Comparing Federal Systems

Comparing
Federal Systems
THIRD EDITION
Ronald L. Watts
Published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen‘s University

by McGill-Queen‘s University Press
Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca
Library and Archives Canada
Cataloguing in Publication
Watts, Ronald L.
Comparing federal systems / Ronald L. Watts. — 3rd ed.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-55339-188-3
1. Federal government. 2. Comparative government. I. Queen‘s University
(Kingston, Ont.). School of Policy Studies II. Title.
JC355.W28 2008 321.02 C2008-901113-9
© Copyright 2008
Contents
List of Tables ................................................................................................ ix

List of Figures ............................................................................................... x
Foreword to the First Edition....................................................................... xi
Preface to the Third Edition and Summary ...............................................xiii
Acknowledgements .................................................................................... xvii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Relevance of Comparisons of Federal Systems.........................1

1.2 A Brief History of Federalism...........................................................2
1.3 The Contemporary Relevance of Federalism....................................4
1.4 Definition of Terms and of Principles of Federalism........................8
1.5 Variations in Federations .................................................................18
1.6 Federal Societies, Constitutions and Governments ........................19
1.7 Issues in the Design and Operation of Federations.........................23
1.8 Federations Considered in This Study ............................................24
2. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY FEDERATIONS
2.1 Mature Federations ..........................................................................29

United States of America (1789) ................................................29
The Swiss Confederation (1848) ................................................30
Canada (1867) .............................................................................32
The Commonwealth of Australia (1901) ....................................33
The Federal Republic of Austria (1920) .....................................34
The Federal Republic of Germany (1949)..................................35
The Republic of India (1950)......................................................36
Comparing Federal Systems
iv
2.2 Emergent Federations ......................................................................38

The United Mexican States (1917) .............................................38
The Federation of Malaysia (1963) ............................................39
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) ...................................40
The Kingdom of Spain (1978) ....................................................41
The Federative Republic of Brazil (1988) ..................................42
The Kingdom of Belgium (1993) ...............................................43
The Russian Federation (1993) ...................................................45
The Argentine Republic (1994) ..................................................47
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) ...............48
The Republic of South Africa (1996) .........................................49
The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).....................................50
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999)............................51
2.3 Micro-Federations ...........................................................................52
The Federated States of Micronesia (1978)................................52
The Republic of Belau (1981).....................................................53
The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis (1985).............................54
The Union of the Comoros (2001)..............................................54
2.4 Confederal-Federal Hybrids ............................................................55
United Arab Emirates (1971) ......................................................55
The European Union (1993) .......................................................56
2.5 Post-Conflict Federal Experiments .................................................58
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) ......................58
Republic of Sudan (2005) ...........................................................59
Republic of Iraq (2005)...............................................................60
The Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) ...............................61
3. THE FORMATION OF FEDERATIONS
3.1 The Variety of Factors and Processes..............................................63

3.2 The Balance of Pressures ................................................................63
3.3 Differing Processes in the Creation of Federations ........................65
3.4 Catalysts of Political Integration .....................................................66
3.5 Catalysts of Constituent Unit Autonomy ........................................66
3.6 The Capacity for Federal Government............................................68
3.7 The Influence of Models .................................................................69
4. THE CONSTITUENT UNITS
4.1 The Building Blocks of Federations ...............................................71

4.2 The Number of Constituent Units ...................................................71
4.3 The Size and Wealth of Constituent Units ......................................72
4.4 Categories of Constituent Units ......................................................74
4.5 The Regional Distinctiveness of Constituent Units ........................76
v
4.6 Reforming Constituent Unit Boundaries.........................................78

4.7 Federal Capitals ...............................................................................79
5. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY IN FEDERATIONS
5.1 A Fundamental Feature of Federations ...........................................83

5.2 Relationship between Legislative and Executive Authority ...........86
5.3 Variations in the Form of the Distribution of
Legislative Authority .......................................................................87
Exclusive Legislative Authority ..................................................87
Concurrent Legislative Authority................................................87
Shared Authority .........................................................................88
Residual Authority ......................................................................89
Emergency or Override Powers ..................................................90
5.4 The Scope of Legislative Authority Allocated ................................90
5.5 Distribution of Administrative Responsibilities..............................92
5.6 Evolution of the Distribution of Powers .........................................93
6. THE DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCES
6.1 Importance of the Allocation of Financial Resources.....................95

6.2 The Distribution of Revenue Powers ..............................................95
Allocation of Tax Powers ............................................................96
Natural Resource Revenues ........................................................97
Other Revenue Raising Issues.....................................................99
6.3 The Allocation of Expenditure Powers .........................................100
6.4 The Issue of Vertical and Horizontal Imbalances .........................103
6.5 The Role of Financial Transfers ....................................................104
6.6 Conditional or Unconditional Transfers........................................106
6.7 Equalization Transfers ...................................................................108
6.8 Processes and Institutions for Adjusting Financial
Arrangements ................................................................................112
7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
7.1 Importance of Processes for Intergovernmental Collaboration ....117

7.2 Forms and Extent of Intergovernmental Relations .......................118
7.3 Other Devices for Flexibility and Adjustment in
the Distribution of Powers.............................................................120
7.4 Cooperative versus Competitive Federalism.................................122
7.5 Implications for the Democratic Character of Federations...........123
8. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN FEDERATIONS
8.1 Political and Constitutional Asymmetry Distinguished................125

8.2 Political Asymmetry ......................................................................125
8.3 Constitutional Asymmetry.............................................................127
9. MULTILEVEL FEDERAL SYSTEMS
9.1 Membership in Supra-Federal Organizations ...............................131

9.2 The Place of Local Governments ..................................................132
10. THE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS OF
FEDERALGOVERNMENTS
10.1 The Importance of Shared Federal Institutions as
a Focus for Unity ...........................................................................135
10.2 Institutions Based on the Separation of Powers or
Parliamentary Principles................................................................136
10.3 The Significance for the Representativeness and
Effectiveness of Federal Governments..........................................137
10.4 The Impact of Electoral Systems and Political Parties .................144
10.5 The Role of Federal Second Chambers.........................................147
Bicameralism within Federations .............................................147
Selection of Members ...............................................................147
Basis of Regional Representation .............................................152
Powers of Second Chambers Relative to First Chambers ........153
Role of Federal Second Chambers............................................153
10.6 Do Federal Second Chambers Constrain Democracy? .................154
11. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY IN FEDERATIONS
11.1 The Constitution as Supreme Law ................................................157
11.2 Processes for Constitutional Adjudication and Judicial Review ..158
11.3 Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts...................................159
11.4 Constitutional Amendment Procedures.........................................161
11.5 The Role of Constitutional Bills of Rights ...................................165
11.6 Provisions for Formal Secession ...................................................168
12. DEGREES OF DECENTRALIZATION AND
NON-CENTRALIZATION IN FEDERATIONS
12.1 Conceptual Issues in Measuring Decentralization and
Relative Autonomy ........................................................................171
Legislative Decentralization......................................................172
Administrative Decentralization ...............................................173
Financial Decentralization ........................................................174
Unfunded Mandates ..................................................................175
Decentralization to Non-governmental Agencies .....................175
Constitutional Limitations ........................................................175
vii
The Character of Federal Decision Making..............................175

12.2 A Comparative Assessment ...........................................................176
12.3 Minimum Federal Powers .............................................................177
13. THE PATHOLOGY OF FEDERATIONS
13.1 Significance of the Pathology of Federations ...............................179

13.2 Sources of Stress ...........................................................................180
The Distribution and Character of Internal Social Divisions ...180
The Role of Institutions and Structures ....................................181
Strategies Adopted to Combat Disintegration ..........................182
Polarizing Political Processes ...................................................183
13.3 The Special Problem of Two-Unit Federations.............................184
13.4 Processes and Consequences of Disintegration ............................185
13.5 Post-Conflict Situations.................................................................187
14. CONCLUSIONS
14.1 Implications Drawn from This Comparative Study ......................189

14.2 Federalism and Liberal-Democratic Values
..................................192
APPENDIX A
The Distribution of Powers and Functions in Selected Federations:
A Comparative Overview .........................................................................193
SELECTED READINGS .........................................................................199
List of Tables
Table 1: The Spectrum of Federal Political Systems .....................................10
Table 2: Contemporary Functioning Federations (including
quasi-federations)..............................................................................12
Table 3: Constitutional and Operational Character of Nominal
Federations ........................................................................................13
Table 4: Some Contemporary Confederations and Hybrids...........................15
Table 5: Associated States and Federacies .....................................................15
Table 6: Decentralized Unions with Some Federal Features .........................16
Table 7: Examples of Varieties of Federal Arrangements ..............................17
Table 8: Population of Full-Fledged Constituent Units..................................73
Table 9: Federal Government Revenues before Intergovernmental
Transfers as a Percentage of Total (Federal-State-Local)
Government Revenues ....................................................................102
Table 10: Federal Government Expenditures after Intergovernmental
Government Expenditures ..............................................................103
Table 11: Intergovernmental Transfers as a Percentage of Provincial or
State Revenues ................................................................................105
Table 12: Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Federal Transfers ..........107
Table 13: Federal Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Total
Provincial/State Government Revenues .........................................108 Table 14:
Equalization Arrangements.............................................................110 Table 15:
Arenas for Resolving Issues of Federal Finance ............................113
Table 16: Constitutional Asymmetry of Full-Fledged Constituent Units
in Federal Systems ..........................................................................128
Table 17: Forms of Executives and Legislatures in Federations ....................138
Table 18: Variations in Selection, Composition, Powers and Role of
Second Chambers in Federations ...................................................148
Table 19: Selection, Composition and Powers of Federal Second
Chambers ........................................................................................149
x Comparing Federal Systems
List of Figures
Figure 1: The Interaction of Federal Societies, Constitutions and

Governments .....................................................................................22 Figure 2:
Federal Evolution through Time .......................................................22
Comparing Federal Systems xi
Foreword to the First Edition
For many observers, the Canadian debate over the reform of our federal systems
has fallen into predicable patterns. Decades of argument about the central issues
facing the federation seem to have etched deep grooves in our collective
consciousness, subtly guiding successive rounds of discussion along familiar —
and unsuccessful — lines. Yet, as Ron Watts emphasizes, Canadian debates
underestimate the wonderful flexibility inherent in the central idea of federalism
and the rich variety of federal arrangements that exist around the world. The
central message of his monograph is that a comparative perspective can expand
our understanding of the possibilities before us.
To broaden our vision, Professor Watts draws on his unique breadth of
knowledge of federal systems. He explores the complexities of federations in
advanced industrial nations such as the United States, Switzerland, Australia,
Austria and Germany, multilingual federations such as India and Malaysia,
emerging federations such as Belgium and Spain, and federations that have
failed such as Czechoslovakia and Pakistan. In exploring this diverse set of
countries, he focuses on the ways in which they cope with the kinds of tensions
that dominate Canadian headlines every day.
Ron Watts is Principal Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Political Studies at
Queen‘s University, and is a Fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations. He has devoted a lifetime of study to the comparative analysis of
federal systems, and is an international leader in the field. He has also served as
an advisor to governments on many occasions. In 1978–79, he was a
Commissioner on the Task Force on Canadian Unity (the Pepin-Robarts
Commission); and in 1991– 92, he served the federal government as Assistant
Secretary to Cabinet for Federal-Provincial Relations (Constitutional Affairs).
Since 1991 he has been President of the International Association of Centers for
Federal Studies.
The Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, which is the only centre
dedicated exclusively to federal studies in Canada, provides a forum for research
and debate over critical questions confronting the Canadian and other
federations.
xii Comparing Federal Systems
This study is part of the Institute‘s series of research monographs that examines
a broad range of issues on federalism and is a companion piece to the recent
study by Peter M. Leslie, The Maastricht Model: A Canadian Perspective on the
European Union. All contributions to this series are peer reviewed.
The research for this publication was supported by the Privy Council Office
of the Government of Canada. However, the views expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent those of the Government of Canada or
the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.
Harvey Lazar
Director
January 1997
Comparing Federal Systems xiii
Preface to the Third Edition and Summary
Many observers have noted that during the past decade there has been increasing
interest throughout the world in adopting federal political institutions. Indeed,
there are at present some two dozen countries encompassing over 40 percent of
the world‘s population that exhibit the fundamental characteristics of a
federation. A distinctive feature about this current popularity of federalism in
the world is that the application of the federal idea has taken an enormous
variety of forms and that there have emerged new and innovative variants.
In these circumstance and at a time when the future of the Canadian
federation was very much in question, the first edition, published in 1996 under
the title Comparing Federalism in the 1990s, was written with a view to looking
at the theory and operation of federal systems elsewhere in the world for both
the positive and the negative lessons they might provide Canadians. That edition
focused upon a selected group of twelve federations chosen for their particular
relevance to issues that were currently prominent in Canada and for the lessons
they might provide. Four categories of federations were selected. The first was
that of federations in developed industrial societies including the United States
(1789), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), Australia (1901), Austria (1920) and
Germany (1949). The second category consisted of two federations in Asia
which, in spite of all their problems, have had a remarkable record of
accommodating their intensely multilingual, multicultural and multiracial
populations: India (1950) and Malaysia (1963). The third category was
represented by two recently emerged and emerging federations in developed
industrial societies: Belgium (1993) and Spain (1978). These two have adopted
innovative approaches to the application of the federal idea, the former in
relation to bicommunal arrangements and the latter in terms of an asymmetrical
approach to accommodating its Autonomous Communities. The fourth category
consisted of two bicommunal federations that had failed — Czechoslovakia and
Pakistan — providing insights into the pathology of federations.
Three years after the first edition was published, with copies of that edition
sold out, the opportunity was taken to update the text generally in a second
edition entitled Comparing Federal Systems. It is now eight years since that
edition first appeared, and given the many developments that have occurred
xiv Comparing Federal Systems
internationally it has seemed appropriate once again to update the text, hence
this third edition. Moreover, since the demand, not just in Canada but elsewhere,
has led to the need for repeated reprinting of the second edition (five to date),
this new edition is now directed less specifically at a Canadian audience and
more widely at the lessons that can be learned from the experiences of
federations throughout the world. With this in mind, two new chapters have
been added: chapter 3, which reviews the factors and processes leading to the
formation of federations, and chapter 4, which outlines the character of the
constituent units within federations. As well, the range of federations
specifically considered has been expanded, both in the text and in the tables,
particularly with the inclusion of references to the Latin American federations
and also to a number of others. The tables have all been extensively updated,
and the list of suggested readings has been enlarged to take account of numerous
significant books and articles that have appeared since the second edition was
published.
The introductory chapter considers some broad issues, including the relevance
and limits of comparatives studies, the history of federalism and its particular
relevance today, conceptual issues relating to the notion of federalism, and
identification of issues in the design and operation of federations.
The second chapter provides a brief overview of the contemporary federations
considered in this study and outlines the distinctive features of each.
The third chapter reviews the different factors and processes that have led to
the creation of federations. There is no single factor that explains all examples.
In each case a range of factors has served as catalysts for some balance in the
pressures for both political integration and regional autonomy.
The fourth chapter considers the constituent units that have served as the
building blocks within federations. Significant variations are noted in the size
and number of these units, in the degree to which they express distinct linguistic,
ethnic or religious communities, and the existence of minorities within them.
Different arrangements for federal capitals are also noted.
The fifth chapter examines how the objective of balancing unity and diversity
within different federal societies has been reflected in the internal distribution of
powers and the scope of responsibilities assigned to each sphere of government
in different federations. A finding that emerges is the great variety among
federations, both in the form and in the allocation of specific responsibilities in
them.
Chapter 6 focuses upon the distribution of financial resources within
federations. This is an important aspect since it enables or constrains what the
different arenas of government within each federation can do in exercising their
constitutionally assigned legislative and executive responsibilities. The
allocations of revenues and expenditures in different federations is compared.
Comparing Federal Systems xv
This indicates the virtually inevitable existence of vertical and horizontal

imbalances and the need for intergovernmental transfers to correct these. There
is considerable variation in the extent to which conditional or unconditional
transfers are employed and in the use of schemes of equalization transfers. An
important aspect considered as well is the processes and institutions used for
adjusting the financial arrangements and the variety of forms that these have
taken.
The processes that federations have adopted for achieving more general
flexibility and adjustment through intergovernmental collaboration are
considered in chapter 7. It includes a consideration of the relative merits of
cooperative and competitive federalism and their implications for democratic
accountability. It would appear that a blend of intergovernmental cooperation
and competition is in the long run most desirable.
The issue of symmetry and asymmetry among the constituent units within a
federation is addressed in chapter 8. A distinction is made between political
asymmetry and constitutional asymmetry among the constituent units within a
federation, and examples of each are identified. In some federations
constitutional asymmetry, or at least the advocacy of it, has induced counter-
pressures for symmetry, suggesting that there may be limits beyond which
extreme asymmetry may become dysfunctional. Nevertheless, in a number of
federations the recognition of some significant constitutional asymmetry has
provided an effective way of accommodating major differences in the interests
and pressures for autonomy among constituent units.
A notable feature of the contemporary world is the membership of a number
of federations within even wider federal organizations. Chapter 9 therefore
considers the significance of multilevel federal systems resulting from the
increasing emphasis both upon supra-federation organizations and upon the role
of local governments.
The representative institutions of federal governments are compared in
chapter 10 with particular attention given to the difference between those based
on the principle of the separation of powers between executives and legislatures
and those based on the fusion of the executive and the legislature through the
adoption of responsible parliamentary executives. These differences have
affected the particular character of intergovernmental relations, the process for
giving voice to regional interests in federal policy making, the character of their
political parties, and the role of federal second chambers.
A characteristic feature of federations generally is an emphasis upon
constitutional supremacy as the ultimate source defining federal and state or
provincial jurisdiction. A number of issues relating to the status of constitutions
within federations are considered in chapter 11, including the status of their
constitutions as supreme law, the processes of judicial review and the role of the
xvi Comparing Federal Systems
courts, constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional bills of

rights, and constitutional provisions for secession.
Chapter 12 examines centralization and non-centralization in various
federations. While identifying the conceptual problems inherent in attempting to
measure relative decentralization and autonomy, an effort is made to assess the
degree of decentralization in different federations.
Chapter 13 turns to the pathology of federations. It includes an examination
of the sources of stress in federations and the special problem of bicommunal
federations with particular reference to the failures of Czechoslovakia and
Pakistan. The chapter also gives consideration to the processes and
consequences of the disintegration of federations. It notes that where separation
occurs, despite professions in advance about the desirability of continued
economic linkages after separation, in practice emotions aroused at the time of
separation have usually meant that for a considerable subsequent period
economic ties have fallen far below expectations.
The concluding chapter considers the importance of public acceptance of the
basic values and processes required for federal systems to operate effectively:
explicit recognition of multiple identities and loyalties, and an overarching sense
of shared purposes and objectives. It also emphasizes the enormous variety of
ways in which the federal idea can be applied to meet particular conditions, and
the value of proceeding by pragmatic and incremental adjustments. Rigid and
unbending federations that fail to make the substantial adjustments necessary in
changing circumstances, however, are prone to crack and disintegrate. Finally, it
considers the relationship between the values of federalism and liberal
democracy.
Ronald L. Watts
December 2007
Acknowledgements
I would especially like to thank April Chang for invaluable research assistance
in the preparation of the third edition, particularly the complete revision of the
tables, updating information, and the preparation of the index, and John McLean
for earlier assistance with both the first and second editions. I would like to
Comparing Federal Systems xvii
express my gratitude to George Anderson, who encouraged the writing of the

first edition and who now as President of the Forum of Federations encouraged
and helped the preparation of this third edition by financial assistance from the
Forum. Douglas Brown read earlier drafts of the first edition and provided
helpful comments, as did James Hurley and David Péloquin. Uwe Leonardy and
Harihar Bhattacharyya made helpful suggestions for revisions in the second
edition. Thomas Fleiner and his colleagues at the Institute of Federalism in
Fribourg, Switzerland, assisted by their interpretation of the significance of the
total revision of the Swiss constitution in 1999. George Anderson, David
Cameron, Cheryl Saunders and John Kincaid reviewed the text of the third
edition. I am grateful to all those who have provided advice, but of course,
responsibility for any errors or misrepresentations remains mine alone.
I am also grateful to Patti Candido and Mary Kennedy for their assistance in
the preparation of all these editions even to the extent of interrupting vacation
time. Eric Leclerc and Hillary Ryde spent many hours preparing the text of this
third edition, and Carlotta Lemieux undertook the onerous task of copyediting.
In addition, I acknowledge the work of Mark Howes and Valerie Jarus of the
School of Policy Studies Publications Unit at Queen‘s University for all three
editions.
Ronald L. Watts
December 2007
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARISONS OF FEDERAL

SYSTEMS
In the early years of the 21st century the world appears to be in the midst of a
paradigm shift from a world of sovereign nation-states to a world of diminished
state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutionally federal
character. Indeed, there are at present some twenty-five countries encompassing
over 40 percent of the world‘s population that each exhibits the fundamental
characteristics of a functioning federation. There would appear to be some value,
therefore, in looking at the theory and operation of federations for both the
positive and the negative lessons that might be learned from their experience.
At the outset it should be noted that the comparison of federations requires
some caution. There is no single pure model of federation that is applicable
everywhere. Rather, the basic notion of involving the combination of regional
self-rule for some purposes and shared-rule for others within a single political
system so that neither is subordinate to the other has been applied in different
ways to fit different circumstances. 1 Federations have varied and continue to
vary in many ways: in the character and significance of the underlying economic
and social diversities; in the number of constituent units and the degree of
symmetry or asymmetry in their size, resources and constitutional status; in the
scope of the allocation of legislative, executive and expenditure responsibilities;
in the allocation of taxing power and resources; in the character of federal
government institutions and the degree of regional input to federal policy
making; in the procedures for resolving conflicts and facilitating collaboration
between interdependent governments; and in procedures for formal and informal
adaptation and change.
1
The epigram of federation as ―regional self-rule plus shared rule‖ was introduced by
Daniel J. Elazar. See Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, Al: University of
Alabama Press, 1987).
2 Comparing Federal Systems
One cannot, therefore, just pick models off a shelf. Even where similar
institutions are adopted, different circumstances may make them operate
differently. A classic illustration of this is the operation of the similar formal
constitutional amendment procedures in Switzerland and in Australia. Both
involve referendums for ratification of constitutional amendments requiring
double majorities, i.e., a majority of the federal population and majorities in the
majority of the constituent units. In Switzerland over 110 formal constitutional
amendments met this requirement between 1891 and 1999 (over three-quarters
of those initiated by Parliament and submitted to referendum), but in Australia of
42 attempts since 1901 only 8 have succeeded.
As long as these cautions are kept in mind, there is a genuine value in
undertaking comparative analyses. Indeed, many problems are common to
virtually all federations. Comparisons may therefore help us in several ways.
They may help to identify options that might otherwise be overlooked. They
may allow us to foresee more clearly the consequences of particular
arrangements advocated. Through identifying similarities and differences they
may draw attention to certain features of our own arrangements whose
significance might otherwise be underestimated. Furthermore, comparisons may
suggest both positive and negative lessons; we can learn not only from the
successes but also from the difficulties or failures of other federations and of the
mechanisms and processes they have employed to deal with problems.
1.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERALISM
While the United States, which adopted a federal constitution in 1787, is often
regarded as the first modern federation, the history of federalism is much older.
The first documented federal system came into being among the ancient
Israelite tribes over 3200 years ago. 2 Of similar antiquity were the
confederations of the Bedouin tribes and the Native confederacies in North
America. The early leagues of the Hellenic city-states in what is today Greece
and Asia Minor were designed to aggregate communal democracies to foster
trade and secure defence. 3 The Roman Republic established asymmetrical
arrangements whereby Rome became the federate power and weaker cities were
attached to it as federal partners.4
The medieval period saw self-governing cities in what is now northern Italy
and Germany, and cantons in Switzerland linking in loose confederations for
2
Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism: An Overview (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), p. 19.
3
E.A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, ed. J.B. Bury
(London & New York: Macmillan, 1893).
4
Elazar, Federalism, p. 20.
Introduction 3
trade and defence purposes. The Swiss confederation established in 1291 lasted
despite some disruptions until 1798 and was renewed 1815–47. In the late
sixteenth century an independent confederation, the United Provinces of the
Netherlands, was established during a revolt against Spain. Both the Swiss and
Netherlands confederations were affected by the Reformation, which sharpened
internal divisions. This period also saw the first writing on explicitly federal
theory, exemplified by the Politica MethodiceDigesta of Althusius and
subsequently by the efforts of German theorists to provide a grounding for a
restored and modernized Holy Roman Empire. Several of the British settlements
in North America, particularly in New England, were based on federal
arrangements growing out of Reformed Protestantism.
Following the American Revolution the newly independent states established
a confederation in 1781. Its deficiencies, however, led to its transformation in
1789, following the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, into the first modern
federation. Switzerland, after a brief civil war, transformed its confederation into
a federation in 1848. Canada became the third modern federation in 1867. In
1871 the North German Federation of 1867 was expanded to include south
German states. Not long after, in 1901, Australia became a full-fledged
federation. In addition, during the nineteenth century a number of Latin
American republics — Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil — adopted
federal structures in imitation of the U.S. federation, but these proved unstable,
suffering periods of autocratic and military rule.
The second half of the twentieth century saw a proliferation of federations as
well as other federal forms to unite multi-ethnic communities in former colonial
areas and in Europe. New federations or quasi-federations, not all of which have
survived, were founded in Asia, for example, in Indochina (1945), Burma
(1948), Indonesia (1949), India (1950), Pakistan (1956), Malaya (1948 and
1957) and then Malaysia (1963); in the Middle East, for example, in the United
Arab Emirates (1971); in Africa, for example, Libya (1951), Ethiopia (1952),
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953), Nigeria (1954), Mali (1959), the Congo (1960),
Cameroon (1961), and Comoros (1978); and in the Caribbean, for example, the
West Indies (1958). Among the federations founded or restored in central and
eastern Europe were those of Austria (1945), Yugoslavia (1946), Germany
(1949) and Czechoslovakia (1970).
Between 1960 and the late 1980s, however, it became increasingly clear that
federal systems were not the panacea that many had imagined them to be. Many
of the post-war federal experiments experienced difficulties and a number of
them were temporarily suspended or abandoned outright. These experiences
suggested that, even when undertaken with the best of motives, there are limits
to the appropriateness of federal solutions or particular federal forms in certain
circumstances.
Despite these developments there was a revival of interest in federal political

solutions in the 1990s. Belgium (which transformed its constitution into a
fullfledged federal one in 1993), South Africa (which in 1996 confirmed with
modifications a constitutional hybrid of federal and unitary features originally
instituted in the interim constitution of 1994) and Spain (which as a result of the
operation of the 1978 constitution has, in practice, become increasingly a
federation in all but name) have been moving towards new and often innovative
federal and quasi-federal forms. In South America, following earlier failures,
Brazil (1988), Argentina (1994) and Venezuela (1999) adopted new federal
constitutions, and Mexico from 2000 on made efforts to bring greater reality to
its federalism. Following the breakup of the USSR, Russia adopted a new
federal constitution in 1993. With the restoration of civilian rule, Nigeria in 1999
established a new federal constitution. There have also been efforts to resolve
severe conflicts by federal experiments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995),
Sudan (2005), Iraq (2005) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006).
Furthermore, federal solutions have also been mooted, although not yet
achieved, in Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Nepal. In Italy too there has been an
evolution towards the adoption of a federal system. The United Kingdom has
adopted new devolutionary arrangements for Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland. Progress towards greater integration in what has become the European
Union has also heightened interest in federal ideas. Political leaders, leading
intellectuals and even some journalists increasingly refer to federalism as a
liberating and positive form of political organization.
1.3 THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF FEDERALISM
Thus, federalism is far from being an obsolete nineteenth-century form of

government inappropriate in the contemporary world as some have argued. In
fact, in the past decade and a half it is the concept of the nation-state, developed
in the seventeenth century, that more and more people have been coming to
regard as obsolete. Observers have noted that we appear to be moving from a
world of sovereign nation-states to a world of diminished state sovereignty and
increased interstate linkages of a constitutionally federal character. There are at
present, among the 192 politically sovereign states recognized by the United
Nations, 25 that are functioning federations in their character, claim to be
federations or exhibit the major characteristics of federations. They contain
about two billion people, or 40 percent of the world population, and they
encompass some 510 constituent or federated units. In addition to these
federations, there have emerged new variants in the application of the federal
idea. Just one of many examples is the European Union where individual
federations, unions and unitary states have ―pooled their sovereignty‖ (as they
Introduction 5
express it) in a hybrid structure which has come to involve elements of

confederation and federation.
There are a number of reasons for the contemporary international trends both
to increased pooling of sovereignty among states in various federal forms and
also to increased devolution within countries. First, modern developments in
transportation, social communications, technology and industrial organization
have produced pressures at one and the same time for larger political
organizations and for smaller ones. The pressure for larger political units has
been generated by the goals shared by most Western and non-Western societies
today: a desire for progress, a rising standard of living, social justice, and
influence in the world arena, and by a growing awareness of worldwide
interdependence in an era whose advanced technology makes both mass
destruction and mass construction possible. The desire for smaller, self-
governing political units has arisen from the desire to make governments more
responsive to the individual citizen and to give expression to primary group
attachments — linguistic and cultural ties, religious connections, historical
traditions and social practices — which provide the distinctive basis for a
community‘s sense of identity and yearning for self-determination. Given these
dual pressures throughout the world, more and more peoples have come to see
some form of federalism, combining a shared government for specified common
purposes with autonomous action by constituent units of government for
purposes related to maintaining their regional distinctiveness, as allowing the
closest institutional approximation to the complex multicultural and
multidimensional economic, social and political reality of the contemporary
world.
Second, and closely related, is the recognition that an increasingly global
economy has itself unleashed economic and political forces strengthening both
international and local pressures at the expense of the traditional nation-state.
Global communications and consumership have awakened desires in the
smallest and most remote villages around the world for access to the global
marketplace of goods and services. As a result, governments have been faced
increasingly with the desires of their people to be both global consumers and
local citizens at the same time. Tom Courchene has labelled this trend
―glocalization.‖5 Thus, the nation-state itself is simultaneously proving both too
small and too large to serve all the desires of its citizens. Because of the
development of the world market economy, the old-fashioned nation-state can
no longer deliver many of the benefits its citizens value, such as rising living
standards and job security. Self-sufficiency of the nation-state is widely
recognized as unattainable and nominal sovereignty is less appealing if it means
5
Thomas J. Courchene, ―Glocalization: The Regional/International Interface,‖
Canadian Journal of Regional Science, 18:1 (1995): 1–20.
that, in reality, people have less control over decisions that crucially affect them.
At the same time, nation-states have come to be too remote from individual
citizens to provide a sense of democratic control and to respond clearly to the
specific concerns and preference of their citizens. In such a context federalism
with its different interacting levels of government has provided a way of
mediating the variety of global and local citizen preferences.
Third, the spread of market-based economies is creating socioeconomic
conditions conducive to support for the federal idea. Among these are the
emphasis on contractual relationships; the recognition of the non-centralized
character of a market-based economy; entrepreneurial self-governance and
consumer rights consciousness; markets that thrive on diversity rather than
homogeneity, on interjurisdictional mobility and on competition as well as
cooperation; and the recognition that people do not have to like each other in
order to benefit each other. There has been a long association between
federations and market economies and as Kincaid has noted federal countries
have been more likely than non-federal countries to have a market economy. 6
Fourth, changes in technology have been generating new and more federal
models of industrial organization with decentralized and ―flattened hierarchies‖
involving non-centralized interactive networks. This in turn has produced more
favourable attitudes towards non-centralized political organization.
Fifth, increasing public attention, especially in Europe, has been given to the
principle of ―subsidiarity,‖ the notion that a ―higher‖ political body should take
up only those tasks that cannot be accomplished by the ―lower‖ political bodies
themselves. There are some problems with the concept: it is difficult to translate
into legal terms, it has a clearly hierarchical character, and it implies that
ultimately it is for the ―higher‖ body to decide at which level tasks should be
performed. Nevertheless, the decentralist thrust of the subsidiarity principle has
been instrumental in encouraging wider interest in a ―citizen-oriented
federalism.‖
Yet another factor has been the resilience of the classical federations in the
face of changing conditions. The constitutions of the United States (1789),
Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867) and Australia (1901) are among the longest
continuously surviving of any in the world today. In spite of problems
experienced over the past three decades, these four federations along with
Germany, another federation, have displayed a degree of flexibility and
adaptability.
Also contributing to the appeal of federation as a model has been the
consistent placing of 8 federations within the top 21 of the some 174 sovereign
John Kincaid, ―Federalism and Democracy: Comparative Empirical and Theoretical

6
Respectives‖, paper presented at workshop on ―Federalism and Democracy‖, Centre for

Federal Studies, University of Kent, Canterbury, April 2-6, 2006.
Introduction 7
states in the annual United Nations ranking in terms of economic welfare,

respect for rights and quality of life. 7 Indeed in 2006, Australia ranked third,
Canada sixth, USA eighth, Switzerland ninth, Belgium thirteenth, Austria
fourteenth, Spain nineteenth and Germany twenty-first as ―the world‘s most
liveable countries.‖ The example of the progressive widening and deepening of
the European Union has also provided an influential model for closer
collaboration among states.
For all these reasons, the federal idea is now more popular internationally than
at any time in history. This suggests that state builders should be wary of
rejecting the advantages that so many elsewhere see in federal solutions.
A distinctive feature about the current popularity of federalism in the world is
that the application of the federal idea has taken a great variety of forms. The
degrees of centralization or decentralization differ across federations, as do their
financial arrangements, the character of their federal legislative and executive
institutions, institutional arrangements for facilitating intergovernmental
relations, judicial arrangements for umpiring internal conflicts, and procedures
for constitutional amendment. Among interesting recent developments and
innovations has been the acceptance in an increasing number of instances of
some degree of asymmetry in the relationship of member units to federations or
to supranational organizations. Significant examples in practice include
Belgium, India, Malaysia, Russia, Spain and, following the Maastricht Treaty,
the European Union. Another has been the trend for federations themselves to
become constituent members of even wider federations or supranational
organizations. Examples are Germany, Belgium and Austria within the European
Union.8 It is also worth noting that the three members of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) — Canada, the USA and Mexico — are each
themselves federations. Thus, there has been an emerging trend towards three or
even four (not just two) levels of federal organization to reconcile supranational,
national, regional and local impulses and thereby to maximize the realization of
citizen preferences.
1.4 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND OF PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERALISM
7
United Nations Development Programme, Human Resources Report (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006). The paper by John Kincaid, op. cit., found a positive
empirical association generally between federal countries and relatively high Human
Development Index, human rights and democracy scores as compared to non-federal
countries.
8
To complicate the picture further, Benelux, one of whose members is itself a
federation (Belgium), represents a confederation within the wider confederal European
Union.
There has been much scholarly debate about the definition of federalism.
Generally, in this debate the term ―federalism‖ has been widely used both as a
normative idea and as a descriptive category for a certain category of political
institutions. For the sake of clarity, however, I shall distinguish the three terms:
―federalism,‖ ―federal political systems,‖ and ―federations.‖ In this distinction,
―federalism‖ is used basically not as a descriptive but as a normative term and
refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-
rule and regional self-rule. It is based on the presumed value and validity of
combining unity and diversity, i.e., of accommodating, preserving and
promoting distinct identities within a larger political union. The essence of
federalism as a normative principle is the value of perpetuating both union and
non-centralization at the same time.
―Federal political systems‖ and ―federations‖ are used as descriptive terms
applying to particular forms of political organization. The term ―federal political
systems‖ refers to a broad category of political systems in which, by contrast to
the single central source of political and legal authority in unitary systems, there
are two (or more) levels of government thus combining elements of shared-rule
(collaborative partnership) through a common government and regional self-rule
(constituent unit autonomy) for the governments of the constituent units. This
broad genus encompasses a whole spectrum of more specific non-unitary forms,
i.e., species ranging from ―quasi-federations‖ and ―federations‖ to
―confederacies‖ and beyond. As in a spectrum, the categories are not sharply
delineated but shade into one another at the margins.
Daniel Elazar has identified the following as specific categories within this
range: unions, constitutionally decentralized unions, federations, confederations,
federacies, associated statehood, condominiums, leagues and joint functional
authorities.9 (See table 1 for definitions of these terms.) Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
list current examples of these federal forms. Furthermore, other political systems
outside the general category of federal systems may incorporate some federal
arrangements because political leaders and nation-builders are less bound by
considerations of theoretical purity than by the pragmatic search for workable
political arrangements. Such considerations may also lead to hybrids such as the
European Union which, although originally a purely confederal arrangement, has
in recent years incorporated some features of a federation.
Within the broad genus of federal political systems, ―federations‖ represent a
particular species in which neither the federal nor the constituent units of
government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign
powers derived from the constitution rather than from another level of
government, each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise
9
Elazar, Federalism, 2–7, 16, and Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Federal Systems of the World,
2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman Group, 1994), p. xvi.
Introduction 9
of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and each is directly elected by its
citizens. Table 2 identifies 25 contemporary functioning examples. This book
focuses primarily on analysing the design and operation of these as a form of
government which at the beginning of the twenty-first century is proving to be
so widespread.
The generally common structural characteristics of federations as a specific
form of federal political system are the following:
• at least two orders of government, one for the whole federation and the
other for the regional units, each acting directly on its citizens;
• a formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority
and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government
ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order;
• provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within
the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular
form of the federal second chamber;
• a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the
consent for amendments of a significant proportion of the constituent units;
• an umpire (in the form of courts, provision for referendums, or an upper
house with special powers); and
• processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for
those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably
overlap.
There are several important points to note. First, there is an important
distinction between constitutional form and operational reality. In many political
systems political practice has transformed the way the constitution operates. In
Canada and India, for example, the initial constitution was quasi-federal,
containing some central overriding powers more typical of unitary systems. But
in Canada these powers have fallen into complete disuse and in India, although
still employed, they have been moderated so that in both cases operational
reality comes closer to that of a full-fledged federation. Other particularly
notable examples of the impact of operational practice have occurred in
Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain and Venezuela. Table 3
summarizes the constitutional and operational character of 28 nominal
federations plus the European Union. Thus, to understand federal systems
generally and federations in particular it is necessary to study both their
constitutional law and their politics and how these interact.
TABLE 1: The Spectrum of Federal Political Systems
Unions Polities compounded in such a way that the constituent units preserve
their respective integrities primarily or exclusively through the
common organs of the general government rather than through dual
government structures. New Zealand and Lebanon are examples.
Belgium prior to becoming a federation in 1993 was an example
(when central legislators served also with a dual mandate as regional
or community councillors).
Constitutionally Basically unitary in form, in the sense that ultimate authority rests
decentralized with the central government but incorporate constitutionally
unions protected sub-national units of government that have functional
autonomy. See table 6 for examples.
Federations Compound polities, combining strong constituent units and a strong
general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the
people through a constitution, and each empowered to deal directly
with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, administrative and
taxing powers, and each with major institutions directly elected by
the citizens. Currently there are some 25 countries in the world that
meet or claim to meet the basic criteria of a functioning federation,
although in the cases of South Africa and Spain their constitutions
have not adopted the label. See table 2 for functioning examples. In
addition, efforts to create federations in post-conflict situations are
currently underway in three countries (see table 3).
Confederations These occur where several pre-existing polities join together to form
a common government for certain limited purposes (for foreign
affairs, defence or economic purposes), but the common government
is dependent upon the will of the constituent governments, being
composed of delegates from the constituent governments, and
therefore having only an indirect electoral and fiscal base. Historical
examples include Switzerland 1291–1798 and 1815–47, and the
United States 1781– 89. In the contemporary world, the European
Union is primarily a confederation, although it has increasingly
incorporated some features of a federation. See table 4 for other
examples.
Federacies
This term, coined by Elazar (1987, pp. 7, 54–7) refers to political
arrangements where a smaller unit or units are linked to a larger
polity, but the smaller unit or units retain considerable autonomy,
have a minimum role in the government of the larger one, and the
relationship can be dissolved only by mutual agreement. Examples
are the relationship of Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas to the
United States. See table 5 for other examples.
Associated states
These relationships are similar to federacies, but they can be
dissolved by either of the units acting alone on prearranged terms
established in the constituting document or a treaty. The relationship
between New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue are examples.
See table 5 for other examples.
... continued
Introduction 11
TABLE 1 (continued)
Condominiums Political units that function under the joint rule of two or more
external states in such a way that the inhabitants have
substantial internal self-rule. Examples have been Andorra,
which functioned under the joint rule of France and Spain
1278–1993, Vanuatu, which operated under a British-French
condominium 1906–80, and Nauru which was under a joint
Australia–New Zealand–United Kingdom condominium 1947–
68.
Leagues Linkages of politically independent polities for specific
purposes that function through a common secretariat, rather
than a government, and from which members may unilaterally
withdraw. See table 7 for examples.
Joint functional An agency established by two or more polities for joint
implementa-
authorities tion of a particular task or tasks. The North Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO), the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the International Labor Organization
(ILO) are three of many examples. Such joint functional
authorities may also take the form of trans-border
organizations established by adjoining subnational
governments, e.g., the interstate grouping for economic
development involving four regions in Italy, four Austrian
Länder, two then-Yugoslav republics and one West German
Land established in 1978, and the interstate Regio Basiliensis
involving Swiss, German and French cooperation in the Basle
Hybrids area.
Some political entities combine characteristics of different
kinds of political systems. Those which are predominantly
federations in their constitutions and operation but which have
some overriding federal government powers more typical of a
unitary system may be described as ―quasi-federations.‖
Examples are Canada initially in 1867, which was basically a
federation but contained some unitary elements which fell into
disuse in the second half of the twentieth century. India,
Pakistan and Malaysia are predominantly federations, but their
constitutions include some overriding central emergency
powers. South Africa (1996) has most of the characteristics of
a federation but retains some unitary features. Germany, while
predominantly a federation, has a confederal element in the
Bundesrat, its federal second chamber, which is composed of
instructed delegates of the Land governments. A hybrid
combining much more fully the characteristics of a
confederation is the European Union after the Maastricht
Treaty. This is basically a confederation but has some features
of a federation. Hybrids occur because statesmen are often
more interested in pragmatic political solutions than in
theoretical purity.
19931993
ons (including quasi-federations) 1

OriginallyCurrent
Founded2 Constitution3
94
ory + 1 capital territory + 7 administered territories 19011901
19201945
19811981
19951995
istrict 18911988
ns18671867+1982
19782001
Introduction
d states + 2 chartered cities 19951995

19491949
19501996
19631963
t 18241917
19791986
ral capital territory 19541999
istered tribal areas + 1 capital territory19731973
ories of regions19931993
19831983
19961996
mmunities + 2 autonomous comm unities + 3 sovereign areas + 1 principality19781978
18482000
19711996
deracies + 3 associated states + 3 local home-rule territories 17891789
13
d territories + 130 Native American domestic dependent nations

rict + 1 federal dependency consisting of 72 islands 18111999
able 1 under ―Hybrids.‖

14
TABLE 3: Constitutional and Oper ational Character of Nominal F ederations
FederationCurrent Constituent Unit ConstitutionOperation 2007
United States50 states +1 federal district + 2 federacies Federation (1789) Federation

3 associated states + 3 local home-rule
territories + 3 unincorporated territories
130 Native American domestic
dependent nations
Switzerland26 cantonsFederation (1848,1999) Federation
Canada10 provinces + 3 territories + AboriginalQuasi-federation (1867,1982) Federation
organizations
+
Australia6 states Federation (1901) Federation
+ + 1 territory + 1 capital territory
7 administered territories
Austria9 LänderFederation (1920,1945) Federation
Germany16 LänderFederation (1949) Federation
India28 states + 7 union territories Quasi-federation (1950) Federation (some quasi-
+ federal aspects)
Brazil26 states + 1 federal capital district Federation (1988) Federation
Belgium3 regions + 3 cultural communitiesFederation (1993) Federation

Spain17 autonomous communities + 2 autono- Devolved Union (1978)Federation in practice
mous communities + 3 sovereign areas
1 principality
Mexico31 states + 1 federal district Federation (1917) Centralized Federation
Nigeria36 states + 1 federal
+ capital territory Federation (1999) Centralized Federation
Ethiopia9 ethnically based states + 2 chartered Federation (1995) Centralized Federation
cities
... continued
ontinued)
rrent Constituent Unit ConstitutionOperation 2007
provincesDevolved Union (1996)Quasi-federation

jects: republics and variousFederation (1993) Quasi-federation
categories of regions
rovinces + 1 federal districtQuasi-federation (1994) Quasi-federation
6 regions
tatesQuasi-federation (1963) (1996) Centralized quasi-federation
+
states + 1 federal district + 1 federal Federation (1999) Centralized quasi-federation
dependency consisting of 72 islands
tatesFederation (1978) Micro-federation
(2005)
sFederation (1981) Micro-federation
(2005)
s2 islandsFederation (1985) Micro-binary-federation
(2006)
Introduction
andsFederation (2001) Micro-quasi-federation

vinces + federally administeredQuasi-federation (1973) Devolved unitary military
tribal areas + 1 capital territory regime
mirates 1 Hybrid confederation-
emiratesConfederation federation
ion27 independent, democratic member states Hybrid (1993)Hybrid confederation-
federation
erzegovina2 entities + 1 district Federation (1995) International (EU) tutelage
In transition
statesFederal Constitution
In transition
governoratesFederal Constitution
Congo 2 In transition
provinces and capitalFederal Constitution
15
tion of the United Arab Emirates refers to it as a ―federal state,‖ but its structure is fundamentally confederal.
riments not fully operational and therefore not listed in table 2.
TABLE 4: Some Contemporary Confederations and Hybrids

Current
Name Constituent Units Constitution1
Benelux 3 member states 1944 (1958)

Caribbean Community 15 member states + 5 associate 1973
(CARICOM) members + 7 observers
Commonwealth of 11 member states + 1 associate 1991
Independent States (CIS) member
European Union (EU) 27 member states 1993
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 7 emirates 1971 (1996)2
1
Current constitution, with founding date and significant amendment in
brackets (ifapplicable).
2
The Constitution of the UAE refers to it as a ―federal state,‖ but in structure
it isfundamentally confederal.
TABLE 5: Associated States and Federacies

Federated
Name Form
Power
Åland Islands Federacy Finland

Azores Islands Federacy Portugal
Bhutan, Kingdom of Associated State India
Cook Islands Associated State New Zealand
Faroe Islands Federacy Denmark
Greenland Federacy Denmark
Guernsey, Bailiwick of Federacy United Kingdom
Isle of Man Federacy United Kingdom
Jammu and Kashmir Federacy India
Jersey, Bailiwick of Federacy United Kingdom
Liechtenstein, Principality of Associated State Switzerland
Madeira Islands Federacy Portugal
Monaco, Principality of Associated State France
Netherlands Antilles Associated State Netherlands
Niue Associated State New Zealand
Northern Mariana Islands, Federacy United States
Introduction 17
Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of Federacy United States
San Marino Associated State Italy
TABLE 6: Decentralized Unions with Some Federal Features

Current
Name Constituent Units Constitution10
Antigua and Barbuda 6 parishes + 2 dependencies 1981

Union of Burma 7 divisions + 7 states 1974
(suspended
1988)
Republic of Cameroon 10 provinces 1972 (1996)
People‘s Republic of China 23 provinces + 5 autonomous 1982
regions + 4 municipalities
+ 2 special administrative regions
Republic of Colombia 32 departments + 1 capital region 1991
Republic of Fiji Islands 4 divisions + 1 dependency 1997
French Republic 22 regions 1958
Republic of Ghana 10 regions 1992
Georgia 9 regions + 2 autonomous republics 1995
Republic of Indonesia 30 provinces + 2 special regions 1959
+ 1 special capital city district
Italian Republic 15 regions + 5 autonomous regions 1947
Japan 47 prefectures 1947
Republic of Namibia 13 regions 1990
Kingdom of the Netherlands 12 provinces 1815 (2002)
Independent State of Papua 20 provinces 1975
New Guinea
Portuguese Republic 18 districts + 2 autonomous regions 1976
Solomon Islands 9 provinces + 1 capital territory 1978
Democratic Socialist 8 provinces 1978
Republic of Sri Lanka
Kingdom of Sweden 21 counties 1975
United Republic of Tanzania 26 regions 1977 (1984)
United Kingdom of Great 4 countries + 5 self-governing (1999)
10
Current constitution, with date of significant amendment in brackets (if applicable).
Britain and Northern Ireland islands

Ukraine 24 provinces + 1 autonomous 1996
republic (Crimea) + 2 municipalities
Republic of Vanuatu 6 provinces 1980
TABLE 7: Examples of Varieties of Federal Arrangements
1
Decentralized UnionFederation ConfederationFederacyAssociated Statehood CondominiumLeague
Antigua-Barbuda Argentina Benelux Denmark-Faroes France-Monaco Andorra: France Arab League

Cameroon Australia Economic Union Finland-Åland India-Bhutan and Spain Association of
China Austria )
Caribbean Greenland- Italy-San Marino (1278–1993) South East
)
Colombia Belau Community Denmark Netherlands- Vanuatu: U.K- Asian Nations
Italy Belgium CARICOM India-Jammu Netherlands France (1906– ASEAN
Japan Bosnia Commonwealth and Kashmir Antilles 80) Baltic Assembly
Herzegovina (
Netherlands ( of Independent Portugal-Azores New Zealand- Nauru: Commonwealth
Papua/New Guinea Brazil States Portugal-Madeira Cook Islands Australia-New of Nations
Solomon Islands Canada European Union Islands New Zealand- Zealand-U.K. North Atlantic
Tanzania Comoros United Arab UK-Guernsey Niue (1947–68) Treaty
Ukraine Ethiopia Emirates 2 UK- Jersey Switzerland- )
Organization
United Kingdom Germany UK-Isle of Man Lichtenstein NATO
Introduction
Vanuatu India US-Northern ( Nordic Council

