the merits of the case.
(Citation omitted.) The trial court made the following findings of fact in its order:
1
The transcript reveals that the trial court precluded cross-examination of DA
Willis about matters related to forensic misconduct, as well as county codes and
ordinances. It appears that the trial court limited the evidence in the hearing to “the
relationship and/or any financial elements of it” in an off-the-record ruling referenced
in the transcript. The record before us contains no authenticated recording or
transcript of the church speech, and it was never introduced into evidence at the
hearing. The appellants do not assert on appeal that the trial court erred by limiting
their cross-examination and introduction of evidence in the hearing.
6
On November 1, 2021, the District Attorney hired Nathan Wade
to serve as a SADA and lead the investigation that produced the
indictment in this case. The District Attorney considered at least one
other option before hiring Wade, extending an offer to former Governor
Roy Barnes, who declined. The contract allowed a $250 hourly rate —
a relatively low amount by metro Atlanta standards for an attorney with
Wade’s years of service — and contained a ceiling on the maximum
number of hours permitted. Under the terms of the first contract, Wade
was not to perform more than 60 hours of work per month without
written permission. No evidence introduced indicates that Wade ever
received permission to exceed these monthly hourly caps. His contract
was renewed on November 15, 2022, and again on June 12, 2023.
Between October 2022 and May 2023, the District Attorney and
Wade traveled together on four occasions that resulted in documentable
expenses. The first included an extended trip in October 2022 to Miami
and Aruba and a cruise. Wade initially covered expenses for the October
2022 trip totaling approximately $5,223. In December 2022, the two flew
to Miami for another cruise for which the District Attorney paid $1,394
for plane tickets, while Wade purchased passage for the cruise along with
other vacation-related expenses totaling approximately $3,684. In March
2023, the two traveled to Belize, where Wade covered resort and
restaurant expenses in the amount of approximately $3,000. In May
2023, they traveled to Napa Valley, where Wade covered airfare,
lodging, and Uber rides in the amount of around $2,829. In addition, the
two described taking a number of day-long road trips to Tennessee,
7
Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, and other parts of Georgia.
They also admitted to dining out on multiple occasions and taking turns
covering the bill. With seemingly full access to Wade’s primary credit
card statements, the Defendants did not produce evidence of any further
documentable expenses or gifts, nor were any revealed through the
testimony. In total, Defendants point to an aggregate documented benefit
of, at most, approximately $12,000 to $15,000 in the District Attorney’s
favor.
8
However, as the District Attorney herself acknowledged, no ledger
exists. Other than a “best guesstimate,” there is no way to be certain that
expenses were split completely evenly — and the District Attorney may
well have received a net benefit of several hundred dollars. Despite this,
after considering all the surrounding circumstances, the [c]ourt finds
that the evidence did not establish the District Attorney’s receipt of a
material financial benefit as a result of her decision to hire and engage in
a romantic relationship with Wade. Simply put, the Defendants have not
presented sufficient evidence indicating that the expenses were not
“roughly divided evenly,” or that the District Attorney was, or currently
remains, “greatly and pecuniarily interested” in this prosecution.
9
Defendants argue that the financial arrangement created an
incentive to prolong the case, but in fact, there is no indication the
District Attorney is interested in delaying anything. Indeed, the record
is quite to the contrary. Before the relationship came to light, the State
requested that trial begin less than six months after indictment. Soon
thereafter, the State opposed severance of the objecting defendants who
did not demand their statutory right to a speedy trial. The State argued
that it only wanted to try the case once (assuming that such a trial would
have been affirmed after any necessary post-conviction appeals). The
State amended its proposed timeline in November 2023 to request that
the trial commence less than one year after the return of the indictment.
And even before indictment, the District Attorney approved a Grand
Jury presentment that included fewer defendants than the Special
Purpose Grand Jury recommended. In sum, the District Attorney has not
in any way acted in conformance with the theory that she arranged a
financial scheme to enrich herself (or endear herself to Wade) by
extending the duration of this prosecution or engaging in excessive
litigation.
10
permit the finding of an actual conflict for simply making bad choices —
even repeatedly — and it is the trial court’s duty to confine itself to the
relevant issues and applicable law properly brought before it.
(Citations omitted.) Although the trial court found “insufficient evidence of an actual
the record made at the evidentiary hearing established that the District
Attorney’s prosecution is encumbered by an appearance of impropriety.
