Risk Assessment

LABORATORY BIOSAFETY MANUAL I
FOURTH EDITION
AND
ASSOCIATED MONOGRAPHS
RISK ASSESSMENT
II RISK ASSESSMENT
LABORATORY BIOSAFETY MANUAL
FOURTH EDITION
AND
ASSOCIATED MONOGRAPHS
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment
(Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs)
ISBN 978-92-4-001145-8 (electronic version)
ISBN 978-92-4-001146-5 (print version)
© World Health Organization 2020

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Design and layout by Paul Bloxham
iii
Contents
Acknowledgementsv
Glossary of termsvi
Executive summaryxi
SECTION 1 Introduction1
1.1 Intended scope and objectives2
1.2 How to use this monograph3
SECTION 2 Getting started5
2.1 Selecting the risk assessment team5
2.2 Factors to consider6
2.3 Completing the risk assessment11
SECTION 3 Applying risk assessment to control risks13
3.1 Application of key risk assessment steps14
3.2 Additional risk control measures19
SECTION 4 Implementation strategies and lessons from the field25
4.1 Lessons from the field: laboratory-associated Salmonella infection26
4.2 Lessons from the field: risk assessment of a “near miss” 28
4.3 Lessons from the field: adapting risk control measures for a health condition28
References 30
Further information31
iv RISK ASSESSMENT
P
ANNEX 1. Risk assessment short template32
ANNEX 2. Risk assessment long template37
ANNEX 3. Completed short template: mycobacterium tuberculosis test-

ing56
ANNEX 4. Completed short template: bloodborne pathogens63
ANNEX 5. Completed long template: influenza research71
ANNEX 6. Completed long template: antimicrobial susceptibility testing

92
v
Acknowledgements
Principal coordinator
Dr Kazunobu Kojima, World Health Organization, Switzerland
Scientific contributors
Prof. Joachim Frey, University of Bern, Switzerland
Dr Samantha Kasloff, Public Health Agency of Canada (WHO Collaborating Centre for
Biosafety and Biosecurity), Canada
Ms Michelle McKinney (Team lead), National Institutes of Health, United States of

America
Dr Christina Scheel, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (WHO Collaborating
Centre for Biosafety and Biosecurity), United States of America
Dr Kathrin Summermatter (Deputy team lead), Institute for Infectious Diseases,

University of Bern, Switzerland
Project management
Ms Rica Zinsky, World Health Organization, Switzerland
Reviewer
Dr Christina Carlson, World Health Organization, Switzerland and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (WHO Collaborating Centre for Biosafety and Biosecurity),
United States of America
Mr Joshua Kimutai, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Kenya
Dr Jürgen Mertsching, Hannover Medical School, Germany
Dr Reynolds Salerno, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (WHO Collaborating
Centre for Biosafety and Biosecurity), United States of America
Technical editing
Ms Fiona Curlet
Financial support
Development and publication of this document have been made possible with
financial support from the Global Partnership Program, Global Affairs Canada, the
Biosecurity Engagement Program, United States Department of State and the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, US Department of Defense.
vi RISK ASSESSMENT
Glossary of terms
Acceptable risk: The risk that is considered acceptable and allows work to proceed
bearing in mind the expected benefit of the planned activities.
Accident: An inadvertent occurrence that results in actual harm such as infection, illness,
injury in humans or contamination of the environment.
Aerosol: Liquid or solid particles suspended in air and of a size that may allow
inhalation into the lower respiratory tract (usually less than 10 micrometres in diameter).
Aerosol/airborne transmission: The spread of infection caused by the inhalation of

aerosols.
Biological agent: A microorganism, virus, biological toxin, particle or otherwise

infectious material, either naturally occurring or genetically modified, which may have
the potential to cause infection, allergy, toxicity or otherwise create a hazard to humans,
animals, or plants.
Biological safety cabinet (BSC): An enclosed, ventilated working space designed

to provide protection to the operator, the laboratory environment and/or the work
materials for activities where there is an aerosol hazard. Containment is achieved by
segregation of the work from the main area of the laboratory and/or through the use
of controlled, directional airflow mechanisms. Exhaust air is passed through a high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter before recirculating into the laboratory or into the
building’s heating, ventilation and air conditioning system. There are different classes (I,
II and III) of BSCs that provide different levels of containment.
Biosafety: Containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to

prevent unintentional exposure to biological agents or their inadvertent release.
Biosafety officer: An individual designated to oversee facility or organizational

biosafety (and possibly biosecurity) programmes. The person fulfilling this function may
also be termed biosafety professional, biosafety advisor, biosafety manager, biosafety
coordinator, or biosafety management advisor.
Biosecurity: Principles, technologies and practices that are implemented for the
protection, control and accountability of biological materials and/or the equipment,
skills and data related to their handling. Biosecurity aims to prevent their unauthorized
access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or release.
Calibration: Establishment of the relationship between the measurement provided by

the instrument and the corresponding values of a known standard, allowing correction
to improve accuracy. For example, laboratory equipment such as pipetting devices may
need calibration periodically to ensure proper performance.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS vii
Certification: A third-party testimony based on a structured assessment and formal

documentation confirming that a system, person or piece of equipment conforms to
specified requirements, for example, to a certain standard.
Consequence (of a laboratory incident): The outcome of an incident (exposure to and/

or release of a biological agent) of varying severity of harm, occurring in the course of
laboratory operations. Consequences may include a laboratory-associated infection,
other illness or physical injury, environmental contamination, or asymptomatic carriage
of a biological agent.
Containment: The combination of physical design parameters and operational

practices that protect personnel, the immediate work environment and the community
from exposure to biological agents. The term “biocontainment” is also used in this
context.
Core requirements: A set of minimum requirements defined in the fourth edition of

the World Health Organization (WHO) Laboratory biosafety manual to describe a
combination of risk control measures that are both the foundation for, and an integral
part of, laboratory biosafety. These measures reflect international standards and best
practice in biosafety that are necessary to work safely with biological agents, even
where the associated risks are minimal.
Engineering controls: Risk control measures that are built into the design of a
laboratory or laboratory equipment to contain the hazards. Biological safety cabinets
(BSCs) and isolators are forms of engineering control in order to minimize the risk of
exposure to and/or unintended release of biological agents.
Exposure: An event during which an individual comes in contact with, or is in close

proximity to, biological agents with the potential for infection or harm to occur. Routes
of exposure can include inhalation, ingestion, percutaneous injury and absorption and
are usually dependent upon the characteristics of the biological agent. However, some
infection routes are specific to the laboratory environment and are not commonly seen
in the general community.
Good microbiological practice and procedure (GMPP): A basic laboratory code of

practice applicable to all types of laboratory activity with biological agents, including
general behaviours and aseptic techniques that should always be observed in the
laboratory. This code serves to protect laboratory personnel and the community from
infection, prevent contamination of the environment and provide protection for the work
materials in use.
Hazard: An object or situation that has the potential to cause adverse effects when
an organism, system or (sub)population is exposed to it. In the case of laboratory
biosafety, the hazard is defined as biological agents which have the potential to cause
adverse effects to personnel and/or humans, animals, and the wider community and
environment. A hazard does not become a “risk” until the likelihood and consequences
of that hazard causing harm are taken into account.
viii RISK ASSESSMENT
Heightened control measures: A set of risk control measures as described in the WHO
Laboratory biosafety manual that may need to be applied in a laboratory facility
because the outcome of a risk assessment indicates that the biological agents being
handled and/or the activities to be performed with them are associated with a risk that
cannot be brought to an acceptable risk with the core requirements only.
Incident: An occurrence that has the potential to, or results in, the exposure of
laboratory personnel to biological agents and/or their release into the environment that
may or may not lead to actual harm.
Initial risk: Risk associated with laboratory activities or procedures that are conducted
in the absence of risk control measures.
Laboratory-associated infection: Any infection acquired or reasonably assumed as a

result of exposure to a biological agent in the course of laboratory-related activities. A
person-to-person transmission following the incident may result in linked secondary
cases. Laboratory-associated infections are also known as laboratory-acquired
infections.
Likelihood (of a laboratory incident): The probability of an incident (that is exposure to

and/or a release of a biological agent) occurring in the course of laboratory work.
Maximum containment measures: A set of highly detailed and stringent risk control
measures described in the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual that
are considered necessary during laboratory work where a risk assessment indicates
that the activities to be performed pose very high risks to laboratory personnel, the
wider community and/or the environment, and therefore an extremely high level of
protection must be provided. These are especially needed for certain types of work with
biological agents that may have catastrophic consequences if an exposure or release
were to occur.
Pathogen: A biological agent capable of causing disease in humans, animals or plants.
Personal protective equipment (PPE): Equipment and/or clothing worn by personnel

to provide a barrier against biological agents, thereby minimizing the likelihood of
exposure. PPE includes but is not limited to, laboratory coats, gowns, full-body suits,
gloves, protective footwear, safety glasses, safety goggles, masks and respirators.
Propagation: The action of intentionally increasing or multiplying the number of

biological agents.
Residual risk: Risk that remains after carefully selected risk control measures have been
applied. If residual risk is not acceptable, it may be necessary to apply additional risk
control measures or to stop the laboratory activity.
Risk: A combination of the likelihood of an incident occurring and the severity of the
consequences (harm) if that incident were to occur.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS ix
Risk acceptance: The risk that is considered to be acceptable, typically after risk control
measures have been applied and allows laboratory work to proceed.
Risk assessment: A systematic process of gathering information and evaluating the

likelihood and consequences of exposure to or release of workplace hazard(s) and
determining the appropriate risk control measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable
risk.
Risk communication: An interactive and systematic process to exchange information

and opinion on risk(s) that inclusively engages all relevant personnel of various
categories as well as community leaders and officials where appropriate. Risk
communication is an integral and ongoing part of the risk assessment, soliciting
clear understanding of the risk assessment process and outcomes, aiming at proper
implementation of risk control measures. Decisions on risk communication, including
what, whom and how should be part of an overall risk communication strategy.
Risk control measure: Use of a combination of tools, which include communication,

assessment, training, and physical and operational controls, to reduce the risk of an
incident/event to an acceptable risk. The risk assessment cycle will determine the
strategy that should be used to control the risks and the specific types of risk control
measures required to achieve this.
Safety culture: A set of values, beliefs and patterns of behaviour instilled and facilitated
in an open and trusting atmosphere by individuals and organizations working together
to support or enhance best practice for laboratory biosafety, irrespective of whether it is
stipulated in applicable codes of practice and/or regulations.
Sharps: Any device or object that is a puncture or wound hazard because of its pointed
ends or edges. In the laboratory, sharps can include needles, syringes with attached
needles, blades, scalpels or broken glass.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs): A set of well-documented and validated

stepwise instructions outlining how to perform laboratory practices and procedures in
a safe, timely and reliable manner, in line with institutional policies, best practice and
applicable national or international regulations.
Transmission: The transfer of biological agent(s) from objects to living things, or

between living things, either directly or indirectly via aerosols, droplets, body fluids,
vectors, food/water or other contaminated objects.
Validation: Systematic and documented confirmation that the specified requirements

are adequate to ensure the intended outcome or results. For example, in order to prove
a material is decontaminated, laboratory personnel must validate the robustness of the
decontamination method by measurement of the remaining biological agents against
the detection limit by chemical, physical or biological indicators.
x RISK ASSESSMENT
Verification: Confirmation that a given item (product, process or system) satisfies the
specified requirements. For example, verification that the performance of an autoclave
meets the standards specified by the manufacturer should be performed periodically.
Zoonotic diseases (zoonosis): Infectious disease that is naturally transmitted from

animals to humans and vice versa.
xi
Executive summary
Risk assessment is a systematic process of gathering information and evaluating
risks to support a risk management strategy that is informed by the likelihood and
consequences of an inadvertent release of and/or exposure to a biological agent.
Risk assessment is essential to guide the selection of risk control measures and ensure
biosafety within the laboratory when working with biological agents. This assessment
requires consideration of many factors including: route(s) of transmission of the
biological agent(s), pathogenicity and infectious dose, availability of prophylactic
treatment or a vaccine, disease severity and mortality, contagiousness, endemicity,
high-risk laboratory procedures (such as work with aerosols, high titres or volumes
of the biological agent(s) being produced/handled, sharps, animals), competency of
laboratory personnel, susceptibility of individual personnel and biosecurity (potential
for misuse of biological agents/use as a weapon for harm). This monograph describes
the process of carrying out a risk assessment of work with a biological agent(s) so
that an informed decision can be made by a laboratory facility about the risk control
measures needed for the work to be safely conducted. The targeted readership for
this monograph is biosafety officers, laboratory personnel, laboratory managers and
scientists who are doing the risk assessment.
The information in this monograph on risk assessment is designed to accompany

and support the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual (core
document) and other associated monographs. The manual and the monographs
adopt a risk- and evidence-based approach to biosafety rather than a prescriptive
approach in order to ensure that laboratory facilities, safety equipment and work
practices are locally relevant, proportionate to needs and sustainable. Emphasis is
placed on the importance of a “safety culture” that incorporates risk assessment, good
microbiological practice and procedure and standard operating procedures, relevant
introductory, refresher and mentoring training of personnel, and prompt reporting of
incidents and accidents followed by appropriate investigation and corrective actions.
This new approach aims to facilitate laboratory design and ways of operating that
ensure greater sustainability while maintaining adequate and appropriate control of
biosafety.
The other associated monographs provide detailed information and help implement
systems and strategies on the following specialized topics: laboratory design and
maintenance, biological safety cabinets and other primary containment devices,
personal protective equipment, decontamination and waste management, biosafety
programme management and outbreak preparedness and resilience.
This monograph describes selecting a risk assessment team and completing a

risk assessment as well as implementation strategies and lessons learnt. Two risk
assessment templates, a short and long one, are provided that personnel can use as
guides when carrying out a risk assessment. In addition, four examples of completed
risk assessments with different scenarios are included.
xii RISK ASSESSMENT
1
INTRODUCTION
SECTION
1
Effective control of biological risk is the cornerstone of laboratory biosafety. All
laboratories that handle or process biological agents have a responsibility to their
personnel and the wider community to ensure that work is done in a way that brings
the potential for incidents and accidents to a minimum. The fourth edition of the
WHO Laboratory biosafety manual (1) promotes a situational approach to laboratory
biosafety that is risk- and evidence-based, rather than fixed and inflexible operational
requirements. This new approach is best implemented through risk assessment, a
systematic process of gathering information and evaluating risks to support a risk
management process. The need to select risk control measures, such as training
and procurement of specific types of PPE, are all influenced by the results of a risk
assessment. For these reasons, risk assessments must always be carried out in a
standardized and systematic way to ensure that they are repeatable and comparable.
The information in this monograph on risk assessment is designed to accompany

and support the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual (1) (core
document). The other associated monographs provide detailed information and help
implement systems and strategies on the following specialized topics: laboratory
design and maintenance (2), biological safety cabinets and other primary containment
devices (3), personal protective equipment (4), decontamination and waste
management (5), biosafety programme management (6) and outbreak preparedness
and resilience (7).
Conducting a comprehensive biological risk assessment relies on knowledge and a

clear understanding of core concepts such as that risk is the likelihood of an incident
with a hazard that has consequences. In the context of laboratory biosafety, a hazard
is a biological agent whose pathogenic characteristics give it the potential to cause
harm to people, animals and/or the environment. The risk associated with the hazard
is defined as the combination of the likelihood of an incident and the severity of the
harm (consequences) if that incident were to occur. Here, likelihood is the probability
of an exposure to or release of the hazard occurring during laboratory work, and the
consequence is the severity of the outcome if such an incident occurred. As such, the
risks of manipulating any biological agent depend on many dynamic factors, including
procedures to be performed, type of equipment available, inherent pathogenic
properties of the biological agent itself, the range of hosts that can be affected and
whether the biological agent is endemic in the population, susceptibility of local
populations, and the competency of laboratory personnel carrying out the work.
2 RISK ASSESSMENT
1.1 Intended scope and objectives

The purpose of this monograph is to provide detailed, stepwise guidance in carrying
out a thorough risk assessment for laboratory work with biological agents. Whether
acting as a biosafety professional, laboratory scientist, facility manager or technician,
the information in this monograph is intended for all personnel who handle biological
agents so that they understand the key concepts and considerations of the risk
assessment framework. The risk assessment framework (Figure 1.1) is a process with
Figure 1.1 The risk assessment framework
five steps or procedures based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle:
n gather information,
n evaluate the risks,
n develop a risk control strategy,
n select and implement risk control measures and
n review risks and risk control measures.

