Tañ ada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No.

L-63915 December 29, 1986

Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity
of laws and not to the requirement of publication.—After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of
the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Same; Same; The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with. —lt is not correct
to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure
to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those
of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules enforcing a statute;
city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative rules
regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only.—The term "laws" should refer to all
laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that
such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

Same; Same; Same.—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Same; Same; Same.—Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Same; Same; Same.—Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Same; Same; Same.—Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.

Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule
on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government Code.
—However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.—We agree that the publication must
be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Same; Same; Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the Official Gazette and
not elsewhere.—At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it
if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2
of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

Same; Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible.—We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.

FERNAN, J., concurring:

Statutes; The requirement of prior publication seeks to prevent abuses by the lawmakers and ensure the people's
right to information.—The categorical statement by this Court on the need f or publication bef ore any law may be
made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people
their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Statutes; To interpret Art 2, NCC literally so as to authorize a statute to be effective upon its
promulgation without publication is to make it collide with the due process clause.—A statute which by its terms
provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into
effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its
approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with
the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both
unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental
principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

Same; Same; Specification by law that the Official Gazette shall be the organ where statutes must be published before
they take effect may be amended to authorize publication in other newspapers.—At the same time, it is clear that the
requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a
newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official
Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could,
without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted. Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985,
the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion
as follows:

"WHEREFORE the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha ve no binding f orce and eff ect.''

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision.1
Specifically, they ask the f ollowing questions:

1.What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or " general applicability"?

2.Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3.What is meant by "publication"?
4.Where is the publication to be made?
5.When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must
be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.2

In the Comment3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply4 refuting
these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or f or particular
persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight
members of this Court.5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision,6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this
is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of
the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements, The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inf orm the public
of the contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration.7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed.9 One reserved his vote10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made.11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court
to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously
has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time. Finally, the claim of the former
Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and
deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of
suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days
from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Fernan, J., I concur. I add a few observations in a separate opinion.

Feliciano, J., I concur. Please see separate opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION
FERNAN, J.:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would
like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against
the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs
to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it
happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two
presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine
citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle
equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19,
1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeff rey Moore and Dennis George Still.

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks to
prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right
to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time,
I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into
effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such
statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout
history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished
from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A
specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of
the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for
instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until
such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected
in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

All laws shall immediately upon their approval, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after fifteen days from publication.