Malaysia Marianas South Asian
Mexico US-Puerto Rico Association for
Micronesia Regional
)
Nigeria Cooperation
Pakistan SAARC
Russia
St. Kitts-Nevis (
South Africa
Spain
Switzerland
United States
Venezuela
19
1 Including quasi-federations as defined in table 1 under ―Hybrids.‖

2 The constitution of the United Arab Emirates refers to it as a ―federal state,‖ but its structure is fundamentall y confederal.
Second, while knowledge about the structural character of a federal political

system or a federation is important to gain an understanding of its character,
equally important is the nature of its political processes. Significant
characteristics of federal processes include a strong predisposition to democracy,
since they presume the voluntary consent of citizens in the constituent units;
non-centralization as a principle expressed through multiple centres of political
decision making; open political bargaining as a major feature of the way in
which decisions are arrived at; the operation of checks and balances to avoid the
concentration of political power; and a respect for constitutionalism and the rule
of law, since each order of government derives its authority from the
constitution.
Third, federal processes may be territorial or consociational or both. While
there are some examples of federations in which there are non-territorial
constituent units recognized in the constitution, the most notable example being
the Belgian Communities, the constitutional distribution of power among
territorial units is by far the most common pattern among federations. In many
federations the constitutional powers are distributed equally among the main
category of constituent units. It is noteworthy, however, that in some federations
there is some asymmetry in the relationship of the main constituent units (e.g.,
Canada, Malaysia, India, Spain and Russia). In some the main constituent units
are classified into two or more categories with ―territories‖ distinguished from
the major constituent units by having less autonomy. (Table 2 indicates those
federations that include such territories.)
Fourth, among the advantages claimed for federations compared with
confederations as a form of political partnership are that federation permits a
relatively decisive form of shared-rule able to carry out redistributive policies.
Furthermore, because most of the federal institutions are based on direct election
by the citizens (in contrast to confederations, federacies and associated states),
federation as a form provides all citizens with an opportunity to participate fully
through democratic processes in the legislative and executive operations of
shared-rule. In this way it contributes to a sense of citizen-ownership of the
institutions of sharedrule. While the political autonomy of the constituent units is
limited to those spheres assigned to them by the constitution, unlike
decentralized unitary systems these are fully safeguarded by a supreme
constitution not unilaterally amendable by the federal government. The main
disadvantage usually attributed to federations is their tendency to complexity,
legalism and rigidity.
1.5 VARIATIONS IN FEDERATIONS

Introduction 21
While certain structural features and political processes common to most

federations can be identified, federations have exhibited many variations in the
application of the federal idea. There is no single ―ideal‖ or ―pure‖ form of
federation. Among the variations to meet particular circumstances that can be
identified among federations are those in:
• the degree and distribution of cultural or national diversity that they attempt
to reconcile;
• their creation by aggregation of constituent units, devolution to constituent
units, or both processes;
• the number, relative size and symmetry or asymmetry of the constituent
units;
• the distribution of legislative and administrative responsibility among
governments;
• the allocation of taxing powers and financial resources;
• the roles of federal and constituent-unit governments in the conduct of
international relations;
• the character and composition of their central federative institutions;
• the processes and institutions for resolving conflicts and facilitating
collaboration between interdependent governments;
• the ratification of constitutional amendments by regional legislatures or
referendums;
• the degree of political centralization or non-centralization and the degree of
economic integration.
Furthermore, in some cases, while most of the defining characteristics and
associated attributes of federations outlined in section 1.4 may be present, some
of them may be missing. Yet other cases may involve hybrids combining unitary
or confederal elements. Nevertheless, they may be regarded as predominately
federations if in operation they exhibit some genuine constitutionally based
autonomy in both orders of government.
Consequently, an important element in the comparative analysis of federations
in this volume will be to identify and contribute to the understanding of the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of different kinds of federal arrangements and
processes in different circumstances.
1.6 FEDERAL SOCIETIES, CONSTITUTIONS AND

GOVERNMENTS
In comparing federations it is important to distinguish between federal societies,

constitutions and governments. The motivations and interests leading to
pressures both for political diversity and for common action within a society, the
legal constitutional structure, and the actual operation, processes and practice of
governments are all important aspects in the operation of federal systems. It is
through studying the interaction of these that we may come to understand the
nature of federal systems.
When political studies were concerned less with the analysis of political
forces within society or of political and administrative behaviour and more with
the study of legal and constitutional structures, authors examining federations
tended to concentrate primarily on the legal framework within which federal and
provincial or state governments carried on their activities. Since the 1950s,
students of politics have come to realize, however, that a merely legalistic study
of constitutions will not adequately explain political patterns within federal
systems. Indeed, the actual operations and practices of governments within
federal systems have, in response to the play of social and political pressures,
frequently diverged significantly from the formal relationships specified in
written legal documents.11
Scholars writing about federations in the second half of the twentieth century
have been conscious of the importance of the social forces underlying federal
systems. Even K.C. Wheare, whose pioneering comparative work, Federal
Government (1946), is often described as institutional in approach, included a
chapter on ―Some Prerequisites of Federal Government‖ which was in some
respects a sociology of federal systems. 12 W.S. Livingston, writing in 1956, went
so far as to suggest that federal systems were a function not of constitutions but
of societies:
The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal
and constitutional terminology, but in the forces — economic, social, political,
cultural — that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary … The
essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in
the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of
the society are articulated and protected.13
11
For one effort to operationalize the idea of a federal political culture note Richard L
Cole, John Kincaid and Alejandro Rodriguez, ―Public Opinion in Federalism and Federal
Political Culture in Canada, Mexico and the United States, 2004,‖ Publius: The Journal
of Federalism, 34: 3 (2004): 201-221.
12
K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), ch. 3.
See also his ―Federalism and the Making of Nations,‖ in A.W. Macmahon, ed.,
Federalism, Mature and Emergent (New York: Russell and Russell, 1955), pp. 28–43.
13
W.S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1956), pp. 1–2.
Introduction 23
In view of the importance of social forces in moulding federal political

institutions and their operation, throughout this study there will be frequent
references to their significance and influence.
But the view that federal institutions are merely the instrumentalities of
federal societies, while an important corrective to purely legal and institutional
analyses, is also too one-sided and oversimplifies the causal relationships. As
authors such as Alan Cairns and Donald Smiley have pointed out, constitutions
and institutions, once created, themselves channel and shape societies. 14 For
example, in both the United States and Switzerland the replacement of
confederal structures by federal institutions in 1789 and 1848 marked turning
points enabling more effective political reconciliation of pressures for diversity
and unity within those societies.
It must be recognized that the causal relationships between a federal society,
its political institutions, and political behaviour and processes are complex and
dynamic. The pressures within a society may force a particular expression in its
political institutions, processes and behaviour; but these institutions and
processes, once established, in turn shape the society by determining the
channels in which these social pressures and political activities flow. Thus, the
relationships between a society, its constitution and its political institutions are
not static but involve continual interaction. In comparing federal systems and
their design, we shall be concerned, therefore, not only with the influence of
social forces upon the adoption, design and subsequent operation of federal
constitutional structures, but with the influence that particular federal political
superstructures and the related processes and political practices have had upon
social loyalties, feelings and diversities. It is in the interplay of the social
foundations, the written constitutions and the actual practices and activities of
governments that an understanding of the nature and effectiveness of federal
political systems is to be found. In comparing and assessing different federal
systems, account therefore needs to be taken not only of how well the
institutions in each system reflect the particular social and political balance of
forces in that society, but also to what extent these institutions, once established,
channel and influence the articulation of unity and diversity within the polity.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this complex relationship.
The interaction of these various aspects is illustrated by the way in which
different federations have evolved. Some that began with federal constitutions of
a highly decentralized form have with time become more integrated and
relatively centralized. The United States and Australia are classic examples.
Others, beginning with more centralized or even quasi-federal constitutions have
14
A. Cairns, ―The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism, Canadian
Journal of Political Science, 10:4 (1977): 695–725; D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition
in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1987), pp. 3–11.
over time become more decentralized. Canada is a classic example of this

pattern, but India, Belgium and Spain also illustrate this. Some formerly unitary
political systems have also decentralized under internal pressures adopting in
part, or even whole, federal institutions. Examples are Belgium, Spain, South
Africa, the United Kingdom and Italy. In all these cases, the pattern of evolution
has been the product of the mutual interaction of social forces and the political
institutions.
FIGURE 1: The Interaction of Federal Societies, Constitutions and
Governments
Society
Constitution
Federal Constituent
Government Government
FIGURE 2: Federal Evolution through Time

Introduction 25
Society changing through time
Federal and constituent unit institutions, processes

and policies changing through time
A predominant issue running through all these examples has been the effort to
encourage a balance between the pressures for unity and diversity. Where
diversity within a society is deep-rooted, the effort simply to impose political
unity has rarely succeeded, and indeed has often instead proved counter-
productive, creating dissension. The early experience of Canada before 1867
illustrates this, as has the much more recent experience in the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, and even the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the
recognition of diversity, by providing the different internal groups with a greater
sense of security, has often contributed to reduced tension, as in Switzerland and
more recently India and Spain. But by itself, greater autonomy may simply
encourage separatism, a trend that in Belgium, Quebec and Scotland has drawn
concern. It is clear that more regional autonomy may contribute to the
accommodation of diversity, but by itself it is likely to be insufficient. It needs to
be accompanied by the institutional encouragement of common interests that
provide the glue to hold the federation together. Thus both the elements of ―self-
rule‖ for constituent units and ―shared-rule‖ through common institutions, a
combination that characterizes federal political systems, are essential to their
long-run effectiveness in combining unity and diversity. This theme runs
through this volume but will be explored further in chapter 13 on the pathology
of federations.
1.7 ISSUES IN THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF

FEDERATIONS
This study, because its aim is to draw lessons from the experience of federations,
will focus on the following issues in their design and operation:
1. The interrelation of social institutions, institutional structures and political
processes and the interaction of these affecting each other. This theme,
rather than being treated in a separate section, runs through all the sections
of this study.
2. The common and varying features of federations:
• the common objectives of combining unity and diversity
• common institutional structures and processes in federations
• variations in the institutional structures and processes of federations
Consideration of the common and varying features of federations also runs
through all the sections of this study.
3. Issues in the design of federations that affect their operation:
• the character of the constituent units in terms of their number, absolute
and relative sizes, and absolute and relative wealth (chapter 4)
– whether the drawing of constituent unit boundaries and constituent
units should represent differences or cut across them (chapter 4)
• the distribution of functions in terms of the following:
– the form of distribution, including the significance of exclusive,
concurrent and residual authority assigned to each level (chapter 5)
– the allocation of legislative and administrative responsibilities
(chapter 5)
– the scope of functions allocated to each level (chapter 5)
– the allocation of financial resources (chapter 6)
– structures and processes relating to intergovernmental relations
within federations (chapter 7)
– degrees of symmetry or asymmetry in the allocation of powers to
constituent units (chapter 8)
– degrees of decentralization and non-centralization (chapters 5, 6, 12)
– degrees of autonomy or interdependence of governments (chapters 5,
6, 12)
– identification of commonly regarded essential federal powers
(chapter 12)
• the nature of the common federative institutions (chapter 10):
– the distinction in this respect between federations and confederations
Introduction 27
– the distinction between parliamentary and non-parliamentary

federations and their differing impact
– special provisions for proportionate representation of constituent
units in the federal executive, legislative institutions (particularly
second chambers), public service and agencies
– the role of constituent unit representatives in common decision
making
• the role and status of the constitution (chapter 11):
– as supreme law
– the role of the courts and judicial review
– the issue of balancing rigidity and flexibility
– formal constitutional amendment processes
– the role of referendums
– safeguarding individual and collective rights
1.8 FEDERATIONS CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
Among the federations currently in the world, those on which attention will
especially be focused are the ―mature‖ federations that have operated effectively
for at least a half-century or more. In this category are the United States (1789),
Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), Australia (1901), Austria (1945), Germany
(1949) and India (1950). Each of these relatively long-standing federations
exhibits virtually all of the characteristics of a federation (described in section
1.4 above) and has displayed a prolonged period of relative federal stability.
Unlike some of the more recent emergent federations, these mature federations
have in their evolution developed both federal and state governments which have
not only formally autonomous powers but which have exercised them fully in
practice.
A second category of federations that is of interest are those that might be
described as ―emergent.‖ These are federations that have been established during
the past fifty years and are still in the process of establishing their equilibrium.
Two European federations in this category are Spain and Belgium. In Spain, the
1978 constitution has produced a continuing process of asymmetrical devolution
which has resulted in a federation in everything but name. In Belgium, two
decades of step-by-step devolution culminated in 1993 in the implementation of
an explicitly federal constitution.
Among the emergent federations are three that have developed a relatively
centralized ―quasi-federal‖ character. These three provide interesting examples
of the impact of a dominant political party on the operation of a federation.
Malaysia (1963) is of interest because of its multiracial character and the formal
asymmetry of powers allocated to its Borneo states. Russia (1993) is significant
because of its swing from an almost confederal and extreme asymmetry in the
treatment of its constitutional units in the Yeltsin years to the emphasis on
central predominance in the Putin era. South Africa‘s quasi-federal constitution
adopted in 1996 exhibits many interesting features designed to foster
intergovernmental cooperation.
The Latin American federations, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, all
have had long histories of federal institutions stretching back to the nineteenth or
early twentieth centuries, in each case heavily influenced by the model of the
United States. But all four have experienced either lengthy periods of military
and autocratic rule or of one-party dominance. Each of them has had a new
federal rebirth in the past two decades, Mexico with the end of PRI party
dominance, and the other three with new federal constitutions: Brazil in 1988,
Argentina in 1994 and Venezuela in 1999. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have
developed somewhat less centralized regimes, but in Venezuela strong
centralizing trends have been reinforced by the Chavez presidency. Each is still
in the process of finding its equilibrium as a federation.
Two emergent federations have been marked particularly by instability and by
frequent periods of military rule. Nigeria first became a federation in 1954 but
emerged from its most recent period of military regime with the new constitution
of 1999. It remains a troubled federation still seeking stability. Pakistan, after the
secession of Bangladesh, adopted a new federal constitution in 1973, but like
Nigeria it has suffered repeated periods of military rule, and while the 1973
constitution (heavily amended) remains nominally in force, a military president
since 1999 has created a de facto decentralized but unitary government.
An emergent federation with particularly unique features has been Ethiopia
(1995). Ethiopia is particularly interesting in the way in which the ethnic basis of
the constituent units is emphasized, but to date the federal policy process has
been mainly channelled by and through the ruling political party.
Among the 25 federations listed in table 2 are four micro-federations. Largely
the product of decolonization, these ―lilliput‖ federations, as Anckar has referred
to them, are federations of small islands: Micronesia, Belau, St. Kitts and Nevis,
and Comoros, with populations ranging from 630,000 in Comoros and 104,000
in Micronesia to 41,000 in St. Kitts and Nevis and 17,000 in Belau. 15
The United Arab Emirates has mixed aspects of traditional and modern rule
and consequently a number of unorthodox and unique federal arrangements
which are in many respects more confederal in character, although the
constitution describes it as a ―federal state.‖ The other distinctive example of a
D. Anckar, ―Lilliput Federalism: Profiles and Varieties,‖ Regional and Federal

15
Studies, 13:3 (2003): 107–24.

Introduction 29
hybrid is the European Union, which is fundamentally confederal in character

but includes a significant number of features more typical of federations.
Therefore, where relevant, it will be alluded to in this volume.
In addition to these functioning federations and hybrids, four others are of
special note because they represented post-conflict experiments. Bosnia and
Herzegovina emerged out of the conflict accompanying the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. It has a number of unique features arising from its complex
structure consisting of two entities — one of which, the Bosniac-Croat
Federation is itself a federation — and from its operation under international
(first UN then EU) tutelage. Iraq and Sudan have adopted federal constitutions in
efforts to resolve conflict situations, but continuing conflict has meant that in
practice they remain non-functional as federations. The Democratic Republic of
the Congo is another post-conflict federal experiment whose constitution came
into effect (in 2006) following a prolonged period of ethnic strife and civil war.
Because these latter three federations are still in transition and do not yet operate
functionally, they are not listed in table 2, although they are noted in table 3.
Other cases to which attention will be paid in chapter 13 on the pathology of
federations are the bicommunal federations of Pakistan (1947–71),
Czechoslovakia (1948–92) and Serbia and Montenegro (1992–2006), each of
which disintegrated into two successor states. The same chapter will also include
references to other federations that have disintegrated, such as the USSR (1918–
91), Yugoslavia (1946–91), the West Indies Federation (1958–62) and Rhodesia
and Nyasaland (1953–63).
The federations reviewed in this study encompass a wide range of variations.
Seven cover vast continental land masses (two, Canada and the USA, in North
America; two in South America, Brazil and Argentina; one, Russia, stretching
from Europe to Asia; one occupying most of the Indian sub-continent; and one,
Australia a continent in the South Pacific). Five, by contrast, are relatively
compact federations in Europe (Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Spain and
Belgium); and four are micro-federations uniting islands with tiny populations
(Micronesia, Belau, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Comoros). Four (the USA,
Switzerland, Canada and Australia) have existed continuously as functioning
federations for more than a century, five (Austria, Germany, India, Malaysia and
Nigeria) were restored or created in the first two decades after World War II, and
the remainder have been recent restorations or creations. Four (Canada,
Australia, India and Malaysia) have parliamentary systems on the majoritarian
Westminster model, three (Germany, Spain, Belgium) have European
parliamentary institutions, seven (United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,
Venezuela, Nigeria and Pakistan) have presidential forms of executive, one
(Switzerland) has a collegial executive, and two (South Africa and Russia) have
mixed presidential-parliamentary systems. Eight (Switzerland, India, Malaysia,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Belgium, Spain and Canada) have significant territory-based
minority language groups, while others in varying degrees are relatively more
homogenous. Three (Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia and Montenegro)
were bicommunal federations that subsequently split in two. Thus, these
federations provide a considerable variety of geographic, historical, economic,
political, social and interterritorial characteristics from which lessons may be
drawn.
Chapter 2
Overview of Contemporary Federations
2.1 MATURE FEDERATIONS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1789)
The United States of America, the first modern federation, adopted federation as
the organizing principle for its structure of government in 1789 following the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787. This resulted from the failure of a confederal
form of government established under the Articles of Confederation of 1781.
Originally comprising 13 states, the United States has evolved into a federation
of 50 states plus 2 federacies, 3 associated states, 3 local home-rule territories, 3
unincorporated territories and over 130 Native American domestic dependent
nations, with a total population of about 300 million. It survived a devastating
civil war during the first century of its existence, but as the most enduring
federation in the world, it is an important reference point in any comparative
study of federations.
Among federations it is marked by a relatively homogeneous society. There
are significant black and Hispanic minorities, but in no state do they constitute a
majority. Nevertheless, there are regional variations in political culture and a
considerable emphasis upon the value of state and local government.
In comparative terms, the federation is moderately decentralized. Jurisdiction
assigned to the 50 states is symmetrical, although this does not apply to the
relationship of the various federacies and associated states. The major feature of
the distribution of powers is the arrangement whereby the constitution lists
subject matters under federal authority — most of which are concurrent and
some of which are made exclusively federal by prohibiting the states from
legislating on them — and leaves the unspecified residual matters to the states.
The federal institutions are based on the principle of the separation of powers
between executive and legislature with presidential-congressional institutions
involving a system of checks and balances. Congress includes a Senate in which
the states are equally represented with members elected directly (since 1912).
Over more than two centuries of operation, the United States as a federation
has become increasingly integrated and the federal government more powerful.
Overview of Contemporary Federations 33
In recent decades the dominant role of the federal government and the extensive
practice of unfunded mandates and federal pre-emption has been described as a
trend from cooperative to coercive federalism. 16 At the same time, there have
been political counter-pressures for more decentralization, although progress in
this direction has been limited. The Bush administration has not propounded an
explicit policy on federalism, but in practice its advocacy of legislation and
constitutional amendments, fiscal policies, administrative actions and judicial
policies has sacrificed federal considerations to specific objectives which have
had centralizing impacts.17
Virtually all subsequently attempted federations have taken some account of
the constitutional design and operation of the United States in developing their
own federal structures, making it an important example.
THE SWISS CONFEDERATION (1848)
The Swiss Confederation, which had existed in various forms since 1291, broke
down in the brief Sonderbund civil war of 1847; a new constitution in 1848, ―the
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation,‖ converted it into a federation.
Switzerland, a small country of some 7 million people, now comprises 26
constituent units called cantons, of which 6 are designated ―half cantons.‖
The Swiss federation is notable for its significant degree of linguistic and
religious diversity, although the German Swiss continue to dominate in overall
numbers and economic power. Its three official languages (German, French and
Italian; a fourth, Romansh, is recognized as a ―national language‖) and two
dominant faiths (Roman Catholic and Protestant) represent territorial cleavages
that cut across each other. Among German-speaking cantons, some are Roman
Catholic and some are Protestant, and the French-speaking cantons are similarly
divided. Consequently, on different issues, cantons form different alignments. Of
the 26 cantons, 17 are unilingually German, 4 are unilingually French and one is
Italian, 3 are bilingual German and French, and one, Graubunden, is trilingual
(German, Italian and Romansh). In all, 14 cantons have Roman Catholic
majorities and 12 have Protestant majorities, the Roman Catholic and Protestant
majorities representing more than two-thirds of the cantonal population in 18 of
the 26 cantons.
A significant proportion of the constitutional distribution of powers is
assigned to the federal government, with the residual powers to the cantons.
16
John Kincaid, ―From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism,‖ Annals of the American
Academy of Politics, 509 (1990): 139–52.
17
T. Conlan and J. Dinar, ―Federalism, the Bush Administration and the
Transformation of American Conservatism,‖ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 27:3
(2007): 279–303.
However, there is in practice a high degree of decentralization because the

constitution leaves the federal government highly dependent upon the
autonomous cantons for the administration of a large proportion of its
legislation. There is a relative symmetry in the jurisdiction of the cantons,
although 6 of the 26 cantons are classified as ―half cantons‖ and therefore each
of these has only half the representation in the federal second legislative
chamber, the Council of States (Standerat).
The principle of the separation of powers has been applied to the federal
institutions, but the executive (the Federal Council) is a collegial body elected by
the Swiss federal legislature for a fixed term and composed of seven councillors
among whom the presidency rotates annually. The federal legislature is
bicameral, composed of the National Council (Nationalrat) and the Council of
States (Standerat); in the latter, cantons have two representatives each and half
cantons one. The electoral system based on proportional representation has
resulted in a multiparty system, but the fixed-term executive has provided
stability, and the tradition has developed that it should encompass the four major
political parties representing an overwhelming majority in the federal legislature.
A characteristic of the Swiss political process has been the widespread use of
referendums and initiatives. Another feature is that dual membership in the
cantonal and federal legislatures is permitted so that about one-fifth of federal
legislators are also members of cantonal legislatures. A long Swiss tradition of
consensual politics has in the past decade come under increasing strain with the
growth of Christoph Blocher‘s Swiss People‘s Party and its controversial
policies. This has been illustrated by its virile anti-immigration campaign in the
2007 federal election.
In April 1999, three decades of sporadic efforts to achieve a comprehensive
revision of the Swiss Constitution culminated in the approval in a referendum of
the total revision of the constitution. In the referendum, the new constitution was
supported by 59.2 percent of the voters, including majorities in 12 of the 20
cantons and in 2 of the 6 half cantons. Although a total revision of the
constitution, the draft avoided substantial and controversial reforms. It took the
form largely of modernizing the language rather than the content of the federal
constitution. Even then, it resulted in a closer than expected vote, opposition
coming largely from the small rural cantons of Switzerland fearing greater
centralization, while the main cities all supported the new constitution. The new
constitution, while largely a modernization of the previous one, nevertheless
refined the fundamental rights of citizens and the relations between federal,
cantonal and municipal authorities. The largest long-term issue currently on the
agenda of the Swiss federation is its relationship with the European Union,
which to date the Swiss voters have rejected joining. However, marginal steps
have been made in European integration, with Swiss citizens voting in favour of
joining the Schengen Treaty in June 2005.
In 2003, Parliament approved a reform of the fiscal equalization arrangements

which disentangles respective responsibilities, invigorates cooperation among
the cantons with an institutionalized system of burden sharing, encourages
cooperation in areas of joint responsibility, and creates a new system of direct
fiscal equalization.
Although small in terms of population and area, its multilingual and
multicultural character makes Switzerland a federation of particular interest.
CANADA (1867)
Second only to Russia in territorial size, Canada became a federation in 1867.

While Canadians use the term ―Confederation,‖ this refers to the process of
bringing provinces together into a federation in 1867 rather than the adoption of
a confederal structure. The federation grew out of efforts to overcome the
political difficulties and deadlocks within the United Province of Canada created
by the Act of Union of 1840. This was to be achieved by splitting it into the two
new provinces of Ontario with an English-speaking majority and Quebec with a
French-speaking majority, and by the addition of the maritime provinces of
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick both for trade and defence purposes. Originally
a union of four provinces, the federation has grown until it is now composed of
ten provinces and three northern territories, following the division in 1999 of the
Northwest Territories. It has a population of over 30 million. A distinctive
feature of the Canadian federation is the continuing existence and vitality of a
French Canadian majority concentrated within one province. Approximately 80
percent of the French Canadian population live in Quebec, where they constitute
over 80 percent of the population. Throughout its history, the Canadian
federation has been marked both by the French-English duality and by a strong
regionalism expressed through the provinces. More recently, there has been
increasing attention given to recognizing the place of the Aboriginal peoples
within the federation.
The original 1867 constitution was marked by strong central powers,
including some powers enabling the federal government to override the
provinces in certain circumstances. Unlike the two federations that preceded it,
the constitution specifically listed three forms of legislative powers: exclusively
federal, exclusively provincial, and concurrent, with the major residual powers
assigned to the federal government. Despite its originally centralized form, 140
years of pressures to recognize duality and regionalism have made Canada a
relatively decentralized federation, both legislatively and administratively. The
Constitution Act, 1982 added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and new
constitutional amendment procedures involving in most cases both the federal
and provincial governments. The original Constitution Act, 1867 recognized the
particular character of Quebec by including some recognition of asymmetry in
provisions relating to language, education and civil law, but efforts within the
past four decades to recognized the reality of Quebec‘s distinctiveness by
increasing constitutional asymmetry have been highly controversial.
The most innovative feature of the federation was that in contrast to the
United States and Swiss federations, which emphasized the separation of the
executive and legislature in their federal institutions, Canada was the first
federation to incorporate a system of parliamentary responsible government in
which the executive and the legislature are fused. This combination of federal
and parliamentary systems was subsequently adopted in Australia and in many
of the other federations considered in this study. The majoritarian character of
the parliamentary federal institutions has had a significant impact on the
dynamics of federal politics in Canada.
The March 2007 federal budget introduced sweeping changes to the system of
equalization. This budget represented a move towards equal per capita cash
payments for Canada‘s vertical fiscal transfers and the restoration of a formula-
based equalization program for horizontal fiscal transfers.
In comparative terms the Canadian federation is of particular interest because
of the way in which it has attempted to deal with the English-French duality of
its society and because it was a pioneer in combining federal and parliamentary
institutions.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (1901)
The Australian federal constitution of 1901 united a number of self-governing

British colonies. Today the federation consists of six states (of which the two
most populous, New South Wales and Victoria, comprise 59 percent of the
federal population) plus one capital territory, the Northern Territory, and seven
administered territories, and has a total population of over 20 million.
Australia is a relatively homogenous society with a population of about 18
million people mostly descended from British and European settlers, but the
geographic vastness and the concentration of populations in dispersed state
capitals each serving its own hinterland have made federation a natural form of
political organization.
The founders of the Australian federation rejected the Canadian model of a
relatively centralized distribution of powers and followed the American model,
enumerating a limited list of federal exclusive powers and a substantial list of
concurrent powers, leaving unspecified residual powers to the state
governments. In practice, however, the Australian federation has evolved into a
relatively more centralized federation, particularly with respect to financial
arrangements. In terms of jurisdiction, there is a symmetry among the six states.
While adopting a different form of distribution of powers, the Australian
federation did follow the Canadian precedent of combining federal and
parliamentary institutions, responsible cabinet government operating at both

federal and state levels. Nevertheless, it incorporated a relatively powerful
directly elected Senate with equal representation of the states. The impact of the
parliamentary system has, however, made the
Senate more of a ―party house‖ than a ―regional house.‖
As a parliamentary federation, Australia has developed the institutions and
processes of ―executive federalism‖ more extensively than any other federation,
with the possible exception of Germany. With its British heritage of
parliamentary institutions and tradition of executive federalism, Australia as a
federation illustrates the characteristics that flow from a marriage of federal and
parliamentary institutions.
In 1999 growing republican sentiment culminated in a referendum to replace
the monarchy, but this was marginally rejected.
The federal government introduced a value-added tax in 1999 to replace all
others sales taxes and to serve as the basis of the fiscal equalization scheme. All
the Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue collected by the federal government
is distributed to the states in an equalized form based on recommendations of the
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC). This reform, as well as the
operation of the CGC and the earlier Australian Loan Council (which
coordinates borrowing by Commonwealth and state governments) has reinforced
Australia as a pioneer in financial and equalization arrangements.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA (1920)
Austria adopted a federal constitution in 1920, shortly after the demise of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Modifications were made in 1929 and again in 1945,
when the Austrian Republic was restored, but the fundamental character of the
original constitution remained basically unchanged. Currently, with a population
of 8 million, it comprises nine Länder.
Austria is culturally largely homogenous. German is the official language,
although special constitutional provision is made for the use of Slovene and
Croat languages in certain regions of the country.
Given a statist and hierarchical traditional political culture, the Austrian
federation exhibits a highly centralized legislative jurisdiction, but with the
administration of federal law extensively decentralized to the Länder. This
administrative decentralization is seen in the 2001 public service reforms that
established Land governments as the first and only point of access for citizens.
Among federations, it is one of the most legislatively centralized, with the
constituent units often serving mainly as ―agents‖ and ―subordinates‖ of the
federal government, although they are assigned the residual legislative authority.
Within the federation, the units are symmetrical in power and status.
Federal government institutions are parliamentary in character, the Chancellor

and Cabinet being responsible to the Nationalrat, although there is a directly
elected federal president who performs the functions of head of state. The
federal legislature is bicameral. The members of the second chamber (the
Bundesrat) are indirectly elected by the assemblies of the Länder with
representation fairly closely proportional to population except for a minimum
guarantee of three representatives for each Land.
The Austrian federation is of interest because it shows how far centralization
and federal-state interdependence can be taken in the spectrum of federal
arrangements. It is worthy of note that although recent efforts at reforming the
federal system in 1989–94 and 2003–05 did not succeed, in 2007 another effort
was launched to enhance the constitutional autonomy of the Länder and reduce
the supervising powers of the federal government over the states in the
implementation of federal laws. A committee of experts was appointed to make
recommendations on these objectives.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1949)
The German federation owes a great deal to the earlier experience of the German
Empire (1871–1918), the Weimar Republic (1919–34) and the failure of the
totalitarian centralization of the Third Reich (1934–45). West Germany in 1949
became the Federal Republic of Germany comprising 11 Länder. The
reunification of Germany in 1990 provided for the accession of 5 new Länder.
The federation now consists of 16 Länder with a total population of over 82
million.
The population of the German federation is linguistically homogenous,
although a considerable gulf remains between the political cultures of the former
West Germany and the former East Germany.
A notable characteristic of the German federation is the interlocked
relationship of the federal and the state governments. The federal government
has a very broad range of exclusive, concurrent and framework legislative
powers, but the Länder have a mandatory constitutional responsibility for
applying and administering a large portion of these laws. These arrangements are
similar to those in Austria and Switzerland, although the Swiss cantons have
legislative jurisdiction over a larger range of subject matters. A significant
difference in the German federation, however, is that the Länder governments in
Germany are more directly involved in the federal government decision-making
process through the representation of their first ministers and designated cabinet
ministers in the federal second chamber, the Bundesrat, which possesses a veto
on all federal legislation affecting the Länder. (About 60 percent of federal
legislation fell into this category until reforms in 2006 reduced this proporion).
Thus the Bundesrat is a key institution in the interlocking federal-state
relationship within the German federation. Within that framework, the Länder
are marked by symmetry in their relative powers, although special financial
arrangements have been particularly necessary for the five new eastern Länder.
Both the Federal and Land institutions are parliamentary in form. The Federal
Chancellor and Cabinet are responsible to the Bundestag, but there is a formal
head of state, the President of the Federal Republic, elected by an electoral
college consisting of the Bundestag and an equal number of members elected by
the legislatures of the Länder. The federal parliament is bicameral, with the
second chamber composed of ex officio instructed delegates of the Land
governments.
The German federation is of interest because of the manner in which the
relationships between the federal and state governments interlock and because of
the way in which the unique Bundesrat serves as a key institution in these
interdependent processes. It is worth noting that recently the tightness of the
interlocking arrangements has come under some criticism and review.
The first stage of reforms to the federal system came into force in September
2006 with the support of a ―grand coalition‖ of political parties. The overarching
goal of these reforms was to enhance the ability of both the Federation and the
Länder to take autonomous decisions and to clarify the division of political
powers.18 It is estimated that these reforms will reduce the proportion of federal
legislation requiring the assent of a majority in the Bundesrat from 60 to about
40 percent. The second stage of federalism reforms is planned to address the
prevention and management of budget crises, the necessity of realigning
revenue-raising capabilities with expenditure responsibilities, and consolidation
of special political services and their impact on the financial relationship
between the Federation and the Länder.
THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA (1950)
India became independent in 1947 and its parliament, serving also as a

constituent assembly, drafted the new constitution that came into effect on 26
January 1950, establishing the federal Union of India. Its federal features
followed closely the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the British
government had attempted a federal solution to resolve the problems facing
India at the time, an act which itself had been modelled on the British North
America Act, 1867, which established the Canadian federation. Given the vast,
populous and variegated nature of India and concerns with the threat of
insecurity and disintegration, the Constituent Assembly concluded that the
18
See Ralf Thomas Baus, Raoul Blindenbacher, and Ulrich Karpen, eds., Competition
versus Cooperation: German Federalism in Need of Reform: A Comparative Perspective
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007).
soundest framework was ―a federation with a strong Centre.‖ Today, the

federation comprises 28 states and 7 union territories (one of the territories being
the ―National Capital Territory of Delhi‖ having a special status) with a total
population of over one billion people.
India is a diverse multilingual society. Hindi, the official language, is spoken
by about 40 percent of the population (mostly in the north) and there are 18
constitutionally recognized regional languages. Following the report of the
States Reorganization Commission established in 1955, between 1956 and 1966
the states were reorganized largely on an ethno-linguistic basis and in one case
(Punjab) on a religio-linguistic basis. Since then there have been some further
revisions to the number of states.
While the founders sought to create a new kind of federation with sufficient
central powers to ensure cohesion and hence with some unitary elements, the
ethno-linguistic basis of many of the states and the powerful forces of
regionalism within the Indian sub-continent have meant in practice a federation
that is only partially centralized and that has powerful states. The constitution
provides for three exhaustive lists of legislative powers — exclusive federal
powers, exclusive provincial powers and concurrent powers (with federal
paramountcy) — and for residual powers assigned to the Union government.
There is a degree of asymmetry with respect to the state of Jammu and Kashmir,
which has been given powers different from those of others states. Asymmetrical
relationships have also applied to some of the smaller new states established in
tribal areas. Formally, the Union government possesses very substantial powers,
especially powers of intervention and pre-emption in emergencies, but it
functions within an ethnopolitical and multiparty context that requires that those
powers be used for the most part to preserve federalism in form and spirit.
Increasingly, power-sharing as a way of reconciling conflict and the operation of
coalition governments has come to predominate, despite some imperfections in
the process.
The institutions of the Union and state governments are parliamentary in form
with responsible cabinet governments at both levels. The head of state is a
president, elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of
both houses of parliament and the state legislatures. The formal heads of the
states, the governors, are appointed by the Union government but, the chief
ministers and their cabinets are responsible to their state legislatures.
Six developments in recent decades have been especially significant. One is
that with the decline of the Congress party, which had dominated in the early
years after independence, there has grown a multitude of regional parties,
making necessary multiparty coalitions sensitive to regional interests within the
federal government. The second was the passage of the Seventy-Third and
Seventy-Fourth Amendments to the constitution in 1991 establishing local
governments, the panchyats and municipalities, as constitutionally recognized
basic ―institutions of self-government.‖ Third has been a decline in the

frequency with which the Union government has exercised ―emergency rule‖ in
the states, a decline influenced by a ruling of the Supreme Court defining the
limits of this power. Fourth has been the impact of two major influential
commissions, the Sarkaria (1988) and the Venkatachelliah (2002) commissions,
on the working of the constitution. Fifth has been the bringing into operation of
the Inter-State Council, provided for in the original constitution to facilitate
intergovernmental cooperation but implemented only following the
recommendations of the Sakaria commission. Sixth has been the reinforcement
of state finances progressively by the recent quinquennial Finance Commissions.
India as a federation is of particular interest because of the way in which it has
used federal institutions and processes to hold together a linguistically diverse
society for over half a century. In 1947 many doubted that the federation could
endure for more than a decade in this vast, poor and deeply divided country, but
India has defied the sceptics and sixty years later it is marked by a vibrant
federation and a growing economy and role in the world.
2.2 EMERGENT FEDERATIONS
THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES (1917)
Historical pressures towards excessive centralization have heavily influenced the

practice of federalism in Mexico. Although this country has technically operated
as a federation since 1917, significant discretionary powers were vested in the
central government, in practice allowing sub-national units little autonomy. This
de facto centralization arose from the need to overcome the strong regional
forces. A major source of centralization was the dominance of the Partido
Revolucionaro Institucional (PRI) party, which from its creation in 1929 to 2000
exercised virtually hegemonic control at all levels of government. It has only
been since the loosening of PRI dominance in the past decade that Mexico has
begun to function federally.
The 1917 constitution established a ―federal, democratic and representative
republic, composed of free and sovereign states in regard to their internal
regime.‖ It consists of 31 states and one Federal District (Mexico City) with a
current population of over 100 million.
The constitution granted the federal government, and especially the President,
substantial discretionary powers. The distribution of powers heavily favours the
federal government. Although the residual power technically resides in the
states, until reforms in the 1990s the federal government‘s exclusive jurisdiction
even included the major areas of education, health and labour. In these areas the
state governments now have responsibility, relying on conditional grants from
the federal government to deliver these ―social rights‖ guaranteed by the
constitution. In terms of fiscal powers, the federal government collects all the
major sources of revenue, with the states and local governments receiving a
share of the proceeds, but the criteria for this distribution have been a source of
controversy, since the allocation has been largely discretionary.
The Mexican Congress is bicameral, with a Chamber of Deputies and a
Senate. One interesting feature intended to prevent corruption is a constitutional
provision that prevents re-election of all elected officials.
From 1989 on, as opposition parties gained power in some states, federalism
has become more of a reality in Mexico. With the election of President Vicente
Fox of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in 2000, state governments began to
play a more meaningful role in the federation. This regime change in Mexican
politics and the renewal of Mexico as a federation has led a significant number
of politicians, academics and journalists to advocate the need for a new
constitution that reflects these changes.
THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA (1963)
The Malaysian federation now comprises 13 states with a population of over 24

million. It was established in 1963 when Singapore and the Borneo states of
Sabah and Sarawak joined the already existing Federation of Malaya that had
achieved independence in 1957. Singapore was expelled from the Federation of
Malaysia just two years later, and since that time the federation has consisted of
the 11 states of the Malay peninsula and the two more autonomous states on the
island of Borneo.
A significant political feature of Malaysia is the diversity of its population in
terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion and social customs. The population is
approximately 65 percent Malay and other indigenous peoples, 26 percent
Chinese and 7 percent Indian. Malays are a majority in most of the peninsular
states, but there are strong concentrations of Chinese in the west coast states, and
other indigenous peoples, composed of a variety of linguistic groups, form the
vast majority in the two Borneo states. The federal system has been an important
factor therefore in maintaining the delicate communal balance within the
federation.
As in India, the Malaysian federation was initially characterized by a high
degree of centralization, which in the latter case was derived from the preceding
Malayan constitution, itself modelled on the Government of India Act, 1935 and
hence indirectly on the British North America Act, 1867. Like India, there are
three exhaustive lists of powers (exclusive federal, exclusive state and
concurrent), but the residual powers are assigned to the state governments. One
distinguishing feature of the Malaysian distribution of powers is the asymmetry
in the legislative, executive and financial autonomy ascribed to some constituent
units. The 11 states of the Malay peninsula — the original states of the
Federation of Malaya — stand in a symmetrical relationship to the federal

government, but the two Borneo states have been allocated greater autonomy as
a means of safeguarding their special ―non-Malayan‖ interests. Unlike India, the
Malaysian federation has, however, continued to maintain its relatively
centralized character, as a result of the dominant political party situation.
Nevertheless, citizens‘ loyalty to their states and political leaders, and the
dependence of the federal government on the states for the administration of
many of its programs have maintained the political viability of the states. 19
Malaysia has incorporated the institutions of cabinets responsible to the
legislature within both levels of government, but it has a unique form of rotating
monarchy to provide the formal head of state of the federation. The Yang di-
Pertuan Agong is selected for a five-year term from among the heredity rulers of
nine of the Malay states.
The Malaysian Federation is of interest because it is a complex delicate
balance of diverse communities within a relatively centralized parliamentary
federation that has experienced rapid economic development, and because it
incorporates asymmetry in the powers of constituent states in order to safeguard
the particular interests of the Borneo states.
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN (1973)
Following the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan, with a total population then of
about 90 million, was a country of two large fragments severed from the
structure of old India. Each of these parts was very different in every way except
one – religion – and separated by a thousand miles of hostile territory. The result
was a federation of two basic units, West Pakistan, largely Urdu-speaking,
MiddleEastern in character, and the wealthier unit, and East Pakistan, Bengali-
speaking, South-East Asian in outlook, and the more populous with 55 percent
of the population. The 1956 federal constitution established a federation of two
provinces, each with parity in representation in a unicameral federal legislature.
However, bipolar tensions between the two units resulted in the secession of
East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in 1971. The former province of West Pakistan
then became a federation of four provinces in 1973. It now has a population of
about 145 million. Of the four provinces, Punjab alone has 55.6 percent of the
total federal population and, therefore, is in a politically dominant position.
The 1973 constitution, despite repeated suspension and numerous arbitrary
amendments by the military, most notably in 1985 and 2002, remains in force.
While the constitution is federal in form, its operation is that of a centralized
19
William Case, ―Semi-democracy and minimalist federalism in Malaysia,‖ in
Baogang He, Brian Galligan, Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Federalism in Asia (Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgan, 2007), pp. 124-143, esp. pp. 127-131.
devolved unitary state. The federal government wields extensive powers through
67 enumerated exclusive federal powers and 47 concurrent powers. Although the
provinces are assigned the residual authority outside these enumerated areas, the
federal government has the ability to intervene in matters of provincial concern.
The federal government has the power to appoint provincial governors, approve
the dissolution of a provincial assembly, confer on a province functions that fall
under the executive authority of the central government, and give directions to
the provinces. When coupled with the provinces‘ relative dependence on the
federal government for fiscal transfers, the autonomy of the provinces is severely
limited.
The constitution establishes a bicameral federal legislature. The 342 seats in
the National Assembly are allocated among the 4 provinces, 6 Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and the Federal Capital on the basis of population
elected from single-member constituencies by plurality. The Senate is intended
to represent the constituent units, each provincial assembly electing 22 members
(14 general members, 4 women and 4 technocrats). The Federal Capital elects 4
members (two general members, one woman and one technocrat) and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas elect 8 senators through direct ballot.
In 1999 President General Pervez Musharraf took power in a military coup
and his presidency was confirmed in a referendum in 2002. President Musharraf
chairs the National Security Council, which is where most of the decision-
making authority is currently vested. This council is composed of military
chiefs, the prime minister and cabinet members. In 2002 and since, a series of
legal and constitutional changes have been manipulated to entrench military rule
and restrict the operation of some political parties.
Thus, while nominally a federation, Pakistan has in practice become a
predominantly centralized military regime. By the end of 2007, after eight years
of the latest period of a Punjabi-dominated military regime, not only had the
federal parliament been reduced to a rubber-stamp and the smaller provinces
deprived of a significant voice, but the stability of the country had come into
question.
THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN (1978)
Spain has been going through a dual process of federalization relating to internal
devolution and external integration within the European Union. In 1978, after
some forty years of totalitarian centralization under the dictatorship of General
Franco, Spain adopted a new constitution establishing a system of parliamentary
democracy. As part of post-Franco democratization and as a means of balancing
powerful regional interests fostered by revived Basque and Catalonian
nationalism, Spain pursued a process of regionalization. It has provided for units
called ―Autonomous Communities,‖ of which there are internally 17 in a country

of over 44 million.
Although traditionally a strongly centralized unitary state, Spain has in fact
contained considerable diversity. While the political culture of the Castilians has
tended to be hierarchical and centralistic, the Aragonese, Basques, Catalonians,
Galicians, Navarrese and Valencians have each had a strong interest in
preserving their way of life and securing the power to maintain their cultural
identity.
The Spanish response to this situation after the adoption of the 1978
constitution was to grant progressively to each region its own statute of
autonomy tailored to its particular situation or based upon a particular set of
compromises negotiated between the regional leadership and the central
government. Subsequent actions of the Madrid government have, however,
leaned to a more uniform distribution of jurisdiction. Although the different
regions have been proceeding to autonomy at different speeds, the intention has
been that ultimately the situation of the Autonomous Communities will be less
asymmetrical. While the Spanish constitution does not define itself as explicitly
federal, it does provide for lists of powers that are exclusive to either the general
or regional governments, while leaving the residual power to the central
government. Thus, Spain is a federation in all but name, with the 17
Autonomous Communities possessing constitutional authority for a considerable
degree of self-rule. Spain is now one of the most decentralized countries in
Europe, but the political regionalization has been derived less from
constitutional mandate than from party strategies, competition and bargaining
within a loose institutional framework.20
The central government is a parliamentary monarchy with the Council of
Ministers responsible to the lower house of the Cortés, Spain‘s bicameral
legislature. The Senate, the second chamber of the Cortés, consists mainly of
directly elected members, but 51 of the 259 senators are appointed by the
autonomous parliaments.
The asymmetry among the Autonomous Communities extends to the
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements where there are two regimes in place, a
―common‖ one for most Autonomous Communities and a special ―foral‖ one
derived from long-standing traditional rights for Navarre and the Basque
Country. Under the latter, Navarre and the Basque Country levy all national
taxes, but in return pay a subsidy for the services provided by the central
government.
20
Josep M. Colomer, ―The Spanish ‗State of Autonomies‘: Non-Institutional
Federalism,‖ in P. Heywood, ed., West European Politics, 21:4 (1998), special issue on
―Politics and Party Democracy in Spain: No Longer Different?‖ pp. 40–52.
For a period, the central government rejected virtually all calls for further
increased autonomy, basing its position on a conservative interpretation of the
constitution, which holds that it is untouchable because it reflects and upholds
civic consensus. The Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party, elected in 2004,
however, has been more amenable to further decentralization. In June 2006 a
referendum in Catalonia, already one of the most advanced in terms of self-
government, was passed to expand its autonomy further, and leaders in a number
of other autonomous communities have been pressing for an increased
devolution of powers. Meanwhile, the Basque Country has continued to be the
source of a secessionist movement.
As a unitary state engaged in devolutionary federalization within its own
borders by a process characterized by considerable asymmetry, Spain is an
interesting example of an effort to accommodate variations in the strengths of
regional pressures for autonomy.
THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL (1988)
The Brazilian federation as it now exists was established in 1988, but before that
Brazil had periodically operated as a federation during the years following the
military coup that ended monarchical rule in 1889. With a substantial population
of about 180 million, the constitution recognizes 26 states and one federal
district, as well as some 5,500 municipalities. Brazil is one of few federal
countries that have explicit provisions in the constitution regarding
municipalities.
The operation of this federation has been strongly influenced by the pressure
of state interests in the national government. This predominance of the sub-
national governments has been principally due to political rather than
constitutional provisions; although the 1988 constitution allocates the residual
power to the state governments, it includes an exhaustive list of exclusive federal
powers that limit the scope of this residual clause. On an informal level,
however, state governors play an important role in the federal legislative
process, because of the nature of the presidential system and the necessity of
securing agreement of three-fifths of all state legislatures for any significant
constitutional reforms.
Federal-state relations focus particularly on financial relations. The 1988
constitution strengthened the already significant tax base of the states and
municipalities, and subsequent amendments to the tax system in 2003 have
reinforced the trend to fiscal decentralization. A notable feature has been the
effort to terminate the ―fiscal war‖ between the states.
The regionally concentrated social and economic disparities in this large
country have been a major source of political conflict. The affluent southern
states have pushed for greater fiscal decentralization. The less affluent northern
and central states have benefited from peculiarities that overrepresent these
regions in the federal institutions. A constitutional provision guarantees each
state at least eight and no more than 70, seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The
biggest loser in this situation is Sao Paulo, the most populous and most affluent
state, which would be entitled to 111 seats if there were no upper limit. The
configuration of the federal Senate accentuates this by giving the northern,
northeastern and centrewestern states (which have 43 percent of the population)
74 percent of the membership.
Recent reforms by President Lula da Silva have included constitutional
amendments to address the unsustainable social security system and the
reassignment of some taxes to the state governments. Also, attempts have been
made to reform intergovernmental relations so that they operate in a more
cooperative manner. However, reforms have been made difficult by the
problems of the separation of presidential and legislative branches and the lack
of legislative support for presidential initiatives.
Brazil is a useful example of the pressures created by regional disparities and
fiscal decentralization.
THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM (1993)
Belgium was founded in 1830 as a unitary constitutional monarchy, but four