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 3
Although each step in the risk assessment framework appears to be discrete and
ordered, in reality, many biosafety professionals who perform risk assessments on a
daily basis do not do so in a stepwise way. For instance, they might consider many
elements, such as the biological agent, applicable procedures and available risk
control measures, to simultaneously evaluate risk and develop a risk control strategy.
Thus, the framework is not intended to mandate one “correct” way to carry out a risk
assessment. Instead, the framework suggests a process that includes all the steps and
key considerations needed to assess the likelihood and consequences of a potential
exposure to and/or release of biological agents when working with these agents.
It is important that this framework is applied in a transparent and consistent manner.
The actual steps of a risk assessment, and the order in which they
are carried out, are not as important as carefully considering all
relevant information before making decisions about the selection and
implementation of risk control measures to ensure that the selected
measures are relevant, effective and sustainable.
1.2 How to use this monograph

This monograph is not intended to supersede any existing regulations or guidelines
and if used, it should be in conjunction and compliance with any national, local and/
or institutional biosafety requirements or other risk assessment templates. The risk
assessment framework and templates provided in this monograph (Annexes 1 and
2) are intended to be supplemented with relevant biosafety information in the fourth
edition of the Laboratory biosafety manual (1) to guide laboratory professionals to
assess risk at their own institutions. Alternatively, this monograph and the two risk
assessment templates can be used to supplement any other risk assessment scheme
or template that is already in use. In section 4 of this monograph, three situations are
described which show the importance of conducting a risk assessment and provide
insight into lessons learnt. In addition, four completed risk assessments are included in
the annexes of this monograph to provide realistic and detailed examples of situations
encountered in many laboratories (Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6). They can be used as a
guide to carrying out a risk assessment.
4 RISK ASSESSMENT
Comprehensive biological risk assessments identify and consider factors affecting all
laboratory personnel. In general and in using the tools provided in this monograph,
information should be collected from personnel with different laboratory roles and
duties to ensure all perspectives have been represented. These personnel include:
laboratory technicians and scientists, laboratory and quality managers, principal
investigators, maintenance workers, and biosafety and biosecurity experts. Information
should also be obtained from the scientific literature such as research papers or review
articles, technical literature and web-based resources. By taking into consideration all
relevant personnel and circumstances in the biological risk assessment process, the
person or team conducting the risk assessment can make informed decisions for the
benefit of all, thereby strengthening overall institutional biosafety practices.
While the templates were primarily developed for biosafety risk assessment, they can
also be used for general safety risk assessment of laboratory activities, especially when
biosafety and general safety risks are interlinked, for example, specimen collection and
transport, where appropriate and applicable.
5
GETTING STARTED
SECTION
2
2.1 Selecting the risk assessment team
Risk assessment is the fundamental process that supports a broader biosafety man-
agement programme. Effective biosafety management integrates and cooperates with
an organization’s existing safety and quality management and leadership structures
to promote evidence-based, continuous improvement, and an organization-wide
biosafety culture. As such, risk assessment is an important responsibility of all members
of the laboratory, and of stakeholders outside the laboratory. Careful selection of team
members to contribute to the laboratory risk assessment process can directly support
the establishment and maintenance of an improved biosafety risk culture by facilitating
leadership and organizational involvement, ownership and understanding of biosafe-
ty responsibilities. These concepts are described in further detail in the Monograph:
biosafety programme management (6).
A comprehensive, effective risk assessment requires input from laboratory personnel

who understand the processes and procedures within the scope of the work being
assessed. The first step in the risk assessment process is to identify the person to lead
the assessment and the team who will contribute to it. The roles and responsibilities of
all team members must be clearly defined before starting the assessment, although
additional people may be consulted as needed. The members of the risk assessment
team should have demonstrated skill in working with the biological agents being
handled or similar biological agents and understand all the hazards associated with
the protocols and procedures to be carried out in the laboratory. The team members
must be familiar with the layout and condition of the laboratory facility as well as
the equipment to be used in the procedure. The risk assessment team should also
know the competency and experience of laboratory personnel who will be doing
the laboratory work. Personnel on the risk assessment team may include, but are
not limited to, principal investigators, laboratory and quality managers, laboratory
technicians and biosafety officers. In situations where the number of personnel is
limited, it may not be possible to gather a team of people qualified to carry out the risk
assessment. The team may comprise one or more individuals but smaller teams have
a greater workload and responsibility in carrying out the risk assessment. Alternative
risk assessment teams are discussed in section 4 of this monograph. It is important to
note that the involvement of the laboratory and/or organizational leadership in the risk
assessment process, whether by direct participation in the risk assessment team or by
communication with the team, is essential to establish organizational support for and
sustainability of a biosafety management programme.
6 RISK ASSESSMENT
2.2 Factors to consider

After the risk assessment team has been formed, the risk assessment can proceed. As an
example or to use as a template, a detailed step-by-step description of how to conduct
a risk assessment is provided in the fourth edition of the Laboratory biosafety manual
(1) (refer to section 2) and in the short (Annex 1) and long (Annex 2) risk assessment
templates in this monograph. The team must gather information about the hazards
associated with the biological agent and laboratory process(es) under consideration.
This information should be collected from all relevant personnel through interviews,
and relevant published material should be consulted as necessary. This information-
gathering step is essential to the biological risk assessment because it influences all steps
that follow. Missing pieces of information in this step (knowledge gaps) will negatively
affect the evaluation of all the risks and the subsequent selection of risk control measures.
In Table 2.1 the steps of the risk assessment and key considerations are listed.
Table 2.1 Key considerations in the risk assessment framework
STEP KEY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Gather information § What biological agents will be handled and what are their
(hazard identification) pathogenic characteristics?
§ What type of laboratory work and/or procedures will be
conducted?
§ What type(s) of equipment will be used?
§ What type of laboratory facility is available?
§ What human factors exist (for example, what is the level of
competency of personnel)?
§ What other factors exist that might affect laboratory
operations (for example, legal, cultural, socioeconomic,
public perception)?
2. Evaluate the risks § How could an exposure and/or release occur?

§ What is the likelihood of an exposure and/or release?
§ What information gathered influences the likelihood the most?
§ What are the consequences of an exposure and/or release?
§ Which information gathered influences the consequences
the most?
§ What is the overall initial risk of the activities?
§ What is the acceptable risk?
§ Which risks are unacceptable?
§ Can the unacceptable risks be controlled, or should the
work not proceed at all?
3. Develop a risk strategy § What resources are available for risk control measures?
§ What risk control strategies are most applicable for the
resources available?
§ Are resources sufficient to obtain and maintain those risk
control measures?
§ Are proposed control strategies effective, sustainable and
achievable in the local context?
SECTION 2 GETTING STARTED 7
Table 2.1 Key considerations in the risk assessment framework (continued)
STEP KEY CONSIDERATIONS

KEY CONSIDERATIONS
4. Select and implement risk § Are there any national/international regulations requiring
control measures prescribed risk control measures?
§ What risk control measures are locally available and
sustainable?
§ Are available risk control measures adequately efficient, or
should multiple risk control measures be used in combination
to enhance efficacy?
§ Do selected risk control measures align with the risk control
strategy?
§ What is the level of residual risk after risk control measures
have been applied and is it now acceptable?
§ Are additional resources required and available for the
implementation of risk control measures?
§ Are the selected risk control measures compliant with
national/international regulations?
§ Has approval to conduct the work been granted?
§ Have the risk control strategies been communicated to
relevant personnel?
§ Have necessary items been included in the budget and
purchased?
§ Are operational and maintenance procedures in place?
§ Have personnel been appropriately trained?
5. Review risks and risk § Have there been any changes in activities, biological
control measures agents, personnel, equipment or facilities?
§ Is there any new knowledge available of biological agents
and/or the processes being used?
§ Are there any lessons learnt from incident reports and
investigations that may indicate improvements to be made?
§ Has a periodic review cycle been established?
Risk is assessed based on the likelihood of an exposure to or release of a biological

agent and the consequences of such an exposure/release. For each step of the
risk assessment cycle, there are several factors that can affect both likelihood and
consequence of exposure to or release of the biological agent. The main factor affecting
the consequences, or severity of harm, is the inherent pathogenic properties of the
biological agent(s) that will be assessed. The likelihood of an exposure or release during
laboratory operations is influenced by several factors, which include: the procedures to
be performed, the surrounding laboratory environment, the personnel directly working
with the biological agent involved and many others. The concepts of likelihood and
consequence and the factors contributing to them, as they relate to biological risk
assessment, are described in more detail in the fourth edition of the Laboratory biosafety
manual (1) (refer to section 2 and Table 2.2 to Table 2.4 also in this monograph).
8 RISK ASSESSMENT
A full list of factors to consider is provided in the following sections and annexes to
guide the collection of information. It is important to note that not all factors will affect
risk in the same way but each should be carefully considered.
Table 2.2 Factors that affect the likelihood of an incident occurring
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RATIONALE

HIGH LIKELIHOOD
OF INCIDENTS OCCURRING
Laboratory activities associated with When aerosols are generated by these
aerosolization (for example, sonication, methods, the likelihood of exposure through
homogenization, centrifugation) inhalation is increased, as is the likelihood
of release of these aerosols into the
surrounding environment where they might
contaminate laboratory surfaces and also
spread into the community.
Laboratory activities associated with When activities involve work with sharps,
sharps materials the likelihood of percutaneous exposure to a
biological agent through a puncture wound
is increased.
Low competency of personnel carrying out Low proficiency of personnel in laboratory

the work processes and procedures, through lack
of experience, understanding or failure to
comply with SOPs and GMPP, can lead to
errors in performing the work which are
more likely to result in exposure to and/or
release of a biological agent.
Cleaning and maintenance personnel
must be trained before working close to a
biological agent.
Highly environmentally stable biological Biological agents that have settled

agents on laboratory surfaces (for example,
contamination caused by poor technique
that allowed settling of aerosol or droplets
after release) can be a source of inadvertent
exposure as long as they remain stable in
the environment, even if the contamination
cannot be seen.
Inadequate or poor availability of electrical All these factors may result in partial breaches
power, dilapidated laboratory facilities and in, or complete failure of, biocontainment
building systems, malfunctioning equipment, systems designed to reduce the likelihood
damage from frequent severe weather and of exposure to and/or release of biological
access of insects and rodents to the agents.
laboratory.
GMPP = good microbiological practice and procedure; SOPs = standard operating procedures.
Table 2.3 Factors that affect the consequences of an incident if it were to occur
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RATIONALE

GREATER CONSEQUENCES IF
AN INCIDENT WERE TO OCCUR
Low infectious dose For infection to occur in an exposed
individual, a certain quantity (volume,
concentration) of biological agent must be
present. Even a small amount of an agent
could result in severe consequences, such as
a laboratory-associated infection.
Furthermore, exposure to larger quantities of
that agent (greater than the infectious dose)
may result in a more severe presentation of
the infection.
High communicability Even one single exposure (causing carriage

or a laboratory-associated infection) could
rapidly spread from laboratory personnel or
fomites to many individuals.
High severity and mortality A laboratory-associated infection following

exposure is more likely to cause personnel to
become debilitated, lose their quality of life
or die.
Limited availability of effective prophylaxis The symptoms or outcomes of a laboratory-

or therapeutic interventions associated infection cannot be effectively
prevented, reduced or eliminated by a medical
intervention. This may also include situations
where medical intervention is not available,
or emergency response capacity is limited.
Large susceptible population (including The larger the susceptible population, the
laboratory personnel at increased risk) more likely a laboratory-associated infection
could rapidly spread and infect larger
numbers of people.
Lack of endemicity (such as exotic disease) When an agent is not endemic in the
surrounding population, the population is
more likely to be susceptible to the agent,
leading to an increased likelihood of a
laboratory-associated infection spreading
to the community.
10 RISK ASSESSMENT
Table 2.4 Factors associated with both a high likelihood of and greater consequences
from a potential incident
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH BOTH A RATIONALE

HIGH LIKELIHOOD OF AND GREATER
CONSEQUENCES FROM A POTENTIAL
INCIDENT
High concentration or volume of the The more biological agent there is in the
biological agent substance being handled, the more infectious
particles there will be available for exposure,
and the more likely the exposure volume will
contain the infectious dose of that agent.
Furthermore, being exposed to a higher
concentration of the agent could result in a
more severe infection, illness or injury.
Airborne route of transmission Biological agents with an airborne route of

transmission may be capable of remaining
in aerosols for prolonged periods of time and
may disseminate widely in the laboratory
environment, increasing the likelihood that
personnel may be exposed
to the agent.
Furthermore, following an exposure event,
aerosolized biological agents may be
inhaled and deposit on the respiratory tract
mucosa of the exposed individual, possibly
leading to a laboratory-associated infection.
Once the factors associated with likelihood or consequence have been defined, a
risk assessment matrix can be used to determine the extent to which these factors
affect the risk. A qualitative matrix-based risk evaluation approach is described in
this monograph in which both likelihood and severity are assigned a non-numerical
classification, which allows the ranking of risk as, for example, “low”, “medium” or “high.”
With this matrix-based approach, the range of classifications for likelihood and severity
can be defined as shown below.
Likelihood of an exposure or release occurring during the proposed laboratory work
n Rare: almost impossible to occur
n Unlikely: not very possible to occur
n Possible: might occur
n Likely: very possible to occur
n Almost certain: highly probable to occur

Severity of the consequences of an exposure/release
n Negligible: Trivial incident or near miss requiring reporting and follow up
n Minor: Incident with self-limiting consequences
n Moderate: Incident that requires medical treatment and/or has insignificant

environmental consequences
n Major: Incident with potential lost time due to infection but non-permanent
consequence and/or limited environmental impact
n Severe: Potential fatality or serious illness with permanent disability and/or serious
environmental impact
This detailed classification system can be found in Annex 2. Long risk assessment
template and a simplified version in Annex 1. Short risk assessment template.
Although a qualitative approach to combining likelihood and

severity parameters in a risk matrix is provided as a risk evaluation
method here, it is important to note that quantitative (for example,
simple numerical scoring schemes to complex mathematical
models) and hybrid (semi-quantitative) methods can also be
used for risk evaluation. Laboratories should use a risk evaluation/
assessment method that best meets their unique needs, without
excluding the possibility of developing customized evaluation
approaches, scoring methods and definitions of the parameters.
2.3 Completing the risk assessment

Two optional templates are provided to help those conducting a risk assessment to
document all the needed information (Annexes 1 and 2). The first version is shorter
and simplified, and may be more useful for small laboratories with a well-defined
and limited scope of work. The second version is longer and more detailed, which
may be better suited for larger facilities with more complex laboratory operations
or may serve as a training tool for risk assessment methodologies. For laboratories
already using another risk assessment method, the templates may provide suggestions
that can be used to complement their current method.
If using one of the templates, complete all sections following the instructions in the grey
boxes, customizing and modifying as needed. The templates could be used as a tool
to facilitate the risk assessment process. The instructions and bullet points in the grey
boxes can be copied into the text boxes beneath the instructions and used as prompts
to gather and record the necessary site-specific information.
12 RISK ASSESSMENT
The grey instruction boxes can then be deleted, and the text remaining will form a
risk assessment draft. This draft must be carefully reviewed, edited as necessary and
approved by the risk assessment team members.
The final draft, including the recommendations of the team, can then be shared with
the laboratory management. If the work being assessed is approved, the process can
move forward and work can begin with the recommended risk control measures in
place to reduce risk, if needed.
A risk assessment is a continual, cyclical process as shown by the framework

(Figure 1.1). Once the laboratory work begins, the risk assessment should be reviewed
and reassessed periodically to address any procedural changes or newly available
information. The template can also be used for future iterations of the continuous
process of risk assessments. Changes that should prompt a reassessment include
equipment or environmental changes, such as procurement of new PPE or laboratory
equipment, or modifications to laboratory spaces. Regulatory changes that would
prompt risk reassessment include changes in legislative oversight of laboratory
operations, including pathogen classification or handling, and updates to biosafety
and biosecurity laws. Changes in personnel, including changes in the health status of
personnel, are also prompts to reassess risks associated with the laboratory work. In
addition, changes in the pathogen status, such as an increase in the prevalence of
disease, expansion of geographical boundaries or development of highly resistant
strains, should prompt review of existing risk assessments. In “Step 5 Review risks
and risk control measures” in the short (Annex 1) and long (Annex 2) risk assessment
templates, the review and reassessment are scheduled. Special situations, such as an
outbreak response, need a dynamic risk assessment that frequently reassesses the
risk and adapts the risk control strategy when necessary. More information on risk
assessment in outbreak situations can be found in Monograph: preparedness and
resilience for an outbreak response (7), section 2. Note that periodic review of risk must
also include analysis of ongoing studies to ensure that they are adequately justified
and the scientific benefits outweigh biosafety risks.
13
APPLYING RISK
SECTION
3
ASSESSMENT TO CONTROL
RISKS
Laboratories that work with biological agents can never eliminate all biological
risks completely. Determining if the risks associated with the work are acceptable or
controllable and hence the work can proceed safely, or if they are too high to allow the
work to be done is part of the risk assessment process. The acceptable risk will vary
from laboratory to laboratory, institution to institution, region to region and country to
country and is influenced by several factors. These factors include but are not limited to:
regulatory requirements overseeing risk, availability and sustainability of resources and
measures for risk mitigation, endemicity of the biological agent or disease in the local
population, value of the work to the community and the risk perception of stakeholders.
Risk acceptance is ultimately determined by the institution and its leadership. For
institutions in regions where published guidance and/or regulations for developing
an acceptable level are currently lacking, the information provided in this section,
as well as in Annexes 1–6, can be used to begin understanding and developing an
institutional approach to risk acceptance. Such an approach will help decide if the risk
it is acceptable (very low or low, for example) or if the risk is unacceptable (medium,
high or very high, for example) and requires risk control measures to bring the risk to
an acceptable risk (very low or low, for example) for work to proceed, based on the
following risk categories.
Table 3.1 Risk assessment matrix defining the risk based on the likelihood of exposure and/or release and
the consequences
Likelihood of exposure/release
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain
Severe Medium Medium High Very high Very high
Major Medium Medium High High Very high

Consequences
of exposure / Moderate Low Low Medium High High
release
Minor Very low Low Low Medium Medium
Negligible Very low Very low Low Medium Medium

14 RISK ASSESSMENT
It is important to note that there are various methods, in addition to the one described
in this monograph, to determine the acceptable risk. Institutions should use a risk
acceptance strategy that best meets their unique needs without excluding the
possibility of developing customized approaches and risk categories that are better
aligned with their laboratory operations.
Based on the initial risk of the laboratory activity, a risk control measure can be applied
to lower this risk to an acceptable risk (Figure 3.1). In some cases, multiple risk control
measures may be required for the risk to be adequately addressed.
Very high
Initial risk
Risk control
measure applied
Risk
Residual risk
Residual risk accepted Start
of laboratory laboratory
activity activity
Very low
Risk assessment process
Figure 3.1 Example of how applying one risk control measure reduces the risk to an
acceptable residual risk, which allows the laboratory activity to start
3.1 Application of key risk assessment steps

A progressive series of common laboratory situations is shown in Table 3.2 to illustrate
how the risk assessment process is applied, and how different laboratory procedures
will need different risk control measures.
The first example in Table 3.2 covers an example of low-risk laboratory work involving
smear preparation and microscopy of sputum specimens. Core requirements
(described in detail in section 3 of the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory biosafety
manual (1)) could be sufficient to control this low risk and no additional risk control
measures are needed. However, it is important to note that despite the low risk, GMPP
must be applied. In addition, to complete the risk assessment cycle, the work should
be reviewed periodically to ensure that GMPP and core requirements are effectively
implemented.
SECTION 3 APPLYING RISK ASSESSMENT TO CONTROL RISKS 15
Table 3.2 Examples of the application of key steps in the risk assessment process
STEP 1: STEP 2: STEP 3: STEP 4: STEP 5:

GATHER EVALUATE RISKS DEVELOP A SELECT AND REVIEW RISKS
INFORMATION RISK CONTROL IMPLEMENT AND RISK
STRATEGY RISK CONTROL CONTROL
MEASURES MEASURES
Routine smear Low Core requirements Prepare SOPs on Observe laboratory
preparation and Specimen volume Core requirements GMPP and core work to ensure
microscopy of and concentration should be adequate requirements GMPP and core
sputum specimens are small to bring this low risk Ensure proper requirements are
Biological agent with to an acceptable risk operation and followed
Aerosol production is
a low infectious dose unlikely maintenance Conduct a review
transmitted through of microscope, in the event of an
Slide containing the
aerosols including written incident, or changes
smear has been
Conducted by SOPs to the characteristics
heat-fixed resulting
competent personal Train personnel on of the biological
in partial inactivation
in a diagnostic SOPs agent or the
laboratory procedures
Small-scale Medium Heightened control In addition to above In addition to above

centrifugation of Biological agent is measures measures: measures:
liquid cultures being propagated in In addition to core Consider potential Observe laboratory
to prepare liquid media requirements, heightened work to ensure
concentrated implementing control measures heightened control
Specimen volume is
stocks for cryogenic certain heightened (PPE, respiratory measures are
small, concentration
storage control measures protective equipment, followed
is high
Biological agent with (such as safety centrifuge safety Conduct a periodic
Aerosol production is
a low infectious dose equipment) should buckets or sealed review (for example,
possible
transmitted through be considered to rotors, BSC) annual)
aerosols bring the medium Ensure proper Evaluate the
Conducted by risk of a potential selection, operation effectiveness of the
competent personal aerosol exposure to and maintenance selected heightened
in a diagnostic an acceptable risk of heightened control measures
laboratory Evaluate and ensure control measures and availability of
heightened control and any additional improved risk control
measures and any safety measures (for measures of the
additional safety example, restricted biological agent or
measures are access to minimize the procedures
locally available potential exposure),
and sustainable including written
(for example, cost– SOPs
benefit analysis) Train personnel
on SOPs and spill
response
16 RISK ASSESSMENT
Table 3.2 Examples of the application of key steps in the risk assessment process (continued)

