Cohen, Bernard - Koyré - Comemoration
Cohen, Bernard - Koyré - Comemoration
Cohen, Bernard - Koyré - Comemoration
Koyre
(1892-1964)
COMMEMORATION
By I. Bernard Cohen
Whoever examines the growth of the history of science during the past
three decades will discern at once the magistral influence of Alexandre
Koyre'
The history of science is not a wholly new discipline. In the eighteenth
century its devotees included suchi masters as Joseph Priestley and J.-B.
Delambre; in the nineteenth century, inter alia, William Whewell, Ferdinand Rosenberger, Moritz Cantor; followed in the twentieth century by
Pierre Duhem, Paul Tannery, Aldo Mieli, George Sarton, Lynn Thorndike,
P. V. Zoubov, 0. Neugebauer, and many others. Nevertheless., the subject
* Harvard University.
This article is based upon a lecture given iii
French at the inaugural session of the Symposium on Galileo held in Florence and Pisa
in September 1964. The original French text
Isis. 1966.
VOL.
157
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158
I. BERNARD COHEN
created by these scholars was radically altered about thirty years ago. To
see this change it is only necessary to leaf through the pages, then and now,
of any of the journals in our field: Isis, Archeion (now the Archives), Janus,
Lychnos, and the rest. A new emphasis is discernible today that was largely
absent some twenty or thirty years ago: a stress upon scientific ideas, understood in their own terms and in relation to the living background in which
they were imbedded - in short, the method of conceptual analysis, based
on the model set before us by Alexandre Koyre'.
The first glimpses of Koyre's method applied to subjects drawn from the
history of science (rather than philosophy) were afforded in a penetrating
analysis of " Galilee et l'experience de Pise" in 1937,2 followed in rapid
succession by " Galilee et Descartes" and Trois lecons sur Descartes as
preludes to the tripartite Etudes Galil-eennes, published in 1939, a work
which more than any other has been responsible for the new history of
science.3 By this time Koyre's name was well known for a variety of books
and articles in French and in German, beginning with his first publication
in 1912, " Sur les nombres de M. B. Russell," and including studies on
Greek philosophy, the development of philosophical concepts (as in his
analysis of L'idee de Dieu . . . chez Descartes and L'idee de Dieu dans la
philosophie de S. Anselme), and works on Russian philosophy (including a
study of La philosophie et le mouvement national en Russie au debut du
XlXe siecle). There was also a brilliant series of articles on Hegel (now
happily reunited in a single book) and a pioneering set of analyses of
German mystics (Jacob Boehme, Valentin Weigel, Sebastien Frank, Caspar
Schwenkfeld, and also Paracelsus), these too now brought together in book
form. There were also editions and translations of classics, including the
Fides quaerens intellectum of St. Anselm, the De intellectus emendatione of
Spinoza, and the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium of Copernicus.
L ooking back from today's vantage point, it is easy to see the direction
his work was taking: from St. Anselm and medieval philosophy to Paracelsus
and the sixteenth-century mystics, and then on to Copernicus, Descartes,
Galileo, and eventually Newton.
Each great scholar has certain special gifts, certain endowments of nature,
which help us to define his particular genius. In the case of Alexandre
Koyre, we would first of all note a fluency in classical Greek and in classical
I do not wish to imply that Alexandre
Koyre was the fons et origo of the method of
conceptual analysis in the history of science:
certainly his predecessors include such thinkers
as Leon Brunschvicg, Emile Meyerson, Ernst
Cassirer, and others. But Koyre applied himself to problems in the history of science in a
way and to a degree that these men did not,
and he not only became the chief exponent of
the new method, but by actual examples
showed us its power.
1
2 There
were earlier publications on Paracelsus (1933) and Copernicus (1933, 1934), but
they did not have the impact of the studies on
Galileo; in retrospect they may be seen to have
been earnests of the great work to come.
3 I do not include bibliographical references
since a bibliography of Alexandre Koyr6's publications may be found in Me'langes Alexandre
Koyre'. Vol. 1: L'aventure de la science. Vol.
2: L'aventure de l'esprit. Edited and introduced by I. Bernard Cohen and Ren6 Taton
(Paris: Hermann, 1964).