stages of devolution in 1970, 1980, 1988 and 1993 culminated in a formal
federation with a population of just over 10 million people. It is composed of six
constituent units. Three are regions territorially defined (the Flemish, Walloon
and Brussels Regions) with councils responsible largely for regional economic
matters.
Overlapping these are three ―Communities‖ (the Dutch-speaking, French-
speaking and German-speaking Communities) with their own councils
responsible mainly for cultural and educational matters. The former represent a
territorial jurisdiction and the latter a personal jurisdiction. The Flemish Region
and Community, however, have merged their institutions thereby further
accentuating the asymmetry within the Belgian federation.
The primary motivating force for the process of devolutionary federalization
has been the political polarization of the two main linguistic groups, the
Dutchspeaking (58 percent) and French-speaking (41 percent) Belgians. The
German-speaking minority constitutes less than one percent of the population.
The bipolar character of Belgian politics has been accentuated by the greater
prosperity of the Flemish Region (reversing the nineteenth-century situation) and
by the resentment of the Dutch-speaking majority at the political dominance that
had traditionally been exercised by the French-speaking Belgians within the
unitary Belgian state.
The distribution of powers, because of the devolutionary character of the

federalization process, has generally taken the form of specifying the increased
powers of the regional and community councils, leaving the unspecified residual
jurisdiction with the central government. Nevertheless, in 1993 it was agreed
that the distribution of powers should be redrafted to enumerate federal powers
and leave residual jurisdiction to the constituent units. Three features distinguish
the Belgian distribution of powers: (1) the progressive devolution has in fact
produced a high degree of decentralization; (2) the powers allocated to each
order of government have been mostly in the form of exclusive powers; and (3)
the considerable measure of asymmetry among the constituent units illustrated
by the difference between Regions and Communities as two distinctly different
types of constituent units with different responsibilities, the differing
interrelationships between Regional and Community councils in the Dutch-
speaking and French-speaking areas, and the particular situation of Brussels as
the capital located in the Flemish Region but with a French-speaking majority.
The federal institutions of the Belgian federation are those of a constitutional
monarchy with a cabinet responsible to the Chamber of Deputies in a bicameral
parliament.
Despite the extensive decentralization, social services and taxation remain
major areas of federal government responsibility. In 2001 the francophone
parties agreed to the decentralization of agriculture, foreign trade, parts of
foreign aid and local/ provincial law in exchange for increased funding for the
Communities, but they have resisted the devolution of social security. This
agreement has been accompanied by determined calls in Flanders, however, for
greater federalization of social policy and even threats of secession. The political
parties have all divided along linguistic lines, and consequently federal
governments have depended on tenuous coalitions across the linguistic divide in
order to survive. Following the 2007 federal elections, disagreements between
the Flemish and French-speaking parties over whether to devolve social security
to the regions led to a stalemate preventing the formation of a coalition federal
government for a protracted period of crisis.
Although the emergent Belgian federation is too recent to allow firm
conclusions to be drawn about its operation, the devolutionary federalization
process is of particular interest because of its intense linguistically bipolar
character. It also serves as an example of a country responding to simultaneous
pressures for federalization in two directions: through internal devolution, which
has converted it from a unitary state into a federation, and through external
integration arising from its membership in the European Union.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (1993)
The Russian Federation, with an area of 17, 075, 000 km2, is territorially the
world‘s largest federation, spanning two continents and eleven times zones. Its
population is approximately 145 million.
The Russian Federation evolved out of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR), the largest member state in the Soviet Union. After 75 years
of communist rule, with the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in 1991, the Russian Federation became independent with Boris
Yeltsin as its first president.
During Boris Yeltsin‘s presidency (1991–99), in an attempt to construct a
stable and integrated federal state, Yeltsin offered decentralizing concessions to
the regions. The volume and diversity of Russia‘s sub-national units was a
testament to this process, with as many as 89 constituent units of various types
existing in 1991. Although the 89 sub-national units were considered equal
members of the federation, under the constitution, only the 21 republics were
entitled to their own constitutions and law; other types of constituent units only
had access to ordinary statutes and laws.
The constitution contained both symmetric and asymmetric federal features.
While the constitution stated that all 89 constituent units were equal in their
relations with federal bodies, the constitution not only differentiated categories
of constituent units but also provided for the negotiation of individual treaties
and agreements for the relationship of these with the federal government. During
Yeltsin‘s presidency, in fact, more than half of the constituent units signed
special bilateral treaties defining their powers. The process of continued
decentralization of power during the Yeltsin regime weakened the federal
government and undermined its ability to coordinate a national reform program.
Under President Vladimir Putin since 1999, the process has been reversed,
with a series of centralizing reforms aimed at concentrating and stabilizing
federal power. Putin spearheaded a major reorganization of Russia‘s political
structures which has strengthened the presidency at the expense of regional
powers. The individual bilateral treaties with constituent units have almost all
been virtually terminated. The federation has been divided into seven federal
districts, each with a federal representative to oversee the activities of the
constituent units. Voluntary regional consolidation has been encouraged to
reduce the number of constituent units, to date reduced from 89 to 86 (21
republics, 48 oblasts, 7 autonomous okrugs, 7 krais, 2 federal cities and one
autonomous oblast), and further consolidations are planned. The president and
federal bodies have been given the right to nominate regional governors for
approval by regional legislatures in place of direct election of regional governors
and to dismiss regional governors and legislatures in the event that they violate
federal legislation. There has also been an emphasis on harmonizing federal and
regional legislation, a major concern in fields of concurrent jurisdiction. This
centralizing trend has also coincided with increasing federal control over the
mass media. Buoyed by world resource prices, especially oil, the system of fiscal
federalism has been reformed to place the federal government in a financially
dominant position. Two-thirds of Russians have considered the concentration of
power in President Putin‘s hands favourably because the oil-price boom has
brought economic growth and a new sense of stability.
Under the constitution, the hybrid presidential-parliamentary system has a
directly elected president, who appoints the prime minister and cabinet, who in
turn are responsible to the Federal Assembly. The bicameral Federal Assembly
consists of a 178-seat Federation Council and the 450-seat State Duma.
Originally the Federation Council was composed of two representatives from
each constituent unit: the heads of the regional legislative and executive bodies.
But as the result of a reform initiated by President Putin, the executive of each
state authority now appoints one representative to the Federation Council, while
the other is elected by the legislature, thus effectively weakening the council‘s
political influence. Half of the members of the State Duma are elected for a four-
year term by party list proportional representation, while the other half are
determined by singlemember constituency elections.
The federal constitution introduced in 1993 gave sweeping potential powers to
the President. The President has the authority to issue decrees that have the force
of law, as long as they do not violate existing laws; however, laws passed by the
Federal Assembly can supersede these decrees. Under specific conditions, the
presidential power also extends to the dissolution of Parliament. The weakness
of Russia‘s civil society and the lack of effective opposition political parties has
left the Putin presidency in a predominant position. President Putin‘s second and
final term as president runs out in March 2008, however, and there are
indications that his continued predominance may be maintained by his taking the
post of prime minister under his successor as president. If that occurs it will
change the balance in the roles of the president and the prime minister.
Although more than 80 percent of the population identifies as Russian, there
are more than 100 distinct nationalities and ethnic groups. Some of these groups
are territorially concentrated, with special rights to preserve and promote their
respective cultures and identities. Despite the reassertion of central authority,
elements of federal dynamics remain because of the challenge of ensuring
national unity within a geographically vast and ethnically diverse country.
THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1994)
The Argentine Federation was first established in 1853. During the succeeding
140 years, however, it was marked by periods of oligarchic or military rule that
generally resulted in a centralized state. In 1983 the Argentinean military handed
over power to civilian authorities, and the 1994 constitutional reforms were built
on the constitution of 1853 plus changes made in 1860, 1866, 1880, 1898 and
1957. The reform of 1994 attempted to reverse the previous ―defederalization‖
by strengthening the federal aspects. As such, the federation consists of 23
provinces and one federal district, with a total population of over 38 million.
All provinces have their own constitutions and full autonomy to deal with
local matters, but they must respect the representative and republican principle
embodied in the national constitution. Furthermore, provinces are bound by
federal legislation, and under certain conditions the federal government can
intervene in the provinces, including the removal and replacement of provincial
authorities. Although the residual clause favours the provincial governments, the
federal government can exercise authority in areas where provincial provisions
could interfere with matters assigned to the federal government. Together, these
peculiarities provide some quasi-federal features. In the realm of financial
arrangements, despite provisions for sharing of resources between the federal
and provincial governments, there has been a tendency for the federal
government to use intergovernmental transfers to secure provincial support for
national policies.
Argentina‘s constitution provides for a clear division between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government. The bicameral federal
legislature has been characterized by an overrepresentation of less populated
provinces in both the 257-seat Chamber of National Deputies and the 72-
member Senate, composed of 3 senators elected from each province and from
the federal district of Buenos Aires.
The resurgence of civilian government since 1983 did not coincided with
political stability. The relationship between the federal government and the
provinces remained a major area of tension. For a period, economic decline also
contributed to dislocation and a widespread distrust of politicians but more
recently the economy has been booming. Among the issues affecting the
operation of federalism in Argentina have been the impact of overrepresentation
of the smaller provinces in the National Congress, the power of provincial
governors and local party bosses over the drafting of party lists leading to their
influence over national legislators, and the discretionary use of fiscal transfers by
the national executive to build alliances with provincial units to achieve their
objectives. Despite the hopes embodied in the reforms of 1994, the Argentine
federation still seeks long-term economic and political stability.
THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA (1995)
Following the military success of the Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the approval by referendum of the Constituent
Assembly proposals, the new constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, with a population of some 67 million, came into force in 1995. This
embodied a radical form of federal devolution to nine new regional states along
predominantly ethnic lines.
The Ethiopian federation was designed with the goal of accommodating a
high degree of ethnic and religious diversity. Many powers are devolved to the
region states to accommodate the many ethnicities and significant Muslim and
Christian populations. Although the country‘s official language is Amharic, all
the regions are able to determine their own languages, to accommodate the more
than 80 languages and 200 dialects spoken by Ethiopia‘s citizens. Indeed with
the aim of accommodating its ethnic diversity, Ethiopia has one of the few
federal constitutions that outlines a right of sub-national units to secede from the
federation, in addition to outlining a process for ethnic groups within existing
states to form new regions.
The Ethiopian federation is a parliamentary democracy with a president
elected by a two-thirds vote of a joint session of Parliament and a prime minister
responsible to the House of People‘s Representatives. The Parliament is
bicameral with a second chamber, the House of Federation. The election of its
members can be direct or indirect according to the decision of the state councils,
and each nation or nationality receives one additional member for each one
million of its population. The House of Federation plays a unique role as the sole
custodian of the constitution, having the exclusive right and ultimate authority to
interpret the constitution. It also reviews and approves the annual budget in
terms of the allocation of resources to the states. As well, it deals with inter-state
disputes, such as borders and cross-boundary issues.
The differing fiscal capacity, development and population of the regional
states has affected the degree to which these constituent units have been able to
take advantage of the high degree of self-determination. The operation of the
federation is also affected by the fact that the federal policy process has been
mainly channelled by the EPRDF as the dominant political party, thus in practice
making the political processes much more centralized than its constitutional
form.21Ethiopia‘s experiment with ―ethnic federalism‖ offers some insights for
other federations with significant ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. The
Ethiopian experience, however, is faced with serious challenges from one of the
highest levels of poverty in the world and its reliance on a rainfall-based
economy.
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1996)
In 1910 the Union of South Africa became a self-governing dominion within the
British Commonwealth, with a decentralized unitary system. The apartheid
21
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A
Comparative Study, revised edition (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2007), p. 450.
system developed in the 1950s involved a massive attempt at social engineering

which collapsed in the 1990s. Following Nelson Mandela‘s release from prison,
negotiations led to an interparty agreement on an interim quasi-federal
constitution in 1993. After the holding of democratic elections and the formation
of a coalition government, a Constitutional Assembly drafted a new constitution,
which came into effect in 1996. In this constitution the label ―federal‖ is avoided
and South Africa is formally a devolved union, but its features have a strong
federal character, drawing especially on the German model of integrated
federalism.
The 1996 constitution established a republic of nine provinces for a country of
over 43 million people, of whom 75.2 percent were black, 13.6 percent white,
8.6 percent coloured and 2.6 percent Indian. The nine provinces deliberately do
not coincide with racial or tribal boundaries in an effort to avoid difficulties that
might arise from units coinciding with geographically concentrated ethnic
populations.
The constitution recognized three ―spheres‖ of government (the term ―levels‖
was specifically avoided), giving formal constitutional recognition to the central,
provincial and local governments, and it was designed to promote cooperative
federalism rather than competitive federalism. The legislative powers of all three
spheres are set out, but the central government is favoured, since concurrent
powers are extensive and the central government may set national standards and
norms and may override provincial standards that threaten national unity or
national standards.
The hybrid presidential-parliamentary form of government has a bicameral
legislature. The National Assembly, to which the Cabinet is responsible, consists
of 400 representatives elected by proportional representation on a party list
system. The second chamber, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), was
modelled somewhat on the German Bundesrat but attempted to improve on it by
including representatives of both the provincial executives and the legislatures.
Its 90 members consist of 10 from each province, 6 representing the legislature
and 4 representing the executive. The veto power of the NCOP varies according
to whether central legislation affects the jurisdiction of the provinces and is
designed to ensure that provincial interests are not seriously undermined. Taxing
powers are highly centralized, but a Finance and Fiscal Commission was
established by the constitution to make recommendations on the distribution of
revenues. The Constitutional Court is responsible for resolving constitutional
conflicts, but the constitution in section 41(3) includes a unique provision
requiring all spheres of government to exhaust every reasonable effort to resolve
any dispute through intergovernmental negotiation before approaching the courts
to resolve the matter.
A major factor affecting the operation of South Africa since 1996 has been the
dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) within virtually all spheres
of government. This has meant that despite the many federal features of the
constitution, the predominance of the ANC has led in practice to a high degree
of centralization in policy making.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1999)
The Nigerian federation as it now exists is relatively new. In 1999 a new

constitution established a federation consisting of 36 states and a federal capital
territory, encompassing an estimated 132 million people and therefore the most
populous country in Africa.
The Nigerian experience with federalism, however, goes back to the colonial
period when after several stages of devolution an orthodox federal constitution
was adopted for the federation composed of three large regions. At the time of
independence in 1960, Nigeria‘s three regions — one of which, the Northern
Region, had three-quarters of the country‘s area and 54 percent of its population
— were distinguished in every conceivable way: by language, religion, social
institutions, geography, history and even political parties. The early years of
independence were marked by the politics of aggressive ethnoregionalism and
persistent minority insecurity within each region. In 1963 a republican
constitution was adopted, and in response to minority pressures a new fourth
region, the MidWestern Region, was created. This marked the beginning of a
process that over subsequent years has increased the number of constituent units
in the federation from 3 to 36.
Beginning with a military coup in 1966, followed by a civil war until 1970,
Nigeria experienced a series of military regimes, 1970–75, 1975–76, 1976–79,
but in 1979 a new federal constitution came into force. This did not last long as
further military regimes took over power 1983–85, 1985–93, 1993–98, 1998–99.
Thus, for most of the time since independence Nigeria has been under various
military regimes, which maintained the formal trappings of a federation but in
reality imposed a high degree of centralization.
The 1999 constitution retained many of the provisions of the 1979
constitution but with a number of amendments. The new constitution makes
specific provision for 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, recognizes
local governments as a third order of government, and establishes a presidential
system of government. The bicameral National Assembly is made up of a 360-
seat House of Representatives and a Senate that has three representatives from
each state.
The division of powers includes an extensive list of 68 exclusive powers, 12
major concurrent powers, and assigns the residual authority to the states.
Although the ―federal character‖ of Nigeria is entrenched in the constitution, the
legacy of the long periods of military rule is displayed in the high degree of
centralization that remains.
Two features of the Nigerian federal financial arrangements are of interest.

First, although virtually all revenues are levied and collected by the federal
government, the constitution provides for a ―Federation Account‖ (derived from
the concept of a ―Distributable Pool‖ introduced by the Raisman commission in
1958) into which most of those revenues are paid with allocations from this
account being made to federal, state and local governments. Allocations are
based on the advice of a National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal
Commission (NRMAFC) employing such criteria as population, equality of
states, internal revenue generation and land mass.
Second, particularly contentious has been the allocation of revenues generated
by natural resources and oil, particularly since they constitute nearly all the
revenues levied by the federal government but are generated in one region of the
country, the south-eastern states. Nigeria is the most oil dependent of all
established federations and, therefore, oil resources dominate both its public
finance and its politics. The constitution provides that at least 13 percent of the
revenue generated from natural resources should be distributed on the principle
of derivation. Consequently, the producing states receive more per capita than
other states, but the overbearing way the federal government has managed the
resource and the corrupt and poor management by the states receiving these
funds has left the population in the oilrich Niger Delta, strongly aggrieved at not
experiencing the benefits of these resources. This has been the source of serious
unrest and even violence.
An election in 2007 produced a new president, but he faced some pressing
problems: challenges to the validity of the election, massive endemic corruption,
insurgency and gangsterism in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, and a
dismally erratic supply of electricity.
Nigeria‘s current attempts to overcome a history of centralizing military
regimes and to assure national unity in a highly diverse society through a civilian
federal regime, its attempts to deal with the allocation of natural resource
revenues, and the efforts to reduce pervasive corruption illustrate issues that are
of importance in a number of emergent federations.
THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999)
The Venezuelan federation has struggled with anti-democratic elements and

excessive centralization since its earliest incarnation in 1811. Although the
country maintained its federal form, repeated military and autocratic regimes
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries meant that the territorial
distribution of power and the autonomy of the states virtually disappeared.
Significant reforms were introduced in 1989, giving Venezuela‘s 23 states
increased autonomy. This positive step was reinforced by electoral reforms that
mandated the democratic election of state governors. These 1989 reforms served
to counter to some degree the previously high degree of centralization.
This marginal process was undone by the new constitution introduced by
President Hugo Chavez in 1999. This document further centralized Venezuela‘s
already centralized federal system by drastically limiting the role,
responsibilities and powers of state governments. The formerly bicameral
legislature was reduced to the unicameral National Assembly, its 165 members
being elected by proportional representation. The abolition of an upper
legislative house greatly diminished state representation in the institutions of
central government. Nominal recognition of state interests is accommodated
through constitutional provisions that require the federal government to consult
with state bodies before passing any legislation that concerns the states.
However, this has not been the case in practice.
The responsibilities of state governments were greatly diminished by the
division of constitutional powers in the 1999 constitution, which enumerated a
significant number of solely federal powers and a few matters of concurrent
jurisdiction. While the residual power had previously been with state
governments, the new constitution introduced a parallel residual power at the
federal level.
This centralization is further entrenched by a system of fiscal federalism that
devotes no sources of revenue to the state governments. The federal government
retains all significant sources of taxation revenue, with municipal governments
given responsibility for local taxes. In contrast, the state governments must rely
entirely on transfers from the federal government to finance their
responsibilities.
Non-democratic processes have reinforced the centralizing tendencies of the
current Chavez government. The blend of centralization, presidentialism and
militarism has given the Venezuelan federation a distinctly authoritarian
inclination. The highly centralized nature of federalism in Venezuela and the
tenuous grasp of democratic institutions remain the twin challenges to this
country in the present day.
2.3 MICRO-FEDERATIONS22
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA (1978)
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), created in 1978, comprises four

island groups (Yap, Pohnpei, Chuuk and Kosrae) and 108,000 people. The
constitution recognizes three levels of government: national, state and local. The
See especially Dag Anckar, ―Lilliput Federalism: Profiles and Varieties,‖ Regional
22
and Federal Studies, 13:3 (2003): 107–124.

Micronesian experience with federalism has been influenced greatly by the

United States, which was assigned administration of all island groups in the
Micronesian archipelago in 1947 under a United Nations Trusteeship
Agreement. The FSM became formally independent in 1991, but the United
States retains a significant degree of involvement. Although the division of
powers enumerates many areas of responsibility of the federal government, in
practice the United States has delivered these services (including postal services,
currency and defence) as part of the free association agreement last negotiated in
2003. The system of fiscal federalism takes into account each state‘s right to 50
percent of taxes collected within its territory, but also to a certain percentage of
development aid.
The Congress, the federation‘s unicameral legislature, has 14 seats. Each state
elects one member ―at large‖ to represent the territory, while the remaining 10
are elected on the basis of representation by population. The President and
VicePresident are elected by Congress and serve four-year terms with the
possibility of one re-election. An ongoing challenge for the FSM is the lack of
attachment to the institutions and offices of central government since some
citizens regard the federal government as another colonial administration.
Additionally, the islands making up the FSM are geographically dispersed with
only a small land mass.
Given the dispersal of the islands within Micronesia and the islands‘ wish for
autonomy, and the wish of the United States to deal with the Trust Territory as a
single entity, a federal solution emerged as the only solution for holding together
this entity.
THE REPUBLIC OF BELAU (1981)
Belau, like Micronesia, was a United Nations Trust Territory administered by

the United States, but its electorate rejected inclusion in the projected Federated
States of Micronesia in 1978. Belau opted to maintain the principle of
federalism, however, by establishing a federation of 16 states. Given the
diminutive size of the federation with a total population of 17,000, these states
operate at the level of local governments elsewhere, some of them having in fact
fewer than 200 people.
The constitution is modelled on the U.S. constitution. Of the four
microfederations, Belau is the only one to have a bicameral rather than
unicameral federal legislature. The constitution prescribes the powers of the
local states but leaves the residual authority with the federal government, which
may delegate powers to the states. The powers delegated to the states are,
however, few. Given the small size and local nature of the states, it is not
surprising that their powers are relatively limited.
The adoption of a federal structure when there was such a small population
has provided a means of accommodating the historical traditions of the previous
16 loosely tied village clusters. Belau became independent in 1994.
THE FEDERATION OF ST. KITTS AND NEVIS (1985)
The islands of St. Kitts and Nevis are located in the Lesser Antilles chain of
islands in the eastern Caribbean, separated by just over 3 kilometres. With a total
population of 46,000, 76 percent reside in St. Kitts and 24 percent in Nevis.
Together with Anguilla these islands formed a single territory within the short-
lived Federation of the West Indies (1958–62). The three islands became a state
in voluntary association with Britain in 1967, but Anguilla, resentful of the
domination of St. Kitts, left the arrangement in the early 1970s. In 1983, St. Kitts
and Nevis obtained independence as a federation.
The new constitution adopted the Westminster form of government. As such,
a Governor General acts as a representative of the monarch as the head of state,
while the Prime Minister is the head of a parliamentary government vested in the
unicameral National Assembly. The National Assembly currently has 11 seats
elected by a first-past-the-post electoral system, 8 of which are allocated to St.
Kitts and the remaining 3 to Nevis. In addition, the Governor General appoints
three senators on advice of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition;
these senators also sit in the National Assembly, giving this body 14 seats in
total.
The St. Kitts and Nevis constitution differs from most federations in two
respects. First, the federation is unbalanced in that Nevis has its own government
and assembly as a constituent unit while St. Kitts does not. Second, the
constitution provides explicitly for the process of Nevis‘s secession requiring a
two-thirds majority in a referendum. The Nevis Island Assembly is allocated a
considerable measure of jurisdiction, but this power is limited by the
constitutional requirement that it cannot take action in many matters without the
concurrence of the federal prime minister. This imbalance has created a political
dynamic where the drive for Nevis‘s secession was virtually inevitable, and
indeed in 1998 a referendum fell just short of the required two-thirds, with 62
percent.
Political life within the federation continues to be contentious and unstable,
illustrating the problems inherent in a binary and asymmetric federal structure.
THE UNION OF THE COMOROS (2001)
The largest of the micro-federations with a total population of 630,000, Comoros

has had three federal constitutions since independence in 1975. Successive
federal constitutions in 1978, 1992 and 2001 have attempted to unite the islands
of Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli (a fourth island, Mayotte, opted to
remain a French dependency). Despite the aim of these constitutions to achieve

unity with a measure of autonomy for each island, the federation has been
marked by secession movements, several violent military coups and general
instability.
The 2001 constitution attempted to solve these problems by giving more
autonomy to the islands. Although the constitution adopts the title ―union,‖ it has
many federal features. The Assembly of the Union is unicameral, but island
assemblies elect half of the 30 members (5 per island), the other 15 seats (5 per
island) being filled by popular vote. There is a small list of enumerated federal
powers (external affairs, defence, currency, nationality and religion), with the
islands being granted increased autonomy over their own affairs. The Union
President and the Federal Assembly, however, have continued to retain
considerable control in practice over defence, posts and telecommunications,
transit, civil, penal and industrial law, and external trade.
There is a significant asymmetry in the island governments. Grande Comore,
which constitutes 51 percent of the federal population, has its own president (as
the executive heads of each island are known), but unlike the other islands does
not have its own sub-national assembly. The result has been clashes between the
President of the Union and the President of Grande Comore over which
ministries each controls, particularly relating to the revenue-generating
departments such as finance and customs.
To date, the operation of the Comoros federation has been turbulent as a result
of concerns about the adequacy of devolution.
2.4 CONFEDERAL-FEDERAL HYBRIDS
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (1971)
The United Arab Emirates, situated on the eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula,
has a population of just over three million people and comprises seven emirates.
The 1971 provisional constitution, which was made permanent in 1996,
proclaims the United Arab Emirates to be a ―federal state,‖ but in form it is
largely confederal in character.
The Supreme Council of Rulers, consisting of the seven non-elected
traditional emirate rulers, is the highest federal authority and has both the
legislative and executive authority. Since the emirs derive their status from their
position within the emirates, this gives the Supreme Council a confederal
character. There is a Council of Ministers with a prime minister appointed by the
President of the Supreme Council to serve executive functions, but the Supreme
Council formulates the general policy of the federation. There is a unicameral
federal legislature, the Federal National Council, to which representatives for
each emirate are appointed by the ruler, but it is a consultative body only, with
legislative authority residing with the Supreme Council and the Council of
Ministers. Federations are normally characterized by democratic processes, but
other than the election of the president and vice-president of the Supreme
Council by the rulers of the emirates, there are no elections. Late in 2007, the
President of the Supreme Council announced, however, plans to institute
elections for half the members of the Federal National Council by an electoral
college of 2000 leading UAE figures, a very modest step towards representative
government.
Since Abu Dhabi and Dubai constitute 41 and 26 percent respectively of the
federal population, these two possess a veto within the Supreme Council. All
decisions on substantive matters require the consent of five of the seven rulers,
and this majority must include Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The procedure for
amending the constitution is similar: the Council of Ministers proposes an
amendment and after passage by the National Council (in this case, by a two-
thirds majority), the Supreme Council can ratify it, accepting or rejecting any of
the recommendations, but it must have the consent of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
The constitution assigns an apparently broad array of federal powers, but in
practice the contrasting centralist and autonomist views of Abu Dhabi and Dubai
have produced a loose federation. The financial resources of the federal
government are dependent upon funds provided by the individual emirates, most
of which historically have been contributed by Abu Dhabi.
The oil wealth of the county has contributed to the stability of the UAE and to
its development of a modern welfare state while retaining the predominance of
its traditional rulers.
THE EUROPEAN UNION (1993)
The origins of the European Union were fundamentally confederal but during
the course of its development is has become a unique hybrid of some features
typical of confederations and some features typical of federations. The process
of European integration began after World War II when the political leadership
in France, Germany and the Low Countries saw economic integration as
necessary to provide a durable peace and an ability to compete economically
with the then two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Its
beginnings lay in the Treaty of Paris (1951), which established the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the Treaties of Rome (1957), which set
up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community
(Euratom). After a period of relative economic stagnation, the process of
integration was intensified by the development of the common market into a
single market for the free movement of people, goods, services and capital under
the Single European Act 1987, and by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union,
1993.
The European Union (EU), established in 1993, was based on three pillars:
one completing the supranational project of an economic and monetary union, a
second establishing intergovernmental cooperation on foreign and security
policy, and a third involving cooperation on matters of justice and home affairs.
The first of these pillars is the core of the EU with its hybrid confederal-federal
character while the other two pillars are less developed and more confederal.
With relation to the first pillar the intergovernmental Council of Ministers
remained the primary legislative body, but in 1993 the previously limited powers
of the European Parliament were strengthened by a co-decision authority in a
number of important policy areas. The further Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and
Nice (2003) strengthened the processes of majority rule within the Council of
Ministers and the co-decision authority of the European Parliament. By 2007 the
process of widening the EU had embraced 27 member countries encompassing a
population of over 490 million.
In institutional terms there are four key bodies within the first pillar of the EU,
two of which are legislative bodies. The Council of Ministers is the main
decision-making institution. It is composed of 27 member state ministers, the
number of votes held by each being roughly proportional to the member state‘s
population. There is also the European parliament with 785 seats as of 1 January
2007; the seats are allocated among states in proportion to population, and
members are elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term. A third
institution is the European Commission, with one commissioner for each of the
27 member states. Its function is to prepare proposals for the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament to consider. The President of the
Commission is designated by the member governments and is confirmed by the
European Parliament; working from member state recommendations, the
President then assembles a ―college‖ of Commission members, who as an entire
commission are confirmed by the European Parliament for a five-year term. The
fourth is the European Court of Justice whose judgments not only regulate the
conduct and relationship of the member states but also apply directly to
individual citizens and business corporations.
The distribution of authority within the EU differs from that in most
federations which define the distribution in terms of ―jurisdiction.‖ In the EU the
distribution is defined primarily in terms of ―objectives,‖ thus leaving
considerable scope for interpretation. The ―subsidiary principle‖ is stipulated as
a basic yardstick. According to this, the EU would adopt new powers only where
individual member states by their own action are not able to achieve the policy
goals. Since this standard is defined by collective agreement, in practice its
restraint on EU policy making has mainly been rhetorical.
The institutions and distribution of powers have made the EU a unique hybrid
of features found in both confederations and federations. 23 Derived from its
confederal roots are the prominence of the intergovernmental Council of
Ministers, the Commission composed of one commissioner from each member
state, its fiscal minimalism and reliance largely on financial transfers from the
member states, the retention by member states of most traditional powers over
domestic and foreign policy, and its legal basis in a series of treaties that require
the unanimous consent of all the member states. On the other hand, there are a
number of features not normally found in confederations and more akin to those
found in federations. These include the roles of the European Commission,
which in many respects is similar to that of an executive body, of the directly
elected European Parliament with its co-decision powers, and of the European
Court as a judicial body enforcing the supremacy of EU law. Furthermore,
voting in the Council of Ministers on a wide range of issues has increasingly
been based on the qualified majority principle rather than unanimity. In terms of
functions, there has been a distribution of responsibilities, with trade and
commerce heavily in the hands of the EU and social policy in the hands of the
member states.
The European Union displays some aspects of formal asymmetry among its
member states. Most significant was the creation in 1999 of a monetary union
with a new currency, the euro applying to all the EU states except the United
Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.
From 2000 on, there developed a strong move to draft a European constitution
that would transform the EU into a federation of European nation-states. In 2002
the European Constitutional Convention was established, and this culminated in
a draft Constitutional Treaty signed in 2004 in Rome, giving member states two
years to ratify it by parliamentary vote or national referendum. Its defeat in
French and Dutch referendums in May–June 2005 dealt a severe setback to the
ratification process, but in June 2007 agreement was reached to proceed to a
treaty, rather than a constitution, that would retain virtually all of the substance
of the proposed constitution less some of the grandiose language and reference
to symbols. Among the main institutional changes would be an end to the
rotating Council presidency in favour of a single person for a conventional term
of office, an enhanced role for the foreign policy High Representative, a
slimmed down number of commissioners, and a reform of the Council voting
weights with a double majority system (by population and number of member
states). In December 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon implementing these provisions
was duly signed at a summit of the European leaders. Thus, this unique hybrid
combining elements of a confederation and a federation continues to evolve.
23
See David McKay, Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal
Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2.5 POST-CONFLICT FEDERAL EXPERIMENTS
THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1995)
Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six republics that composed the Federal
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia created at the end of World War II. With the
secession of Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia from the federation in the early
1990s, Bosnia too declared its independence in 1992. The resulting war led to
international pressure and the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 for the creation
of a new federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of two ―entities‖: the
Bosniac-Croat Federation (itself a federation of eight cantons with its own strong
central government but serving as one entity within the broader federation); and
the unitary Serbian Republika Srpska.
The Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska share a central
bicameral legislature (the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples)
and a three-member presidency composed of Bosnian, Croat and Serb
representatives. In both legislative houses seats are allocated with one-third to
each of the three ethnic groups. Among the procedures for resolving
constitutional conflicts are a Constitutional Court and a special parliamentary
procedure enabling each ethnic group to block legislation vital to its interests.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a relatively decentralized federation, with the
residual powers assigned to the constituent units. Jurisdiction over taxation is not
explicitly mentioned in the division of powers, and thus this important power
falls to the entities. The Bosniac-Croat Federation provides two-thirds and the
Republika Srpska one-third of the revenues required by the federal budget. The
decentralized division of powers also allows the constituent units to act in areas
that may appear to overlap the central government‘s jurisdiction over foreign
policy and trade, such as establishing relationships with neighbouring states and
entering agreements with foreign states and international organizations (with the
consent of the federal Parliamentary Assembly). This reflects the imperative of
accommodating diverse and regionally concentrated populations. However, the
Dayton Peace Agreement allows for some powers that were temporarily
entrusted to the entities to be eventually transferred back to the central
government, and it empowers the central government to create additional
institutions to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and international personality of the country.
The complex institutions created to accommodate diversity have at times
threatened Bosnia and Herzegovina with paralysis. As such, recent reform
efforts have attempted to reinforce the institutions of the central government.
Whether the international community‘s continued interventionist role exercised
by the United Nations up to 2002 and by the European Union and NATO after
that can succeed in establishing a prosperous and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina
remains to be seen.
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (2005)
Military regimes favouring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated

national politics in Sudan since independence from the United Kingdom in 1956.
Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars during most of the remainder
of the twentieth century. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic,
political and social domination of the southern Sudanese, largely non-Muslim,
non-Arab. The first civil war ended in 1972 but broke out again in 1983. The
second war and faminerelated effects resulted in more than 4 million people
displaced and more than 2 million deaths over a period of two decades. Peace
talks gained momentum in 2002–04 with the signing of several accords. The
final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005, granted the
southern rebels autonomy for six years, after which a referendum on whether the
South should be independent is scheduled to be held. The Interim National
Constitution of 2005 established a federation of 25 states, with a bicameral
federal legislature and a president who is both head of state and head of
government from the north and a vice-president from the south. A distribution of
powers listing federal, state and concurrent powers was set out.
Meanwhile, a separate conflict, which broke out in the western region of
Darfur in 2003, has displaced nearly 2 million people and caused an estimated
200,000 to 400,000 deaths. As of 2007, peacekeeping troops were struggling to
stabilize the situation, which has become increasingly regional in scope and has
brought instability to eastern Chad as well as Sudanese incursions into the
Central African Republic. Sudan also has faced large refugee influxes from
neighbouring countries, primarily Ethiopia and Chad. Armed conflict, poor
transport infrastructure, and lack of government support have chronically
obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations.
While there has been some progress on the autonomy promised to the south,
there have been accusations that Khartoum has been dragging its heels on the
sharing of oil revenues and the recognition of a border between the north and
south. As a result, during October 2007, the party representing the black mostly
Christian south pulled out of the predominantly Arab and Muslim coalition that
runs the federal government. While talks followed to redress the southern
grievances, the tendency to northern intransigence may have a significant impact
on the referendum on independence for the south scheduled for 2011.
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (2005)
Following the invasion of Iraq and the replacement of the Saddam Hussein
regime in 2003 by a coalition led by the United States, a Transitional National
Assembly was elected, which proceeded to draft a constitution that was
approved by a referendum in October 2005.24 This constitution was intended to

be federal in form although a number of features were either ambiguous or
incomplete. The central institutions included the interim Presidency Council
with a president and two vice-presidents representing the Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish communities, a prime minister and cabinet, and a bicameral federal
legislature but with the membership and authority of the second chamber, the
Federation Council, left undefined. Two categories of constituent units were
specified: 18 governorates, which were basically administrative units; and
regions with greater powers, combining governorates where they choose to join
together and including a Kurdish region from the beginning. The distribution of
powers set out federal and concurrent powers but contained a number of
ambiguities, especially relating to control of natural resources such as oil and gas
ownership. In the area of concurrent jurisdiction paramountcy was assigned to
regional law over federal law. An election under the constitution was held in
December 2005, but many of the ambiguities remained unresolved, and despite
the continued presence of coalition forces a virtual state of civil war has
continued to persist. In the meantime a constitutional review committee has
made proposals which, if accepted, would clarify and strengthen the role of the
central government and establish a number of key central institutions. These
proposals have not yet been approved, however.
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2006)
After a prolonged period of ethnic strife and civil war beginning in 1994, the
Pretoria Accord in late 2002 was signed by the warring parties to end the
fighting and establish a government of national unity for this country of 68
million people with some 250 ethnic groups. The transitional government held a
successful constitutional referendum in December 2005 and the new constitution
came into effect in February 2006. The National Assembly was established in
September 2006, a president was chosen in December 2006, and provincial
assemblies governors and national senators came into office early in 2007. The
federation consists of 25 provinces plus Kinshasa as the capital. The head of
state is elected for a five-year term and the Prime Minister as head of
government is appointed by the President. The federal Parliament is bicameral,
the Senate members being elected by the provincial assemblies. The distribution
of powers is strongly weighted to the federal government, but the residual
authority lies with the provinces. There is a Constitutional Council to ensure the
constitutionality of laws. Constitutional amendments require passage by the two
24
For an assessment see Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone and Ben Rowswell,
Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflict (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2007).
houses convened in Congress by a twothirds majority followed by approval in a

referendum.
To date, the constitution has been in operation for insufficient time to judge its
effectiveness in resolving the previous conflicts that afflicted this country. With
continued violence in
eastern Congo‘s North Kivu province during 2007, the dangers of the Congo
and Rwanda and of the Hutus and Tutsis returning to war have remained a
concern.
Chapter 3
The Formation of Federations
3.1 THE VARIETY OF FACTORS AND PROCESSES
What factors and processes have led to the adoption or creation of federations?
Some analysts have tried to identify a single common factor. For instance, W.H
Riker attributed a significant external or internal threat as the factor common to
the creation of all federations.25 But while this factor has been important in a
number of cases, notably Switzerland, Canada and Mexico, there are a number
of other instances, such as Australia, where it was clearly not the major factor.
Indeed, in most federations it has been a combination of factors that was
responsible for the choice by political leaders of federation as a form of
government, and the particular combination of factors and the process of
formation has varied from federation to federation.
3.2 THE BALANCE OF PRESSURES
While the particular factors encouraging unity and regional autonomy have
varied in the formation of federations, what is common to all the successful
instances is the existence of a relative balance in the pressures for political
integration and for regional autonomy. It should be noted that it is possible for a
strong integrative consciousness in a wider community to coexist with an equally
strong regional consciousness, as has been the case in India for instance, or for
both forces to be relatively weak, as was the case in the founding of the
Australian federation; but what both these cases had in common was the relative
balance in the forces for unity and for regional autonomy.
Where one of the these pressures is strong and the other weak, the result is
likely to be either unitary political integration, on the one hand, or the
independence of the regional units or at least a confederal solution, on the other.
W.H. Riker, ―Federalism,‖ in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. eds.,

25
Handbook of Political Science: Government Institutions and Processes, vol.5 (Reading,

MA: Addison Wesley, 1975).
The Formation of Federations 69
Where both motivations exist in something approaching an equal balance,

federation as a solution is likely to appeal by enabling both an effective federal
government and genuine regional autonomy to coexist. This latter situation
arises because people may be members of and feel loyalty to several groups and
communities at the same time (e.g., family, work group, professional
association, church, ethnic or linguistic community, political movement, village
or city, regional community, nation, supranational association or global
community) rather than being focused on only one of them to the exclusion of
the others. Because people‘s attachments to these different groups or
communities vary in intensity and over time, these loyalties are not necessarily
mutually exclusive; hence, the possibility of the coexistence of both uniting and
regionalizing pressures at the same time.
It needs to be emphasized that while this relative balance of motivations is
common to federations, the particular factors contributing to the balance has in
each case been the unique result of differing historical and social forces and the
choices made by political leaders. As a result, each federation has in a sense been
a unique experiment, combining in its own distinctive way a particular regional
structure, distribution of powers, arrangements for intergovernmental
cooperation, organization of central government, and protection for the
supremacy of the constitution — all to fit its own particular circumstances.
It should be noted that the balance of factors encouraging unity and regional
autonomy is important not only in leading to the creation of federations but also
in their subsequent operation. Over time, the importance of particular factors
may change, shifting the balance of pressures. For instance, typically in colonial
federations, movements for independence have provided a strong uniting force,
but once independence has been achieved the strength of that unifying
motivation has dissipated. In a number of cases this led to the subsequent
difficulties or even disintegration of newly independent federations in the 1960s
and 1970s. This indicates that in assessing the effectiveness of a federal political
system, it is necessary to consider not only whether initially the particular form
of its institutions appropriately exposed and reconciled the conflicting demands
of the society on which it was based, but whether subsequently it continues to
reflect changes and shifts in the factors affecting aspirations for both unity and
regional autonomy. The splitting of overcentralized Pakistan in 1970 and the
disintegration of the ineffectual Federation of the West Indies in 1962 illustrate
cases where the particular form of the federation failed to reflect accurately the
balance in the aspirations for united action and for regional autonomy.
3.3 DIFFERING PROCESSES IN THE CREATION OF
FEDERATIONS
A number of analysts have noted that federations have been created in different
ways. Carl Friedrich in 1968 drew attention to the importance of the process by
which federations were created and to the fact that while some were established
by bringing separate units together, others involved devolving power to regional

units. 26 More recently, Alfred Stepan has emphasized the distinction between
federations created by the ―coming together‖ of formerly separate units and
those resulting from ―holding together‖ regions in a formerly united polity. 27
Federations have, in fact, been created in three different ways. One is the
aggregation of formerly separate units. The United States, Switzerland, and
Australia provide classic examples. In these the process of aggregation led in the
early stages to an emphasis on retaining a large element of autonomy for the
federating units. A second pattern has been through devolution from a previous
unitary regime. Examples of this pattern are provided by Belgium, Germany
(after the Third Reich), Nigeria and Spain. This pattern, at least initially, has
usually resulted in a greater relative emphasis on federal powers. A third pattern
has been the combination of these two processes, Canada and India providing
major examples. The creation of the Canadian federation involved a devolution
to two new provinces (Ontario and Quebec) from what had previously been a
single unitary Province of Canada, and also the addition of two previously
separate colonies (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) as provinces of the new
federation. The Union of India established by the 1950 constitution included a
devolution to states that had previously been provinces and the incorporation of
the previously separate princely states into the new federation.
These examples illustrate the variety of processes by which federations have
been created. The different paths have often affected the character of the
resulting federation, although common to them all has been the eventual
establishment, as a result of political negotiation, of a compound polity in which
each of the different orders of government derives its authority from a supreme
constitution rather than from another level of government.
3.4 CATALYSTS OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION
One set of factors found in the formation of federations has been those
contributing to political integration. While the specific factors contributing to the
motivation for distinct regional groups to come together or when devolution
occurs to maintain common institutions of shared-rule has varied from federation
to federation, the existence of some desire for shared-rule has been common to
all of them.
26
Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger,
1968).
27
Alfred Stepan, ―Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,
Multinationalism and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,‖ in E.L. Gibson, ed.,
Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Balitimore & London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004), pp. 33–7.
The pressure for united action in at least some areas has depended on the
following factors. The first is the influence of the background conditions,
including (a) the degree of spillover from pre-existing national, economic and
social links or integration anong the constituent units, (b) the geographical
proximity of the constituent units, (c) the relative size and bargaining power of
the constituent units, and (d) the affinities between their elites. Second is the
strength of the integrative motives present, including (a) the desire for security
from external or internal threats, (b) the desire for economic benefits from the
larger market or complementary products, (c) the desire for greater international
influence, and (d) the desire for a common identity. Third is the character of the
integration process itself in terms of (a) the character of the bargaining process,
(b) the role of political leaders, (c) the role of external governments or, in the
case of colonial federations, the imperial government, and (d) the timing and
sequence of steps in the process of negotiation and unification.
3.5 CATALYSTS OF CONSTITUENT UNIT AUTONOMY
The strongest catalyst for political union into larger federations since the middle
of the twentieth century has been increasing worldwide interdependence in an
era when advances in technology and communications have made it difficult for
even nation-states to be self-sufficient economically or to defend their own
security. Paradoxically, it has been the awareness of this trend that has also
frequently encouraged a stronger regional consciousness within political
systems. The growth of larger and remote political structures, coupled with the
increasing pervasiveness of vast governmental structures and bureaucracies
impinging upon the life of citizens, has often provoked a counter-reaction.
The heightened resistance to political integration and the vigorous demand for
self-expression, dignity and self-rule have been particularly strong where
regional groups have been marked by differences of language, race, religion,
social structure, and cultural tradition. In such cases as Switzerland, Canada,
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Belgium and Spain, linguistic,
religious or racial minorities, fearing discrimination at the hands of political
majorities, have insisted on regional autonomy as a way to preserve their distinct
identities. Where the threat to this distinctiveness has been perceived as
particularly serious, such regional groups have sometimes turned to outright
secession as the only sure defence against assimilation, even when that means
forgoing the benefits of the wider federation.
Linguistic identity has been a particularly potent force for regionalism. This is
not surprising, since language differences often serve as barriers to
communication. Moreover, a shared language provides a means of expression
and communion, which is a most important ingredient in one‘s awareness of a
social identity and a treasured heritage of a common past. Not surprisingly, any
community governed through a language other than its own has usually felt
disenfranchised. Significantly, linguistic regionalism has been a greater problem
in societies that are industrial or are in the process of modernization compared
with primitive agrarian societies, because in the former, official recognition of a
language substantially affects career opportunities and employment. Where
different linguistic groups exist within a country, it would appear that conflict is
particularly severe where members of different language groups are under
unequal pressures to learn the language of others.
Other cultural factors can also be divisive. In Switzerland, for example,
political divisions have as often followed confessional as linguistic lines.
Elsewhere, as on the Indian sub-continent, ostensibly religious differences have
been explosive. Generally, regional consciousness has been strongest where
differences of language, race, religion and social institutions have reinforced
rather than cut across each other, as in Switzerland, or where they have been
associated with economic subordination, as in Belgium and Malaysia.
Among other factors contributing to the intensity of regional consciousness
are differences in the degree of modernization. Where some regions have lagged
behind, this has been a source not only of resentment but also of fears of
exploitation or domination by the more advanced regions.
Differences of economic interest have also been an important factor. While
economic differences have often contributed to integration through opening the
possibility of exchange of different products across regional boundaries, they
may also foster regional consciousness because of differences in problems of
production, types of exports, sources of foreign capital and appropriate policies
for the promotion of economic development. Furthermore, although political
union may bring economic gains to the union as a whole, economic integration
may not only have ―trade-creation‖ effects but may also have ―tradediversion‖
effects that impose hardship and inequality on some regions. It is noteworthy
that many ostensibly linguistic, racial or cultural movements for regional
autonomy or separateness in countries such as Canada, India, Malaysia and
Nigeria have had strong economic undercurrents related to the struggle for jobs
and economic opportunities.
In federations such as the United States, Australia, Brazil and Argentina,
where linguistic or cultural divisions have been more moderate, economic and
also historical differences among the federating units have been sufficiently
strong to fuel the pressure for regional autonomy.
Not to be overlooked is the impact in some cases of direct or indirect external
influences upon regional consciousness. Quebec in Canada, Biafra in Nigeria
and the Jura in Switzerland provide powerful examples of the impact of direct
encouragement of a regional separatist movement by a foreign government.
This discussion suggests that to understand regionalism it must be examined
not simply in terms of the absence of factors encouraging political union, but
also in terms of factors that encourage a regional consciousness. These factors
parallel the factors for united action identified in section 3.2 above, but
encourage regional consciousness. First, there are the background conditions,
including (a) the degree to which each particular region is internally
homogenous in language, religion, race and culture, (b) differences in the level
of modernization, economic development and political ideology or outlook, (c)
the degree of disparity in relative wealth and potential influence among
constituent units within the proposed federation, and (d) the competitiveness of
the elites in the different regimes. Second, the strength of the immediate motives
for regional autonomy is significant, including (a) the desire to secure the
distinctive features of the regional society against potential threats of
assimilation, (b) the desire to enhance the economic benefits for the specific
regional group, and (c) the strength of the desire for a sense of regional identity
or even nationhood. Third, also important is the character of the process for
negotiating a federal solution involving regional autonomy in terms of (a) the
character of the negotiating process (e.g., use of referendums, elections, or
guerrilla campaigns), (b) the role of leading regional elites, (c) the responses of
neighbouring regions, (d) the impact of direct and indirect external influences,
and (e) the timing and sequence of steps in the negotiations.
3.6 THE CAPACITY FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
K.C. Wheare, in examining factors leading to the creation of federations, drew

attention to an important difference between the factors that contributed to the
desire for federation and those that contributed to the capacity to create and
operate a federal form of government. The desire for federation is itself an
important element in the capacity to operate a federal system. There must be a
strong enough sense of joint identity and interest to achieve loyalty to a common
federal government for certain purposes and to make the necessary
accommodations to achieve this. There must also be a strong enough sense of
distinct identities to maintain real autonomy at the regional level.
A number of other factors are also important for the capacity to operate a
federal system. Among these are the availability of sufficient trained human and
financial resources to support the operation of two or more orders of
government. Another crucial element is the existence of a supportive political
culture. Since federations are distinguished by each order of government
receiving its authority from the constitution, a respect for constitutionalism and
the rule of law is a crucial prerequisite for effective operation. Since federations
involve accommodating and reconciling territorial diversity, a political culture
emphasizing tolerance and compromise is an equally important prerequisite.
These prerequisites mean that the existence of reasonably functioning
democratic processes are an important factor. The failure of such nominal
federations as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the
ineffective operation of the new constitutions of Sudan and Iraq point to the
importance of these prerequisites.
3.7 THE INFLUENCE OF MODELS
Earlier federations have often served as models providing institutional

precedents and examples that have been of influence to political leaders
establishing subsequent federations. This influence has taken both positive and
negative forms where particular institutional arrangements have been followed
or avoided in the light of previous experience.
The United States of America as the first modern federation, established in
1789, not only influenced a number of features adopted by the Swiss in 1848,
such as the bicameral legislature (but the avoidance of a non-collegial
presidency), and the Australian federation in terms of the form of the distribution
of powers, but it also was the predominant model followed by the Latin
American federations, which all adopted the presidential-congressional form of
institutions. On the other hand, in the 1860s during the period of the civil war in
the United States, Canadians deliberately chose a more centralized form of
federation to avoid the apparent weakness of the U.S. federal government.
Switzerland has perhaps had a less pervasive influence than warranted, but the
use of referendums with a double majority (federation-wide majority and
majorities in a majority of constituent units) for constitutional amendments has
served as a model not only for Australia but for a number of other more recent
federations.
Canada, founded as a federation in 1867, was the first federation to
incorporate Westminster parliamentary institutions, and this pattern was
followed in most of the former British colonies that subsequently became
federations. Australian political leaders, despite expressly preferring the more
decentralized U.S. form of the division of powers, followed the Canadian
precedent of incorporating parliamentary institutions on the Westminster pattern.
India and Malaysia, in part through the influence of the Government of India Act,
1935, itself modelled on the British North America Act, 1867, were heavily
influenced by the Canadian model, even to including some quasi-federal
elements. It is noteworthy too that most of the subsequent European federations
have incorporated parliamentary rather than presidential-congressional
institutions.
Australia, with bodies such as the Loan Council, the Commonwealth Grants
Commission, and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), has been a
pioneer in the establishment of intergovernmental councils, especially in relation
to issues of federal finances, but also more broadly. This example has influenced
the establishment of such bodies in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia and South
Africa, among others.
The German federation, with its emphasis on administrative rather than

legislative decentralization and concomitant interlocking federal-state
relationships, has influenced not only a number of European federations but
particularly the cooperative character of the South Africa federation. The South
African federal second chamber, the National Council of Provinces, was an
attempt to improve on the German Bundesrat by incorporating both executive
and legislative representation from the provinces.
Whether in terms of imitations, variations or express avoidance of features of
earlier federations, later federations have clearly exhibited an awareness of and
have taken account of the earlier examples.
Chapter 4
The Constituent Units
4.1 THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF FEDERATIONS
The constituent units representing one of the orders of government constitute the
building blocks on which a federation is based. In different federations the basic
constituent units have gone by different names: ―states‖ in Australia, Belau,
Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, the United States
and Venezuela; ―provinces‖ in Argentina, Canada, Pakistan and South Africa;
―Länder‖ in Austria and Germany; ―cantons‖ in Switzerland; ―Autonomous
Communities‖ in Spain; ―Regions‖ and ―Communities‖ in Belgium; ―subjects‖
in Russia; ―islands‖ in Comoros and St. Kitts and Nevis; ―emirates‖ in the
United Arab Emirates; and ―entities‖ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of these,
however, represent the basic governmental components in these federations.
4.2 THE NUMBER OF CONSTITUENT UNITS
The number of constituent units plays an important role in shaping the dynamics
of political relationships within federations. In this respect there has been a great
variety among federations (see table 8). In nine federations there are 20 or more
basic constituent units, the largest number being originally 89 (in 1993) but now
86 (in 2007) subjects in Russia, and 50 states in the United States. The others are
Argentina with 23, Brazil with 26, India with 28, Mexico with 31, Nigeria with
36, Switzerland with 26 and Venezuela with 23. Having such a large number of
constituent units has usually meant that none of them is in a position to dominate
politics within the federation or to individually counterbalance the federal
government.
At the other extreme are federations with 2 to 4 constituent units. Examples
are found in three of the micro-federations: Comoros with 3; Micronesia with 4;
and St. Kitts and Nevis with 2. Other examples are Pakistan since 1973 with 4
provinces; Bosnia and Herzegovina with 2 entities; and in its early years as a
federation until 1963, Nigeria with 3 regions. Also notable are the bicommunal
characters of Pakistan 1956–71 before the separation of Bangladash,
The Constituent Units 77
Czechoslovakia prior to segregation in 1992, and Serbia and Montenegro 1992–

