Religions, Democracy and Governance: Spaces for the Marginalised in Contemporary

India
Author(s): GURPREET MAHAJAN and SURINDER S JODHKA
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , JANUARY 7, 2012, Vol. 47, No. 1 (JANUARY 7,
2012), pp. 45-52
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

Religions, Democracy and Governance:

Spaces for the Marginalised in Contemporary

GURPREET MAHAJAN, SURINDER S JODHKA

This paper examines the dynamics of religion and

democratic politics by looking at political mobilisationsnent. The creation of Pakistan - a separate homeland for the
India's Independence
Muslim population - and the communalcame with
violence that followedthe Partition of the subconti
of marginalised groups in Punjab and Maharashtra. It
the "transfer of populations" drew attention to the presence of
argues that even when religious identity remains the
strongly etched religious identities and communities. If Partition
bedrock of social life and individual experience, made it difficult to ignore the concerns and demands of these
communities, it also pointed to the violence that might ensue as
democratic politics brings out new configurations and
they sought recognition of these identities or protested their non
alignments, in which neat boundaries of religious
recognition and made claims on that basis. A crucial issue facing
difference are occasionally blurred or overwritten by
independent India, then, was how to deal with these communi
other identities. The Indian experience also reveals that
ties and their concerns. It was clear that religion could not be re
stricted simply to the private domain, but in what way should re
religious groups are not homogeneous. While political
ligion and religious communities be accommodated? This was
mobilisation tends to unite them as communities with
the crucial question upon which the unity of India and the viabil
common interests, development policies have invariably
ity of her democratic system depended.
The Constituent Assembly deliberated at length on this
disaggregated them, reinforcing the internal divisions
and diversities within religious communities. issue and eventually devised a framework that neither adopted
the American model of secularism, which separated religion
from politics completely, nor followed the path of many other
countries in the region, which endorsed and privileged a par
ticular religion. At the time of independence religious com
munities, particularly minority communities, needed assurance
that they would be equal partners in the emerging democracy,
and would enjoy the freedom to pursue their religious and
cultural way of life. However, members of these communities
also had development-related concerns and these surfaced time
and time again, sometimes through popular ground-level mobi
lisations and sometimes through initiatives by the government
in office.

While deliberating on matters of religion, the framers of the

Indian Constitution also noted the presence of caste and the role it
played in determining a person's identity and position in society in
India. In particular, they noted the presence of caste-based dis
crimination and exclusion within the Hindu community and tried
to eliminate this form of discrimination by abolishing the practice
of untouchability and opening all common public places, such as
drinking water wells, inns and restaurants to members of all castes
and communities. In addition, they reserved seats for members of
the erstwhile excluded populations, the scheduled castes (scs), in
legislative assemblies. The Constitution also included an enabling
provision under Article 16 that permitted the State to reserve seats
Gurpreet Mahajan (gurmahajan@hotmail.com) is with the department for members of the scs in government jobs. Since then, caste has
of political science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Surinder
been an important basis for group mobilisations and focus of pub
S Jodhka (ssjodhka@yahoo.com) is with the department of social
lic policy. Initially, policies involving reservation of seats were in
systems, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
tended to target identified groups within the Hindu community,

Economic & Political weekly CEE9 January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no 1 45

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RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

