Conflict of Laws Outline

Conflict of Laws outline, Spring 2006. Russell Miller.
I. UNDERPINNINGS
A. THEORY
1. What is conflict of laws?
a) Definition: a mechanism for resolving dispute and transactions that have legal
implications involving more than one sovereign.
b) Components
(1) Jurisdiction
(2) Choice of law
(3) Enforcement of judgments
B. HISTORY
1. The Egyptians: said that forum law always applies. Some states follow this approach.
2. The Romans: said that you don't choose one law, but rather mesh together the
applicable laws into a new law to apply--jus gentium
3. The Statutists: (during the 14th and 15th centuries) looked at a particular statute to
determine whether it was "real" or "personal." Real statutes operated only within the
territory of the enacting state, whereas "personal" statutes followed all people who
owed allegiance to the enacting state. This is a unilateral approach--it focuses on the
applicable laws themselves to determine which applies.
4. The Dutch: (during the 15th and 16th centuries) applied laws generally only within
the enacting state, but to all those there, whether temporarily or permanently.
However, they also introduced the idea of comity, which called for application of
foreign law when needed to preserve rights acquired in foreign states--so as to protect
the forum state from retaliation when the tables were turned.
5. Savigny: (a German in the 19th century) reintroduced a multilateral approach,
focusing not on the competing laws themselves, but on aspects of the dispute outside
of those laws in order to determine which law to choose.
6. Beale: (the 20th century) who was a radical multilateralist, looking strictly at features
outside the competing laws.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. The Choice of Law Analysis
1. What's the forum?
2. What are the interested jurisdictions?
3. What would be the different results?
a) Based on jurisdiction law?
b) Based on characterization?
4. (What law to choose?)
B. THE FIRST RESTATEMENT (BEALE)
Comment: Used by 10 states for torts, 11 for contracts.
1. Rules
a) Torts: the law of the place of the wrong governs; that place is where the "last
event necessary" to make the defendant liable occurred.
(1) Restatement Rules
Conflict of Laws, Spring 2006 Outline: Page 1 R. Miller

(a) Torts
i) 377. The Place of Wrong. The place of wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place.
a. Note: Summary of Rules in Important Situations Determining
Where a Tort is Committed.
1) Except in the case of harm from poison, when a person sustains
bodily harm, the place of wrong is the place where the harmful
force takes effect upon the body.
2) When a person causes another voluntarily to take a deleterious
substance which takes effect within the body, the place of
wrong is where the deleterious substance takes effect and not
where it is administered.
3) When harm is caused to land or chattels, the place of wrong is
the place where the force takes effect on the thing.
4) When a person sustains loss by fraud, the place of wrong is
where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent
representations are made.
5) Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the place of
wrong is where the defamatory statement is communicated.
ii) 378. Law Governing Plaintiff's Injury. The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.
iii) 379. Law Governing Liability-Creating Conduct. Except as stated in
382 [Duty of Privilege to Act], the law of the place of wrong
determines
a. whether a person is responsible for harm he has caused only if he
intended it,
b. whether a person is responsible for unintended harm he has caused
only if he was negligent,
c. whether a person is responsible for harm he has caused irrespective
of his intention or the care which he has excercised.
iv) 382. Duty or Privilege to Act.
a. A person who is required by law to act or not to act in one state in
a certain manner will not be held liable for the results of such
action or failure to act which occur in another state.
b. A person who acts pursuant to a privilege conferred by the law of
the place of acting will not be held liable for the results of his act
in another state.
v) 384. Recognition of Foreign Cause of Action.
a. If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause
of action will be recognized in other states.
b. If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery
in tort can be had in any other state.
vi) 385. Contributory Negligence. Whether contributory negligence of

the plaintiff precludes recovery in whole or in part in an action for
negligent injury is determined by the law of the place of wrong.
vii) 386. Liability to Servant for Tort of Fellow Servant. The law of the
place of wrong determines whether a master is liable for a wrong
caused by a fellow servant.
viii) 387. Vicarious Liability. When a person authorizes another to act
for him in any state and the other does so act, whether he is liable for
the tort of the other is determined by the law of the place of wrong.
ix) 390. Survival of Actions. Whether a claim for damages for a tort
survives the death of the tortfeasor or of the injured person is
determined by the law of the place of wrong.
(b) Actions for Death
i) 391. Right of Action for Death. The law of the place of wrong
governs the right of action for death.
(c) Workmen's Compensation
i) 398. Compensation under Act of State of Employment. A workman
who enters into a contract of employment in a state in which a
Workmen's Compensation Act is in force can recover compensation
under the Act in that state for bodily harm arising out of and in the
course of the employment, although the harm was suffered in another
state, unless the Act provides in specific words or is so interpreted as
to apply only to bodily harm occurring within the state.
ii) 399. Compensation under Act of State of Harm. Except as stated in
401 [Abolition Of Right Of Action For Common Law Tort Or
Wrongful Death], a workman may recover in a state in which he
sustains harm under the Workmen's Compensation Act of that state
although the contract of employment was made in another state, unless
the Act provides in specific words or is so interpreted as to apply only
when the contract of employment is made within the state.
(d) Damages
i) 412. Measure of Damages for Tort. The measure of damages for a
tort is determined by the law of the place of wrong.
ii) 421. Exemplary Damages. The right to exemplary damages is
determined by the law of the place of wrong.
(2) Unintentional Torts (the basic rule)
(a) Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll (Ala. 1892) (p1): this case
illustrates that, under the First Restatement (Beale), even when nearly
every contact in the case is with State A (Alabama here, the forum state),
if the place of the wrong (even if not the negligent conduct) was in State B
(Mississippi here), then State B's law will apply.
i) This result shows how the Beale approach will reduce a court's
discretion and thus promote uniformity (and prevent forum shopping).
a. However, note that the discretion in characterization is still there
under Beale. Here, for instance, the state could characterize the
dispute as one over contracts, not torts, and possibly reach a

different result.
(3) Intentional Torts (a special rule?)
(a) Marra v. Bushee (D. Vt. 1970) (p16): the court here, in a loss of
consortium action, escapes the strict territorial approach of the First
Restatement by emphasizing that intentional torts are different--that the
purpose of them is at least partly punitive, thus the point of them is to
control conduct, and therefore the place of conduct should govern which
law to choose.
i) The court's approach here, deviating from Beale, foreshadows modern
choice of law approaches that focus on state interests, sometimes over
territoriality.
b) Contracts: the law to choose will depend on whether the dispute is over
formation, validity, or performance. If over formation, use the Restatement Rules
to determine where the contract would be formed if at all, and apply that state's
law. If over validity, apply that law of the state where the contract was formed.
If over performance, apply the law of the state where the contract was to be
performed.
(a) Place of Contracting
i) 311. Place of Contracting. The law of the forum decides as a
preliminary question by the law of which state questions concerning
the formation of a contract are to be determined, and this state is, in
the Restatement of this Subject, called the "place of contracting."
ii) 312. Formal Contract. . . . place of contracting is where the delivery is
made.
iii) 314. Formal Contract Completed by Mail of Carriage. . . . place of
contracting is where the document is posted or is received by the
carrier.
iv) 315. Formal Contract Delivered by Agent. . . . place of contracting is
where the agent delivers it.
v) 323. Informal Unilateral Contract. . . . place of contracting is where
the event takes place which makes the promise binding.
vi) 325. Informal Bilateral Contract. . . . place of contracting is where the
promise is made in consideration for the first promise.
vii) 326. Acceptance Sent from One State to Another. . . . place of
contracting is as follows:
(a) If the acceptance is sent by an agent of the acceptor, the place of
contracting is the state where the agent delivers it.
(b) if the acceptance is sent by any other means, the place of
contracting is the state from which the acceptance is sent.
viii) 322. Law Governing Validity of Contract. The law of the place of
contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with
respect to
(a) capacity to make the contract;
(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made;