This appearance is not created by mere status alone, but comes because
of specific conduct, and impacts more than a mere “nebulous” public
interest because it concerns a public prosecutor. Even if the romantic
relationship began after SADA Wade’s initial contract in November
2021, the District Attorney chose to continue supervising and paying
Wade while maintaining such a relationship. She further allowed the
regular and loose exchange of money between them without any exact or
verifiable measure of reconciliation. This lack of a confirmed financial
split creates the possibility and appearance that the District Attorney
benefitted — albeit non-materially — from a contract whose award lay
solely within her purview and policing.
11
submitted in his pending divorce indicates a willingness on his part to
wrongly conceal his relationship with the District Attorney. As the case
moves forward, reasonable members of the public could easily be left to
wonder whether the financial exchanges have continued resulting in
some form of benefit to the District Attorney, or even whether the
romantic relationship has resumed.[2] Put differently, an outsider could
reasonably think that the District Attorney is not exercising her
independent professional judgment totally free of any compromising
influences. As long as Wade remains on the case, this unnecessary
perception will persist.
2
DA Willis and SADA Wade testified that their personal relationship ended
sometime in the summer of 2023.
12
testimony of Robin Yearti raised doubts about the State’s assertions, it
ultimately lacked context and detail. Even after considering the proffered
cell phone testimony from Defendant Trump, along with the entirety of
the other evidence, neither side was able to conclusively establish by a
preponderance of the evidence when the relationship evolved into a
romantic one.
3
Mendacity means “untruthfulness” or “tendency to lie.” See Webster’s
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language.
13
involved prejudiced the Defendants in any way. Nor is disqualification
of a constitutional officer necessary when a less drastic and sufficiently
remedial option is available[, i.e., the District Attorney’s selection of
whether Wade would withdraw or she would refer the case to the
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council for reassignment].
1. The appellants contend that the trial court’s failure to disqualify DA Willis
and her office was erroneous in light of the trial court’s finding that the record
impropriety.” In the appellants’ view, the trial court’s forward-looking remedy did
not cure the already existing appearance of impropriety and the “odor of mendacity”
found by the trial court. Based upon the fact findings of the trial court in its order and
fashioned by the trial court, we turn to Georgia law on this issue. While the parties
disqualification should always result when the elected district attorney engages in
14
activities that raise the appearance of impropriety — Georgia law requires neither as
a matter of course. Instead, we must examine the particular facts and circumstances
of each case while keeping some general principles in mind. First, the trial court’s
State, 311 Ga. 83, 88 (3) (856 SE2d 289) (2021). Second, the issue of attorney
15
Id. at 409-410. See also Battle v. State, 301 Ga. 694, 698 (3) (804 SE2d 46) (2017)
prosecutor) .
In our criminal justice system, the district attorney represents the people
of the state in prosecuting individuals who have been charged with
violating our state’s criminal laws. The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; [her] duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because the
prosecutor represents the sovereign and should exercise restraint in the
discretionary exercise of governmental powers. Therefore, the district
attorney is more than an advocate for one party and has additional
professional responsibilities as a public prosecutor to make decisions in
the public’s interest. In the district attorney’s role as an administrator of
justice, he or she has broad discretion in making decisions prior to trial
about who to prosecute, what charges to bring, and which sentence to
seek.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wooten, 273 Ga. 529, 531 (2) (543 SE2d
721) (2001). These considerations take this case out of the continuum of cases
16
counsel and a client’s interest in counsel of choice balanced against a more nebulous
public interest.
After carefully considering the trial court’s findings in its order, we conclude
that it erred by failing to disqualify DA Willis and her office. The remedy crafted by
the trial court to prevent an ongoing appearance of impropriety did nothing to address
the appearance of impropriety that existed at times when DA Willis was exercising her
broad pretrial discretion about who to prosecute and what charges to bring. While we
disqualification, this is the rare case in which disqualification is mandated and no other
remedy will suffice to restore public confidence in the integrity of these proceedings.4
4
Our opinions in Head v. State, 253 Ga. App. 757 (560 SE2d 536) (2002),
Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125 (441 SE2d 262) (1994), and Whitworth v. State, 275
Ga. App. 790 (622 SE2d 21) (2005), are distinguishable. In Head, we addressed an
appearance of impropriety based upon status alone where the investigator with the
alleged status conflict took no part in the investigation or prosecution of the case. 253
Ga. App. at 758 (2). Similarly, in Billings, the assistant district attorney with the
appearance of impropriety did not participate directly or indirectly in the prosecution
of the case after joining the office of the district attorney. 212 Ga. App. at 365-266 (4).