since the practice of "untouchability" or forced exclusion

which was
meanta that community institutions and codified commu
consequence of the caste system associated with the nity
Hindu
lawsreli
would decide all matters relating to family, such as
marriage,
gion. In post-independence India, however, similar policies inheritance, divorce, maintenance, adoption and the
have
targeted "Other Backward Classes" (obcs) - that is, different reli
custody of children. Assessing positively the work done by differ
gious and community groups that are said to be socially and eco institutions in various spheres of social life, as for
ent religious
nomically deprived, including Muslims and Christians. Seats are
instance, setting up educational institutions, fellowships, free
currently reserved in the field of education, including higher inns for travellers and provision for drinking water,
dispensaries,
education, posts and jobs in the public sector for members of26the
Article of the Constitution gave all religious communities the
scs, scheduled tribes (sts) and identified obcs (Sheth
right 2004;
to "establish and maintain institutions for religious and
Mahajan 2008a). charitable purposes". In addition, Articles 29 and 30 gave all mi
There are today groups within all the religious communities in right to set up their own educational institutions to
norities the
protect
India that consider reservations to be a major asset that their language and culture and to impart education of
can give
them access to prized public goods in a situation of acute
their compe
choice. To make this an effective option, the Constitution
tition and scarcity of resources. Caste identities remain a critical
included an enabling provision that allowed such institutions to
receive
basis for mobilisation and offer an alternative basis for funds from the State (Mahajan 1998,2008b).
solidarity
both within a religious community and across different Each of these rights was subject to a few restrictions, but
religious
communities. The institutionalisation of constitutional and secu collectively they provided a fair degree of religious and cultural
lar democracy in a society marked by religious diversity andliberty to all religious communities and offered some safeguards
caste hierarchy has therefore yielded a peculiar dialectic of
against cultural assimilation. They also provided space to
religion, caste and politics. This paper explores this relationship
religious communities, in particular the minorities, to continue
through a study of two popular caste-based mobilisations in
their own distinct cultural and religious practices. The scope of
Punjab and Maharashtra. More specifically, it looks at mobilisa
some of the provisions, such as the right to establish educational
tions by the lower castes in different religious groups, the Hindu
institutions given to all minority groups, has been interpreted
majority as well as Sikh and Muslim minorities, to understand generously by the courts in independent India. Today, minority
the space granted to religion/religious organisations in the public
educational institutions impart education at various levels, from
arena to articulate their interests and the modalities that govprimary and high school (where the major concern is to protect
and promote one's language and culture) to professional and
ernments and the State have adopted to reach out and respond to
technical colleges (where protecting one's culture is not the
the development-related needs of the different communities and
main concern).
marginalised groups. The fieldwork for this study was mostly
carried out during April and November 2007. At a more substantive level, religion entered into the public
domain, as individuals who shared a religious identity could
Religion and Politics: Constitutional Framework come together and form political organisations and associations.
There were two choices before independent India. As a separate
Based on the view that members of a religion may have shared
homeland had been created for the Muslim population, it might
concerns and even interests, they were at liberty to organise
have been possible to make India the homeland for the Hinduthemselves, campaign with existing political parties, or form
community. Alternatively, it could opt to become a secular demo their own political party to pursue their demands and concerns.
cracy, equally hospitable to people of different communities. India
Religious political parties claiming to speak on behalf of a com
chose the latter path. There was a general consensus that the State
munity could, therefore, coexist with "secular" parties that were
would have no established religion of its own and would treatnot bound to the interests of any one religious community. Both
members of different communities as equal citizens. There were,
kinds of parties could voice the demands of a community, so long
however, significant differences of opinion about what equal treat
as they did not encourage inter-community hatred or refer to a
ment would entail. It was agreed in the initial stages of the delib
candidate's religion in order to seek votes for themselves.
erations that each of the recognised religious communities (along A range of political organisations claiming to be the voice of
with the scs and sts) would receive separate representation ina given religious and cultural way of life existed even in pre
proportion to their share of the population. However, the division
independence India. In the post-independence period, different
of colonial India on the basis of religion and the communal con
regions saw the emergence of specific religion-based parties,
such as the Akali Dal in Punjab, the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra
flicts that followed made many wary of treating religious commu
nities as the basic units for political participation. The discussions
and the Indian Union Muslim League in Kerala. The constitutional
eventually led the religious minorities to withdraw their demand
framework provided the space for the emergence of religious par
for separate representation (Bajpai 2000). ties. But how are these parties different from the "secular" par
A consensus emerged that equal treatment for all religious
ties and how has their presence structured the nature of demo
communities would be assured by protecting the religious liberty
cratic politics in the country? In particular, how has the presence
of all. To ensure this, three kinds of fundamental rights were
of such parties affected the ability of the marginalised sections to
given by the Constitution. Article 25 gave each individual equal
access development goods? These questions are examined in the
liberty to "profess, propagate and practise" their religion. The
next section by taking a closer look at the Akali Dal in Punjab and
personal laws of different communities were also protected, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra.

46 January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no i 0353 Economic & Political weekly

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 RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

