1.

Roman Law- is the body of rules and priciples adopted to guide Romans in the conduct of observance of their personal and official affairs without necessarily
specifying the period or the time when those rules were adopted or promulgated.

Common Law- is derived from case law and books of authority. An unwritten law which does not emanate from the express of the legislature.

Mohammedan Law – is not strange in the Philippines for it has and is still being observed by Muslims in Mindanao provided it is not conflict with the general law of
the land. It is derived from the Koran and from writings of Islamic Jurists.

2.

Law is a rule of conduct, just and obligatory, promulgated by the competent authority for common observance and benefit.

3.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

136 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-63915; April 24, 1985

Facts:
The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to compel respondents to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and administrative orders.

Summary of Arguments
Petitioners Respondent
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between Issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
laws of general applicability and those which are not; government agency or of particular persons did not have to be
published;
that publication means complete publication; and
that publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Official Gazette; and
Gazette.
that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication?

Summary of Principles:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.

2. The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with.

lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of
its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

3. For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those of general application, but also to laws of local
application, private laws; administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act; but
not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the
courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.

4. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in
the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

5. Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which
are governed by the Local Government Code.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

6. Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

7. Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.

8. Laws must be published as soon as possible.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason,
to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS:

Invoking the people’s right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, which States “The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and paper pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish in
the Official Gazette the Presidential Decrees, Letter of Instructions, General Orders, Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation and Administrative Orders.

However, respondents would like to have the case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition, they
being not the aggrieved parties defined in Section 3, Rule 65, furthermore, the respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the
law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
 The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which
have not been published have no force and effect. Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

Tañada vs. Tuvera

CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement
of publication.

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the
official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

HELD:

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.

In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed,
and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar
as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its
title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No.
9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other
than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive
officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public
Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon
the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUE: W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as
well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD: Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective.
However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

Umali vs Estanislao 209 SCRA 446

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the
poverty threshold level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income
from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and
prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.

Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication in “Malaya”), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29,
par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often than once every three years, the personal and additional
exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.

The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time
Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers.

Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have become effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing
of personal income tax returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30
January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be
available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and
been presumably paid (The law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to
compensation income received during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The
implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval”. The revenue regulation should take
effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid
are entitled to refunds or credits.

[CASE DIGEST] CALTEX v. COA (208 SCRA 726)

FACTS

The Commission on Audit (COA) ordered Caltex Philippines to remit to the OPSF its collection of additional tax on petroleum products
as authorized under P.D. 1956. Pending such remittance, all CPI’s claims for reimbursement would be held in abeyance, too, and
Caltex should desist from further offsetting the taxes it collected against its own outstanding claims for reimbursement.

Caltex argued that it should be allowed to offset its claims from the OPSF against its contributions to the fund as this had been
allowed in the past. But COA insisted that there can be no offsetting of taxes against the claims that a taxpayer may have against the
government, as taxes do not arise from contracts or depend upon the will of the taxpayer, but are imposed by law.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of COA.

A taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be the subject of
compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutual creditors and debtors of each other, and a claim for taxes is not
such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set off. Too, Caltex's position that the OPSF contributions are not for
public purpose is untenable.

The SC said that axation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue to support the existence of the government;
taxes may be levied with a regulatory purpose to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry,
which is affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the state.

LA – BUGAL BULAAN
FACTS:

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to “govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources.”

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took
effect.33

Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which
was adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect.

E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of Congress on July 27, 1987.214 Section 8 of the E.O.
states that the same “shall take effect immediately.” This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of E.O. No. 200,215 which provides:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and
the President’s power to legislate had ceased.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course
incorrect for the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued pursuant thereto.

ISSUE: WON E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect.

HELD:

Nevertheless, petitioners’ contentions have no merit.

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than—even before—the 15-day period after its publication.
Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is
otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity.

What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera,217 is the publication of the law for without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation,” is deemed written in the law.218 Hence, the due process clause,219 which, so Tañada held, mandates the publication of
statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication “either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines,” finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette220 on
August 3, 1987.

From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately
upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still
validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.221 Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:

SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
 The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had
previously enacted.

There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.

2. Why obey the law? _________________________

II.

"LAW" — officially promulgated rules of conduct, backed by state-enforced penalties for their transgression.
''JUSTICE'' — rendering to each person what he or she deserves.

LAW vs. MORALITY

Morality is a principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.

any law that claims to regulate behavioral expectations must be in harmony with moral norms. Approached from this perspective, the law must be enacted in
such a way that it secures the welfare of the individual and the good of the community. Thus, the aim of all laws should be both the attainment of the end of the
state and the common good of the community, both immediate and ultimate.

1. SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice tends to focus more on just relations between groups within society as opposed to the justice of individual conduct or justice for individuals.