159
and medieval Latin, dating back to his youth in the lycees of Tiflis and of
Rostoff-on-the-Don in Imperial Russia. He knew modern languages,, of
course, and had an easy familiarity in reading, writing, and speaking English,
Italian, German, Russian, and French. He had pursued higher studies in
mathematics and physics at the University of Gottingen and had studied
philosophy at Gottingen and at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne) and at the College de France.4
Eventually Professor Koyre became " Directeur d'Etudes " of the fifth
section of the Lcole Pratique des Hautes 1tudes and a " staff member" of
the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton). He was a " Visiting Professor " at the universities of Cairo, Chicago, Johns Hopkins, and Wisconsin,
and lectured at many universities in Europe and in America (including
Harvard, Yale, Buffalo, and Brandeis). Those who heard him lecture and
reply to the questions of his audience were at once aware of his massive
erudition, his ability to cite texts from memory in the original ancient and
modern languages, his vast knowledge of scientific and philosophic ideas
from all periods, his ability to see antecedents and consequents of theories.
A particular gift was the ability to call at will upon this vast store of information and to use it to show how a given topic was related at once to the main
streams of ideas and to the little-known directions of thought. He taught
us that to understand giants like Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton,
we must also study carefully their lesser contemporaries: Hooke, Barrow,
Roberval, Wallis, Hobbes, Seth Ward, Cavalieri, Riccioli, Gassendi, and
even Bonamico.
Well versed in the history of philosophy, Koyre was able to show us that
the central concepts of philosophy at any given time may be a determining
element of the nature of the scientific thought of that age, and vice versa.
Some examples are the effect of the geometrization of space in the Renaissance, the concept of an infinite universe, matter and spirit. To see Professor Koyre's method in action, we may turn to his own statement concerning his Ltudes Galile'ennes:
J'ai essayed'analyser,dans ce dernier ouvrage, la revolution scientifiquedu
XVIIesiMle, 'a la fois source et resultat d'une profonde transformation spiritKoyr6 described his early career as follows:
Ne le 29 aolkt 1892 a Taganrog (Russie). Etudes secondaires aux lycees de Tiflis et de
Rostoff-sur-Don. - Etudes de mathematiques
et de philosophie aux Universit6s de Goettingue et de Paris, 'a l'Ecole Pratique des
Hautes-Etudes et au College de France
1908-1914.
Guerre 1914-1918: Engage volontaire pour
la duree de la guerre.
Etudes a l'Universite de Paris, 'a l'Ecole
Pratique des Hautes-Etudes, au College de
France: 1919-1922.
Diplome d'etudes sup6rieures de philosophie, 1913. - Diplome de l'Ecole Pratique
des Hautes Etudes, Ve Section, 1922 (No 3
de la bibliographie). - Docteur de l'Univer-
160
I. BERNARD COHEN
uelle qui a bouleverse non seulement le contenu, mais les cadres memes de
notre pens6e: la substitution d'un univers infini et homogene au cosmos fini
et hierarchiquement ordonn6 de la pensee antique et medievale, implique
et n6cessite la refonte des principes premiers de la raison philosophique et
scientifique, la refonte aussi de notions fondamentales, celles du mouvement,
de l'espace, du savoir et de l'etre. C'est pourquoi la decouverte de lois tres
simples, telle la loi de la chute des corps, a cou1te"ade trEs grands genies de
si longs efforts qui n'ont pas toujours e't couronnes de succ6s. Ainsi, la
notion d'inertie, aussi manifestement absurde pour F'antiquit6 et la moyen
age qu'elle nous paralt plausible, voire 6vidente, aujourd'hui, n'a pu etre
d6gag6e dans toute sa rigueur meme par la pens6e d'un Galike et ne I'a ete
que par Descartes.
Professor Koyre stated his creed as follows:
L'influence de la pens6e scientifique et de la vision du monde qu'elle determine n'est pas seulement pr6sente dans les systeme - tels ceux de Descartes
et Leibniz -. . . mais aussi dans les doctrines - telles les doctrines mystiques
- apparemment 6trangeres 'a toute pr6occupation de ce genre. La pens6e,
lorsqu'elle se formule en systime, implique une image, ou mieux, une conception du monde et se situe par rapport 'a elle: la mystique de Boehme est
[donc] rigoureusement incomprehensible sans reference 'a la nouvelle cosmologie cr6e par Copernic.5
In these words we can see how his philosophical studies illuminated his
work in scientific thought. In short, " L'evolution de la pensee scientifique
... ne formait pas . . . une serie independante, mais etait, au contraire, tres
etroitement liee 'a celle des idees transscientifiques, philosophiques, metaphysiques, religieuses."