Religious Parties and Democratic Politics higher than that of the Akali Dal, irrespective of who won the
elections. In its bid to compete with the Congress in the assembly
Akali Dal
elections in 1972, the Akali Dal campaigned around the slogan of
"Sikh Panth in danger". This attempt to mobilise the community
The Akali Dal was born in pre-independent India, in the movement
for freeing Sikh gurdwaras from the control of the mahants.on religious lines received little support and its vote share in fact
Since
declined.
then, it has claimed to represent Sikh interests and aspirations, ini Sensing the mood of the people, and their desire to
have a government that focused on development concerns, such
tially seeking a separate state for the Sikh community. However,
when this demand did not receive sufficient support from as
theindustrialisation
peo and better irrigation facilities, in 1977 the
ple of the Punjab region and the central government too was Akali
averseDal placed the religious agenda in the background. Instead,
it raised other economic and political concerns, focusing on
to according a separate state/geographical territory to a religious
greater
community, it instead sought a separate state within the Indian Un autonomy for the region within the federal system and
advocating changes in centre-state relations. The new agenda
ion - "Punjabi Suba" - on the ground of a shared linguistic identity
- a claim that the central government had already recognised
not only won the party popular support in the elections, it also
when it set up the States Reorganisation Commission. received the support of other non-Congress state governments
If its demand for recognition of a linguistic identity gave
likethe
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Left Front, each of
Akali Dal a political platform to compete in electoral politics, thewas seeking changes in centre-state relationships.
which
creation of Punjabi Suba in 1966 gave its political career a The
firmcompulsions of electoral politics dictate that all parties,
base. The Sikhs constituted almost 60% of the total population
even of
those that claim to speak on behalf of a community that is a
the newly constituted state, and this yielded a new set of oppor in a region (as was the case of Akali Dal in Punjab), need
majority
tunities to the Akali Dal and the local regional elite. Yet,
to even
reach out to different communities and take up issues of devel
though contemporary politics in the region revolves almost en (or at least issues other than those relating to religion and
opment
tirely around the Sikhs, almost all the major national parties
identity)
- if they wish to win successive elections. More impor
Congress, Jan Sangh/Bjp and the communist parties - have been perhaps, even when a community is mobilised around iden
tantly
present in Punjab and they continue to enjoy a reasonable tity
degree
issues, it does not necessarily vote as one. In other words, cul
of electoral support from the people. tural and religious homogeneity does not translate into political
To understand the democratic and electoral politics of Punjab,
homogeneity of the same order. Hence, even though identity may
specifically its capacity to reach out to the most marginalised
be a unifying element, there is not a one-to-one correspondence
sections, the lower castes, two facts need to be noted.between
First, the cultural/religious and the political. Thus identity pol
Punjab has the highest percentage of sc population ofitics
all the
does not occupy all the space for what might be termed "secu
states of the union. Second, thanks to the success of thelar
green
parties". All through the 1980s, when identities were strongly
revolution, Punjab has been one of the most prosperous states in
mobilised by the different factions of the Akali Dal, the Congress
independent India. Party retained a significant percentage of the total vote. Neverthe
Yet, and contrary to the expectations of modernisation theorists,
less, the presence of religious parties does make a difference to the
nature
economic well-being did not bring with it an eclipse of religious and of democratic politics: it invariably makes identity issues
central
cultural identities. Instead identity-based mobilisations grew and to the political discourse, compelling all actors (political
gained strong roots. Such mobilisations had occurred even parties)
in pre to address them, if not to foray into that area themselves.
independence days and in the post-independent period they be
ShivSena
came manifest in three forms: (a) the emergence of a political party
- the Akali Dal - that was closely associated with the Sikh A
religion
similar story unfolds when we turn to the Shiv Sena in
rashtra.1
and politics; (b) the demand for a Punjabi Suba (literally implying a In the 1980s, the party was able to extend its su
base beyond Mumbai and other urban centres by combini
state for the Punjabi linguistic community, though it was simultane
ously to be a state where the Sikhs would constitute a majority);
communal rhetoric (which reified religious community iden
and (c) a militant movement for autonomy which eventually de
and interests) with the need to address the lack of developm
manded secession (for an overview of the literature on the rise
the and
rural areas of Maharashtra. In other words, it successfu
decline of the Khalistan movement, see Jodhka 1997,2002).ploited local level contradictions to its own advantage, produ
a new
In mobilising the Sikh religious and linguistic identity, thekind of what Hansen described as "vernacularised Hin
dutva"
Akali Dal tended to speak in the name of "the community", often (Hansen 1996). This new rhetoric also appealed to the
overlooking the internal differences that existed within Punjab.
lower middle classes in Bombay city, who were affected by rising
urban
Its attempt to mobilise the people of Punjab along identity unemployment (Palshikar 2004). The strategy of the Shiv
lines
provided limited gains. In the period before the creationSena
of the
was to consolidate the Hindu vote through an anti-Muslim
"Punjabi Suba", it polled less than 13% in state assembly elecHowever, it was more successful in weaning away the
tirade.
tions. However, its share of votes increased substantially after thecastes from the Congress/Nationalist Congress Party, while
middle
reorganisation of the state boundaries and the creation of upper
Punjabcaste voters alternated between support for the Congress/
in its present form, varying from 20 to 32%. While identity Nationalist Congress Party or the Shiv Sena/Bjp, depending upon
their of
politics certainly benefited the Akali Dal, the percentage share assessment of which would best serve their interests

votes for the national Congress Party had always remained

(Palshikar and Deshpande 1999).

Economic & Political weekly B5E3 January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no 1 47

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RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

migrated
Thus, even in this case, when the religious identity-based party to cities like Mumbai and Pune from north Ind
was able to set the political agenda, the dominant religious com a large proportion of Muslims in Maharashtra are loc
However,
Marathi-speaking groups, mostly from a relatively poor ba
munity did not act as a homogeneous entity in the electoral process.
ground
The point again is that a religious majority does not readily trans and in traditional occupations. As a result, they identi
late into a political majority, placing some constraints with the local backward caste communities. In other words,
on reli
Muslims
gious and cultural majoritarianism. To some extent, these limits of Maharashtra can be divided into two categories,
occur because all communities are internally divided along the
ajlafs (upper castes) and the ashrafs (lower/backward castes).
lines of caste and gender, which are important because they The
oftenajlaf Muslims have been gradually moving away fro
influence the capacity of an individual to access resources and
traditional Muslim organisations and seeking to educate the
opportunities. Hence, even when voters share religious children
and cul in English medium private schools rather than Ur
tural concerns, they may differ on other counts and suchmedium
differ schools. Their realisation that they are socially and
ences can be important in competitive electoral politics; cationally
indeed, backward (Hansen 2000: 261) has given rise to a n
in India, all the political parties use the spaces provided set of mobilisations for recognition as obcs along with the Hin
by such
multiple identities to consolidate their electoral support.obcs,
In this
a recognition that would entitle them to apply for reser
quotasbein jobs, higher education and other such benefits fr
respect, there is little difference between the political parties,
thewhen
they secular or religious. This becomes even more evident State.