(c) the mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to make a
promise binding;
(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding;
(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstances which make a
promise void or voidable;
(f) except as stated in 358, the nature and extent of the duty for the
performance of which a party becomes bound;
(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its terms to
be performed;
(h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise.
(b) Creation of a Contract
i) 333. Capacity to Contract. The law of the place of contracting
determines the capacity to enter into a contract.
ii) 334. Formalities for Contracting. . . . law of the place of contracting.
iii) 335. Sealed Instruments. . . . law of the place of contracting.
iv) 336. Negotiable Instruments. . . . law of the place of contracting.
v) 340. Contracts to Transfer of to Convey Land. . . . law of the place of
contracting.
(c) Performance of a Contract
i) 355. Place of Performance. The place of performance is the state
where, either by specific provision or by interpretation of the language
of the promise, the promise is to be performed.
ii) 358. Law Governing Performance. The duty for the performance of
which a party to a contract is bound will be discharged by compliance
with the law of the place of performance of the promise with respect
to:
(a) the manner of performance;
(b) the time and locality of performance;
(c) the person or persons by whom or to whom performance shall be
made or rendered;
(d) the sufficiency of performance;
(e) excuse for non-performance.
iii) 360. Illegality of Performance.
(1) If performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the place of
performance at the time for performance, there is no obligation to
perform so long as the illegality continues.
(2) If the legality of performance is temporary and the obligation of
the contract still continues, whether the contract must be performed
within a reasonable time after its performance becomes legal depends
upon the law of the place of performance . . . .
iv) 361. What Amounts to Performance. The law of the place of
performance determines the details of the manner of performing the
duty imposed by the contract.
(2) Cases
(a) Poole v. Perkins (Va. 1919) (p29): the court here, in a contract dispute,

characterizes the issue as one of performance, even though common sense
suggests the issue--about a wife's capacity to contract--is one of contract
validity. Moreover, the court makes its determinations by looking at the
parties' intentions--something that Beale would hate.
(b) Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp. (Pa. 1958) (p33): this Pennsylvania
court must determine where a contract negotiated by telephone was
formed. It looks at decisions from other states in order to follow any
pattern so to promote uniformity and combat forum-shopping. It finds
that the majority rule is that acceptance by telephone takes place where the
words are spoken.
(c) Burr v. Beckler (Ill. 1914) (p76): this Illinois court determines that a trust
deed, conveying Illinois real estate as security for a note that the plaintiff
alleges she was induced to execute, was a contract, not a conveyance.
Thus, it applies the contract conflicts rules, which dictate that the law of
the place of contracting (Florida here) govern, rather than the real property
rules, which dictate that the law of the place where the property is governs
(Illinois here). Under those rules, the plaintiff wife had no capacity to
contract and so the whole conveyance is blown.
c) Domicile (a mechanism to assist in choosing law): a person's domicile is the place
where he has at least some actual physical presence and an intent to make that
place his principal home.
(a) Meaning of Domicil
i) 9. Domicil. Domicil is the place with which a person has a settled
connection for certain legal purposes, either because his home is there,
or because that place is assigned to him by the law.
ii) 10. Domicil by What Law Determined.
a. A question of domicil as between the state of the forum and
another state is determined by the law of the forum.
b. A question of domicil as between one or another of several states
other than the forum, the law of each which differs from that of the
other and from that of the forum, is determined by the law of the
forum.
(b) General Requirements of Domicil
i) 11. One and Only One Domicil. Every person has at all times on
domicil, and no person has more than one domicil at a time.
ii) 12. Relation between Domicil and Home. Except as stated in 17 and
26 to 40, relating to domicil in a vehicle and to domicil by operation of
law, when a person has one home and only one home, his domicil is
the place where his home is.
iii) 13. Home Defined. A home is a dwelling place of a person,
distinguished from other dwelling places of that person by the
intimacy of the relation between the person and the place.
(c) Acquisition and Change of Domicil
i) 14. Domicil of Origin. The domicil of origin is the domicil assigned to

every child at its birth.
ii) 15. Domicil of Choice.
a. A domicil of choice is a domicil acquired, through the exercise of
his own will, by a person who is legally capable of changing his
domicil.
b. To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-
place with the intention of making it his home.
c. The fact of physical presence at a dwelling-place and the intention
to make it a home must concur; if they do so, even for a moment,
the change of domicil takes place.
d. A person can have a domicil of choice only in one of three ways:
1) having no home, he acquires a home in a place other than his
former domicil;
2) having a home in one place, he gives it up as such and acquires
a new home in another place;
3) having two homes, he comes to regard the one of them not
previously his domicil as his principal home.
iii) 16. Requisite of Physical Presence. To acquire a domicil of choice in a
place, a person must be physically present there; but a home in a
particular building is not necessary for the acquisition of a domicil.
iv) 18. Requisite of Intention. A person cannot change his domicil by
removal to a new dwelling-place without an intention to make the new
dwelling place his home.
v) 19. Nature of Intention Required. The intention required for the
acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to make a home in
fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil.
vi) 20. Present Intention. For the acquisition of a domicil of choice the
intention to make a home must be an intention to make a home at the
moment, not to make a home in the future.
vii) 21. Presence under Compulsion. A person cannot acquire a domicil of
choice by any act done under legal or physical compulsion.
viii) 23. Continuing Quality of Domicil. A domicil once established
continues until it is superseded by a new domicil.
ix) 25. Domicil in Dwelling-House Cut by Boundary Line. Where a person
has his home in a dwelling-house which is situated upon a dividing
line between political subdivisions of territory, his domicil is within
the division in which the preponderant part of his dwelling-house is
situated; if there is no preponderance, the domicil is in the territorial
division in which the principal entrance to the house is situated.
(d) Domicil by Operation of Law
i) 27. Domicil of Married Woman.
ii) 41. Domicil of Corporation.
(2) Cases
(a) White v. Tenant (W.Va. 1888) (p43): the decedent in this case was

domiciled in Pennsylvania, the court here said, even though he never
actually began living there--his actual presence at his new home there
(putting his stuff and his stock there) and his intent to move from West
Virginia was enough to establish domicile.
(b) Rodriguez Diaz v. Sierra Martinez (1st Cir. 1988) (p46) (not discussed in
class): a federal court must determine where a minor is domiciled in order
to determine whether there is sufficient diversity for federal jurisdiction.
In doing so, it recites the general domicile test: (1) physical presence in a
place plus (2) intent to make that place a home. This case is complicated
by the fact that the minor's infancy may deprive him of any legally
cognizable intent to establish domicile, and yet even if forum law were
applied to resolve that question the minor would end up as a citizen of
both New York and Puerto Rico.
d) Marriage: generally, a marriage that's valid where it was celebrated is valid
everywhere else (and invalid everywhere if invalid in the celebration state). But,
marriages against the statutory law of the domicile of either spouse (132(d)) are
invalid everywhere; and marriages "sufficiently offensive" to the policy of a state
will not be given effect in that particular state.
(a) Marriage
i) 121. Law Governing Validity of Marriage. Except as stated in 131
[Remarriage After Parties To Divorce Both Forbidden To Remarry]
and 132 [Marriage Declared Void by Law of Domicil], a marriage is
valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state
where the contract of marriage takes place are complied with.
ii) 122. Requirements of State of Celebration. A marriage is invalid
everywhere if any mandatory requirement of the marriage law of the
state in which the marriage is celebrated is not complied with.
iii) 123. "Common Law" Marriage.
iv) 128. Marriage in a Nomadic Tribe.
v) 129. Evasion of Requirement of Domicil. If the requirements of the
law of the state of celebration are complied with, the marriage is valid
everywhere, except under the circumstances stated in 131 and 132,
although the parties of the marriage went to that state in order to evade
the requirements of the law of their domicil.
vi) 130. Remarriage after One Party to Divorce Forbidden to Remarry.
vii) 132. Marriage Declared Void by Law of Domicil. A marriage which is
against the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the
requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied
with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases:
a. (a) polygamous marriage,
b. (b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that
their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
c. (c) marriage between persons of different races where such
marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious,