2006. In all these federations the small number of regional units, often with one
dominant region, has made it possible for individual units to challenge the
federal government, typically producing quite unstable political relationships.
The remainder of the federations fall between these two extremes: Australia
with 6 states, Austria with 9 Länder, Belgium with nominally 3 Communities
and 3 Regions, Canada with 10 provinces, Ethiopia with 9 states, Germany with
16 Länder, Malaysia with 13 states, South Africa with 9 provinces, Spain with
17 Autonomous Communities, and the United Arab Emirates with 7 emirates. In
these instances, individual constituent units have been able to exert more
political influence than in the federations that have a larger number of units,
especially where one or two regional units have themselves been significantly
large or wealthy, but they have not experienced the degree of instability
displayed by the federations with only two to four constituent units.
4.3 THE SIZE AND WEALTH OF CONSTITUENT UNITS
There are also enormous variations in the size of the constituent units among the
contemporary functioning federations listed in table 8. The largest units – Uttar
Pradesh in India with 166 million, Punjab in Pakistan with 80 million and
California in the United States with 34 million – are each larger than the total
population of many federations. At the other extreme, some constituent units in
Belau have barely more than 200 inhabitants, while Kosrae in Micronesia has a
population of only 8,000, Nevis in St. Kitts and Nevis 10,000, and Appenzell–
Inner Rhodes in Switzerland 15,000.
The absolute size of constituent units is significant because this may affect the
range of functions that they have the capacity to perform. On the other hand,
where constituent units are of the immense size of Uttar Pradesh in India, Punjab
in Pakistan or California in the United States, questions arise about how
responsive they can be to the interests of individual citizens or to distinct local
communities.
Another important aspect relating to the size of constituent units is the relative
variation among the regional units within a given federation. Many federations
are marked by enormous variations, as table 8 indicates. This means that within a
federation there may be a wide difference among constituent units in terms of
their capacity to perform functions and in their influence on federal policy
making.
78
opulationPopulationPopulationPopulationPopulation
f Largest
itUnitFederationto Smallest
0.68%87.3
0.2%86.7
m59.7%German Community
4.5
33.7%2.0
0.5%70.2 44.2%1.2 m
m
7 0.07 0.5%27.4
0.015
28.5
39.0%1.6
7 m
1.2
0.5
%10.5
ic5.2 m
Federal Countries, 2005
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005).
epublika Srpska1.6 m
Particularly significant in this latter respect are federations where one or two
constituents may constitute a majority or nearly a majority of the federal
population. Notable examples where a single constituent unit contains a majority
of the federal population are the Flemish Region in Belgium (59.7 percent), the
Bosniac-Croat Federation as an entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (61 percent),
Grande Comore within Comoros (51.3 percent), Chuuk within Micronesia (50.1
percent), Punjab within Pakistan (55.6 percent), and St. Kitts within St. Kitts and
Nevis (75.8 percent). The tensions such a situation may give rise to are
illustrated by the disintegration of such federations as the Federation of the West
Indies (1958–62) where Jamaica, one of ten territories, had 52 percent of the
federal population; Pakistan 1956–71 where one unit, East Pakistan, had 54
percent of the federal population; Czechoslovakia 1920–92 where the Czech
Republic had 66.4 percent of the population; and Serbia and Montenegro from
1992 until its demise in 2006, where Serbia had 91.8 percent of the population.
Also a considerable source of tensions are cases where two constituent units
together have constituted a majority of the federal population or close to it.
Examples are Abu Dhabi (41 percent) and Dubai (26 percent), totalling 67
percent of the UAE population; Ontario (38 percent) and Quebec (24 percent),
totalling 62 percent in Canada; Oromia (35 percent) and Amhara (26 percent),
totalling 61 percent in Ethiopia; New South Wales (34 percent) and Victoria (25
percent), totalling 59 percent in Australia; and Buenos Aires (38 percent) and
Cordoba (9 percent), totalling 47 percent in Argentina. These units have tended
to play a predominant role in the federal politics of their federations, to the
resentment of the more numerous smaller constituent units. It is of interest to
note that despite the large absolute size of their populations, Uttar Pradesh in
India and California in the United States represent only 16 and 12 percent of
their total federal populations, thus moderating their influence in federal politics.
In most federations there is also a considerable variation in the wealth of their
constituent units, especially in relation to natural resources. As in the case of
population, this is significant in terms of their capacity to perform the functions
constitutionally assigned to them. Also, variations within each federation in
terms of their relative wealth have been a factor affecting the influence of
particular constituent units in the dynamics of federal politics.
4.4 CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUENT UNITS
In most federations there is just one category of full-fledged constitutional units

although, as noted in section 4.1, their labels may vary. In a few cases, however,
these full-fledged constituent units may be placed into several categories.
Most notable in this respect is Belgium where two kinds of constituent units
were established in 1970 with different jurisdictions assigned to them. Three of
the constituent units (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) are Regions territorially
demarcated and responsible mainly for regional economic development, public

works, transportation, international trade and agricultural policy. Three
constituent units are culturally defined Communities (Flemish, French and
German) overlapping the Regions and with powers over language, culture,
education and social services such as health care. The situation is further
complicated by the fact that since 1980 the Flemish Region and Community
have merged their institutions.
The Russian Federation as created in 1993 comprised 89 constituent units in
several categories inherited from the previous Soviet Union. These were 21
republics, 49 oblasts (regions), 6 krais (territories), 10 autonomous okrugs
(districts), one autonomous oblast, and 2 federal cities (Moscow and St.
Petersburg). According to the constitution all have equal legislative and
executive powers, but the republics are distinguished by the fact that they
contain significant non-Russian ethnic populations (e.g., Tartars in Tartarstan,
Bashkirs in Bashkortostan, and so on). Oblasts and krais are non-ethnically
based regions. Autonomous okrugs are ethnically based districts that are
homelands to indigenous Aboriginal populations. They are considered both
separate members of the federation and parts of the oblasts or krais in which they
are located, a situation that has led frequently to jurisdictional disputes.28
Spain, in addition to its 17 Autonomous Communities, has 2 non-indigenous
Autonomous Communities, Ceuta and Melilla (located on the north coast of
Morocco), which were granted eligibility to become Autonomous Communities
in 1995.
In a number of federations there are secondary classes of constituent units
with less autonomy than the full-fledged constituent units and with special
funding arrangements. These less autonomous units, most commonly called
―territories,‖ usually are remote and thinly populated regions lacking the
resources to sustain full self-government, or they are special tribal areas,
overseas possessions or federal capital districts. The arrangements of federal
capital districts is dealt with below in section 4.7. Examples of non-capital
territories are found in Australia (the Northern Territory plus 7 administrative
territories), Canada (Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon), India (7 Union
Territories), Pakistan (6 Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Spain (3 directly
administered sovereign areas off the coast of Morocco), and Venezuela (one
federally controlled dependency consisting of 11 federally controlled island
groups with a total of 72 individual islands). In some cases, notably the United
States, Brazil, Canada and India, historically new full-fledged states have been
created out of former territories when their populations and development
28
A.L. Griffiths, ed., Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005 (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005), pp. 266–67.
provided the basis to sustain self-government at the level of the primary

constituent units.
Some federations have also had a looser federacy or associate state
relationship with certain units. Examples of federacies are the Northern Mariana
Islands and Puerto Rico in relation to the United States. Examples of associated
states are Bhutan in relation to India and Liechtenstein in relation to Switzerland.
In the case of Spain, until 1993, Andorra functioned under the joint rule of Spain
and France as a condominium.
4.5 THE REGIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS OF CONSTITUENT

UNITS
In some federations, such as Argentina, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Germany,

Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Venezuela, where
there is clearly a dominant language and relatively low levels of religious or
ethnic divisions within the federation, the constituent units have not represented
distinct ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages. In these cases there have often
been historical and economic regional differences among the constituent units,
but not the depth of distinctiveness engendered by ethnicity, language or
religion.
Other federations, such as Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Russia,
Spain and Switzerland, contain constituent units marked by different linguistic,
ethnic or religious majorities. In these, the consciousness of regional
distinctiveness tends to be particularly sharp. The first such federation was
Switzerland, which was established in its current form in 1848, and the second
was Canada, established in 1867, but the number of such federations proliferated
in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Two strategies have been advocated for dealing with such deep regional
cleavages. One is that of weakening potentially divisive ethno-nationalism by
designing the constituent units to prevent ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities
from becoming majorities within constituent units. Among advocates of this
view are Donald Horowitz and Daniel Elazar, building on earlier work by S.M.
Lipset and an earlier American tradition going back to James Madison.29 This
strategy grows out of a concern at the sharp divisions and secessionism that
29
D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985), pp. 601–52; D. Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace (Kingston: Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1994), p. 168; S.M. Lipset, Political
Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 91–2;
J. McGarry and B. O‘Leary, ―Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Resolution,‖ in
M. Burgess, ed., Multinational Federations (London & New York: Routledge, 2007):
180– 211.
strong ethnonationalism can engender. The objective is to proliferate when

possible the multiple points of power away from a focus on ethno-nationalism.
Among federations with ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, this specific
strategy in the design of constituent units was attempted in India originally in
1950 (although abandoned in 1956) and in South Africa when establishing the
boundaries of its nine new provinces.
An alternative strategy has been to accommodate ethnic, linguistic and
regional groups by establishing regional units within which they may form a
majority with the power to protect and promote their distinctiveness through a
measure of selfgovernment.30 Those advocating this approach see it as reducing
interethnic tension by giving each group a sense of security in protecting its
distinctiveness. Among federations clearly following this path have been
Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, Russia and Ethiopia. In Switzerland, as
noted in chapter 2, most of the cantons are predominantly unilingual and have
either a Roman Catholic or Protestant majority. In Canada, the French-speaking
population is heavily concentrated in Quebec, where it constitutes about 80
percent of the population; New Brunswick is officially bilingual and the other
eight provinces have overwhelming English-speaking majorities. In Belgium, the
three constituent units labelled ―Communities‖ clearly represent the Flemish-,
French- and German-speaking peoples. The Spanish constituent units, labelled
―Autonomous Communities‖ have permitted the re-emergence of historic
nationalities as political entities. While the predominant ethnicity and language
in the Russian Federation is Russian, the republics and the autonomous okrugs
specifically represent non-Russian ethnic populations. Ethiopia as a federation
was explicitly established to recognize its diverse ethnic groups although it was
not possible to give every ethnic group its own state and one of the largest states
is very multi-ethnic.
It is also significant that over time both India and Nigeria have found it
necessary to follow this approach. Originally, the Constituent Assembly of India,
fearing it would sharpen divisions, resisted defining the states on the basis of
language, but beginning with the States Reorganization Act in 1956 and during
the following decade, state boundaries were redrawn largely on linguistic lines
and in the case of Punjab taking religious differences into consideration;
subsequently, the process was continued further to recognize some smaller new
states in the northeast. Nigeria, too, which at the time of independence in 1960
consisted of 3 large regional units, has since 1963 progressively increased the
number of states to a total of 36, largely defined to reflect distinct linguistic,
ethnic and religious groups.
4.6 REFORMING CONSTITUENT UNIT BOUNDARIES
30
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Most federations have a special constitutional amending procedure for altering

the boundaries of constituent units and for creating new constituent units.
Revising constituent unit boundaries usually requires the consent of the
constituent units directly affected. For the creation of new constituent units, this
usually requires the consent of any constituent units directly affected or a special
majority of all existing constituent units. The reason for these procedures is to
assure constituent units that their interests as distinct units will not be vulnerable
to federal action. Thus, as a rule, in most federations the redrawing of internal
boundaries, once they have been established, is a difficult process.
There are exceptions to this pattern, however. In the United States, Canada,
Brazil and Argentina, federal action has created new states or provinces out of
former ―territories,‖ or provinces have been enlarged by adding former territorial
lands to them. In India, the Constituent Assembly, anticipating a need to redraw
state boundaries after the immediate crises of independence, partition and the
integration of the princely states had been surmounted, provided a particularly
flexible constitutional amendment process specifically for this purpose —
namely, passage by the Union Parliament by ordinary law. 31 This facilitated the
subsequent systematic redrawing of state boundaries from 1956 on. In the case
of Nigeria, most of the evolution from the 3 regions of 1960 to the 36 states of
today was facilitated by the action of the military regimes when democracy was
suspended. The process adopted by Switzerland to define the boundaries of the
new canton of Jura out of the canton of Bern is of interest: a series of cascading
referendums was used to determine its creation and boundaries.
In the current efforts to merge some constituent units in Russia, referendums
have also been used. Under the amendments to the Russian constitution in 2001
and 2005, the territorial integrity of the subjects of the federation is guaranteed:
their borders cannot be changed without their consent as well as that of the
Federation Council. On the other hand, the subjects of the federation have the
right to merge with another subject of the federation to form a new constituent
unit. The procedure for such mergers is established by federal law. As of 1
January 2007, referendums had passed approving two mergers involving 5
constituent units reducing the total number of subjects in the federation to 86,
and 3 further mergers involving 6 subjects, which would reduce the total to 83,
were projected.
4.7 FEDERAL CAPITALS
Every federation faces the difficult task of deciding how its federal capital
should be governed. The problem is a difficult one because usually it involves a
conflict of interests. The federal government usually wishes to control and
31
Such bills can be introduced only by the government, however, and only after the
views of the legislatures in the affected states have been obtained.
develop the capital and the seat of federal government in the interests of the
federation as a whole. If the capital is itself a member state or comes under the
jurisdiction of one of the members states, then that state is in a position to
dominate the federal capital, and the control of the federal government over its
own seat of government is restricted. On the other hand, the citizens of the
capital city usually wish to govern themselves to the greatest extent possible,
rather than being controlled by the federal government. These issues are
compounded by the fact that federal capitals are often characteristically large and
rapidly growing cities with populations spilling beyond the legal boundaries of
the central city into the neighbouring territory. The objectives usually sought in
the organization of federal capitals include generating a pride throughout the
federation in its capital; meeting the needs of the federal legislature, ministries,
security and foreign diplomatic representatives; and avoiding the appearance of
favouring one particular state or province.
Broadly speaking, there are three main types of constitutional organization for
the government of federal capitals: a federal district, a city-state, and government
under the jurisdiction of one of the states. Each has its own advantages and
peculiar problems.
Many but by no means all federations have established a federal district or
territory under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government as the way of
governing the federal capital. Eight significant examples are Washington, DC
(USA), Canberra, the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), the Federal
District of Mexico City (Mexico), the Federal District of Caracas (Venezuela),
the Union Territory of Delhi (India), the Capital Territory of Islamabad
(Pakistan), Abuja Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria) and the Federal Capital
City of Addis Ababa (Ethiopia).
Among the advantages of this type of arrangement is that it gives the central
government sufficient control over the planning and development of its own
capital. Furthermore, it avoids having the laws of any one member state
dominating the capital of the whole federation, interfering with the organs of the
central government, or imposing its legal and cultural dominance on the federal
capital.
Among the disadvantages typical of the federal district type of arrangement is
the tendency for there to be too much central control over local residents. In
many of these cases (although not all), there is no locally elected government,
and in a number of them their residents also do not elect representatives to the
federal congress or parliament. There are a few cases, however, such as Caracas,
Mexico City and Delhi, where a considerable degree of local self-government is
in fact provided. Generally this has worked well, but it can create problems
where different political parties dominate the federal government and the elected
local council. A further disadvantage with the federal district arrangements is
that if they are not made large enough to begin with, problems arise when the
urban population spreads beyond their boundaries (e.g., Buenos Aires, Caracas,
Mexico City, Washington) especially since boundary changes requiring

constitutional amendments are usually difficult to implement.
In terms of the appropriateness of this form of federal capital organization, it
exists in both centralized and decentralized federations and for large and small
capital cities. It has been a particularly popular arrangement when new capitals
have been established where there was previously no significant local
population. While this form of capital organization has also been created around
existing old cities, general experience suggests that in this type of federal capital
organization the predominant legal, financial and political power of the federal
governments tips the balance between central control and local interests strongly
in favour of the former. It may be worth noting that in a few cases non-capital
cities have been given a similar special status in the form of federally chartered
cities, an example being Dire Dawa in Ethiopia.
In some cases, the federal capital is given the status of a full-fledged state
within the federation. There are four notable examples: Vienna (Austria),
Moscow (Russia), Berlin (Germany since reunification 1990), and Brussels
(Belgium). The Brussels Capital Region is one of the three regions in Belgium. It
should be noted that Brussels also serves as the capital of the EU. There are other
cases of federations containing non-capital city-states as full-fledged member
states that have worked quite effectively (e.g., Bremen and Hamburg in
Germany, and St. Petersburg in Russia). As an arrangement for a federal capital,
in contrast to the federal district form of organization, status as a full-fledged
member state ensures local self-government while at the same time avoiding
subservience to one of the other member states.
The disadvantage of this arrangement is that because of the autonomy intrinsic
with full statehood, the federal government is left with minimal control over its
own seat of government. Furthermore, because of the usual rigidity of state
boundaries, if the area is not big enough at the time of creation, a subsequent
spillover of population may create problems with neighbouring states or regions.
This is exemplified by the spillover of population from Brussels into the Flemish
Region and by the as yet unsuccessful efforts to merge Berlin and Brandenburg
in Germany.
Where the capital is very large and has many industrial and other substantial
interests not directly related to its functions as a capital, there is a case for this
arrangement. To some extent its appropriateness depends significantly on the
degree of decentralization in the powers assigned generally to the states. Where
the federation is relatively centralized, as in Austria, Germany and Russia, the
federal government may have sufficient powers to influence the operation of the
capital even though it is a city-state. Where, however, the federation is
significantly decentralized, this arrangement may severely limit the scope of the
federal government to control and develop its capital.
In some federations there is a third kind of arrangement. The capital city

comes under the jurisdiction of the member state within which it is located, in a
manner broadly similar to other cities within that state.
Eight examples are Bern (Bern, Switzerland), Ottawa (Ontario, Canada),
Kuala Lumpur (Selangor, Malaysia), Bonn (North Rhine Westphalia, Germany,
during 1949–90), Madrid (Madrid Autonomous Community, Spain), Basseterre
(St. Kitts, St. Kitts and Nevis), Pretoria (Gauteng, South Africa) 32 and Abu
Dhabi (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates). In many of these cases, the federal
capital is situated in the largest member state, and sometimes, as with Bern,
Basseterre and Abu Dhabi, it is also the capital of that state.
Two advantages of this arrangement are that the management of the
boundaries of the federal capital with the neighbouring areas is open to
flexibility, and that it has usually provided for the general operation of local self-
government in the federal capital in the same way as elsewhere in the state of
which it is a part.
This arrangement, however, clearly limits the degree to which the federal
government can manage the development and control of its own capital city.
This has been the case particularly in more decentralized federations such as
Switzerland (Bern) and Canada (Ottawa). In the case of Canada, federal
government influence over the capital district has been mainly through spending
on the National Capital Commission and public works. In such cases, it has
required a high degree of voluntary intergovernmental cooperation between the
federal government and the canton or province within whose jurisdiction the
federal capital falls.
Generally speaking, state-governed federal capitals (especially in
decentralized federations) have enjoyed a high degree of self-government, but
they have suffered from problems of divided jurisdiction, financial insufficiency,
cultural domination by the governing state, and limitations upon the ability of the
federal government to control its capital city in the interests of the federation as a
whole. In more centralized federations where the scope of the state government
jurisdiction is more limited, this has to some extent been less of a problem. One
compromise approach is that applied in Malaysia, a relatively centralized
federation, where the federal government has used powers assigned to it under
the general distribution of powers to legislate a Federal Capital Act (1960) for
Kuala Lumpur without establishing a federal district or territory and while
leaving it otherwise under the jurisdiction of the state of Selangor.
To summarize, each of the arrangements for the organization of federal
capitals has its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. They also vary according
to the general distribution of powers between the federal and member state
32
Pretoria is the administrative capital, Cape Town is the seat of Parliament, and
Bloemfontein is the seat of the Constitutional Court.
governments affecting the degree of centralization or decentralization within the

federation. The federal district form of organization avoids the situation of
placing the federal capital under the dominance of the state in which it is located.
But generally, the federal district form of organization has resulted in limited
local self-government, although Caracas and Delhi provide examples that this is
not inevitable. Because of the tendency for local self-government to be restricted
in federal capital territories, where such a form of organization is adopted there
has been a need to include specific provisions for local political rights and
selfgovernment.
On the other hand, there are numerous examples where federal capitals have
operated either as city-states or under the jurisdiction of the state in which they
are located. These have generally been marked by greater degrees of local
selfgovernment and in the case of federal capitals in a state by greater flexibility
of boundaries. But these advantages come at the expense of limited scope for the
federal government to control and develop its own capital. The example of Kuala
Lumpur, however, indicates that even without creating a federal district, there
can be arrangements for giving the central government some exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over some aspects of the organization of the federal
capital in order to allow its needs to be met.
Chapter 5
The Distribution of Authority in Federations
5.1 A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF FEDERATIONS
In all federations, a common feature has been the existence at one and the same
time of powerful motives to be united for certain purposes and of deep-rooted
motives for autonomous regional governments for other purposes. This has
expressed itself in the design of federations by the distribution of powers
between those assigned to the federal government for the purposes shared in
common and those assigned to the regional units of government for the purposes
related to the expression of regional identity. Thus the fundamental defining
institutional characteristic of federations has been the constitutional distribution
of powers between the federal and regional governments. Furthermore, what
distinguishes federations from other forms of federal systems such as
decentralized unions or confederations is the constitutional guarantee of
autonomy over a certain range of assigned functions for each order of
government.
The specific form and allocation of the distribution of powers has varied,
however, relating to the underlying degrees and kinds of common interests and
diversity within the particular society in question. 33 Different geographical,
historical, economic, ecological, security, linguistic, cultural, intellectual,
demographic and international factors and the interrelation of these have been
significant in contributing to the strength of the motives for union and for
regional identity, and therefore have affected the particular distribution of
powers in different federations. Generally the more the degree of homogeneity
within a society the greater the powers that have been allocated to the federal
government, and the more the degree of diversity the greater the powers that
have been assigned to the constituent units of government. Even in the latter case
33
See, for instance, Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds.,
Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, Forum of Federations
and International Association of Centres for Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on
Federalism, Volume 2 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2006)
for a recent detailed analysis of the distribution of powers in eleven federations.
The Distribution of Authority in Federations 89
it has often been considered desirable, however, that the federal government
should have sufficient powers to resist tendencies to balkanization.
In addition to expressing a balance between unity and diversity, the design of
federations has also required a balance between the independence and
interdependence of the federal and regional governments in relation to each
other. The classic view of federation, as enunciated by K.C. Wheare and often
quoted in the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia, considered the
ideal distribution of powers between governments in a federation to be one in
which each government was able to act independently within its own watertight
sphere of responsibility. 34 In practice federations have found it impossible to
avoid overlaps in the responsibilities of governments, and a measure of
interdependence is typical of all federations. An example of this in its most
extreme form is the interlocking relationship between governments in the
German federation which has developed because there most of the federal
legislation is administered by the states. Such a strong emphasis upon
coordination through joint decision making may carry its own price in terms of
reduction in opportunities for flexibility and variety of policy through
autonomous decision making by different governments. Indeed, in both
Germany and Austria, which represent in extreme form interlocking
relationships, there have been recent efforts to disentangle some of these in order
to encourage more autonomous initiatives in each level of government. There is
therefore a need to find a balance between the independence and
interdependence of governments within a federation.
The process by which federations are established may affect the character of
the distribution of powers. Where the process of establishment has involved the
aggregation of previously distinct units giving up some of their sovereignty to
establish a new federal government, the emphasis has usually been upon
specifying a limited set of exclusive and concurrent federal powers with the
residual (usually unspecified) powers remaining with the constituent units. The
United States, Switzerland and Australia provide classic examples. Austria and
Germany followed this traditional pattern although their reconstruction during
the post-war period did involve some devolution by comparison with the
preceding autocratic regimes. Where the creation of a federation has involved a
process of devolution from a formerly unitary state, the reverse has usually been
the case: the powers of regional units have been specified and the residual
authority has remained with the federal government. Belgium and Spain provide
examples. Some federations, such as Canada, India and Malaysia, have involved
a combination of these processes of aggregation and devolution, and they have
listed specifically exclusive federal, exclusive provincial, and concurrent powers
with the residual authority, in Canada and India (and the earlier Malayan
34
See, for instance, K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th edn (London: Oxford
University Press, 1963), p.14.
Federation) but not in the Malaysian Federation, assigned to the federal

government.
Note should also be taken of three other sets of factors affecting the
distribution of powers in federations. One is the period in which the
constitutional distribution of powers was drafted. The eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century constitutions of the United States, Switzerland and Canada
distributed powers in fairly general terms, while the newer federal constitutions
of the latter half of the twentieth or early twenty-first centuries have often
included minutely detailed lists of powers and extensive provisions for
intergovernmental institutions and processes. Examples are the three lists
(exclusively federal, concurrent and exclusively state) of powers in the Seventh
Schedule of the Indian constitution containing 97, 47 and 66 entries,
respectively, or the very finely detailed distribution scheme in the Swiss
constitution of 1999.
Second, the prevalence of a common law tradition (as in the United States,
Australia, India, Malaysia and Nigeria), a mixed common law and civil law legal
system (as in Canada, South Africa and Nigeria), or a civil law tradition (as in
European and Latin American federations such as Switzerland, Germany,
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Brazil and Mexico) has had a strong bearing on how
the constitutional law is applied and interpreted. In federations where the civil
law tradition has prevailed the result has usually been a much more explicit
delineation of jurisdiction and a more limited scope for judicial review. 35
Finally, a factor that has had some impact upon the form and operation of the
distribution of powers is the character of the federal legislative and executive
institutions (dealt with more fully in chapter 10 below). Whether these
institutions are presidential-congressional in form (as in the United States, the
Latin American federations and some others) or essentially parliamentary in
form (as in most of the other federations) affects the diffused or fused way in
which the assigned legislative powers are handled within each level of
government and therefore the character of interactions between governments.
5.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY
In some federations, particularly those in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, each order

of government has generally been assigned executive responsibilities in the same
fields for which it has legislative powers. Classical examples are the USA,
Canada and Australia. There are several reasons for favouring such an
35
Majeed, Watts and Brown, op. cit., p. 325; Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, eds., A
Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 3: Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance
in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2006),
p. 348.
arrangement. First, it reinforces the autonomy of the legislative bodies. Second,

it assures to each government the authority to implement its own legislation
which might otherwise prove meaningless. Third, in such cases as Canada and
Australia where the principle of parliamentary executives responsible to their
legislatures has been adopted, it is only if legislative and executive jurisdiction
coincides that the legislature can exercise control over the body executing its
laws. Nevertheless, the European parliamentary federal regimes and the Indian
parliamentary regime in relation to areas of concurrent jurisdiction and Canada
in relation to criminal law, have, however, managed to live with an arrangement
where significant areas of legislative and executive jurisdiction have not
coincided.
In European federations, particularly Switzerland, Austria and Germany, more
commonly administrative responsibility has not coincided with legislative
authority, administration for many areas of federal legislative authority being
assigned by the constitution to the governments of the constituent units. This
enables the federal legislature to lay down considerable uniform legislation while
leaving this to be applied by constituent unit governments in ways that take
account of varying regional circumstances. Such an arrangement does in practice
require more extensive collaboration and coordination between the levels of
government, however. In its extreme form as exhibited by Germany and Austria
it has created an interlocking relationship between governments at different
levels.
In practice the contrast between these two approaches is not quite so sharp.
Even in the Anglo-Saxon federations federal governments have delegated
considerable responsibilities for federal programs to constituent governments,
often by providing financial assistance through grant-in-aid programs.
Furthermore, in Canada the constitution itself provides an exception to the
general pattern by providing for federal legislation and provincial administration
in the sphere of criminal law. Newer federations in former British colonial areas
such as India and Malaysia have also provided more broadly in their
constitutions for state administration of federal laws made in areas of shared
concurrent jurisdiction. The current Russian constitution even stipulates that the
federal and unit executive bodies constitute a single system of executive
authority within the federation. On the other hand, Belgium contrasts with the
other European federations, since the allocation of executive powers is closely
tied to the allocation of legislative powers.
The advantage of assigning a responsibility exclusively to one government or
another is twofold. It reinforces the autonomy of that government and it makes
clear which government is accountable for policy in that area. In practice,
however, even where most powers have been assigned exclusively to one level
of government or the other, experience, such as that of Switzerland, Canada and
Belgium, has indicated that overlaps of jurisdiction are unavoidable because it is
virtually impossible to define absolutely, watertight compartments of exclusive
jurisdiction. This has, in practice, softened the exclusivity of the allocated

powers even where they have been emphasized.
5.3 VARIATIONS IN THE FORM OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
In most federations some legislative powers are assigned exclusively to the

federal government, but the extent of these varies. The allocation of exclusive
federal jurisdiction is relatively limited in the United States and Australia, with
most federal powers being identified as shared or concurrent powers. In Austria,
Germany, India, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia and
Ethiopia, the exclusive jurisdiction assigned to the federal legislature is more
extensive, but the distribution of powers in these federations also includes large
areas of concurrent jurisdiction.
In some federations, notably Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, India, Malaysia,
South Africa and the United Arab Emirates, fields of exclusive jurisdiction of the
constituent units are constitutionally defined, but in most other federations the
exclusive legislative powers of the constituent units are left undefined as residual
powers. The form of the Spanish distribution of powers is distinctive. The
constitution lists the exclusive powers of the central government but transfers the
determination of the powers of the Autonomous Communities to separate
Statutes of Autonomy. Under these, despite an emphasis upon exclusivity in the
assignment of the powers of the Autonomous Communities, many areas have
required joint governmental intervention.
A notable feature of the constitutions of South Africa, Brazil, Venezuela, and
India (as a result of the Seventy-Third and Seventy-Fourth Constitutional
Amendments 1992) is the additional constitutional specification of the
jurisdiction also of local governments.
CONCURRENT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The recognition of the inevitability of overlaps in many areas has led to

extensive areas of concurrent legislative jurisdiction being allocated in the
constitutions of the USA, Australia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Brazil,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Ethiopia and Venezuela. This contrasts with Canada,
where the only constitutionally specified areas of concurrent jurisdiction are
agriculture, immigration, old age pensions and benefits, and export of non-
renewable natural resources, forest products and electrical energy.
Concurrency has a number of advantages in federations. It has provided an
element of flexibility in the distribution of powers, enabling the federal
government to postpone the exercise of potential authority in a particular field

until it becomes a matter of federal importance. The constituent governments can
thus be left in the meantime to pursue their own initiatives. The federal
legislature may use concurrent jurisdiction to legislate federation-wide standards
while giving regional governments room to legislate the details and to deliver the
services in a manner sensitive to local circumstances. Indeed, in Austria and
Germany (and in some respects in Spain, Mexico and Brazil) there is a special
constitutional category of jurisdiction specifying a federal power to enact
―framework legislation‖ in certain fields, leaving the Länder to fill out these
areas with more detailed laws. In addition, in Germany a constitutional
amendment in 1969 added a category of ―joint tasks‖ in relation to higher
education, improvement of regional economic structures, and agrarian
improvement and coastal preservation in which the federal government would
participate in the discharge of Länder responsibilities.
Concurrent lists of legislative power avoid the necessity of enumerating
complicated minute subdivisions of individual functions to be assigned
exclusively to one area of government or the other, and reduce the likelihood that
such minute subdivisions will over time become obsolete in changing
circumstances.
Normally where concurrent jurisdiction is specified, the constitution has
specified that in cases of conflict between federal law and unit law the federal
law prevails. Consequently, areas of concurrent jurisdiction are potentially areas
where federal legislation may predominate. One notable exception occurs in
Canada where old-age pensions are an area of concurrent jurisdiction but in
cases of conflict provincial law prevails over federal law. This has enabled
Quebec to preserve its own pension system and other provinces to accept federal
pension jurisdiction. The proposed constitution of Iraq, affirmed by the
referendum of October 2005, is unique in extending the area of concurrent
jurisdiction in which regional law prevails to virtually all areas of concurrent
jurisdiction. A problem with the Sudanese constitution is that although it
provides for areas of concurrent jurisdiction, no paramountcy or clear criteria are
specified for the courts to establish which law should prevail in cases of conflict.
SHARED AUTHORITY
There is a category of powers akin to concurrent authority but distinct from it.
―Shared powers‖ occur where both orders of government have related powers.
This is distinct from concurrency over a specific common head of power. An
example is the nature of power over environmental matters in many federations.
For example in Canada both orders of government have exclusive powers with
environmental significance that permit them to regulate large projects, but to
proceed with such projects requires the consent of both orders because neither
has paramountcy. Similar issues can arise in certain other areas of regulation and
lawmaking. It is only when the laws of different orders of government are in

direct conflict that the courts may rule on their validity in terms of essence or
colouration.
RESIDUAL AUTHORITY
The residual authority represents assignment by the constitution of jurisdiction

over those matters not otherwise listed in the constitution. In most federations,
especially those created by a process of aggregating previously separate units
(although also in some others), the residual power has been retained by the unit
governments. Examples are the USA, Switzerland, Australia, Germany,
Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates. In some federations, however, usually where devolution from a
more centralized unitary regime characterized the process of federal formation,
the residual powers have been left with the federal government. Examples are
Canada, India, the Federation of Malaya before it was expanded into Malaysia,
South Africa and Belgium, although in the case of Belgium it has been agreed
(but yet to be implemented) to reformulate the constitutional distribution of
powers so that the residual power lies with the unit governments. In Spain under
the 1978 constitution, 5 of the 17 Autonomous Communities were assigned the
residual authority, but for the others it remains with the central government. The
residual authority in Venezuela is retained by the states, but the 1999
constitution limited this power by granting the federal government a parallel
residual competency in taxation.
The significance of the residual powers is related to the number and
comprehensiveness of the enumerated lists of legislative power in the
constitution. The greater the enumeration of powers, the less the scope of the
residual power. Thus in federations such as India, Malaysia, South Africa and to
a lesser extent Canada, where the constitutions set out three exhaustive and
comprehensive lists of exclusive federal, exclusive provincial and concurrent
legislative powers, the residual power has been relatively less significant. By
contrast, in federations such as the USA, Australia, Germany, Brazil, Mexico,
Nigeria, Russia and Pakistan, where the state powers were not enumerated but
simply covered by a substantial unspecified residual power, the scope of the
residual authority can be highly significant, although in some cases like Nigeria,
Russia, Pakistan, Brazil and Mexico the extensiveness of the federal exclusive
and concurrent lists of authority has actually left little room for exclusive
constituent unit legislation. The assignment of residual power to the states was
intended to underline their autonomy and the limited nature of powers assigned
to the federal government. It is important to note, however, that in practice there
has been a tendency in these federations for the courts to read the maximum
―implied powers‖ into the specified federal authority at the expense of the scope
of the undefined residual state powers, thus producing a tendency over time
towards the progressive centralization of government powers. Paradoxically, in

such federations as Canada, India and Malaysia, where the centralist founders
enumerated what were intended to be limited specific provincial powers, there
has been a tendency for the courts to read those powers broadly, thus tempering
the expansion of federal authority.
EMERGENCY OR OVERRIDE POWERS
In a few federations the constitution provides the federal government with

specific override or emergency powers to invade or curtail in certain conditions
otherwise normally provincial constitutional powers. These have been the result
of the fears of their founders about the prospect of potential balkanization or
disintegration. The most extensive examples of such quasi-unitary powers are
found in the Indian, Pakistani, Malaysian and Argentine constitutions. During
the Putin presidency, some quasi-unitary powers have also been introduced. The
Canadian constitution continues to include the powers of reservation and
disallowance of provincial legislation; the declaratory power relating to public
works in the national interest; and the peace, order and good government clause,
but in practice, over the past half-century, almost all of these federal unilateral
powers have fallen into disuse. On the other hand, the extensive emergency
powers embodied in the Indian constitution of 1950 have been frequently used,
although the Supreme Court has ruled that the use of this power may be subject
to judicial review and there is now growing political pressure to limit their use.
In South Africa the central government may within certain constraints override
provincial legislation that threatens national unity or national standards.
5.4 THE SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY ALLOCATED
In addition to variations in the form that the constitutional distribution of powers

has taken, the particular powers assigned to each order of government have also
varied from federation to federation according to the particular circumstances
and balance of interests within each federation.
Broadly speaking, in most federations international relations, defence, the
functioning of the economic and monetary union including currency, customs
and excise, international trade and interstate trade, major taxing powers
(although corporate and income taxes are sometimes shared), interregional
transportation, major physical infrastructure, and pensions have been placed
under exclusive federal jurisdiction, or occasionally under concurrent
jurisdiction. Social policy (including primary and secondary education, health
services, social welfare and labour relations), maintenance of law and security
and local governments have usually been assigned exclusively to the constituent
unit governments. Parts of these areas, however, especially those relating to
social services and income security, are often shared. Among areas for which the
assignment has varied are agriculture, natural resources, postsecondary
education, environment, criminal law, civil law, courts and police. In a number
of cases these have represented shared responsibilities. While this represents a
general pattern, there is considerable variation in the specific allocations within
different federations, depending on the degree of emphasis placed upon common
action or upon non-centralization as well as the impact of particular
circumstances.
Some subject matters have proved particularly troublesome. Foreign affairs is
an example.36 In many federations a sweeping federal jurisdiction over foreign
affairs and treaties has sometimes been used to override jurisdiction that would
otherwise belong to the governments of the constituent units. In a few
federations, however, the federal treaty power has been limited by the
requirement that where treaties affect the jurisdiction of regional governments
consultation must occur or their consent must be obtained. In the case of Canada,
as a result of judicial interpretation of the constitution, implementing provincial
legislation is required where treaties relate to fields in the exclusive jurisdiction
of the provinces. In Germany such treaties have required the endorsement of a
majority in the Bundesrat composed of delegates of the Land governments, and
since 1993 the German Basic Law has required extensive consultation or
agreement of the Länder with regard to European Union matters. Two of the
most recent constitutions, that of Belgium (1993) and Switzerland (1999), assign
to their respective constituent units a significant role in the conduct of foreign
relations or require their extensive consultation regarding foreign policy
decisions.
Coordinating public debt has also sometimes been a problem because a
constituent unit government may by its external borrowing affect the credit-
worthiness of other governments within the federation. This led in Australia to
provision for the coordination of public borrowing by an intergovernmental Loan
Council with power to make decisions binding on both levels of government. In
some other federations such concerns have led to federal control of public
borrowing, particularly foreign borrowing, by constituent unit governments.
Two areas where in practice there has tended to be extensive activity by both
levels of government are economic policy and social affairs. In the former,
36
See H.J. Michelmann, ed., Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, Forum of
Federations and International Association of Centres of Federal Studies, A Global
Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 5 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press,
forthcoming 2008); J. Kincaid, ―Comparative Observations,‖ in J. Kincaid and G.A. Tarr,
eds., Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in Federal Countries, Forum of
Federations and International Association of Centres of Federal Studies, A Global
2005), pp. 434–5.
regional units of government have been concerned to ensure the economic

welfare of their citizens and to develop policies related to their own particular
economic interests. This has sometimes extended to the establishing of trade
offices in foreign countries to encourage both trade and investment, a pattern
found in such federations as the United States, Canada, Australia and Germany.
In the area of social affairs, including health, primary and secondary education
and social services, regional governments have usually had primary
constitutional responsibility. But, commonly, extensive federal financial
assistance has often been necessary because of program costs and because of the
pressures for federation-wide standards of service to citizens. Where constituent
units have welcomed such federal financial assistance, it has frequently proved
to be a Trojan horse for federal dominance.
The increased interrelation of economic and cultural policy in the
contemporary world has made the resolution of multi-ethnic issues within
federations more complex than in the past. The original simple Canadian
solution of 1867, which consisted of centralizing control of economic policy but
assigning responsibility for cultural distinctiveness and related social programs
to the provinces, has been complicated by two developments. One is the greatly
increased cost of social policies requiring federal financial assistance, and the
other is the realization by regionally concentrated ethnic groups that their
distinctiveness depends not just upon cultural policy but also upon being able to
shape economic policies regarding their own welfare. A further complication is
that different ethnic groups are never completely demarcated in territorial terms.
Consequently, any distribution of powers has to take account of the need to
protect minorities within minorities by placing constitutional limits upon state or
provincial governments regarding their policies towards internal minorities.
In the distribution of responsibilities within the European Union the principle
of subsidiarity has been adopted as the basis. This is the principle that only
subjects that cannot be adequately dealt with by a lower order of government
should be performed by the higher order of government. As a principle, it has
had considerable appeal. By itself as a principle, however, it leaves open the
issue of who decides on its application to a particular subject matter. This is not
merely a technical issue but in many ways may have to do with fundamental
values and issues of identity. If the decision is made by the higher order of
government, that leaves the lower order vulnerable; while if it is made by the
governments of the lower order, they may — despite difficulties — resist
transferring responsibility.
5.5 DISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
As noted in section 5.2, in a number of federations, especially those in the

AngloSaxon tradition (e.g., the USA, Canada and Australia), the distribution of
administrative responsibilities in most matters corresponds with the distribution

of legislative authority. However, in some federations, as also noted in section
5.2, there are constitutionally mandated and entrenched provisions for splitting
legislative and administrative jurisdiction in an area between different orders of
government. These permanent and constitutionalized arrangements are to be
distinguished from temporary delegations of legislative and executive authority
that also occur in many federations. Examples of extensive constitutionalized
allocation of executive and administrative responsibilities differing from the
allocation of legislative jurisdiction occur in Switzerland, Austria, Germany,
India and Malaysia. In all five, autonomous canton and state governments are
constitutionally responsible for the implementation and administration of a wide
range of federal legislation. In India and Malaysia all federal legislation enacted
in the area of concurrent jurisdiction is specified by the constitution as resting
with the states for its administration. Thus, while these federations are relatively
centralized legislatively, they are much more decentralized administratively.
These federations have shown that benefits can flow from the administrative
decentralization of federal legislation particularly in adapting it to the different
circumstances and sensitivities of the various regions.
5.6 EVOLUTION OF THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWERS
Federations are not static organizations, and over time the distribution of powers
in each has had to adapt and evolve to respond to changing needs and
circumstances and the development of new issues and policy areas. For instance,
federations established during the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries have had to
work out which governments should be responsible for environmental and
energy issues. This adaptation has required a balance between flexibility and
rigidity; too much flexibility may undermine the sense of security of regional
and minority groups, while too much rigidity may make effective response to
changing circumstances difficult.
In seeking the balance, federations have relied on a number of processes with
varying emphasis in different federations, as will be discussed in subsequent
chapters: formal constitutional amendments (chapter 11), judicial interpretation
of the constitution (chapter 11), intergovernmental financial adjustments (chapter
6) and intergovernmental collaboration and agreements (chapter 7).
Some other factors affecting the distributions of powers also considered in
subsequent chapters are the extent of symmetry or asymmetry in the allocations
of authority (chapter 8), participation in supra-federation federal organizations
(chapter 9), and the operation of the federative institutions of federal
governments (chapter 10). The cumulative effect of these provides the basis for
assessing the overall degree of non-centralization in each federation (chapter 12).
Chapter 6
The Distribution of Finances
6.1 IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLOCATION OF FINANCIAL