The studies on which Alexandre Koyre' was engaged during the past
twenty years deal with the central problems of the Scientific Revolution of
the seventeenth century, linked to names such as Galileo, Kepler, Descartes,
Hooke, Borelli, Newton. He once described his endeavor as a look at the
transition of le monde de l'a peu pres to l'univers de la pre'cision. This
transition he found characterized by the elaboration of the concept (and
the ancillary techniques) of exact measurement, the creation of scientific
instruments which made possible the transition from qualitative experience
to the quantitative experiment of classical modern science, and, finally, the
beginnings of the infinitesimal calculus.
The historical method of Alexandre Koyre had as one of its distinguishing
features a sympathetic approach to the subject under discussion. While of
course he recognized orders of genius and of importance, he avoided the
posture of the schoolmaster (so prevalent among historians of science), who
gives grades to the scientists of the past: assigning to this one a " pass " and
5 This and the following French extracts are
quoted from Koyre's statement of " Orientation des recherches et projets d'enseignement "
in the pamphlet
supra.
mentioned
in footnote
161
to that one a " fail " and occasionally finding a subject worthy of an
" honor " grade. Professor Koyr6 always attempted to find what the basis
might possibly be of the particular argument, theory, or set of concepts
which he encountered. He rejected the kind of history in which a modern
scholar remarks that this was correct and that was wrong judging each
statement, not in the context of the time in which it was composed, but
rather grading it from the viewpoint of our own presently accepted theories
and collections of facts. Such historians, according to Koyre, were not
engaged in conceptual analysis; they were not attempting to understand
what the men of science of the past were thinking and even accomplishing
with the mathematical, theoretical, and experimental tools then available.
Professor Koyre was interested - first and foremost - to find out the degree
to which men of science of the past may have been " right " in the terms of
their own times, not ours.
In his method of procedure Koyre did not confine himself to what
may be correct or faulty by the standards of today. He was more concerned to discover whether the statements in question did or did not
follow from either the explicit or implicit assumptions of the author or the
general presuppositions of the age in which that author lived. In many
cases it was necessary to study hard and deep to discover such preconceptions.
Readers of Koyre's writing are familiar with his oft-repeated comment after
such an analysis: And he was right! Such conceptual analysis applied to the
secondary men of the seventeenth century revealed the biases and presuppositions that had up till then remained hidden behind the otherwise inscrutable pages of a Newton or even a Descartes.
This method was thus premised on the thesis: " I1 est essentiel de replacer
les ceuvres etudiees dans leur milieu intellectuel et spirituel, de les interpreter en fonction des habitudes mentales, des preferences et des aversions
de leurs auteurs." Koyre warned us constantly:
R6sister a la tentation, 'a laquelle succombent trop d'histoiriens des sciences,
de rendre plus accessible la pensee souvent obscure, malhabile et meme confuse des anciens, en la traduisant en un langage moderne qui la clarifie mais
en meme temps la deforme: rien, au contraire, n'est plus instructif que
l'etude des demonstrations d'un meme th6oreme donn6es par Archimede et
Cavalieri, Roberval et Barrow.
In the studies of Newton's Principia which occupied the last years of his
life, Alexandre Koyre constantly sought illumination and clarification in
Mme du Chatellet's French translation, and to some degree in Andrew
Motte's contemporaneous English version. Motte and Mme du Chatellet
preserved some of Newton's original ambiguity, where we today would
restrict him to the narrow confines of our own current technical expressions.
Professor Koyr6 was himself a skillful translator - and he rendered into
French great sections of the writings of Galileo and Kepler, as well as whole
books by St. Anselm, Spinoza, and Copernicus - yet he was always sensitive
to the needs of comprehending a text in its own terms and he liked to quote
162
I. BERNARD COHEN
the old saying, traduttore-traditore, which once he even used as the title of
an article dealing with errors in translation 'apropos Copernicus and Galileo.