d. (d) marriage of a domciliary which a statute at the domicil makes
void even though celebrated in another state.
viii) 133. Effect of Foreign Marriage. Except as stated in 134 [Marriage
Contrary to Public Policy], a state will give the same effect to a
marriage created by the law of another state that it gives to a marriage
created by its own law.
ix) 134. Marriage Contrary to Public Policy. If any effect of a marriage
created by the law of one state is deemed by the courts of another state
sufficiently offensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state
will refuse to give that effect to the marriage.
x) 136. Law Governing Nullity.
(b) Legitimacy
i) 137. Law Governing Legitimacy.
ii) 138. Legitimacy at Birth.
iii) 139. Legitimacy from Birth.
iv) 140. Legitimation after Birth.
v) 141. Effect of Legitimacy Created by Foreign Law.
(2) Cases
(a) Lanham v. Lanham (Wis. 1908) (p65): a Wisconsin court voids a
Michigan marriage between a divorced woman and an 84 year old man
from, both from Wisconsin. The court characterizes the exceptions to the
general Restatement rule as (1) marriages contrary to the law of nature
won't be recognized anywhere (132(d)) and (2) the forum can refuse
validity in the forum state based on public policy (134). Here, the court
uses 132(d), saying that such state statutes must clearly intend to apply
extraterritorially (cf. May's Estate), and that this statute was clearly
intended to apply extraterritorially because the statute didn't say it wasn't
so intended.
i) This is probably an instance of a court using wiggle room within the
conflicts rules to do what it wants--invalidate this marriage by a gold
digger to an 84 year old.
ii) Cf. In re May's Estate (N.Y. 1953) (p60) (not discussed in class): a
New York court allows a Rhode Island marriage between an uncle and
a niece despite a New York statute prohibiting such marriages in New
York, because of the First Restatement rule. The court said the
marriage did not fall within the 132(d) exception because the NY
statute did not expressly prohibit such marriages if made abroad.
(b) Burns v. Burns (Ga. 2002) (h/o): this Georgia court decides that it will
enforce a divorce consent decree prohibiting child visitation with a parent
cohabiting while not married, despite that the former wife entered a same-
sex civil union in Vermont. The court rejected the wife's argument that
under the FFCC, her civil union was a marriage in Georgia, saying that (1)
Vermont law expressly distinguishes civil unions from marriages and (2)
even if the civil union was a divorce, it would be contrary to Georgia
public policy and Georgia would not have to give it full faith and credit

under DOMA.
e) Property
(1) Real Property: the law of the place where the property is located governs.
(a) Restatement Rules
i) Property in General
a. 211. Property in Tangible Thing: Where Created. The original
creation of property in a tangible thing is governed by the law of
the state where the thing is at the time of the events which create
the interests.
ii) Immovables
a. Conveyances
1) 214. Legal Effect and Interpretation of Words Used in an
Instrument of Conveyance.
(1) Words used in an instrument of conveyance of an interest
in land which, by the law of the state where the land is, have a
given operative effect irrespective of the intent of the
conveyor, will be accorded such effect in any state.
(2) Words used in an instrument of conveyance of an interest
in land which, by the law of the state where the land is, have a
given operative effect unless a contrary intent is shown by
admissible evidence, will be accorded such effect in any state.
(3) The meaning of words used in an instrument of
conveyance of an interest in land which, by the law of the state
where the land is, are accorded neither of the effects described
in Subsections (1) and (2), is in the absence of controlling
circumstances to the contrary, determined in accordance with
usage at the domicile of the conveyor at the time of the
conveyance.
2) 216. Capacity to Convey Interest in Land. . . . determined by
the law of the state where the land is.
3) 217. Formalities of Conveyance of Interest in Land. . . .
determined by the law of the state where the land is.
4) 218. Substantial Validity of Conveyance of Interest in Land.
Whether a conveyance of an interest in land, which is in due
form and is made by a party who has capacity to convey it, is
in other respects valid, is determined by the law of the state
where the land is.
5) 219. Capacity of Grantee to Take or Hold Land. . . .
6) 220. Effect of Conveyance of Interest in Land. . . . determined
by the law of the state where the land is.
7) 221. Nature of Interest Created by Conveyance of Land. . . .
8) 222. Non-Possessory Interests in Land. . . . determined by the
law of the state where the land is.

b. Transfers by Operation of Law
1) 223. Transfer of Interest in Land by Operation of Law. An
interest in land can be transferred by operation of law only by
the law of the state where the land is.
c. Incumbrances
1) 225. Mortgage on Land; By What Law Determined. The
validity and effect of a mortgage on land is determined by the
2) 226. Assignment of Mortgage on Land. . . . determined by the
3) 227. Foreclosure of Mortgage on Land. . . . determined by the
d. Marital Property
1) 237. Effect of Marriage on Existing Interests in Land. . . .
2) 238. Effect of Marriage on an Interest in Land Later Acquired.
. . . determined by the law of the state where the land is.
e. Equitable Interests
1) 244. Equitable Conversion of Trust Property. Whether the
interest of the beneficiary of a trust of land is real estate or
whether, because of a direction to sell the land, it is personal
property, is determined by the law of the state where the land
is.
f. Succession on Death
1) 245. Inheritance of Land. The law of the state where the land is
determines it devolution upon the death of the owner intestate.
2) 246. Legitimacy of Claimant by Decedent. A person who is
heir by the law of the state where the land is, only if legitimate,
is heir if, but only if, he is born legitimate as stated in 138 or
has been legitimized as stated in 139 and 140.
3) 248. Share of Spouse in Land upon Termination of Marriage. .
. . determined by the law of the state where the land is.
4) 249. Will of Land. . . . determined by the law of the state where
the land is.
5) 250. Revocation of Will of Land. . . . determined by the law of
the state where the land is.
6) 251. Interpretation, Construction and Effect of Will of Land.
(1) Words used in a devise of an interest in land which, by
law of the state where the land is, have a given operative effect
irrespective or the intent of the testator, will be accorded such
effect in any state.
(2) Words used in a devise of an interest in land which, by
the law of the state where the land is, have a given operative
effect unless a contrary intent is shown by admissible evidence,
will be accorded such effect in any state.

(3) The meaning of words used in a devise of an interest in
land which, by the law of the state where the land is, are
accorded neither of the effects described in Subsections (1) and
(2), is, in the absence of controlling circumstances to the
contrary, determined in accordance with usage at the domicile
of the testator at the time when the will was made.
(b) Cases: illustrating the characterization (of an instrument as either a
conveyance or a contract for conveyance) makes all the difference here.
i) Burr v. Beckler (Ill. 1914) (p76): this Illinois court determines that a
trust deed, conveying Illinois real estate as security for a note that the
plaintiff alleges she was induced to execute, was a contract. Thus, it
applies the contract conflicts rules, which dictate that the law of the
place of contracting (Florida here) govern. Under those rules, the
plaintiff wife had no capacity to contract and so the whole conveyance
is blown.
ii) Thomson v. Kyle (Fla. 1897) (p77): this Florida court determines that a
note evidencing a mortgage on Florida land will be governed by the
law of the place where the land is (Florida), even though the note was
made and had everything to do with Alabama, where its maker lacked
the capacity to make it.
(2) Trusts: the law to choose will depend on whether the dispute is over validity,
interpretation, or administration of the trust, and whether the trust is a
testamentary or inter vivos trust. The rules fall out like this:
Validity dispute
IV: law of the place where the property was when the trust was created
T: law of the testator's domicile at death
Interpretation dispute: law of the domicile of the grantor at execution of
the instrument
Administration dispute
IV: law of the place where the instrument locates administration
T: law of the testator's domicile at death, unless intent otherwise
i) Movables::Equitable Interests
a. 294. Validity of Trust of Movables Created Inter Vivos.
(1) Except as stated in 263, the validity of a trust of chattels
created by settlement or other transaction inter vivos is determined
as to each item by the law of the state in which the particular
chattel is at the time of the creation of the trust.
(2) The validity of a trust of choses in action created by a
settlement or other transaction inter vivos is determined by the law
of the place where the transaction takes place.
b. 295. Validity of Trust Created by Will. The validity of a trust of
movables created by a will is determined by the law of the
testator's domicil at the time of death.
c. 296. Interpretation of Trust Instrument. The meaning of the words