Here, on the other hand, DA Willis and SADA Wade have been actively involved in
this case from its inception. Division 1 of our opinion in Whitworth is non-binding
physical precedent, and the case addressed only the disqualification of a special
assistant district attorney. 275 Ga. App. at 791-797 (1). Likewise, the Supreme Court
of Georgia’s opinion in Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690 (362 SE2d 351) (1987), relied
upon by the trial court, is factually distinguishable and does not require a different
17
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to disqualify
DA Willis and her office. As we conclude that the elected district attorney is wholly
disqualified from this case, “the assistant district attorneys — whose only power to
prosecute a case is derived from the constitutional authority of the district attorney
609, 613 (761 SE2d 289) (2014) (distinguishing between absolute disqualification of
elected district attorney and disqualification of elected district attorney from serving
2. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to
dismiss the indictment. The State responds that the appellants have failed to show
that the trial court erred in finding that the appellants had not shown “that [their] due
process rights have been violated or that the issues involved prejudiced [them] in any
way.”
. . . for unlawful government conduct.” State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892, 896 (2) (770
result. The issue before the Supreme Court was the disqualification of the entire
district attorney’s office based upon an assistant district attorney’s conflict of interest
rather than the conduct of the elected district attorney. Id. at 693-694 (9).
18
SE2d 629) (2015). In the absence of express statutory authorization, dismissal of an
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. While this is the rare case in which DA Willis
cannot conclude that the record also supports the imposition of the extreme sanction
of dismissal of the indictment under the appropriate standard. See Olsen v. State, 302
Ga. 288, 293-294 (2) (806 SE2d 556) (2017); Lamb v. State, 267 Ga. 464, 465-466 (5)
(479 SE2d 719) (1997). We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellants’
motion to dismiss.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Markle, J., concurs. Land, J.,
dissents.
19
A24A1595. ROMAN v. THE STATE; and associated cases.
Because the law does not support the result reached by the majority, I
respectfully dissent. I am particularly troubled by the fact that the majority has taken
what has long been a discretionary decision for the trial court to make and converted
it to something else entirely. If this Court was the trier of fact and had the discretion
to choose a remedy based on our own observations, assessment of the credibility of the
reaching the result declared by the majority. But we are not trial judges, and we lack
that authority. Given the unique role of the trial court and the fact that it is the court
which has broad discretion to impose a remedy that fits the situation as it finds it to
be, we should resist the temptation to interfere with that discretion, including its
chosen remedy, just because we happen to see things differently. Doing otherwise
violates well-established precedent, threatens the discretion given to trial courts, and
restraint. We are here to ensure the law has been applied correctly and to correct
harmful legal errors when we see them. It is not our job to second-guess trial judges
or to substitute our judgment for theirs. We do not find the facts but instead defer to
the trial court’s factual findings where there is any evidence to support them. “We
review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify a prosecutor for abuse of
discretion. Such an exercise of discretion is based on the trial court’s findings of fact
which we must sustain if there is any evidence to support them.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 88 (3) (856 SE2d 289) (2021).
Here, the trial court expressly found that appellants failed to show that the
district attorney had an actual conflict of interest, failed to show that she received any
material financial benefit as a result of her relationship with Nathan Wade, failed to
show that she had a personal stake in the conviction of any defendant, failed to show
that her relationship with Wade involved any actual impropriety on her part, and
failed to show that their relationship, including their financial arrangements, had any
actual impact on the case. Because there was some evidence presented to the trial
2
court that supported these findings, we are bound to accept them. Neuman, 311 Ga.
at 88 (3). The majority does not dispute these findings. Rather, it holds, with the
citation of no supporting authority and apparently for the first time in the history of
our state, that the mere existence of an appearance of impropriety, in and of itself, is
sufficient to reverse the trial court’s refusal to disqualify the district attorney and her
entire office. As shown below, the law does not support this outcome; rather, it
Where, as here, a prosecutor has no actual conflict of interest and the trial
court, based on the evidence presented to it, rejects the allegations of actual
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis require our restraint and do not permit us
to impose a different remedy than the one chosen by the trial court simply because we
might see the matter differently and might have chosen to impose another remedy had
For at least the last 43 years, our appellate courts have held that an appearance
no basis for the reversal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify. This is true
3
in civil cases and criminal cases, and it applies to prosecutors. Our Supreme Court
first addressed this issue in 1981 after a trial court disqualified an attorney based on an
appearance of impropriety arising from the fact that counsel for a caveator was
Concluding that counsel should not be disqualified under these circumstances, the
Supreme Court declared that “[a]lthough the issue has never been squarely addressed
the actual trial of the case will be tainted.” Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406, 407-
408 (276 SE2d 607) (1981). Accepting the trial court’s finding that there was no actual
impropriety but rather just an appearance of such, the Supreme Court held that
Appellees have not shown us a case where a per se rule was applied to
disqualify an attorney on the basis of an appearance of impropriety alone.
