Chapter 8

The Logic of Conditionals

One thing the theorem on page 195 tells us is that introducing the material
conditional and biconditional symbols did not increase the expressive power of
fol. Since and can be defined using the Boolean connectives, we could
always eliminate them from claims or proofs by means of these definitions.
Thus, for example, if we wanted to prove P Q we could just prove P Q,
and then use the definition. In practice, though, this is a terrible idea. It is far
more natural to use rules that involve these symbols directly, and the resulting
proofs are simpler and easier to understand.1
The material conditional, in particular, is an extremely useful symbol to
have. For example, many claims and theorems that we will run across can
only be expressed naturally using the conditional. In fact, quite a few of the
examples weve already used are more naturally stated as conditional claims.
Thus in an earlier exercise we asked you to prove Even(n m) from the premise
Odd(n + m). But really, the fact we were interested in was that, no matter
what numbers n and m you pick, the following conditional claim is true:
Odd(n + m) Even(n m)
Given the importance of conditional claims, and the frequency youll encounter them, we need to learn how to prove these claims.

Section 8.1

Informal methods of proof

As before, we will first look at informal proofs involving conditionals and later
incorporate the key methods into the system F. Among the informal methods,
we distinguish simple valid steps from more important methods of proof.

Valid steps
The most common valid proof step involving goes by the Latin name modus
ponens, or by the English conditional elimination. The rule says that if you
Exercise 8.38 we ask you to construct proofs of (P Q) P and the equivalent
(P Q) P, so that you can see for yourself how much simpler the first is than the second.
1 In

199

modus ponens or
conditional elimination

200 / The Logic of Conditionals

biconditional
elimination

contraposition

have established both P Q and P, then you can infer Q. This rule is obviously valid, as a review of the truth table for shows, since if P Q and P
are both true, then so must be Q.
There is a similar proof step for the biconditional, since the biconditional
is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two conditionals. If you have established either P Q or Q P, then if you can establish P, you can infer Q.
This is called biconditional elimination.
In addition to these simple rules, there are a number of useful equivalences
involving our new symbols. One of the most important is known as the Law of
Contraposition. It states that P Q is logically equivalent to Q P. This
latter conditional is known as the contrapositive of the original conditional. It
is easy to see that the original conditional is equivalent to the contrapositive,
since the latter is false if and only if Q is true and P is false, which is
to say, when P is true and Q is false. Contraposition is a particularly useful
equivalence since it is often easier to prove the contrapositive of a conditional
than the conditional itself. Well see an example of this in a moment.
Here are some logical equivalences to bear in mind, beginning with contraposition. Make sure you understand them all and see why they are equivalent.
Use Boole to construct truth tables for any you dont immediately see.
PQ
PQ
(P Q)
PQ
PQ

Q P
P Q
P Q
(P Q) (Q P)
(P Q) (P Q)

Remember
Let P and Q be any sentences of fol.
1. Modus ponens: From P Q and P, infer Q.
2. Biconditional elimination: From P and either P Q or Q P, infer
Q.
3. Contraposition: P Q Q P

The method of conditional proof

One of the most important methods of proof is that of conditional proof, a
method that allows you to prove a conditional statement. Suppose you want

Chapter 8

Informal methods of proof / 201

to prove the conditional claim P Q. What you do is temporarily assume

the antecedent, P, of your desired conditional. Then if, with this additional
assumption, you are able to prove Q, conditional proof allows you to infer that
P Q follows from the original premises.
Lets look at a simple example that uses both modus ponens and conditional proof. We will show that Tet(a) Tet(c) is a logical consequence of
the two premises Tet(a) Tet(b) and Tet(b) Tet(c). In other words, well
show that the operator is transitive. This may seem obvious, but the proof
is a good illustration of the method of conditional proof.

conditional proof

Proof: We are given, as premises, Tet(a) Tet(b) and Tet(b) Tet(c).

We want to prove Tet(a) Tet(c). With an eye toward using conditional proof, let us assume, in addition to our premises, that Tet(a)
is true. Then, by applying modus ponens using our first premise,
we can conclude Tet(b). Using modus ponens again, this time with
our second premise, we get Tet(c). So we have established the consequent, Tet(c), of our desired conditional on the basis of our assumption of Tet(a). But then the rule of conditional proof assures us that
Tet(a) Tet(c) follows from the initial premises alone.
Conditional proof is clearly a valid form of reasoning, one that we use all
the time. If Q follows logically from some premises plus the additional assumption P, then we can be sure that if those premises are true, the conditional
P Q must be true as well. After all, the conditional can only be false if P is
true and Q is false, and our conditional proof shows that, given the premises,
this can never happen.
Lets look at a more interesting example. This example will use both conditional proof and proof by contradiction. We will prove:
Even(n2 ) Even(n)
Proof: The method of conditional proof tells us that we can proceed
by assuming Even(n2 ) and proving Even(n). So assume that n2 is
even. To prove that n is even, we will use proof by contradiction.
Thus, assume that n is not even, that is, that it is odd. Then we can
express n as 2m + 1, for some m. But then we see that:
n2

=
=
=

(2m + 1)2
4m2 + 4m + 1
2(2m2 + 2m) + 1

But this shows that n2 is odd, contradicting our first assumption.

This contradiction shows that n is not odd, i.e., that it is even. Thus,
by conditional proof, we have established Even(n2 ) Even(n).