RESOURCES
The allocation of financial resources to each order of government within a

federation is important for two main reasons: first, these resources enable or
constrain governments in achieving their policy objectives within their
constitutionally assigned legislative and executive responsibilities; second,
taxing powers and expenditure are themselves important instruments for
affecting and regulating the economy. 37
6.2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE POWERS
A number of sometimes conflicting principles are involved in the effective

assignment of revenue-raising powers among governments in federations. Some
principles point to the desirability of federal assignment and some to assignment
to the constituent units. Among the former are the administrative advantages of
centralizing certain kinds of revenue levying and collection. Another is avoiding
tax competition among constituent units that would influence mobile companies
and individuals to locate in a particular region. This problem is illustrated by the
―tax wars‖ that occurred in Brazil following the devolution of revenue powers,
making necessary a reversal of fiscal decentralization and a ―fiscal discipline‖
law enacted in 2000. Another consideration is equity. This may require a
concentration of revenues in the federal government in order that it may play a
redistributive role to avoid sharply different tax levels among constituent units
with varied wealth.
37
For a recent analysis of financial arrangements in twelve federations, see Anwar
Shah, ed., The Practice of Fiscal Federalism, Forum of Federations and International
Association of Centres for Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol.4
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2007).
The Distribution of Finances 101
On the other side, to enhance accountability of governments to their electors,

it is often argued that governments should be responsible for raising most of the
revenues they spend. Furthermore, some economists favour a measure of tax
competition as a positive encouragement to better policies among governments.
Ultimately there is also the desirability of constituent unit autonomy rather than
dependency upon federal transfers.
ALLOCATION OF TAX POWERS
Most federations specify in their constitutions (or in the case of Belgium in

special legislation) the revenue-raising powers of the two orders of government.
These powers may be exclusive, concurrent or shared. Where they are
concurrent the paramountcy rules determine the ultimate authority in cases of
conflict. Where both orders share a tax field, they can both levy taxes with no
constitutional limit, the only constraints being political in the form of the
taxpayers‘ tolerance and the politicians‘ reluctance to bear the blame.
The major taxing powers usually identified are customs and excise, corporate
taxes, personal income taxes and various sales and consumption taxes. Customs
and excise taxes have almost always been placed under federal jurisdiction in the
interests of ensuring an effective internal customs and economic union.
Corporate income taxes have also most often come under federal jurisdiction
because corporations in earning their income tend to cross the boundaries of the
internal regional units, and the location of their headquarters does not
necessarily reflect the geographical sources of their income. Nevertheless, in
some federations this taxation may be shared and if so usually comes under
concurrent jurisdiction. Personal income taxes may be more directly attributed to
location of residence and therefore is often an area shared by federal and
regional governments, although in some federations it has been exclusively
federal (e.g., Austria and India). Sales and consumption taxes are areas which in
most federations both federal and regional governments share, although there are
some exceptions to this pattern.
A common characteristic of the allocation of fiscal powers in nearly all
federations is that the majority of major revenue sources have been assigned to
the federal governments. Even where some tax fields are shared or placed under
concurrent jurisdiction, the federal governments tend to predominate because of
the federal power to pre-empt a field of concurrent jurisdiction and because of
provisions limiting the range of tax sources, both direct and indirect, that
regional governments have been assigned. Two factors have been particularly
influential in creating this general pattern. One is the concentration of resources
in the federal government necessary if it is to perform the redistributive role
usually expected of it. The other is the influence of Keynesian theories
concerning policies for economic stability and development prevalent at the time
when many of the current federal fiscal arrangements were developed in these
federations.
Table 9 gives an indication of the degree to which the levying of revenues has
been generally concentrated in federal governments and the range of variation.
Two points are worthy of note. First, generally in the allocation of revenue
powers, federal governments have been favoured over states and local
governments. Second, quite clearly, control of revenues has been much more
concentrated in the federal governments of more recent emergent federations
than in the mature federations. In the mature federations the contemporary range
of federally levied revenues as a percentage of total federal, state and local
revenues generally ranges from 40 percent in Switzerland to 65 percent in
Germany with Australia as the outlier at 75 percent. Historically, however, this
has varied with in some cases a much higher federal percentage during the two
World Wars. Among emergent federations the contemporary range is from
Brazil with 69 percent to Nigeria at 98 percent.
NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUES
One controversial area in a number of federations where natural resources are

concentrated in some regions and not in others has been whether the taxing
powers and royalties relating to these should lie with the federal or regional
governments.38Federations had a significant share of global oil (48 percent) and
gas (59 percent) in 2006, and therefore the issue of allocation of natural resource
revenues has been important in a number of them. Because the concentration of
resources in some regions can lead to enormous disparities in the wealth of the
constituent units, this has been an extremely contentious issue in such
federations as Canada, Nigeria, Russia, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and
Sudan and has been a source of major contention in the constitutional
negotiations in Iraq. In Nigeria and Iraq, petroleum resources account for well
over 90 percent of government revenues; in Sudan and Venezuela for well over
half and in Russia for about thirty percent.
Natural resource revenues come principally from royalties, license fees,
export taxes and corporate taxes. In those federations which are rich in natural
resources such as oil, gas, diamonds, and some metals, these are typically
extremely unevenly distributed among the constituent units. In some federations
the federal government owns these resources and in others the governments of
the constituent units. Inevitably there have been sharp debates about who should
collect the revenues from these resources and whether they should benefit the
38
The Forum of Federations, Ottawa, is currently conducting under the leadership of
George Anderson a study on non-renewable natural resources in federations which is
likely to lead to publications commencing in 2008.
federation as a whole or the constituent unit in which they are located, and in the
latter case whether they should be taken into account in efforts to equalize the
revenues of the constituent units. In Canada, the provinces own their resources,
and this has meant that Alberta with its oil resources has vastly more revenue per
capita than other provinces. The Canadian equalization systems brings poorer
provinces up to the national standard, but does not bring the richer provinces
down and it could not afford to bring all provinces to anything close to Alberta‘s
fiscal capacity. Furthermore, the federal government has lost its powers to apply
export taxes to energy exports. Consequently, Canada has had a major debate
over how to treat natural resource revenues for the purposes of equalization, with
poorer resource producing provinces arguing that their equalization entitlements
should not be reduced on this account.
When Argentina transferred natural resources to the provinces the result was
that some small but resource rich provinces came to enjoy a substantial fiscal
advantage. In the United States, most resources are owned by the states or
private individuals, but there are also extensive ―federal lands‖ in the western
states and Alaska. Alaska‘s resource revenues have permitted annual payments
to citizens.
In most federations with twentieth century constitutions, the federal
government largely controls resource development and revenues. In Nigeria
where natural resources are the overwhelming source of revenues, the federal
government collects these and makes transfers to the states on a variety of
criteria of which ―derivation‖ is one. This has meant significant more per capita
revenue for the producing states, but because they are underdeveloped and poor
they have complained that this share is inadequate. They also want a special
share of offshore revenues, though the offshore lies outside state boundaries. In
addition, the producing states want a greater say in the actual management of the
resources, which has often been done in an environmentally damaging fashion
and with little regard for the local population. The seriousness of this issue,
complicated by considerable corruption and lack of transparency regarding what
happens to resources revenues, has fed a continuing insurgency in the oil-
producing region.
In Russia, after a period when it was highly decentralized the federal
government has reasserted control of the levying and collection of royalties and
export taxes on natural resources. Producing subjects of the federation now get
only about 5 percent of the oil revenues and none of the gas revenues. Russia has
taken advantage of its very high petroleum revenues to pay off much of its debt
and to create a lont-term revenue stabilization fund.
In both Sudan and Iraq the issue of whether resource revenues belong to the
country as a whole or to the producing regions has been a highly contentious
issue. In Sudan interim, but not fully implemented, revenue sharing
arrangements give a per capita larger share to South Sudan, the main source of
production. In Iraq, where oil is the main source of revenue, the constitution has
left ambiguous the issues of where control of oil revenues should lie, thus
prolonging controversy over the issue.
Mexico has a highly centralized regime based upon a state oil company and in
2006 committed one half of surplus revenues (those exceeding the five-year
mean price) to be shared between the states and municipalities.
A particular issue in many federations is control over offshore resources.
Typically, courts have found that state boundaries do not extend beyond the
highwater mark or, at most, the three mile territorial limit. However, the
economic zone extends to two hundred miles and even beyond in some cases. In
most federations the federal government has retained control of offshore
management and resources, though Canada has effectively given both to the
adjacent provinces. In the United States, some states, using their control of the
shoreline, have been able to impose moratoriums on offshore development for
environmental reasons. There is a major debate over oil and gas development on
federal lands, notably in Alaska.
OTHER REVENUE RAISING ISSUES
In some federations, notably Spain and Belgium, different financial

arrangements apply to different sets of constituent units. In Spain the ―common‖
system applies to 15 of the 17 Autonomous Communities, but for the two foral
Autonomous Communities of Basque and Navarre there is a ―special‖ scheme
based on longstanding ancient rights. For the former, the major taxing powers
remain with the federal government and although some taxes have been
devolved, the major sources of revenue for the Autonomous Communities lie in
revenue sharing and equalizing grant transfers from the federal government. The
functioning of the financial system for theforal Autonomous Communities is
radically different, entailing maximum tax autonomy for these constituent units
and transfers to the federal government for the services it provides. Belgium also
has two financial systems, one for the Regions and one for the Communities.
That for the Regions involves some measure of regional taxes (28 percent of
regional revenues), while the Communities are almost totally dependent on
federal transfers (see table 11).
In addition to taxation there are two other important sources for governmental
raising of funds. The first is public borrowing, a source open to both levels of
government in most federations, although foreign borrowing in some cases
(most notably Austria, India and Malaysia) is placed under exclusive federal
jurisdiction. In the case of Australia, all major public borrowing by both levels is
coordinated through the operation of the intergovernmental Loan Council. The
second source is the operation of public corporations and enterprises, the profits
of which may serve as a source of governmental income. In most federations this

latter is a revenue source for both levels of government.
6.3 THE ALLOCATION OF EXPENDITURE POWERS
Broadly speaking, the distribution of expenditure powers in each federation

corresponds to the combined scope of the legislative and administrative
responsibilities assigned to each government within the federation. But several
points should be noted.
First, where the administration of a substantial portion of federal legislation is
constitutionally assigned to the governments of the constituent units as in
Switzerland, Austria, Germany, India and Malaysia, the constitutional
expenditure responsibilities of the regional governments are significantly
broader than would be indicated by the distribution of legislative powers taken
alone.
Second, the expenditure requirements of different areas of responsibility may
vary. For instance, in relative terms health, education and social services are
highercost functions by comparison with functions relating more to regulation
than the provision of services.
Third, in most federations the spending power of each order of government
has not been limited strictly to the enumerated legislative and administrative
jurisdiction. Governments have usually been taken to possess a general spending
power.39Thus, federal governments have used their general spending power to
pursue certain objectives in areas of state jurisdiction by providing grants to
regional governments that otherwise could not afford to provide the services
being demanded of them. For their part, constituent unit governments in a
number of federations have used their general spending power to establish trade
promotion offices outside the federation even where there was no constitutional
jurisdiction in external affairs specified.
The use of the federal spending power in areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction has been politically contentious in Canadian intergovernmental
relations but has not been successfully challenged in the courts. The courts have
ruled that federal spending is not limited solely to areas of legislative jurisdiction
assigned by the constitution. Consequently, federal governments in Canada have
frequently used their spending power to make grants in support of provincial
programs in order to encourage provinces to implement federal priorities and to
undertake direct spending in such areas as culture, research and student aid.
Provincial governments have complained that this unilateral use of the federal
spending power undermines their autonomy in areas assigned by the constitution
39
For a fuller comparative analysis of the spending power in federal systems, see
Ronald L. Watts, The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study
(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1999).
exclusively to them. The practice is not unique to the Canadian federation,

however. It has occurred extensively in the USA and Australia since the
economic depression of the 1930s. Regional governments in federations have
frequently accepted the federal assistance, but where it has taken the form of
grants with conditions attached they have resented this as an invasion of their
areas of exclusive jurisdiction. This has particularly been the case where federal
spending on matters within regional authority is commenced uninvited or is
withdrawn without notice. In both Canada and the United States such unilateral
withdrawals of assistance have lead to charges of ―off loading‖ and of ―fend-for-
yourself federalism.‖
It should be noted that in some older federations such as the United States and
Canada, where the use of the federal general spending power has been
widespread, the constitution does not explicitly identify a general spending
power. Nonetheless, their courts in varying degrees have recognized that the
taxing and appropriating powers of the federal governments can be used to affect
a field of activity beyond the strict confines of their normal legislative powers.
Some federal constitutions, such as Australia, India and Malaysia, designed in
the light of practice in older federations, have made explicit recognition in their
constitutions of the authority of their federal governments to provide grants to
state governments for any purpose, whether that purpose is under federal
government jurisdiction or not. In other federations, however, there are limits
upon the exercise of a general spending power. In Spain, for example, the
Constitutional Court in 1992 (judgment no. 13) permitted a federal spending
power in areas of exclusive jurisdiction of the Autonomous Communities, but
only within certain limits. In Switzerland the constitution generally does not
permit federal spending in areas of exclusive cantonal jurisdiction, although the
only check on such spending would be by referendums (rather than court
rulings) and these have not occurred. In Germany federal decisions on spending
affecting the Länder require a weighted majority of Länder votes in the
Bundesrat, the second chamber composed of delegates of the Länder. Belgium
explicitly limits spending of governments to areas of legislative competence.
In those federations where the constitution assigns to the state governments
administrative responsibility for a considerable portion of federal legislation,
substantial federal transfers, either as portions of federal tax proceeds or in the
form of unconditional and conditional grants, are a typical feature.
Table 10 shows the cumulative level of federal expenditures as a percentage
of total federal, state and local expenditures after intergovernmental transfers in
a large number of federations. By comparison with the distribution of revenues
(in table 9) the range of variation is considerably less, although generally the
federal proportion of expenditures has been higher in the emergent federations
than in the mature federations. In most federations the federal portion of
expenditures falls between 45 and 60 percent, with Malaysia above that and
Belgium, Germany, Canada and Switzerland below it.
TABLE 9: Federal Government Revenues before Intergovernmental Transfers
as a Percentage of Total (Federal-State-Local) Government
Revenues
2000–04
Nigeria 98.0
Mexico 91.3
Russia 91.0
Malaysia 86.9
South Africa 82.0
Australia 74.8
Belgium 71.0
Spain 69.2
Brazil 69.2
Germany 65.0
Austria 61.8
India 61.1
United States 54.2
Canada 47.2
Switzerland 40.0
Note: Revenue shares are before intergovernmental transfers and represent ―ownsource‖
revenues. In cases of revenue sharing, revenue sources have been allocated according to
the government that has the power to levy and set rates (usually the federal government).
Figures are rounded to one decimal point. Countries are listed broadly in descending
order of centralization. Depending on source, these figures are the latest available
between 2000 and 2004.
Sources for Tables 9–13: Various country statistics from Department of Finance websites
and statistics bureaus adjusted for comparability. Also OECD Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration, Fiscal Federalism Network, 2002; IMF Government Finance Statistics,
various years; Anwar Shah, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol.4: The Practice of
Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s
University Press, 2007); M.M. Guijale and S.B. Webb, Achievement and Challenges of
Fiscal Decentralization: Lessons from Mexico (World Bank, 2000); A. Jimoh, ―Fiscal
Federalism: The Nigerian Experience,‖ in Economic Commission for
Africa, Fiscal Policy and Growth in Africa: Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and
Incidence of Taxation (Addis Ababa, 7–9 October 2003); M. Nicolas, ―Financial
Arrangements between the Australian Government and the Australian States,‖ Regional
and Federal Studies, 13:4 (2003): 153–82; E.L. Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy
in Latin America (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); R.L.
Watts, Dencentralization and Recentralization: Recent Developments in Russian
Federalism (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University,
Working Paper 2007(2)).
TABLE 10: Federal Government Expenditures after Intergovernmental
Government Expenditures
2000–04
Malaysia 84.3
Brazil 59.5
Nigeria 59.7
Australia 59.3
Mexico 58.7
Austria 55.0
Spain 51.0
South Africa 50.0
Russia 46.0
United States 45.9
India 44.6
Belgium 38.1
Germany 37.0
Canada 37.0
Switzerland 32.0
Note: Expenditures are after transfers of shares of federal taxes and grants to state and
local governments. Figures are rounded to one decimal point. Countries are listed broadly
in descending order of centralization. Depending on the source, these figures are the
latest available between 2000 and 2004.
Sources: See table 9.
6.4 THE ISSUE OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL

IMBALANCES
Virtually every federation has found the need to correct two kinds of financial
imbalances. The vertical imbalances occur when constitutionally assigned
federal and unit government revenues do not match their constitutionally
assigned expenditure responsibilities. These imbalances occur generally for two
reasons. First, it has usually been found desirable to allocate the major taxing
powers to the federal government because they are closely related to the
development of the customs union and more broadly to an effective economic
union, while some of the most expensive expenditure responsibilities such as
health, education and social services have usually been considered best
administered on a regional basis where particular regional circumstances can be
taken into account. Tables 9 and 10 read together illustrate the differences in the
proportions of total (federal-statelocal combined) revenues and of total (federal-
state-local combined) expenditure responsibilities of federal governments in the
different federations. A second reason for vertical imbalances is that no matter
how carefully the original designers of the federation may attempt to match the
revenue resources and expenditure responsibilities of each order of government,
over time the significance of different taxes change (such as income taxes and
consumption taxes) and the costs of expenditures vary in unforeseen ways.
Consequently, there is a need to build in processes whereby these imbalances
can be adjusted from time to time.
Horizontal imbalances represent a second form that requires correction.
Horizontal imbalances occur when the revenue capacities of different constituent
units vary so that they are not able to provide their citizens with services at the
same level on the basis of comparable tax levels. In addition to horizontal
revenue imbalances, there can also be interprovincial imbalances on the
expenditure side due to differences in the ―expenditure needs‖ of different
constituent units because of variations in sociodemographic characteristics of
their populations, such as population dispersion, urbanization, social
composition and age structure, and the cost of providing services affected by
such factors as the scale of public administration and the physical and economic
environment.
6.5 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERS
In order to correct these imbalances most federations have arrangements for

financial transfers from one level of government to another. Because federal
governments generally have controlled the major tax sources, adjustments have
usually taken the form of transfers from the federal to the regional units of
government. Their purpose has been both to remove vertical imbalances by

transfers in the form of tax-shares, unconditional block grants or specific-
purpose conditional grants, and to remove horizontal imbalances through
assistance to poorer units. Table 11 gives an indication of the significance of
these transfers as a portion of total provincial or state revenues and the degree of
resulting provincial or state dependence on transfers. As the table indicates, there
is an enormous variation among federations in terms of their reliance and
dependence upon intergovernmental transfers.
It should be noted that in tables 9 and 11, revenue sharing of the proceeds of
federal taxes, even when constitutionally required, has been classified as an
―intergovernmental transfer‖ rather than as ―own-source‖ revenues of the states.
Many analyses adopt the latter interpretation, but that is misleading because the
states do not control the size of these proceeds when the federal government
levies these taxes and sets the rates. In a few cases, notably the ―ceded‖ taxes in
Spain, some freedom to adjust tax levels and exemptions in relation to the
federal taxes has been given to the Autonomous Communities, but such
arrangements are relatively unusual.40
Revenue sharing of particular federal taxes as a form of unconditional
transfers to the constituent units has often been favoured over simple
unconditional grants, because in the former the proceeds normally grow in
proportion to the growth in the federal tax, whereas in the case of unconditional
grants growth requires a deliberate decision by the federal government. In some
federations revenue sharing for the states is drawn from a pool of federal taxes,
the most
TABLE 11: Intergovernmental Transfers as a Percentage of Provincial or

State Revenues
2000–04
South Africa 96.1

Nigeria 89.0
Mexico 87.9
Spain 72.8
Belgium – Communities 96.5 68.0
Regions 57.4
40
V.R. Almendral, ―Fiscal Rights for Communities in the Spanish Constitution,‖
Federations, 6:1 (2007): 16–20
Austria 47.4
India 46.0
Australia 45.6
Germany 43.8
Malaysia 30.4
Brazil 30.0
United States 25.6
Mexico 25.4
Russia 25.0
Switzerland 24.8
Canada 12.9
Note: Figures are the latest available between 2000 and 2004, and are rounded to one
decimal point. Countries are listed in descending order of dependence on federal
transfers.
Sources: See table 9. Also M. Verdonck and K. Deschouwer, ―Patterns and Principles of
Fiscal Federalism in Belgium,‖ Regional and Federal Studies, 13:4, (2003): 91–110.
complete form of this being the Federation Account in Nigeria from which
federal, state and local allocations are drawn. In practice, the Indian Finance
Commissions have also come to treat most central revenues as a pool for
sharing, but where in Nigeria the transfers from this pool represent nearly the
totality of state revenues (89 percent), in India the states still raise about 54
percent of their own revenues (table 11).
6.6 CONDITIONAL OR UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS
The degree of provincial or state dependence is affected not only by the

proportion that federal transfers represent in their revenues but even more by
whether these transfers are conditional or unconditional in character. Federal
transfers to regional units of government may have conditions attached to them
in order to influence how they are spent. This ―golden lead,‖ as it is referred to
in Germany, may however undermine the autonomy of the regional units of
government, especially if conditional transfers constitute a high proportion of the
transfers and hence a significant portion of total state or provincial revenues. To
avoid this, transfers may take the form of unconditional transfers (either through
revenue sharing by set percentages of certain federal tax proceeds, as occurs in
many of the newer federations, or unconditional block grants). Although strictly
comparable statistics are difficult to obtain, there is clearly a considerable
variation among federations in the extent to which federal transfers have been
conditional or unconditional. Table 12 setting out conditional transfers as a
percentage of federal transfers indicates an enormous range here too in the
proportion of conditional transfers, ranging from 100 percent in the United
States to around 6 percent in Belgium. This variation reflects differences in the
emphasis upon accountability in the expenditure of federal funds or upon the
importance of constituent unit autonomy. There are also differences in the
specificity of the conditions set for conditional grants. While those in the United
States and Australia tend to be highly specific, those in Canada have been so
general as to be virtually unconditional. The figure for Canada in table 12
depends on whether the Canadian Health and Social Transfers (CHT/CST),
which are at most semi-conditional in character, are regarded as conditional or
unconditional. If these transfers are classified as conditional, the comparable
Canadian figure for the proportion of transfers that are conditional is 65 percent,
as shown in the table; but if they are classified as unconditional, the proportion
would be 27 percent.
The proportion of total state or provincial revenue made up by federal
conditional transfers provides one significant measure of the constraints upon
state or provincial autonomy. As table 13 indicates, in most federations
conditional transfers constitute between 10 and 26 percent of total state or
provincial revenues, with Mexico, Spain and Austria as higher outliers and
Brazil, Belgium and Russia as lower outliers.
TABLE 12: Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Federal Transfers
2004
United States 100.0

Austria 78.9
Switzerland 73.1
Spain 66.1
Canada 64.9‡
Germany 64.5
Mexico 55.5
Australia 40.9
India 40.7
Malaysia 39.3
Brazil 25.0
South Africa 11.5

Russia 9.0
Regions 6.1
Note: Depending on source, figures are the latest available between 2000 and 2004, in
descending order conditionality.
‡
The CHT/CST transfer is included here as conditional; if treated as unconditional
because of the very general nature of the conditions, the figure for Canada would be 26.8
percent.
Sources: See tables 9 and 11.
Arguments have been advanced in support of both forms of transfer. In

support of conditional grants has been an argument which has particularly
tended to dominate discussion of the subject in the United States. This is based
on the principle of financial responsibility and accountability, i.e., that the
federal government, which has the nasty task of raising the funds by taxation,
should in the interests of accountability to the tax-payer, control and set the
conditions for the use of these funds by the state governments. Consequently, in
recent decades, conditional grants have predominated in the federal transfers in
the United States.
Countering this, however, is the concern to which more attention has been
paid in some other federations that conditional grants are likely to undermine the
autonomy of the regional units of government by inducing them to undertake
expenditures not necessarily in tune with their own priorities. Furthermore, in
those federations where the regional units of government have parliamentary
executives responsible to their own legislatures, it has been argued that these
TABLE 13: Federal Conditional Transfers as a Percentage of Total
Provincial/State Government Revenues
2000–04
Mexico 48.8
Spain 41.9
Austria 37.4
United States 25.6
India 18.7
Australia 18.6
Switzerland 17.0
Canada 14.1‡
Malaysia 12.0
South Africa 11.0
Germany 9.8
Brazil 7.5
Regions 3.5
Russia 2.5
Note: Depending on source, figures are the latest available between 2000 and 2004.
‡ CHT/CST transfer is included here as conditional; if treated as unconditional because of
the very general nature of the conditions, the figure for Canada would be 3.7 percent.
Sources: See tables 9 and 11.
governments can be held responsible for the use of unconditional transfers

through their accountability to their own legislatures and hence electorates.
These arguments have led in the case of most parliamentary federations to a
significantly lower reliance upon conditional transfers and a higher proportion of
unconditional transfers than in the United States where members of the Congress
have focused on securing identified benefits for their states or districts rather
than leaving discretion to the state administrations.
6.7 EQUALIZATION TRANSFERS
The importance of ―equalization‖ transfers lies in the view that all citizens
within a federation should be entitled to comparable services without having to
be subject to excessively different tax rates. The need for such transfers has
arisen in most federations from a recognition that disparities in wealth among
regions within a federation are likely to have a corrosive effect on cohesion
within a federation. Indeed, it is for this reason that in most European federations
equalization transfers have been labelled ―solidarity‖ transfers.
The arrangements for equalization transfers have varied from federation to
federation and these are set out in summary form in table 14. Several points are
especially noteworthy. First, the extent of the equalization transfers varies
considerably. Most federations, with the exception of the United States and
Mexico, have some formal equalization scheme, but the scope of such transfers
has been greater in some (such as Germany, Canada and Australia) than in
others (such as Switzerland).
Second, in all but the German case and in the proposed Swiss reforms,
equalization is achieved totally by redistribution effected by federal transfers to
the poorer regional units of government. Germany has been unique in providing
constitutionally for interstate transfers to cover a substantial portion for adjusting
horizontal imbalances. Initially this was the sole method of equalization in
Germany, but later, federal transfers in the form of supplementary per capita
payments derived from the Value Added Tax (VAT) have provided a substantial
further equalizing redistribution. Similarly, the proposed reforms for Switzerland
include an element of intercantonal payments.
Third, in Canada the effort to correct horizontal imbalances through federal
equalization payments has focused primarily on adjusting for differences in the
revenue capacities of the provinces. While this approach is typical of many
federations, in some and most notably in Australia, there has been considerable
effort to account as well for equalizing expenditure imbalances.
Fourth, the form of equalization transfers to regional units of government
varies. There are those that are based on an agreed formula, e.g., Switzerland,
Canada, Germany, Austria, Malaysia, Belgium and Spain (although in some of
these cases the federal government dominates the process of arriving at an
agreement). In others, notably Australia, India, South Africa and Nigeria, the
allocations have been based largely on the recommendation of standing or
periodic independent commissions (which may themselves use a variety of
formulae to arrive at their recommendations).
Fifth, in some circumstances there may be a relationship between the degree
of decentralization in a federation and the need for equalization arrangements.
The more fiscally decentralized a federation is and the greater the interstate
disparities in revenue capacity and expenditure need, the greater is likely to be
the need for equalizing mechanisms to promote horizontal balance.
Sixth, the size of regional fiscal disparities varies greatly among federations,
and where these are large it is harder for the federal government to afford to
apply full equalization. Furthermore, the ability of the federal government to
afford full equalization is affected by the extent to which revenue sources are
centralized.
TABLE 14: Equalization Arrangements
United States No coherent generalized equalization scheme; some equalization occurs from
the cumulative effect of provisions in specific federal grant-in-aid schemes as
approved by Congress.
Switzerland Federal transfers: based on formulae involving a range of criteria ranking

cantons by financial capacity and need as the basis for tax-sharing and
conditional grants, but the equalizing transfer system is smaller than in
Germany, Canada and Australia. Reform of fiscal equalization as of 2008:
grants will cover burdens of urban areas, mountain regions, and poorer
cantons (lifting to within 85% of the national average) and will include an
element of intercantonal transfers.
Canada Federal transfers: equalization scheme based on formula (adjusted from time
to time) assessing provincial revenue capacity in terms of a representative set
of provincial taxes and non-tax revenue sources against a middle-range
fiveprovince standard and providing unconditional grants representing 42% of
all transfers. Reform of equalization as of 2007: move towards equal per
capita cash payments for federal block funding transfers to all provinces and
some restoration of formula-based equalization to correct recent non-formula
modifications.
Australia Federal transfers: based between 1933 and 1981–82 on recommendations
derived from determination of needs of claimant states by a standing
independent Commonwealth Grants Commission; from 1981/2 to 2000,
transfers took the form of adjustments to the general Adjustment Grant based
on calculation of relativities of revenue capacities and of expenditure needs
among states; since 2000, the federal government has collected a goods and
services tax (GST) that funds General Purpose Payments to the states.
Allocation is based on calculation of revenue capacity and expenditure needs
from comparisons of 18 revenue categories and 41 expenditure categories.
Germany Primarily interstate transfers (62%): equalization through an interstate
revenue pool to which rich Länder pay and from which poor Länder draw
according to a formula; plus federal transfers (38%): Federal Supplementary
Payments of 1.5% of value-added tax (VAT). The primary per capita
distribution of the shares of the Länder of a portion of the VAT also has an
equalizing effect. Forthcoming reforms under negotiation will address the
prevention and management of budget crises and realigning revenue-raising
capabilities with expenditure responsibilities.
Austria Federal transfers: Länder receive a per capita federal grant sufficient to bring
their average per capita tax revenue up to the national average (a little more
than half the Länder qualify). The primary distribution of Land shares of
federal taxes also has an equalization effect.
India Federal transfers: based on recommendations of quinquennial independent
Finance Commissions recommending share of federal taxes and distribution
of unconditional and conditional grants to fill gaps in state revenues, taking
account of differences among states in population, per capita income, area,
economic and rural infrastructure needs, and tax effort. However, Planning
Commission transfers for specific projects tend to counter equalization
effects.
... continued
TABLE 14 (continued)
Malaysia Federal transfers: determined by federal government following consultation

with intergovernmental National Finance Council and based on a combination
of unconditional shares of certain federal taxes and unconditional and
conditional per capita grants.
Belgium Before 2000: federal transfers: a ―national solidarity‖ unconditional grant was
paid to Regions where personal income tax revenue per capita is below the
national average (to adjust for the receipt by Regions of a percentage of
personal income taxes on the basis of derivation). Since 2000: allocation of
the shared portion of personal income tax is based on the regional yield of the
tax and the increase in the amount at the same pace as inflation and growth in
GNP.
Spain Federal transfers: since 1987 criteria including population, size, personal
income, fiscal effort, number of internal provinces within Autonomous
Community, and distance to state capital; applied by federal government to
shares of federal tax revenue transferred to Autonomous Communities.
Brazil A Revenue Sharing Fund of the States and a Revenue Sharing Fund of the
Municipalities are derived from revenue sharing of three main federal taxes:
personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, and the selective VAT. The
distribution of these among the states and municipalities is mainly based on
redistributive criteria, but horizontal inequalities in the distribution of fiscal
resources remain highly significant.
Mexico Multiple programs of revenue sharing and unconditional and conditional
grants with various criteria and no coherent equalization objective. However,
the net effect of more than 20 unrelated individual transfer programs plus
own-source revenues reveals considerable horizontal balance.
Nigeria Federal transfers assigned by the National Assembly with distribution among
states based on criteria specified in the constitution: population (and
population density), equality of states, internal revenue effort, land mass,
terrain, rural road/inland waterway, potable water, education, health, and at
least 13 percent based on derivation (to reflect resource revenues). The
appropriate allocation of revenues from natural resources remains highly
contentious. The emphasis upon equality of states (40 percent of transfers)
has meant that because of large differences in the size of the states per capita
revenues have in fact varied sharply.
Russia Federal transfers: formula-driven equalization transfers from the Fund for
Financial Support of Regions. Changes to regional fiscal capacity
equalization methods and whether support to extremely weak constituent
units should be under strict federal control remain a much-discussed topic in
Russia today. In practice equalization is up to about 60 percent of the
wealthiest constituent units.
South Africa Federal transfers: based on the recommendation of the independent Finance
and Fiscal Commission to meet the constitutional requirement of ―equitable‖
division among provinces and municipalities. The Commission has developed
a formula taking account of specific factors of demography and economic
activity.
Seventh, it would appear that the different federations vary in terms of the
tolerance of their citizens for horizontal imbalances and their emphasis upon
―derivation‖ as the basis of distribution of transfers. For example, egalitarian

Australia, which is blessed with relatively modest interstate disparities in
revenue capacity, goes to great lengths to equalize fully on both the revenue and
expenditure aspects. Germany also provides nearly full equalization, at least on
the revenue side. The United States, with relatively large interstate disparities
but no formal equalization system at all, appears to have a much greater
tolerance for horizontal imbalances. Canada lies somewhere between these two
extremes. It has a substantial equalization program that, because of the
particularly large revenue disparities among the provinces, only delivers partial
equalization. One factor affecting variations in the tolerance for horizontal
imbalances in different federations is the relative value placed upon equity as
opposed to provincial autonomy and non-centralization. Another factor is the
extent of the opportunities for interjurisdictional mobility within the federation
and the value placed on mobility, a feature lessening the pressure for
equalization arrangements in the United States.
Eighth, because they involve a redistribution of resources among constituent
units, the operation or modification of equalization arrangements is often
controversial involving conflicting positions among the wealthy and poorer
constituent units within a federation.
It should be noted that in addition to equalization transfers to poorer states,
some redistribution within federations may be effected through the regional
location of direct federal government spending. Examples are direct federal
spending on major infrastructure projects, military expenditure or transfers to
individuals for social welfare. In such cases the location of federal spending is
usually determined by political consideration rather than constitutional
requirements.
6.8 PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR ADJUSTING

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
Because, as already noted, the values of revenue resources and expenditure

responsibilities change over time, federations have found it necessary to
establish processes and institutions to facilitate dealing regularly with vertical
and horizontal imbalances. Table 15 summaries the arenas in which these issues
have been fought out in different federations. It is noteworthy that in those
federations characterized by a separation of executive and legislative powers
within each order of government, such as the United States, the primary arena is
the federal legislature. In the other federations characterized by fused
parliamentary executives, the primary arena has been that of executive
federalism, i.e., negotiations between the executives representing the federal and
regional units of government.
TABLE 15: Arenas for Resolving Issues of Federal Finance
United States Congress: negotiations among representatives of different states in

Congress over allocation of grant-in-aid programs; representatives of
state administrations act as lobbyists.
Switzerland Federal Parliament: negotiations within Federal Council (i.e., federal
executive) and Parliament (containing cantonal representatives) but with
extensive consultation of the Conference of Cantonal Governments, and
assisted from time to time by commissions.
Canada Processes of executive federalism predominate. Ultimate decision lies
with federal government and federal legislation, but in practice for each
fiveyear period renewal is preceded by extensive federal-provincial
negotiations through officials and federal and provincial finance ministers
to arrive at an agreed program. Recently, disputes over previous
equalization modifications led to an independent commission (2006
Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Finance).
Australia Processes of executive federalism predominate. Ultimate decision lies

with federal government and federal legislation, but equalization transfers
from the GST pool are based on recommendations of an independent
expert Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), whose
recommendations are usually implemented, the recommendations being
made within a context established by an intergovernmental ministerial
council.
Austria Executive federalism: intergovernmental negotiation with dominant
federal government role, but federal second chamber is composed of
representatives of state legislatures.
Germany Executive federalism: ultimately fiscal arrangements require endorsement
by a majority in the Bundesrat, which is composed of delegates of
governments of Länder.
India Ultimate decision lies with Union government, but constitutionally
mandated quinquennial independent Finance Commissions make
recommendations for the total state share of shared central taxes and for
unconditional grants to states, and for distributions of both among states.
Recommendations have in practice usually been implemented. These
transfers are supplemented by substantial conditional grants allocated on
the recommendation of the Planning Commission.
Malaysia Executive federalism: dominant role of federal government, but it is

constitutionally required to consult National Finance Council which
includes a representative of each state.
Belgium Interparty coalition bargaining within the federal government and
intergovernmental negotiation.
... continued
Spain Executive federalism: regional financial arrangements are negotiated

every five years in the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, an
intergovernmental ministerial body with the decisions made by a
qualified majority vote in which the vote of the two central government
ministers is equal to that of all the regional councillors. Legally an
advisory body but in practice decisive.
Brazil General lack of institutional structures for financial arrangements except
for the National Council for Fiscal Policy (CONFAZ) for coordinating
the fiscal and tax policies of the states, but in practice this performs
purely formal functions. Ultimate approval is by Congress where the
smaller states have disproportionate influence.
Mexico Lack of institutional structures. In response to dissatisfaction with fiscal
federalism at the sub-national level, the federal government introduced a
―New Federalism‖ program that sought to transfer resources to states and
municipalities, to reduce the discretionary power of the federal
government in the allocation of funds, and to simplify and clarify the
process of resource distribution to states and municipalities.
Nigeria Allocations from the Federation Account to the federal, state and local
governments are based on recommendations of the National Revenue
Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC), but
ultimately must be approved by the National Assembly.
Russia Intergovernmental negotiation determines revenue flows, leading to an
ineffective dispute-resolution process dominated by the federal
government.
South Africa Ultimate decisions lie with the national government, but an independent
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) of 22 members, of whom 9 are
appointed by provinces and 2 by local governments, is mandated by the
constitution to make recommendations on the ―equitable shares‖ for state
and for local governments and on the formula for distribution. These are
reviewed by the Budget Council and the Budget Forum (both
intergovernmental councils). In practice, the FFC has been treated by the
Finance Ministry of the national government largely as an advisory body.
Ethiopia A joint session of Parliament has to vote by a two-thirds majority on tax

powers not specifically assigned by the constitution separately or jointly
to one or both orders of government. The House of Federation determines
the formula for subsidies states are entitled to receive from the federal
government. Revenues from joint federal and state tax sources and
subsides provided by the federal government to the states are also
determined by the House of Federation based on recommendations made
by the Committee of Revenue Sharing.
In terms of the processes for adjusting issues of federal finance, four distinct
patterns can be identified.41 In Australia and India, although in different form,
expert commissions established by the federal government have been entrusted
with the primary task of determining distributive formulae. That in Australia is a
standing commission, while that in India is quinquennial and established by
constitutional requirement. These commissions hear representations from the
state governments and report to the federal government which normally follows
their recommendations. South Africa with its Financial and Fiscal Commission
follows this general pattern, but in practice the central Finance Ministry has
more often departed from the Commission‘s recommendations, thus weakening
its value as an independent authority. Nigeria has had a long history of finance
commissions dating back to the Phillipson Commission of 1946, and up to the
National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission since 1989.
A feature of the current Nigerian financial arrangements, derived from the
original concept of a ―Distributive Pool‖ introduced by the Raisman
Commission in 1958, is that nearly all of the revenues are levied by the federal
government, though most of them go into a Federation Account. Allocations are
made from this Federation Account to the federal, state and local governments
on the recommendation of the National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and
Fiscal Commission although these allocations must ultimately be approved by
the National Assembly.42
A second pattern is the constitutional provision for an intergovernmental
council composed of federal and state representatives, the Malaysian National
Finance Council and the Pakistan quinquennial National Finance Commission
being examples.
A third pattern is exemplified by Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the
United States, Brazil and Argentina, where grants to the states are determined by
the federal legislature, but since there are formal representatives of the states in
the federal legislature, state representatives are involved in the approval process
(although arrangements vary in these federations).
A fourth pattern is found in Canada, where the determination of equalization
formula, other tax transfer programs and tax agreements, are under the control of
41
Richard M. Bird, ―A Comparative Perspective on Federal Finance,‖ in Keith G.
Banting, Douglas M. Brown, and Thomas J. Courchene, eds., The Future of Fiscal
Federalism (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations,
John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen‘s University, 1994), pp.
304–5.
42
J. Isawa Elaigwu, The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria (Jos: Aha Publishing House,
2005), pp. 243–316; J. Isawa Elaigwu, ed., Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Facing the
Challenges of the Future (Jos: Aha Publishing House, 2007).
the federal government whose legislature contains no provision for formal

representation of regional governments. Nevertheless, because of the importance
of these issues, federal-provincial financial relations have been a matter for
extended discussion in innumerable committees of federal and provincial
officials, and are the source of much public polemics between federal and
provincial governments.43
From time to time a key role has been played by commissions such as the
RowellSirois Commission and much more recently by an advisory panel on
equalization.
In virtually all federations, but most notably Australia, India, Malaysia,
Nigeria, South Africa, Germany and Canada, a variety of intergovernmental
councils, commissions and committees have been developed to facilitate
adaptation of the financial arrangements. Australia has gone furthest in
developing such institutions with three intergovernmental institutions worth
noting here. The Premiers Council plays a key role in deliberations on the
transfers but is not a body established by the constitution. The Loan Council,
which coordinates federal and state borrowing, was established by a
constitutional amendment in 1927 and can make decisions binding both levels of
government. The Commonwealth Grants Commission is a standing body that
since 1933 has advised the Australian federal government on equalization
transfers. In India, too, intergovernmental institutions have played an important
role, both the Finance Commissions primarily concerned with correcting vertical
and horizontal imbalances and the Planning Commission concerned with
development projects having set the pattern of transfers to the states. In
Germany, the Bundesrat and its committees, because of the unique character of
this federal second legislative chamber composed of the delegates of the Land
executives, has played a key role in intergovernmental deliberations relating to
the adjustment of the financial arrangements. In other federations, including
Switzerland and Belgium, periodic commissions have from time to time advised
governments on the adjustment of intergovernmental financial arrangements.
43
Bird, ―A Comparative Perspective,‖ 305.
Chapter 7
Intergovernmental Relations
7.1 IMPORTANCE OF PROCESSES FOR

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION
The inevitability within federations of overlaps and interdependence in the

exercise by governments of the powers distributed to them has generally
required the different orders of government to treat each other as partners. This
has necessitated extensive consultation, cooperation and coordination between
governments.44
The institutions and processes for intergovernmental collaboration serve two
important functions: conflict resolution and a means of adapting to changing
circumstances.
Furthermore, intergovernmental relations have two important dimensions.
One is that of relations between the federal and unit governments. The other is
that of inter-unit relations. Typically in federations both kinds of
intergovernmental relations have played an important role.
Within each of these dimensions relations may commonly involve all the
constituent units within the federation, regional groupings of units, or be bilateral
(i.e., between the federal government and one regional unit or between two
regional units).
44
See, for instance, R. Agranoff, ―Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental
Relations,‖ Regional and Federal Studies, 14:1 (2004): 25–65; Forum of Federations,
Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Countries (Ottawa: Forum of Federations, 2001);
R.L. Watts, Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kingston: Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1989); J. Kincaid and G.A. Tarr, eds.,
Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries Forum of
Federations and International Association of Centres for Federal Studies, A Global
2005), pp. 438–9; K. Le Roy and C. Saunders, eds., Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Governance in Federal Countries Forum of Federations and International Association of
Centres for Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 3 (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2006), pp. 375-8.
7.2 FORMS AND EXTENT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS
An important element of intergovernmental relations that occurs within

federations is carried out informally through various means of direct
communication (e.g., by letter and telephone) between ministers, officials and
representatives of different governments at various levels with each other.
In addition to these there are in most federations a range of more formal
institutions to facilitate intergovernmental relations, such as those we have
already noted in section 6.8 above relating to financial relations. These have
usually taken the form of a variety of standing and ad hoc meetings involving
ministers, legislators, officials and agencies of different governments. A
noteworthy feature, especially in parliamentary federations where first ministers
and cabinet ministers responsible to their legislatures tend to predominate within
both levels of government, is the prevalence of ―executive federalism,‖ i.e., the
dominant role of governmental executives (ministers and their officials) in
intergovernmental relations. The institutions and processes of executive
federalism have usually developed pragmatically rather than by constitutional
requirement, but in such federations as Canada, Australia, Germany, India and
Malaysia they range extensively from meetings of officials to councils of
ministers and to first ministers‘ meetings.45Within some federations there have
been well over five hundred such committee, council and conference meetings a
year. These meetings have provided institutional processes for consultation,
negotiation, cooperation and, on occasion, joint projects. Not uncommonly,
where executive federalism has been the characteristic mode of
intergovernmental relations, governments have each established their own
internal specialized intragovernmental organizations to coordinate their relations
with other governments within the federation.
An interesting development in Australia was the establishment in 1992 of the
Council of Australian Governments to oversee the collaborative processes and
particularly to make the operation of the Australian economic union more
effective, but after an active period in its first few years its influence has varied
with the emphasis put on its activities by the Australian prime minister. Another
interesting development was the intergovernmental cooperative framework
established in Canada in the form of the ―Framework for Improving the Social
Union for Canadians‖ signed by the federal government and nine of the
provinces (but not including Quebec) on 4 February 1999. This was intended to
45
While in most federations the institutions and processes for intergovernmental
relations have developed pragmatically, in South Africa an Intergovernmental Relations
Framework Act was enacted in 2005 (Act No. 13 of 2005). See Intergovernmental
Relations Framework Act: Evolution and Practice (Pretoria: Department: Provincial and
Local Government, Republic of South Africa, 2005)
Intergovernmental Relations 125
commence a new era of federal-provincial cooperation, collaboration and

information-sharing in creating and financing social programs and includes a
dispute resolution mechanism. Proceeding with this framework without the
participation of Quebec because of the difficulty of obtaining an agreement with
the Quebec government of the day marked an implicit recognition, however, of
the need for asymmetry in the relationships within the Canadian federation.
Among contemporary federations, executive federalism in intergovernmental
relations is probably the most extensively developed in Australia and Germany,
with the Bundesrat serving as the centrepiece in the latter. In India, the activation
of the Inter-State Council (provided for in the 1950 constitution) recognized in
the 1990s the increased importance of processes for formal intergovernmental
relations within a federation marked by multiple political parties.
While executive federalism has not developed in Spain as far as in Australia,
Canada and India, a Council of Autonomous Community Presidents was formed
recently, and it has biannual meetings with the federal prime minister.
Nevertheless, multilateral networks as opposed to bilateral relations between
Madrid and the communities are still relatively underdeveloped. This may have
been influenced by the bilateral laws governing relations with each community.
Where there has been a separation of legislative and executive powers within
each government of a federation, as in the United States, the Latin American
federations and Switzerland, channels for intergovernmental relations have been
more dispersed. These have involved a variety of channels between executives,
administrators and legislators in different governments often in crisscrossing
patterns. A notable feature has been the extensive lobbying of federal legislators
by various state and cantonal representatives.
Nevertheless, some presidential regimes have had strong executives. Notable
examples are Russia under the Putin regime, some Latin American federations
such as Mexico up to 2000, currently Venezuela, Nigeria since 1999, Ethiopia,
and Pakistan in the early years under President Musharraf. In a number of these
cases the presidential power has been derived from the dominance of a
presidential party that is in control of the federal legislature.
An important factor affecting the character of intergovernmental relations
within a federation is the character of the political party regime. Where a single
party (or alliance) has dominated politics within both orders of government, as in
India in the early decades with the Congress party, in Malaysia with the Alliance
party, in Mexico up to 2000 with the predominance of the PRI, and currently in
South
Africa and Ethiopia, federal party leaders have had great influence over the party
leaders and organizations in the constituent units. In these cases, many of the
intergovernmental issues have been virtually dictated by the federal government
or have been resolved through party channels. In federations where different
parties predominate within different levels, as has often been the case in Canada,
Australia, and in recent years India, the formal intergovernmental processes and
institutions have been the major channels for negotiating cooperative

arrangements.
The need for extensive intergovernmental relations has been further increased
in those federations where there is a constitutional requirement that a
considerable portion of federal legislation must be administered by the
governments of the regional units. This has been a major factor contributing, for
example, to the ―interlocked federalism‖ for which Germany is especially noted.
As already noted in section 6.8, in most federations intergovernmental
institutions and processes have been particularly important for the regular
adjustment of financial arrangements and transfers.
In virtually every federation intergovernmental relations have had both
vertical and horizontal dimensions. In addition to relations between the federal
and constituent unit governments there have been inter-unit relations. These have
often dealt with cross-boundary issues affecting neighbouring states or
provinces, for example, jointly shared rivers, transportation routes or
environmental issues. In addition there are often efforts by regional groupings of
states or provinces to cooperate. Sometimes inter-unit efforts at cooperation have
been extended even more broadly to encompass all the states or provinces within
a federation to deal cooperatively with issues of wider scope without resort to the
centralizing impact of relying on federal government action. Such efforts in
Switzerland have been referred to as ―federalism without Bern‖ and in the
United States as ―federalism without Washington.‖ The confederal character of
the decision making involved has sometimes limited the success of such
arrangements, however. Nevertheless, similar proposals in Canada have recently
been the focus of considerable attention. Furthermore, in 2003 the premiers in
Canada established a new formal interprovincial Council of the Federation
comprising the 13 premiers of the ten provinces and three territories not only to
foster interprovincial cooperation but to enable a common stand in negotiations
with the federal government. This precedent has influenced a similar
development in Australia. In Switzerland similarly, the Conference of Cantonal
Governments has for some time been playing an increasingly important role in
collective negotiations with the federal government.
7.3 OTHER DEVICES FOR FLEXIBILITY AND ADJUSTMENT IN