The Georgia cases cited by appellee do not stand for the proposition that
a trial judge is authorized in Georgia to disqualify an attorney solely on
the basis of an appearance of impropriety. . . . It is perhaps helpful to
view the issue of attorney disqualification as a continuum. At one end of
the scale where disqualification is always justified and indeed mandated,
even when balanced against a client’s right to an attorney of choice, is
4
the appearance of impropriety coupled with a conflict of interest or
jeopardy to a client’s confidences. In these instances, it is clear that the
disqualification is necessary for the protection of the client. Somewhere
in the middle of the continuum is the appearance of impropriety based
on conduct on the part of the attorney. As discussed above, this generally
has been found insufficient to outweigh the client’s interest in counsel
of choice. This is probably so because absent danger to the client, the
nebulous interest of the public at large in the propriety of the Bar is not
weighty enough to justify disqualification. Finally, at the opposite end of
the continuum is the appearance of impropriety based not on conduct
but on status alone. This is an insufficient ground for disqualification.
This is particularly clear in this case in light of the trial court’s specific
finding that there was no actual impropriety on the part of any of the
parties.
Id. at 409.1
1
The trial court in Blumenfeld granted the motion to disqualify on the basis of
Canon 9 of the then existing Code of Professional Responsibility, which provided:
“A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” Id. at 407.
Notably, the Supreme Court revised Georgia’s Rules of Professional Conduct,
effective January 1, 2001, and among other changes removed Canon 9 and any
mention of “appearance of impropriety” outside of the context of lawyers’ direct
dealings with a tribunal. See current Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5, comment 2
(imposing an “appearance” standard on lawyers whose conduct could be seen as
“tampering with judicial impartiality”); compare Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.2,
comment 2 (“Judges must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety”)
(emphasis supplied). The fact that the rules have changed since Blumenfeld gives us
even more reason to defer to the trial court’s refusal to disqualify the district attorney
here. See Herrmann v. GutterGuard, Inc., 199 Fed. Appx. 745, 755 (IV) (11th Cir.
5
In one of Georgia’s leading criminal cases dealing with the disqualification of
prosecutors, Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305 (369 SE2d 232) (1988), there is no
is premised on actual conflicts of interest (found not to exist here) and actual
2006) (“the [district] court properly applied the conflict of interest standard [Georgia
Code of Professional Responsibility 1.9(b)] and did not apply the outdated
appearance of impropriety standard [former Georgia Canon 9]”). As a leading scholar
on disqualification has noted in describing this movement away from an appearance
of impropriety standard, “prosecutors cannot realistically be expected to comply with
the standards of impartiality required of judges”; in many states, “prosecutorial
disqualification is deemed to be appropriate only when the remedy is needed to
prevent the accused from suffering prejudice.” Richard Flamm, Lawyer
Disqualification (2014 ed.), § 31.3, p. 816.
6
Id. at 314 (2) (B), citing “The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in
the Prosecution of a Criminal Case,” 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946 (1954). Here, there is no
contention that the district attorney previously represented or consulted with any of
the defendants, and there has been no showing that she has a personal interest or stake
in any conviction. These facts support the trial court’s conclusion that she has no
In 2005, this court was faced with an appeal from a conviction where the
explicitly rejected the argument that “the appearance of impropriety alone is sufficient
to require a reversal” and labeled that argument “irrelevant to the case” given the fact
Whitworth v. State, 275 Ga. App. 790, 794 (1) (c) (622 SE2d 21) (2005). Elaborating
on this point, this court stated that “no actual conflict of interest was shown. As
previously noted, a prosecutor, who is not a judicial officer, is not held to as high a
7
has repeatedly held that an ‘actual conflict of interest’ is required to warrant reversal
In Kamara v. Henson, 340 Ga. App. 111 (796 SE2d 496) (2017), disapproved on
other grounds, Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 310 Ga. 289 (849 SE2d 465) (2020), this
Court was presented with the issue under consideration here – specifically, whether
of impropriety should be overturned. Our holding could not have been clearer: “We
affirm the trial court’s denial of Kamara’s motion to disqualify [d]efense [c]ounsel .
. . because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in the absence of
an actual conflict of interest or actual impropriety.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 111. Citing
Blumenfeld, we elaborated:
2
This court’s opinion in Whitworth is physical precedent only because Judge
Adams did not fully concur with all of the reasoning contained in the majority opinion.
However, with respect to the issue discussed above, Judge Adams did fully concur
with the other two judges. Writing separately, he stated that while he could not agree
with all that was stated by the majority, he did agree with the result because there had
been no adequate showing that the special prosecutor had an actual conflict of interest.