Section 8.1

202 / The Logic of Conditionals

Did you get lost? This proof has a pretty complicated structure, since we
first assumed Even(n2 ) for the purpose of conditional proof, but then immediately assumed Even(n) to get an indirect proof of Even(n). The contradiction
that we arrived at was Even(n2 ), which contradicted our first assumption.
Proofs of this sort are fairly common, and this is why it is often easier to
prove the contrapositive of a conditional. The contrapositive of our original
claim is this:
Even(n) Even(n2 )
Lets look at the proof of this contrapositive.
Proof: To prove Even(n) Even(n2 ), we begin by assuming
Even(n), i.e., that n is odd. Then we can express n as 2m + 1,
for some m. But then we see that:
n2

= (2m + 1)2
= 4m2 + 4m + 1
= 2(2m2 + 2m) + 1

But this shows that n2 is also odd, hence Even(n2 ). Thus, by conditional proof, we have established Even(n) Even(n2 ).
By proving the contrapositive, we avoided the need for an indirect proof
inside the conditional proof. This makes the proof easier to understand, and
since the contrapositive is logically equivalent to our original claim, our second
proof could serve as a proof of the original claim as well.
The method of conditional proof is used extensively in everyday reasoning. Some years ago Bill was trying to decide whether to take English 301,
Postmodernism. His friend Sarah claimed that if Bill takes Postmodernism,
he will not get into medical school. Sarahs argument, when challenged by Bill,
took the form of a conditional proof, combined with a proof by cases.
Suppose you take Postmodernism. Then either you will adopt the
postmodern disdain for rationality or you wont. If you dont, you will
fail the class, which will lower your GPA so much that you will not get
into medical school. But if you do adopt the postmodern contempt
toward rationality, you wont be able to pass organic chemistry, and
so will not get into medical school. So in either case, you will not get
into medical school. Hence, if you take Postmodernism, you wont
get into medical school.
Unfortunately for Bill, he had already succumbed to postmodernism, and
so rejected Sarahs argument. He went ahead and took the course, failed chemistry, and did not get into medical school. Hes now a wealthy lobbyist in
Washington. Sarah is an executive in the computer industry in California.

Chapter 8

Informal methods of proof / 203

Proving biconditionals
Not surprisingly, we can also use conditional proof to prove biconditionals,
though we have to work twice as hard. To prove P Q by conditional proof,
you need to do two things: assume P and prove Q; then assume Q and prove
P. This gives us both P Q and Q P, whose conjunction is equivalent to
P Q.
There is another form of proof involving that is common in mathematics. Mathematicians are quite fond of finding results which show that
several different conditions are equivalent. Thus you will find theorems that
make claims like this: The following conditions are all equivalent: Q1 , Q2 , Q3 .
What they mean by this is that all of the following biconditionals hold:
Q1 Q2
Q2 Q3
Q1 Q3
To prove these three biconditionals in the standard way, you would have
to give six conditional proofs, two for each biconditional. But we can cut our
work in half by noting that it suffices to prove some cycle of results like the
following:

proving a cycle of
conditionals

Q1 Q2
Q2 Q3
Q3 Q1
These would be shown by three conditional proofs, rather than the six that
would otherwise be required. Once we have these, there is no need to prove the
reverse directions, since they follow from the transitivity of . For example,
we dont need to explicitly prove Q2 Q1 , the reverse of the first conditional,
since this follows from Q2 Q3 and Q3 Q1 , our other two conditionals.
When we apply this technique, we dont have to arrange the cycle in
exactly the order in which the conditions are given. But we do have to make
sure we have a genuine cycle, one that allows us to get from any one of our
conditions to any other.
Lets give a very simple example. We will prove that the following conditions on a natural number n are all equivalent:
1. n is even
2. n2 is even
3. n2 is divisible by 4.
Proof: Rather than prove all six biconditionals, we prove that (3)
(2) (1) (3). Assume (3). Now clearly, if n2 is divisible by 4, then

Section 8.1

204 / The Logic of Conditionals

it is divisible by 2, so we have (3) (2). Next, we prove (2) (1)
by proving its contrapositive. Thus, assume n is odd and prove n2
is odd. Since n is odd, we can write it in the form 2m + 1. But then
(as weve already shown) n2 = 2(2m2 + 2m) + 1 which is also odd.
Finally, let us prove (1) (3). If n is even, it can be expressed as 2m.
Thus, n2 = (2m)2 = 4m2 , which is divisible by 4. This completes
the cycle, showing that the three conditions are indeed equivalent.
When you apply this method, you should look for simple or obvious implications, like (1) (3) above, or implications that youve already established,
like (2) (1) above, and try to build them into your cycle of conditionals.
Remember
1. The method of conditional proof: To prove P Q, assume P and prove
Q.
2. To prove a number of biconditionals, try to arrange them into a cycle
of conditionals.

Exercises

8.1
.

8.2
|.