MEASURES MEASURES
Large-scale culture High Heightened control In addition to above In addition to above:
of drug-resistant Biological agent is measures measures: Routinely conduct
strains being propagated in In addition to core Consider potential spill exercises and
Biological agent with liquid media requirements, heightened drills on potential
a low infectious dose Specimen volume is consider control measures incidents (for
transmitted through high, concentration implementing (for example, example, biannually)
aerosols is very high selected heightened segregation of the Continually evaluate
Conducted by control measures laboratory area training/mentorship
Aerosol production
competent personal (for example, where the higher- programmes (for
is likely
in a pharmaceutical safety equipment risk work is being example, solicit
Biological agent and/or facility done, controlled
laboratory feedback and input
is known to be enhancements) ventilation and/ from the laboratory
resistant to available to reduce the or waste disposal personnel) of the
medicines risk of a potential systems) biological agent or
aerosol exposure Ensure proper the procedures
or release of high- selection, operation
risk pathogen to an and maintenance of
acceptable risk heightened control
Ensure heightened measures, and any
control measures additional criteria
and any additional for facility design,
laboratory safety including written
design criteria are SOPs
locally sustainable Train personnel on
(for example, cost– SOPs, including
benefit analysis to emergency response
include outsourcing and large spill
versus doing the management
work in-house)

MEASURES MEASURES
Oral inoculation of Low Core requirements Prepare SOPs on Observe laboratory
rodents with a non- GMPP and core work to ensure
infectious rotavirus Non-pathogenic Core requirements requirements GMPP and core
biological agent should be adequate requirements are
Conducted by newly Ensure proper
Percutaneous injury to bring this low risk followed
trained personnel performance of
from oral inoculation to an acceptable risk
in a research the experiments Conduct a review
laboratory is unlikely but rodent according to the in the event of an
bite is possible SOPs incident, or changes
New personnel to the characteristics
must be trained of the biological
and demonstrate agent or the
competency on SOPs procedures
and safe animal
handling procedures
Intravenous Medium Heightened control In addition to above In addition to above

inoculation of Severe disease but measures measures: measures:
rodents with tick- vaccine may be In addition to core Consider potential Observe laboratory
borne encephalitis available requirements, heightened work to ensure
virus implementing control measures heightened control
Percutaneous injury
Conducted by newly from intravenous certain heightened (PPE, respiratory measures are
trained personnel inoculation or rodent control measures protective followed
in a research bite is possible (safety equipment, equipment, safety Conduct a periodic
laboratory vaccination) should sharps devices, BSC) review (for example,
Aerosol generation is
be considered to Ensure proper annual)
possible
bring the medium selection, operation Evaluate the
risk of a potential and maintenance of effectiveness of the
aerosol exposure heightened control selected heightened
and a needle measures (for control measures
stick injury to an example, restricted and availability of
acceptable risk access to minimize improved risk control
Evaluate and ensure potential exposure), measures
heightened control including written
measures and any SOPs
additional safety New personnel
measures are must be trained
locally available and demonstrate
and sustainable competency on safe
(for example, cost– sharps handling
benefit analysis)
18 RISK ASSESSMENT

MEASURES MEASURES
Intravenous High Heightened control In addition to above In addition to above:
inoculation of Fatal disease, measures measures:
rodents with Routinely conduct
no available In addition to core Consider potential
Creutzfeldt-Jakob spill exercises and
prophylaxis, vaccine requirements, heightened
disease agent drills on potential
or treatment consider control measures
(prions) incidents (for
Percutaneous injury implementing (for example,
example, biannually)
Conducted by newly from intravenous selected heightened segregation of the
trained personnel control measures laboratory area Continually evaluate
inoculation or rodent
in a research (for example, where the higher- training/mentorship
bite is possible
laboratory work practices, risk work is being programmes (for
Aerosol generation is example, solicit
safety equipment done, controlled
possible feedback and
and/or facility ventilation and/
Highly resistant enhancements) or specialized input from the
to common to reduce the decontamination laboratory personnel
disinfection/ risk of a potential methods and waste especially on safe
sterilization methods percutaneous or disposal systems) sharps devices and
aerosol exposure handling)
Ensure proper
or release of high- selection, operation
risk pathogen to an and maintenance of
acceptable risk heightened control
Ensure heightened measures, and any
control measures additional criteria
and any additional for facility design,
laboratory safety including written
design criteria are SOPs
locally sustainable New personnel must
(for example, cost– be trained, mentored
benefit analysis to and demonstrate
include outsourcing competency on
versus doing the SOPs and rigid
work in-house) disinfection/
sterilization/waste
management
protocols
BSC = biological safety cabinet; GMPP = good microbiological practice and procedure; PPE = personal protective equipment; SOPs =
standard operating procedures.
Note: To simplify the process, the situations and scope of analyses are deliberately narrow and do not include all possible inputs and
outcomes. An actual risk assessment is likely to have many more factors to consider and be more complex than the examples in the
table. This table is intended to provide a high-level overview of how different laboratory procedures will affect the risk assessment
process and outcomes.
Culturing of small volumes of human pathogenic biological agents could be

an example of a medium-risk activity. For this type of laboratory activity, core
requirements may be supplemented with selected heightened control measures
(described in detail in section 4 of the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory biosafety
manual (1)), such as safety equipment, to bring risk to within an acceptable range.
High-risk laboratory activities may include work such as manipulation of large volumes
of drug-resistant strains of biological agents and animal studies with zoonotic agents
that can be transmitted through aerosols. Laboratory work of this nature needs careful
consideration, and cost–benefit analyses of the work to determine if it should be done.
These analyses should include a thorough evaluation of heightened control measures
that could be implemented to improve the laboratory’s facilities and reduce risks.
Other factors to consider are the cost–benefit of outsourcing the work or whether the
work should proceed at all.
It is important to note that some situations, unlike those in Table 3.2, present extremely
high risks. For example, laboratory work with a biological agent that has been
eradicated globally may be considered very high-risk work. Accidental exposure or
release could result in a rapid spread of infection in a susceptible population causing
severe disease and many deaths. For this type of work, maximum containment
measures (described in detail in section 5 of the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory
biosafety manual (1)) may be the only suitable risk control measures to effectively
control risks.
Such measures require specialized facilities and highly trained personnel. Maximum
containment measures provide the highest level of protection against exposure to and
release of dangerous pathogens with catastrophic consequences. These measures
are costly to maintain, and require frequent and rigorous performance verification of
procedures, equipment and laboratory facilities. It is therefore important to confirm
that maximum containment measures can be effectively implemented and maintained
before considering work with highly dangerous pathogens as described above.
Detailed examples of the risk assessment process and implementation of risk-based

strategies and programmes for laboratories are provided in the risk assessment
templates (Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6).
3.2 Additional risk control measures

Biological risks are influenced by the pathogenic potential of the biological agents
manipulated in the laboratory. However, to a greater degree, these risks are influenced
by the physical state of these organisms and the specific manipulations to be done.
Consultation with peers and periodic review of the literature may provide alternative or
new methods that may supplement or replace high-risk activities with low-risk methods,
which can reduce the initial risk of the laboratory activity before applying any risk
control measures. These methods might reduce risk in several ways.
20 RISK ASSESSMENT
Some may allow work to be done using smaller volumes and concentrations of
pathogens, while others may allow work to be done with inactivated biological agents
thereby eliminating the need for active replication of pathogenic strains.
Molecular detection methods produce highly sensitive and specific results and pose
less risk than standard bacterial and viral culture. Selecting low-risk (for example,
attenuated) positive controls for assay verification is another way to reduce biological
risk. Depending on the test method, attenuated strains of the biological agent may
be used as positive controls providing results equivalent to highly pathogenic strains.
This strategy is of particular interest to laboratories responsible for surveillance
testing for severe and re-emerging epidemic diseases. Another example of reducing
biological risk is the use of inactivated biological agents in vaccine production. Vaccine
production requires manipulation of large volumes of organic material. However, in
some cases, recombinant or attenuated strains of the biological agent are available
which can replace highly virulent bacteria or viruses, thus greatly reducing risks to
personnel and the environment if an accidental exposure or release occurred.
Substituting new molecular methods for traditional microbiological methods reduces

risks and should be considered wherever possible. Although use of these methods
may be costly to begin with, laboratories that have made use of them have ultimately
experienced reduced operational costs and improved personnel performance.
However, elimination or substitution of the hazardous laboratory activity is not always
possible, and any laboratory activity should not proceed until risks are acceptable.
As a general rule, consider the following as ways to reduce risk.
n Use microvolumes. Wherever possible, reduce the volumes of biological materials for
analyses by substituting small tubes (for example, microtubes, microcentrifuge tubes)
and micropipetting for large tubes/bottles and pipettes.
n Avoid culture and propagation of the pathogens. Highly sensitive and specific
molecular detection methods have become available for many pathogens. Nucleic
acid amplification techniques can directly use clinical specimens without the need
for culture. Using molecular methods, a small portion of DNA/RNA of the pathogen
can be amplified from a clinical specimen, and this is usually sufficient to confirm
infection. Currently, the costs of molecular genetic methods are comparable to
classical microbiological methods.
n Inactivate clinical specimens before analyses. Specimens from biopsies or

necropsies can often be placed directly into special inactivating buffers (for example,
thiocyanate-based buffers or buffered formalin). These buffers make tissues non-
infectious but conserve the important target for analysis, such as DNA, RNA or protein.
After inactivation, organic specimens are safer and simpler to transport and often
do not require a cold chain. They can be handled in the laboratory without risk of
infection in the event of accidental exposure or release.
n Use non-infectious control and production strains. For diagnostic laboratories, the
use of positive controls is important for instrument calibration and assay verification.
Depending on the test, attenuated control strains may be available and can be
substituted as positive controls for highly pathogenic strains. Similarly, using either
attenuated or recombinant pathogens that express the antigens necessary for
vaccine production will substantially reduce the biological risk and costs of vaccine
production.
Eliminating or substituting the hazard in certain procedures, for example, by using DNA
or inactivated/attenuated strains of the biological agent to reduce the initial risk, is the
most effective means of risk reduction (Figure 3.2). However, administrative controls
(for example, training, policies, guidelines, SOPs) should be in place before beginning
any laboratory work. In most situations, selecting and implementing the right
combination of risk control measures is necessary so that they complement each other
in reducing biological risks. In order to select appropriate measures for risk control,
an understanding of the purpose and strengths and weaknesses of each measure is
required. Table 3.4 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the most common
risk control measures. These features can be compared and contrasted during a
laboratory risk assessment and the most appropriate control(s) selected for the work
proposed.
22 RISK ASSESSMENT
DECREASING RISK
In vivo propagation In vitro propagation Nucleic acid-based assays
Pathogenic strains Attenuated strains Inactivated strains
Large volume Small volume Microvolume
Figure 3.2 Examples of techniques to reduce or eliminate the risks of infection associated with manipulating
biological agents. The lower risks reduce the need for risk control measures that would otherwise be
required.
Table 3.4 Types of control
TYPE OF CONTROL EXAMPLES ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Substitution or § Inactivated materials § Reduces or completely § May not always be
elimination § Attenuated/less virulent eliminates the hazard a scientifically and
strain of a biological agent diagnostically possible
option
§ Molecular or
immunological method
instead of a culture for
diagnosis
Administration § Policies, standards and § Limits or prevents exposure § Does not always eliminate
guidelines used to control to the hazard the hazard
risks § Standardized procedural § Relies heavily on personnel
§ Changes to the way people approach training, competency and
work compliance with SOPs
§ Signs and warning labels
Practices and § GMPP

procedures § SOPs
PPE § Laboratory coats § Effective when correctly § Does not eliminate the
§ Footwear used hazard
§ Gloves § Readily available § Only protects the person
§ Relatively low cost wearing the PPE
§ Eye protection
§ May be uncomfortable to
§ Respiratory protection
wear
§ May limit dexterity
§ May be used incorrectly
Primary barriers or § BSCs § Eliminates and/or isolates § Increased cost

containment devices § Sealed rotors and personnel from the hazard § May not be locally
centrifuge safety buckets § Protects everyone in the available/sustainable
laboratory § Increased complexity
Secondary barriers Facility design criteria such
§ Effective when used and § Relies on personnel training
as:
maintained properly and competency
§ Separation of the
laboratory work area from
administrative areas and
public access
§ Decontamination facilities
(for example, autoclaves)
§ Handwashing facilities
BSCs = biological safety cabinets; GMPP = good microbiological practice and procedure; PPE = personal protective equipment;
SOPs = standard operating procedures.
24 RISK ASSESSMENT
25
IMPLEMENTATION
SECTION
4 STRATEGIES AND
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD
Risk assessments are generally conducted following the standard framework outlined
in Figure 1.1; however, as mentioned previously, they may be conducted in different
ways. Although the exact method of risk assessment may vary, all risk assessments are
equally valid if they appropriately incorporate all the elements of the risk assessment
framework (Figure 1.1). If choosing a risk assessment method that differs from the
standard framework, it is important to consider issues such as the availability of
resources and key personnel, the organizational and/or governmental structure, and
the needs specific to a facility or region. A common problem when preparing to
carry out a risk assessment is the lack of experienced personnel. In such cases, the
risk assessment team may be led by a single experienced individual. However, other
laboratory personnel should still be consulted for their input to ensure all elements
of the laboratory work are properly considered. Examples of approaches to risk
assessments where the number of personnel is limited are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Approaches to conducting risk assessments where the number of personnel
is limited: advantages and disadvantages
PERSONNEL AND ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

APPROACH
§ One designated individual, § Quick completion of the risk § The assessment may not be
either a biosafety assessment if designated prioritized if the individual
officer or laboratory individual is highly is carrying out biosafety
manager/technician, is motivated activities as an additional
responsible for drafting duty
the risk assessment for the § Relevant details may
laboratory be missed if the level of
§ Subsequent review by expertise and experience
relevant subject-specific with the laboratory
experts and the laboratory activities of this individual
management is limited, especially if few
experienced personnel
are available for the
subsequent review
26 RISK ASSESSMENT
Table 4.1 Approaches to conducting risk assessments where the number of personnel
is limited: advantages and disadvantages (continued)
PERSONNEL AND ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

APPROACH
§ A small team of laboratory § Varied experience and § If roles and responsibilities
and/or biosafety personnel expertise within the group are not clearly defined and
to contribute to the risk applied, differing opinions
assessment and unresolved conflicts
may affect completion of
the assessment on time
§ A blended version with § Laboratory management § If roles and responsibilities

a designated individual and the individuals directly of the designated assessor
(laboratory manager/ responsible for conducting and the committee are not
principal investigator the laboratory work clearly defined and applied,
or biosafety officer) working together delays in completion of the
responsible for providing § Integration of laboratory assessment may occur
a first draft of the risk management needs with § Those not actively
assessment biosafety best practice participating in the
§ A small team or committee assessment may not
of laboratory scientists or feel accountable; it may
technicians to review the therefore be necessary to
draft prepare SOPs, charters
and other mechanisms to
ensure their engagement.
SOPs = standard operating procedures.
4.1 Lessons from the field: laboratory-associated Salmonella

infection
BOX 4.1 LESSONS FROM THE FIELD:

LABORATORY-ASSOCIATED SALMONELLA INFECTION
Jan, a junior member of the laboratory personnel in an enteric bacterial laboratory,

was asked to prepare a subculture of Salmonella Typhimurium (causative
agent for infectious diarrhoea) for another laboratory. She had prepared
many subcultures before and had been trained to do so but her main role was
to receive, check and record incoming cultures from satellite laboratories. All
cultures received are stored frozen in Luria broth and 40% glycerol but old cultures
were frozen in Luria broth and blood. Jan mentioned that the S. Typhimurium
culture was frozen and she had not worked with frozen cultures before. The unit
chief therefore asked an experienced member of the personnel to train her to
manipulate the frozen culture.
SECTION 4 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 27

LABORATORY-ASSOCIATED SALMONELLA INFECTION (CONTINUED)
Less than a week later, Jan was sick for several days and off work. Later, it was
found that she had been suffering from severe diarrhoea and cramping and
visited the emergency room at a local hospital to receive treatment. When
the doctor asked about any potential cause of the illness, Jan mentioned her
work at the laboratory. A stool culture was taken and sent to the state public
health laboratory for identification. Jan alerted the unit chief of her laboratory
the following day. It was noted that she may be suffering from a laboratory-
associated infection.
Results from the state health laboratory indicated that the bacterial species was
indeed S. Typhimurium. Because of the serious implications of a laboratory-
associated infection, DNA was sequenced in both the culture that was
manipulated and the stool culture isolate. Comparative sequence analyses
confirmed that it was a laboratory-associated infection. A root cause analysis was
carried out to identify what had happened to cause Jan to become infected. This
analysis showed that: 1) the training to work with frozen cultures did not occur, 2)
this culture was manipulated outside of the biological safety cabinet (BSC) and
no face shield was used, and 3) the frozen culture was not fully thawed before
subculturing began. It is suspected that an ice chip containing the organism
was ingested, either directly in the mouth during the procedure or through the
laboratory coat or other environmental contamination before handwashing.
A completed risk assessment determined that culture manipulation was sometimes
carried out at the bench with no shield in place, and that only S. Typhi (causative
agent for typhoid) was routinely manipulated inside the BSC. As a result, all
laboratory personnel received BSC training and were instructed to carry out
all manipulations on solid and liquid media inside a BSC. After all hazards and
risks were identified, other risk control measures were applied. These measures
included the use of goggles when working (mixing capped tubes) with cultures in
broth at the bench and the use of carts to transport any cultures in the laboratory
to avoid spills. No further incidents have occurred.
28 RISK ASSESSMENT
4.2 Lessons from the field: risk assessment of a “near miss”

RISK ASSESSMENT OF A “NEAR MISS”
The preparation of slides for microscopic evaluation from cytological specimens

takes place in a laboratory in a department of pathology. In the same laboratory,
other work is done such as immunohistochemistry but no potentially infectious
material is used in this other work. To prevent the spread of potentially infectious
biological agents from the work with cytological specimens, the handling of a
specimen is done in a biological safety cabinet (BSC) with a small centrifuge. The
range of specimens is wide (pleural effusion, sputum, ascites, urine, cerebrospinal
fluid and others), and the presence of biological agents in most of the specimens
is unknown, unless it is stated in the accompanying documents. These biological
agents could include HIV, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus and Mycobacterium
tuberculosis, among others. Several methods are used in the laboratory to prepare
cytological slides, such as the standard smear preparation, cytobloc preparation
and cytospin, but most of the methods include a centrifugation step.
The centrifuge in the BSC had been recently replaced and, because no risk
assessment had been done for the old centrifuge, the laboratory management did
not consider carrying out a risk assessment for the new centrifuge. After a month, a
member of the personnel reported a possible disruption in the airflow in the BSC. A
smoke test was done which confirmed the initial suspicion of an airflow interruption.
Following this near miss, a risk assessment was done which identified that
aerosols, potentially containing biological agents, could escape from the BSC as
a result of the interrupted airflow caused by the centrifuge. To reduce this risk, the
centrifuge was placed outside the BSC. The standard operating procedures for the
preparation of cytological slides were amended to include a section explaining
how to disinfect the surface of the microcentrifuge tube containing the biological
agent before bringing it out of the BSC for centrifugation.
4.3 Lessons from the field: adapting risk control measures for
a health condition