used in an instrument creating a trust of movables is, in the
absence of controlling circumstances to the contrary, determined in
accordance with the usage at the domicil of the settlor of the trust
at the time of the execution of the instrument which created it.
d. 297. Administration of Trust of Movables Created Inter Vivos. A
trust of movables created by an instrument inter vivos is
administered by the trustee according to the law of the state where
the instrument creating the trust located the administration of the
trust.
e. 298. Administration of Trust of Movables Created by Will. A
testamentary trust of movables is administered by the trustee
according to the law of the state of the testator's domicil at the time
of his death unless the will shows an intention that the trust should
be administered in another state.
(b) Cases
i) Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (Del. 1942) (p103): a
Delaware court determines whether an appointment made under a trust
created in New York but then moved to Delaware should be governed
by New York law (which would void the appointment as against the
Rule Against Perpetuities) or Delaware law (where the appointment
would be okay. The court makes its determination by looking at
contacts and the intent of the grantor--that is, rejecting territoriality
(and Beale's fixation).
(3) Personal Property: the law of the state where the chattel is at the time of
conveyance, and conveyed interests will be recognized if the chattel is later
moved into another state.
i) Movables
a. Conveyances
1) 255. Capacity to Convey Chattel. . . . determined by the law of
the state where the chattel is at the time of conveyance.
2) 256. Formalities of Conveyance of Chattel. . . . determined by
the law of the state where the chattel is at the time of
conveyance.
3) 257. Substantial Validity of Conveyance of Chattel. . . .
determined by the law of the state where the chattel is at the
time of conveyance.
4) 258. Nature of Interest Created by Conveyance of Chattel. . . .
determined by the law of the place where the chattel is at the
time of conveyance.
5) 260. Moving Chattels into Another State; Effect on Title. An
interest in a chattel acquired in accordance with the law of the
state in which the chattel is at the time when the interest is
acquired will be recognized in a state into which the chattel is
subsequently taken.

6) 261. Chattel Embodied in a Document.
(1) Whether the title to a chattel is embodied in a document is
determined by the law of the place where the chattel is at the
time when the document is issued.
(2) The validity of a conveyance of a chattel, title to which is
embodied in a document, depends upon the validity of the
conveyance of the document.
(3) The validity of the conveyance of a document in which
title to a chattel is embodied as stated in Subsection (1), is
determined by the law of the palce where the document is at
the time of the conveyance.
b. Marital Property
1) 289. Effect of Marriage on Title to Existing Movables. . . . law
of the domicil of the husband at the time of marriage.
2) 290. Movables Acquired during Marriage. . . . law of the
domicil of the parties when the movables are acquired.
3) 291. Removal of Movables of Spouses to Another State.
Interests in movables acquired by either or both of the spouses
in one state continue after the movables have been brought into
another state until the interests are affected by some new
dealings with the movables in the second state.
c. Succession on Death
1) 300. Devolution of Chattels on Death of Owner. At the death
of the owner of chattels the title to the chattels passes to the
executor or administrator appointed by the court of the state in
which the chattels are habitually kept.
2) 301. Right of Widow or Child Outside Will. . . . determined by
the law of the state in which the decedent died domiciled.
3) 302. Enforcement of Widow's Allowance in Another State.
4) 306. Will of Movables. . .. determined by the law of the state in
which the deceased died domiciled.
5) 307. Revocation of Will of Movables. determined by the law of
the state in which the deceased was domiciled at the time of his
death.
(b) Case
i) Morson v. Second National Bank of Boston (Mass. 1940) (p111) (not
discussed in class): this Massachussets court says that although shares
of stock are chattels, conveyances of stock will not be governed by the
law of the place where it is conveyed--rather, they will be governed by
the law of the place of incorporation of the issuing corporation.
f) Corporations: the law to choose will depend on whether the dispute is over the
formation of the entity, the entity's external acts, or the entity's internal
(organizational) acts. If over formation, use the Restatement Rules to determine
where the entity would be formed if at all, and apply that state's law. If over
external acts, apply the law of the state where the acts were done. If over internal

act, apply the law of the state of formation.
(a) Creation, Recognition and Dissolution
i) 154. Recognition of Foreign Corporation. The fact of incorporation
by one state will be recognized in every other state.
ii) 155. Questions of Incorporation.
(1) Whether an association has been incorporated is determined by
the law of the state in which an attempt to incorporate has been made.
(2) The effects of an unsuccessful attempt to incorporate are
governed by the law of the state in which the attempt was made.
(3) Defects in the process of incorporation which may give the
incorporating state a power to dissolve the corporation are governed
by the law of such state.
(b) Action by Corporation
i) 165. Powers of Foreign Corporation. A foreign corporation can
legally perform any act within its corporate powers under the law of
the state of incorporation unless the act is prohibited by the law of the
state where it is to be performed.
ii) 166. Law Governing Act of Foreign Corporation. The effect of an act
directed to be done by a foreign corporation is governed by the law of
the state where it is done.
(c) Shareholders and Directors
i) 182. Law Governing Title to Share. . . . determined by the law of the
state of incorporation.
ii) 183. Participation in Management and Profits. . . . determined by the
law of the state of incorporation.
iii) 187. Director's or Shareholder's Liability. . . . determined by the law
of the state of incorporation.
iv) 188. Liability Imposed by State Where Corporation Acts. So far as the
directors or agents are participants in acts done within the state, a state
can impose liability upon the directors or agents of a foreign
corporation doing business in the state for acts done within the state or
for failure to do acts required by the law of the state as a condition of
doing business within the state.
v) 190. Direct Liability of Shareholder Imposed by State of
Incorporation. The state of incorporation can impose liability on a
shareholder running directly to creditors, for debts of the corporation
incurred in another state and this liability will be enforced in any state
which has judicial jurisdiction over the shareholder.
vi) 191. Direct Liability of Shareholder Imposed by Foreign State.
Liability for an act caused by a foreign corporation to be done by its
agent can be imposed on a shareholder by the law of the state where
the act is done only if the shareholder
(a) is domiciled in the state, or
(b) has personally taken part in doing the act or causing it to be done,

or
(c) has notice that the corporation was formed to do business there.
This liability will be enforced in any state having judicial jurisdiction
over the shareholder.
(d) Interference with Internal Affairs
i) 192. Action Concerning Shares. . . . a court will usually not entertain a
suit brought against a foreign corporation to obtain a decree against it
requiring or enjoining the issuance, transfer, or cancellation of shares.
(e) Association Incorporated by More Than One State
i) 205. Creation of Shares by Reincorporated Association. . . . governed
by the law of the state which first incorporates the association.
(2) Cases
(a) Vanderpoel v. Gorman (N.Y. 1894) (p84) (not discussed in class): the
New York court here reasoned that there were fundamental differences
between foreign corporations and domestic corporations, which were
created pursuant to the laws of the state, and concluded that the existence
of a statute prohibiting a transaction by a domestic corporation did not in
itself demonstrate a public policy against such transactions and thus the
foreign corporation was not prohibited, as domestic corporations were.
i) Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2d Cir. 1936) (p87) (not
discussed in class): the court grapples with a state statute designed to
overrule Vanderpoel, and concludes that it can't directly effect foreign
property but can order the defendants to reconvey.
(b) McDermott Inc. v. Lewis (Del. 1987) (p89) (not discussed in class): this
Delaware court invokes the internal affairs doctrine and applies
Panamanian law to a voting dispute involving a Panamanian corporation.
Moreover, the court declined to apply Delaware law, despite the doctrine,
for public policy reasons and in fact felt that the internal affairs doctrine
was constitutionally compelled by the Commerce Clause.
2. Problems
a) Characterization
(1) Substance vs. substance: note that there are no Restatement rules here.
(a) Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. (Wis. 1959) (p114): in a dispute
over whether a wife could sue her husband for negligence, a Wisconsin
court must determine whether the dispute is about torts (in which case the
law of California, where the last act occurred, applies and gives the wife
no capacity to sue) or about capacity to sue (in which case the law of
Wisconsin, the domicile of the spouses, applies and gives the wife
capacity). The court concludes (conveniently) that real nature of the
dispute is about capacity to sue, and so domicile law (which is,
incidentally, forum law in this case) governs. So, this case illustrates how
characterization gives courts some wiggle room.
(b) Poole v. Perkins (Va. 1919) (p29): the court here, in a contract dispute,
characterizes the issue as one of performance, even though common sense
suggests the issue is one of contract validity. Moreover, the court makes