we turn to lower caste mobilisations among different religious

The Muslim obc movement emerged shortly after the subm
communities in Punjab and Maharashtra. sion of the Second Backward Classes Commission Report in 198
The report, popularly known as the Mandal Commission repo
Caste-Based Organisations identified socially and economically backward groups across
As noted above, the active presence of different community idenferent religions. Accepting the possibility that there are caste-l
tities provides the context for democratic politics and offers dif structures (Sikand 2004; Ahmad 1973) and ensuing forms of
ferent kinds of opportunities for voicing and taking up the concernsrivation and backwardness within all the religions, the comm
of the marginalised sections. While religion-based mobilisationssion identified certain groups among Muslims and Christians
and political parties homogenise and attempt to speak of a single "backward", and recommended special dispensations in the fo
community, caste identities offer modes of differentiation withinof reservation of seats for them in education and public jobs.
this community. Indeed, caste yields a different set of groups andpossibility of Muslim groups being identified as backward
communities, allowing political parties of all hues to consolidatethereby eligible for the benefits of reservation and other form
themselves and challenge the hegemony that may be exercisedaffirmative action was something new and took much of the Mus
by a religious party in a region. Even more importantly, this createscommunity by surprise. As Mohammed Iqbal Ansari, preside
space for the marginalised to articulate their demands and be New All India Muslim obc Organisation (aimobco) explained:
heard and counted in the political domain. The story of caste mo After the Mandal Commission report was submitted and it created s
bilisations in Punjab and Maharashtra reveals two different ways much of fury, we were forced to think about it.... Never had any M
in which the marginalised have entered into the political dis lim religious leader or group staged a 'dharna' or demonstration
course and political parties have attended to their concerns. issues of economic and social development of the community. Th
never take up [the] issue of education, jobs, loans, roads and electrici

The Muslim OBC Movement in Maharashtra What they have touched upon are always emotional issues of religio
such as Muslim Personal Law, triple Talaq, Babri Masjid, etc. The
Maharashtra is the third largest state of India and is second only
fore in all our meetings we used to say that if you have to think of you
to Uttar Pradesh in terms of its total population. Cities likedevelopment,
Mumbai you have to come out of the old ways of thinking.2

and Pune have made it one of the most urbanised regions in the
Emergence
country. Its religious demography is similar to the national of Small Muslim Groups
demography, with an overwhelming Hindu majority (80.2%)
It was with this understanding of the needs of the Muslim c
while Muslims (10.6%) and Buddhists (6%) are the main minor
munity that small groups began to emerge in Maharashtra. O
ity communities. Christians too have a presence in thesuch
state,
group
con that emerged in 1983 was the Ansari Welfare Socie
(later in
stituting around 1% of the total population. Though small renamed
nu the Muslim obc Council), under the leadership
merical terms, Maharashtra is also home to the largestMohammed
number ofParvez Iqbal, who is still actively involved with the
Jains, Zoroastrians and Jews of any Indian state. Muslim movement and is known to everyone in his locality as t
Politically Muslims have been quite marginal in Maharashtra
right to al
information (rti) man.3 Over the years, the Ansari W
fare Society/Muslims
though they constitute more than 10% of the total population of obc Council has organised jalsas (pu
the state and have an even larger presence in the city gatherings)
of Mumbai with a view to enhancing awareness among Musl
about
(previously Bombay) -17% - and their marginalisation the
seems toneed to obtain caste certificates, and the advanta
have grown over the years. As is the case with most religious com accrue to them as obcs. Jalsas of this kind were org
that might
munities, the Muslims of Maharashtra are internally ised in Mumbai, Pune, Bhiwandi, Malegaon and several ot
heterogene
places.
ous and differentiated. The older communities like Bohras, In Mumbai, the group usually met at the Gareeb Naw
Khojas
Madarsa,
and Memons were wealthy traders with extensive family which is located in the central part of the city. Par
networks
Iqbal was
within and outside the country. In addition, some Muslims initially helped in this work by his friend, Fat
have

48 January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no i QEE3 Economic & Political weekly

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 RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