ADAPTING RISK CONTROL MEASURES FOR A HEALTH CONDITION
An institute plans laboratory activities as well as animal infection studies with

avian influenza. To date, only molecular methods were used in the laboratory. The
biosafety team together with the responsible scientist undertook a risk assessment
to determine the risk control measures for safe working. The responsible scientist
rarely works in the laboratory and delegates the work to several people in his team.
SECTION 4 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 29

ADAPTING RISK CONTROL MEASURES FOR A HEALTH CONDITION
(CONTINUED)
One team member is a female laboratory assistant. However, this laboratory

assistant suffers from a thrombocyte dysfunction. This means that coagulation
of her blood is impaired if she is injured (by a cut, a needlestick injury). Therefore,
severe bleeding injuries are dangerous because she can lose a large amount of
blood in a very short time. Routine laboratory activities such as molecular biology
methods do not pose an increased risk for her. In addition, no sharps are used in
her work thus reducing the risk of injury.
The original risk assessment of the laboratory work including inoculation of eggs
or mice and dissection of mice was based on healthy laboratory personnel. In
this original risk assessment, sharps are routinely used, either to inoculate eggs or
mice or to dissect infected mice. During the initial biosafety training, the laboratory
assistant mentioned her medical status. This triggered a review of the existing risk
assessment and additional risk control measures were defined for the laboratory
assistant. She is not allowed to carry out any steps with a high risk of injury, such
as working with sharps for mice inoculation or dissection. The use of a microtome
is also prohibited. For mice dissection or removal of organs, only blunt scissors (for
example, Baby Metzenbaum) instead of a scalpel are to be used. A second person
must always be with her during animal work. All members of the group and all
first responders are informed and instructed how to act in case of an injury to the
laboratory assistant. In the first-aid room, medication and haemostatic cotton
wool/plasters are stored, together with clear instructions on how to act in case of
an emergency.
Risk communication is never more important than when working with personnel
with greater susceptibility to a laboratory hazard and therefore at increased risk.
Some personnel are willing, and are even insistent that they be allowed, to do their
laboratory work despite their increased risk because of their medical status and/or
disability. Depending on national regulations and local policies that typically govern
these situations, certain restrictions and/or accommodations have to be made.
It is important that all potential risks are properly communicated to these
individuals at increased risk. If they are permitted to work in laboratory areas,
perhaps with increased risk control measures such as PPE, it is important that
both they and others working in the area are made aware of these measures. This
situation can be especially complicated when trying to preserve an individual’s
right to privacy but it is essential that others are not made to feel “less safe” than
the at-risk person who is working with additional risk control measures. Proper
communication is vital to make these types of situation workable and safe for all.
30 RISK ASSESSMENT
References
1. Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition. Geneva: World Health Organization;
2020 (Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs).
2. Laboratory design and maintenance. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020

(Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs).
3. Biological safety cabinets and other primary containment devices. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2020 (Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and
associated monographs).
4. Personal protective equipment. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020

5. Decontamination and waste management. Geneva: World Health Organization;

2020 (Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs).
6. Biosafety programme management. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020

7. Outbreak preparedness and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020

31
Further information
Biosafety and biosecurity: standard for managing biological risk in the veterinary
laboratory and animal facilities. In: Manual of diagnostic tests and vaccines for
terrestrial animals, 8th edition. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE);
2018 (https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/1.01.04_
BIOSAFETY_BIOSECURITY.pdf, accessed 6 December 2019).
Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories, 5th edition. Washington,

DC: US Department of Health and Human Services; 2009 (https://www.cdc.gov/labs/
pdf/CDC-BiosafetyMicrobiologicalBiomedicalLaboratories-2009-P.PDF, accessed 6
December 2019).
Health Canada decision-making framework for identifying, assessing, and managing

health risks. Health Canada; 2000 (https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/
corporate/about-health-canada/reports-publications/health-products-food-branch/
health-canada-decision-making-framework-identifying-assessing-managing-
health-risks.html, accessed 26 November 2019).
The International Federation of Biosafety Associations Laboratory biosafety and

biosecurity risk assessment technical guidance document. Albuquerque: Sandia
National Laboratories; 2014 (https://prod-ng.sandia.gov/techlib-noauth/access-
control.cgi/2014/1415939r.pdf, accessed 6 December 2019).
Public Health Agency of Canada. Pathogens safety data sheets. Government of

Canada (https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/laboratory-biosafety-
biosecurity/pathogen-safety-data-sheets-risk-assessment.html, accessed 26
November 2019).
Salerno RM, Gaudioso J, editors. Laboratory biorisk management: biosafety and

biosecurity, 1st edition. Boca Raton (FL): CRC Press; 2015 (https://www.crcpress.com/
Laboratory-Biorisk-Management-Biosafety-and-Biosecurity/Salerno-Gaudioso/p/
book/9781466593640, accessed 26 November 2019).
ISO 35001:2019 Biorisk management for laboratories and other related organisations.
Geneva: International Organization for Standardization; 2019 (https://www.iso.org/
standard/71293.html, accessed 20 February 2020)
32 RISK ASSESSMENT
ANNEX 1. RISK ASSESSMENT

SHORT TEMPLATE
Institution/Facility name
Laboratory name
Laboratory manager/Supervisor
Project titles/Relevant standard operating

procedures (SOPs)
Date

If using this template, complete all sections following the instructions in the grey boxes. The instructions and
bullet points in the grey boxes can be copied into the text boxes beneath the instructions and used as prompts to
gather and record the necessary site-specific information. The grey instruction boxes can then be deleted, and the
text remaining will form a risk assessment draft. This draft must be carefully reviewed, edited as necessary and
STEP 1. Gather information (hazard identification)

Instructions: Provide a brief overview of the laboratory work and summarize the laboratory activities to be
conducted that are included in the scope of this risk assessment.
Describe the biological agents and other potential
hazards (for example, transmission, infectious dose,
treatment/preventive measures, pathogenicity).
Describe the laboratory procedures to be used (for example,
culturing, centrifugation, work with sharps, waste
handling, frequency of performing the laboratory activity).
Describe the types of equipment to be used (personal
protective equipment (PPE), centrifuges, autoclaves,
biological safety cabinets (BSCs)).
Describe the type and condition of the facility where
work is conducted.
Describe relevant human factors (for example,

competency, training, experience and attitude of
personnel).
Describe any other factors that may affect laboratory
operations (for example, legal, cultural, socioeconomic).

ANNEX 1 RISK ASSESSMENT SHORT TEMPLATE 33
STEP 2. Evaluate the risks

Instructions: Describe how exposure and/or release could occur.
What potential situations are there in which exposure or
release could occur?
What is the likelihood of an exposure/release occurring

(unlikely, possible, likely)?
What is the severity of the consequences of an exposure/

release (negligible, moderate, severe)?

Instructions: Evaluate the risk and prioritize the implementation of risk control measures. Circle the initial risk of
the laboratory activities including risk control measures described in STEP 1 but before any additional risk control
measures have been put in place.
Note:
• When assigning priority, other factors may need to be considered, for example, urgency, feasibility/sustainability
of risk control measures, delivery and installation time and training availability.
• To estimate the overall risk, take into consideration the risk ratings for the individual laboratory activities/
procedures, separately or collectively as appropriate for the laboratory.
Unlikely Possible Likely
Severe Medium High Very high
Consequences of
exposure /release Moderate Low Medium High
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
Laboratory activity/procedure Initial risk Is the initial risk Priority

(very low, low, acceptable? (high/medium/low)
medium, high, (yes/no)
very high)
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Select the overall initial risk.
Very low Low Medium High Very high
Should work proceed without additional risk
Yes ¨ No ¨
control measures?
34 RISK ASSESSMENT
STEP 3. Develop a risk control strategy

Instructions: Describe the resources available for risk control and consider their applicability, availability and
sustainability in the local context including management support.
Are resources sufficient to secure and maintain potential
risk control measures?
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and

strategies (if any).
Will work be able to proceed without any of the risk

control measures; are there alternatives?
STEP 4. Select and implement risk control measures

Instructions: List any requirements that have been prescribed by international and national regulations, legislation,
guidelines, policies and strategies on biosafety and biosecurity. In addition, consider if there are any local
regulations, guidelines or policies that restrict or govern certain laboratory activities and/or the handling and use of
any biological agents.
Describe the measures required by national legislation
or regulations (if any).
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and


Instructions: Describe where and when risk control measures are needed, the residual risk when these risk control
measures are in place, and an assessment of the availability, effectiveness and sustainability of the risk control
measures.
Laboratory activity/procedure Selected risk Residual risk Is the residual risk Are risk control
control measure(s) (very low, low, acceptable? measures
medium, high, (yes/no) available, effective
very high) and sustainable?
(yes/no)

ANNEX 1 RISK ASSESSMENT SHORT TEMPLATE 35
STEP 4. Select and implement risk control measures (continued)

Instructions: Evaluate the residual risk that remains after risk control measures have been selected to determine if
the risk is now acceptable and whether work should proceed.
Circle the residual risk of the laboratory activities after risk control measures are in place.
Consequences of
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Overall residual risk.
If the residual risk is still unacceptable, further action is necessary such as additional risk control measures, based
on the initial risk evaluated in STEP 2, redefining the scope of work such that it is acceptable with existing risk control
measures in place or identifying an alternative laboratory with appropriate risk control strategies already in place
that is capable of conducting the work as planned.
Should work proceed with selected Yes ¨ No ¨
Approved by (Name and title)
Approved by (Signature)
Date

Instructions: Describe how to communicate risks and risk mitigation strategies to personnel. Provide a mechanism of
communication within the laboratory. Describe the process and timeline for ensuring that all identified risk control
measures are purchased, have associated SOPs and training has been completed before starting the laboratory
work.
Communication of the hazards, risks and risk control
measures
Purchase (and budgeting) of risk control measures
Operational and maintenance procedures
Training of personnel

36 RISK ASSESSMENT
STEP 5. Review risks and risk control measures

Instructions: Establish a periodic review cycle to identify: changes in laboratory activities, biological agents,
personnel, equipment or facilities; changes in knowledge of biological agents or processes; and lessons learnt from
audits/inspections, personnel feedback, incidents and/or near misses.
Frequency of the review
Person to conduct the review
Describe updates/changes
Personnel/procedures to implement the changes
Reviewed by (Name and title)
Reviewed by (Signature)
Date

37
ANNEX 2. RISK ASSESSMENT

LONG TEMPLATE
Institution/Facility name
Laboratory name
Laboratory manager/Supervisor
Location
Project titles/Relevant standard operating

procedures (SOPs)
Date


1.1 Provide a brief overview of the laboratory work
Instructions: Summarize the laboratory activities to be conducted that are included in the scope of this risk
assessment. If the laboratory conducts other similar work on a regular basis (for example, well-defined, routine
diagnostic testing), consider using one assessment to cover all laboratory activities. However, large and more
complex laboratories that carry out a variety of laboratory activities, such as diagnostic testing, confirmatory
testing, characterization of biological agents and research, may want to conduct separate risk assessments.
38 RISK ASSESSMENT
1.2 Describe the biological agents and other potential hazards
Instructions: Identify the hazards. It is important to know the characteristics of the biological agent(s) when
determining the risks it presents. When the specific biological agent is known, the following information will
be useful for the risk assessment and should be thoroughly researched. When handling unknown or diagnostic
specimens, it is important to try and obtain any information on the source of the specimens and/or a presumptive/
suspected diagnosis. Typical information to be gathered about the biological agent(s) includes:
• pathogenicity/severity of disease
• epidemiology and host range
• sources/specimens
• infectious dose, concentration and volume
• route(s) of transmission
• incubation period and communicability
• viability and susceptibility to disinfectants
• means of diagnosing the disease, type of testing done for diagnosis
• treatment, immunization and prophylaxis available
• unique laboratory hazards (laboratory-associated infections)
• additional information.
ANNEX 2 RISK ASSESSMENT LONG TEMPLATE 39
1.3 Describe the laboratory procedures to be used
Instructions: Identify the laboratory activities that might cause exposure to the biological agent when it is being
transported, handled or manipulated. Consider the following:
• centrifuging
• cleaning up spills
• contact with fomites or contaminated surfaces
• inoculating media, including how frequently and in what concentration the biological agent is isolated/
propagated
• manipulating inoculation loops, pipettes, needles and other sharps, syringes
• mixing, blending, grinding, shaking, sonicating and vortexing
• pouring, splitting or decanting liquids
• preparing smears, heat fixing or staining slides
• spilling/dropping/splashing infectious material
• transporting specimens/materials inside and outside the laboratory, leaky specimen containers
• frequency of performing the laboratory activity
• using animals and insects
- scratches, bites, stings
- dissection, organ collection and disposal procedures
- inoculation, injection or blood drawing
• handling biological waste
- specimen/culture/pathogen transport procedures
- inactivation procedures (for example, chemical, heat)
- disposal procedures (for example, autoclaving, incinerating).
40 RISK ASSESSMENT
1.4 Describe the types of equipment to be used
Instructions: Determine what instruments and equipment will be used to do the laboratory work. Please note
that each type of equipment has its own inherent risks. For example, if centrifugation will be used, the potential
for aerosols to be produced is a risk to consider. List any safety equipment that is available and likely to be used.
Examples of equipment that may be used include:
• personal protective equipment (PPE)
- gloves
- protective clothing
- protective eyewear
- respiratory protection (has it been fit tested?)
• autoclave (has it been validated?)
• biological safety cabinet (BSC) (has it been certified?)
• handwashing sink
• centrifuge (does it have sealed rotors or safety cups?)
• incubator
• refrigerator/freezer
• additional equipment, list:
1.5 Describe the type and condition of the facility where work is conducted
Instructions: Consider the layout and type of facility where work will be done to determine if laboratory activities
can be conducted safely and securely. The workflow of the laboratory activities from one area of the laboratory to
another should also be considered, including specimen receipt, transport, processing and disposal. Consider the
following factors.
• Will the work be carried out in a large, multipurpose space?
• Are separate rooms or spaces available for high-risk laboratory activities?
• Does the workflow and specimen transport create any special concerns for surface contamination or other
laboratory accidents?
• Are laboratory floors, bench tops and furniture non-porous and impervious to the biological agent?
• Is laboratory furniture in good repair and ergonomically appropriate for the workstation?
• Do laboratory areas have closable doors?
• Are windows sealed or fitted with screens?
42 RISK ASSESSMENT
1.6 Describe relevant human factors (for example, competency and suitability of personnel)
Instructions: Consider the competency and experience of laboratory personnel. Assess the training the personnel
have had on the biological agent(s), and their experience of handling it and using relevant biosafety practices and
safety equipment when performing laboratory work. Consider the following factors.
• Do personnel have experience working with these biological agents or similar biological agents?
• Do personnel have experience performing these procedures and using this equipment?
• Are personnel trained to work with diagnostic specimens and unknown agents and do they have experience in this
work?
• Have all personnel had relevant biosafety training or been briefed on laboratory biosafety, including cleaning
and maintenance personnel and visitors, so that all personnel and people entering the laboratory are adequately
informed about the hazards in the laboratory?
• Do personnel have positive attitudes to biosafety and adherence to safety procedures?
• Have there been prior incidents or laboratory-associated infections with this laboratory or these personnel?
• Are any personnel at increased risk because of greater susceptibility to laboratory hazards?
• Is there undue time pressure on personnel that may result in stress and fatigue?
Use the following table to list the personnel and their training on the relevant SOP and safety.
Personnel
Name SOP/Safety training Date completed

1.7 Describe any other factors that may affect laboratory operations
Instructions: Consider the legal, cultural and socioeconomic effects related to the work, and potential public
perception of the work. Consider the following in relation to the local context.
• Is the laboratory, institute or agency highly regarded by the government or the public such that this could
influence decision-making?
• Is the level of organizational and financial resources available enough to manage the biological risks, including:
- reliable utilities (electrical/water supply),
- properly maintained facility infrastructure,
- commitment to personnel development to prevent under-staffed laboratories with under-trained personnel?
• Is there potential for severe weather that could adversely affect laboratory operations?
• Is there political, economic or criminal activity/instability that could adversely affect laboratory operations?
• Do any of the laboratory activities or biological agents have the potential to cause fear or panic in the community?
- Is the biological agent unusual or unfamiliar to the local community?
- Does infection have very severe or potentially fatal consequences?
- Is there potential for widespread transmissibility or an outbreak of disease?
- Are preventative or therapeutic interventions locally available?
44 RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Describe how exposure and/or release could occur
Instructions: Based on the information gathered, and the biological and procedural hazards associated with the
laboratory work that have been identified, give details of how a potential exposure or release could occur.
• Examples of how exposure to a biological agent could occur include:
- direct contact with skin and/or mucous membranes from spills, splashes or contaminated work surfaces
- percutaneous or parenteral exposure through inoculation or contaminated sharps
- ingestion
- inhalation of infectious aerosols
- malfunction or misuse of PPE.
• Examples of how release of a biological agent could occur include:
- improper packaging and transport, leaking containers
- malfunction of safety equipment resulting in breaches of containment
- spills
- improper disinfection or waste handling and disposal.
2.2 Determine the likelihood of exposure or release and what factors have the greatest influence on likelihood
Instructions: Based on the information gathered and the potential situations for exposure/release to occur, what
factors influence the likelihood of an exposure to or release of a biological agent? Consider the questions below
and identify any others that either increase or decrease the likelihood that an exposure/release will occur.
• What laboratory activities are planned (for example, genetic modification, animal work, sonication, centrifugation
or other procedures that may result in the production of aerosols)?
• What equipment is needed for the planned activities?
• What is the concentration and volume of the biological agent and potentially infectious material to be
manipulated?
• What is the competency of the personnel carrying out the work?
• How often is the task performed and how long does it take to do?
• Has an exposure/release ever happened before? How often?
• How effective are current risk control measures in reducing risk?
• Are the hazards more likely to cause harm because of the working environment?
• Could the way people act and behave affect the likelihood of a biological agent causing harm?
• Do any of the above items make the harm more or less likely? If yes, list them and explain why.
• What is the likelihood of the exposure and/or release occurring?
- Rare: almost impossible to occur
- Unlikely: not very possible to occur
- Possible: might occur
- Likely: very possible to occur
- Almost certain: highly probable to occur
46 RISK ASSESSMENT
2.3 Determine the consequences of exposure or release and what has the greatest influence on consequence
Instructions: Based on the information gathered and consequences of an exposure and/or release, what factors
influence the consequences? Consider the questions below and identify any others that either increase or decrease
the severity and/or magnitude of these consequences if an exposure/release occurred.
• What type of harm could occur? How severe is the harm? Could the hazard cause death, serious injuries or illness,
or only minor injuries requiring first aid?
• What factors could influence the severity of harm that occurs? For example, the distance someone might fall or
the concentration of a particular substance will determine the level of harm that is possible. The harm may occur
immediately or it may take time to become apparent.
• How many people are exposed to the hazard and how many could be harmed inside and outside the workplace?
• Could one incident lead to other incidents?
• Could a small incident escalate to a much larger incident with more serious consequences?
• What is the consequence if an exposure and/or release occurred?
- Negligible: Trivial incident or near miss requiring reporting and follow up
- Minor: Incident with self-limiting consequences
- Moderate: Incident that requires medical treatment and/or has insignificant environmental consequences
- Major: Incident with potential lost time due to infection but non-permanent consequence and/or limited
- Severe: Potential fatality or serious illness with permanent disability and/or serious environmental impact
2.4 Describe the initial risk of the laboratory activities before additional risk control measures have been put in place
Instructions: Circle the initial risk of the laboratory activities before additional risk control measures have been put
in place. Based upon your evaluation of the likelihood and consequences of an exposure/release as listed above,
assess the initial, or currently existing, risk of the laboratory activity using the table below. Find the likelihood of
exposure (top row of the chart) and the consequences (left column of the chart).