its determinations by looking at the parties' intentions--something that
Beale would hate.
(c) Burr v. Beckler (Ill. 1914) (p76): in this land case, it depends on whether
the dispute is characterized as one over the validity of the contract for
conveyance (law of place of contracting) or the actual conveyance itself
(law of the place where the property is applies).
i) Thomson v. Kyle (Fla. 1897) (p77): a case with the same
characterization issue as Burr, but the court comes out the other way.
This illustrates how characterization inserts discretion into the choice
of law process.
(2) Substance vs. procedure
(a) Generally
i) Restatement Rules
a. Distinction between Substance and Procedure
1) 584. Determination of Whether Question Is One of Procedure.
The court at the forum determines according to its own
Conflict of Laws whether a given question is one of substance
or procedure.
2) 585. What Law Governs Procedure. All matters of procedure
are governed by the law of the forum.
b. Proceedings in Court
1) 588. Parties. The law of the forum determines who may and
who must sue and be sued.
2) 591. Commencement of Action. The law of the forum
determines at what moment action is begun.
3) 594. Mode of Trial. The law of the forum determines whether
an issue of fact shall be tried by the court or by a jury.
4) 595. Proof of Facts.
(1) The law of the forum governs the proof in court of a fact
alleged.
(2) The law of the forum governs presumptions and
inferences to be drawn from evidence.
5) 596. Witnesses. The law of the forum determines the
competency and the credibility of witnesses.
6) 597. Evidence. The law of the forum determines the
admissibility of a particular piece of evidence.
7) 599. Integrated Contracts. When a contract is integrated in a
writing by the law of the place of contracting, no variation of
the writing can be shown in another state which could not be
shown in the place of contracting under the law of that state,
whatever the law of the other state as to integrated contracts.
8) 600. Execution of Judgment. The law of the forum determines
matters pertaining to the execution of a judgment, and what
property of a judgment defendant within the state is exempt
from execution and on what property within the state execution

can be levied, and the priorities among competing execution
creditors.
c. Conditions of Maintaining Suit
1) 601. Freedom from Fault. If the law of the forum makes it a
condition of maintaining an action that the party bringing the
action show himself free from fault, the condition must be
fulfilled though there is no such requirement in the state where
the cause of action arose.
2) 606. Limitation of Amount Recoverable. If a statute of the
forum limits the amount which in any action of a certain class
may be recovered in its courts, no greater amount can be
recovered though under the law of the state which created the
cause of action, a greater recovery would be justified or
required.
ii) Case
a. Sampson v. Channell (1st Cir. 1940) (p131): in an action about a
car wreck in Maine, the 1st Circuit considering a case that was
brought in diversity in a Massachusetts federal district court must
determine (1) whether to apply the federal or state burden of proof
on contributory negligence and then, because it determines to
apply state law, (2) whether to apply the Maine or Massachusetts
burden of proof.
1) (1) The federal-state question is an Erie question an turns on
whether the burden of proof is substantive or procedural. The
court determines that under the policies announced in Erie, it is
substantive, and so state law governs.
2) (2) Since state law governs, the court is thrown into another
choice of law--Maine or Massachusetts. Here, it determines,
based on a decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
that the burden of proof is procedural--and so forum (Mass.)
law governs.
(b) Statutes of limitations
i) Restatement Rules
a. Procedure::Conditions of Maintaining Suit
1) 603. Statute of Limitations of Forum. If action is barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
though action is not barred in the state where the cause of
action arose.
2) 604. Foreign State of Limitations. If action is not barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum, an action can be maintained,
though action is bared in the state where the cause of action
arose.
3) 605. Time Limitations on Cause of Action. If by the law of the
state which has created the right of action, it is made a
condition of the right that it shall expire after a certain period

of limitation has elapsed, no action begun after the period has
elapsed can be maintained in any state.
ii) Cases
a. Borrowing statutes will trump the Restatement rule: Duke v.
Housen (Wyo. 1979) (p146): although this Wyoming court
recognizes the First Restatement rule that the forum SOL will
govern, it nevertheless applies the SOL of the state where the
cause arose, because of Wyoming's borrowing statute, which says:
"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action
arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state."
1) Idaho has a borrowing statute, I.C. 5-239: "Actions barred in
another state. When a cause of action has arisen in another
state or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws
thereof an action thereon can not there be maintained against a
person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall
not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of
one who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued."
2) Flowers (9th Cir. 2002) (h/o): this 9th Circuit panel interprets
the "except in favor of a citizen thereof who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued" clause in Nevada's
borrowing statute, saying that it applies to aid Gennifer
Flowers, who moved to Nevada after she acquired the right of
action at issue. Compare the "except" clause language in
Idaho's borrowing statute.
b. The Restatement rule is generally constitutional...: Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co. (1953) (p398): the Court allows
Pennsylvania to apply its own SOL to a claim brought under
Alabama's wrongful death statute, an application that has the effect
of door-closing. That is, the Court simply adheres to its precedent
that SOL's are procedural and that the FFCC therefore doesn't
compel a forum state to substitute its own policy, embodied in its
SOL, with that of another state's.
1) ...but the Due Process Clause could trump the Restatement
rule: Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) (p343): here, the
Court must decide whether Texas can choose its own two-year
SOL over a Mexican one-year SOL that was also inserted into
the contract under dispute. It says that SOL can not apply its
SOL, because that application would be so unfair and arbitrary
as to be a deprivation of property without due process of law,
violating the DPC of the 14th amendment.
(3) Substance vs. law of conflicts (Renvoi)
i) Rules for the Application of Conflict of Laws
a. 7. Law of Forum Applied. Except as stated in 8, when there is a
difference in the Conflict of Laws of two states whose law are

involved in a problem, the rule of Conflict of Laws of the forum is
applied;
1) (a) in all cases where as a preliminary to determining the
choice of law it is necessary to determine the quality and
character of legal ideas, these are determined by the forum
according to its law;
2) (b) where in making the choice of law to govern a certain
situation the law of another state is to be applied, since the only
Conflict of Laws used in the determination of the case is the
Conflict of Laws of the forum, the foreign law to be applied is
the law applicable to the matter in hand and not the Conflict of
Laws of the foreign state.
b. 8. Rule in Questions of Title to Land or Divorce.
(1) All questions of title to land are decided in accordance with
the law of the state where the land is, including the Conflict of
Laws rules of that state.
(2) All questions concerning the validity of a decree of divorce
are decided in accordance with the law of the domicil of the
parties, including the Conflict of laws rules of that state.
(b) Case
i) University of Chicago v. Dater (Mich. 1936) (p122): here, in a case
involving land, renvoi is not nipped in the bud, and the result is that
the forum (Michigan) law points to Illinois law, which points to
Michigan law (and so on infinitely). The court here decides to let that
go round just once, and strip of Michigan conflicts law once Illinois
returns the question to Michigan's law.
b) Public policy
(1) Restatement Rule
(a) Procedure::Access to Courts
i) 612. Action Contrary to Public Policy. No action can be maintained
upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of
which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.
ii) (1948 Supp.) [A] distinction has to be noted between the situation
dealt with in this Section and the situation where a party sets up a
defense which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum. the
latter situation involves more than a matter of denial of access to the
court. The plaintiff is asking for a judgment even though there is a
defense otherwise valid. It is, therefore, not within the scope of the
rule of this Section.
(b) See also the specific public policy exceptions for marriage disputes, 132
(d) and 134.
(2) Case
(a) Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft (N.Y. 1938) (p162): here, a
German national sued his German employer because his employment
contract entitled him to money if he was discharged. But German law