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
In most federations, the distribution of powers between the federal and regional
unit governments is embodied in a relatively rigid constitution which is difficult
to amend (see section 11.4). Indeed in most established federations
comprehensive constitutional amendment has proved extremely difficult as the
experience of such efforts in Canada, Switzerland, Germany and Austria has
made clear. This has required the resort to a variety of devices for flexibility and
adjustment.
In those federations such as the United States, Australia, India and Malaysia
where the constitution sets out extensive areas of concurrent jurisdiction this has
provided a degree of flexibility and cooperation in areas of shared jurisdiction. It
should be noted, however, that concurrency can also contribute to
intergovernmental competition and conflict when processes for partnership in
these areas are not developed.
Another device for flexibility is that of intergovernmental delegation of
powers. The earlier federations did not expressly provide for this and as a result
courts have sometimes limited the scope for the delegation of legislative powers.
Australia and most of the federations created later in the twentieth century
enhanced their flexibility by including express constitutional provisions enabling
delegation of legislative as well as administrative authority in either direction.
Yet another device for flexibility is the concept of ―opting-out‖ or ―opting-in‖
to the exercise by a government of certain legislative powers. Examples in the
Canadian Constitution Act, 1867 are section 94A enabling provincial legislation
to override federal legislation on pensions and survivors‘ benefits, and section 94
relating to federal legislation for uniform property and civil rights applying in
those provinces which assent. Another Canadian example of an ―opting-in‖
provision is section 23(1)(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to
certain minority educational rights which do not apply in Quebec until
authorized by the Quebec legislative assembly (section 59). Elsewhere similar
provisions available to all constituent units but enabling de facto asymmetry
have existed in Spain and Belgium.
In a number of federations, the practice of formal intergovernmental
(federalstate or interstate) agreements and accords has been developed. This has
been a subject much discussed in recent decades in Canada where the Macdonald
Commission advocated the inclusion of a provision allowing for the
constitutional entrenchment of federal-provincial agreements. The notion of
interstate agreements finds its origin in the United States constitution. The
arrangement there permits two or more states to enter into an agreement for joint
action, becoming effective upon receiving congressional consent. Interstate
agreements have been used in a number of federations by the regional units as a
way of taking joint action where there is a consensus without calling upon direct
intervention by the federal government.46
7.4 COOPERATIVE VERSUS COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
The unavoidability of interdependence and the need for intergovernmental

institutions and processes to deal with this has led to an emphasis on
46
J. Poirier, ―The Functions of Intergovernmental Agreements: Post-Devolution
Concordats in a Comparative Perspective,‖ Public Law (spring, 2001): 134–57.
―cooperative federalism‖ within most federations. But equally significant is the

concept of ―competitive federalism.‖ In many federations, but particularly in
Germany during the past decade as the internal interlocking relationships of the
federation have come under critical review, there has been considerable debate
about the relative merits of ―cooperative‖ and ―competitive‖ federalism. 47
Analysis indicates that there are benefits and costs associated with each
approach.
―Cooperative federalism‖ contributes to the reduction of conflict and enables
coordination, but when it becomes ―interlocking federalism,‖ to the extent
experienced for example in Germany, it may lead to what Scharpf has called the
―joint decision trap‖ which reduces the autonomy and freedom of action of
governments at both levels. 48 Furthermore, where ―executive federalism‖
predominates, it may limit the role of legislatures. Nevertheless, virtually every
federation has found that it is impossible to isolate the activities of the different
levels of government in a federation into watertight compartments. Given the
unavoidability of overlaps of jurisdiction, cooperative federalism in the form of
intergovernmental collaboration has proved necessary in all federations. The
question remains, however, to what degree such intergovernmental cooperation
may, if extensive, limit the opportunity for autonomous action and initiative by
each order of government.
Advocates of ―competitive federalism‖ argue that competition between
governments in a federation may actually produce beneficial results for citizens.
For example, Albert Breton in his supplementary note to the Macdonald
Commission Report in Canada argues that just as economic competition
produces superior benefits compared to monopolies or oligopolies, so
competition between governments serving the same citizens is likely to provide
citizens with better service.49He equates ―cooperative federalism‖ with collusion
directed at serving the interests of governments rather than of citizens.
Competition among governments may take vertical (federal-state) or horizontal
(inter-state or inter-provincial) forms. In the case of the latter, advocates of
competition often criticize equalization arrangements because they suppress
47
Ralf Thomas Baus, Raoul Blindenbacker, and Ulrich Karpen, eds., Competition
versus Cooperation: German Federalism in Need of Reform – A Comparative
Perspective (Baden-Bade: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007).
48
F. Scharpf, ―The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and
European Integration,‖ Public Administration 66 (autumn 1988): 238–78.
49
Albert Breton, ―Supplementary Statement,‖ in Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Macdonald Commission, Report, vol. 3
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985), pp. 486–526. On competitive federalism,
see also Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid, eds., Competition among States and Local
Governments: Efficiency and Equity in American Federalism (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute Press, 1991).
competition, thus producing Länder inefficiencies. But it must be noted that,

while competition does not necessarily equate with conflict, ―competitive
federalism‖ to excess, as Canadian experience indicates, can lead to
intergovernmental conflict and acrimony and have a divisive impact within a
federation.
It should be noted that virtually all federations combine elements of
cooperation and competition. Thus, for instance, while the culture of cooperation
has been important in Switzerland, there is considerable tax competition among
the cantons. Federations generally are characterized simultaneously by elements
of cooperation, collaboration, coordination, collusion, competition and conflict
coexisting and changing over time. The extent to which elements of cooperation
or of competition prevail among governments within different federations has
varied, however. In some, such as Switzerland, Germany and South Africa, there
is a strong ―culture of cooperation‖ which in some respects has been enshrined
as a principle in the constitution. In others, such as Canada, Australia, India,
Brazil, Nigeria, Comoros, Mexico and St. Kitts and Nevis, intergovernmental
relations have to varying degrees tended to be competitive and conflictual,
although all of them have found some measure of cooperation unavoidable. The
differences have tended to reflect the divisions within their societies and the
character of party politics.
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF

FEDERATIONS
Excessive ―cooperative federalism‖ may undermine the democratic

accountability of each government to its own electorate, a criticism frequently
voiced about executive federalism in Germany, Australia and Canada. But while,
as noted above, there is some democratic value in competition among
governments to serve their citizens better, competition to excess can be
harmfully divisive. As is usually the case in federations, the need for balance
seems to be the keynote. It has usually been found that there needs to be a
combination of cooperation to avoid the harmful effect of conflict in areas of
interdependence, and of competitive bargaining among governments, each
aiming through autonomous action to serve better the interests of its citizens.
In these circumstances, most federations have attempted to reinforce the direct
democratic accountability of their representatives in intergovernmental
negotiations through the development of internal procedures, processes and
legislative committees within each level of government rather than by restricting
intergovernmental collaboration.
Chapter 8
Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federations
8.1 POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY

DISTINGUISHED
Two kinds of asymmetry among regional units may affect the operation of
federations. One, which is characteristic of all federations and might be
described as political asymmetry, arises from the impact of cultural, economic,
social and political conditions affecting the relative power, influence and
relations of different regional units with each other and with the federal
government. The other, which exists in some but not all federations and which
might be labelled constitutional asymmetry, refers specifically to the degree to
which powers assigned to regional units by the constitution of the federation are
not uniform.
8.2 POLITICAL ASYMMETRY
Political asymmetry among full-fledged constituent units exists in every

federation. 50 Among the major factors are variations in population, territorial
size, economic character, and resources and wealth among the regional units.
Table 8 (in chapter 4) gives an indication of the variation in population between
the largest and smallest units within the federations in descending order of the
ratio between the largest and smallest regional units. The impact of this factor
lies in the relative power and influence within these federations of the larger
regional units, especially where one or two dominate, and in the relative
powerlessness of the smallest member units. Both can be a source of internal
resentment and tension in the political dynamics within federations. A
particularly serious source of tension has existed in those federations where a
single unit has contained over half the federation‘s population, almost invariably
50
C.D. Tarlton was the first to draw attention to this feature. See C.D. Tarlton,
―Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation,‖
Journal of Politics, 27:4 (1965): 861–74.
a source of instability. Examples have already been noted in section 4.3 above.
They include Jamaica (with 52 percent of population) within the short-lived
West Indies Federation 1958–62, East Pakistan with 54 percent within Pakistan
prior to its secession (and Punjab Province with 56 percent of the population
within Pakistan after that), Russia within the former USSR, the Czech Republic
within Czechoslovakia prior to the separation of 1992, Serbia within Serbia and
Montenegro with 92 percent, the Flemish Region with 58 percent within the
current Belgian federation, the Bosniac-Croat Federation as an entity within
Bosnia and Herzegovina with 61 percent, Grande Comore within Comoros with
51 percent, Chuuk within Micronesia with 50 percent, and St. Kitts within St.
Kitts and Nevis with 76 percent. Each of these cases has created serious
tensions. Examples where two member provinces or states have had a
preponderant influence within a federation include Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the
UAE (combined population 67 percent), Ontario and Quebec in Canada
(combined population 62 percent), Oromia and Amhara in Ethiopia (combined
population 61 percent), and New South Wales and Victoria in Australia
(combined population 59 percent).
By contrast with these instances of relatively large and dominant regional
units within federations, as table 8 indicates, most federations also contain
among their full-fledged regional units some very small ones. Most notable in
terms of the population ratio between largest and smallest units are India, the
European Union, Ethiopia, Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. In some
federations, the desirability of reducing the asymmetry in the size of the
constituent regions has led to pressures for the redrawing of unit boundaries, as
in Nigeria (where the number of units has been progressively increased from 3
regions to 36 states and one territory) or in Pakistan in 1956 (where the number
of provinces was reduced from 4 provinces to 2). Among other federations
where the constituent units have been reshaped are Germany during the early
years of the West German Republic and in East Germany at the time of
reunification. In Belgium, the federalization process of the past three decades
has included the delineation of the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Regions and
of the Dutch-, French- and German-speaking Communities. Most recently, South
Africa in the 1990s reconstituted its regional structure into 9 provinces.
Asymmetry in terms of the territorial size and per capita wealth of regional units
within individual federations are other factors that have reinforced the picture of
unit political asymmetry among the units within federations generally.
These asymmetries are politically significant for two reasons. First, they affect
the relative capacity of different regional units to exercise their constitutionally
assigned powers. Second, they affect the degree of a regional unit‘s influence
Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federations 127
within those institutions of the federal government in which representation is
based on population (such as the first chambers of the legislature, to which in
parliamentary federations the federal executive is responsible).
Generally speaking, some political asymmetry has existed in every federation,
but where it has been extreme it has been a source of tension and instability.
Furthermore, political asymmetry has often induced efforts at corrective
measures. These have included moderating the political influence of larger
regional units at the federal level by establishing a federal second legislative
chamber with representation weighted to favour smaller regional units, and
assisting less wealthy regional units by redistributive equalization transfers (see
section 6.7 and table 14).
8.3 CONSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY
Constitutional asymmetry refers specifically to differences in the status or

legislative and executive powers assigned by the constitution to the different
regional units.
As indicated in the introduction and in table 2, and noted in chapter 4, many
federations have a variety of units with relationships to the federation
substantially different from that of the full-fledged units of regional government.
These have taken the form of federal capital districts, federally administered
territories, or peripheral federacies and associated states.
In most federations the formal constitutional distribution of legislative and
executive jurisdiction and of financial resources applies symmetrically, however,
to all the full-fledged member states. Nevertheless, there are some instances
where the constitution explicitly provides for constitutional asymmetry in the
jurisdiction assigned to full-fledged member states. Where this has occurred the
reason has been to recognize significant variations among the full-fledged
constituent units relating to geographic size and population or to their particular
social and cultural composition and economic situation.
There have been basically three approaches to establishing constitutional
asymmetry in the distribution of powers within federal systems. One has been to
increase from the norm the federal authority (i.e., to reduce regional autonomy)
in particular member states for certain specified functions within the federal
system. Such arrangements have existed in India and the short-lived Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–63).
The second approach has been to increase from the norm the jurisdiction of
particular member states (i.e., to increase regional autonomy). The most
sustained example of this approach has been the concessions made to the Borneo
states when they joined the Malaysian federation in 1963. Certain matters which
come under federal government jurisdiction elsewhere in the Malaysian
federation, such as native laws, communications, shipping and fisheries, were
made matters of exclusive state or concurrent jurisdiction in Sabah and Sarawak.
Other matters, such as immigration, remained under federal authority, but in
these the approval of a Borneo state is required when a policy is applied to one
of those states. In India there have been similar adjustments in constitutional
jurisdiction applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and to some of the newer
small states that contain distinct ethnic groups. Canada from the beginning has
had a measure of constitutional asymmetry, principally related to denominational
and linguistic guarantees in education, the use of French in the legislature and
the courts, and the civil law.
TABLE 16: Constitutional Asymmetry of Full-Fledged Constituent Units in

Federal Systems
Symmetrical Units Asymmetrical Units
Argentina Belgium
Australia Bosnia-Herzegovina
Austria Canada
Brazil Comoros
Ethiopia European Union
Germany India
Mexico Malaysia
Micronesia St. Kitts and Nevis
Nigeria Spain
Pakistan
South Africa
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United States
Venezuela
Note: There are large variations in the degree of asymmetry in the federations listed in the
second column.
There is a third constitutional approach for permitting asymmetry in the

jurisdiction and powers exercised by certain member states. That is one in which
the constitution is formally symmetrical in giving all the member states the same
jurisdiction, but includes provisions that permit member states in certain cases to
―opt in‖ or ―opt out‖ of these assignments. These provisions enable governments
to take up the full exercise of their autonomy at different speeds. Such
arrangements retain the formal symmetrical application of the constitutional
distribution of powers to all member states, but provide specific means for
accommodating within that framework a de facto asymmetry among member
states in the exercise of these powers. In Canada sections 94 and 94A of the
Constitution Act, 1867 and Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federations 129
section 23(1)(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act,
1982 have been such constitutional provisions. Thus, at a practical level, Quebec
as a province within Canada has enjoyed a degree of legislature asymmetry
when compared with other provinces (exemplified by the Quebec Pension Plan)
and administrative asymmetry (it collects it own income tax, for example). The
Meech Lake Accord 1987 and the Charlottetown Agreement 1992, which were
proposals for a comprehensive revision of the Canadian constitution, contained
provisions for more asymmetry relating to Quebec, but these were not enacted.
The Spanish approach has been to recognize variations in the pressures for
autonomy in different regions by granting to each Autonomous Community its
own statute of autonomy tailored to is particular set of compromises negotiated
between Madrid and the regional leadership. These agreements are nonetheless
set within a framework in which it is anticipated that eventually there will be less
asymmetry among them.
Among the examples of federal systems not yet mentioned which have
exhibited some degree of constitutional asymmetry in the application of
jurisdiction are the European Union, Russia and Belgium. The European Union,
in negotiating the accession of each new member, has often had to make
particular concessions. Furthermore, in order to get agreement upon the adoption
of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union found it necessary to accept a
measure of asymmetry in the full application of that treaty, most notably in the
cases of Britain and Denmark. Perhaps the most complex current example of
constitutional asymmetry within a federal political system occurred in the variety
of powers which the 89 component units (such as republics, oblasts, okrugs,
etc.), constituting the Russian Federation were able to negotiate during the
Yeltsin presidency. Within a formally symmetrical constitutional framework,
many of the constituent units within Russia concluded bilateral treaties providing
for asymmetrical treatment. Under the Putin presidency there has, however, been
a policy to cancel these treaties and to return to more symmetrical arrangements.
In the Belgian Federation, constitutional asymmetry exists not only in the
differences in jurisdiction of the three territorial constituent Regions and the
three non-territorial constituent Communities, but also in the interrelation
between Regional Councils and Community Councils, since the Flanders Region
and the Flemish Community have merged their institutions. Bosnia and
Herzegovina consists of two entities, one of which is itself a federation (the
Bosniac-Croat Federation) and the other is the unitary Republic of Srpska.
Two of the micro-federations, Comoros and St. Kitts and Nevis, have
established asymmetric constituent units by arranging that the largest island
(Grande Comore in the former and St. Kitts in the latter), unlike the other islands
does not have its own separate legislative assembly, that purpose being served
by the federal assembly. In a small federation this arrangement reduces
institutional duplication and complexity, but in both cases it has contributed to
internal tensions.
An important factor influencing the powers and autonomy that member states
in a federation are able to exercise is the constitutional allocation of financial
resources. As the extensive literature on fiscal federalism has invariably
emphasized, where there has been initial symmetry in the constitutional
allocation of financial resources in federations it has often produced sharp
variations in the wealth and fiscal capacities of their member states.
Consequently, in many federations there have been efforts to reduce the
corrosive effect on unity of such disparities and to enhance federal cohesion by
formal schemes for the redistribution and equalization of resources among the
member states (see section 6.7 for details). Thus, redistributive asymmetrical
transfers have been employed to make the fiscal capacities of the member states
more symmetrical. In the case of Spain, furthermore, two quite distinct financial
arrangements have been established for the 15 ―common‖ Autonomous
Communities and the two foral Autonomous Communities of the Basque
Country and Navarre (see section 6.2).
Proposals for constitutional asymmetry have sometimes, most notably in
Canada, raised the question whether greater autonomy of jurisdiction for some
member states should affect the representation of those states in the federal
institutions. For example, should representatives from the more autonomous
member states be restricted from voting within the federal institutions on those
matters over which the federal government does not have jurisdiction in their
particular member state? A rational argument can be made for such a quid pro
quo, and the issue has recently been intensely debated in Canada as a
consideration if Quebec were to be granted significant asymmetric legislative
authority. The issue has also been raised in the United Kingdom as a result of the
implementation of Scottish devolution. There would, however, be serious
complexities in trying to operate a system of responsible cabinet government if
cabinets had to rely on different majorities according to the subject matter under
deliberation. In any case, in no federation to date have adjustments actually been
made in federal representation or voting by state or provincial representatives
within the federal institutions on such grounds.
Clearly, constitutional asymmetry among the regional units within a
federation introduces complexity. Nevertheless, some federations have found
that the only way to accommodate the varying pressures for regional autonomy
has been to incorporate asymmetry in the constitutional distribution of powers.
The most notable of such cases are Malaysia, Canada, India and Belgium. In
some other cases, asymmetry has proved useful as a transitional arrangement
accommodating regions at different stages of political development. Examples
are the arrangements within Spain for the various Autonomous Communities and
the concept of a Europe of ―variable geometry‖ proceeding at ―varying speeds.‖
In some cases, pressures for asymmetry have induced intense counter-pressures
for symmetry, for example, in Canada and Spain, and these examples suggest
that there may be limits beyond which extreme asymmetry may become
dysfunctional. Nevertheless, in at least some federations it appears that the
recognition of constitutional asymmetry has proved an unavoidable way of
accommodating major differences between constituent units in the relative
pressures for autonomy.
Chapter 9
Multilevel Federal Systems
9.1 MEMBERSHIP IN SUPRA-FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS
A notable feature in the contemporary world is the membership of a number of

federations within wider federal organizations. One particular example is the
membership of Germany, Belgium, Austria and Spain in the European Union.
Membership in the European Union, itself a hybrid which is predominately
confederal in character but has some of the characteristics of a federation, has
had implications for the internal relationships within those European Union
member states which are themselves federations. Among the issues that have
arisen has been the role of the regional units within each of these federations in
negotiations with the institutions of the European Union. This has led to the
establishment by regional units within the member federations of offices at the
European Union capital in Brussels and to their direct representation in the
Committee of Regions of the European Union. The result has been a new
element of complexity in intergovernmental relations in these federations. The
impact upon the federal-regional balance within each federation of the transfer
of certain powers to Brussels has also on occasion become a contentious issue,
most notably in Germany.51 There it led to an important case before the German
Constitutional Court. It should also be noted that concern about the impact of
membership in the European Union upon the character of the Swiss federation
has been a factor in the resistance within Switzerland to joining the European
Union.
Other illustrations of federations in wider supra-federation organizations are
the membership of Canada, the United States, and Mexico (all three themselves
R. Hbrek, ―Germany,‖ in A.L. Griffiths, ed., Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005

51
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005), pp. 157–8.

federations) within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Malaysia in
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India and Pakistan
(both at the time federations) in the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC). In each of these cases membership in the wider
organization has had implications for the internal organization and balance
within the member federations.
Traditionally, the analysis of federations has centred upon relations between
their federal and state governments. But increasingly in the contemporary world,
federal arrangements have taken on a multi-tiered character. It has been the
effort to maximize citizen preferences or reduce their frustrations that has led to
the establishment of multiple levels of federal organization each operating at a
different scale for performing most effectively their particular functions.52 The
resulting multi-tiered federal systems have created a more complicated context
for the operation of individual federations participating in these wider forms of
federal organization.
9.2 THE PLACE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
While considering the trend to multi-tiered federal systems, it should be noted

that there has been increasing attention given also to the role of local
governments within federations.53 Traditionally, the determination of the scope
and powers of local governments was left in federations to the intermediate state
governments. The importance and autonomy of the tier of local government has
varied enormously from federation to federation being perhaps most prominent
in Switzerland and the United States and least in Australia. Furthermore, in some
federations intergovernmental relations directly between federal and local
governments have been considerable, whereas in others (including Canada) such
relations have been funnelled through the provinces or states as intermediaries. It
is worth noting that there have been efforts in some federations, notably
Germany, India (since constitutional amendments in 1992), Nigeria (in its 1999
Multilevel Federal Systems 133
constitution) and Switzerland in the new constitution of 1999, to recognize

formally in the constitution of the federation the position and powers of local
governments. Brazil, Venezuela and South Africa are notable in that their
52
J.R. Pennock, ―Federal and Unitary Government: Disharmony and Reliability,‖
Behavioral Science, 4:2 (1959): 147–57.
53
See, for instance, N.Steytler, ed., The Place and Role of Local Government in
Federal Systems (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005); J.Kincaid and G.A.
Tarr, eds., A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 1: Constitutional Origins, Structure
and Change in Federal Countries (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University
Press, 2005), pp. 438–9.
constitutions fully recognize local governments as a full-fledged third order of
government within the federation. Indeed in both Brazil and South Africa there
have been efforts recently to emphasize local governments at the expense of the
states or provinces. In Brazil the first Lula administration clearly favoured the
cities over the states with new transfers, in part because his party‘s power base
was in the cities. In South Africa there has been some consideration even of
abolishing the provinces or at least characterizing the Republic as a case of
―hour-glass‖ federalism in which the national and local spheres each weigh more
than the provinces.54 In Australia, although local governments fall within state
jurisdiction, representation for local governments was formally included in the
Council of Australian Governments established in 1992 to improve collaboration
on economic development policies.
54
Department: Provincial and Local Government, Republic of South Africa, Policy
process on the system of Provincial and Local Government: Background: Policy
questions, process and participation (Pretoria: Department of Provincial and Local
Government, 2007).
Chapter 10
The Representative Institutions of Federal
Governments
10.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SHARED FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

AS A FOCUS FOR UNITY
There are two essential aspects in the design and operation of any federation.
One is the recognition of diversity through a constitutional distribution of
powers which enables the self-rule of the constituent units in specified areas of
jurisdiction; the other is the shared institutions of federal government which
enable common action and provide the glue to hold the federation together. With
respect to the shared institutions of federal government, experience in
federations generally suggests that to obtain the confidence of the citizens in the
different units, two criteria must be met: (1) representativeness within the
institutions of the federal government of the internal diversity within the
federation, and (2) effectiveness in federal government decision making.
The shared institutions of a federation are different in character from those in
a confederation. In a confederation the common institutions are composed of
delegates appointed by and accountable to the constituent governments. In a
federation the executive and first legislature chamber in the common institutions
are composed of representatives directly elected by and accountable to the
citizens, and in exercising its legislative and taxing powers the federal
government normally acts directly on the citizens, paralleling the direct
relationship of the regional governments to their electorates. In this way they
minimize the apparent ―democratic deficits‖ and technocracy that have
characterized contemporary confederal political systems. In the latter, major
central institutions are not directly elected but are composed of officials and
ministers who serve as delegates of the constituent governments. This ―indirect‖
relationship with the electorate of the central confederal institutions has tended
in practice to create difficulties for generating public support and loyalty for
confederal institutions, a problem that has become apparent, for instance, in the
European Union.
10.2 INSTITUTIONS BASED ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

OR PARLIAMENTARY PRINCIPLES
Generally the federal government institutions within federations fall into one of
two basic categories: those embodying the separation of executive and
legislative powers and those involving the fusion of executive and legislative
powers in a parliamentary executive responsible to the popularly elected house
of the federal legislature. The distinction between these alternatives is significant
because the form of these institutions has a major impact on the political
dynamics within a federation.55
Each of these forms of executive-legislature relationship has a differing
democratic premise. The separation of executive and legislative powers with
fixed terms for each is directed at limiting the possible abuse of power. It is a
further extension of the principle of dispersing powers among multiple decision-
making centres which is implicit in the concept of federation itself. In
federations incorporating the separation of the executive and the legislature,
power is not only divided between federal and regional governments but also
divided within each order of government. By contrast, the fusion of executive
and legislative power in parliamentary systems is based instead on the
democratic notion that by placing the executive within the legislature and
making it continuously responsible to the legislature which is itself
democratically controlled in elections, coherent but controlled and accountable
federal policies will be possible. In federations incorporating this latter
arrangement authority is divided between the federal and regional governments,
but within each order power is concentrated in a parliamentary fusion of
executive and legislature.
One form of executive-legislature relationship embodying the principle of the
separation of powers is the presidential-congressional form exemplified by the
United States in which the president and the two houses of Congress are each
elected directly for a fixed term. The Latin American federations — Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela — have all adopted this model as has Nigeria in
its current constitution. Another form is the collegial executive in Switzerland
where the executive is a Federal Council elected by the federal legislature but for
a fixed term, and constitutes a collegial group, rather than a single person. In this
latter form the presidency rotates annually among the members of the Federal
Council.
55
K. LeRoy and C.Saunders, eds., Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in
Federal Countries, Forum of Federations and International Association of Centres of
Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 3 (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-
Queen‘s University Press, 2006).
The Representative Institutions of Federal Governments 143
There are two types of parliamentary executives: those modelled closely on

the pattern of the majoritarian British institutions at Westminster, as found, for
example, in Canada, Australia, India and Malaysia, and those following
European traditions of responsible cabinet government, usually with coalitions,
as found in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Spain. Some federations in each of
these two variants of parliamentary government are constitutional monarchies,
e.g., Canada, Australia, Malaysia, Belgium and Spain, while some are republics
with presidents elected either directly or by an electoral college, as in Austria,
Germany and India. Despite these variations, basically common to all these
parliamentary federations is a fusion of powers in which the federal cabinet is
chosen from the members of the federal legislature and is accountable to it for its
continued existence if office.
There is a third category which might be called the hybrid presidential-
parliamentary form of executive. Russia is an example of a federation
incorporating this form in which a directly elected president with some
significant executive powers is combined with a parliamentary cabinet
responsible to the federal legislature. Pakistan is also an example. The
constitution of 1973 provided for a president elected by the parliament and the
leader of the majority party or majority coalition to be elected prime minister by
the National Assembly. After General Musharraf took power in a military coup
in 1999, he organized a referendum in 2002 to elect himself president for five
years and then issued a legal framework order to amend the constitution. As
president he chairs the National Security Council where most decision making is
concentrated. That Council is comprised of the military chiefs, the prime
minister and the cabinet. South Africa provides another variant closer to the
parliamentary model. There the leader, as in parliamentary systems is drawn
from parliament and to hold office depends on its continued confidence, but the
leader is described as a president rather than a prime minister and plays not only
the role of government leader but also that of head of state. Once elected, the
president ceases to be a member of parliament, although most of the ministers
must be members of parliament. France was an earlier non-federal example of a
presidential-parliamentary hybrid form of executive.
The examples of the basic forms of executive-legislature relationship are set
out in table 17, which refers not only to the institutions of the federal
governments but also to those of the regional governments in each federation.
10.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE REPRESENTATIVENESS AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
These various forms of federal government institutions have had a differing

impact upon the dynamics of federal politics affecting particularly the
representativeness and effectiveness of their federal governments.
Executives and Legislatures in Federations
144
FederalBicameral orState/Provincial
tive-Head ofUnicameralExecutive-Head ofHead of
reFederalHead ofFederalLegislatureRegionalRegional
tionshipGovernmentFederationLegislatureRelationshipGovernmentState
t-CongressGovernor-legislature
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arated:President President1 BicameralSeparated:Governor Governor1
2
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ermFixed-termcantonalcantonal President2 BicameralSeparated:President ofPresident of
3
collegial executivecollegial executivecouncil
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t-Congress Governor-legislature
1 1
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t-CongressGovernor-legislature Governor-legislature
1 1
ted:President President1 UnicameralSeparated:Governor Governor1
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1 1
:President President1 BicameralSeparated:Governor Governor1
ister(GovernorcabinetGovernor
lePrimeMonarchBicameralFused: responsiblePremierLieutenant
4
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iblePrimeMonarchBicameralFused: responsiblePremierGovernor
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cabinetMinister or Mayor)(or Mayor

6 7
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The Representative Institutions of Federal Governments
blePrimeMonarchBicameralFused: responsiblePresident ofPresident of

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145
... continued
148
FederalBicameral orState/Provincial
tive-Head ofUnicameralExecutive-Head ofHead of
reFederalHead ofFederalLegislatureRegionalRegional
tionshipGovernmentFederationLegislatureRelationshipGovernmentState
cabinetMinistercabinetMinister
12 13
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iaFused: responsiblePrimePresident BicameralFused: responsibleGovernor Governor14
cabinetcabinet
They have, for instance, affected the relative roles and effectiveness of their
federal executives and legislatures. The presidential-congressional form in the
United States has given both the president and the two houses of Congress
prominent roles and has limited the excessive dominance by any one body by the
checks and balances on each other. It has, however, been prone to deadlocks and
impasses, especially when different parties control the presidency and the houses
of Congress.
The Swiss form of the separation of executive and legislative powers has
provided, by contrast with the presidential systems, the collegial Federal Council
traditionally with an opportunity for inclusive representativeness through
multiparty maximum coalitions embracing in their membership most of the
major parties in the legislature. This has, however, resulted in prolonged and
lengthy decisionmaking processes. Nevertheless, it has meant that when
decisions are reached they have generally had wide public support.
The parliamentary forms of executive found in the other federations,
especially Canada and Australia, have tended to provide more cohesive and
decisive federal governments than in the US model, but at the price of entailing
strong party discipline, executive dominance and a more majoritarian emphasis
by comparison with those embodying the separation of powers principle. On the
other hand, in multi-party situations where coalitions of federal parties have
become the norm as in many European federations and India, decisive decision
making has been sacrificed but a less majoritarian representativeness has been
achieved.
The presidential-parliamentary hybrid, as exemplified by the Russian
federation, aims at the best of both worlds but in practice seems often to have
fluctuated between strong and weak presidentialism. In the Yeltsin period it was
characterized by complexity and tensions between the two arms of the federal
government, but under the Putin regime the executive has reasserted a dominant
role. With the term limit on Putin‘s presidency, the possibility of his successor
naming Putin as prime minister may mark another significant shift towards a less
dominant president.
The different forms have also affected the capacity for regional
representativeness within the executive of the federal government. In terms of
balancing regional and minority interests within the executive, the U.S.
presidential form is limited basically to two individuals: the president and the
vice-president. While most presidential candidates have taken regional balance
into account in selecting their vice-presidential running mates, this has provided
only a rudimentary opportunity for regional or other balancing. In other
presidential systems internal political diversity has often required not only the
president and the vice-president to come from different constituent units but
also, as in Nigeria, that the Cabinet include a member from every state; but even
in such cases, the president has usually proved to be the dominant figure. The
collegial form in Switzerland consciously avoided emphasizing a single

individual as president. Although limited to seven members, the Federal Council
has in practice exhibited a much better opportunity to ensure representation not
only of the major political parties but also of the different language and religious
groups and of major cantons. In this respect it is an important vehicle for
expressing within the federal executive the Swiss proportionality syndrome (i.e.,
the insistence upon proportional representativeness of different groups in the
composition of every federal body). The various parliamentary executives in
other federations have typically all been widely representative. The
―proportionality syndrome‖ in federal cabinet composition has been strong not
only in Canada but in virtually all the parliamentary federations, although party
distribution within the federal legislature may moderate or constrain the scope of
representation that is possible. In the Belgian case, the constitution (article 99)
actually requires equality in the numbers of French-speaking and Dutch-
speaking ministers (excluding the prime minister). The Russian presidential-
parliamentary hybrid has enabled some representativeness in the parliamentary
portion of the executive, but this has been hampered by the complex and not
always clear party distribution in the Duma.
The form of executive has also affected the capacity of the federal executive
to generate federal consensus. The U.S. presidential form provides a strong
personal focus upon the president as federal leader. Furthermore, the need to
capture the support of a majority in the Electoral College in presidential
elections has encouraged electoral campaigns aimed at aggregating the widest
range of possible support from different groups. On the other hand, the
frequency of presidential-congressional impasses, particularly when the
presidency and the houses of Congress are dominated by different parties, has
often emphasized political divisions and has had a corrosive impact on
consensus within the federation. The collegial form of federal institutions in
Switzerland has contributed to federal cohesion by inducing political processes
that have emphasized maxi-coalitions and inclusiveness. On the other hand, the
time taken to produce decisions through these processes has on occasion
produced a measure of public frustration. The increasing success of the People‘s
Party led by Christoph Blocher in federal elections since 1999 has, however,
recently introduced a more adversarial element into Swiss politics.
The parliamentary federal executives, where based on single-party majorities
or on stable coalitions (the latter being typical of the European federations), have
generally contributed to cohesion. But where cabinets are based upon the
support of a simple majority in the federal legislature, they tend often to be
perceived as less inclusive of the variety of regional interests and minorities than
in the Swiss example and to leave significant regions or groups feeling
themselves inadequately represented. Canadian experience in this respect, such
as when Pierre Trudeau‘s parliamentary majority from 1980 to 1984 included no
Members of Parliament from the three most western provinces, is but one
example. Furthermore, in those parliamentary federations where a multiparty

system develops but stable coalitions are not achieved, the resulting federal
government instability may seriously undermine federal cohesion. The
experience of Pakistan prior to the secession of East Bengal is an example, and
the tensions within Belgium from time to time is another. The development in
India of a multiparty system with strong regional parties has led to a gradual
recognition of the importance of power-sharing to reconcile conflict and of the
need to make coalition governments work rather than merely toppling them.
As noted in chapter 7, the form of executive within both federal and regional
levels of government has also had a significant impact upon the character and
processes of intergovernmental relations in federations. In the USA the
presidential-congressional system at the federal level, together with the parallel
separation of powers between governors and legislators in the states, has meant
the dispersal of power within each tier of government. This has made necessary
multiple channels of federal-state relations involving executives, officials,
legislators and agencies interacting not only with their opposite numbers but in a
web of crisscrossing relationships which one American scholar has characterized
as ―marblecake federalism.‖56 Within this complex set of processes, Congress,
and its various committees and sub-committees, have played a particularly
significant role because of their part in approving the variety of specific grant-in-
aid programs.
The collegial form of executive within governments at both levels in
Switzerland has also led to the dispersed conduct of intergovernmental relations.
Two other factors have contributed to the character of intergovernmental
relations in Switzerland. One is the arrangement whereby the Swiss cantons are
responsible for the administration of much federal legislation and therefore are
extensively consulted by different branches of the federal government
concerning proposed legislation. Second, an additional channel of
intergovernmental communication between legislators arises from the provisions
enabling dual membership in cantonal and federal legislatures. About one-fifth
of the legislators in each federal house have in practice usually fallen into this
category.
In the other federations where parliamentary responsible cabinets have
operated within governments at both levels, a common prevailing characteristic
has been the executive predominance in intergovernmental relations (see also
section 7.2). ―Executive federalism‖ has been most marked in Germany,
Australia and Canada, but is also a major characteristic of intergovernmental
relations in India, Malaysia, Austria, Belgium and Spain. This is a natural
outcome of the existence within both levels of a governmental form in which
Morton Grodzins, ―The Federal System,‖ in A. Wildavsky, ed., American

56
Federalism in Comparative Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 257.

dominant cabinets and strong party discipline have been induced by the
requirement of continuous support by their respective legislatures.
The presidential-parliamentary hybrid in Russia would appear so far to have
led to executive dominance in intergovernmental relations due to the weakness
of the legislators. An interesting feature affecting intergovernmental relations in
Russia is the constitutional provision that each regional unit is represented in the
federal second chamber, the Federation Council, by two representatives, one
chosen by the legislature of the constituent unit and the other by the executive
body of the that unit. In South Africa the provincial delegations in the central
second chamber, the National Council of Provinces, also include representatives
of both the provincial legislatures and executives.
10.4 THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL

PARTIES
The particular electoral system employed for the institutions of federal

government has also had an impact on the representativeness and effectiveness
of these federal institutions. In the USA, Canada, India and Malaysia, single-
member constituency plurality electoral systems have been employed for the
popularly elected first house of the federal legislature. In Switzerland, Austria
and Belgium various forms of proportional representation have been used for
elections to the lower house of the federal legislature. Germany employs a mixed
system with half the members of the Bundestag elected by proportional
representation from party lists and the other half by plurality votes in single-
member constituencies. Australia has used the single-member preferential voting
system for its House of Representatives.
These differing electoral systems have shaped the processes for generating
federal cohesion, the representation of regional and minority views, and the
relative stability of governments. In federations with single-member plurality
electoral systems, the inherent overrepresentation of swings in voting patterns
has made them highly sensitive to shifts in electoral opinion. In the United States
and (until recently) Canada, this system has also for the most part provided
stable singleparty majorities. However, the inherent overrepresentation of
pluralities has been at the expense of representativeness, with minority parties
tending to be underrepresented. Furthermore, by favouring regionally
concentrated parties, single-member plurality electoral systems have, as in
Canada, often heightened regional splits in parliamentary representation over-
representing the regional concentrations in actual voting. On the other hand, in
some cases, such as India, the degree of social diversity has produced a pattern
requiring coalition governments. Those federations employing proportional
representation electoral systems have reflected voting distribution much more
accurately, although since they do not exaggerate voting shifts, they are less
sensitive to changes. Furthermore, they have tended to encourage multiparty

systems. As a result, party coalitions have been the norm for federal
governments in many of these countries and particularly Switzerland, Austria,
Belgium and Germany.
In some federations where both houses of the federal legislature have directly
elected members, different electoral rules or terms apply to the two houses. An
example is Australia, where members of the House of Representatives are
elected on the basis of preferential voting for three-year terms and senators are
elected by proportional representation for six-year terms. Other examples of
differing electoral rules or of terms for the two houses occur in Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland and the United States.
An important factor in the dynamic of any federation is the character and role
of its political parties. These tend to be influenced by both institutional
characteristics, particularly the executive-legislature relationship and the
electoral system, and by the nature and characteristics of the diversity in the
underlying society. There are four aspects of political parties that may
particularly affect the operation of a federation: (1) the relationship between the
party organizations at the federal level and provincial or state party level, (2) the
degree of symmetry or asymmetry between federal and provincial or state party
alignments, (3) the impact of party discipline upon the representation of interests
within each level, and (4) the prevailing pattern of political careers.
In terms of party organization, the federal parties in the United States and
especially Switzerland have tended to be loose confederations of state or
cantonal and local party organizations. This decentralized pattern of party
organization has contributed to the maintenance of non-centralized government
and the prominence in their federal legislatures of regional and local interests. In
the parliamentary federations, the pressures for effective party discipline within
each government in order to sustain the executive in office have tended to
separate federal and provincial or state branches of parties into more
autonomous layers of party organization. This tendency appears to have been
strongest in Canada. The ties between federal and regional branches of each
party have remained somewhat more significant, however, in such parliamentary
federations as Germany, Australia and India. In the case of Belgium, the federal
parties have in fact become totally regional in character, with each party based in
a region or distinct linguistic group.
In virtually all of these federations the prevailing alignment of parties in
different regions has often varied significantly from region to region and from
federal politics. These variations in the character of party competition and
predominance in different regional units have usually been the product of
different regional economic, political and cultural interests. Consequently, these
regional variations in prevailing parties have contributed further to the sense of
regional identification and distinctiveness within these federations.
The pressure or absence of strong party discipline in different federations has

also had an impact upon the visible expression of regional and minority interests
within the federal legislatures. Where parliamentary institutions have operated,
the pressure has been to accommodate regional and minority interests as far as
possible behind closed doors within party caucuses so that the visible façade is
one of cabinet and party solidarity. This contrasts with the shifting alliances and
visibly varying positions much more frequently taken by legislators in federal
legislatures where the principle of the separation of powers has been
incorporated. Regional and minority concerns are more openly expressed and
deliberated in the latter cases, although that has not necessarily meant that they
are translated any more effectively into adopted policies.
An area that illustrates the contrasting representational patterns in different
federations is the variation in the normal pattern of political careers. In some
federations, most notably the United States and Switzerland, the normal pattern
of political careers is progression from local to state or cantonal and then to
federal office. Presidential candidates in the USA, for instance, have usually
been selected from among governors or senators rooted in their state politics. By
contrast, in Canada few major federal political leaders have been drawn from the
ranks of provincial premiers, and it is the norm for Canada‘s most ambitious
politicians to fulfill their entire careers at one level or the other, either in federal
or in provincial politics. The political career patterns in most of the other
parliamentary federations fall between these extremes, examples of the links
between provincial experience and filling positions of federal office being more
frequent in such federations as Germany, Australia and India than in Canada.
Federations have varied in having many parties, two or more major parties, or
one dominant party, and these have significantly affected the functioning and
character of their operation as federations. Among those with multiparty
systems, especially regionally based parties, coalition governments seeking
interparty compromises have been typical; Belgium, Brazil, Austria, Germany,
India in recent decades, and Switzerland provide prime examples. Examples of
federations characterized by two major parties holding power in different periods
have been Australia and the United States. Until recently this was the pattern in
Canada, although the impact of regional and minority parties has recently
reduced the major parties to governing as minority governments. Spain has a
competitive system of two major parties, but to form a government each must
rely on the support of smaller regionally based parties. India in its early decades,
Mexico until 2000, and South Africa currently have been dominated by one
party prevailing within both orders of government and thus contributing to
centralized policy making under the influence of the central party apparatus.
Nigeria‘s recent post-military politics has seen the president‘s People‘s
Democratic Party predominant at both levels and a fractured opposition, but
charges that elections have not been free and fair have raised questions about the
government‘s legitimacy. In Russia, President Putin has built up a strong
presidential party from the formerly fractured party system of the Yeltsin period,
and this has contributed to the reassertion of the federal government‘s strength.
Argentina and Pakistan both have experienced volatile party politics, reflecting
the primarily ―presidential‖ character of their politics frequently punctuated by
periods of military rule.
10.5 THE ROLE OF FEDERAL SECOND CHAMBERS
BICAMERALISM WITHIN FEDERATIONS
The principle of bicameralism has been incorporated into the federal legislatures
of most federations. Debate over whether representation in the federal legislature
should be in terms of the population or in terms of the states was intense at the
time of the creation of the first modern federation, the United States. The issue
was resolved at the Philadelphia Conference in 1787 by the Connecticut
Compromise whereby a bicameral federal legislature was established with
representation in one house, the House of Representatives, based on population,
and representation in another house, the Senate, based on equal representation of
states with senators originally elected by the state legislatures. This ensured that
differing state viewpoints would not be simply overridden by a majority of the
population dominated by the larger states.
Since then, most subsequent federations have adopted bicameral federal
legislatures. Indeed, all eighteen federations listed in table 19, without exception,
have bicameral federal legislatures. Two other contemporary federations, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Belau, also have bicameral federal legislatures. Currently,
the only federations among the 25 listed in table 2 (in chapter 1) that do not have
bicameral federal legislatures are the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and three
of the four small island federations, Comoros, Micronesia and St. Kitts and
Nevis. Two other former federations which had unicameral legislatures were
Pakistan (1956–73) and Serbia-Montenegro (1992–2006), neither of which
proved stable.
While the European Union is a hybrid of confederal and federal institutions, it
is worth noting that it, too, has bicameral legislative institutions. Both the
European Parliament, representing the citizens, and the Council of Ministers,
representing constituent governments, have certain co-decision powers.
However, the Council, which in character corresponds to the second chambers in
federations, plays the more predominant role within the European Union.
While most federations have found it necessary to establish bicameral federal
legislatures, there is enormous variation among them in the method of selection
of members, the composition, and the powers of the second chamber, and
consequently its role. Table 18 sets out the variations of these elements that have
existed in federal second chambers. Table 19 summarizes the particular
combination of elements incorporated in eighteen federal second chambers.
SELECTION OF MEMBERS
There is considerable variety in the ways in which members of federal second

chambers are elected or appointed. In seven federations, Australia since its
inception in 1901, the United States since 1913, Switzerland (by cantonal choice
eventually in all cantons), Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria, members of
the TABLE 18: Variations in Selection, Composition, Powers and Role of
Second Chambers in Federations
Selection Composition Powers Role

1. Appoint 1. Equal 1. Absolute 1. Primarilylegisl

ment by ―regional‖represen vetowith mediation ative chamber (e.g.,
federalgovernmen tation (e.g., committees (e.g., Argentina,
t (no formal Canada for groups Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Brazil,
consultation) of provinces) Mexico, Switzerland, Canada, India,
(e.g., Canada, USA) Malaysia, Mexico,
2. Equal
Malaysia 63% of Switzerland, USA)
staterepresentation 2. Absolute
seats) (e.g., Argentina, veto onfederal 2. Combined
2. Appoint Australia, Brazil, legislation affecting legislative and
ment by Malaysia 37% of any state intergovernmental role
federalgovernmen seats, Mexico 75% administrative (e.g.,
t based on of seats, Nigeria, functions (e.g., Germany, South Africa)
nomination by Pakistan 88% of Germany, South
3. Ultimateinterpr
provincial seats, Africa)
etation of constitution
governments Russia, South
3. Suspensive (e.g.,
(e.g., Canada: Africa, USA)
veto: Ethiopia)
Meech Lake 3. Two time limit (e.g.,
Accord proposal) categories Malaysia, South
3. Appoint ofcantonal Africa except above,
ment ex officioby representation Spain)
state governments (e.g., Switzerland: 4. Suspensive
(e.g., Germany, full cantons and veto:
Russia 50% of half cantons)
matching lower house
seats, South 4. Weighte vote to
Africa 40% of d statevoting: four override (e.g.,
seats) categories (e.g., Germany except
4. Indirect Germany: 3, 4, 5 above)
election by or 6 block votes)
5. Deadlockre
statelegislatures 5. Weighte solved by joint sitting
(e.g., Austria, d (e.g., India)
Ethiopia, India, staterepresentation
Malaysia 6. Deadlockre
:
37% of seats, solved by double
multiple categories
Pakistan, dissolution then joint
(e.g., Austria, India)
Russia 50% of sitting (e.g.,
seats, South 6. Addition Australia)
Africa 60% of al orspecial
7. Money
seats, USA 1789– representation for bills: brief suspensive
1912) others including
aboriginals (e.g., veto (India,
5. Direct Ethiopia, India, Malaysia), or no veto
election by Malaysia, Pakistan) (Pakistan).
simpleplurality
(e.g., Argentina, 7. A
Brazil, Mexico minority
75% of seats, ofregional
USA since 1913) representatives
(e.g., Belgium,
6. Direct Spain)
election
byproportional
representation
(e.g., Australia,
Nigeria, Mexico
25% of seats)
7. Choice
of method left
tocantons or
states (e.g.,
Ethiopia,
Switzerland:
Swiss choice
direct election
by plurality)
8. Mixed
(e.g.,
Belgium,Ethiopi
a, Malaysia,
Mexico, Russia,
South
Africa, Spain)
TABLE 19: Selection, Composition and Powers of Federal Second Chambers

Argentina Senate: elected by direct vote; one-third of the members elected every
two years to a six-year term; equal state representation; absolute veto.
Australia Senate: direct election (by proportional representation); equal state
representation; absolute veto (but followed by double dissolution and
joint sitting).
Austria Bundesrat: elected by state legislatures; weighted representation (range

12:3); suspensive veto (may be overridden by simple majority in lower
house, the Nationalrat).
Belgium Senate: combination of directly elected (40), indirectly elected by

linguistic Community Councils (21), and co-opted senators (10); variable
representation specified for each unit; equal competence with House of
Representatives on some matters but on others House of Representatives
has overriding power.
Brazil Senado Federal (Senate): 3 members from each state and federal district
elected by a simple majority to serve eight-year terms; one-third elected
after a four-year period, two-thirds elected after the next four-year period;
absolute veto.
Canada Senate: appointed by federal government; equal regional representation

for 4 regional groups of provinces (Ontario; Quebec; 4 western
provinces; 3 maritime provinces) plus 6 for Newfoundland and one each
for the 3 territories; absolute veto (legally) but in practice weakened
legitimacy.
Ethiopia House of Federation (Yefedereshn Mekir Bet): 71 members (63%)
directly or indirectly elected by the states and 41 (27%) appointed on
population and ethnicity. This body serves as the supreme constitutional
arbiter. The House of Federation also plays a role in adjustments to
taxing powers and to subsidies to the states. Members serve five-year
terms. For members selected by states, directly or indirectly elected
according to decision of state councils.
Germany Bundesrat: state government ex officio delegations; weighted voting (3,

4, 5 or 6 block votes per state); suspensive veto on federal legislation
overridden by corresponding lower-house majority, but absolute veto on
any federal legislation affecting state administrative functions (60% of
federal legislation reduced to about 40% by reforms in 2006); mediation
to resolve differences.
India Rajya Sabha (Council of States): elected by state legislatures (plus 12

additional representatives appointed by the President for special
representation); weighted representation of states (range 31:1); veto
resolved by joint sitting.
... continued
Malaysia Dewan Negara (Senate): 26 (37%) elected by state legislatures plus 44

(63%) additional appointed representatives for minorities; equal state
representation (for 37% of total seats); suspensive veto (six months).
Mexico Camara de Senadores (Senate): 128 seats in total; 96 ( 3 per state) are
elected by popular vote to serve six-year terms and cannot be re-elected;
32 are allocated on the basis of each party‘s popular vote; absolute veto.
Nigeria Senate: each state has three seats while one senator represents the Federal
Capital Territory. A total of 109 senators are directly elected for a
fouryear term; absolute veto (except taxation and appropriation bills
resolved by joint sitting) with joint committees to resolve deadlocks.
Pakistan Senate: 100 seats indirectly elected by provincial assemblies to serve