Consequences
release
Instructions: Check the initial risk to determine the appropriate risk control measures required.
Assessed initial risk Potential consequences Actions

¨ Very low If an incident occurred, harm would Undertake the laboratory activity with
be very unlikely. the existing risk control measures in
place.
¨ Low If an incident occurred, there would Use risk control measures if needed.
be a small likelihood of harm.
¨ Medium If an incident occurred, harm would Additional risk control measures are
result that would require basic advisable.
medical treatment and/or simple
environmental measures.
¨ High If an incident occurred, harm would Additional risk control measures
result that would require medical need to be implemented before the
treatment and/or substantial laboratory activity is undertaken.
Very high
If an incident occurred, a permanent, Consider alternatives to doing the
¨
impairing harm or death and/or laboratory activity. Comprehensive
extensive environmental effects would risk measures will need to be
be likely. implemented to ensure safety.

48 RISK ASSESSMENT
(continued)
Instructions (optional): For additional specification on the risks of individual laboratory activities, determine
which risks can/should be reduced and prioritized. For each laboratory activity or procedure of the work under
assessment, record the initial risks determined from the risk assessment above. Decide whether the work can
proceed without additional risk control measures, or whether the risks posed by the work are unacceptable and
further risk control measures are needed to reduce the risks. Use the right column of the table below to assign a
priority for the implementation of risk control measures based on the identified risks.
Note:
Risk of the laboratory activity/ Initial risk Is the initial risk Priority
procedure (very low, low, medium, acceptable? (high/medium/low)
high, very high) (yes/no)
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes ¨ No ¨
control measures?
Will work require additional risk control
Yes ¨ No ¨
measures?
3.1 Describe the resources available for risk control measures
Instructions: Consider the applicability, availability and sustainability of resources for all risks that require
additional risk control measures. Consider the following questions.
• Are alternative detection methods or risk control measures available?
• Are resources sufficient to secure and maintain potential risk control measures?
• Does the management support the budget necessary for purchasing, operating and maintaining these risk control
measures?
• Does the management support training for personnel on the proper installation, operation and maintenance of
these risk control measures?
• What factors exist that may limit or restrict any of the risk control measures? Are there financial, legal,
organizational or other factors that could limit or restrict the risk control measures?
• Will work be able to proceed without any of risk control measures?
50 RISK ASSESSMENT

4.1 Describe the measures required by national legislation or regulations (if any)
regulations, guidelines or policies that restrict or govern certain laboratory activities and/or the handling and use
of any biological agents.
4.2 Describe where and when additional risk control measures are needed, including an assessment of their
availability, effectiveness and sustainability
Instructions: For each laboratory activity or procedure of the work under assessment, record the unacceptable
risks determined from the risk assessment above. Decide which risk control measures have been selected to reduce
the unacceptable risks. Determine the new, residual risk after risk control measures have been implemented and
whether it is acceptable (very low or low, for example) or unacceptable (medium, high or very high, for example)
and further risk control measures are needed to reduce risk, or if the work should not proceed at all at this facility.
Alternatively, and based on the local circumstances, consider adjusting the acceptable risk. Note that some
procedures may require several risk control measures (that is redundancy in case of any failures) to reduce risk to
an acceptable risk. Use the right column of the table below to assess the availability, effectiveness and sustainability
of selected risk control measures and provide additional information to support this assessment as necessary. If
any risks cannot be reduced to an acceptable risk using available, sustainable risk control measures, it is best not to
undertake the laboratory activity or to coordinate with another laboratory with the capability to do the work.
Once the risks have been evaluated, risk control measures can be put into place to reduce them. Consider the
following risk control measures.
• Removing the hazard or substituting it for one that reduces risk (for example, substituting an attenuated or less
virulent strain of a biological agent or working with inactivated materials)
• Enhancing personnel proficiency (for example, providing additional training and mentorship, competency
assessments, exercises and drills)
• Applying safety policies and procedures (for example, minimizing propagation and concentration of biological
agents, limiting the use of sharps, putting up hazard signs, implementing occupational health programmes)
• Using PPE (for example, gloves, protective clothing and respiratory protection), which should be evaluated for each
risk to ensure it provides the intended protection to the user
• Using primary and secondary barriers such as safety equipment and certain facility design features respectively,
such as centrifuge safety cups/sealed rotors, BSCs and autoclaves
• Routinely evaluating all risk control measures for effectiveness and failures; any failures should be documented
and corrected
Use the following table to list procedures, selected risk control measures and the residual risk, and indicate whether
the risk control measure reduces risk to an acceptable risk and is effective and sustainable.

availability, effectiveness and sustainability (continued)
Risk of the laboratory activity/ Selected risk Residual risk Is the residual risk Are risk control
procedure control measure(s) (very low, low, acceptable? measures
(yes/no)

4.3 Evaluate the residual risk that remains after risk control measures have been selected
Instructions: Circle the residual risk of the laboratory activities after selection of risk control measures. Based on
your evaluation of the effect of the additional risk control measures on the residual risk and their availability and
sustainability, as listed above, assess the likelihood and consequences of an exposure/release from the laboratory
activity using the chart below. Find the likelihood of exposure (top row of chart) and the consequences (left
column of chart). Determine if the residual risk is acceptable and whether work should proceed, indicating who is
responsible for the approval to conduct the work.

Consequences
release

52 RISK ASSESSMENT
4.3 Evaluate the residual risk that remains after risk control measures have been selected (continued)
Instructions: Check the residual risk to determine the appropriate actions required.
Assessed residual risk Potential consequences Actions

¨ Very low If an incident occurred, harm would If the identified residual risk is
be very unlikely. acceptable, no further action is
required for laboratory work to
proceed.
¨ Low If an incident occurred, there would
¨ Medium If an incident occurred, harm would If the identified residual risk is not
result that would require basic acceptable, further action is required
medical treatment and/or simple for laboratory work to proceed.
environmental measures. Revisit subsection 2.4 and re-evaluate
High If an incident occurred, harm would your risk control strategy based upon
¨
result that would require medical the initial risk of laboratory activities.
treatment and/or substantial Actions may include (but are not
environmental measures. limited to):
• Implementing additional risk control
¨ Very high If an incident occurred, a permanent,
measures in accordance with the
impairing harm or death and/or
initial identified risk of laboratory
extensive environmental effects would
activities to reduce residual risk to
be likely.
an acceptable risk, that is
- If initial risk was assessed as
medium/high, then further
risk control measures need to
be implemented before the
laboratory activity is undertaken.
very high, then comprehensive
risk measures will need to be
implemented to ensure safety.
• Redefining the scope of work such
that the risk is acceptable with
existing risk control measures in
place
• Identifying an alternative laboratory
with appropriate risk control
strategies already in place that is
capable of conducting the work as
planned

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Select the overall residual risk.
Yes ¨ No ¨
measures?
Date

4.4 Communication of the hazards, risks and risk control measures
Instructions: Develop a plan to communicate risks and risk control strategies to laboratory and other relevant
personnel. These plans should include the mechanism(s) of communication within the laboratory, such as in-person
team meetings and/or training classes, published SOPs, and identification of an accessible place to store all risk
assessments and documentation on the risk control strategy.
4.5 Purchase of required risk control measures
Instructions: Describe a process and timeline for ensuring that all needed equipment/supplies for the risk control
measures are purchased on time. Consider the budgeting, financial sustainability, ordering, receipt and installation
of all risk control measures to be purchased before starting the laboratory work.
54 RISK ASSESSMENT
4.6 Operational and maintenance procedures
Instructions: Describe a process and timeline for ensuring that all risk control measures have associated SOPs and
that training on these risk control measures has been completed. The plan should include development of SOPs,
training of personnel who will perform the work, and maintenance and/or calibration, certification, validation of
equipment before starting the laboratory work.
4.7 Training of personnel
Instructions: Describe a process and timeline for ensuring that training has been completed for all risk control
measures. Take into consideration that all personnel (laboratory and support/maintenance personnel) should have
completed all training necessary to use all risk control measures before starting the laboratory work.

5.1 Establish a periodic review cycle to evaluate the effectiveness of risk control measures and to identify any changes
Instructions: Describe the periodic review process. Reviews of risk assessments, risk control measures and risk
control strategies should be done periodically to ensure that the laboratory procedures are safe and that the risk
control measures that have been implemented to reduce risk are still effective. Components of periodic reviews
may include laboratory inspections/audits and/or asking for feedback from personnel during training and team
meetings. Reviews of risks and risk control measures must also include:
• updates on laboratory activities or procedures
• new biological agents, or new information on existing biological agents
• changes in personnel
• changes in equipment and/or facilities
• results of audits/inspections
• lessons learnt from laboratory incidents or near misses
• personnel feedback on procedures, risk control measures and residual risks
• person responsible for doing the review and the frequency of reviews
• method of documenting the updates and changes
• procedures for implementing the changes.
While annual reviews may be most common, the frequency of the review should be proportionate to the risks, and
reviews should be conducted and risks reassessed whenever there are major changes in any elements of the work.
Date

56 RISK ASSESSMENT
ANNEX 3. COMPLETED SHORT

TEMPLATE: MYCOBACTERIUM
TUBERCULOSIS TESTING
Institution/Facility name Regional Public Health Laboratory (RPHL)

Laboratory name Microbiology
Laboratory manager/Supervisor Erika Sebiko, Laboratory Manager, RPHL
Project titles/Relevant standard operating Diagnostic testing for Mycobacterium tuberculosis
procedures (SOPs)
Date 12 July 2020


Describe the biological agents and other potential • M. tuberculosis may be present in clinical specimens
hazards (for example, transmission, infectious dose, (sputum, urine, other body fluids or infected tissues)
treatment/preventive measures, pathogenicity). • Spread by airborne and percutaneous routes, ingestion,
contact/fomites
• ID50 (infectious dose) is estimated to be < 10 bacilli
• Highly transmissible
• Effective immunization is not routinely available
• Antibiotics are available for post-exposure prophylaxis
• Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) (MDR-TB) and
extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB) strains exist but
are not likely in this setting
• Susceptible to 5000 ppm hypochlorite, 10 minutes
exposure time and autoclave at 121 °C for 15 minutes

ANNEX 3 COMPLETED SHORT TEMPLATE: MYCOBACTERIUM TUBERCULOSIS TESTING 57
STEP 1. Gather information (hazard identification) (continued)

Describe the laboratory procedures to be used (for example, • Specimen receipt and recording
culturing, centrifugation, work with sharps, waste • Direct smear microscopy to detect acid-fast bacilli
handling, frequency of performing the laboratory activity).
• Autoclaving and disposal of waste (by external contractor)
• Cleaning of laboratory after any spills
Describe the types of equipment to be used (personal • PPE: laboratory coats, latex gloves
protective equipment (PPE), centrifuges, autoclaves, • Equipment: refrigerator, heat block/flame, microscope,
biological safety cabinets (BSCs). broken glass/sharps containers, autoclave (validated
annually)
Describe the type and condition of the facility where The microbiology laboratory is a room next to the patient
work is conducted. waiting area and specimen collection/phlebotomy rooms.
It is an older facility with some cracked vinyl tiles on the
floor, open, screened windows and open doors that can
be closed at the end of the work shift. Bench tops are
impervious to disinfectants; however there are some
cracks in the surface. All furniture is sturdy and able to
be disinfected. Electric and water supply is adequate for
laboratory work but there is only one sink that is used for
staining and hand washing.
Describe relevant human factors (for example, Personnel are trained on laboratory biosafety and
competency, training, experience and attitude of compliance is generally good among senior personnel.
personnel). Personnel turn-over, especially of the younger colleagues,
is high. New personnel require mentorship but adequate
supervision is not always available. Job aides with
photographs are posted to remind personnel of laboratory
and safety procedures.
There is occasional crime in the area (for example,
burglary), but it is mostly of computer and office supplies
and the laboratory or patient rooms have never been
affected.

58 RISK ASSESSMENT

What potential situations are there in which exposure or • Aerosol exposure to or release of M. tuberculosis from a spill
release could occur? • Contact with contaminated surfaces
• Improperly treated waste
What is the likelihood of an exposure/release occurring • Aerosol exposure to or release of M. tuberculosis from a
(unlikely, possible, likely)? spill – possible
• Contact with contaminated surfaces – possible
• Improperly treated waste – possible
What is the severity of the consequences of an exposure/ Moderate
release (negligible, moderate, severe)?

Note:
Consequences of
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
STEP 2. Evaluate the risks (continued)

Laboratory activity/procedure Initial risk Is the initial risk Priority (high/
(very low, low, acceptable? medium/low)
medium, high, (yes/no)
very high)
Spill of patient specimens with production of Medium No High
aerosols
Spill of or contamination from patient High No High
specimens
Sharps injury from handling glass slides Low Yes Low
Exposure to improperly treated waste Medium No Medium
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes ¨ No
control measures?

Are resources sufficient to secure and maintain potential Yes, PPE is provided and readily available but additional
risk control measures? PPE, such as respiratory protection, is not available.
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and Limited financial resources are available to buy any
strategies (if any). additional PPE or safety equipment.
Will work be able to proceed without any of the risk
Unknown; if liquid culture or antibiotic sensitivity testing
control measures; are there alternatives?
needs to be done, or if MDR-TB or XDR-TB were present,
additional PPE and safety equipment may need to be
procured or specimens will have to be sent to another
laboratory for confirmatory testing.

60 RISK ASSESSMENT

Describe the measures required by national legislation No national regulations or guidelines are available for this
or regulations (if any). work
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and • WHO guidelines on TB
strategies (if any). • WHO Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition

measures.
(yes/no)
Spill of patient specimens, with Transport in sealed Low Yes Yes
production of aerosols container
Spill of or contamination from Wear gloves when Low Yes Yes
patient specimens handling any
patient specimens/
slides; disinfect
work area daily;
wash hands in
sink available in
adjacent room
that is not used for
laboratory work
(contamination
of doors and
other items by
contaminated
gloves must be
avoided)
Sharps injury from handling Use sharps Very low Yes Yes
glass slides containers
whenever possible
Exposure to improperly treated Autoclave will be Very low Yes Yes, if indicators
waste validated monthly for validating the
autoclave are
readily available


Consequences of
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Should work proceed with selected Yes No ¨
Approved by (Name and title) Omar Abubakr, Microbiology Laboratory Manager
Approved by (Signature) Omar Abubakr
Date 29 July 2020

work.
Communication of the hazards, risks and risk control • SOPs will be updated with new risk control measures
measures for specimen transport, PPE use, sharps disposal, hand
washing, disinfection and decontamination.
• Signs and job aides will be updated and displayed.
Purchase (and budgeting) of risk control measures Additional gloves, sharps containers and biological
indicators will be added to laboratory operating budget
for approval and purchase.
Operational and maintenance procedures Autoclave SOP will be updated for more frequent validation.
Training of personnel Personnel will be trained on new SOPs.

62 RISK ASSESSMENT

Frequency of the review This risk assessment will be reviewed in 6 months to ensure
proper implementation of all recommended risk control
measures and then annually after that.
Person to conduct the review The laboratory manager
Describe updates/changes • Any culturing of TB is prohibited. If culture becomes
necessary, another risk assessment must be performed
to evaluate the need for additional risk control measures
such as PPE and safety equipment (BSC).
• MDR-TB and XDR-TB strains exist but are not likely in
this setting. If they were suspected in a patient specimen,
work would stop for another risk assessment and
specimens suspected to be positive for MDR-TB and XDR-
TB shipped to another laboratory.
Personnel/procedures to implement the changes Additional PPE and/or safety equipment may be necessary
in those cases, or specimens could be sent to the central
laboratory for further testing.
Reviewed by (Name and title) Erika Sebiko, RPHL Laboratory Manager
Reviewed by (Signature) Erika Sebiko
Date 31 July 2020

63
ANNEX 4. COMPLETED SHORT

TEMPLATE: BLOODBORNE
PATHOGENS
Institution/Facility name Primary Reference Laboratory
Laboratory name Bloodborne-Pathogen Testing Laboratory
Laboratory manager/Supervisor Chen Shixin, Laboratory Manager
Project titles/Relevant standard operating Lateral flow diagnostic testing SOPs
procedures (SOPs) Biosafety manual
Date 15 March 2020


Describe the biological agents and other potential Bloodborne pathogens: human immunodeficiency virus
hazards (for example, transmission, infectious dose, (HIV), and hepatitis A, B, C and D viruses. Unknown
treatment/preventive measures, pathogenicity). bloodborne pathogens (rarer). The most dangerous of the
bloodborne pathogens is hepatitis B since it can survive
outside the body (on surfaces) for up to 7 days and it is a
common sexually transmitted infection. Hepatitis C can
also survive outside the body on surfaces but only up to 4
days. Although Hepatitis A can survive on surfaces for long
periods, this infection is always acute, is transmitted by the
faecal/oral route and can be easily detected.
• Hepatitis A: vaccine-preventable, post-exposure
prophylaxis available, acute and recovery is spontaneous
• Hepatitis B: vaccine-preventable, post-exposure
prophylaxis available, acute and chronic forms
• Hepatitis C: no vaccine, chronic, now treatable
• HIV: no vaccine, post-exposure prophylaxis available,
incurable, lifelong treatment with antiretroviral drugs
All are transmissible; all can be prevented using good
microbiological practice and procedure, and the specified
risk control measures.