required the employer to discharge the plaintiff, yet the NY court still
applies the German law to let the employer out of its obligation--since it
was forced by law to discharge the plaintiff--focusing not on the anti-
Jewish aspects of the law, in conflict with NY law, but on the lack of
conflict with NY's policy to hold nationals to the contracts that they made
in their own country.
C. MODERN APPROACHES
1. Interest Analysis (Currie)
a) Purposes: this approach is a response to criticisms of Beale's approach: that it
was (1) arbitrary and content-blind, (2) policy-blind, and (3) unrealistic, in that to
really deliver uniformity, all characterizations, generic substantive rules, last act
determinations, and public policy exception (612) invocations would have to be
done of one mind across all courts.
(1) But Currie's approach receives its own criticisms:
(a) Although it is not policy-blind, it does not consider "macro" policies like
comity and unity, and rather favors local interests.
(b) It has no good resolution of true conflicts.
(c) It's goal of effectuating legislative policy isn't articulated well enough and
maybe isn't a good goal.
b) The Analysis: "no choice of law rules at all." Instead, courts are to use their
existing jurisprudential mechanisms to resolve conflicts.
(1) Is anyone arguing for non-forum law? If not, then forum law applies.
(2) If so, does one state have a stronger interest in enforcing its policies? If not,
then we've got a "false conflict." If so, however, then maybe we'll apply that
state's law. But...
(3) If so, are you sure? Try harder to identify one state that's most interested. If
this added push resolves things, then we had an "apparent conflict."
(a) Bernkrant v. Fowler (Cal. 1961) (p223): confronted with a Californian
statute of frauds that would invalidate the contract at issue and a Nevadan
statute of frauds that would not, a California court determines that there is
no true conflict because California would have no interest in applying its
statute of frauds to a contract where the parties had no way of knowing
that California's, not Nevada's, statute of frauds would ever apply. (There
is, arguably, some of the renvoi problem going on here.)
(4) If you're sure: then we have a "true conflict." Apply forum law.
(a) Lilienthal (Or. 1964) (p219): here, an Oregon court picks Oregon law to
apply to a contract dispute. The contract was made in California, so under
Beale's approach, California law would apply. But this court went
through Currie's interest analysis, looking at (1) California's (a) policies
and (b) interests, then at (2) Oregon's (a) policies and (b) interests.
Although it seems like everything's about equal (a true conflict), the court
suggests that Oregon's policies trump California's (so is this a false
conflict?).
(5) But, what if none of this is relevant to me? That is, what if no state is

interested in applying it's policies, or if the forum isn't interested. These are
"unprovided-for cases," and you apply forum law.
(a) Hurtado v. Superior Court (Cal. 1974) (p228) (not discussed in class): in
deciding whether to apply California wrongful death damage measures or
Mexico measures to a Californian accident between Mexican residents,
the California court here determines that Mexico has no interest at all in
having its measures used, since they were meant to protect only
defendants resident in Mexico. Thus, because here the defendant's
(decedent's heirs) resided in California, the forum state's (California's) law
governs.
(6) Couldn't Congress just solve all of this? Yes, it arguably could. And that's
what Currie would really like.
2. The "Better Rule" (Leflar)
a) Better Rule Rules
(1) Predictability of Results
(2) Maintenance of Interstate and International Order
(3) Simplification of the Judicial Task
(4) Advancement of the Forum's Governmental Interests
(5) Application of the Better Rule of Law
b) Cases
(1) Milkovich v. Saari (Minn. 1973) (p254) (not discussed in class): to choose
whether or not to apply a foreign "guest statute" from the law of both
plaintiff's and defendants' residence (Ontario, Canada), the court considers
Leflar's Better Rule factors. It determines that forum law--no guest statute--
should apply, finding that the rationales for the guest statute (fear of collusive
suits or, alternatively, of vindictive hosts) were unpersuasive.
3. The Second Restatement (Reese)
Comment: Used by 22 states for torts, 24 for contracts. This is Idaho's approach.
a) Second Restatement Rules: a schizophrenic approach, where there are
presumptive, interest-blind rules for each cause of action, which look Bealean,
unless another state has a more "significant relationship" to the action, in which
case more general rules and approaches (e.g. 145 for torts and 6 in all cases)
which call for policy analysis and look Curriean or Leflaresque.
(1) Introduction
(a) 6. Choice-of-Law Principles.
i) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.
ii) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of
the applicable rule of law include
a. the needs of the interstate and international systems,
b. the relevant policies of the forum,
c. the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

d. the protection of justified expectations,
e. the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
f. certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
g. ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
(2) Wrongs::Torts
(a) 145. The General Principle.
i) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of that state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties under the principles stated in 6 [Choice-Of-Law Principles].
ii) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
a. the place where the injury occurred,
b. the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
c. the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
d. the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
iii) These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with repsect to the particular issue.
(b) 154. Interference with Marriage Relationship. The local law of the state
where the conduct complained of principally occurred determines the
liability of one who interferes with a marriage relationship, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in 6 to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
b) Cases
(1) Phillips v. General Motors Corp. (Mont. 2000) (p264): the Montana Supreme
Court adopts the Second Restatement approach for resolving tort law conflicts
and then does a thorough application of 146, 145, and 6, taking the following
steps: (1) 146 presumptively applies the law of the state of injury unless
another state has a more significant relationship; (2) 6, using 145 factors for
each 6 factor, prescribes the analysis for determining whether another state
has a more significant relationship; (3) a court can give more or less weight to
each 6 factor, and here the most important factor to this court is 6(2)(b) and
(c), the relevant policies of the various interested states, has the most weight
and points to Montana law--the law of the residence of the parties before the
accident.
(a) This case is also an example of renvoi, because the court finds some
significant relationships between North Carolina and the action, but
mostly ignores them because North Carolina, a First Restatement
jurisdiction, would not even apply its own law.
(2) Kuntz v. Lamar Corp. (E.D. Wash. 2002) (h/o): a Washington federal district
court, sitting in diversity, recognizes that Washington applies the "most
significant relationship" (Second Restatement) approach to torts conflicts and

applies that approach to determining what contributory fault law to use. In
applying the approach, the court basically counts contacts and determines that
any significant relationship Washington might have to the action is not
enough to overcome the presumption that law of the place of injury, Idaho
(also the state with the most contacts, here), governs.
4. Significant Contacts: determine which which state has the most significant contact
or aggregate of contacts, and apply that state's law.
5. Lex Fori: always apply forum law.
6. Combined Modern: various hybrids of interest analysis, better rule, Second
Restatement, and significant contacts.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES
1. Choice of Law Limitations
a) The Text
(1) The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Amend. XIV, Sec. 1.
(a) The DPC, Miller says, is primarily concerned with individuals.
(2) The Full Faith and Credit Clause. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may be general laws prescribe a Manner in which
such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Art. IV, Sec. 1.
(a) The Full Faith and Credit Act. Such Acts, records, and judicial
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. 1738.
(b) The FFCC, Miller says, is primarily concerned with states.
(c) "Acts" versus "records" and "judicial proceedings": the FFCC doesn't
protect all of its subjects equally--rather "acts" (legislative measures and
common law) are not due the absolute full faith and credit that "records"
and "judicial proceedings" are.
i) Compare Pacific Employers and Shutts, regarding "acts" (where the
FFCC does not compel a state to substitute another state's statute for
its own) with the recitation in Baker that "the full faith and credit
obligation is exacting" in the case of judgments, giving all judgments
"nationwide force."
b) The Old, Separated Rules: arbitrariness (DPC) and interest balancing (FFCC).
(1) Due Process: Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) (p343): here, the Court
must decide whether Texas can choose its own two-year SOL over a Mexican
one-year SOL that was also inserted into the contract under dispute. Despite
plaintiff's arguments that the SOL is procedural and thus governed by forum
law and that Texas's SOL was Texas public policy and therefore within the