The idea of social justice is that all people should have equal access to wealth, health, well-being, justice, privileges, and opportunity regardless of their legal,
political, economic, or other circumstances. In modern practice, social justice revolves around favoring or punishing different groups of the population,
regardless of any given individual's choices or actions, based on value judgements regarding historical events, current conditions, and group relations.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

2. LAW vs. EQUITY

1.Law is the body of rules which are regulated by the government and enforced by the courts while equity is a set of rules which
follows the natural law and fairness.
2.In a court of law, defendants can be ordered to pay monetary damages while in equity, if the complainant wants to get back what
is taken from him instead of getting money, the court can order the defendant to do so.
3.Law can order writs while equity can order injunctions.
4.In a court of law, a case is heard by a jury and the judge while in equity only the judge settles a case.

Equity proceeds in the principle that a right or liability should as far as possible be equalized among all interested. In other words, two parties have equal right in any
property, so it is distributed equally as per the concerned law.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which au
thorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D.
Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548
constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No.
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the
welfare of all people.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public, the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015 – CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO,
OSB, Respondents.
FACTS:
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay
Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao
(Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she
would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of
an employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus,
a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to the charge against her.
On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a “Support Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS cites “disgraceful or
immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter,9 which, in part, reads:
To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry each other who later on married each other does not fall within the
contemplation of “disgraceful or immoral conduct” and “serious misconduct” of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the students and other employees of your school is speculative and is more
imaginary than real. To dismiss her on that sole ground constitutes grave abuse of management prerogatives.
Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present condition would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of
financial capacity to sustain maternal needs.10
In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal
impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of employment under
the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the Catholic Church and expect its
employees to abide by the same. They further asserted that the petitioner’s indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that she is the Assistant to the
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate, a position of responsibility that the students look up to as role model. The petitioner was
again directed to submit a written explanation on why she should not be dismissed.
On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s letter dated June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12
Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of
serious misconduct. She stressed that pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry, even if they subsequently
married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out that SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that SSCW stands for and teaches its students.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr.
Quiambao (respondents). In her position paper,14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative as there was no just cause for
her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely private affair and not
connected in any way with her duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her boyfriend eventually got married even prior to
her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s employment with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s
management prerogative. They maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to a disgraceful or immoral
conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an employee under the 1992 MRPS.
They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters exclusively to young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would
maintain employees who do not live up to the values and teachings it inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being an employee
of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school.15
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision, 16 in NLRC Case No. 6-17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner.
The LA found that there was a valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal ; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a “disgraceful and immoral
conduct.” The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by
SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined that:
Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that she was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic
[teaching]. It should not be taken in isolation but rather it should be analyzed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as a whole. We must also take into
[consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was committed by the complainant
in an environment where her strict adherence to the same is called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake.

Issue: whether or not the dismissal of the employee is valid.

Ruling: The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The CA opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of
management prerogative to impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.
The Court does not agree.
The Court has held that “management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not
absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.” Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or
despotic manner.53
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already
explained, there is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents
themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy, does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the petitioner is
despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for the termination of her employment . SSCW failed to adduce
substantial evidence to establish that the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in
light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of
the petitioner’s dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of SSCW . In turn, the CA committed
reversible error in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal, failing to recognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in ruling for
the respondents.
The proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94 e of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which is made
as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.

CHUA-QUA v. CLAVE G.R. No. 49549 – 189 SCRA 117 – Labor Law – Post-Employment – Grounds for Termination – A
teacher having a relationship with a student is not per se immoral

Evelyn Chua was a teacher at Tay Tung High School, Inc. By 1975, she had been teaching there for thirteen years. By that time also,
Evelyn, who was thirty years old, developed a romantic relationship with one of her students, a sixteen years old Grade 6 student
named Bobby Qua. In December 1975, Evelyn and Bobby legally married each other (the old Civil Code allowed such marriages
then). Due to the marriage, the school applied for clearance from the Department of Labor to be allowed to terminate the services of
Chua on the ground that her having an affair with a student 14 years younger than her is immoral and a violation of the Code of
Ethics for Teachers which provides that a “school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil
or student.”

The Labor Arbiter ruled that though there is no direct evidence that Evelyn and Bobby did immoral acts while inside the classroom,
“it seems obvious xxx that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classroom after regular class hours. The
marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous
relations [during class hours].” The Labor Arbiter gave clearance for the school to terminate the employment of Evelyn. The National
Labor Relations Commission reversed the ruling of the labor Arbiter. The Minister of Labor reversed the ruling of the NLRC. Then
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave affirmed the ruling of the Minster of Labor. Evelyn now comes to the Supreme Court
questioning the ruling of Clave.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid ground to terminate the services of Evelyn Chua-Qua.

HELD: No. As per the evidence presented, the school failed to prove that Evelyn and Bobby engaged in immoral conduct. It was
wrong for Clave to adopt the findings of the Labor Arbiter which had no basis in the first place. With the finding that there is no
substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers
would have no basis. The school utterly failed to show that Evelyn took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart
has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so
casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

However, since Evelyn’s relations with the school is already strained, reinstatement is no longer feasible. She is however entitled to
separation pay and backwages.