64 RISK ASSESSMENT
STEP 1. Gather information (hazard identification) (continued)

Describe the laboratory procedures to be used (for example, We will be testing blood specimens collected in the field
culturing, centrifugation, work with sharps, waste using a rapid diagnostic test that relies on lateral flow
handling, frequency of performing the laboratory activity). detection. We will follow the manufacturer’s instructions
to dilute individual specimens of patient blood (using the
buffer supplied) in microfuge tubes before testing. The
tubes will be incubated for 5 minutes and then put in a
vortex mixer. Rapid diagnostic test strips, one per tube of
patient specimen, will be submerged in the tube so that
the specimen pad is wetted with the patient’s diluted blood.
Tubes with strips will be incubated for 5 minutes as per
manufacturer’s instructions and the test strips read and
analysed according to manufacturer’s instructions. Strips
will be photographed with patient identifier for record
keeping, and both used test strips and blood dilution tubes
will be discarded as biohazardous waste.
Describe the types of equipment to be used (personal • PPE will be worn, including disposable gloves and an
protective equipment (PPE), centrifuges, autoclaves, open-front laboratory coat.
biological safety cabinets (BSCs). • A vortex mixer will be used to mix blood specimen
dilutions.
• An autoclave will be used to destroy biological agents in
biohazardous waste.
Describe the type and condition of the facility where The facility is old but has adequate bench space. There
work is conducted. is one BSC in the laboratory but it needs a new high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter.
Describe relevant human factors (for example, We have no personnel trained in this procedure but the
competency, training, experience and attitude of manufacturer of the rapid diagnostic kit will send a trainer
personnel). to our laboratory a month before the project begins.
Both hepatitis and HIV infection are culturally unacceptable
in the community. All specimens will have identification
removed by the personnel receiving the specimens before
being forwarded to laboratory personnel. The clinic
physicians will inform patients of their disease status and
onsite counselling will be available for those found positive
for infection.

ANNEX 4 COMPLETED SHORT TEMPLATE: BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS 65

What potential situations are there in which exposure or • We are not using needles in this work, nor are we using
release could occur? any supplies made of glass. It is possible that a spill/
fall situation could lead to accidental introduction of
bloodborne biological agents through a skin wound.
• Vortexing the microfuge tubes can create aerosols, so
contact with mucous membranes is possible.
• Laboratory surfaces contaminated with blood may
harbour bloodborne pathogens, especially hepatitis B
and C viruses, so these must be thoroughly cleaned with
bleach solution or other approved disinfectants.
What is the likelihood of an exposure/release occurring • Hepatitis A: unlikely
(unlikely, possible, likely)? • Hepatitis B: possible
• Hepatitis C: possible
• HIV: unlikely
What is the severity of the consequences of an exposure/ • Hepatitis A: moderate
release (negligible, moderate, severe)? • Hepatitis B: moderate
• Hepatitis C: moderate
• HIV: moderate

66 RISK ASSESSMENT
STEP 2. Evaluate the risks (continued)

Note:
Consequences of
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
Laboratory activity/procedure Initial risk Is the initial risk Priority (high/

(very low, low, acceptable? medium/low)
medium, high, very (yes/no)
high)
Hepatitis A Low Yes Low
Hepatitis B Medium No Medium
Hepatitis C Medium No Medium
HIV Low Yes Low
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes ¨ No
control measures?

Are resources sufficient to secure and maintain potential • We need to reduce the risk associated with 1) surface
risk control measures? contamination and 2) contact of infectious droplets
with mucous membranes. Working inside a BSC would
reduce the risk of both potential hazards. We do not have
immediate funding to repair the BSC but we will include
this cost in the annual funding budget. We will begin
our work (in about a month) using the BSC in a nearby
laboratory of another department. We will develop SOPs
for preparing the specimens for transport and their
transport to the other laboratory, until the BSC in our
laboratory is repaired.
• We may have to begin work in our laboratory in about
a month and will have to use the BSC without an
appropriate filter. However, this choice is better than
working on the open bench since it will isolate the
blood and potential pathogens and will lower the
number of people who could come into contact with any
contamination. While the BSC is being used without a
HEPA filter, additional PPE (face shield, double gloves,
laboratory gown) will be necessary. Until the BSC is
repaired, it will be prohibited to work in it with biological
agents with r transmission. A notice with this prohibition
will be attached to the front of the BSC.
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and Only the delay in funding to replace the HEPA filter and
strategies (if any). certify the BSC.
Will work be able to proceed without any of the risk Yes – we will use the BSC as a containment area while we
control measures; are there alternatives? wait for repairs.

68 RISK ASSESSMENT
Describe the measures required by national legislation None
or regulations (if any).
Describe the measures advised by guidelines, policies and None

measures.
(yes/no)
Creation of infectious aerosols Working inside BSC Low Yes Yes
while using the vortex mixer workspace
Contamination of work
Decontamination Low Yes Yes
surfaces
of surfaces after
completing work
and at the end of
the day

Consequences of
Negligible Very low

Very low Low Medium
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Should work proceed with selected Yes No ¨
Approved by (Name and title) Manfred Gruber, Primary Reference Laboratory Head
Approved by (Signature) Manfred Gruber
Date 15 May 2020

work.
Communication of the hazards, risks and risk control I will prepare an SOP specific to our laboratory that will
measures include biosafety equipment to be used and practices that
must be followed.
Purchase (and budgeting) of risk control measures Risk control measures will be included in the annual budget.
The laboratory manger will be responsible for inventory
and usage records, and will inform me of expenditures so
that budget adjustments can be made accordingly.
Operational and maintenance procedures These will also be included in the annual budget
Training of personnel
All personnel will be invited to one-on-one training with the
manufacturer of the rapid diagnostic kit. Personnel will be
observed performing this assay and will have to be judged
competent before working independently.

70 RISK ASSESSMENT
Frequency of the review This procedure will be reviewed in one year from the start
date of this risk assessment but sooner if needed because
of personnel, equipment and/or protocol changes. The
procedure will be reviewed before the one-year date if a
laboratory incident occurs.
Person to conduct the review The laboratory manager.
Describe updates/changes Minor updates or changes to the SOP may be implemented
to: 1) ensure accuracy of testing, or 2) improve workflow.
These will be done on a case-by-case basis without review
of the entire process.
Personnel/procedures to implement the changes The laboratory manager.
Reviewed by (Name and title) Chen Shixin, Laboratory Manager

Reviewed by (Signature) Chen Shixin
Date 19 June 2020

71
ANNEX 5. COMPLETED LONG

TEMPLATE: INFLUENZA RESEARCH
Institution/Facility name Global Communicable Diseases Research Institute
Laboratory name Influenza Laboratory
Laboratory manager/Supervisor Dr Zhang Tian, Director, Global Communicable Diseases
Research Institute
Location City near the mountains
Project titles/Relevant standard operating • SOP for influenza research
procedures (SOPs) • SOP for spill cleaning
• SOP for waste management
• SOP for laboratory rules
Date 12 March 2020


In order to define the determinants of interspecies transmission and pathogenesis of influenza A virus infections in
the different host species, wild-type strains of influenza A virus or interferon-sensitive mutants (= deletion of NS1) will
be inoculated on in vitro respiratory epithelium cell models of avian, porcine, human and bat species. We will use
the well-established reverse genetic system to produce wild-type strains of influenza A virus or interferon-sensitive
mutants (MxA-sensitivity (= deletion of NS1)) using 293T cell line. We will also use well-characterized chemical
inhibitors or lentiviral-based short-hairpin RNA-mediated knockdown of host gene expression to determine the
influence of host genes involved in the innate immunity on replication characteristics of the different virus strains and
the dynamics of the host innate immune response.
72 RISK ASSESSMENT
• Influenza A virus PR8 (H1N1) wild type and NS1 deletion mutant
- Transmission of influenza A virus in humans can occur through respiratory infection by aerosols and droplets or
from contact transmission from contaminated surfaces. Thus, if specimens containing influenza A are handled
incorrectly, transmission to humans could occur at every working step in the laboratory.
- The infectious dose for specific influenza A virus subtypes is unknown but even though high titre virus stocks
are produced in the laboratory, cell cultures are inoculated with low multiplicities of infection (0,25). In an
experimental set up/in vitro, influenza A virus can grow to a high titre (107) depending on the inoculated cell type.
- Possible consequences of exposure: Influenza A virus induces influenza (flu) in humans which is characterized by
cold-like symptoms, high fever, myalgia, malaise and occasionally pulmonary or cardiac complications. Death
from flu is generally rare, except in those with chronic lung or heart conditions. Flu is a highly communicable
disease. However, after an exposure to or release of influenza A virus PR8 wild type, no epidemic would be
expected because influenza A virus subtype H1N1 is still circulating in the human population and is included in
current vaccines. The influenza A virus PR8 strain is a mouse-adapted strain but can possibly induce flu in humans.
In mice, the influenza A virus PR8 NS1 deletion mutant is no longer pathogenic and, in vitro, its replication is
attenuated in interferon-competent cells. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the NS1 mutant would induce disease
in humans.
• Primary cell cultures of human, bat, avian and porcine origin
- Human: primary bronchial cells, the tracheobronchial material used for cell isolation, come from patients
undergoing bronchoscopy or pulmonary resection in hospital. These patients tested negative for HIV, and hepatitis
B and C viruses; nevertheless, cell cultures should be treated as potentially infected material as they may be
contaminated with other biological agents.
- Bat: the tracheobronchial material used for cell isolation comes from healthy bats from a zoo. Even though these
animals are healthy, bats can harbour many potentially pathogenic biological agents and the cell cultures should
always be treated as infectious material.
- Avian and porcine: the tracheobronchial material used for cell isolation comes from in-house specific pathogen-
free chickens and pigs. The health of these animals is monitored over a long time and cells are very unlikely to
carry undetected human pathogens.
• Lentiviral particles mediating knockdown of host genes involved in innate immunity
- Vesicular stomatitis virus G-protein pseudotyped lentiviral particles can infect a wide range of non-dividing and
actively dividing cell types of different host species, including humans.
- Transgenes used in our work target genes involved in innate immunity and are not oncogenic by themselves.
However, depending on the site of integration, there is the potential for oncogenesis or other deleterious effects
through insertional mutagenesis.
- Lentiviral particles are replication incompetent; thus, the infection cannot spread in the body but is localized to the
initially infected cells. However, if a person with HIV were accidentally infected, lentiviral particles could recombine
with the native HIV and result in revertants that could replicate.
ANNEX 5 COMPLETED LONG TEMPLATE: INFLUENZA RESEARCH 73
1.2 Describe the biological agents and other potential hazards (continued)
• Chemical inhibitors of host genes involved in innate immunity are only used in low concentrations and in small
quantities.
• Use of cryogenics (dry ice): cells are stored at –150 °C, viruses at –80 °C and the transport of both occurs on dry ice.
Cryogenics can cause burns or frostbite. The gas of dry ice can cause health effects in lower concentrations (toxic
hazard) and displaces oxygen in higher concentrations (asphyxiation hazard).
• Use of compressed gas (CO2) for cell culturing: danger of a gas bottle bursting if it falls over or is heated.
74 RISK ASSESSMENT
• centrifuging
propagated
• Preparation and handling of cells (airway cultures and cell lines)

- Use of scalpels/scissors and forceps for preparation of tracheobronchial material to isolate primary epithelial cells
- Incubation of tracheobronchial material in digestion solution on a rocking platform at 4 °C
- Centrifugation of cell cultures
- Freezing of cells to –150 °C
- Incubation of cell cultures with chemical inhibitors directed against expression of host genes involved in innate
immune response
- Thawing of frozen cell stocks and transportation of frozen cells on dry ice
- Renewal of compressed gas bottles (CO2) for cell culturing
• Work with infectious viruses (influenza A virus and lentiviral particles): preparation of virus stock, infection of cell
cultures, processing of infected cell cultures
- Thawing of virus stock in water bath, vortexing and pipetting of virus stock, transfer of virus stock from storage
location to the laboratory on dry ice, transfer of infected cell cultures from the biological safety cabinet to
incubator, spills of infectious materials
- A spill kit for biological and chemical material is in place and training on clean-up procedures is regularly done
• Waste handling
- Separation of solid and liquid waste in order to inactivate both waste types using different autoclave programmes
- Double wrapping of solid waste for transport to the in-house autoclave three floors below
- After use, placing of serological pipettes back into their packing bags and removal from the BSC to an autoclaving
bag without prior inactivation.
- Pre-disinfection of liquid waste before transport to the autoclave in order to reduce the viral load
- Collection and autoclaving of sharps in sharps boxes and their disposal according to local/community disposal
guidelines
- gloves
• incubator
• For cell isolation from primary tracheobronchial material, the following equipment is used: a BSC, scalpels, scissors
and forceps, a room at 4 °C for enzymatic digestion, centrifuge, vortex, serological pipettes and pipette aid
• A humidified incubator with 5% CO2 is used for cell culture
• Crystal violet is used to determine the viral titre after virus titration
• PPE: laboratory coat and gloves when working with infectious material, toxic chemicals or cell cultures; cold-
resistant gloves and safety goggles when working with dry ice or liquid nitrogen
• BSC with self-checking system for downflow and inflow velocities with alarm functions, serviced annually: used when
working with infectious material. However, one of the BSCs is 2 metres wide, which tempts people to work in twos at
the BSC, irrespective of the work they do – this is discouraged
• Centrifuges: with safety buckets
• Vortex: outside the BSC; it is only used with closed tubes
• Freezer (–150 °C): run by electricity (no liquid nitrogen is used)
• Autoclave: validated each year for correct pathogen inactivation in liquid and solid waste
• Hygiene: hand washing facilities and hand disinfection available in every laboratory
• Spill kit: readily available and contains all necessary items to clean a spill which contains infectious viruses
76 RISK ASSESSMENT
following factors.
Work will be done in a multipurpose laboratory dedicated for work with human viruses. The laboratory has closable
doors, and windows are not to be opened (but are not sealed). The laboratory has appropriate ventilation (no
negative air pressure) and room temperature is kept constant. Cell culture incubators are next to the two BSCs
ensuring short transport routes for (infected) cell cultures. The laboratory also has benches for 10 people, a light
microscope with a multiviewing system and a fluorescence microscope, four refrigerators, two large centrifuges and
several table-top centrifuges, a water bath and two PCR machines. Some of the benches are high but are equipped
with high chairs with foot-rests for ergonomic reasons.
Storage for consumables is outside the laboratory in a hallway or in other rooms on the same floor (4 °C room and
chemical room). Storage room for viruses and cells (–150 °C and –80 °C freezers) is in the basement of the same
building, so safety measures for transport of infectious material to these freezers must be taken.
The inactivation and sterilization unit for waste and reusable material from the laboratory is three floors below
the laboratory in the same building. The laboratory waste is stored in the corridor next to the laboratories and is
transported by a trained technician in sealed containers.
• Are personnel trained to work with diagnostic specimens and unknown agents and do they have experience in this work?
All laboratory personnel have had biosafety training on relevant engineering controls, PPE and procedures (for
example, BSC, laboratory coats, hygiene) when working with infectious biological agents with respiratory transmission.
New personnel and less experienced people (such as undergraduate and postgraduate students working there
for a limited period – internship or scientific project) are always supervised and trained by experienced laboratory
personnel on experimental procedures.
Many people are working in this influenza research team, which can limit the time available to use the BSC or make
organization of the work more difficult. One of the BSCs is 2 metres wide, which tempts people to work in twos at the
BSC, irrespective of the work they do, which is discouraged.
People with impaired immune systems are not allowed to work with human pathogens and can use the fluorescence
microscope or PCR machines in this laboratory only when wearing a laboratory coat and gloves.
Cleaning and in-house maintenance personnel have only basic knowledge of laboratory procedures/cultures and
basic biosafety training.
Personnel
Wasilisa Iwanow Safety rules, biosafety, influenza A 13 January 2020
virus
Joseph Dunn Safety rules, biosafety 12 June 2020
Shivar Kumar Waste handling 28 November 2019
Sabine Bernd Safety rules, biosafety, influenza A 25 February 2020
virus
Miguel Sanchez Waste handling, influenza A virus 28 August 2020

78 RISK ASSESSMENT
• The legal basis for handling infectious agents is the contained use ordinance (national legislation) and is applicable to
every institution using infectious biological agents. The necessary permits were obtained before starting the laboratory
activity.
• There is probably a pre-immunity against the influenza A virus H1N1 subtype in the human population, as an H1H1
strain is circulating and the annual vaccination against influenza includes an H1N1 subtype. Therefore, infection is
not expected to have fatal consequences.
• Preparations have been made and drills conducted for emergency response activities such as medical emergencies,
severe weather and criminal activity in the local community.

- ingestion
- spills
Infectious or toxic material

• Inhalation of aerosols
- Aerosol-generating laboratory activities conducted outside the BSC (for example, pipetting, vortexing)
- Spill on the floor or in the centrifuge while handling infectious material or contaminated waste
2.1 Describe how exposure and/or release could occur (continued)
- ingestion
- spills
• Direct contact with specimens and/or carry over of biological agents from contaminated work surfaces to mucous
membranes (eyes, nose, mouth)
- Contamination of hands/wrists/laboratory coat because of incorrect working techniques (in the BSC) and then:
- touching mucous membranes with contaminated hands/wrists/laboratory coat
- carrying over the contaminants to laboratory equipment where other laboratory personnel can contaminate
their hands, PPE and then carry over to their mucous membranes
- differing glove policies among laboratory personnel about which laboratory equipment must be touched with
gloves and which not (some personnel keep gloves on after having worked with infectious material in the BSC
and touch the incubator or microscope wearing the same gloves, whereas other personnel touch the incubator/
microscope without gloves)
- Incorrect removal of PPE resulting in contamination of clothing or the body
- Working without PPE, working outside the BSC with infectious material (for example, discarding supernatants from
infected cell cultures/spilling on oneself)
- Uncontained infectious material outside the BSC. For example, after use in the BSC, serological pipettes are put
back into their packaging bag and discarded in an autoclaving bag outside the BSC. However, there is often a last
droplet of liquid at the tip of the pipette which could splash or contaminate the outside of the pipette packaging
bag
Cryogenics
• Direct contact between cryogenic liquids or cold vapours and unprotected parts of the body resulting in burns to the
skin or damage to the eyes
• Asphyxiation because of displacement of oxygen in closed rooms by gaseous CO2 (from dry ice). Disregard of the
gas alarm or unawareness of what it means. Malfunctioning of the gas alarm system
Compressed gas for incubators
• Gas bottles falling over and exploding
• Gas bottle leaking – the suffocation hazard is greater, the smaller the room
80 RISK ASSESSMENT
manipulated?
Highest viral titres and largest volumes to be handled occur when making the virus stocks, which are produced only
every 2–3 months. The virus stock is then frozen in 1–2 mL aliquots. During experimental infection of cell cultures,
smaller volumes of virus stocks are used. Current laboratory personnel are competent in manipulation of infectious
viruses. However, because of the large number of people working in the laboratory, work is sometimes rushed or done
less carefully and without following the same glove policy.
Primary cell cultures from human, avian, porcine and bat origin are always handled in a BSC because: 1) they have to
stay sterile and 2) they could contain undetected biological agents, although this is very unlikely.
Chemical inhibitors are not volatile and are only handled inside a BSC because they have to stay sterile. Personnel
wear gloves when working with these inhibitors.
When handling dry ice, personnel have to wear long-sleeved laboratory coats, goggles and cold protection gloves.
However, they do not always wear these items of PPE because of laziness and underestimation of the hazard.
The dry ice stock is kept in a special container in a ventilated room which has a CO2 sensor at the bottom of the room
and a visual alarm. The flashing light can be seen from outside the room through a window in the door. The sensor is
maintained on an annual basis.
Compressed CO2 bottles are secured with chains and are only handled by trained technical personnel of the facility.
We have not had any known exposure so far.
2.2 Determine the likelihood of exposure or release and what factors have the greatest influence on likelihood (continued)
manipulated?
Influenza A virus wild type Rare