In the following list we give a number of inference patterns, some of which are valid, some
invalid. For each pattern, decide whether you think it is valid and say so. Later, we will return
to these patterns and ask you to give formal proofs for the valid ones and counterexamples for
the invalid ones. But for now, just assess their validity.
1. Affirming the Consequent: From A B and B, infer A.
2. Modus Tollens: From A B and B, infer A.
3. Strengthening the Antecedent: From B C, infer (A B) C.
4. Weakening the Antecedent: From B C, infer (A B) C.
5. Strengthening the Consequent: From A B, infer A (B C).
6. Weakening the Consequent: From A B, infer A (B C).
7. Constructive Dilemma: From A B, A C, and B D, infer C D.
8. Transitivity of the Biconditional: From A B and B C, infer A C.
Open Conditional Sentences. Suppose that the sentences in this file are your premises. Now
consider the five sentences listed below. Some of these sentences are consequences of these
premises, some are not. For those that are consequences, give informal proofs and turn them

Chapter 8

Informal methods of proof / 205

in to your instructor. For those that are not consequences, submit counterexample worlds in
which the premises are true but the conclusion false. Name the counterexamples World 8.2.x,
where x is the number of the sentence.
1. Tet(e)
2. Tet(c) Tet(e)
3. Tet(c) Larger(f, e)
4. Tet(c) LeftOf(c, f)
5. Dodec(e) Smaller(e, f)
The following arguments are all valid. Turn in informal proofs of their validity. You may find it helpful
to translate the arguments into fol before trying to give proofs, though thats not required. Explicitly
note any inferences using modus ponens, biconditional elimination, or conditional proof.

8.3
.

The unicorn, if it is not mythical, is

a mammal, but if it is mythical, it is
immortal.
If the unicorn is either immortal or a
mammal, it is horned.
The unicorn, if horned, is magical.

8.4
.

The unicorn, if horned, is not a

mammal.

The unicorn is magical.

8.5
.

The unicorn, if horned, is elusive

and magical, but if not horned, it is
neither.
If the unicorn is not horned, it is not
mythical.

8.6
.

The unicorn is horned if and only if

magical or mythical.

8.7
.

b is small unless its a cube.

If c is small, then either d or e is too.
If d is small, then c is not.
If b is a cube, then e is not small.
If c is small, then so is b.

The unicorn, if horned, is elusive and

dangerous.
If elusive or mythical, the unicorn is
rare.
If a mammal, the unicorn is not rare.

a is a large tetrahedron or a small

cube.
b is not small.
If a is a tetrahedron or a cube, then b
is large or small.
a is a tetrahedron only if b is medium.
a is small and b is large.

8.8
.

d is in the same row as a, b or c.

If d is in the same row as b, then it is
in the same row as a only if its not in
the same row as c.
d is in the same row as a if and only
if it is in the same row as c.
d is in the same row as a if and only
if it is not in the same row as b.

Section 8.1

206 / The Logic of Conditionals

8.9

a
a
a
a

is
is
is
is

either a cube, a dodecahedron, or a tetrahedron.

small, medium, or large.
medium if and only if its a dodecahedron.
a tetrahedron if and only if it is large.

a is a cube if and only if its small.

8.10
|.

8.11
.

Open Between Sentences. Determine whether this set of sentences is satisfiable or not. If it
is, submit a world in which all the sentences are true. If not, give an informal proof that the
sentences are inconsistent. That is, assume all of them and derive a contradiction.
Analyze the structure of the informal proof in support of the following claim: If the U.S. does
not cut back on its use of oil soon, parts of California will be flooded within 50 years. Are there
weak points in the argument? What premises are implicitly assumed in the proof? Are they
plausible?
Proof: Suppose the U.S. does not cut back on its oil use soon. Then it will be unable
to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions substantially in the next few years. But then
the countries of China, India and Brazil will refuse to join in efforts to curb carbon
dioxide emissions. As these countries develop without such efforts, the emission of
carbon dioxide will get much worse, and so the greenhouse effect will accelerate. As a
result the sea will get warmer, ice will melt, and the sea level will rise. In which case,
low lying coastal areas in California will be subject to flooding within 50 years. So if
we do not cut back on our oil use, parts of California will be flooded within 50 years.

8.12

Describe an everyday example of reasoning that uses the method of conditional proof.

8.13
.

8.15
.

8.16
.

Prove: Odd(n + m) Even(n m).

[Hint: Compare this with Exercise 5.24
on page 141.]

8.14
.

Prove: Irrational(x) Irrational( x).

[Hint: It is easier to prove the contrapositive.]

Prove that the following conditions on the natural number n are all equivalent. Use as few
conditional proofs as possible.
1. n is divisible by 3
2. n2 is divisible by 3
3. n2 is divisible by 9
4. n3 is divisible by 3
5. n3 is divisible by 9
6. n3 is divisible by 27
Give an informal proof that if R is a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn and Q, then Q R
is a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn .

Chapter 8

Formal rules of proof for and / 207

Section 8.2

Formal rules of proof for and

We now turn to the formal analogues of the methods of proof involving the
conditional and biconditional. Again, we incorporate an introduction and elimination rule for each connective into F.

Rules for the conditional

The rule of modus ponens or conditional elimination is easily formalized. If you
have proven both P Q and P then you can assert Q, citing as justification
these two earlier steps. Schematically:
Conditional Elimination ( Elim):
PQ
..
.
P
..
.
Q
The corresponding introduction rule is the formal counterpart of the method of conditional proof. As you would expect, it requires us to construct a
subproof. To prove a statement of the form P Q we begin our subproof
with the assumption of P and try to prove Q. If we succeed, then we are
allowed to discharge the assumption and conclude our desired conditional,
citing the subproof as justification. Schematically:
Conditional Introduction ( Intro):
P
..
.
Q
PQ
Strategy and tactics
The strategy of working backwards usually works extremely well in proofs
that involve conditionals, particularly when the desired conclusion is itself a

Section 8.2

208 / The Logic of Conditionals

conditional. Thus if the goal of a proof is to show that a conditional sentence

P Q is a consequence of the given information, you should sketch in a
subproof with P as an assumption and Q as the final step. Use this subproof
as support for an application of Intro. When you check your proof, Q will
become your new intermediate goal, and in proving it you can rely on the
assumption P.
Lets work through a simple example that involves both of the rules for
the conditional and illustrates the technique of working backwards.

working backwards

You try it
................................................................