4year terms. Of the 22 seats allocated to each province, 14 are general
members, 4 are women and 4 are technocrats. Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATAs) and the Capital Territory fill seats through direct
election, with 8 seats given to the FATAs and 4 for the Capital Territory;
no veto on money bills, budget, borrowing or audit of federal accounts.
Russia Federation Council (Soviet Federatsii): Asymmetry of length of term and

method of selection depending on the republic or region. Each unit has 2
representatives in the Federation Council, one elected by of the
constituent unit legislature, the other appointed by the governor; dispute
resolution by joint committee which may be overridden by two-thirds
majority in lower house.
South Africa National Council of Provinces (NCOP): 90 seats, consisting of 54

representing provincial legislatures and 36 representing provincial
executives; equal provincial representation (6 legislators plus 4
executives per province); veto varied with type of legislation.
Spain Senate: 208 members directly elected from the provinces and 51
appointed by parliaments of 17 Autonomous Communities; categories of
4, 3 or one directly elected senator(s) per province (sub-units of
Autonomous Communities) supplemented by representation of one or
more (related to population) appointed by each autonomous parliament;
suspensive veto (2 months).
Switzerland Council of States: in practice direct election (direct election by plurality;

method chosen individually by all cantons); 2 representatives for full
cantons and 1 for half cantons; absolute veto (mediation committees).
United States Senate: direct election since 1913 (by simple plurality); equal state
representation (six-year terms with one-third elected every two years);
absolute veto (mediation committees).
federal second chamber are directly elected by the citizens of the constituent
units. A feature unique to Switzerland is the provision enabling cantonal
legislators to sit concurrently in both federal legislative houses, and in practice
about one-fifth of the members of each federal house concurrently hold seats in a
cantonal legislature, thus providing a channel for cantonal views to influence
federal policy making. Originally in the USA (1789–1912), members of the
federal second chamber were indirectly elected by the state legislatures. This is
currently the case in Austria, India, Ethiopia and Pakistan for most members of
the federal second chamber, and in Belgium, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa and
Spain for a portion of the members. In Germany the members of the Bundesrat
are delegates of their Land cabinets, holding office in the federal second
chamber ex officio as members of their Land executive and voting in the
Bundesrat in a block on the instructions of their Land governments. In Canada,
senators are appointed by the federal prime minister and hold office until their
retirement at 75. Although appointed to represent regional groups of provinces,
senators have, however, as a result of the method of appointment, tended to
display little accountability to regional interests and to vote instead generally on
party lines. The adoption of an appointed Senate in Canada in 1867 was the
result of a conscious rejection of an elected Senate because of the difficulties
previously experienced in the prefederation period when the elected second
chamber claimed an equal mandate to the elected lower chamber in relation to
cabinets. The federal second chambers in Belgium, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Russia
and Spain have a mixed membership. In Belgium 40 senators are directly
elected, 21 indirectly elected by the Flemish, French and German Community
Councils, and 10 are co-opted (appointed by the directly elected senators). The
Ethiopian House of Federation is composed of 71 members directly or indirectly
elected from the regional states as determined by their council of the state, plus
41 apportioned on the basis of population and ethnicity. In Malaysia only 37
percent of the Senate seats are filled by indirect election by the state legislators,
the remaining 63 percent being central appointees. In Russia half the members of
the Federation Council represent the legislatures and half the members represent
the executive bodies of the constitutional units, while in South Africa 60 percent
represent the legislatures of the provinces and 40 percent the executives. The
Spanish Senate has 208 directly elected members elected from the provinces
(sub-units within the communities) and 51 representatives appointed by the
parliaments of the Autonomous Communities.
In those federations where the members of the federal second chamber are
directly elected, generally they tend to vote along party lines rather than strictly
for the regional interests they represent. Where they are indirectly elected by
state legislatures they are more likely to regard themselves as representing
regional interests, although regional political party interests also can play a
significant role. Where, as Germany, they are ex officio instructed delegates of
the constituent governments, it is primarily the views of those governments that
they represent and only indirectly those of the electorate. Where senators are
appointed by the federal government, as in Canada and to a large extent in
Malaysia, they have the least credibility as spokespersons for regional interests,
even when they are residents of the regions they represent. Federal appointment
does, however, provide a means of ensuring representation of some particular
minorities and interests. It was for this reason that the Indian constitution
provided for 12 such appointed members out of an overall total of 250 members
in the Rajya Sabha, and the Malaysian constitution currently provides for 44 out
of 70 senators to be appointed by the federal government. The mixed basis of
selection of senators in Belgium and Spain embodies political compromises
intended to obtain the benefits of the different forms of selection for members of
the federal second chamber.
BASIS OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATION
In most federations representation in the popularly elected lower house is based

on population, and it is in the second chamber that representation of the
constitutional units, either equally or weighted to favour the smaller units,
occurs. In a few instances, however, guarantees of minimum representation have
been given also to smaller constituent units in the lower house. Examples can be
found in Brazil and Canada, although the extra weighting for smaller units is less
than in the second chambers.
While it is often assumed that equality of state representation in the federal
second chamber is the norm in federations, in practice this is the case, however,
for most of the seats in only nine of the federal second chambers listed in tables
18 (second column) and 19. In most other federations representation in the
federal second chamber favours in some measure the smaller regional units or
significant minorities, but states with larger populations do get more seats. 57 In
the Malaysian Senate the seats filled by indirectly elected senators are equally
distributed among the states, but the substantial proportion that are filled by
centrally appointed senators have not followed a consistent pattern of balanced
state representation; thus the net effect has been one of considerable variation in
state representation. In most other federations the population of the units is a
factor in their representation in the federal second chamber, although generally
there is some weighting to favour the smaller units. There have been various
degrees of weighting. In Switzerland there are two categories of representation
57
On the consequences of equal senate representation in the United States, see Frances
E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of
Equal Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). On the effect of
disproportionate representation in Latin American federations, see E.L. Gibson, ed.,
Federalism and Democracy in Latin American (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2004), especially chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10.
in the Council of States: 20 cantons have 2 representatives and 6 ―half-cantons‖

have only one each. In Germany the constitution (article 51) establishes four
population categories of Länder having three, four, five or six block votes in the
Bundesrat. In India, Austria and Spain the range of state representation is wider;
for example, 31:1 in India and 12:3 in Austria. In Belgium the differential
representation of each Community and Region in the Senate is specified in the
constitution, but for some especially significant issues the constitution (article
43) requires majorities within both the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking
members in the Senate (as well as within the Chamber of Deputies). Canada, as
is the case with so much about its Senate, is unique among federations in basing
Senate representation on regional groups of provinces with the four basic regions
having 24 seats each, plus an additional 6 for the Province of Newfoundland and
Labrador, and 3 for the three territories.
POWERS OF SECOND CHAMBERS RELATIVE TO FIRST CHAMBERS
Where there is a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature,
as in the United States, Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, normally the
two federal legislative houses have had equal powers (although in the United
States the Senate has some additional powers relating to ratification of
appointments and treaties). Where there are parliamentary executives, the house
that controls the executive (invariably the popularly elected first chamber)
inevitably has more power. In these federations the powers of the second
chamber in relation to money bills are usually limited. Furthermore, in the case
of conflicts between the two houses, provisions for a suspensive veto, for joint
sittings where the members of the second chamber are less numerous, or for
double dissolution have usually rendered the second chamber weaker (see table
18, column three, for examples). This has sometimes raised questions within
parliamentary federations about whether their second chambers provide
sufficient regional influence in central decision making. This concern is
reinforced by the overriding strength of party discipline within parliamentary
federations. Nonetheless, some of the federal second chambers in parliamentary
federations, such as the Australian Senate and the German Bundesrat, have been
able to exert considerable influence. The particular membership of the German
Bundesrat, and the fact that its absolute veto over all federal legislation
involving administration by the Länder has in practice until recently applied to
more than 60 percent of all federal legislation, have been major factors in its
influence.
ROLE OF FEDERAL SECOND CHAMBERS

The primary role of most of the federal second chambers in the federations
reviewed in this study has been legislative, reviewing federal legislation with a
view to bringing to bear upon it regional and minority interests and concerns. In
a number of federations the federal second chambers also perform some other
functions of a federal character, such as nominations for or giving consent to
certain federal appointments (as in Germany and the United States), consent to
treaties (as in the United States and Argentina) or approval of emergencies or the
use of federal overriding powers (as in India and South Africa). In contrast to the
others, the German Bundesrat performs an additional and equally important role
of serving as an institution to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation and
collaboration. It is able to do this because, unlike the other federal second
chambers, as noted, it is composed of instructed delegates of the Land
governments and because its suspensive veto power over all federal legislation
and absolute veto over federal legislation affecting state legislative and
administrative responsibilities give it strong political leverage. This model
heavily influenced the South Africans in the design of their national second
chamber in the constitution adopted in 1996, although some significant
modifications were made to include representation of both executives and
legislators from the provinces in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).
From time to time during the past two decades the reform of the Canadian
Senate has been suggested. Various alternative models have been advocated, but
while most Canadians agree that the Senate should be reformed, disagreement
about the appropriate model has left it unreformed.
The Ethiopian House of Federation is unique among federal second chambers
in having been assigned a role as the ultimate guardian of the constitution. It has
the exclusive right and ultimate authority to interpret the constitution, and this
indeed is its main function.
10.6 DO FEDERAL SECOND CHAMBERS CONSTRAIN

DEMOCRACY?
Critics of federations have noted particularly that most federations, in

establishing bicameral federal legislatures with second chambers weighted in
differing degrees to favour smaller constituent units, have appeared to violate the
cardinal principle of democracy based on ―one person one vote.‖ Consequently,
they have characterized such federal second chambers as ―demos-
constraining.‖58 To take just one example, in the United States Senate a single
58
A. Stepan, ―Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism Multinationalism,
and Democracy,‖ in E.L. Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy in Latin America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), pp. 28–84; A. Stepan, ―Electorally generated
Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems,‖ in E.L. Gibson ed., op.cit., pp. 323–61; G.
vote in Wyoming counts 65 times more than its equivalent in California. Such
contrasts are replicated in many other federal second chambers. Brazil represents
an extreme example where senators representing 43 percent of the federal
population control over 74 percent of the Senate vote. Argentina is another case
where the disproportion representing the smaller constituent units has had a
marked influence on federal policies. Of course, as the differing composition and
powers of federal second chambers outlined in tables 18 and 19 indicate, there
are considerable variations among federal second chambers in the degree to
which they operate as ―veto players‖ and are ―demos-constraining‖ in character.
The federal second chambers of the United States, Switzerland, the Latin
American federations and Germany (the latter because of the special character of
the Bundesrat) have tended to be strong veto players, while those in most
parliamentary federations, where cabinets have been responsible to the popularly
elected house, have normally been weaker (although in Australia the Senate has
some significant veto powers). Consequently, it is appropriate to place federal
second chambers, depending on their composition and powers, on a continuum
in terms of their character as ―veto-players‖ constraining democratic majorities.
It should be added that while federal institutions may place some limits upon
majoritarian democracy, democracy more broadly understood as liberal
democracy may actually be expanded by federalism. Democracy and
governmental responsiveness can be enhanced within federations because
multiple levels of government maximize the opportunity for citizens‘
preferences to be achieved, because they establish alternative arenas for citizen
participation and because they provide for governments that are smaller and
closer to the people. In this sense, federations are potentially ―demos-enabling‖
and hence might be described as ―democracy-plus.‖
Furthermore, from a liberal-democratic point of view, by emphasizing the
value of checks and balances and dispersing authority to limit the potential
tyranny of the majority, federal second chambers contribute to the protection of
individuals and minorities against abuses. 59 This is, however, a question of
balance and in some cases like Brazil and Argentina the disproportionate
representation of the smaller constituent units may have been carried too far. 60
The checks on democratically elected majorities imposed by federal second
chambers have often pushed federations in the direction of ―consensus
democracy,‖ contributing to the accommodation of different groups within
diverse and multicultural federations, and have added to the vitality and
Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, (2002).
59
J. Madison, A. Hamilton and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (1788; reprint with
editor‘s introduction, New York: Penguin Books, 1987), no. 9.
60
See footnote 4.
recognition in federal policy making of the distinct peoples in their various

constituent units.61
61
A. Liphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
ThirtySix Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
Chapter 11
Constitutional Supremacy in Federations
11.1 THE CONSTITUTION AS SUPREME LAW
Since an essential characteristic of federations is the constitutional distribution of

powers between two or more orders of government, an important feature in the
design and effective operation of any federation is ensuring the supremacy of the
constitution as the source of governmental authority for each order of
government. A recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over all orders
of government and a political culture emphasizing the fundamental importance
of respect for constitutionality are therefore prerequisites for the effective
operation of a federation. If these are lacking, a federation is likely to deteriorate
to a situation where one or other order of government subordinates the other
thereby undermining the basic constitutional coordinacy that is an essential
feature of federations.
The constitutions of most federations therefore explicitly or implicitly declare
the supremacy of the constitution. This helps to explain why judicial review by
the courts, discussed below, has been an important element in the operation of
most federations. Other important implications flow from the principle of
constitutional supremacy in federations. These relate to the processes of
constitutional amendment, the role of constitutional bills of rights, and
provisions, if any, for formal secession.62
Federal constitutions have varied in terms of their detail. Most of the
federations created before the middle of the twentieth century contain less detail,
laying out the basic features and principles. Those created since the middle of the
twentieth century tend to extend to much more detail. The Indian constitution as
adopted in 1950, for instance, contained 395 articles and 9 schedules, running to
291 pages. While the more recent constitutions have thereby attempted to reduce
62
J. Kincaid and G.A. Tarr, eds., Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in
Federal Countries, Forum of Federations and International Association of Centres for
Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 1 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2005).
Constitutional Supremacy in Federations 169
conflicts over their interpretation, they have tended to be less flexible than the
older shorter constitutions.
In some federations, generally those established by a devolutionary process,
the basic elements of the state or provincial constitutions are included in the
federal constitution; Canada and India are examples. In others, generally those
established by aggregating previously separate states (e.g., Switzerland,
Australia, Brazil and Mexico), the federal constitutions have set out only a few
minimum principles which the state constitutions must meet, otherwise leaving it
to the constituent units to adopt their own constitutions. Nevertheless, in matters
relating in any way to the relationship between federal and constituent unit
governments, the ultimate supremacy of the federal constitution over all
governments has always been prescribed in federations.
11.2 PROCESSES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Given the unavoidability of overlaps and interdependence between governments

within federations and the consequent likelihood of intergovernmental
competition and conflict, most federations have found the need for processes to
adjudicate disputes and resolve conflicts. Disputes may arise over interpretation
of the exact scope of power assigned to each order of government by the
constitution, from conflicts of laws passed by different governments in areas of
concurrent jurisdiction, from non-governmental bodies challenging the legal
jurisdiction of a government, and from challenges that a law contravenes a
constitutionally established right. A fundamental question that arises is whether
electoral or judicial processes should be the primary means for dealing with such
disputes and conflicts. Most federations have in fact relied on a combination of
these processes. Ultimately, through the periodic elections that occur within both
levels of government in federations, electorates have had the opportunity where
there is a conflict between governments to express and support their preferences
by voting parties in or out of power in each level of government. In the case of
Switzerland, in addition to elections at each level of government, the electorate
plays a major adjudicating role through the operation of the legislative
referendum. In this process, any federal legislation that is challenged by 50,000
citizens or 8 cantons must be submitted to a direct popular vote in a referendum.
As a result, this referendum process becomes the adjudicative process for ruling
on the validity of federal legislation. An interesting by-product of this
constitutional procedure is the inducement that it provides for interparty
compromise and cohesion within the federal government and legislature in order
to ensure the maximum possible breadth of support, thereby reducing the risk of
a successful challenge through the legislative referendum process.
In addition to elections within each level of government, most federations

have also relied upon the courts to play a major adjudicating role. In this role,
courts have performed three functions: (1) impartial constitutional interpretation,
(2) adaptation of the constitution to changing circumstances (especially where
constitutional amendment is difficult), and (3) resolution of intergovernmental
conflicts.
11.3 SUPREME COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
Two types of courts for ultimate constitutional jurisdiction may be found among
federations. One is a supreme court serving as the final adjudicator in relation to
all laws including the constitution. Examples are the Supreme Courts of the
United States, Canada, Australia, India, the four Latin American federations,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Comoros, Micronesia, Belau and the High Court in
St. Kitts and Nevis. The other is a constitutional court, specializing in
constitutional interpretation, which is the pattern followed in Germany, Austria,
Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Arab Emirates, Belgium and Spain.
A third approach is that found in Switzerland involving a limited tribunal. Under
the unique Swiss arrangement, the Federal Tribunal may rule on the validity of
cantonal laws but not of federal laws. The validity of federal laws is determined
instead through the instrument of the legislative referendum referred to above.
Ethiopia is unique among federations in making the federal second chamber,
the House of Federation, composed of members representing the states, as the
sole guardian of the constitution. It has the exclusive right (article 62(1)) and
ultimate authority (article 83) to interpret the constitution, and that is its main
function. The constitution (article 62(2)) provides for a Council of Constitutional
Inquiry to advise the House of Federation on constitutional matters, but the
House is not bound by the Council‘s advisory opinions.
If courts are to be accepted within a federation as impartial and independent
adjudicators, there appear to be two requirements: (1) independence from
influence on the court by any particular level of government, and (2)
proportional representativeness of membership on the court. The first of these
raises the issue of the method and security of appointment. In relation to the
second of these issues, in most federations some provision is made either by
constitutional requirement or in practice for the constituent unit governments to
have a role in the appointment of judges adjudicating the constitution. In the
USA, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, appointments to the Supreme Court rest
solely with the President but require ratification by the Senate, where the state
electorates are equally represented. In Canada and Australia, constitutionally the
power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court lies solely with the federal
government, but by convention provincial or state governments are consulted. In
Malaysia the federal cabinet has had the last word in the appointment of
Supreme Court judges but has been required by the constitution to consult
certain bodies before making the appointments. Although appointments to the
Supreme Court in India are nominally made by the president in consultation with
the Supreme Court, in a series of judgments between 1981 and 1998 the
Supreme Court wrested from the executive the power to make these
appointments. In Germany the Bundesrat representing the Länder appoints half
the members of the Constitutional Court and the Bundestag the other half. In
both cases two-thirds majorities are required (for the Bundesrat in plenary
session and for the Bundestag in the Judicial Elections Committee). In Spain the
Constitutional Court is composed of 12 members of whom 4 are elected by
Congress, 4 by the Senate, 2 are appointed on the proposal of the Government
Council, and 2 are appointed on the proposal of the General Council of Judicial
Power. On the other hand, in Belgium the members of the ultimate adjudicating
Court of Arbitration are simply elected by the multiparty Federal Assembly. In
Russia the 19 judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the Federation
Council (federal second chamber) on the recommendation of the President. The
members of the Nigerian and Pakistan Supreme Courts are appointed by the
President, but in Pakistan an attempt by the President to remove the Chief Justice
in 2007 met with such public opposition that this became a major destabilizing
factor within the federation. In most federations, in the interest of ensuring
independence there is also provision for strong tenure, making it difficult to
remove judges during their term of office.
The issue of proportionality in the composition of these ultimate adjudicating
courts has also been an issue in most federations. This has been particularly so in
Canada in relation to regional representation (especially of Quebec with its civil
law tradition differing from the common law tradition prevailing elsewhere in
Canada), in Switzerland where the three official languages are represented, and
in Belgium where strict legal requirements are laid down for linguistic balance in
the membership of the Court of Arbitration.
An important factor affecting the role of judicial review in federations is
whether the character of the legal system is based on common law or civil law. 63
The United States and most of the federations that evolved from former British
colonies (such as Australia, India, and Malaysia) have common law legal
systems, while most of the European and Latin American federations have civil
law systems. Canada, South Africa and Nigeria have mixed legal systems,
although in the field of public law they are predominately common law in
character. In civil law systems, legislative codes are the predominant source of
63
K. LeRoy and C. Saunders, eds., Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in
Federal Countries, Forum of Federations and International Association of Centres for
Federal Studies, A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. 3 (Montreal & Kingston:
McGillQueen‘s University Press, 2006), p. 348.
law, and the courts in their interpretation tend to be more limited in their scope.
In the common law federations, the law derives from either legislation or
judicial decisions with the latter having precedential value, and in these
federations judicial review has come to be a major element in the operation of
their constitutions.
The question is sometimes raised, especially in common law federations,
whether federation as a form of government results ultimately in rule by judges
rather than by elected representatives. There is some element of truth in this and
it is reinforced where the judges also interpret a set of fundamental individual
and collective rights in the constitution. This has sometimes led to the advocacy
of the popular election or recall of judges, although that has not yet been applied
to the most senior constitutional court in any federation. To be noted is the Swiss
alternative referred to above, of the legislative referendum to determine the
validity of federal laws. In this process the electorate becomes the adjudicating
umpire. It should also be noted that, generally speaking, the extent to which the
role of courts as adjudicators becomes prominent depends on the extent to which
problems fail to be resolved by other methods of adjustment and conflict
resolution through intergovernmental agreements, mediation procedures between
the federal legislative chambers (as in the USA, Germany and South Africa),
governmental changes induced by elections, and formal constitutional
amendments. The South African constitution, in order to minimize
intergovernmental litigation, uniquely provides (section 41(3)) that ―all spheres
of government must exhaust every reasonable effort to resolve any disputes
through intergovernmental negotiation,‖ and the courts can refer a dispute back
to the governments if they consider that substantial efforts have not been made in
this regard (section 41(4)).
11.4 CONSITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCEDURES
In federations it is the constitution that defines the authority of each of the orders
of government so that neither level is constitutionally subordinate to the other. It
follows that the written constitution, at least in those respects defining and
affecting the relative powers of the orders of government, must not be
unilaterally amendable by just one order of government, since that would
potentially subordinate the other order of government to it. But providing for
special procedures to amend the constitution raises the issue of balancing the
requirements for both rigidity and flexibility in the operation of the constitution
in a federation. Some element of rigidity is required to safeguard the protections
built in for regional and minority interests in the constitutional structure of the
federation. This is necessary since a sense of regional or minority insecurity
generally tends to undermine federal cohesion. At the same time it is important
that as conditions change, the federation is sufficiently flexible to adapt. Too
rigid a constitutional structure may seriously weaken the ability of the federation
to respond to and accommodate changing internal economic, social and political
pressures and external international conditions. What is required, then, in the
constitutions of federations is a balance between rigidity and flexibility.
One common means of achieving such a balance has been to provide for
different amendment procedures for different parts of the constitution, with
amendment of those aspects of the constitution that establish its fundamental
federal character requiring the involvement of both orders of government, but the
procedure for amending other portions of the constitution being more flexible.
For instance, federal legislatures are often free to amend those institutions of
federal government that do not affect the representation or influence of the
constituent units, and constituent units are usually free to amend their own
constitutions within the limits permitted by the federal constitution. This is
typical of most federations, but particularly notable examples are the
constitutions of India and Canada, both with a variety of amendment processes
for different parts of the federal constitution. Following this pattern, when the
Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 (sections 38–49) added procedures for
amending the Canadian constitution, five different procedures were actually set
out for amending different parts of the constitution. These involve varying
degrees of rigidity: (1) a ―normal‖ procedure requiring the assent of Parliament
and two-thirds of the legislatures of the provinces containing at least half the
total population of all the provinces, (2) a procedure requiring the assent of
Parliament and the unanimous consent of the provincial legislatures for a select
number of constitutional provisions, (3) a bilateral procedure for amendment of
provisions relating to some but not all provinces, (4) amendments by Parliament
alone for provisions not affecting the provinces, and (5) amendments by
provincial legislatures of provincial constitutions.
In most federations, while the federal legislature is assigned the power to
initiate constitutional amendments, approval of amendments to those portions of
the constitution relating to the distribution of powers and the integrity of the
constituent units requires approval both in the federal legislature, often by
special majorities, and by a majority of the legislatures or of referendums in the
constituent units. Approval by both federal houses of legislature by special
majorities is required in the United States, India, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Ethiopia (in a joint sitting), Nigeria, Pakistan and Russia. In South
Africa a special majority of the National Assembly is required. A simple
majority in both federal houses is required in Switzerland and Canada. In the
unicameral federal legislatures of St. Kitts and Nevis and the United Arab
Emirates, but not in Venezuela, special majorities are also required.
In addition, in most federations such amendments require approval by a
special majority of constituent unit legislatures. Examples are the USA, Canada,
Nigeria and Russia. In some a simple majority of state legislatures is required, as
in India and Mexico. In Switzerland and Australia, instead of approval by
constituent legislatures, a referendum with a double majority consisting of an

overall majority and majorities in a majority of constituent units is required. A
referendum with a special majority both federally and in Nevis is required in St.
Kitts and Nevis for constitutional amendments. A simple federal majority in a
referendum is required in Venezuela and in some special cases in Russia. Major
amendments in Malaysia affecting the Borneo states require the concurrence of
those states. Some federations, such as Argentina, Comoros, Belau, and in
certain circumstances Russia, involve a special constituent assembly or
constitutional convention procedure. In the United States, a convention called on
the application of two thirds of the state legislatures is an alternative
constitutional amendment procedure, but has almost never been invoked.
Brazil, Germany, Austria, Malaysia (for most amendments), South Africa,
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates stand out as federations requiring only
special majorities in the federal legislature for constitutional amendments
affecting the federal character of the federation, thus leaving the constituent units
to depend on their representation in the federal second chamber to protect their
interests in the processes of constitutional amendment.
Some special points may be noted about constitutional amendment procedures
in the United States, Australia, Switzerland, Germany, South Africa, Austria,
Belgium and Spain. The amendment processes in both the United States and
Australia have in practice proved relatively rigid. In the United States, after the
first 10 amendments made in 1791, over the two centuries since there have been
only 17 further successful amendments to the constitution. In Australia over a
century, of 42 proposed amendments sent to referendum only 8 have achieved
the necessary double majorities for adoption. Switzerland in 1891 instituted two
different procedures: one for total revision of the constitution and one for partial
revision. Although attempted on a number of occasions, until 1999 the former
had never been successfully used. In 1999, after more than three decades of
efforts to undertake a comprehensive revision of the Swiss constitution, a total
revision was finally achieved. But to improve its chances of adoption this
revision involved few substantive changes and was characterized in the
referendum for approval as simply a modernization of the language of the
constitution. Even then the outcome was relatively close with only 59 percent
voting in favour and with majorities in 12 of the full cantons and 2 of the half
cantons out of the 20 full cantons and 6 half cantons. On the other hand, the
procedure for partial revision has proved remarkably flexible. It has been used
successfully more than 110 times since 1891. There is also in Switzerland an
initiative process for constitutional amendments which has frequently been
employed.
Germany requires only special majorities in the two federal houses for
constitutional amendments, but the Bundesrat is composed of instructed state
government delegates so that endorsement by a special majority in the Bundesrat
is equivalent to consent by that majority among the Land governments. In
practice this procedure has proved relatively flexible, producing 46 constitutional

amendments during the first 50 years, including a strengthening of the legislative
and financial roles of the federal government in 1967–69 and the reunification of
Germany in 1990.
In South Africa the level of approval in Parliament required varies with the
nature of the constitutional amendment, but the highest threshold requires
approval of three-quarters of the National Assembly and 6 of the 9 provinces in
the National Council of Provinces (composed of provincial delegates voting as a
provincial block).
In Austria, partial constitutional amendments require passage in the lower
house (Nationalrat) of the federal legislature by a two-thirds majority with at
least half of the membership of the chamber present, but one-third of the
membership of either federal house may demand a total revision of the
constitution requiring a referendum at which a majority of the population decides
the matter.
The Belgian procedure for constitutional amendment (article 131) involves
only a two-thirds majority in the federal parliament, and does not involve the
Regions or Communities. Most of the detailed provisions relating to its federal
features do, however, require a complex process which involves a special
election, special majorities in each federal house, and in many areas (relating to
amendments to the distribution of powers or to the Court d‘Arbitrage) special
legislation supported by a majority of each of the two major linguistic groups in
Parliament.
In Spain the initiating of constitutional amendments lies normally with the
government, Congress or Senate, although there is provision for an Autonomous
Community Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Ratification is by
a majority of three-fifths of the members of each federal chamber or, where the
chambers disagree, by an absolute majority in the Senate and a two-thirds vote in
the Congress. If one-tenth of the members of either house request it, this is
followed by a referendum. A total revision of the constitution or a partial
revision of certain specific portions of the constitution are more rigidly
entrenched, requiring a two-thirds majority in each federal chamber and
ratification by referendum.
Typically, most federations make a special attempt to protect the integrity of
their constituent units by provisions in the constitution requiring the consent of a
constituent unit for any modification of its boundaries. India is, however, an
exception to this pattern, as noted above in section 4.6 of chapter 4.
A few federal constitutions include provisions prohibiting the abolishing of
the federal system. Examples are Germany and Brazil. In a series of cases the
Indian Supreme Court has imposed a similar limit on the power of constitutional
amendment. In Australia there has been a division of opinion on whether the
formal constitutional amendment process could be used to abolish the federal
system.
As a result of the requirements described above, the constitutions of most

federations have in practice proved relatively rigid concerning the features
essential to their federal structures. Swiss and German experience points to the
value of incremental partial constitutional revisions as opposed to efforts at
comprehensive constitutional revision in achieving adaptation. The failure in
Canada of several efforts at comprehensive constitutional revision of its federal
features during the past forty years confirms this. The general rigidity of most
constitutions of federations has made other forms of adjustment to achieve
flexibility and adaptability all the more important. Consequently, there has been
a heavy reliance in virtually all federations upon other forms of adjustment,
including judicial review, financial transfer arrangements, and intergovernmental
collaboration and agreements.
11.5 THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL BILLS OF RIGHTS
Federations are essentially a territorial form of political organization. Thus, as a

means of safeguarding distinct groups or minorities, they do this best when those
groups and minorities are regionally concentrated in such a way that they may
achieve self-government as a majority within a regional unit government.
Examples are the many largely unilingual and uniconfessional cantons within
Switzerland, the predominantly French-speaking majority in Quebec within
Canada, the various linguistic majorities in the different Indian states following
the reorganization of the states along linguistic lines, the distinctive populations
of the Borneo states in Malaysia, the predominantly Flemish and French-
speaking Regions and Communities within Belgium, and the populations of the
historical Regions of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia within Spain. In
each of these cases, the primary safeguard for groups which are a minority
within the federation is through their control as a majority in a self-governing
regional unit having guaranteed constitutional powers within the federation.
But populations rarely in practice are distributed into neat watertight territorial
regions. In virtually all federations some intra-unit minorities within the regional
units of government have been unavoidable. Where significant intra-region
minorities have existed, three types of solutions have been attempted.
The first has been to redraw the boundaries of the constituent units to coincide
better with the location of the linguistic and ethnic groups. Examples are the
separation of the Jura from the canton of Bern to create a new canton in
Switzerland, the major reorganization of state boundaries in India in 1956 and
some subsequent further revisions, and Nigeria‘s evolution by stages from 3
regions to 36 states. While such revisions may produce more internally
homogeneous and coherent regional units of government, experience makes it
clear that in redrawing boundaries it is extremely difficult to avoid leaving some
intra-regional minorities.
A second approach has been to assign to the federal government a special

responsibility as guardian for intra-regional minorities against possible
oppression by a regional majority. The Canadian Constitution Act, 1867 included
such a provision (section 93(4) relating to minority education). In addition the
federal government was given exclusive legislative authority over Indians and
lands reserved for them (section 91(24)). In India the federal government has
been given a more extensive power to give direction to state governments
regarding the recognition within states of minority languages, the use within
states of minority languages for education, and the establishment within states of
regional legislative committees and development boards. Provision has also been
made for a special officer reporting to the Union government on the operation of
minority safeguards within the states. The Constitution of Malaya, 1957, which
preceded the later Malaysian one, gave to the federal government the power to
give directions to the state governments regarding Aboriginal Peoples and also
specified that changes in the reservation of land for Malays required not only a
special majority in the state assembly but approval by special majorities in the
federal parliament. In Pakistan, prior to its separation, a similar role to that in
India was assigned to the federal government in relation to scheduled areas and
tribes, and the authority to specify whether there would be joint or separate
electorates was left under the 1956 constitution to the National Assembly to
decide after consulting the provincial legislatures.
A third approach, and the most widely used one, has been to protect
intraregional minorities through embodying a set of fundamental citizens‘ rights
in the constitution. In the United States this was not the original intention of the
Bill of Rights, added to the constitution in the form of the first ten amendments
ratified in 1791. These were intended to limit federal government action and did
not initially apply to the states. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, following the civil war of 1861–65, however, led the Supreme Court in the
process of judicial review, beginning in 1897 and particularly after World War
II, to extend the protections of individual rights to apply also against state action.
As set out in the constitution of the United States, all such protected rights are
formulated as individual rights with no provision for group rights. Nevertheless,
the right to equality proved crucial for desegregation within states.
Most subsequent federations have set out in their constitutions more extensive
lists of rights protected from both federal and regional government action,
although Australia and Austria have been notable exceptions. In some, but not
all, of these federations special group rights have been included. Among the
federations that have included in their constitutions a list of fundamental rights
are Mexico (1917), Germany (1949), India (1950), Malaysia (1963), Spain
(1978), Canada (added in 1982), Belgium (1993), Russia (1993), Brazil (1994),
South Africa (1996), Nigeria (1999) and Switzerland (1999). Of these, the Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany lists numerous individual rights and
some collective rights relating to trade unions, employee associations and
university autonomy. On the other hand, the constitutions of such multi-ethnic

federations as India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Canada and Belgium all make provision
for some group rights.
As one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse federations, India‘s
constitution makes provision not only for fundamental individual rights but also
for the recognition of 18 regional languages and for the recognition and
protection of linguistic minorities (including their language and education),
Anglo-Indians, and scheduled castes and tribes. This includes provision for a
―special officer for linguistic minorities‖ and a national commission to
investigate and monitor all matters relating to the rights and safeguards of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The Malaysian constitution similarly lists individual rights and also makes
special provision for certain specified groups within the states. There are explicit
arrangements on behalf of the Malays for the reservation of land, for quotas for
permits and quotas for employment in the public services in the states. These
guarantees have been intended to protect the Malays, who (although the
majority) might otherwise, because of their relative education and economic
backwardness, suffer in competition with other racial groups. Similar provisions
extend to ―natives‖ in the Borneo states, and additional safeguards have been
provided for the variety of indigenous peoples in the Borneo states centring on
the continued use of native languages and the protection of the Muslim religion
and education.
In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms added by the Constitution Act,
1982 not only includes a wide range of individual rights but also identifies
minority language rights, the rights of Aboriginal Peoples, and rights related to
the ―preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage.‖
The Belgian constitution sets out fundamental individual rights and liberties
and also constitutional guarantees for linguistic minorities. As a result, there are
statutory guarantees concerning the use of language in administrative matters, in
legislation, in the armed forces, in education, in labour relations, in the bilingual
capital of Brussels and in the German-speaking Region.
The Spanish constitution of 1978 sets out a long list of civil, political and
socioeconomic rights, most of which are individual rights. In terms of ethno-
linguistic rights, the constitution specifies Castilian as the official language of
Spain (article 3(1)) but also states (article 3(2)) that there may be other official
languages in the respective Autonomous Communities, thus providing some
measure of de facto territoriality to the language regime in Spain. Consequently,
the Basque, Galician, Catalan and Valencian languages are co-official with
Spanish.
The Swiss constitution until its amendment in 1999 was mainly concerned
with the organization of government structures and with the distribution of
powers between the orders of government. Concerns over rights (individual or
collective) received very little treatment in the constitution. The constitution did
recognize three official and four national languages and did specify that the
Federal Tribunal must include representatives of all three official languages. But
while the constitution contained little about rights, there evolved a number of
unwritten principles relating to linguistic rights that came to take on considerable
significance.
Three basic principles came to prevail considering language rights.64 These were
(1) the absolute equality of the Swiss languages, (2) cantons have general
jurisdiction over language matters except where the constitution provides
specific limits in favour of the federal government, and (3) the principle of
―territoriality‖ prevails. This is interpreted to mean that ―any canton or linguistic
area is deemed to have the right to preserve and defend its own distinctive
linguistic character against all outside forces tending to alter or endanger it.‖ 65
The revised Swiss constitution adopted in 1999, while largely a modernization of
the language of the previous constitution, does, however, now include a
consolidation of fundamental rights (articles 6–32) as well as a statement of
social goals (article 33).
The Ethiopian federation has ethnicity as its underlying organizing principle,
clearly expressed in the preamble of the constitution. With more than 80
different ethnic groups and some 200 dialects, there are too many for each to
have its own constituent unit within the federation. Consequently, although
Amharic is the working language of the federal government, all Ethiopian
languages enjoy equal recognition under the constitution.
In Australia and Austria the constitutions do not elaborate a set of fundament
rights. Australia‘s constitution contains no general statement of individual or
group rights, although there are specific references relating to the acquisition of
property on just terms, trial by jury, freedom of movement between states,
freedom of religion, protection against discrimination on the basis of state
residence, and voting rights. Recent jurisprudence of the High Court indicating
its willingness to ―imply‖ certain rights from the provisions of the constitution
has been the subject of considerable debate.
The Austrian constitution includes no list of rights of any kind, but there is a
reference to minority group rights of the Croatian and Solvene minorities in
article 7 of the State Treaty of Austria, 1955 that was signed by the Allied
powers and the Austrian government at the time the occupation of Austria was
ended.
In a number of federations, including the United States and Canada, some
state or provincial constitutions also grant more individual rights or minorities
protections adding to those embodied in the federal constitution.
64
Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), p. 21.
65
Ibid., 122.
11.6 PROVISIONS FOR FORMAL SECESSION
Until recently, few federations anywhere have included in their constitution the
recognition of a unilateral right of secession or explicit provisions for a formal
process for secession. Indeed, the constitution of the former USSR was in its
time unique in this respect, being the only constitution of a federation then
making reference to a unilateral right of secession. Generally, three reasons have
been offered for not including a unilateral right of secession in the constitutions
of federations. First, it has been feared that the right to secede would weaken the
whole system by placing a weapon of political coercion in the hands of the
governments of the constituent units. Second, there has been anxiety that the
possibility of secession would introduce an element of uncertainty and lack of
confidence in the future, seriously handicapping efforts to build up federal
economic development and unity. Third, theorists have argued that it would
undermine the fundamental principle of coordinacy between levels of
government in a federation: if a regional government acting alone had the
unilateral right to leave the federation, or the federal government had the
unilateral right to expel a regional unit, then the other level of government would
be subordinated.
Consequently, secession has rarely been authorized by a federal constitution.
Indeed, many federations have emphasized the ―indissoluble‖ character of the
federation and where necessary have enforced this by federal military action, of
which the civil war in the United States in the 1860s was a prime example.
The current exceptions are the constitutions of Ethiopia, St. Kitts and Nevis,
and Sudan, and the result of judicial review in Canada. The Ethiopian
constitution with its emphasis on ethnic self-determination expressly provides
for the constitutional right of secession (article 39(4)) by a procedure that
includes as steps a two-thirds majority vote of the council of the respective state,
a referendum organized by the federal government, and a majority vote in the
referendum. To date, Eritrea in 1993 has been the only unit to gain de jure
independence though this process. The St. Kitts and Nevis constitution (section
113) permits the secession of Nevis if two-thirds of the elected members of the
Nevis Assembly approve such a bill and it is endorsed in a referendum on Nevis
by two-thirds of all the votes cast. In 1998 such a referendum was actually held,
but with 61.7 percent in favour it failed to achieve the necessary majority for
secession. The Sudan peace agreement of 2005 provided for the possibility after
a ten-year interim period of a referendum on the independence of Southern
Sudan.
In Canada, the constitution contains no explicit reference to a right of
secession, but in 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada admitted in a historic
reference case that provinces did have the right to secede from Canada, but not
unilaterally. It ruled that if the population of a province indicated by a clear
majority in response to a clear question that they wished to secede (the measures
of clarity were left unspecified), the rest of Canada would have an obligation to
negotiate the terms of secession, taking into account the interests of all parties,
including the province concerned, the rest of Canada and minorities within the
particular province, and also the fundamental organizing principles of the
constitution such as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of
law. Ultimately, secession would require that a constitutional amendment be
negotiated, and this would require the agreement of the federal government. The
judgement of the court left many issues open, but in attempting a balanced
judgment that would not inflame passions among either federalists or Quebec
secessionists, it did recognize the possibility within certain terms of the
possibility of a non-unilateral secession.
It must be noted that the fact that virtually all other federations except
Ethiopia, St. Kitts and Nevis and Sudan have made no explicit constitutional
provision for a right of unilateral secession does not mean, however, that there
have not been cases of actual unilateral succession or expulsion. It simply means
that when secession has been attempted or has occurred, the process has
invariably been extra-constitutional, expressing political pressures that have
broken the constitutional mould. Examples will be taken up in chapter 13 below.
Chapter 12
Degrees of Decentralization and
Non-centralization in Federations
12.1 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN MEASURING

DECENTRALIZATION AND RELATIVE AUTONOMY
The concepts of decentralization and non-centralization are closely related. Some

authors have preferred to use the term ―non-centralization‖ to ―decentralization‖
in relation to federations on the grounds that the latter implies a hierarchy with
power flowing from the top or centre as exemplified by decentralization within
unitary political systems, whereas the former infers a constitutionally structured
dispersion of power and therefore better represents the character of a
federation.66Nevertheless, since the term ―decentralization‖ is in such widespread
public use in referring to federations, the terms will be used interchangeably
here.
While in ordinary language we may loosely compare differing degrees of
decentralization within federations, the comparative measurement of
decentralization or non-centralization is actually a complex issue. There are at
least four problems in discussing the degree of decentralization (or
centralization) within a political system: first, how to define what the concept of
decentralization actually refers to; second, how to measure it; third, how to relate
different indices of measurement to each other; and fourth, how to compare such
measurements across countries or over time.
To begin with we must distinguish between decentralization of jurisdiction,
i.e., the responsibilities exercised by each level of government, and
decentralization of decision making at the federal level, i.e., the degree to which
the constituent units play a significant role in decision making at the federal
level. The former, decentralization of jurisdiction, itself has two aspects to be
distinguished: the scope of jurisdiction exercised by each level of government,
and the degree of autonomy or freedom from control by other levels of
66
Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1987), pp. 34–6.
Degrees of Decentr alization and Non-centralization 183
government with which a particular government performs the tasks assigned to

it. For example, in one sense Japan (a decentralized unitary state) is highly
decentralized in terms of the administrative tasks performed by the prefectures
and the local authorities, but in another sense it is relatively centralized in terms
of the controls the central government exercises over these subordinate levels of
government. Some federations allocate fewer responsibilities to their constituent
states or provinces, but leave them with greater freedom and autonomy over the
exercise of those responsibilities.
A major problem in any comparative assessment is that no single quantifiable
index can adequately measure the scope of effective jurisdictional
decentralization and the degree of autonomy of decentralized decision making
within a political system. Among the multiple indices (although not all of equal
weight) that need to be considered in any such assessment are legislative and
administrative decentralization, financial decentralization, decentralization to
non-governmental agencies, constitutional limitations, and the character of
federal decision making.67Each of these indices is discussed below.
LEGISLATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
• The formal allocation by the constitution of legislative powers to each level

of government gives an indication of the scope of decentralized jurisdiction.
In comparing such allocations in different federations, however, it should be
noted that the relative lengths of the lists of heads of federal or state powers
do not by themselves give a full picture, because individual heads of power
may vary in relative significance. Furthermore, account must be taken of the
degree to which in practice constitutionally assigned powers are actually
fully or only partially exercised by the governments to which they are
assigned. Nevertheless, the constitutional allocation of legislative
jurisdiction is one major indicator of the scope of jurisdictional
decentralization.
• Account must be taken also of the degree of autonomy with which a
government may exercise the legislative jurisdiction assigned to it by the
constitution. In this respect the extent of exclusive jurisdiction and the
extent of concurrent or shared responsibilities set out in the constitution is
significant.
• Another aspect of the autonomy of legislative decentralization is the extent
to which constituent units are bound by international treaties negotiated by
the federal government in areas that normally come under the jurisdiction of
the constituent units. In some federations international treaties may create a
See, for instance, L. Thorlaksen, ―Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and

67
Representation in Six Federations,‖ West European Politics, 26:2 (2003): 1–22.

limitation on state autonomy (e.g., USA and Australia), but in others such
federal treaties in areas normally under state jurisdiction require
implementing state or provincial legislation or the consent of the provincial
or state government (e.g., Canada, Germany and Austria) or non-binding
consultation of state governments (e.g., India and Malaysia). The Belgian
federation goes the farthest in giving constituent units specific powers to
negotiate international treaties in areas of their own competence.
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
• The allocation of administration responsibilities assigned by the constitution

or developed through delegation or intergovernmental agreements is another
relevant index of the scope of jurisdictional decentralization. While in many
federations the constitutional allocation of administrative responsibilities
broadly corresponds to the constitutional legislative jurisdiction, there are
many exceptions to this. Indeed, in most European federations their
constitutions require a substantial portion of federal laws to be administered
by the states. Thus, in these cases these federations are more decentralized
administratively than legislatively. The same arrangement has also been
applied in the European Union.
• The relative sizes of the public services of each level of government is
another indicator of the scope of decentralization of decision making,
particularly in relation to administrative responsibilities, although it
provides little indication of the degrees of autonomy.
• In assessing the degree of autonomy in the exercise of administrative
jurisdiction, one needs to take account of the extent to which one level of
government may be dependent on another for implementing its policies
(especially where a federal government is dependent upon constituent
governments for this) and the degree to which the level of government that
has legislative responsibilities may, as in Germany, give directions to the
government that is administering its legislation. It is significant, for
example, that in Switzerland, however, the cantons have extensive
autonomy in how they implement federal laws for which the constitution
has given them administrative responsibility, thus emphasizing the
decentralized character of that federation. In other federations, where
administration of federal laws is delegated by the choice of the federal
government rather than by constitutional requirement, the terms of the
arrangement (including financial terms) and the directives of the federal
government may limit the degree of autonomy with which the delegated
administration is performed.
FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION
• Federal government revenues before transfers as a percentage of all

government revenues (federal-provincial-local) provide one measure of the
scope of financial centralization or decentralization. Since this relates to
own-source revenues directly raised by each level of government and
excludes transfers, it also provides a measure of the degree of their financial
autonomy. Table 9 in chapter 6 above provides a comparative tabulation of
federations in descending order, from the more centralized to the more
decentralized in this respect.
• Federal government expenditures after transfers as a percentage of all
government expenditures (federal-provincial-local) give a measure of the
scope of centralization or decentralization of expenditure and of the
administration of programs and delivery of services. Since these include
expenditures funded by transfers, however, they are not a good indicator of
the degree of financial autonomy. Furthermore, the cost of different
responsibilities does not by itself indicate their importance. Those functions
involving delivery of services are generally more expensive than those that
are primarily regulatory. Nevertheless, table 10 in chapter 6, which provides
a comparative tabulation of expenditures after transfers, gives another
measure of relative decentralization.
• The size and character (whether conditional grants, unconditional grants or
shares of federal taxes) of transfers from one level of government to another
gives some indication of the degree of dependency or autonomy with which
levels of government perform their responsibilities. Table 11 in chapter 6
provides a comparative tabulation indicating intergovernmental transfers as
a percentage of provincial or state revenue, and tables 12 and 13 indicate the
significance of conditional and unconditional transfers affecting the degree
of dependence or autonomy in different federations.
• The extent to which one level of government may and actually does use its
spending power to act or influence activities in areas of responsibility
constitutionally assigned to other levels of government must also be taken
into account in assessing both the scope and the degree of autonomy
applying to decentralization within a particular political system.
• Access of constituent units to public borrowing is another indicator of the
degree of financial autonomy. Provided their governments are not mired in
debt, the autonomy of constituent units is enhanced when they have direct
and unhindered access to borrowed funds. Federations differ widely in
terms of the formal or practical ability of constituent units to borrow. In
some federations (e.g., Austria, India and Malaysia) the federal constitution
limits foreign borrowing to the federal government. In the United States
there are balanced budget requirements in many states. In Australia the
constitutionally established intergovernmental Loan Council is a
coordinating body with binding authority upon both levels of government.
Such cases contrast with other federations, including Canada, where

constituent units have substantial and unhindered access to both domestic
and international borrowing.
UNFUNDED MANDATES
In some federations, such as the United States, ―unfunded mandates‖ may

introduce an element of federal government control. These are federal actions
requiring state and local government activity that are not accompanied by
funding to cover the costs of the activity. This has been described as leading to
the emergence of ―fend-for-yourself federalism‖ in the United States. 68 The
increase of this practice since 1945, coupled with the increase in federal pre-
emption of state and local government authority, federal laws and actions pre-
empting the ability of state and local governments to take action or generate
policies on their own, and reductions in federal aid and support levels has
produced a common assessment of the federal role in relation to states and local
governments as ―less money and more regulations‖.
DECENTRALIZATION TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
• The scope and extent of decentralization to non-governmental agencies as

opposed to other levels of government is also relevant in judging the
character and scope of decentralization within a political system.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
• Constitutional prohibitions (e.g., constitutional stipulations of individual or

collective rights such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
prohibiting certain activities by any level of government must also be taken
into account in measuring the extent of non-centralization.
• In some federations the extent of the autonomy of both levels of government
(e.g., Switzerland) or of the states (e.g., some states in the USA) may be
subject to the checks and balances of citizen-initiated referendums and
initiatives.
THE CHARACTER OF FEDERAL DECISION MAKING
Christopher Hoene, ―Unfunded Mandates in the U.S. and fend-for-yourself

68
federalism,‖ Federations 6:1 (February/March2007):31-2.