Influenza A virus mutant Unlikely
Primary cell cultures from human, avian, porcine and Rare
bat origin
Influenza A virus for a person with an impaired immune Rare
system
Lentiviral particles Rare
Chemical inhibitors Rare
Burns from dry ice Possible
Asphyxiation from cryogenics (CO2) Rare
Explosion of compressed CO2 Rare
82 RISK ASSESSMENT
Exposure to influenza A virus wild type strain could cause flu which is transmissible from person to person. Infected
people are contagious before they show symptoms and can also infect people outside the laboratory. However, as
other H1N1 strains are circulating in the general population, no epidemic would be expected. One of our personnel
working in the laboratory has an impaired immune system because of drug treatment for an autoimmune
inflammatory disease. For this person, the infectious dose could be smaller and the course of disease more serious or
longer but this is not exactly known. Therefore, this person is not allowed to work with influenza A virus and only works
in the laboratory dedicated to work on non-human viruses. He wears gloves when he has to use the microscope
which is in the laboratory where influenza A virus work is done.
The influenza A virus NS1 deletion mutant is attenuated and is not likely to cause disease after an exposure incident in
a healthy person or in a person with an impaired immune system.
Lentiviral particles can infect human cells and will integrate their genetic material into the DNA of the host cell.
However, as lentiviral particles cannot replicate, the infection will not spread in the body or to other people, and will
be localized in the initially infected cell. (An exception to this would be a person infected with HIV where the lentiviral
particles could recombine with the native HIV). The lentiviral particles inserted in this work are not oncogenic on their
own; however, depending on the site of integration, an oncogenic effect cannot be completely discounted. After a
splash incident, the cells that would most likely be exposed are skin or mucous membrane cells on the face. After
injection with a syringe, blood cells or cells in the wound could also be involved. Because of their high turnover, skin
cells are shed quickly. What happens to lentiviral particle-transduced cells of mucous membranes is not predictable;
however, the development of a tumour can be monitored relatively easily because the mucous membranes are clearly
visible. The effect of integration of lentiviral particles into blood cells cannot be predicted or monitored. Retroviral
therapy, which has severe side-effects, or surgical excision of a tumour are the only therapies that exist. Therefore, the
use of sharps when working with lentiviral particles is forbidden.
The primary cells from bat, avian, porcine or human origin are very unlikely to be contaminated with human
pathogens because the health of the people and animals is monitored.
Chemical inhibitors will be used only in small quantities and will have no systemic effect on a person if exposed.
Penetration of the membrane of skin cells by the inhibitors after exposure depends on the solvent used and whether
they can inhibit several target molecules of the exposed cell. Penetration of mucous membrane cells is more likely. If
penetration occurs, the inhibition will only be for a short time and will have no severe effects on the health of the person.
2.3 Determine the consequences of exposure or release and what has the greatest influence on consequence (continued)
or only minor injuries requiring first-aid?
Consequences of exposure or release

Influenza A virus wild type Moderate
Influenza A virus mutant Negligible
Primary cell cultures from human, avian, porcine and Negligible
bat origin
Influenza A virus for a person with an impaired immune Major
system
Lentiviral particles Minor
Chemical inhibitors Negligible
Burns from dry ice Moderate
Asphyxiation from cryogenics (CO2) Minor
Explosion of compressed CO2 gas Negligible
84 RISK ASSESSMENT

Consequences
release

place.
Medium If an incident occurred, harm would Additional risk control measures are
Very high
¨

(continued)
Note:
Influenza A virus wild type Low Yes Medium
Influenza A virus mutant Very low Yes Low
Primary cell cultures from Very low Yes Low
human, avian, porcine and bat
origin
Influenza A virus for a person Medium No High
with an impaired immune
system
Lentiviral particles Very low Yes Low
Chemical inhibitors Very low Yes Low
Burns from dry ice Medium No High
Asphyxiation from cryogenics Very low Yes Low
(CO2)
Explosion of compressed CO2 Very low Yes Low
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes ¨ No
control measures?
Yes No ¨
measures?
86 RISK ASSESSMENT

measures?
Substitution of any of the hazards is not possible but the management has supported necessary risk control measures
through proper budgeting and allocation of resources.
Regular training courses and posters showing pictures of good microbiological practice and procedure and PPE are
carried out and are supported by the management.

Chicken blood. Obtained from specific-pathogen-free white Leghorn chickens in compliance with the national
legislation: Animal Welfare Act, Animal Welfare Ordinance and the Animal Experimentation Ordinance. The national
and international regulation and guidelines were reviewed by the federal state ethical committee for animal
experiments and approved by the federal veterinary authorities with the local agreement only for these experiments.
Specific-pathogen-free pigs. Blood obtained from the Institute’s specific-pathogen-free breeding unit.
National regulation on protection of workers and contained use of organisms.
and corrected

88 RISK ASSESSMENT
(yes/no)
Work with infectious influenza Engineering Low Yes Yes
A virus, lentiviral particles and controls: Perform
primary cell cultures: avoiding vortexing and
exposure through aerosols manipulation
or surface contamination only in the BSC.
and contact with mucous Use centrifuges
membranes with safety caps.
Use a dedicated
laboratory for work
on influenza A
virus and lentiviral
particles.
PPE: Use gloves
also in BSC


Consequences
release


proceed.
Low If an incident occurred, there would
¨ High If an incident occurred, harm would your risk control strategy based upon
be likely.
place
planned

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Select the residual overall risk.
Yes ¨ No
measures?
90 RISK ASSESSMENT
Reviewed by (Name and title) Dr Giulia Tresch, Director, Influenza Laboratory
Reviewed by (Signature) Giulia Tresch
Date 11 April 2020

New SOPs on working procedures are developed by the biosafety team and laboratory members together. Protocols
are stored in an electronic database.
New laboratory personnel are required to attend several hands-on biosafety training courses covering relevant
biosafety issues (good microbiological practice and procedure, BSC, spill clean-up, hygiene, putting on and removing
PPE, transport within the facility and between facilities). Refresher courses are regularly offered to current personnel.
New personnel and less experienced people (undergraduate and postgraduate students) are always supervised and
trained on experimental procedures by experienced laboratory personnel.
All the equipment needed is already in place with maintenance and service contracts.
Maintenance and calibration is done by the manufacturer annually (BSC, incubators and other devices).
To keep track of the training level of the personnel, all personnel have to sign an attendance form after completing a
course.

If there are incidents or significant changes in personnel and/or equipment, the SOPs will be reviewed by the biosafety
team together with laboratory personnel. If an incident occurs or when improved technology or “best practice”
information is available, changes will be implemented by the biosafety team and supported by the management.
Reviewed by (Name and title) Dr Tian Zhang, Director, Global Communicable Diseases
Research Institute
Reviewed by (Signature) Tian Zhang
Date 14 June 2020

92 RISK ASSESSMENT
ANNEX 6. COMPLETED LONG

TEMPLATE: ANTIMICROBIAL
SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING
Institution/Facility name United Microbiology Laboratories
Laboratory name Gastrointestinal Diseases/Bacterial Unit
Laboratory manager/Supervisor Dr Jill Smith, Laboratory Manager
Location City on the seaside
Project titles/Relevant standard operating Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
procedures (SOPs)
Date 6 May 2020


The bacterial unit will begin testing bacterial isolates sent from local laboratories and hospitals in the state for
antimicrobial susceptibility. Isolates will be identified to the genus and, if possible, species before submission to the
bacterial unit. All isolates will be received on either Luria broth, or MacConkey or trypticase soy agar. Antimicrobial
susceptibility testing will be by broth microdilution using minimum inhibitory concentrations established by the
Clinical Laboratory and Standards Institute. Cultures received will be limited to Proteobacteria including pathogenic
biological agents from Enterobacteriaceae (Escherichia coli, Shigella spp. Salmonella spp.) – except for Klebsiella
(work on this bacterium is done in a separate laboratory) – Campylobacter spp. and Vibrio spp. Our laboratory
has experience working with all these bacteria but has not done antimicrobial susceptibility testing using broth
microdilution on this scale before. This testing is usually done on request and most often done using test strips on agar.
We expect to receive between 30 and 100 isolates a month and think that this number may grow over time.
ANNEX 6 COMPLETED LONG TEMPLATE: ANTIMICROBIAL SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING 93
Instructions:
Instructions: Identify
Identify thethe hazards.
hazards. It
It is
is important
important to to know
know the
the characteristics
characteristics of
of the
the biological
biological agent(s)
agent(s) when
when
determining
determining the the risks
risks itit presents.
presents. When
When the the specific
specific biological
biological agent
agent is
is known,
known, the
the following
following information
information will
will
be
be useful
useful for
for the
the risk
risk assessment
assessment and and should
should bebe thoroughly
thoroughly researched.
researched. When
When handling
handling unknown
unknown oror diagnostic
diagnostic
specimens,
specimens, itit is
is important
important to to try
try and
and obtain
obtain anyany information
information onon the
the source
source of
of the
the specimens
specimens and/or
and/or aa presumptive/
presumptive/
suspected
suspected diagnosis.
diagnosis. Typical
Typical information
information to to be
be gathered
gathered about
about the
the biological
biological agent(s)
agent(s) includes:
includes:
•• pathogenicity/severity
pathogenicity/severity of
of disease
disease
•• epidemiology
epidemiology and
and host
host range
range
•• sources/specimens
sources/specimens
•• infectious
infectious dose,
dose, concentration
concentration and
and volume
volume
•• route(s)
route(s) of
of transmission
transmission
•• incubation
incubation period
period and
and communicability
communicability
•• viability
viability and
and susceptibility
susceptibility to
to disinfectants
disinfectants
•• means
means of
of diagnosing
diagnosing the
the disease,
disease, type
type of
of testing
testing done
done for
for diagnosis
diagnosis
•• treatment,
treatment, immunization
immunization and
and prophylaxis
prophylaxis available
available
•• unique
unique laboratory
laboratory hazards
hazards (laboratory-associated
(laboratory-associated infections)
infections)
•• additional
additional information.
information.
The hazards associated with the enteric pathogenic biological agents listed above are mostly associated with
ingestion. This could occur from contact with contaminated surfaces in the laboratory or from splashes. Some of these
bacteria can be acquired through inhalation of aerosol particles/droplets (in broth/liquid).
Infectious dose (ID), transmission routes (TR) other than ingestion, consequences of exposure (CE), prevention and
treatment (P/T), severity of disease (SD) and association of the bacteria to be tested with laboratory-acquired
infections (LAIs) of each biological agent are as follows.
S. Typhi
• ID: 100–100 000 bacteria cells
• TR: inhalation of aerosols, contact with mucous membranes, needlestick, person-to-person
• CE: infection may not be apparent for weeks (usually 7–14 days, depending on dose); symptoms include sustained
fever, weakness, stomach pain, headache, dry cough, diarrhoea or constipation, loss of appetite; up to 5% of people
infected can become asymptomatic carriers
• P/T: regular vaccination is preventative; treatment is antibiotics, such as ciprofloxacin, azithromycin
• SD: can be very severe and require hospitalization (typhoid fever). Untreated death rate can reach 20%; illness
duration is 4–40 days
• LAIs: more than 250 exposures reported with 20 deaths (as high as 8% mortality)
V. cholerae
• ID: 106–1011 bacteria cells
• TR: mucous membranes, aerosols, needlestick, wounds/cuts, intact skin
• CE: onset of illness is 4 hours to 4 days; symptoms include watery diarrhoea (rice-water stool), cramps, nausea, chills,
fever
• P/T: vaccine available but not recommended; fluid replacement, antibiotics in severe cases
• SD: usually resolves in several days in healthy people
• LAIs: 13 cases reported with 4 deaths
94 RISK ASSESSMENT
Vibrio spp.
• ID: 105–108 colony forming units
• TR: mucous membranes, wounds/cuts, needlestick
• CE: onset of illness is 2 hours to 7 days (depending on species and dose); symptoms are diarrhoea, cramps, nausea,
redness around skin wound/cut; high-risk individuals may experience skin lesions, chills and shock
• P/T: no vaccine available; fluid replacement, supportive care, antibiotics if severe
• SD: usually resolves within one week
• LAIs: few cases reported
Campylobacter spp.
• ID: 500–1000 bacteria cells
• TR: needlestick, rarely person-to-person
• CE: onset of illness is 2–10 days; symptoms are watery diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting, possibly fever
• P/T: no vaccine available; treatment is supportive – the illness is self-limiting in healthy people, antibiotics for severe
infections
• SD: illness lasts one week
• LAIs: few cases reported
Salmonella spp.
• ID: varies by species
• TR: mucous membranes, needlestick (S. Typhimurium causes the most severe disease of non-Typhi Salmonella)
• CE: onset of illness is 12–72 hours; symptoms are diarrhoea, cramps, vomiting, fever
• P/T: no vaccine available; supportive treatment, antibiotics for severe cases
• SD: illness lasts 4–7 days
• LAIs: 48 reported
Shigella spp.
• ID: as low as 10–100 bacteria cells
• TR: mucous membranes, aerosols, skin/clothing; long-lived on surfaces (up to one week) and highly transmissible
(flies, sexual contact, saliva, fomites)
• CE: onset of illness is 12 hours to 7 days; symptoms are watery or bloody diarrhoea, fever, cramps, nausea; Sh.
dysenteriae may produce Shiga toxin which can lead to haemolytic uraemic syndrome, subgroup B may lead to
reactive arthritis (Reiter syndrome) in people who are genetically predisposed
• P/T: no vaccine available; supportive care, antibiotics essential for Sh. dysenteriae infections to prevent
complications of haemolytic uraemic syndrome
• SD: usually resolves within one week with supportive care. In cases of Reiter syndrome, mild to severe arthritis,
urogenital inflammation and eye inflammation may occur (can be severe), and administration of antibiotics is
necessary – symptoms can last one month with arthritis lasting as long as one year. In the case of haemolytic
uraemic syndrome caused by Sh. dysenteriae, antibiotics should be administered as soon as diagnosed because
this is associated with better outcomes. Shiga toxin targets blood vessels, kidneys and other organs and can lead to
neurological disorders. Haemolytic uraemic syndrome is most common in children and has a fatality rate of 10%.
• LAIs: Shigella spp. is the most frequent biological agent associated with LAIs.
E. coli (non-commensal)
• ID: as low as 10–100 bacteria cells
• TR: mucous membranes, aerosols, needlestick, animal bites
• CE: onset of illness is 2–8 days; duration is one week in non-severe cases; symptoms include diarrhoea (mild to
severe and bloody), stomach pain and cramps, and sometimes nausea and vomiting. Several non-commensal
strains (for example, O157:H7, O145) are Shiga toxin-producing E. coli and infection with theses strains may result in
haemolytic uraemic syndrome.
• P/T: no human vaccine available; treatment is supportive for mild cases, antibiotics are needed for severe cases and
for haemolytic uraemic syndrome.
• SD: mild to haemolytic uraemic syndrome (see Shigella spp.)
• LAIs: few reported/no data
96 RISK ASSESSMENT
• centrifuging
propagated
1. Bacterial cultures will be checked on receipt by visualization and confirmation of primary container integrity.
Compromised cultures (for example, broken primary container, mixed, dried out) will be rejected. Accepted cultures
will be labelled and sorted by genus.
2. Cultures will be subcultured once onto Luria broth agar using sterile techniques and grown for 24 hours at 37 °C or
24–48 hours at 24 °C.
3. Bacterial cultures will be examined for growth and either subcultured again, or prepared for antimicrobial
susceptibility testing.
4. Isolates to be tested will be programmed into the automated antimicrobial testing system along with pre-
programmed quality controls (bacterial isolates from ATCC – American Type Culture Collection).
5. For each culture tested, a 96-well plate pre-loaded with antibacterial drug dilutions will be used for incubation and
later reading of antimicrobial susceptibility testing using an automated spectrophotometric system.
6. Colonies will be isolated and transferred to pre-labelled tubes of sterile water to rinse for no longer than 10 minutes,
vortexed briefly and the concentration measured using a nephelometer against a McFarland standard to obtain
the density required to inoculate tubes with Luria broth.
7. Appropriate dilution (1:10) of bacteria will be added to Luria broth tubes and vortexed briefly.
8. The tubes will then be loaded into an automated dispenser for distribution and dispensing into the 96-well
antimicrobial plates.
9. Plates will be covered with a plastic seal and placed in the incubator and the automated system started. Plates will
incubate overnight and then be read.
10. All bacterial growth density readings will be confirmed using a digital reader of minimum inhibitory concentration.
11. Data on minimum inhibitory concentrations will be uploaded securely from the computer system and stored in a
secure database.
12. Waste culture plates and titre plates will be deactivated by daily autoclaving.
13. Isolates of interest (resistant to one or more of the drugs) will be stored at –70 °C in cryogenic tubes containing
Luria broth and 40% glycerol. The location of the frozen isolates will be recorded in a database and tracked.
- gloves
• incubator
1. Bacteria will be subcultured in a BSC using large-ring disposable loops.