1. We will step you through a formal proof of A C from the premise

(A B) C. Use Fitch to open the file Conditional 1. Notice the premise
and the goal. Add a step to the proof and write in the goal sentence.

2. Start a subproof before the sentence A C. Enter A as the assumption of

the subproof.

3. Add a second step to the subproof and enter C.

4. Move the slider to the step containing the goal sentence A C. Justify
this step using the rule Intro, citing the subproof for support. Check
this step.
5. Now we need to go back and fill in the subproof. Add a step between the
two steps of the subproof. Enter A B. Justify this step using Intro,
citing the assumption of the subproof.
6. Now move the slider to the last step of the subproof. Justify this step using
the rule Elim, citing the premise and the step you just proved.
7. Verify that your proof checks out, and save it as Proof Conditional 1.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Congratulations
Once we have conditional introduction at our disposal, we can convert
any proof with premises into the proof, without premises, of a corresponding
conditional. For example, we showed in Chapter 6 (page 158) how to give a
formal proof of A from premise A. We can can now use the earlier proof to
build a proof of the logically true sentence A A.

Chapter 8

Formal rules of proof for and / 209

1. A
2. A
3.

Intro: 1, 2

4. A

Intro: 23

5. A A

Intro: 14

Notice that the subproof here is identical to the original proof given on
page 158. We simply embedded that proof in our new proof and applied conditional introduction to derive A A.
Default and generous uses of the rules
The rule Elim does not care in which order you cite the support sentences.
The rule Intro does not insist that the consequent be at the last step of
the cited subproof, though it usually is. Also, the assumption step might be
the only step in the subproof, as in a proof of a sentence of the form P P.
The default applications of the conditional rules work exactly as you would
expect. If you cite supports of the form indicated in the rule statements, Fitch
will fill in the appropriate conclusion for you.

default uses of
conditional rules

You try it
................................................................
1. Open the file Conditional 2. Look at the goal to see what sentence we are
trying to prove. Then focus on each step in succession and check the step.
On the empty steps, try to predict what default Fitch will supply.
2. When you are finished, make sure you understand the proof. Save the
checked proof as Proof Conditional 2.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Congratulations
You can use the Add Support Steps command when you are using the
Intro rule, and have an implication at the focus step. Fitch will insert a
subproof as support. The antecedant of the implication will be the assumption
of the subproof, and the consequent will appear at the last line of the subproof.
You cannot use Add Support Steps with Elim.

Section 8.2

210 / The Logic of Conditionals

Rules for the biconditional

The rules for the biconditional are just what you would expect, given the rules
for the conditional. The elimination rule for the biconditional can be stated
schematically as follows:

Biconditional Elimination ( Elim):

P Q (or Q P)
..
.
P
..
.
Q

This means that you can conclude Q if you can establish P and either of the
biconditionals indicated.
The introduction rule for the biconditional P Q requires that you give
two subproofs, one showing that Q follows from P, and one showing that P
follows from Q:

Biconditional Introduction ( Intro):

P
..
.
Q
Q
..
.
P
PQ

Here is a simple example of a proof using biconditional introduction. It

shows how to derive the double negation law within the system F.

Chapter 8

Formal rules of proof for and / 211

1. P
2. P
3.

Intro: 1, 2

4. P

Intro: 23

5. P
Elim: 5

6. P
7. P P

Intro: 14, 56

Strategy and tactics

When you are constructing a proof whose conclusion is a biconditional, it
is particularly important to sketch in the proof ahead of time. Add the two
required subproofs and the desired conclusion, citing the subproofs in support.
Then try to fill in the subproofs. This is a good idea because these proofs
sometimes get quite long and involved. The sketch will help you remember
what you were trying to do.

You try it
................................................................
1. Open the file Conditional 3. In this file, you are asked to prove, without
premises, the law of contraposition:

(P Q) (Q P)
2. Start your proof by sketching in the two subproofs that you know youll
have to prove, plus the desired conclusion. Your partial proof will look like
this:

1. P Q
2. Q P

Rule?

3. Q P
4. P Q
5. (P Q) (Q P)

Rule?
Intro: 12, 34

Section 8.2

212 / The Logic of Conditionals

3. Now that you have the overall structure, start filling in the first subproof.
Since the goal of that subproof is a conditional claim, sketch in a conditional proof that would give you that claim:

1. P Q
2. Q
3. P
4. Q P

Rule?
Intro: 23

5. Q P
6. P Q
7. (P Q) (Q P)

Rule?
Intro: 14, 56

4. To derive P in the subsubproof, you will need to assume P and derive a

contradiction. This is pretty straightforward:

1. P Q
2. Q
3. P
4. Q
5.
6. P
7. Q P

Elim: 1, 3
Intro: 4, 2
Intro: 35
Intro: 26

8. Q P
9. P Q
10. (P Q) (Q P)

Chapter 8

Rule?
Intro: 17, 89

5. This completes the first subproof. Luckily, you sketched in the second
subproof so you know what you want to do next. You should be able to
finish the second subproof on your own, since it is almost identical to the
first.