In 1957, I had the signal good fortune to become associated with Professor
Koyre in the preparation of a critical edition of Newton's Principia and such
ancillary studies as might arise from our investigations. We had already
begun to discuss the possibility of such an edition at the time of the VlIIth
International Congress of the History of Science held at Florence-Pisa and
Milan in 1956. Thereafter, until Professor Koyre's illness in the fall of
1962, we met for periods of three or four days each month in America in Princeton or Cambridge, and sometimiiesin New York; in Paris each
summer; in Cambridge (England), in London, and in Spain during a trip
we took following the IXth International Congress. I undertook the chief
responsibility for the immediate supervision and preparation of the critical
(" variorum ") text, based on a verbatim et litteratim collation of the three
printed editions, the original manuscript, and two annotated copies of the
first and of the second editions from Newton's own library. Needless to
say, every stage of the preparation of the Latin text was closely scrutinized
by him and we spent many, many long hours over the problem of how best
to make the results of the collation available in the final printed version.
Professor Koyre meanwhile undertook important studies of Kepler and
Borelli, necessary for our understanding of Newton's astronomy and physics;
of Cavalieri, whose method of " indivisibles" forms the basis of Newton's
own " method of first and last ratios "; and kindred topics. We were fortunate enough to be able to obtain photocopies of many of Newton's manuscripts,6and we analyzed these in our monthly meetings, attempting to find
what light they might throw on the source and development of Newton's
ideas, and to discover what relation they might bear to the variae lectiones
of the critical edition of the Principia we were preparing. One after another,
brilliant Newtonian studies were produced by Professor Koyre, and the
series is now united in book form.7 In one of these essays,based on a hitherto
unpublished lecture given at Harvard, he examined certain keys to the
dependence of Newton's science on Descartes' philosophy. In particular, he
called attention to Newton's use of the word status in his statement of the
prima lex motus, all bodies conserving their status (either a status of rest,
or a status of motion in a straight line at constant speed) unless acted upon
by an external force. It is owing to this very concept of status that Newton
was able to conceive a dynamic equivalence of motion - at least, uniform
rectilinear motion - and rest. Motion and rest are quite different - both in
an absolute sense and in terms of a given inertial frame of reference - but
6 In this work we were generously supported
by an initial grant from the American Philosophical Society, augmented by a considerable
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Subsequently the research in connection with the
Principia was generously supported by the National Science Foundation.
7 Newtonian
Studies (Cambridge: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1965; London: Chapman & Hall,
1965). A volume of essays on the science of
the seventeenth century is scheduled to appear
shortly under the title Metaphysics and Measurement in Seventeenth-Century Science.
163
164
I. BERNARD COHEN
Alas, Koyre did not live to add his contribution to either of these planned studies.
165
COMMEMORATION
By Marshall Clagett
The succeeding remarks constitute hardly more than a footnote to Professor Cohen's fine account of the content and influence of the work of our
late and beloved friend, Alexandre Koyre. Cohen has rightfully singled
out his extraordinary influence on a generation of American scholars. This
influence came at a time when the history of science was firmly establishing
itself as an independent discipline in the American academic community.
Hence, the influence was felt not only on some of us who were already
committed to the history of science, but on our students as well, who wvere
urged to take Koyre's studies as models. While I am sure that what I say
about the influence of Alexandre Koyre on my own work is equally valid
for many other scholars, I shall here confine myself to an attempt to describe
that personal influence. It was, above all, in the careful analysis of scientific
concepts in their philosophical context that Professor Koyre exerted his
most important influence. My own admiration and friendship for Koyre
began with the excitement I felt at first reading his Ltudes Galile'ennes at
a time when I was attempting to find a satisfactory way to examine medieval
mechanics and to contrast it with that of the Galilean period. His subtle
reading -of Galileo offered an excellent point of departure for my own work.
I was equally impressed by his beautiful paper, " Le Vide et l'espace infini
au XIVesiecle," 1 and particularly by the doubt it cast on the easy generalizations of Pierre Duhem. Above all, it gave an example of the caution one
must exercise in examining the full context of concepts.
Following upon a first brief meeting between us in Paris in 1951 when
we discussed at length the significance of medieval statics, Koyre came to
Institute for Advanced Study.
l Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen dge, 1949, 17.
166
MARSHALL CLAGETT