Mohammed Ansari,4 but later the society arranged a small work

listen to us but we tried our best to satisfy them in all their queries,
both
ing team of seven to 11 people, who distributed pamphlets andrationally and religiously... As a result, today there are more than
250 mosques all over Maharashtra (20 in Mumbai alone) where every
visited several villages around Mumbai.
Friday in the sermon, after offering prayers, the Imams tell community
Small organisations of this kind grew over time. In 1984, for
members to apply for their obc certificate for education and employ
example, Shabbir Ahmed Ansari from Jalna established the
ment of their children.10
Maharashtra Muslim obc Organisation, which held a large rally
In addition, Mohammed Iqbal Ansari told us that:
on 5 February. In 1986, as a result of this and similar mobilisations,
the right to issue caste certificates in Mumbai was transferred The
fromother means that we used in those days were using public figures
the metropolitan magistrate to the collector or the tehsildar.5 for our purpose. Veteran actor Dilip Kumar (an obc) and later Kader
This was a small but significant gain, the benefits of whichKhan could(a non-OBc) and poet and lyricist Hasan Kamal (a non-OBc)
became our voice.11
accrue only if people were made aware of and persuaded to apply
Their efforts were carried forward when Shabbir Ahmed Ansari
for caste certification. Once again, the task was to raise aware
ness about this benefit among members of the Muslim commu
and Sonawane organised several conferences in different parts
of the state where leaders tried to tell the common Muslims
nity. Shabbir Ahmed Ansari, along with Hasan Kamal, therefore
to understand the significance of getting certified as obcs.
focused on mobilising castes and sub-castes amongst Muslims,
which was by no means an easy task. According to HasanPamphlets
Kamal: and posters were distributed to make obc Muslims
aware of the benefits that they could avail from the government
When we started travelling across Maharashtra, we found that Muslims
after
too were divided along professional lines and like Hindus their getting their caste status certified. Soon afterwards, in
caste
was identified along their working pattern, e g, Malis in Hindus werethe first national convention of the aimobco was held in
1996,
Baghbaan in Muslims, Dhuniyas were Naddafs, Badhais were Nazzafs,
New Delhi. It started to carry out surveys of organised occupa
etc. So when the Mandal Commission report was accepted, we thought
that if Muslims too were included in its fold, it could be part of the solu
tional categories and assist others to become organised.12
tion to the problems that large sections of the community face.6
Response of the Government
Muslims as OBCs
Following the aimobco conferences, the Akhil Bhartiya Muslim
The obc Muslim movement received a fresh impetus with theSahitya Parishad continued campaigning through meet
Marathi
formation of Akhil Bhartiya Muslim Marathi Sahitya Parishad inrallies in different parts of Maharashtra and sending
ings and
delegations
1989. Vilas Sonawane (one of the most important leaders in the to meet relevant state ministers. As a result of all
movement) told us that nearly 100 writers and poets attended its
these efforts, on 7 December 1994, the Maharashtra government,
first conference in the same year.7 under Sharad Pawar passed a Government Resolution (gr) that
included 36 Muslim communities (out of 118 identified by the
The decision of the then Prime Minister V P Singh to implement
aimobco) for inclusion in the obcs list.
the recommendations of the Mandal Commission by reserving
seats for obcs in all central government jobs gave a renewed
This resolution was the second great success of the movement,
reason to mobilise the Muslim community and make them
butaware
the task ahead was even more challenging; it had won recogni
of the opportunities that were now available to them. tion
On 1from
Maythe government but now faced a reluctant bureaucracy,
1994, Shabbir Ahmed Ansari, Vilas Sonawane, Hasanthe
Kamal,
people who were supposed to issue obc certificates. In the course
Faqruddin Bennur and many others launched the aimobco in
of this study, Sarfaraz Arzoo (the editor of Hindustan Daily) stated:
Jalna. Shabbir Ahmed became its president and all the members
When the movement picked up, the bureaucracy started creating
of the Akhil Bhartiya Muslim Marathi Sahitya Parishad obstacles
became in the way of issuing caste certificates. Caste certificate was
members of the new organisation. Hasan Kamal and Vilas
theSona
ticket to prosperity. Therefore, they stopped helping at that stage
wane described how: and started eliminating at the bottom level itself. This is now the big
gest problem that the obc movement in Mumbai faces.13
To create caste awareness and identify different caste groups among
Muslims, we started travelling to different towns and organised smallGiven that normally Muslims do not mention their caste in any
and big meetings. But this attempt was vehemently opposed by the official document, claiming caste certificates was very difficult.
established political and religious leadership of the community every
They therefore had to demand a separate process for certification
where. We were presented as conspirators against Islam.8
of obc status for Muslims. The Maharashtra government conceded
Almost all the leaders of the movement that we met confirmed that
this demand and, in October 1995, passed another gr which
made the process of certification simpler. "Now, if a Muslim
they had had similar experiences, although these did not deter them
from continuing their work. "The ulemas spoke and wrote against
wishes to claim the benefits of being an obc, s/he needs only the
this move in all possible ways. From our side, we tried to clearapproval
all of the sarpanch or the approval of the local school".14
suspicions and made them understand that this was a positive oppor Interestingly even the Shiv Sena-Bjp government, which was
tunity to get out of the age-old bondage with specific occupations."9
known for "Muslim bashing", apparently continued to facilitate
The leaders used different strategies to overcome the oppo
the process of Muslim obc certification. As Mohammad Iqbal
Ansari told us:
sition that came from within the community. For example, Hasan
Kamal explained that:
When in 1995, we sat on a hunger strike in front of the office of the
Since we were being opposed by the Imams and Maulanas, we startedcollector at Kolhapur, the cm of that time Manohar Joshi, ordered a
visiting the mosques and tried to convince them. Initially they did notcircular that 'if a Muslim obc is not able to produce his/her caste in the

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RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