public policy exception, the Court said that choosing the Texas SOL would be
a deprivation of property (contract rights) without due process of law, because
that choice would be arbitrary and unfair in light of the complete absence of
any connection between the dispute and Texas. This result shows a Court
leaning towards a Bealean approach to choice of law.
(a) Miller suggests that it's the Court's outrage here that is the measure of Due
Process Clause protection in the choice of law realm, after this case. That
is, the more outraged at the choice the Court is, the more likely the choice
will be determined to be arbitrary and unfair.
(b) The Court mention that the plaintiff's residence in Texas was "without
significance." Of course, Beale would not even mention this--it's less than
"without significance" to him, it's completely irrelevant.
(2) Full Faith and Credit: Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n (1939) (p350): the Court, simplifying an even older, dual
approach (an "obnoxiousness" test and an interest-balancing test), adopts a
straightforward interest-balancing test for FFC Clause choice of law cases.
Here, a dispute over whether California can apply its worker's compensation
law to a claim by a Mass. employee to his Mass. employer over a California
injury, the Court suggests that the FFCC was intended to preserve the federal
union and that therefore a foreign state (Mass. here) cannot demand that the
forum state (Cal. here) substitute the forum's statute with a conflicting, foreign
statute.
(a) This decision suggests that the Court has begun to lean away from a pure
Bealean approach to choice of law. (Note that the brunt of the Great
Depression may have awakened the Court, since Dick, to the states'
interests in regulating the workplace.)
(b) Moreover, Miller suggests that the FFCC under this case is a
constitutional buffer between the states.
c) The New, Merged Rule: arbitrariness/unfairness, determined by looking for
significant contacts. But remember that the DPC and FFCC still protect distinct
interests (those of individuals and states, respectively).
(1) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague (1981) (p359): the Court merges the DPC and
FFCC choice-of-law rules in this dispute over whether Minnesota can apply
its insurance coverage "stacking" law to allow the plaintiff here to recover
three times as much money. The test: "examine[] the contacts of the State,
whose law was applied, with the parties and with the occurrence or
transaction giving rise to the litigation"; the Court will "invalidate[] the choice
of a law of a State which has had no significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the
occurrence of transaction," because that choice of law would be "arbitrary []or
fundamentally unfair."
(a) Although both the majority and dissent agree on the merged analysis, they
bicker over whether the contacts in this case are significant enough to
constitutionally bless the choice of law. The contacts with Minnesota are:
decedent's employment there, defendant's doing of business there, and the
fact that the plaintiff (decedent's wife) moved there after the accident.

i) Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts (1985) (p376): the Court invalidates a
choice of law, in this class action about natural gas royalties, for the
first time in the modern era. It does not change the Hague significant
contacts test, although it does further articulate it, making it clear that
the contacts analysis needn't be done at all if the chosen law does not
conflict with any other law that could apply (i.e., there's a "false
conflict). Here, though, the Court found a real potential conflict, and
did the contacts analysis and found that only 3% of the plaintiff class
had any connection at all with the forum state (Kansas) that tried to
apply its own law. That was not enough to pass constitutional muster.
a. The Court rejected the contacts that plaintiff urged, including that
some class members were in fact from Kansas, that Kansas has a
strong interest in regulating petroleum industries operating in
Kansas, that the plaintiff class wanted Kansas law to apply, and the
cart-before-the-horse argument that if Kansas law didn't apply the
class certification would fail for inconsistency.
(b) Stevens, concurring along, would not merge the DPC and FFCC
standards.
2. Discrimination
a) Discrimination in Providing a Forum
(1) Mechanisms of discrimination: these might be pursued in order to promote
judicial efficiency, party convenience, or deference to the state that created
the cause of action in question.
(a) Door-closing provisions: those that require a court to refuse to hear certain
disputes from other states.
i) Note that there has not been a problem with door-closing provisions in
the criminal law or family law contexts.
(b) Localizing provisions: those that purport to prohibit the courts of other
states from hearing certain disputes.
(2) The Full Faith and Credit Clause as a check on discrimination
(a) Hughes v. Fetter (1951) (p394): the Court strikes down a Wisconsin door-
closing provision that prohibits Wisconsin's courts from hearing wrongful
death suits brought under the wrongful death statutes of states other than
Wisconsin itself. To reach this result, the Court balances two interests: (1)
the interest in comity and the federal union, embodied in the FFCC, and
(2) Wisconsin's interest in its own policy, embodied in its door-closing
provision.
i) The Court also looks at the contacts with Wisconsin in the case, but
this is merely a supplementary, buttressing rationale.
(b) Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. (1953) (p398): the Court allows
Pennsylvania to apply its own SOL to a claim brought under Alabama's
wrongful death statute, an application that has the effect of door-closing.
That is, the Court simply adheres to its precedent that SOL's are
procedural and that the FFCC therefore doesn't compel a forum state to
substitute its own policy, embodied in its SOL, with that of another state's.
The Court notes, distinguishing other cases such as Hughes, that

Pennsylvania's approach is not discriminatory--everyone gets the same
treatment.
i) Hughes can be specifically distinguished on the fact that there the
Court said that Wisconsin, which had its own wrongful death statute,
was not being forced to subordinate its own policies for others that
were in conflict; whereas here, Pennsylvania, if required to use
Alabama's SOL, would have to subordinate its policy on the expiry of
actions for the conflicting such policies of Alabama.
(c) State of Nevada v. Hall (1979) (p402): the Court allows California to
apply its limitless waiver of sovereign immunity to the State of Nevada,
which has only a limited waiver, but was sued in a California court. To
hold otherwise, the Court says, would require California to subordinate its
own policies for those of another state (cf. Wells) (or surrender
jurisdiction), and the FFCC doesn't require that (see Wells, Shutts, Hague).
i) This is a horizontal sovereign immunity issue, not the usual vertical
(federal-state) sovereign immunity issue, which is covered by the 11th
Amendment.
ii) And the Court specifically notes that although the result here might
promote retaliation among the states, the more serious threat to
constitutional federalism would be if the Court--a federal court--told
California what to law to choose.
b) Substantive Interstate Discrimination
(1) The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a check on discrimination
(a) The Text: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States. Art. IV, Sec. 2.
i) The use of this clause in the choice-of-law context has been limited.
In fact, the use of it, period, has been limited--just to questions about
access to state resources (such as timber). If it did apply in the choice-
of-law context, rational basis analysis would be employed, making it
difficult to invalidate a choice with this clause.
(b) Case
i) Austin v. New Hampshire (1975) (p412): the Court invalidates a New
Hampshire law that had the effect of taxing all commuters into the
state, despite that New Hampshire did not tax its own citizens at all.
The Court strikes the law down under the authority of the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, saying that it requires "substantial
equality of treatment" and the "reasonably fair distribution of
burdens."
a. Despite the result in this case, it's still important to keep in mind
that "substantial equality" does not mean exact equality, and that
all of this, under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
will be analyzed merely for a rational basis.
(2) The Equal Protection Clause as a check on discriminationdiscrimination
(a) The Text: Nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Amend. XIV, Sec. 1.

i) Like the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause has limited application in the choice-of-law context.
This is mainly because rational basis analysis will be employed in
nearly every possible choice-of-law case.
(b) G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn (1982) (p421): the Court upholds a New Jersey
statute that tolls SOLs against corporations without a registered agent in
the state. Because the corporation is not a protected class, and because
states have absolute discretion in setting SOLs (i.e., they implicate no
fundamental right), and finally because the Privileges and Immunities
Clauses protect only "citizens" (which corporations aren't), the corporation
is left with only the Equal Protection Clause, in rational basis mode, to
argue with. And the Court thinks that its reasonable for New Jersey to
assume that it could be hard to find unregistered corporations and
therefore rational for it to toll its SOLs for unregistered corporations.
3. The Commerce Clause (not discussed in class): The Congress shall have power . . .
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with
the Indian Tribes. Art. I., Sec. 8.
III. JUDGMENTS
A. Preclusion Law: we have these doctrines in order to guarantee some degree of finality.
Thus, in a federal system, these doctrines also guarantee some degree of portability.
Note, however, that we eschew finality in some contexts, such as child support,
desegregation, and restraining orders.
1. Res Judicata: the prohibition on the relitigation of a particular claim. I.e., the
protection of the effect of a judgment in subsequent litigation.
a) Types
(1) "Bar": res judicata applied to prevent relitigation of the cause of action that
was actually litigated previously.
(2) "Merger": res judicata applied to prevent relitigation of matters so closely
related to the previously litigated matters that they should have been litigated
all at once.
b) Identity: res judicata requires absolute identity or at least some privity.
2. Collateral Estoppel: the prohibition on the relitigation of a particular issue. I.e., the
protection of prior findings of fact and holdings in subsequent litigation.
a) Identity: originally, collateral estoppel required identity or privity, but these rules
have become relaxed.
3. Bar on reraising rejected arguments
4. Bar on raising arguments not previously raised
5. Full Faith and Credit
a) The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. Art. IV, Sec. 1.
b) The Full Faith and Credit Act: State and Territorial statutes and judicial
proceedings; full faith and credit.
The Acts of legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United