Formal rules of proof for and / 213

6. When you are done, save your proof as Proof Conditional 3.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Congratulations
The default and generous uses of the biconditional rules are exactly like those
for the conditional connective, and Add Support Steps works exactly as
you would expect.
Exercises

8.17

If you skipped any of the You try it sections, go back and do them now. Submit the files
Proof Conditional 1, Proof Conditional 2, and Proof Conditional 3.

In the following exercises we return to the patterns of inference discussed in Exercise 8.1. Some of
these are valid, some invalid. For each valid pattern, construct a formal proof in Fitch. For each invalid
pattern, give a counterexample using Tarskis World. To give a counterexample in these cases, you will
have to come up with sentences of the blocks language that fit the pattern, and a world that makes
those specific premises true and the conclusion false. Submit both the world and the sentence file. In the
sentence file, list the premises first and the conclusion last.

8.18

8.20

8.22

8.24

Affirming the Consequent:

From A B and B, infer A.

8.19

Strengthening the Antecedent:

From B C, infer (A B) C.

8.21

Strengthening the Consequent:

From A B, infer A (B C).

8.23

Constructive Dilemma:
From A B, A C, and B D,
infer C D.

8.25

Modus Tollens:
From A B and B, infer A.
Weakening the Antecedent:
From B C, infer (A B) C.
Weakening the Consequent:
From A B, infer A (B C).
Transitivity of the Biconditional:
From A B and B C,
infer A C.

Use Fitch to construct formal proofs for the following arguments. In two cases, you may find yourself
re-proving an instance of the law of Excluded Middle, P P, in order to complete your proof. If youve
forgotten how to do that, look back at your solution to Exercise 6.33. Alternatively, with the permission
of your instructor, you may use Taut Con to justify an instance of Excluded Middle.

8.26

8.27
P (Q P)

(P (Q R)) ((P Q) R)

Section 8.2

214 / The Logic of Conditionals

8.28

P P

8.29

(P Q) (P Q)

8.30

(P Q) (P Q)

The following arguments are translations of those given in Exercises 8.38.9. (For simplicity we have
assumed the unicorn refers to a specific unicorn named Charlie. This is less than ideal, but the best we
can do without quantifiers.) Use Fitch to formalize the proofs you gave of their validity. You will need
to use Ana Con to introduce in two of your proofs.

8.31

(Mythical(c) Mammal(c))
(Mythical(c) Mortal(c))
(Mortal(c) Mammal(c)) Horned(c)
Horned(c) Magical(c)

8.32

Horned(c) Mammal(c)

Magical(c)

8.33

(Horned(c) (Elusive(c) Magical(c)))

(Horned(c) (Elusive(c)
Magical(c)))
Horned(c) Mythical(c)

Horned(c) (Elusive(c)
Dangerous(c))
(Elusive(c) Mythical(c)) Rare(c)
Mammal(c) Rare(c)

8.34

Horned(c) (Magical(c) Mythical(c))

(Tet(a) Large(a)) (Cube(a)

Small(a))
Small(b)
(Tet(a) Cube(a)) (Large(b)
Small(b))
Tet(a) Medium(b)
Small(a) Large(b)

8.35

Cube(b) Small(b)
Small(c) (Small(d) Small(e))
Small(d) Small(c)
Cube(b) Small(e)
Small(c) Small(b)

Chapter 8

8.36

SameRow(d, a) SameRow(d, b)
SameRow(d, c)
SameRow(d, b) (SameRow(d, a)
SameRow(d, c))
SameRow(d, a) SameRow(d, c)
SameRow(d, a) SameRow(d, b)

Soundness and completeness / 215

8.37

Cube(a) Dodec(a) Tet(a)

Small(a) Medium(a) Large(a)
Medium(a) Dodec(a)
Tet(a) Large(a)
Cube(a) Small(a)

8.38

Use Fitch to give formal proofs of both (P Q) P and the equivalent sentence (P Q) P.
(You will find the exercise files in Exercise 8.38.1 and Exercise 8.38.2.) Do you see why it is
convenient to include in fol, rather than define it in terms of the Boolean connectives?

Section 8.3

Soundness and completeness

We have now introduced formal rules for all of our truth-functional connectives. Lets step back for a minute and ask two important questions about the
formal system F. The questions get at two desirable properties of a deductive
system, which logicians call soundness and completeness. Dont be confused
by the names, however. These uses of sound and complete are different from
their use in the notions of a sound argument and a truth-functionally complete
set of connectives.