• In addition to the above indicators that provide various measures of

decentralization and non-centralization in terms of the scope and autonomy
of jurisdiction, the extent to which federal decision making requires
involvement of other levels of government in a co-decision-making process
(e.g., the role federal second chambers such as the German Bundersrat) is
another measure of the degree to which policy making is decentralized. A
related factor here too is the political party structure and the degree to which
federal parties are distinct from or dependent upon provincial or state party
structures, or control provincial or state party organizations.
The assessment of the degree of decentralization within a political system is
further complicated by difficulties of quantification when measuring powers,
degrees of dependency or autonomy, relative roles in areas of overlap and
interdependence, or influence upon other governments. In many federations
where the distribution of responsibilities among provincial or state governments
is not uniform, one needs also to take account of differences (i.e., asymmetry) in
the powers assigned or exercised by different constituent units and in the
resources and expenditures available to them noted in chapter 8 above.
Thus, it is clear that attempting to measure with any precision the degree of
decentralization (or centralization) within political systems is complicated and
difficult and at the very least requires reference to multiple indices with some
effort to weigh their relative importance.
12.2 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
Given the complex issues identified in the preceding section, a comparative

assessment of the degree of decentralization in different federations would
require intensive and extensive research in terms of the various indices noted
above. Much of this research has yet to be undertaken by comparative scholars.
Nonetheless, it is possible to make two sets of broad objective generalizations.
First, as noted in section 5.4 in chapter 5 above, the particular areas of
legislative jurisdiction that are centralized or decentralized vary from federation
to federation in order to meet the particular economic, demographic and social
conditions of each federation. Thus, to take Canada as one example, it is less
decentralized than Switzerland in relation to language policy and culture and to
citizenship, but it is more decentralized in other areas. Canada is less
decentralized than Germany regarding banking and broadcasting but more
decentralized in a large number of other areas. In comparison with the United
States, Canada is less decentralized regarding banking and criminal law but more
decentralized in many other areas. Also, while Canada is more decentralized
than most federations in many areas of jurisdiction, on the other hand, when it
comes to the participation of its provincial governments in federal policy
making, there is less constitutional provision for this than in most other
federations. The Canadian example is just one illustration of the variations in the
areas and forms of decentralization that has existed among federations.
The second broad generalization is that, while it is difficult to arrive at a
ranking of federations in terms of overall decentralization because of the
different indices that have to be taken into account (as described in section 12.1
above), nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at some general assessments.
For this purpose the tables in chapter 6 (tables 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) provide a
broad basis, although account must also be taken of the other criteria noted in
section 12.1 above. Table 10, which compares federal-state-local expenditures
(after transfers), gives a general indication of the relative cost of the functions
performed by each order of government in the various federations. There, the
federations in descending order of centralization would rank Malaysia as highly
centralized, Brazil, Nigeria, Australia, Mexico, Austria, Spain, South Africa,
Russia, the United States and, India in the middle range, and Belgium, Germany,
Canada and Switzerland as the most decentralized.
This ranking has to be moderated when a number of other factors are
considered. Germany, for instance, ranks where it does in that table because of
the extensive administrative decentralization that affects the expenditure levels,
but this indicator does not reflect sufficiently the high degree of legislative
centralization. Furthermore, table 9 showing the distribution of federal-state-
local revenues before transfers indicates that in terms of taxing powers, as
contrasted with expenditure, federal governments are somewhat more dominant
in comparative terms in Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico, Russia, Australia,
Germany and India. Furthermore, tables 11, 12 and 13 indicate the differing
degrees to which constituent units are dependent upon transfers from their
federal governments and particularly upon conditional transfers. Taken together,
the financial tables point to Canada and Switzerland as clearly the most
decentralized federations.
When not only the financial figures but all the various criteria outlined in
section 12.1 above are taken into account, we may broadly rank federations in
practice on a continuum of descending centralization as follows: most highly
centralized are Venezuela, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Argentina, Mexico and
Russia; relatively centralized are Brazil, Austria and Australia; moderately
centralized are Germany, Spain, the USA and India; the most decentralized are
Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. Of the four micro-federations, Comoros and
Belau rank with the most highly centralized federations, and Micronesia and St.
Kitts and Nevis with the relatively centralized federations.
12.3 MINIMUM FEDERAL POWERS

The preceding analysis in this study has indicated that there is an enormous
variation among federations in terms of the degree of centralization or
decentralization regarding both particular functions and in general. This raises
the question whether experience elsewhere suggests that there is a minimum list
of federal powers required if a federation is to be effective over the long term.
In addressing this question it should be noted that the essence of federal
political systems is to reconcile diversity and unity within a single political
system by assigning sovereignty over certain matters to the constituent provinces
and sovereignty over other matters to the federal government, with each level of
government responsible directly to its electorate. Any consideration of devolving
additional powers to states or provinces must, therefore, also take account of
what powers may be required for the federal government to fulfill its role
effectively for the federation as a whole. Decentralization and devolution of
powers that may be desirable to accommodate linguistic, cultural, historical and
economic diversity or to enhance administrative efficiency will not by
themselves hold a federation together. All federations need also a central focus
of loyalty able to deal effectively with matters of common interest if the
federation is to hold the loyalty of its citizens over the long term.
Experience in other federations suggests that although there have been many
variations in the terms of the precise formulation, federal governments have
generally been assigned the major responsibility for defence, international
relations, currency and debt, and equalization, and the primary (although not
exclusive) responsibility for management of the economy and the economic
union.
Provinces or states have usually been given exclusive or major responsibility
for education, health, natural resources, municipal affairs and social policy.
Areas such as agriculture, environment, immigrant, language and culture have
often been shared through some form of concurrency, legislative delegation or
intergovernmental agreements. However, in some multicultural or multinational
federations (e.g., Switzerland and Belgium) constituent governments have been
given a primary responsibility for their own language policy and culture.
In addition, as noted in chapter 8, in a number of federations de facto and even
de jure asymmetry in the powers of particular constituent units have affected the
balance (e.g., Belgium, Malaysia, India, Spain and Canada).
Chapter 13
The Pathology of Federations
13.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PATHOLOGY OF FEDERATIONS
Much of the comparative literature on federal systems and federations has

concentrated on their establishment and operation. Furthermore, it is true that
many federations continue to be remarkably effective and that many of the
longeststanding constitutional systems anywhere in the world today are
federations still operating basically under their original constitutions (e.g.,
United States 1789 (despite the civil war 1861–65), Switzerland 1848, Canada
1867 and Australia 1901).69 A number of authors have attributed the prosperity,
stability and longevity of such federations to the effectiveness of federation as a
form of political organization.70
But the period since 1945 has seen not only the proliferation of federal
systems and particularly federations, but also the failure of some of them.
Significant examples have been the disintegration of federations in the West
Indies (1962), Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963), Yugoslavia (1991), and the
USSR (1991); the splitting of Pakistan (1971), Czechoslovakia (1992) and
Serbia and Montenegro (2006); the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia
(1965); and the civil war in Nigeria (1967–70) followed by alternating civilian
and military rule. In any comparative review, account must therefore be taken of
these failures, of other cases of serious stress in federations that have not failed,
and of the literature examining the conditions and processes leading to the
breakdown of federations where this has occurred.71 An important point to note
69
The new Swiss constitutions of 1874 and 1999, although total revisions, preserved
the basic character of the federation established in 1848. In Canada, the Constitution Act,
1982 added to but did not replace the Constitution Act, 1867.
70
J.R. Pennock, ―Federal and Unitary Government: Disharmony and Reliability,‖
Behavioral Science, 4:2 (1959): 147–57; Martin Landau, ―Federalism, Redundancy and
System Reliability,‖ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 3:2 (1973): 173–95.
71
See, for instance, Thomas Franck, Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the
Requisites for a Successful Federation (New York: New York University Press, 1966);
Ronald L. Watts, ―The Survival and Disintegration of Federations,‖ in R. Simeon, ed.,
The Pathology of Federations 191
at the outset of any consideration of the pathology of federal systems is that the
problems faced by them have arisen not so much because of the adoption of
federation as a form of government but from the particular variant or variation of
federal arrangements that was adopted. It should also be noted that it is not so
much because they are federations that countries have been difficult to govern
but because they were difficult to govern in the first place that they adopted
federation as a form of government.
13.2 SOURCES OF STRESS
There are four factors that have contributed to stress within federations: (1) sharp
internal social divisions, (2) particular types of institutional or structural
arrangements, (3) particular strategies adopted to combat disintegration, and (4)
political processes that have polarized internal divisions.
THE DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTER OF INTERNAL SOCIAL DIVISIONS
Regional divergences of political outlook and interests are typical of all

federations; that is usually why they adopted ―federation‖ as a solution in the
first place. But a number of factors may sharpen such differences. Among the
sharpest divisive forces have been language, religion, social structure, cultural
tradition and race. Where several of these have operated simultaneously to
reinforce each other, as for instance in India, Malaysia, and particularly in
Pakistan before its separation, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Yugoslavia and
the USSR, the internal cleavages have been accentuated. By contrast, in
Switzerland linguistic, religious and economic differences among the cantons
have tended to cut across each other, moderating the sharpness of internal
differences. Other factors that have contributed to the sharpness of internal
cleavages have been variations in the degree of economic development, and
regional disparities in wealth accentuating regional resentment, especially when
these have further reinforced linguistic, cultural and social differences among
regions. On the other hand, in some instances moderating factors that have
emphasized the importance of maintaining unity have been the need for security
from external threats (an important motivation in both Swiss and Canadian
history but in both cases now much diminished in relative influence), and the
significance of interregional trade and of the need for international leverage
through united action in trade and investment negotiations and relations.
Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s Press, 1977), pp.42–60; Ursula K. Hicks,
Federalism: Failure and Success: A Comparative Study (London: Macmillan, 1978);
Robert A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 1995), chapters 10 and 11.
THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES
Whether the stresses within a federation can be accommodated and resolved

depends not only upon the strength and configuration of the internal divisions
within the society in question but also upon the institutional structure of the
federation. The way these institutions have channelled the activities of the
electorate, political parties, organized interest groups, bureaucracies, and
informal elites has contributed to the moderation or accentuation of political
conflict. The function of federations is not to eliminate internal differences but
rather to preserve regional identities within a united framework. Their function,
therefore, is not to eliminate conflict but to manage it in such a way that regional
differences are accommodated. But how well this is done has in practice
depended not just on the adoption of a federal form of government but often
upon the particular form of the institutions adopted within the federation.
Four institutional factors have been particularly critical. First, extreme
disparity in the population, size and wealth of the constituent units has invariably
contributed to stress, even leading in some cases to reorganization of the
boundaries of the regional units, as in India and Nigeria. Almost invariably a
source of extreme instability has been the situation within a federation where one
regional unit has dominated through having a majority of the population.
Examples are Prussia within the German confederation and subsequent
federation up to the 1930s, Jamaica within the abortive West Indies Federation
1958–62, Northern Nigeria prior to the Nigerian civil war, East Pakistan prior to
its secession, Russia prior to the breakup of the USSR in 1991, the Czech
Republic within Czechoslovakia prior to its split in 1992, and Serbia with 92
percent of the population of Serbia and Montenegro. This is a continuing
problem in the Belgian federation, where the Flemish Community represents
59.7 percent of the federal population, and in Pakistan under the 1973
constitution where the province of Punjab contains 55.6 percent of the total
federal population.
Second, while regional distinctiveness is a basic factor leading to the adoption
of federation as a form of government, the ability of the federal institutions to
generate some sense of positive consensus is vital to their continued operation.
Particularly critical is how regional groups are represented in the federal
legislature, executive, civil service, political parties and life of the capital city.
Where particular regional groups have had inadequate representation and
influence in the federal institutions, the resulting alienation has directed itself
into separatist movements, as in the cases of the East Pakistanis, the Singapore
Chinese, the Jamaicans in the West Indies Federation, and the black Africans of
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. A particularly dangerous situation is where
parties operating at the federal level have become primarily regional in their
focus so that there are no federal political parties serving as effective
interregional bridges. This was a major factor in the instability within Pakistan
prior to its split in 1971, in Nigeria prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1967, in
the ultimate breakdown of the Yugoslavian federation in 1991, and in
Czechoslovakia in the period before it was divided in 1992. In this respect one of
the most ominous signs within the current Belgian federation is the regional
character of all its political parties operating at the federal level and the
difficulties of negotiating federal coalitions of these parties to bridge the
divisions. Indeed, this situation reached crisis proportions following the 2007
elections. The recent signs of a similar trend in Canada in terms of the federal
opposition parties and the difficulty of obtaining majority federal governments is
therefore something of a danger signal.
Third, in most multicultural federations it has proved necessary to recognize
as official the languages of major minority groups and to provide constitutional
or political guarantees of individual and group rights against discrimination.
Where the language of a major regional group has been denied recognition as a
federal language, extreme bitterness and tension has resulted. Pakistan, Nigeria,
India and Malaysia have provided examples of the intensity of resentment and
pressure that can be aroused.
Fourth, where the particular distribution of powers has failed to reflect
accurately the aspirations for unity and regional autonomy in a given society,
there have been pressures for a shift in the balance of powers or, in more extreme
cases, even for abandoning the federal system, as in overcentralized Pakistan or
the ineffectual West Indies Federation. It has been to avoid this extreme result
that some federations, such as Malaysia, have instituted and maintained a
constitutional asymmetry in the distribution of powers.
Fifth is the special case of two-unit federations dealt with below in section 13.3.
STRATEGIES ADOPTED TO COMBAT DISINTEGRATION
Once stress within a federation has reached a certain level, the issue of the
appropriate strategy to combat it usually comes to the fore. Broadly speaking, in
this sort of situation one of two alternative strategies has been attempted. One is
to reinforce the strength and power of the federal government in order to resist
disintegration and to hold the federation together. Such a strategy, which in
effect attempted to impose unity, clearly failed in Pakistan, Nigeria and Malaysia
(in relation to Singapore). Indeed, where assimilationist or repressive measures
have been adopted, these have usually exacerbated the situation and have often
led to violence. An alternative strategy is to attempt to accommodate regional
pressures by emphasizing further devolution. Such a strategy when carried out
without any attempt to generate at the same time a focus of loyalty to the
federation has also generally failed, as exemplified by the disintegration of the
West Indies Federation, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and
Czechoslovakia. It would appear from these examples that where the sole focus
has been exclusively on one or other of these two strategies this has failed. Other
cases where secession movements have been successfully countered suggest that
what is required is a strategy that combines both efforts to strengthen a federal
focus of loyalty and an accommodation of the major concerns of disaffected
regional groups. Also important is developing a culture of tolerance and
accommodation that is reinforced by policies and symbols that give the different
groups within the federation a sense of belonging. Federations such as
Switzerland, Canada and India have found that embracing diversity as a federal
value has enhanced unity. Yet a further factor has been the importance of
inspired political leadership such as that of Ghandi and Nehru in India and
Mandela in South Africa.
POLARIZING POLITICAL PROCESSES
The preceding survey indicates that there is no single condition, institutional

arrangement or strategy that has by itself generated stress or led to all the
examples of disintegration in federations. In each case, crises have been the
product of a cumulative combination of factors. What does appear to be common
is the resulting development of processes of a polarizing character. Where
different kinds of social cleavages have reinforced each other, where federal
institutions have been unable to moderate or have even exacerbated these
cleavages, where political strategies have involved an emphasis upon either
federal unity at the expense of regional accommodation or regional
accommodation at the expense of federal unity, and where negotiations have
repeatedly failed to produce solutions, there has usually resulted a decline in the
support for compromise and a cumulative political polarization within the
federation. In such situations, political conflict has usually taken on the character
of a contest with very high stakes in which each side becomes convinced that
only one side can win — and that at the expense of the other. Once such a
situation of emotional confrontation and mounting frenzy has developed, it has
often taken only a relatively insignificant incident to trigger an act of unilateral
secession or expulsion, resulting in civil war or disintegration of the federation.
It is worth noting that the character of separatist movements may affect the
nature of the polarizing process. Where such movements have resorted to
violence or terrorist activities as in Spain, Sudan or Sri Lanka, the resulting
reaction to this has often increased the polarization and resistance to separation.
On the other hand, where separatist movements have respected the democratic
rules of the game, as in Canada and Belgium, federations have survived long
periods even with separatist parties in power within constituent units, in part
because they have accepted that they had no democratic mandate to separate.
13.3 THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TWO-UNIT FEDERATIONS
A set of cases worthy of special examination is that of federal systems and

federations composed of only two constituent units.
The experience of bipolar or dyadic federal systems is not encouraging.

Pakistan prior to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, Czechoslovakia prior to
its segregation in 1992 and Serbia and Montenegro prior to its splitting in 2006
have provided examples of the difficulties that arise in bipolar federations.
Another relevant case was the bipolar racial and ideological Malaysia-Singapore
relationship within the Malaysian federation which culminated in Singapore‘s
expulsion after only two years. All four of these cases resulted in the end in the
splitting of these federations. Another example of the difficulties arising in a
federation composed of only two constituent units is St. Kitts and Nevis. While it
continues to survive as a federation, it has experienced severe pressures in Nevis
for secession. Indeed, the particular difficulties of dyadic federations and unions
have generally been recognized. 72 Although constitutionally the Belgian
federation consists of six units — three Communities and three Regions — the
fundamentally bipolar Flemish-French character of its federal politics has been a
source of severe political tensions. To date, however, a major factor discouraging
separation has been the existence of Brussels with its French-speaking majority,
as the capital within Flanders.
The problem within two-unit federations usually has been that insistence upon
parity in all matters between the two units has tended to produce impasses and
deadlocks. This is because there is no opportunity for shifting alliances and
coalitions among the constituent units, which is one of the ways in which multi-
unit federations are able to resolve issues. Furthermore, since invariably one of
the two units is less populous than the other (e.g., West Pakistan, Slovakia and
Montenegro) that unit has usually been particularly conscious of the continuous
need to insist upon equality of influence in federal policy making, while the
larger unit (and in the case of Czechoslovakia, the wealthier unit) has developed
a sense of grievance over the constraints imposed upon it in order to
accommodate the smaller unit. The resulting cumulatively intensifying bipolarity
in these examples led ultimately to their terminal instability. Such tendencies
would appear likely to be accentuated in a two-unit confederation, since it is a
normal characteristic of confederations that each member unit possesses a veto
on all major policy decisions in the confederation. The existence of mutual
vetoes where there are only two units is a recipe for repeated impasses and
deadlocks contributing to cumulatively sharpening frustrations. Thus, the
application of the European Union Maastricht model, which despite its
difficulties works for a confederation of 27 member states, is likely to be much
less workable when applied to a confederation of two units.73
72
See, for instance, Ivo Duchacek, ―Dyadic Federations and Confederations,‖ Publius:
The Journal of Federalism, 18:2 (1998): 5–31.
73
Peter M. Leslie, The Maastricht Model: The Canadian Perspective on the European
Union (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1996).
The case of three-unit federations is almost as problematic as that of two-unit

federations, especially where one of the three units possesses a majority of the
federal population. This was the case in the Nigerian federation of the 1950s and
early 1960s which ultimately broke down in a civil war. Subsequently, Nigeria
has been divided into a progressively larger number of units, now 36. Where
there are only three constituent units almost invariably there has developed a
feeling on the part of one of the units that the other two have allied to impose
their interests, and this has had a corrosive impact upon relations within the
federation. Other cases where this has been apparent are the disintegration of the
short-lived threeunit federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–63) and the
difficulties that arose when East African political leaders attempted to establish a
three-unit federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (before it became
Tanzania) in 1963–64. Comoros, a federation of three islands, has in recent years
experienced considerable tensions. As a general rule it would appear that
federations composed of only two or three constituent units are likely to
experience terminal instability.
13.4 PROCESSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DISINTEGRATION
While the constitutions of nearly all federation have explicitly or implicitly

prohibited unilateral secession by member units (see section 11.6 in chapter 11),
these constitutional restrictions have seldom prevented sufficiently alienated
regional groups from taking matters into their own hands and acting
extraconstitutionally. Once a regional unit has declared its own unilateral
secession, a federal government is faced with the dilemma whether to enforce
the constitution of the federation upon the unwilling region or simply to accept
the secession as a political fact even if unconstitutional. In the past, most
independent (i.e., non-colonial) federations have chosen the former course,
fearing that once the secession of one member unit is accepted there will be
nothing to prevent other member units from separating whenever they wish or at
least using such a threat as a lever against the federal government. Consequently,
in a number of cases the result of a unilateral declaration of secession has been a
civil war in which the federal government (or in the case of Switzerland, the then
confederal government) has imposed continued federation either successfully,
e.g., United States (1861–65), Switzerland (1847) and Nigeria (1967–70), or
unsuccessfully,
e.g., Pakistan (1971) and Yugoslavia (1991–95). The breakup of the USSR also
led to some incidences of violence, and within the successor Russian federation
bitter fighting in Chechnya followed an attempt at secession. One interesting
case that did not involve violence was that of Western Australia which,
dissatisfied with its place in the federation, in 1933 voted by a majority in a
referendum to secede from the Australian federation. The Australian federal
government, however, stood firm and refused to implement the separation of

Western Australia (as did the United Kingdom Parliament when subsequently
petitioned by the state of Western Australia to permit secession). The federal
government instead responded to the concerns and grievances of Western
Australia by establishing a system of special financial assistance to claimant
states based on advice by a Commonwealth Grants Commission instituted in
1933.
While secessions have usually been contested and have often led to violent
conflict, there have been some cases of peaceful secession from
federations.74Two of these, which led ultimately to the disintegration of the West
Indies Federation (1962) and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963),
occurred in colonial federations. In these cases it was the imperial government in
the United Kingdom that not only accepted secession but held the ring to ensure
that there was no violence. Among independent federations the only cases of
peaceful separation during the past half-century have been in Malaysia,
Czechoslovakia, and Serbia and Montenegro. The first of these in 1965 was not
really a case of unilateral secession but of unilateral expulsion by the federal
government reacting to the troublesome political dynamics that had followed
Singapore‘s inclusion in the Malaysian federation two years earlier. The
Czechoslovakian separation, which came into effect on 1 January 1993, occurred
largely because it was the climax of a gradual but accelerating process of
polarization in which the regionally based political parties within each of the two
units found it politically profitable to engage in mutual antagonism, conflict and
disagreement, and ultimately to effect the breakup of the federation without an
election or referendum on the issue.75The splitting of Serbia and Montenegro
without violence in 2006 was in part facilitated by the hopes held out by the
European Union for their eventual individual membership in the EU.
Elsewhere, the general experience has been that once the separation of one
unit has been conceded, other regional units have raised similar demands which
have led to further disintegration. This was the pattern both in the West Indies
and in Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Moreover, resentments aroused at the time of
separation or dissolution have tended to persist. They have usually discouraged,
for a considerable subsequent period, creation of a looser form of association
between the separating territories, because whenever secession has occurred it
has inevitably been accompanied by sharp political controversies that were not
easily forgotten. Furthermore, the unscrambling of federations has made
necessary the allocation of assets and liabilities among successor states, and
rarely has this been achieved without adding further to the resentments felt by
74
For an analysis of these cases in detail, see R.A. Young, The Secession of Quebec,
chapters 10 and 11; and R.A. Young, TheBreakup of Czechoslovakia, (Kingston: Institute
of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, Research Paper no. 32, 1994).
75
Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, p. 145.
one or both sides. In this respect the least negative examples have been the
expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia and the separation of Czechoslovakia. Yet
in both cases, despite professions about the desirability of continued economic
linkages after separation, in practice for a considerable subsequent period,
economic ties fell far below expectations. Generally it is clear that the separation
of units from federations, even in the few cases where it has been managed
peacefully, has exacted a high price in economic costs, diplomatic and defensive
ineffectiveness, and lasting bitterness between the groups involved.
In some countries where there has been pressure for devolution, the
establishment of a federation has been resisted for fear that it would simply be
the first step towards ultimate secession, a fear that has often been expressed
recently in both the United Kingdom and Sri Lanka. It should be noted, however,
that while the risk of secession has often been associated with federations,
historically separatist movements have occurred in many unitary countries as
well. Among notable examples have been the separation of Ireland from the
United Kingdom early in the twentieth century, the Basque insurgency under
Franco in Spain, the lengthy civil wars in South Sudan, and the current
insurgency of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Where societies contain distinctive
diverse groups, imposing unity within a unitary system has, if anything, proved
less successful than a federal solution.
13.5 POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Most federations have emerged peacefully from a period of negotiations aimed

at creating a federation involving the aggregation of separate units or the
devolution of autonomous powers to constituent units. That has not universally
been the case, however. Some federations have been created in post-conflict
situations or have survived periods of internal conflict. Among the mature
federations, Switzerland, India and the United States serve as examples.
Switzerland became a federation after the preceding confederation erupted in the
brief Sonderbund civil war of 1847, but the very brevity of that conflict and the
compromises between the war‘s winners and losers that were embodied in the
new federal constitution of 1848 moderated the intensity of the feelings aroused
by the civil war. The independence of India in 1947 occurred under emergency
conditions marked by the violence of partition with Pakistan and the need for
rapid integration of the princely states, but the drafting of the new federal
constitution by the Constituent Assembly, 1947– 49, occurred in a period that
was not marked by internal strife. The adoption of a federal constitution by the
United States took place a full decade after the War of Independence, but more
than seventy years later the USA did experience a prolonged and bitter civil war,
1861–65. Although the federal military forces ultimately triumphed, the war and
the period of reconstruction imposed on the South, 1865– 76, left a sense of
southern alienation that took a long time to heal. Among more recent emergent
federations, a number have been created or re-established after periods of civil
war: Mexico in 1917, Argentina and Venezuela on a number of occasions,
Nigeria 1967–70, and Ethiopia 1991 and 1998–2000. Typically, such conflicts
have left these societies deeply divided, and it has taken a considerable period
for reconciliation to be achieved.
In recent years there have been a number of attempts to resolve conflicts by
creating a federation.76 Notable examples have been Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sudan, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, proposals
have been advanced for federal solutions in Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Philippines
as a way of ending insurgencies. These efforts have all been fraught with
difficulties because of the absence of the necessary conditions for establishing an
effective federation. As a consequence, it is not surprising that Bosnia and
Herzegovina remains under international tutelage and that Sudan, Iraq and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, although formally committed to federal
institutions, have not consolidated their operation as federations. The lack of
mutual trust and accommodation and of an acceptance of the rule of law and
constitutionality has made it difficult to obtain agreement on federal solutions or
to operate federal institutions that require an emphasis upon trust,
accommodation and constitutionality. Where these requisites for an effective
federation are lacking, the challenge is how to achieve them in the atmosphere of
distrust and hostility aroused by the preceding conflict. All too often, insufficient
attention has been given to the need to establish the necessary conditions. The
dilemma is how these conditions are to be created in situations that are already
permeated by the antagonisms aroused by conflict.
See, for instance, David Cameron, ―Making Federalism Work,‖ in M.E. Bouillon,
76
D.M. Malone and B. Rowswell, eds., Iraq: Preventing A New Generation of Conflict
(Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publication, 2007), pp. 153–5.
Chapter 14
Conclusions
14.1 IMPLICATIONS DRAWN FROM THIS COMPARATIVE

STUDY
In drawing implications from this comparative analysis of federations, we must

keep in mind the comments at the outset about the benefits and limits of
comparisons among federations. Comparisons do help draw attention to crucial
issues and to possible alternatives illustrated by the experience of other
federations. But we need also to recognize the limits to the applicability of
comparisons and particularly to the transferability of institutions to differing
circumstances and contexts. Above all, it is important to recognize that it is not
simply in the examples of different institutional structures that the comparisons
may lead to useful conclusions; rather, it is in coming to understand the way in
which underlying social, economic and political conditions, and federal
institutions and political processes have interacted with each other within
federations.
What we can learn from federations that have succeeded and from the
pathology of other federations is that even more important than their formal
structures has been the public acceptance of the basic values and processes
required for federal systems. These include the explicit recognition and
accommodation of multiple identities and loyalties within an overarching sense
of shared purposes and objectives. Efforts to deny or suppress the multiple
identities within a diverse society have almost invariably led to contention,
secession or civil war. An essential element therefore in any federation
encompassing a diverse society has been the acceptance of the value of diversity
and of the possibility of multiple loyalties expressed through the establishment
of constituent units of government with genuine autonomous self-rule over those
matters most important to their distinct identity. At the same time, equally
important has been the recognition of the benefits within even a diverse society
to be derived from shared purposes and objectives providing the basis for the
parallel processes of shared-rule.
This comparative study has made clear that within the general category of
federal political systems, and indeed within the more specific category of
federations, there has been a considerable variety in the patterns of social
conditions accommodated and an enormous range in the institutional
arrangements and political processes adopted. All these systems have attempted,
many with considerable success, to combine elements of autonomous self-rule
for the constituent units in certain matters and an overarching shared-rule in
other matters in order to reconcile the desire for both distinctive diversity and
united action. But the variations among them also make it clear that there is no
single pure ideal form of federation that is applicable everywhere. Federations
have varied greatly in their institutional design and in their operation to meet
their own particular conditions and context. A further implication that may be
drawn from some of the more recent examples is that political leaders should not
be constrained to traditional arrangements or theories about federalism but
should be ready to consider more imaginative and innovative ways of applying
pragmatically the spirit of federalism as a way of combining unity and diversity.
At the same time, it may be possible to draw lessons or inspiration from practice
in other federations, particularly in relation to identifying potential dangers to be
averted, desirable objectives to be attained, and appropriate and inappropriate
processes for achieving those objectives. But ultimately, while bearing these in
mind, each federation, if it is to be effective and long-lasting, will have to direct
its efforts at pragmatically accommodating the particular conditions and
―realities‖ of its own society.
We can conclude by noting that the experience of federal systems has taught
us five major lessons. First, as the mature federations illustrate as a group,
federal systems do provide a practical way of combining through representative
institutions the benefits of both unity and diversity. For instance, the United
States (1789), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), and Australia (1901) are
among the longest continually operating constitutional systems anywhere in the
world today. Furthermore, the United Nations annual Index of Human
Development, issued in recent years, ranking some 174 countries in terms of
quality of life based on a weighted average of life expectancy, adult literacy,
school enrolment and per capita gross domestic product, has consistently ranked
four federations — Australia, Canada, the United States and Switzerland —
among the top ten countries in the world, with four others — Belgium, Austria,
Spain and Germany — not far behind. 77 Furthermore, a number of recent
empirical studies, including those of Arendt Lijphart, Ute Wachendorfer-
Schmidt and John Kincaid, have indicated that federal Conclusions 191
77
United Nations Development Programme, Human Rights Report (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006).
political systems have on balance generally actually facilitated political
integration, democratic development and economic effectiveness better than
non-federal systems.78
Second, as the pathology of federations has illustrated, it is also clear,
however, that federal systems are not a panacea for humanity‘s political ills.
Account must therefore also be taken of the pathology of federal systems and of
the particular types of federal structural arrangements and societal conditions and
circumstances that have given rise to problems and stresses within federal
systems.
Third, the degree to which a federal political system is effective depends very
much upon the extent to which there is acceptance of the need to respect
constitutional norms and structures, and an emphasis upon the spirit of tolerance
and compromise. Where these are lacking, as for instance currently in Sri Lanka,
Iraq and Sudan, it has usually been futile to advocate federal solutions unless the
necessary conditions are also established.
Fourth, the extent to which a federal system can accommodate political
realities depends not just on the adoption of federal arrangements but on whether
the particular form or variant of federal institutions that is adopted or evolved
gives adequate expression to the demands and requirements of the particular
society. There is no single, ideal federal form. Many variations are possible.
Examples have been variations in the number and size of the constituent units, in
the form and scope of the distribution of legislative and executive powers and
financial resources, in the degree of centralization or non-centralization, in the
character and composition of their central institutions, and in the institutions and
processes for resolving internal disputes. Ultimately, federalism is a pragmatic,
prudential technique, whose applicability may well depend upon the particular
form in which it is adopted or adapted, or even upon the development of new
innovations in its application.
Fifth, some commentators, such as Daniel Elazar,79 have questioned whether
federations composed of different ethnic groups or nations are workable, or
simply run the risk of suffering civil war. While these possibilities exist, the
persistence of federal systems despite their difficulties in such multi-ethnic or
multinational countries as Switzerland, Canada, India and Malaysia indicates
that with appropriately designed institutions, federal systems can be sustained
and prosper in such countries. In a number of significant cases where ethnic
78
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government
in Twenty-One Countries, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), and Patterns of
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1999); Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt, ed., Federalism and Political
Performance. (London & New York: Routledge, 2000); and John Kincaid ―Federalism
and Democracy; Comparative Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives,‖ (forthcoming in
M. Burgess, ed., Federalism and Democracy).
79
D. J. Elazar, ―International and Comparative Federalism,‖ PS: Political Science and
Politics, 26:2 (1993): 190–5.
nationalism has been a crucial issue, federal devolution has in fact reduced
tension by giving distinct groups a sense of security through their own self-
government, thereby paradoxically contributing to greater harmony and unity.
While federal political systems are not universally appropriate, in many
situations in the contemporary world they may be the only way of combining,
through representative institutions, the benefits of both unity and diversity.
Experience does indicate that countries with a federal form of government have
often been difficult to govern; but it has usually been because they were difficult
countries to govern in the first place that they have adopted federal political
institutions.
14.2 FEDERALISM AND LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES
The question is sometimes raised whether a federal system, by limiting the range
of issues on which a majority within the polity may ultimately rule, is
undemocratic. If democracy is interpreted simplistically, solely as majority rule,
there is no question that a federal system by limiting the jurisdiction of the
federal government and establishing constituent units of government with
autonomous jurisdiction over some matters does place constitutional limits upon
the scope of decision making by an overall majority within the polity. Federal
systems with their constitutional distributions of authority and resources,
normally adjudicated by courts, are clearly a form of limited constitutional
government.
On the other hand, in another sense it can be argued that federal systems
enhance democratic majority rule by giving constituent groups who are in a
majority within their own region the opportunity to decide matters of regional
interest by majority rule. In this sense, federalism represents ―democracy plus,‖
since it provides for majority rule relating to issues of shared interest throughout
the polity, plus majority rule within autonomous units of self-government
dealing with matters of particular regional interest.
At a more fundamental level the congruence of federal and liberal-democratic
values should be noted. Liberal-democracy is not based solely on majority rule
but also emphasizes constitutionalism and the rule of law, respect for minorities
and the dispersal of political power. Thus, liberal-democratic values are a
precondition for an effective federal political system that depends upon respect
for constitutional norms and the rule of law, respect for regional minorities, and
a spirit of tolerance and compromise. Federalism, in turn, on balance enhances
liberal-democratic values by ensuring the democratic legitimacy of both the
federal and the constituent unit governments, each directly elected by and
accountable to its own electorate, and by checking autocracy through the
dispersal of legitimate power among multiple centres of decision making within
the polity.
Appendix A
The Distribution of Powers and Functions in
Selected Federations: A Comparative Overview
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a comparative overview of the

constitutional distribution of powers in 12 federations (as originally published in
R.L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd edition (1999), pp. 125–30).
Information in this table is based on a reading of constitutional texts, academic
interpretive texts and other sources. The tables indicate whether legislative
authority for a subject matter is Federal (F), State (S) or Concurrent (C). Where
different aspects of a matter are assigned exclusively to the federal and to the
state governments this is indicated by the notation FS. The legend at the bottom
of each page explains the notations for variations or exceptions to these standard
classifications. A space left blank indicates that the matter is not explicitly
referred to in the constitution or that the power to legislate in that area rests with
the residual authority (indicated in the first line of the table). The content and
allocation of some subjects are often more complex than might appear from the
table, and reference to the constitutional documents themselves should be made
for greater detail.
wers and Functions in F ederal Systems: A Comparative Overview
CanadaUnited StatesSwitzerlandAustraliaGermanyAustriaIndiaMalaysiaBelgiumSpainCzechoslovakiaPakistan
(1867)(1789)(1848/1999)(1901)(1949)(1929)(1950)(1963)(1993)(1978)(1968)(1962)
FS*SS
a
rsYESNOSOMENONOYESYESYES YESa YESa NONO
uthorityNONOYESYESYESNOYESYESYESYES
ns
a
F/FSF CFFF
FF
a
FFSFCFS FFS
a
CFSF
a
ion FFFFFFFFFFFF
SCFSFFFFScrFSFSFS
FSCFSFSFSFScrFSFSFS
n/Länd/autonomous community)
s
eral paramountcy except where denotedwhich
C denotes provincial paramountcy)
l orders of government retain residual powers, for the others the residual powers are federal
tion of powers
206
ers and Functions (continued)

(1867)(1789)(1848/1999)(1901)(1949)(1929)(1950)(1963)(1993)(1978)(1968)(1962)
FFFFFFFF
FSFFSF(1)F(2)F(2)SScrFFFF(2)
a
FFFF
a
) CCCCFFFF FFF
a
ns)C†FC
nion
C†FFFScFF
a
SrFCF
a
F
a
Appendix A
FS
a
FFFS
/Länd)
ral paramountcy except where
tes provincial paramountcy)
This
requires
page: implementing legislation or consent of pr
requires consultation (non-binding of sta ovincial or state governments
n of powers te governments)
banking is exclusively federal but savings and credit unions are provincial
195
s field administered by the states

Powers and Functions (continued)
(1867)(1789)(1848/1999)(1901)(1949)(1929)(1950)(1963)(1993)(1978)(1968)(1962)
a
FC†F
FSFSC†FSFSFSSrSF
a
†FFF FSS
SFSFCFFFFFFCF
FFFFFCF
†FFScFCF
urces
a
C C†F†SCSC SC
a
FS SrS*FFS
SC†FFSFSSrFF
CFFFFF
anton/Länd)
s
(federal paramountcy except where denoted C denotes provincial paramountcy)
which
er
lication of powers
aters
in this field administered by the states
factodistribution of powers and functions
208
tionof Powers and Functions (continued)

(1867)(1789)(1848/1999)(1901)(1949)(1929)(1950)(1963)(1993)(1978)(1968)(1962)
esearch FS*S
a
econdary EducationSSC†SSSFSCSF Sc
a
Education SFSFC†SFSC†**FFCSF ScF
a
DevelopmentFSFFSSC†FSFCSF FScFS
F
a
F SF SFSC†C†SF ScFS*
and Sanitation SSC†SC†FSSFCScS
ial Services FSCFC

a
t InsuranceFFSC†CCFSF FF
a
tyFSFCCCFCSF FF
sS F SF C†CC†SCSCScFSC
Appendix A
s a
CC†CC†SFCF SFFFS
wer
incial/canton/Länd)
s
t power (federal paramountcy except where denoted C denotes provincial paramountcy)
which
ity‖ power
ical application of powers
sub-national orders of government have jurisdiction over education and health
as a framework legislation jurisdiction whereby the federal government may enact general principles only
islation in this field administered by the states

enotede factodistribution of powers and functions
197
nof Powers and Functions (continued)
(1867)(1789)(1848/1999)(1901)(1949)(1929)(1950)(1963)(1993)(1978)(1968)(1962)
a
†FS*CF SFF
SC†FS*CF
a
ourtsFSFSSFSC†FFSF FS
a
(police) FSFSCSFC†SFSFSFFFS CS
†FSFF
F
SFScFS
CSaS
a
FFCFSF FS
F†SFSC†FSSrC
a
SSSSSSF SFSrFS
ial/canton/Länd)
s
wer (federal paramountcy except where denotedC which denotes provincial paramountcy)
power
application of powers
tion in this field administered by the states. Legislation regarding criminal law and organization of the in practice
ts iscour
ly federal
slate Germany.
in theinfields of criminal and civil law if necessary to dispose of an item within the scope of their le
gislativecompetence
ragraph 9)
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Tarlton, C.D., ―Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical
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Tarr, G. Alan, Robert F. Williams, Josef Marko, eds., Federalism, Subnational
Constitutions, and Minority Rights (Westport: Praeger, 2004).
Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and Recommendations
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979).
Ter-Minassian, Teresa, ed., Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, 1997).
Thorlakson, L., ―Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six
Federations,‖West European Politics, 26:2 (2003): 1–22.
Tsebelis, G., Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton
Verney, Douglas V., ―Federalism, Federative Systems, and Federations: The United
States, Canada and India,‖ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 25:2 (1995): 81–97.
Vijapur, A.P., ed., Dimensions of Federal Nation Building (New Delhi: Manok
Publications, 1998).
Watts, Ronald L., New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford:

Claredon Press, 1966).
______, Multicultural Societies and Federalism, Studies of the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, no. 8 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970).
______, ―Federalism, Regionalism and Political Integration,‖ in D. Cameron, ed.,
Regionalism and Supranationalism (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public
Policy, 1981), pp. 3–19.
______, ―Divergence and Convergence: Canadian and US Federalism,‖ in H.N.
Schreiber, ed., Perspectives on Federalism: Papers from the First Berkeley
Seminar on Federalism (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1987), pp. 179–213.
______, Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kingston: Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1989).
______, The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study (Kingston:
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, 1999).
______, The Historical Development of Comparative Federal Studies (Kingston: Institute
of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen‘s University, Working Paper, 2007 (1)).
Watts, Ronald L., and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1991).
Wheare, K.C., Federal Government, 4th edn (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Young, Robert A., The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, Revised and
expanded edition (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 1998).
Zimmerman, Joseph, Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National
Power (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992).
______, ―National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century,‖
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 31:2 (2001): 15–30.
* * *
Journals in which articles about federal systems regularly appear:

Federations (published quarterly by the Forum of Federations in English, French, Spanish
and Russian).
Publius: The Journal of Federalism (published quarterly in English).
Regional and Federal Studies (published quarterly in English).
Queen‘s Policy Studies
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Exploring Social Insurance: Can a Dose of Europe Cure Canadian Health Care
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Canada in NORAD, 1957–2007: A History, Joseph T. Jockel, 2007
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Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside, Alan S. Williams,
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Choice of Force: Special Operations for Canada, David Last and Bernd Horn (eds.),
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The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-
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Implementing Primary Care Reform: Barriers and Facilitators, Ruth Wilson, S.E.D.
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Social and Cultural Change, David Last, Franklin Pinch, Douglas L. Bland, and
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Clusters in a Cold Climate: Innovation Dynamics in a Diverse Economy, David A. Wolfe
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Canada Without Armed Forces? Douglas L. Bland (ed.), 2004
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Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the
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Understanding Innovation in Canadian Industry, Fred Gault (ed.), 2003
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Delicate Dances: Public Policy and the Nonprofit Sector, Kathy L. Brock (ed.), 2003
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Beyond the National Divide: Regional Dimensions of Industrial Relations, Mark
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The Nonprofit Sector in Interesting Times: Case Studies in a Changing Sector,
Kathy L. Brock and Keith G. Banting (eds.), 2003
Paper ISBN 0-88911-941-4 Cloth 0-88911-943-0
Clusters Old and New: The Transition to a Knowledge Economy in Canada’s Regions,
David A. Wolfe (ed.), 2003 Paper ISBN 0-88911-959-7 Cloth 0-88911-961-9
The e-Connected World: Risks and Opportunities, Stephen Coleman (ed.), 2003
Paper ISBN 0-88911-945-7 Cloth 0-88911-947-3
Knowledge Clusters and Regional Innovation: Economic Development in Canada,
J. Adam Holbrook and David A. Wolfe (eds.), 2002
Paper ISBN 0-88911-919-8 Cloth 0-88911-917-1
Lessons of Everyday Law/Le droit du quotidien, Roderick Alexander Macdonald, 2002
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Improving Connections Between Governments and Nonprofit and Voluntary
Organizations:
Public Policy and the Third Sector, Kathy L. Brock (ed.), 2002
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Governing Food: Science, Safety and Trade, Peter W.B. Phillips and Robert Wolfe (eds.),
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The Nonprofit Sector and Government in a New Century,Kathy L. Brock and
Keith G. Banting (eds.), 2001 Paper ISBN 0-88911-901-5 Cloth 0-88911-905-8
The Dynamics of Decentralization: Canadian Federalism and British Devolution,
Trevor C. Salmon and Michael Keating (eds.), 2001ISBN 0-88911-895-7
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations
Canada: The State of the Federation 2005: Quebec and Canada in the New Century –
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Dynamics, New Opportunities, vol. 19, Michael Murphy (ed.), 2007
Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems,
Harvey Lazar and Christian Leuprecht (eds.), 2007
Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, vol. 18, Municipal-Federal-Provincial
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Canadian Fiscal Arrangements: What Works, What Might Work Better, Harvey Lazar
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Canada: The State of the Federation 2003, vol. 17, Reconfiguring Aboriginal-State
Relations, Michael Murphy (ed.), 2005 Paper ISBN 1-55339-010-5 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-
011-3
Canada: The State of the Federation 2002, vol. 16, Reconsidering the Institutions of
Canadian Federalism, J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (eds.),
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Federalism and Labour Market Policy: Comparing Different Governance and
Employment
Strategies, Alain Noël (ed.), 2004 Paper ISBN 1-55339-006-7 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-007-5
The Impact of Global and Regional Integration on Federal Systems: A Comparative
Analysis,
Harvey Lazar, Hamish Telford and Ronald L. Watts (eds.), 2003
Canada: The State of the Federation 2001, vol. 15, Canadian Political Culture(s) in
Transition,
Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (eds.), 2002
Federalism, Democracy and Disability Policy in Canada, Alan Puttee (ed.), 2002
Paper ISBN 0-88911-855-8 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-001-6, ISBN 0-88911-845-0 (set)
Comparaison des régimes fédéraux, 2e éd., Ronald L. Watts, 2002ISBN 1-55339-005-9
Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-Level Governance,
Keith G. Banting and Stan Corbett (eds.), 2001
Disability and Federalism: Comparing Different Approaches to Full
Participation, David Cameron and Fraser Valentine (eds.), 2001
Federalism, Democracy and Health Policy in Canada, Duane Adams (ed.), 2001
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The 2006 Federal Budget: Rethinking Fiscal Priorities, Charles M. Beach, Michael
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Health Services Restructuring in Canada: New Evidence and New Directions,
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A Challenge for Higher Education in Ontario, Charles M. Beach (ed.), 2005
Current Directions in Financial Regulation, Frank Milne and Edwin H. Neave (eds.),
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Higher Education in Canada, Charles M. Beach, Robin W. Boadway and R. Marvin
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Financial Services and Public Policy, Christopher Waddell (ed.), 2004
The 2003 Federal Budget: Conflicting Tensions, Charles M. Beach and Thomas A.
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Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century, Charles M. Beach, Alan G. Green and
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Framing Financial Structure in an Information Environment, Thomas J. Courchene and
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Towards Evidence-Based Policy for Canadian Education/Vers des politiques
canadiennes d’éducation fondées sur la recherche, Patrice de Broucker and/et Arthur
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Money, Markets and Mobility: Celebrating the Ideas of Robert A. Mundell, Nobel
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The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, Patrick Grady
and Andrew Sharpe (eds.), 2001 Paper ISBN 0-88911-942-2 Cloth ISBN 0-88911-940-6
The 2000 Federal Budget: Retrospect and Prospect, Paul A.R. Hobson and
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Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems,
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Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, vol. 18, Municipal-Federal-Provincial
Relations in
Canada, Robert Young and Christian Leuprecht (eds.), 2006
Canadian Fiscal Federalism: What Works, What Might Work Better, Harvey Lazar (ed.),
2005 Paper ISBN 1-55339-012-1 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-013-X
Canada: The State of the Federation 2003, vol. 17, Reconfiguring Aboriginal-State
Relations, Michael Murphy (ed.), 2005 Paper ISBN 1-55339-010-5 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-
011-3
Money, Politics and Health Care: Reconstructing the Federal-Provincial Partnership,
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Canada: The State of the Federation 2002, vol. 16, Reconsidering the Institutions of
Canadian Federalism, J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (eds.), 2004
Federalism and Labour Market Policy: Comparing Different Governance and
Employment
Strategies, Alain Noël (ed.), 2004Paper ISBN 1-55339-006-7 Cloth ISBN 1-55339-007-5
The Impact of Global and Regional Integration on Federal Systems: A Comparative
Analysis,
Harvey Lazar, Hamish Telford and Ronald L. Watts (eds.), 2003
Canada: The State of the Federation 2001, vol. 15, Canadian Political Culture(s) in
Transition, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (eds.), 2002
Federalism, Democracy and Disability Policy in Canada, Alan Puttee (ed.), 2002
Comparaison des régimes fédéraux, 2e éd., Ronald L. Watts, 2002ISBN 1-55339-005-9
Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective on Multi-Level Governance,
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Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed., Ronald L. Watts, 1999ISBN 0-88911-835-3
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Comparing

Published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen‘s University

List of Tables ................................................................................................ ix

1.1 The Relevance of Comparisons of Federal Systems.........................1

2. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY FEDERATIONS

2.1 Mature Federations ..........................................................................29

2.2 Emergent Federations ......................................................................38

3.1 The Variety of Factors and Processes..............................................63

4. THE CONSTITUENT UNITS

4.1 The Building Blocks of Federations ...............................................71

4.6 Reforming Constituent Unit Boundaries.........................................78

5. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY IN FEDERATIONS

5.1 A Fundamental Feature of Federations ...........................................83

6. THE DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCES

6.1 Importance of the Allocation of Financial Resources.....................95

7.1 Importance of Processes for Intergovernmental Collaboration ....117

8. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN FEDERATIONS

8.1 Political and Constitutional Asymmetry Distinguished................125

9. MULTILEVEL FEDERAL SYSTEMS

9.1 Membership in Supra-Federal Organizations ...............................131

The Character of Federal Decision Making..............................175

13.1 Significance of the Pathology of Federations ...............................179

14.1 Implications Drawn from This Comparative Study ......................189

Figure 1: The Interaction of Federal Societies, Constitutions and

Foreword to the First Edition

Preface to the Third Edition and Summary

This indicates the virtually inevitable existence of vertical and horizontal

courts, constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional bills of

express my gratitude to George Anderson, who encouraged the writing of the

1.1 THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARISONS OF FEDERAL

1.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERALISM

Despite these developments there was a revival of interest in federal political

1.3 THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF FEDERALISM

Thus, federalism is far from being an obsolete nineteenth-century form of

express it) in a hybrid structure which has come to involve elements of

John Kincaid, ―Federalism and Democracy: Comparative Empirical and Theoretical

Respectives‖, paper presented at workshop on ―Federalism and Democracy‖, Centre for

states in the annual United Nations ranking in terms of economic welfare,

ons (including quasi-federations) 1

d states + 2 chartered cities 19951995

d territories + 130 Native American domestic dependent nations

able 1 under ―Hybrids.‖

FederationCurrent Constituent Unit ConstitutionOperation 2007

United States50 states +1 federal district + 2 federacies Federation (1789) Federation

Belgium3 regions + 3 cultural communitiesFederation (1993) Federation

rrent Constituent Unit ConstitutionOperation 2007

provincesDevolved Union (1996)Quasi-federation

andsFederation (2001) Micro-quasi-federation

TABLE 4: Some Contemporary Confederations and Hybrids

Benelux 3 member states 1944 (1958)

TABLE 5: Associated States and Federacies

Åland Islands Federacy Finland

TABLE 6: Decentralized Unions with Some Federal Features

Antigua and Barbuda 6 parishes + 2 dependencies 1981

Britain and Northern Ireland islands

Antigua-Barbuda Argentina Benelux Denmark-Faroes France-Monaco Andorra: France Arab League

Vanuatu India US-Northern ( Nordic Council

1 Including quasi-federations as defined in table 1 under ―Hybrids.‖

Second, while knowledge about the structural character of a federal political