2. Incubation will take place in a 37 °C incubator or in sealed plastic sweater boxes on the bench top at 24 °C.
3. Bacteria will be inoculated into sterile water tubes using a small-ring disposable loop.
4. A pipette will be used to transfer/titrate rinsed bacterial isolates into Luria broth tubes.
5. A vortex mixer will be used to mix the broth dilution
6. A nephelometer will be used to read the concentration of the bacteria in the broth tubes.
7. The broth cultures will be dispensed from broth tubes into 96-well antimicrobial plates using an automated system.
8. Plastic plate covers will be applied manually.
9. Plates will be transferred to the bench that has the incubating automated spectrophotometer and placed inside
overnight.
10. Isolates to be kept for storage will be transferred to cryotubes in a BSC.
11. Used culture plates will be transferred to cryogenic tubes for autoclaving.
PPE and other risk control measures already available in the laboratory include:
• disposable gloves
• bench shields
• long-sleeved disposable laboratory gowns
• goggles
• 2 BSCs (certified annually)
• autoclave (regularly maintained and tested/certified annually)
• two hand washing sinks and eyewash stations in the laboratory – one sink for “dirty” washing (for hand washing
after working directly with the biological agents) and the other for “clean” washing (for hand washing after work not
involving biological agents).
Note: need an incubator or Anoxomat® for Campylobacter spp. culture
98 RISK ASSESSMENT
following factors.
The Gastrointestinal Disease facility will use a laboratory that has four benches with workspace on either side,
giving a total of eight workspaces. One of these workspaces will be needed for the automated equipment such as
an automated nucleic acid isolation device, computer and digital visualizer of minimum inhibitory concentrations.
Another workspace will be needed for the broth manipulations, nephelometer and the automated plate dispenser.
This leaves one workspaces for receipt/recording of cultures and up to five workspaces for other activities.
Chairs are in good condition and of the appropriate height for proper posture while working at the bench.
The laboratory has two BSCs for manipulation of cultures.
The laboratory has a closable door that opens onto a hallway where there is storage for supplies, large equipment
and freezers. There are no windows in the laboratory but it has a glass viewing panel that allows the inside of the
laboratory to be seen from the office corridor.
The laboratory has a negative-pressure ventilations system that is continually maintained and monitored and
personnel are warned when the ventilation system is not working properly.
Workflow issues have not been identified yet.
Note: Freezers (–70 °C) are in the laboratory equipment room outside the laboratory, so special risk control measures
will be taken for transport of cultures to this area, which is semi-clean.
• Are personnel trained to work with diagnostic specimens and unknown agents and do they have experience in this work?
Current personnel have experience manipulating these bacterial cultures, with the exception of Campylobacter spp.
but they have little or no experience in this broth microdilution technique used for antimicrobial susceptibility testing.
We expect to hire two new personnel with adequate experience but our personnel budget is limited so it is likely that
they will be junior scientists.
The safety culture in the laboratory is good but the most senior scientist in the laboratory has developed incorrect
habits that are hard to break. We may need to improve the safety culture in view of the new procedures that involve
work with bacterial broth culture.
No one has reported becoming ill and there have been no chemical spills or major biological incidents/spills.
One of the current personnel is planning to start a family so she should also be trained to perform other duties that do
not involve culturing these biological agents given her circumstances.
Maintenance personnel enter the laboratory when repair work is done but we are given advance notice so the
laboratory is decontaminated before they enter. The maintenance department has begun a training programme
for maintenance personnel on recognizing hazards and asking appropriate questions about work in the laboratory.
The same is true for equipment technicians – the laboratory is decontaminated and no cultures are in the open. All
external personnel are escorted by laboratory personnel while they are in the laboratory. External personnel also
know that we work with S. Typhi and only vaccinated personnel are allowed to enter the laboratory.
Personnel
Marleen Fournier BSC training 28.01.2020
Paulin Nilsson Waste handling 03.06.2020
Simon Abramowitz Waste handling, BSC training 26.07.2020
Carolin Aerbischer BSC training 18.02.2020

100 RISK ASSESSMENT
United Laboratories has a reputation to uphold but it is not under extreme scrutiny by an oversight authority except
perhaps at the state level. We do not often make press announcements.
The laboratories of the gastroenterology bacterial unit are subject to federal occupational health and safety
administration regulations. We have internal safety policies and practices as well but do not work with Tier 1 agents,
so do not come under the Federal Select Agent Program. There are no special regulations for working with the
pathogens listed earlier.
S. Typhi and Shigella spp. pose the most danger; we are familiar with manipulating these pathogens, although not in
broth. All personnel working in the laboratory, or who will work in the laboratory, are immunized against S. Typhi. S.
Typhi and Shigella spp. are also the most communicable agents, so any new personnel will be trained to handle these
appropriately in the BSC.
Most infections with the bacteria listed earlier are self-limiting and do not require antibiotics, except in severe cases.
Exceptions are S. Typhi, for which a person can become a carrier, and bacteria with Shiga toxin (Shigella spp. and E.
coli subtypes). Haemolytic uraemic syndrome caused by these biological agents is rare in adults.

- ingestion
- spills
• Exposure to these bacterial pathogenic biological agents could occur during manipulation and environmental
contamination if not done in a BSC.
• Aerosols could be produced if the broth tubes are damaged or compromised, so inoculation is also best done in a
BSC.
• Exposure to or release of the pathogen could occur if culture plates or glass broth tubes are dropped on the floor.
102 RISK ASSESSMENT
manipulated?
The cultures will not be grown to large volumes and will be at their highest concentration on the agar plates. Current
laboratory personnel are competent in manipulation of all cultures except Campylobacter spp. but the two new
personnel we expect to recruit may not be experienced in handling these biological agents. Further, no laboratory
personnel that I am aware of are competent in this broth dilution procedure for antimicrobial susceptibility testing.
This work will be done at least weekly by more than one person based on the number of isolates that we receive.
The procedure (start to finish) takes up to 4 days from receipt to freezing the desired isolates. As personnel become
familiar with the procedure, they will become experienced in doing it and less likely to make mistakes, even though
the chance of exposure is more frequent.
As well as their other duties, personnel will be assigned groups of pathogens that will be tested on different
antimicrobial panels. The panels for Shigella spp., E. coli and Salmonella spp. are the same, and those bacteria will
likely be the responsibility one person, who will be the main tester for antimicrobial susceptibility. These three bacteria
are likely to make up most of the cultures received. Campylobacter is anaerobic and must be cultured using slightly
different methods. It has its own panels for antimicrobial susceptibility testing and one person is assigned to do the
testing. Vibrio spp. require a slightly different panel and are relatively rare in our area. S. Typhi requires slightly higher
containment because of the long illness it can cause, its higher mortality rate and transmissibility factors. I plan to
assign one person to work with Vibrio spp. and S. Typhi, preferably someone who has experience with both. This
makes a total of three people who will be doing the antimicrobial susceptibility testing. I may assign a junior team
member to handle receipt and recording of cultures, since there is less chance for exposure during that process
because the primary containers are enclosed within a secondary container (clear sealable bag). The new procedure
will therefore require four personnel, who will work in a dedicated laboratory for antimicrobial susceptibility testing.
We have not had any exposures that I am aware of, although exposures sometimes go unrecognized because
symptoms are similar to other gastrointestinal biological agents (for example, norovirus) and infections.
Current risk control measures for bacterial manipulation are effective but I have only two BSCs and I may have to
install another cabinet (or two) in order to accommodate the procedure and work load. Personnel do not currently use
goggles because they rarely use the vortex mixer, so they will need goggles or the vortex mixer may have to be kept
and operated in the BSC.
2.2 Determine the likelihood of exposure or release and what factors have the greatest influence on likelihood (continued)
manipulated?
The facility design and condition do not pose any hazards to this work. Since some cultures will be stored frozen, I
have to plan the safest strategy to transfer cultures from the laboratory to the linear equipment room. Adding a
freezer in the laboratory may reduce some of the risk associated with the transfer of these cultures (they will be frozen
and senescent and therefore less active during transport).
Taking the above into consideration as well as the characteristics listed for each biological agent, the likelihoods of
exposure/release are as follows.
S. Typhi Rare (this work is already performed in a BSC)
V. cholerae Unlikely
Vibrio spp. Unlikely
Campylobacter spp. Unlikely
Salmonella spp. Possible
Shigella spp. Unlikely
E. coli Unlikely
104 RISK ASSESSMENT
Exposure to S. Typhi can cause serious illness and death and this pathogen is transmissible from person to person.
Infected people can have no symptoms and can be carriers of the disease, inadvertently spreading it to others outside
the laboratory.
Exposure to Sh. dysenteriae or some E. coli subtypes may result in haemolytic uraemic syndrome, a serious disease
that can cause death or permanently damage organs and brain function. These pathogens are also likely to cause
dysentery and severe illness. Although laboratory-associated infections with Shigella are very common, no deaths
have been reported with these infections.
V. cholerae is transmissible if the biological agent is released in food or water but the likelihood of an undetected
laboratory-associated infection is low as symptoms appear quickly and are quite characteristic of the infection (rice-
water stools). Very few cases of laboratory-associated infections have been reported; these infections have resulted
in four deaths. Other Vibrio species are rare in our area, since we are in the centre of the country and Vibrio spp. are
associated with marine life.
Campylobacter spp. infections can be serious in certain populations but are zoonotic diseases and more common in
livestock and wildlife than people. There are few data that support many laboratory-associated infections with this
genus.
Taking the above into consideration as well as the characteristics listed for each biological agent, the consequences of
exposure or release are as follows.
S. Typhi Severe
V. cholerae Major – few laboratory-associated infections, most
people recover within one week without treatment
Vibrio spp. Moderate
Campylobacter spp. Moderate
Salmonella spp. Moderate
Shigella spp. Major – likelihood of haemolytic uraemic syndrome in
healthy adults is extremely low
E. coli Major – likelihood of haemolytic uraemic syndrome in
healthy adults is extremely low

Consequences
release

place.
Medium If an incident occurred, harm would Additional risk control measures are
Very high
¨

106 RISK ASSESSMENT
(continued)
Note:
S. Typhi Medium No Medium
V. cholerae Medium No Low
Vibrio spp. Low Yes Low
Campylobacter spp. Low Yes Low
Salmonella spp. Medium No Medium
Shigella spp. High No High
E. coli Medium No Medium

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes ¨ No
control measures?
Yes No ¨
measures?

measures?
National guidelines for working with these pathogens are available in the fifth edition of the Biosafety in
microbiological and biomedical laboratories (https://www.cdc.gov/labs/pdf/CDC-BiosafetyMicrobiologicalBiome
dicalLaboratories-2009-P.PDF) and international guidelines are found in the fourth edition of the WHO Laboratory
biosafety manual. Public Health Canada has biosafety data sheets which provide organism-specific guidance for
many pathogens (https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/laboratory-biosafety-biosecurity/pathogen-
safety-data-sheets-risk-assessment.html). All of these will be used to guide biosafety working practices and
conditions related to this work. Personnel safety is also regulated according to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and rules set out in their policies will be followed.
108 RISK ASSESSMENT

As mentioned previously, I can add at least one BSC in the laboratory so that all work will be performed with
appropriate engineering controls. Vortexing broth tubes will be carried out in the BSC also, further reducing risk.
Purchase and mandatory use of goggles when performing procedures at the bench will further reduce the chances of
exposure through mucous membranes.
The management is very supportive of this work and has approved the recruitment of two new personnel and
allowed an adequate budget for laboratory modifications, supplies and equipment. We charge a fee for some of our
work, so we do not have budgetary restrictions that would limit our ability to sustain this activity. The management
understands that a laboratory-associated infection damages our reputation and is an indicator of inefficiency, so it is
supportive of safety and quality needs and activities.
and corrected

(yes/no)
Vortexing Engineering Low Yes Yes
Applies to: Salmonella spp. controls: Vortex and
(non-Typhi), Vibrio spp., E. coli, manipulation in a
Campylobacter spp. BSC
To avoid exposure through
surface contamination and
potential contact with mucous
membranes
Vortexing Engineering Low Yes Yes
Applies to: Shigella spp. controls: Vortex and
manipulation in a
BSC
membranes
Bench work including plating PPE: Use goggles Low Yes Yes
isolates in an autoinoculator in the laboratory
Applies to: all biological agents while not working
in the BSC
membranes
Specimen transport Administrative Very low Yes Yes
Applies to: all biological agents controls: Transport
all biological
To avoid spills
agents across
the laboratory in
sealed containers
on carts, with no
exceptions
Transport within the facility
Administrative Very low Yes Yes
controls: Install
Applies to: all biological agents
a –20 °C freezer
To avoid spills during the
in the main
transport
laboratory for
freezing isolates
before transfer
to –80 °C. Handle
freezer transfer
as a within-
facility specimen
transport (cart
and boxes will be
decontaminated)

110 RISK ASSESSMENT
(yes/no)
S. Typhi Engineering Medium Yes Yes
To avoid spills during controls: Use
inoculation procedure dedicated bench
and BSC for work
on this biological
agent


Consequences
release


proceed.
Low If an incident occurred, there would
¨ High If an incident occurred, harm would your risk control strategy based upon
be likely.
place
planned

¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
Yes No ¨
measures?
112 RISK ASSESSMENT
Reviewed by (Name and title) Professor Abed Achebe, Director, United Microbiology
Laboratories
Reviewed by (Signature) Abed Achebe
Date 30 May 2020

We have the SOPs from the state laboratory, which was doing this work before. We will develop our own SOPs based
on the state laboratory SOPs and tailor them to conform to our laboratory set-up and workflow.
All SOPs are stored in an electronic database and relevant laboratory personnel are required to read them and sign
that they understand them before they are trained to perform the procedures at the bench in the laboratory.
Technicians who install the automated equipment will train personnel on its use, and this training will be summarized
in a job aid to supplement the SOPs.
The personnel will be individually trained to do broth microdilution antimicrobial susceptibility testing using the “see
one, do one, teach one” method. I have found that this is a most effective method and that it is usually more effective
to train one person at a time to avoid distractions and so that all questions that may arise can be answered. After
training and practice with non-pathogenic bacteria, the personnel will be tested for competency in the procedure (a
competency test is being prepared). If an individual passes the test and is considered competent, he/she can begin
working with pathogenic bacteria and reporting actual results.
As Unit Chief, I will be responsible for maintaining necessary records, including personnel competency reports
(confidential). These and other shared documents will be stored in our database to ensure accessibility for all
authorized personnel who may need them.
This biological risk assessment will be one of the forms stored in the database, which houses all our records, including
test results from (de-identified) specimens collected from patients around the state.
We will require several equipment items and additional supplies. One of our personnel in the bacterial unit is
responsible for all inventory purchasing (over and above his other duties) but he will need assistance and possibly
my help for the first year. Work is planned to begin in 6 months and I have already ordered the larger equipment,
including the automated incubating spectrophotometric plate reader. This unit holds 64 plates at once so should be
more than adequate for our needs. The automated plate dispenser and the nephelometer have also been ordered.
Maintenance personnel will come to the (decontaminated) laboratory to discuss placement of the additional BSCs.
The –20 °C freezer and BSCs will be ordered next week (after checking quality and value) because it often takes
longer to receive these items.
The additional PPE, laboratory carts and supplies, such as three vortexes (we only have one at present) will be
ordered in the next 3 months.
Supplies such as pipette tips, loops, plate covers, laboratory towels, will be ordered the month before work starts
because these require storage space and need to be reordered frequently.
The antimicrobial plates will be received last because the antimicrobial drugs have a limited shelf life. We will have to
evaluate our needs continually based on the number of cultures we receive and the number of clients who send them.
We do not foresee any budgetary or staffing problems that would affect the sustainability of this work because we are
a private laboratory that generally charges a fee for its services.
As mentioned earlier, the protocols for the antimicrobial susceptibility testing work are from the state health laboratory
and only slight adjustments will be made. I expect to have these adjustments completed within the next 2 months.
SOPs for specific risk control measures are already in place and current personnel have been trained to perform/
understand these procedures. These include proper use of BSCs, putting on and removing laboratory coats and gloves,
proper hand washing, and transport of biological agents within the facility. All of these need to be referenced in the SOP
for antimicrobial susceptibility testing because we received only the technical part of the state health laboratory SOP.
Training for maintenance and calibration will be limited to one person. Beyond daily or weekly maintenance (for example,
cleaning), most of the maintenance will be done by the manufacturer or their designated representative, because all
the automated equipment will be under contract for the duration of this project or until it becomes obsolete.
Current personnel have been trained to use the existing risk control measures but not in the context of the
antimicrobial susceptibility testing protocol. For these personnel, we will review the risk control measures in a group
training in the laboratory.
The newly recruited personnel will require training in all aspects of the antimicrobial susceptibility testing work, use
of risk control measures and our laboratory-specific procedures, including use of our database, waste handling
and restocking. Training on use of risk control measures and our laboratory-specific procedures should take about
a month, after which these personnel should be ready to start training on antimicrobial susceptibility testing. I will
request to start interviewing potential recruits at the beginning of next month. The jobs have already been advertised
for a week so I hope to have several qualified candidates for interview by then.
114 RISK ASSESSMENT

Reviews will be conducted by the biosafety officer annually and if incidents or significant changes in personnel, equipment
or SOP occur. Updates to risk control measures will be made as needed, such as after an incident or when improved
technology or “best practice” information is available. Improvements will be implemented with management support.
Reviewed by (Name and title) Dr Jill Smith, Laboratory Manager

Reviewed by (Signature) Jill Smith
Date 19 June 2020

117
118 RISK ASSESSMENT

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LABORATORY BIOSAFETY MANUAL I

© World Health Organization 2020

1.1 Intended scope and objectives2

1.2 How to use this monograph3

SECTION 2 Getting started5

2.1 Selecting the risk assessment team5

2.2 Factors to consider6

2.3 Completing the risk assessment11

SECTION 3 Applying risk assessment to control risks13

3.1 Application of key risk assessment steps14

3.2 Additional risk control measures19

SECTION 4 Implementation strategies and lessons from the field25

4.1 Lessons from the field: laboratory-associated Salmonella infection26

ANNEX 1. Risk assessment short template32

ANNEX 2. Risk assessment long template37

ANNEX 3. Completed short template: mycobacterium tuberculosis test-

ANNEX 4. Completed short template: bloodborne pathogens63

ANNEX 5. Completed long template: influenza research71

ANNEX 6. Completed long template: antimicrobial susceptibility testing

Dr Kazunobu Kojima, World Health Organization, Switzerland

Prof. Joachim Frey, University of Bern, Switzerland

Ms Michelle McKinney (Team lead), National Institutes of Health, United States of

Dr Kathrin Summermatter (Deputy team lead), Institute for Infectious Diseases,

Ms Rica Zinsky, World Health Organization, Switzerland

Dr Jürgen Mertsching, Hannover Medical School, Germany

Aerosol/airborne transmission: The spread of infection caused by the inhalation of

Biological agent: A microorganism, virus, biological toxin, particle or otherwise

Biological safety cabinet (BSC): An enclosed, ventilated working space designed

Biosafety: Containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to

Biosafety officer: An individual designated to oversee facility or organizational

Calibration: Establishment of the relationship between the measurement provided by

Certification: A third-party testimony based on a structured assessment and formal

Consequence (of a laboratory incident): The outcome of an incident (exposure to and/

Containment: The combination of physical design parameters and operational

Core requirements: A set of minimum requirements defined in the fourth edition of

Exposure: An event during which an individual comes in contact with, or is in close

Good microbiological practice and procedure (GMPP): A basic laboratory code of

Laboratory-associated infection: Any infection acquired or reasonably assumed as a

Likelihood (of a laboratory incident): The probability of an incident (that is exposure to

Pathogen: A biological agent capable of causing disease in humans, animals or plants.

Personal protective equipment (PPE): Equipment and/or clothing worn by personnel

Propagation: The action of intentionally increasing or multiplying the number of

Risk assessment: A systematic process of gathering information and evaluating the

Risk communication: An interactive and systematic process to exchange information

Risk control measure: Use of a combination of tools, which include communication,

Standard operating procedures (SOPs): A set of well-documented and validated

Transmission: The transfer of biological agent(s) from objects to living things, or

Validation: Systematic and documented confirmation that the specified requirements

Zoonotic diseases (zoonosis): Infectious disease that is naturally transmitted from

The information in this monograph on risk assessment is designed to accompany

This monograph describes selecting a risk assessment team and completing a

The information in this monograph on risk assessment is designed to accompany

Conducting a comprehensive biological risk assessment relies on knowledge and a

1.1 Intended scope and objectives

Figure 1.1 The risk assessment framework

five steps or procedures based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle:

n develop a risk control strategy,

n select and implement risk control measures and

n review risks and risk control measures.

1.2 How to use this monograph

1.1 Intended scope and objectives2

1.2 How to use this monograph3

SECTION 2 Getting started5

2.1 Selecting the risk assessment team5

2.2 Factors to consider6

2.3 Completing the risk assessment11

SECTION 3 Applying risk assessment to control risks13

3.1 Application of key risk assessment steps14

3.2 Additional risk control measures19

SECTION 4 Implementation strategies and lessons from the field25

4.1 Lessons from the field: laboratory-associated Salmonella infection26

ANNEX 1. Risk assessment short template32

ANNEX 2. Risk assessment long template37

ANNEX 4. Completed short template: bloodborne pathogens63

ANNEX 5. Completed long template: influenza research71