Soundness
We intend our formal system F to be a correct system of deduction in the
sense that any argument that can be proven valid in F should be genuinely
valid. The first question that we will ask, then, is whether we have succeeded
in this goal. Does the system F allow us to construct proofs only of genuinely
valid arguments? This is known as the soundness question for the deductive
system F.
The answer to this question may seem obvious, but it deserves a closer look.
After all, consider the rule of inference suggested in Exercise 7.32 on page 198.
Probably, when you first looked at this rule, it seemed pretty reasonable, even
though on closer inspection you realized it was not (or maybe you got the
problem wrong). How can we be sure that something similar might not be the
case for one of our official rules? Maybe there is a flaw in one of them but we
just havent thought long enough or hard enough to discover it.
Or maybe there are problems that go beyond the individual rules, something about the way the rules interact. Consider for example the following

soundness of a
deductive system

Section 8.3

216 / The Logic of Conditionals

argument:
(Happy(carl) Happy(scruffy))
Happy(carl)

FT

Soundness of FT

We know this argument isnt valid since it is clearly possible for the premise to
be true and the conclusion false. But how do we know that the rules of proof
weve introduced do not allow some very complicated and ingenious proof
of the conclusion from the premise? After all, there is no way to examine all
possible proofs and make sure there isnt one with this premise and conclusion:
there are infinitely many proofs.
To answer our question, we need to make it more precise. We have seen that
there is a certain vagueness in the notion of logical consequence. The concept
of tautological consequence was introduced as a precise approximation of the
informal notion. One way to make our question more precise is to ask whether
the rules for the truth-functional connectives allow us to prove only arguments
that are tautologically valid. This question leaves out the issue of whether the
identity rules are legitimate, but we will address that question later.
Lets introduce some new symbols to make it easier to express the claim
we want to investigate. We will use FT to refer to the portion of our deductive
system that contains the introduction and elimination rules for , , , , ,
and . You can think of the subscript t as standing for either tautology or
truth-functional. We will also write P1 , . . . , Pn T S to indicate that there
is a formal proof in FT of S from premises P1 , . . . , Pn . (The symbol is
commonly used in logic to indicate the provability of whats on the right from
whats on the left. If you have trouble remembering what this symbol means,
just think of it as a tiny Fitch bar.) We can now state our claim as follows.
Theorem (Soundness of FT ) If P1 , . . . , Pn T S then S is a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn .
Proof: Suppose that p is a proof constructed in the system FT . We
will show that any sentence that occurs at any step in proof p is
a tautological consequence of the assumptions in force at that step.
This claim applies not just to sentences at the main level of p, but also
to sentences appearing in subproofs, no matter how deeply nested.
The assumptions in force at a step always include the main premises
of the proof, but if we are dealing with a step inside some nested
subproofs, they also include all the assumptions of these subproofs.
The soundness theorem follows from our claim because if S appears

Chapter 8

Soundness and completeness / 217

at the main level of p, then the only assumptions in force are the
premises P1 , . . . , Pn . So S is a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn .
To prove this claim we will use proof by contradiction. Suppose that
there is a step in p containing a sentence that is not a tautological
consequence of the assumptions in force at that step. Call this an
invalid step. The idea of our proof is to look at the first invalid step
in p and show that none of the twelve rules of FT could have justified
that step. In other words, we will apply proof by cases to show that,
no matter which rule of FT was applied at the invalid step, we get a
contradiction. (Actually, we will only look at three of the cases and
leave the remaining rules as exercises.) This allows us to conclude
that there can be no invalid steps in proofs in FT .
Intro: Suppose the first invalid step derives the sentence Q R
from an application of Intro to an earlier subproof with assumption Q and conclusion R.
..
.
Q
..
.
R
..
.
QR
..
.
Again let A1 , . . . , Ak be the assumptions in force at Q R. Note
that the assumptions in force at R are A1 , . . . , Ak and Q. Since step
R is earlier than the first invalid step, R must be a tautological consequence of A1 , . . . , Ak and Q.
Imagine constructing a joint truth table for the sentences A1 , . . . , Ak ,
Q, Q R, and R. There must be a row h of this table in which
A1 , . . . , Ak all come out true, but Q R comes out false, by the
assumption that this step is invalid. Since Q R is false in this
row, Q must be true and R must be false. But this contradicts our
observation that R is a tautological consequence of A1 , . . . , Ak and
Q.

Section 8.3

218 / The Logic of Conditionals

Elim: Suppose the first invalid step derives the sentence R by an
application of Elim to sentences Q R and Q appearing earlier
in the proof. Let A1 , . . . , Ak be a list of all the assumptions in force
at R. If this is an invalid step, R is not a tautological consequence of
A1 , . . . , Ak . But we will show that this leads us to a contradiction.
Since R is the first invalid step in p, we know that Q R and Q
are both valid steps, that is, they are tautological consequences of
the assumptions in force at those steps. The crucial observation is
that since FT allows us to cite sentences only in the main proof or
in subproofs whose assumptions are still in force, we know that the
assumptions in force at steps Q R and Q are also in force at R.
Hence, the assumptions for these steps are among A1 , . . . , Ak . An
illustration may help. Suppose our proof takes the following form:
A1
..
.
QR
..
.
A2
..
.
Q
..
.
A3
..
.
R
..
.

As should be clear, the restrictions on citing earlier steps guarantee

that all the assumptions in force at the cited steps will still be in
force at the step containing R. In the example shown, assumption
A1 is in force at the step containing Q R, assumptions A1 and A2
are in force at the step containing Q, and assumptions A1 , A2 and
A3 are in force at the step containing R.
Suppose, now, we construct a joint truth table for the sentences
A1 , . . . , Ak , Q, Q R, and R. By the assumption that R is an invalid