school certificate, then the tehsildar will make a home inquiry and along lines of caste, community and language, mean that
cleavages
provide him/her so'.15 no party can win by representing the interests of a single commu
With the passage of time, members of the Muslim community
nity and each must reach out to other identities. As noted above, in
have become increasingly aware of the benefits that can accrue
the case of the Shiv Sena and the bjp, political parties that openly
pursue
from claiming obc status and today many more are applying foran agenda of cultural/religious majoritarianism, margin
the necessary caste certificates. The movement continues alised
to playoccupational and caste groups among the Muslims never
a facilitating role in obtaining caste certificates. Different occu
theless are a possible source of support.17 It is therefore not sur
pational groups that are eligible for obc status have also that when these political parties were in government, they
prising
organised themselves for the objective. They work through their the certification of caste within the Muslim community.
facilitated
Since
biradari (community) network. In one case, a directory has beenreligious mobilisations and institutions usually voice
prepared by the Tamboli community of Sholapur, listing shared community needs and demands, they focus on religious
all their
members who are eligible to receive certificates. and cultural concerns. Development concerns, particularly issues
Maharashtra is not the only state to witness the obc Muslim
of access to such basic amenities as good education, jobs, health
movement. It has gained momentum in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
care, and social security benefits, are raised and pursued in the
public
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamilarena by political parties and other social and political
organisations.
Nadu. However, unlike many other states, it has grown and had a Democracy, and especially competitive electoral
politics, pushes all parties to seek electoral support among all
measure of success in Maharashtra. As many of our respondents
told us, in part this is because successive governments in Mahargroups and creates space for the articulation and pursuit
religious
ashtra have been open to and accommodative of their demands.
of development agendas in different ways. This becomes even
Some went so far as to say that the state governments have never
more evident when we turn to Punjab and consider the strategies
acted "adversely to their demands". For example, the state gov
used in that state for extending the benefits of reservations to
ernments have, from time to time, adjusted and altered the rules
marginalised sections of lower caste vulnerable communities.
by passing new grs or modifying the existing ones. We were told
that to date almost 39 grs have been passed with regardThe Balmiki-Mazhabi Movement in Punjab
to the
obc and dalit Muslim issues.16 The scs are the most marginalised sections of Punjabi society and,
This analysis of the mass mobilisation of marginalised groupslike most other caste clusters, are internally differentiated.
within the Muslim community to access resources and opportunities Within the category, there are different communities with dis
reveals three significant elements. First, the collective assertion had tinct social identities and experiences of economic development.
a complex relationship with the religious institutions and leadership The official list of scs in Punjab enumerates 37 different commu
of the community. The desire to obtain caste certification to accessnities, which political sociologists have tended to group into two
benefits granted by the government to identified obc communitiesto three broad clusters. The first cluster, comprising the Mazhabi
did not initially win the support of the religious leadership. Because Sikhs and the Balmikis/Bhangis, constitutes a total of 41.9%
the leaders of the movement felt that the religious leadership had(30.75% and 11.15% respectively) of the total sc population. The
never attended to the development needs and concerns of memberssecond caste cluster is made up of the Ad Dharmis (15.74%) and
of the community, they began to work outside the available religiousthe Chamars/Ravidasis/Ramdasi Sikhs (25.85%), who together
forums and organisations. Yet, they recognised that to succeed they constitute 41.59%. The remaining 33 caste groups constitute only
would have to gain the support of the religious professionals, both16.51% of the total sc population of Punjab.18
because through them it would be possible to reach a much larger For various historical reasons, groups from the second cluster
section of the community and also to allay any misgivings individuof Punjabi scs have been much more mobile and politically active
als might have about asserting a caste identity than the rest (Juergensmeyer 1988; Jodhka 2002) and have
Second, the emergence of an assertive obc movement outsideexperienced much more social mobility than the first cluster of
the framework of recognised religious organisations and institucaste groups.
tions has not weakened the religious identity of its members, which In contrast, the Chuhrah cluster of the dalit castes (Balmikis and
gains centre stage during periods of communal violence. WhileMazhabi Sikhs) has been far less mobile. In rural areas the Mazhabi
taking up the issue of development and better access to publicSikhs have been closely associated with agriculture, mostly as
goods, the obc movement has not raised the question of women's wage labourers or tied servants of the big landlords. Rarely did
subordination and continued marginalisation within the commuthey own any agricultural land and only a few cultivated land as
nity, although its concern for better education and other developtenants in Punjab. As the official data show, less than 5% of all dalits
ment goods has yielded some indirect spin-offs for women. are listed as cultivators and, given their status, the proportion of
Third, as discussed above, democratic politics could also createMazhabi Sikhs among this group would be even lower.
space for the articulation of development concerns. As in the case
Balmikis
of other successful movements, political parties have tried to win
over some of the leaders of the Muslim obc movement by giving Many have migrated to urban areas because of the limited oppor
them tickets to contest elections and have tried to consolidatetunities available to them in rural areas, in response to the grow
their votes by reaching out to sections of the "apparent other".ing urban demand for scavengers, especially in middle class
This is certainly the case in India, where the existence of multiple localities. While employment, some with regular salaries and

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 RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