Id. at 801-802. On this point, then, it appears that all three judges were in agreement.
8
409-410 (276 SE2d 607) (1981) (mere appearance of impropriety is an
insufficient ground for disqualification). Consequently, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment in this regard. In sum, we affirm the denial of
Kamara’s motion to disqualify [d]efense [c]ounsel, because there is no
actual conflict of interest or actual impropriety.
In Ga. Trails & Rentals, Inc. v. Rogers, 359 Ga. App. 207 (855 SE2d 103) (2021),
we once again affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify counsel where
Finally, our Supreme Court reiterated these principles less than a year ago in
conflict of interest. In Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412 (897 SE2d 856) (2024), the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of the motion to disqualify, succinctly declaring that “the
9
trial court did not abuse its discretion . . . by failing to disqualify the Assistant District
The majority opinion in this case cannot be reconciled with any of these cases,
but we are bound to follow them. “Stare decisis is the preferred course because it
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (111 S.Ct.
3
Lee is notable because it involved a motion to disqualify a prosecutor. Thus,
any suggestion that Blumenfeld and its progeny do not apply to prosecutors is
dispelled completely by Lee. Further, all of these cases are consistent with the often
repeated principle that disqualification of counsel is an extraordinary remedy that
should be granted sparingly. Hodge v. URFA-Sexton, LP, 295 Ga. 136, 139 (1) (758
SE2d 314) (2014); Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460, 462 (2) (614 SE2d 775)
(2005); Blumenfeld, 247 Ga. at 408-409. This principle is just as true for prosecutors,
including an elected district attorney, as it is for private attorneys, and there is no
good reason not to apply it here. “The elected district attorney is not merely any
prosecuting attorney. [Sh]e is a constitutional officer, and there is only one such
officer in each judicial circuit.” McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609, 612 (761 SE2d
289) (2014), citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I (a). The district
attorney was elected by the voters of her circuit. We should tread lightly when asked
to deprive the electorate of the attorney they chose to perform this job, especially
where there has been no finding of an actual conflict of interest or actual impropriety.
See, e. g., State v. Giese, 386 N. C. 127, 137 (V) (900 SE2d 881) (2024)
(disqualification of elected district attorney interferes with her performance of
constitutionally mandated duty and cannot stand in the absence of “an actual conflict
of interest or legitimate due process concerns”).
10
2597, 114 LEd2d 720) (1991). If we are not going to follow binding precedent and have
no good reason to overrule it, all of these virtues of stare decisis are threatened.
In this case, the trial court expressly found that the district attorney had no
conflict of interest and rejected the allegations of actual impropriety arising from her
relationship with Nathan Wade. It rejected the notion that she received any material
financial benefit from her hiring of Wade, that she hired him as part of a scheme to
enrich herself, or that their financial arrangements had any impact on this case. It was
certainly critical of her choices and chastised her for making them. I take no issue with
that criticism, and if the trial court had chosen, in its discretion, to disqualify her and
her office, this would be a different case. But that is not the remedy the trial court
chose, and I believe our case law prohibits us from rejecting that remedy just because
we don’t like it or just because we might have gone further had we been the trial judge.
See State v. Evans, 187 Ga. App. 649, 651 (3) (371 SE2d 432) (1988)(decision to
the trial court and the appellate courts will not interfere where, as here, the court’s
discretion was not abused”), overruled on other grounds, State v. Smith, 268 Ga. 75,
n.7 (485 SE2d 491) (1997); First Key Homes of Ga., LLC v. Robinson, 365 Ga. App. 882,
882 (880 SE2d 371) (2022) (“The ultimate determination of whether an attorney
11
should be disqualified from representing a client in a judicial proceeding rests in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Bowers v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 369 Ga. App. 875, 883-884 (b) (894 SE2d 690) (2023) (“review
conclusions the trial judge may reach and we will affirm a trial court’s decision even
though we would have gone the other way had it been our call”) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also, United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (III) (3rd
Cir. 1980) (abuse of discretion standard applies to trial court’s chosen remedy on
motion to disqualify; trial court “has a wide discretion in framing its sanctions to be
just and fair to all parties involved”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Every day in courtrooms all over this state, trial judges solemnly and diligently
fulfill their constitutional obligations and perform a vital and indispensable public
service when they convene hearings, listen to testimony, observe witnesses, make
credibility determinations, resolve conflicts in the evidence, weigh the evidence, and
exercise their discretion in countless ways. We should not lightly interfere with their
work or weaken their discretion by imposing our will because we don’t like the result.
Because I am convinced that is what the majority has done in this case, I respectfully
dissent.
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