Chapter 8

Soundness and completeness / 219

step, there must be a row h of this table in which A1 , . . . , Ak all come

out true, but R comes out false. However, since Q and Q R are
tautological consequences of A1 , . . . , Ak , both of these sentences are
true in row h. But this contradicts the truth table for .
Elim: Suppose the first invalid step derives the sentence Q from
. Since this is the first invalid step, must be a tautological consequence of the assumptions in force at . By the same considerations as in the first case, the assumptions in force at are also in
force at Q. Hence is a tautological consequence of the assumptions
A1 , . . . , Ak in force at Q. But the only way that this can be so is for
A1 , . . . , Ak to be tt-contradictory. In other words, there are no rows
in which all of A1 , . . . , Ak come out true. But then Q is vacuously a
tautological consequence of A1 , . . . , Ak .
Remaining rules: We have looked at three of the twelve rules.
The remaining cases are similar to these, and so we leave them as
exercises.
Once a contradiction is demonstrated in all twelve cases, we can
conclude that our original assumption, that it is possible for a proof
of FT to contain an invalid step, must be false. This concludes the
proof of soundness.
Having proven the Soundness Theorem, we can be absolutely certain that
no matter how hard someone tries, no matter how ingenious they are, it will
be impossible for them to produce a proof of Happy(Carl) from the premise
(Happy(Carl) Happy(Scruffy)). Why? There is no such proof because the
former is not a tautological consequence of the latter.
A corollary is a result which follows with little effort from an earlier theorem. We can state the following corollary, which simply applies the Soundness
Theorem to cases in which there are no premises.
Corollary If T S, that is, if there is a proof of S in FT with no premises,
then S is a tautology.
The import of this corollary is illustrated in Figure 8.1. The corollary tells
us that if a sentence is provable in FT , then it is a tautology. The Soundness
Theorem assures us that this same relationship holds between provability
in FT , with or without premises, and tautological consequence. Notice the
question marks in Figure 8.1. So far we do not know whether there are any
tautologies (or tautologically valid arguments) that are not provable in FT .
This is the second question we need to address: the issue of completeness.

Section 8.3

220 / The Logic of Conditionals

a=a b=b

a) Tet
(
et(

a)

???

Provable in FT
Tautologies
Logical truths

Figure 8.1: The soundness theorem for FT tells us that only tautologies are
provable (without premises) in FT .

sound deductive system

vs. sound argument

Before turning to completeness, we should reiterate that our use of the

term soundness in this section has little to do with our earlier use of the term
sound to describe valid arguments with true premises. What soundness really
means when applied to a deductive system is that the system only allows you
to prove valid arguments. It would be more appropriate to call it a validness
theorem, but that is not what it is traditionally called.

Completeness

completeness of a
deductive system

Chapter 8

Sometimes, in doing an exercise on formal proofs, you may have despaired of

finding a proof, even though you could see that the conclusion followed from
the premises. Our second question addresses this concern. Does our deductive
system allow us to prove everything we should be able to prove?
Of course, this raises the question of what we should be able to prove,
which again confronts us with the vagueness of the notion of logical consequence. But given the soundness theorem, we know that the most FT will let
us prove are tautological consequences. So we can state our question more precisely: Can we convince ourselves that given any premises P1 , . . . , Pn and any
tautological consequence S of these premises, our deductive system FT allows
us to construct a proof of S from P1 , . . . , Pn ? Or could there be tautological
consequences of some set of premises that are just plain out of the reach of the

Soundness and completeness / 221

a=a b=b
t(a) Tet(a
Te
)

Provable in FT
Tautologies
Logical truths

Figure 8.2: Completeness and soundness of FT tells us that all and only tautologies are provable (without premises) in FT .
deductive system FT ? The next theorem assures us that this cannot happen.
Theorem (Completeness of FT ) If a sentence S is a tautological consequence
of P1 , . . . , Pn , then P1 , . . . , Pn T S.
The proof of this result is quite a bit more complicated than the proof of
the Soundness Theorem, and requires material we have not yet introduced.
Consequently, we will not be able to give the proof here, but will prove it in
Chapter 17.
This result is called the Completeness Theorem because it tells us that
the introduction and elimination rules are complete for the logic of the truthfunctional connectives: anything that is a logical consequence simply in virtue
of the meanings of the truth-functional connectives can be proven in FT . As
illustrated in Figure 8.2, it assures us that all tautologies (and tautologically
valid arguments) are provable in FT .
Notice, however, that the Soundness Theorem implies a kind of incompleteness, since it shows that the rules of FT allow us to prove only tautological
consequences of our premises. They do not allow us to prove any logical
consequence of the premises that is not a tautological consequence of those
premises. For example, it shows that there is no way to prove Dodec(c) from
Dodec(b) b = c in FT , since the former is not a tautological consequence
of the latter. To prove something like this, we will need the identity rules in
addition to the rules for the truth-functional connectives. Similarly, to prove