Hence the question: how do we reach out to the most margin

pensions, was therefore relatively easily available, urbanisation
alised?
did not necessarily bring social mobility. In practice, How do their interests get factored into the political dis
the pro
portion of urban Balmikis engaged in scavenging work
course? The story of Punjab reveals that competitive democratic
politics
increased after migration from the villages, where only creates a peculiar situation where apparently "secular"
a small
political
proportion worked as scavengers. Their local identities were ofparties like the Congress target the most marginalised
and try
kammi or sepi, meaning regular farm workers, a secular to wean them away from "religious" political parties
occu
pation, even though their status was invariably determined
(namely,by
Akali Dal) by granting special benefits to them.
their position in the caste hierarchy. Given all these limitations
The Politics of Reservation
on the mobility of Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, their achieve
ments in education have also been limited. The assurance of The Mazhabi Sikhs who constitute nearly 31% of Punjab's sc pop
lation, were the single largest group of dalits in the state. Co
employment in municipalities as scavengers had only discour
aged the Balmiki families from pushing their children towards
pared to the dalit caste groups of the Chamar cluster, the Mazha
education. As a leader of the Balmiki community told us were
in anfar more enthusiastic about the Sikh religion and Akali po
interview in Ludhiana: tics. At the time of independence the Akali Sikh leadership played
critical role in ensuring that the lower castes among the Sikhs wer
Surprisingly those who get jobs in the government sector at a relatively
included in the list of identified scs for receiving the benefits
senior level from our community invariably come from rural areas.
Among the urban Balmikis there has traditionally been no aptitude
reservation. This was a significant achievement for the Sikh lead
for education.19
ship, as lower castes in other religious communities (besides H
According to Ram Rattan Ravan, another important leader duism)
of did not receive the benefits of reservations.
the Balmiki community, Mazhabi Sikh support translated into an advantage to the Akal
over the Congress Party. But Balmikis with a substantial presen
The Municipal Act has worked against our community. It blocked our
in urban Punjab mostly went along with the "Hindu" politics of th
development and kept us attached to the traditional occupation of
Jan Sangh. It was against this backdrop that the Congress Part
scavenging. Our people started getting secure jobs without any educa
tion and therefore they did not feel the need of making any effort to get
introduced sub-quotas within the seats reserved for the scs by t
themselves or their children educated. In the city of Ludhiana where
Constitution. On 5 May 1975, Chief Minister Giani Zail Singh se
we have several colleges and a university and all possible facilities for
a letter to various departments directing them to offer "50% of
education, only two students from the Balmiki community could quali
the
fy to be doctor in more than 30 years. This mentality of depending on vacancies of the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes...
Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, if available, as a first preference fr
the municipality service was rampant in our community and therefore
has been the biggest challenge for us. Our struggle is not only against
amongst the Scheduled Caste candidates."22 However, this su
the other communities but also against our own traditions.20
quota was to apply "in direct recruitments only and not in prom
tion cases".23
In contrast, the Chamars had an inherent advantage over the
Chuhras. As R L Sabberwal, a retired officer of the Punjab governLearning from the Punjab experience, the state government
Haryana too decided in 1995 to divide its sc population into t
ment and an ideologue of the Balmiki movement, explained to us:
blocks, A and B, limiting 50% of all the seats for the Cham
The Chamars have had an advantage over us. Their involvement with
(block B) and offering 50% of the seats to non-Chamars (block
leatherwork and shoe-making naturally made them entrepreneurs
and traders. They were quick to exploit the new opportunities that
on preferential basis.
came with urbanisation and reservations. We have had no such tradi
This arrangement worked well until 2005 when the Punjab an
tion. Our occupation kept us backward.21
Haryana High Court responding to a writ petition by Gaje Singh
However, over the years things have begun to change Chamar
for the from the region, decreed the action of the two state g
Balmikis as well. Secure employment as scavengers in the urban as illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Con
ernments
municipality is increasingly becoming a thing of the past. TheThe petitioner had cited the Supreme Court judgment di
tution.
newly emerging scavenging contractors pay very lowlowing
wages.the sub-classification of scs in the case of Andhra Prades
With no education or specialised skills, the Balmiki youththe
do not
high court took note of this decision and terminated the su
have many options. Even those who get educated are invariably
classification within the reserved quota of seats.
When
the first generation of the educated in their families. It is not easythe termination of the classification of quotas was ordered
for them to compete with the relatively more mobile Chamars
on 25 July 2006 by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, there w
and Ad Dharmis for reserved quotas in government jobs. a sense of anger and agitation among the Balmikis and Mazhabis
Punjab.
The point that needs to be highlighted here is that group cohe They were quick to organise themselves and formed
siveness breaks down when we use development/capacities
groupascalled the "Balmiki and Mazhabi Sikh Reservation Bach
the criterion and examine the ability of a community to access
Morcha".24 In the months that followed, the Balmiki communi
organised
available resources. In religious terms the Sikhs are a majority in bandhs and protests seeking the restoration of s
the region but within that community there are specific quotas
sections
within the existing regime of reservations for the scs.
that are worse off on many development indicators. WithinAs elections to the state assembly were near, the Congre
this
government
marginalised section too there are vast internal disparities and responded to the Balmiki-Mazhabi movement
differences, which can offer alternate axis of mobilisation and a legislation to convert the "1975 directive" into an "Ac
framing
policy formulation. and presented it in the state assembly on 17 September 2006, t

Economic & Political weekly January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no 1 51