States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. 1738.
6. Judgment Filing Statutes: some states have filing statutes, under which you can file a
copy of a foreign judgment with the state and get full effect of that judgment in the
state where its filed.
a) Idaho has a filing statute, I.C. 10-1302. Filed judgments have "the same effect
and [are] subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening,
vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district court [in Idaho] and may be
enforced or satisfied in like manner." The statute has exceptions, limiting
modification, for child custody and child support judgments.
B. Jurisdictional Objections
1. The "ironclad" rule: Durfee v. Duke (1963) (p642): the Court requires a Missouri
federal district court, sitting in diversity, to give res judicata effect to a Nebraska
judgment determining that certain land was in Nebraska. The Court invokes what
Miller calls the "ironclad rule" that an enforcing state cannot inquire into a judgment-
rendering court's jurisdiction. However, the Court suggests that there's a possible
exception to the ironclad rule if the jurisdictional issue was not "fully and fairly
litigated and finally decided" in the rendering court (this suggestion, however, is
merely dicta here; see Chicot County and Sherrer, prior cases, for suggestion
otherwise).
2. A "land taboo" exception: Fall v. Eastin (1909) (p646): the Court does not require a
Nebraska court to give full faith and credit to a Washington court's judgment over
land located in Nebraska. The Court notes that the Washington court was sitting in
equity and therefore had subject matter jurisdiction only over the parties before it, not
over the actual land in question; thus, the Washington decree could only affect the
parties. This result suggest that there truly is a "land taboo," but one limited to cases
where the land in question was clearly outside of the jurisdiction of the rendering
court.
a) Why a special rule for land? Because if there was no such rule, then land would
have to be registered in every single county in the country or else not be protected
against quiet title actions anywhere. That is, the land taboo promotes efficiency
and convenience for landowners.
b) Note that even in this case, the Washington could have protected its judgment by
coercing the defendant to comply with its order; e.g., through contempt
proceedings.
3. A federal exclusive jurisdiction excpeption: Kalb v. Feuerstein (1940) (p652): the
Court says that a Wisconsin court's dispossession judgment was not due full faith and

credit because is was entered while federal bankruptcy proceedings were pending.
The Court says that Congress has granted the federal bankruptcy courts exclusive,
monopoly jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, and that while those courts are
exercising jurisdiction over certain subject matters, other courts have no jurisdiction
at all over those subject matters. What's more, the Wisconsin court's jurisdiction
doesn't even have to be contested or raised by a collateral attacker--it is simply
completely nonexistent.
C. Substantive Objections
1. The ironclad rule, again: Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) (p657): the Court says that a
Mississippi court must enforce a Missouri judgment even though that judgment (for
collection on a futures contract debt) is directly in conflict with Mississippi's
substantive policy (against the validity of futures contracts) embodied in statute. The
Court concedes that state statutes can deprive a state court of jurisdiction, and so says
that it must determine whether the Mississippi statute at issue was jurisdictional or
merely a rule of decision. Because the statute here was just a rule of decision, it
meant that the Mississippi court had jurisdiction and so under the FFCC had to use it
to give effect to the Missouri judgment.
2. An admistrative proceedings exception: Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. (1980)
(p662): a fractured Court holds that a worker employed in Virginia but injured in
D.C. can collect worker's compensation in Virginia and then get whatever extra
worker's compensation that D.C. will give him. The Court was forced to try to make
sense of two conflicting precedents, Magnolia (saying that a worker's decision to
collect compensation in one state precluded him from seeking it elsewhere, too) and
McMartin (saying that only "unmistakable language" in the state worker's comp.
statute precluding recovery in other states would actually make a worker's first award
res judicata so as to prevent compensation elsewhere). The plurality questioned
McMartin, abrogating its "unmistakable language" rule, but ultimately sided with its
narrow holding, allowing this worker to seek awards in multiple places. The crucial
ratio decidendi for the plurality was that the Virginia judgment was not really a
"judicial proceeding" within the meaning of that term in the FFCC--that rather it was
a mere administrative proceeding, and that the Virginia administrative agency had
limited statutory authority to consider only Virginia law, not to make any choice of
law at all. Thus, the Virginia agency never made a choice of law determination and
therefore full faith and credit is not due.
3. An "exclusive-province"-invasion exception: Baker v. General Motors Corp. (1998)
(p677): the Court does not require Missouri to prevent a specific person from
testifying, even though a Michigan court had issued a permanent injunction
prohibiting that person from testifying. This injunction conflicted with Missouri's
policy of hearing all relevant evidence. The Court says that State A (Missouri, here)
need not enforce an injunction from State B (Michigan, here) that attempts to (1)
accomplish an "official act within the exclusive province" of State A or (2) interfere
with litigation over which State B has no authority. This rule may be limited,
because the doctrines of preclusion, to situations where the litigants in State A are
strangers to the underlying, State B litigation. Still, this case does not change that
State A owes State B's judgment full faith and credit on the merits of the State B
judgment.
a) This result isn't necessarily very radical, because throughout the law of conflicts

is an exception for procedure, where outside of exceptional, unconstitutional
situations (see Dick), a forum is entitled to apply its procedural laws.
D. Preclusion Law Objections
1. Still an ironclad rule: Union National Bank v. Lamb (1949) (p689) (not discussed in
class): the Court requires Missouri to enforce a Colorado judgment that had been
revived in Colorado but could not have been revived in Missouri. Specifically, the
Court cited Roche v. McDonald for the rule that a forum state can't defeat a foreign
judgment on the grounds that it was obtained by a procedure that the forum state
doesn't like or that it was based on a cause of action that the forum would not
recognize.
2. An exception for statutes referring to the rendering state's preclusion law: Watkins v.
Conway (1966) (p691) (not discussed in class): the Court upholds a Georgia statute
that bars all suits on expired judgments that can't be revived in the rendering state.
The Court concluded that the statute was no discriminatory, and that it actually
insures full faith and credit rather than denies it.
3. The last-in-time rule: Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co. (1939) (p696) (not discussed
in class): the Court adopts a "last-in-time" rule for state court judgments rendered
following concurrent litigation--the last one to be issued must be given full faith and
credit.
IV. A Specific Example: Same-Sex Marriage
A. Rules
1. The Defense of Marriage Act
a) Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof. No State, territory,
or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. 28 U.S.C. 1738C.
2. Full Faith and Credit
a) The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. Art. IV, Sec. 1.
b) The Full Faith and Credit Act: State and Territorial statutes and judicial
proceedings; full faith and credit.
The Acts of legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of

such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. 1738.
3. First Restatement
a) 121. Law Governing Validity of Marriage. Except as stated in 131 [Remarriage
After Parties To Divorce Both Forbidden To Remarry] and 132 [Marriage
Declared Void by Law of Domicil], a marriage is valid everywhere if the
requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes
place are complied with.
b) 132. Marriage Declared Void by Law of Domicil. A marriage which is against the
law of the state of domicil of either party, though the requirements of the law of
the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere in
the following cases:
(1) (a) polygamous marriage,
(2) (b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage
is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(3) (c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at
the domicil regarded as odious,
(4) (d) marriage of a domciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even
though celebrated in another state.
c) 134. Marriage Contrary to Public Policy. If any effect of a marriage created by
the law of one state is deemed by the courts of another state sufficiently offensive
to the policy of the latter state, the latter state will refuse to give that effect to the
marriage.
B. Case
1. Burns v. Burns (Ga. 2002) (h/o): this Georgia court decides that it will enforce a
divorce consent decree prohibiting child visitation with a parent cohabiting while not
married, despite that the former wife entered a same-sex civil union in Vermont. The
court rejected the wife's argument that under the FFCC, her civil union was a
marriage in Georgia, saying that (1) Vermont law expressly distinguishes civil unions
from marriages and (2) even if the civil union was a divorce, it would be contrary to
Georgia public policy and Georgia would not have to give it full faith and credit
under DOMA.
C. Commentary
1. Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 799 (1999).
2. David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 Green Bag 2d 7 (1997).
3. Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
Creighton L. Rev. 409 (1998).

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Conflict of Laws outline, Spring 2006. Russell Miller.

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