completeness of FT

soundness and
incompleteness

Section 8.3

222 / The Logic of Conditionals

uses of soundness and

completeness

Larger(c, b) from Larger(b, c), we would need rules having to do with the
predicate Larger. We will return to these issues in Chapter 19.
The Soundness and Completeness Theorems have practical uses that are
worth keeping in mind. The Completeness Theorem gives us a method for
showing that an argument has a proof without actually having to find a
such proof: just show that the conclusion is a tautological consequence of
the premises. For example, it is obvious that A (B A) is a tautology so
by the Completeness Theorem we know it must have a proof. Similarly, the
sentence B D is a tautological consequence of ((A B) (C D)) so we
know it must be possible to find a proof of the former from the latter.
The Soundness Theorem, on the other hand, gives us a method for telling
that an argument does not have a proof in FT : show that the conclusion is not
a tautological consequence of the premises. For example, A (A B) is not
a tautology, so it is impossible to construct a proof of it in FT , no matter how
hard you try. Similarly, the sentence B D is a not tautological consequence
of ((A B) (C D)), so we know there is no proof of this in FT .
Recall our earlier discussion of the Taut Con routine in Fitch. This procedure checks to see whether a sentence is a tautological consequence of whatever
sentences you cite in support. You can use the observations in the preceding
paragraphs, along with Taut Con, to decide whether it is possible to give
a proof using the rules of FT . If Taut Con says a particular sentence is a
tautological consequence of the cited sentences, then you know it is possible
to give a full proof of the sentence, even though you may not see exactly how
the proof goes. On the other hand, if Taut Con says it is a not tautological
consequence of the cited sentences, then there is no point in trying to find a
proof in FT , for the simple reason that no such proof is possible.
Remember
Given an argument with premises P1 , . . . , Pn and conclusion S:
1. (Completeness of FT ) If S is a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn ,
then there is a proof of S from premises P1 , . . . , Pn using only the
introduction and elimination rules for , , , , , and .
2. (Soundness of FT ) If S is not a tautological consequence of P1 , . . . , Pn ,
then there is no proof of S from premises P1 , . . . , Pn using only the
rules for , , , , , and .
3. Which of these alternatives holds can be determined with the Taut
Con procedure of Fitch.

Chapter 8

Valid arguments: some review exercises / 223

Exercises
Decide whether the following two arguments are provable in FT without actually trying to find proofs.
Do this by constructing a truth table in Boole to assess their tautological validity. Submit the table. Then
explain clearly how you know the argument is or is not provable by applying the Soundness and Completeness results. Turn in your explanations to your instructor. (The explanations are more important
than the tables, so dont forget the second part!)

8.39
|.

8.40

A (B A (C D))
E (D (A (B D)))

|.

AB

A (B A (C D)) (A D)
(E (D (A (B D))))

In the proof of the Soundness Theorem, we only treated three of the twelve rules of FT . The next three
problems ask you to treat some of the other rules.

8.41
.

8.43
.

Give the argument required for the

Elim case of the Soundness proof. Your
argument will be very similar to the one
we gave for Elim.

8.42
.

Give the argument required for the

Intro case of the Soundness proof. Your
argument will be similar to the one we
gave for Intro.

Give the argument required for the

Elim case of the Soundness proof.

Section 8.4

Valid arguments: some review exercises

There is wisdom in the old saying Dont lose sight of the forest for the
trees. The forest in our case is an understanding of valid arguments. The
trees are the various methods of proofs, formal and informal, and the notions
of counterexample, tautology, and the like. The problems in this section are
intended to remind you of the relationship between the forest and the trees,
as well as to help you review the main ideas discussed so far.
Since you now know that our introduction and elimination rules suffice to
prove any tautologically valid argument, you should feel free to use Taut Con
in doing these exercises. In fact, you may use it in your formal proofs from
now on, but with this important proviso: Make sure that you use it only in
cases where the inference step is obvious and would go by without notice in an
informal proof. For example, you may use it to introduce the law of excluded

Section 8.4

224 / The Logic of Conditionals

middle or to apply a DeMorgan equivalence. But you should still use rules like
Elim, Intro, and Intro when your informal proof would use proof by
cases, proof by contradiction, or conditional proof. Any one-step proofs that
consist of a single application of Taut Con will be counted as wrong!
Before doing these problems, go back and read the material in the Remember boxes, paying special attention to the strategy for evaluating arguments on page 173.
Remember
From this point on in the book, you may use Taut Con in formal proofs,
but only to skip simple steps that would go unmentioned in an informal
proof.

Exercises
In the following exercises, you are given arguments in the blocks language. Evaluate each arguments
validity. If it is valid, construct a formal proof to show this. If you need to use Ana Con, use it only to
derive from atomic sentences. If the argument is invalid, you should use Tarskis World to construct
a counterexample world.

8.44

Adjoins(a, b) Adjoins(b, c)
SameRow(a, c)

8.45

a = c

8.46

Cube(a) (Cube(b) Tet(c))

Tet(c) Small(c)
(Cube(b) Small(c)) Small(b)

8.47

Cube(a) Small(b)

8.48

Small(a) (Medium(b) Large(c))

Medium(b) FrontOf(a, b)
Large(c) Tet(c)
Tet(c) FrontOf(a, b)

(Cube(b) b = c) Cube(c)

Small(a) (Medium(b) Large(c))

Medium(b) FrontOf(a, b)
Large(c) Tet(c)
Tet(c) FrontOf(c, b)

8.49

(Dodec(a) Dodec(b))
(SameCol(a, c) Small(a))
(SameCol(b, c) Small(b))
(Dodec(b) Small(a))
SameCol(a, c) SameCol(b, c)
Dodec(a) Small(b)

Chapter 8

Valid arguments: some review exercises / 225

8.50

8.52

Cube(b) (Cube(a) Cube(c))

Dodec(b) (Cube(a) Cube(c))
Cube(b) (Cube(a) Cube(c))
Dodec(b) a = c

8.51

8.53

Cube(b) (Cube(a) Cube(c))

Dodec(b) a = b
Small(a) Small(b)
Small(b) (SameSize(b, c) Small(c))
Small(a) (Large(a) Large(c))
SameSize(b, c) (Large(c) Small(c))

Section 8.4