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 RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP

last day of its session. The bill was passed unanimouslythis

by is
theused as a way of bringing the people together and creating
legislative assembly, and it became an Act on 5 October awareness
2006, for their collective cause.
after being approved by the governor.
Conclusions
Interestingly enough, it was not the Akali Dal (and its many
factions) that addressed the needs of the most marginalised sec at these two case studies, it is evident that democracy cre
Looking
tions. As and when particular formations of the Akali Dalspaces
raised that can at times work to the advantage of marginalised
development concerns they focused on such matters astions
better
or create opportunities that may help them to articulate
prices for agricultural produce, irrigation facilities and pursue
regional
their development-related concerns. Democratic politics h
autonomy. These matters affected the fate of the more dominant
ever operates in complex ways. On the one hand, it provides space
castes - the Jats - in the region. In an attempt to breakmarginalised
the con populations to mobilise and voice their demands, whi
solidation of Sikh votes in favour of the Akali Dal, it was the Conother it compels political parties to woo groups by raising
on the
gress Party that raised the issue of the Mazhabis receiving the to their demands. In the case of obc Muslims in Mahara
attending
benefits of good education and public posts available through
tra, the
their collective mobilisations compelled the attention of t
system of reserved seats. political leadership across the board, including the Shiv Sena, wh
The awareness and subsequent group mobilisationisof the
otherwise hostile to the Muslim community In Punjab, the deve
Balmiki-Mazhabis was consolidated and strengthenedment
by the
needs of marginalised sections were raised by the secular po
policies pursued by the Congress Party in office. And, when the
cal parties in order to fracture the supposed unity of the Sikh com
sub-quotas in reservations were withdrawn due to the interven
nity and win electoral support from at least some sections of it.
tion of the court, these mobilisations gained greater potency.
Both cases illustrate that the development needs of margi
The link between these mobilisations and prevailing religious
ised sections can only be addressed by disaggregating individ
organisations were weak, if not non-existent. The emerging lead
religious communities. Religious identities remain important,
ership of these marginalised communities did not turnreligious
to reli groups are internally differentiated and unequal. T
gious organisations for support; and even the existing religious
role of religion cannot be discounted in the pursuit of collecti
political party was not seen as an ally in this struggle. Nordevelopment
did the needs, but there are occasions when a shared r
religious political parties take up the issue of sub-quotasgious
for the
identity may distract from, and even camouflage, the dif
most marginalised sections within the category of Mazhabis.
ences of power and access to opportunities that exist betwe
Religion, or the religious idiom, enters into the picture in members
a differ of the same community. As a result, conceptions o
ent way. Separate celebrations are organised on important reli community as a single collective whole are unlikely
religious
gious festivals/events by the Balmiki-Mazhabi leadership and the concerns of equality, development and governance.
further

NOTES
the northern part of India. We, so many times, - (2ooo): "Predicaments of Secularism: Muslim
requested
1 Shiv Sena was founded on 19 June 1966 in the community leaders and people Identities and Politics in Mumbai", Journal of
Bombay by Bal Thackeray, who has since there
beento identify their caste, but there were no Royal Anthropological Institute, 6, 255-72.
its patriarch. initiatives (Personal interview March 2007). Jodhka, S S (1997): "Crisis of the 1980s and Changing
2 Personal interview, February 2007. 17 Indeed, the Shiv Sena has over the years wooed Agenda of 'Punjab Studies': A Survey of Some
and received the support of OBCs. Recent Research", Economic & Political Weekly,
3 In the last few years he has filed more than 100
18 (RTI)
All these 32.6, 273-79.
petitions under the right to information in figures are based on 1991 Census and
several departments on issues that were of were collected from the office of the department - (2002): "Caste and Untouchability in Rural Punjab",
concern to the Muslim community. He is a teacher of social welfare, Chandigarh, Government of Economic & Political Weekly, 37.19,1813-23.
in a government school by profession and has Punjab. Juergensmeyer, M (1988): Religious Rebels in the
also published a booklet of rules and procedures 19 Personal interview, August 2007. Punjab: The Social Vision of Untouchables (Delhi:
regarding the issue of caste certificates in Mumbai. 20 Personal interview, August 2007. Ajanta Publications).
4 Since 2005 he has also been the vice president of21 Personal interview, August 2007. Mahajan, G (1998): Identities and Rights: Aspects of
the Pune-based AIMOBCO which is headed by22 Official Directive, Government of Punjab was col Liberal Democracy in India (Delhi: Oxford Univer
Mohd Iqbal Ansari. lected from the office of the department of social sity Press).
5 Interview with Parvez Iqbal, February 2007. welfare, Chandigarh, Government of Punjab. - (2008a): "Higher Education Reservations and India's
6 Personal Interview, February 2007. 23 Official Directive, Government of Punjab was col Economic Growth: An Examination", Working
7 Personal Interview, February 2007. lected from the office of the department of social paper No 36, Centre for International Governance
welfare, Chandigarh, Government of Punjab. Innovation, Waterloo, Canada.
8 Personal Interview, February 2007.
24 The morcha was headed by Darshan Ratan - (2008b): "Religion and the Indian Constitution:
9 Personal Interview, February 2007.
Rawan, the president of the Adi Dharm Samaj. Questions of Separation and Equality" in Rajeev
10 Personal Interview, February 2007.
Some of the other active members were G K Shab Bhargava (ed.), Politics and Ethics of the Indian
11 Personal Interview, February 2007. Constitution (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
harwal (Rtd ADC) and Chandan Garewal (presi
12 Personal Interview, February 2007. dent of the Jalandhar Safai Mazdoor Union). Palshikar, S (2004): "Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many
13 Personal interview, May 2007. Faces", Economic & Political Weekly, 39, 3 April,
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52 January 7, 2012 vol xlvii no i EH23 Economic & Political weekly

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