Estrada vs. Escritor,

492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting
with a man not her husband and having a child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing
a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.

Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct for the reason that
she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is
in conformity with her religious beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance
with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations. The Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in countries
where divorce is allowed.

Issue:

Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?

Does her religious belief justify such act?

Ruling:

Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are
guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one
dissent to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their
conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the
act.

No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of religion justifies her conjugal
arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of
Education is instructive on the matter, viz:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including religious freedom, may be enjoyed.

KAREN VS. SALVACION

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, American tourist, lured and detained petitioner Karen Salvacion and was able to rape the latter several times. Bartelli was eventually arrested
and criminal cases for serious illegal detention and four counts of rape were filed against him. A civil case for damages with preliminary attachments were also filed.

On the day for Bartelli’s petition for bail hearing, the latter escaped from jail. Hence, the criminal cases were archived but the civil proceedings continued and later
granted moral and exemplary damages to the petitioner through a writ of attachment on Bartelli’s dollar deposits.

The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused to honor the writ of attachment, invoking Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426, as amended, which provides in part that
“foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.”

Respondent argument:

Expanding, the Central Bank said: that one reason for ex-empting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process
of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines;
that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly
channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is
being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latter’s 12-year-old
rape victim.

RULING:

In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the peculiar circumstances obtaining make the law not applicable to the case of the 12-year old rape victim
and that the banks should comply with the writ of execution and release the dollar deposit in favor of the victim, the Court applied the principles of right and justice
to prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute.
The questioned law would, therefore, make the favorable judgment futile. The intention of the questioned law may have been good when it was enacted which is a
time when the economy was in shambles. However, the law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. When the statute is silent
or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli.

“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to
draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced
by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.

“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank
only for a short time.

SOLICITOR GENERAL COMMENT:

The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and
regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien.

J. Muller vs Muller,

GR NO. 149615 August 29, 2006

In re: Petition for Separation of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller, petitioner

vs.

HELMUT MULLER, respondent

Ynaes-Santiago, J.:

Doctrine Laid by the SC: It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly—he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.

Facts:

Originating Court: Petitioner Elena and Respondent Helmut were married in Germany. In 1992, the couple moved to the Philippines.
Respondent, using his inheritance money and despite the knowledge of the constitutional prohibition in owning land, bought a
property in Antipolo and live with petitioner permanently. However, due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

During the termination of absolute community, it was ruled that the respondent cannot recover his funds for the Antipolo
property due to the violation of section 7, Art. XII of the Constitution, which states that save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Thus, being a foreigner, respondent is disqualified to acquire the land.

Appellate Court: Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, it held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent.

Issue: whether or not Respondent has the right to have reimbursement.

Ruling:

No. As Supreme Court held that “He who seek equity must do equity.” The Respondent bought the said property
willingly and knowingly despite the constitutional prohibition. Thus, respondent is in bad faith in buying the property.
Therefore, Respondent shall not have the right of reimbursement due to acquiring the property in bad faith.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands.The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court.11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition.12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed.

G.R. No. 203947. February 26, 2014.*

RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO DELICTA, and ADRIANO ALABATA, petitioners, vs. LOURDES
ALABATA, respondent.

FACTS:

The prior case before the RTC-43 involved a reconveyance of a parcel of land in favor of the rightful owners, the heirs of one Agapito Alagadmo. Petitioners, in
instituting the case against respondent, showed their desire and resolve to pursue and take back what was rightfully theirs. Eventually, they succeeded in obtaining
justice and won back what was theirs. For their sufferings, the trial court saw it fit to also assess moral damages and exemplary damages against respondent.

When the case was elevated by respondent to the CA, the PAO continued to represent petitioners’ cause. As it was an appealed case, the matter was referred to, and
handled by, SAC-PAO in Manila.

For reasons known only to her, the respondent withdrew her appeal, which resulted in the RTC-43 Decision becoming final and executory. The petitioners, however,
never knew of this because when they followed up the case with PAO-Dumaguete, they were informed that the appeal was still pending.

It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned.
Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her resignation in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of
such development.

It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from
RTC-43.

Both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. Section 6 is clear.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry
of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the insti tution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in strictly applying the procedural rules.

RULING:

The court grant the petition. To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent
decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO,
SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the
circumstances, they could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still pending on appeal.
Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be expected to bypass PAO- Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the
case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal. Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the
“Declaration of Heirship and Sale,” dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and
exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to
petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of
judgment filed by petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way possible and exercise its soundest discretion to
prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the
rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.

Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that are: Publicly promulgated. Equally enforced.
Independently adjudicated. And consistent with international human rights principles.

4 PRINCIPLES OF RULE OF LAW

It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in
the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and
legal transparency