Oreda LNG

APPENDIX B
FAILURE RATE DATA

TO THE
INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS

(APPENDIX C1)
Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Risknology, Inc.

Independent Risk Assessment January 2006
Independent Risk Analysis of the Proposed Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port
Failure Rate Data
SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

STEP:
IDN001. Improper filling of Initiating event frequency for Annual failure frequency: In the 25 year design life of Confidential client(s) data.
LNG Cargo Tank the improper filling of an LNG 0.04/yr * 1.4E-3 = 5.5E-5. the FSRU BHP Billiton does
tank that is out of service. not expect to ever have to
isolate the tank for entry.
Conservatively assume one
tank entry for any cause in
the life of the FSRU. 0.04/yr.
An estimate of improper
filling is derived from failure
of work process controls
(isolation, lock out – tag out)
conditioned on the cargo tank
entry frequency. 1.4E-3
energy isolation
failures/energy isolation
performed.
IDN002. Improper filling of Tank unmanned and failure to Assume the tank will be NA NA
LNG Cargo Tank detect the improper LNG unmanned half an hour every
loading of an out of service 24 hours.
tank. 0.02
IDN003. Improper filling of Loss of 2-way radio Assume the loss of 2-way NA NA
LNG Cargo Tank communication causing a radios inside the tank would
failure to detect the improper occur 1 in every 100 attempts.
LNG loading. 0.01
IDN004. Improper filling of Personnel inside tank 0.5 50% chance that LNG NA
LNG Cargo Tank incapacitated and unable to released in a tank will cause
communicate the improper the personnel in the tank to be
LNG loading. incapacitated in such a way
that they would be unable to
communicate with topsides
personnel.
IDN005. Improper filling of Topsides tank watchman 0.02 1 in 50 chances that the NA
LNG Cargo Tank unavailable and failing to detect topsides watchman will not
the improper LNG loading. be available for
communication.
Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 1 Risknology, Inc.
Risk Analysis January 2006
Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN006. Improper filling of Failure to detect LNG in tank. Fault tree calculations show the The fault tree shown in NA
LNG Cargo Tank overall probability of failing to Figure 5.2 provides logic for
detect LNG inside a gas free the failure to detect LNG in
tank to 0.55 tank.
IDN007. Improper filling of Failure to shutdown the LNG 2.4E-02 Table 5-3. System-oriented Gertman, David I., and
LNG Cargo Tank loading in sufficient time. Human Error Probability Harold S. Blackman. 1994.
Data Sample. Value used: Human Reliability & Safety
Mean Human Error Analysis Data Handbook.
Probability (HEP), Error of New York: John Wiley and
omission, for ESALS Sons, Inc.
(emergency safety and
activator logic system)
Operates, location: control
room operator
IDN008. Improper filling of Ignition of the LNG liquid or Assume no forced ventilation Based on Pmax of the Ignition DNV Technica Ltd. 1992.
LNG Cargo Tank vapors inside the tank. inside tank. Model on page 81. Offshore Hazard and Risk
0.25 Analysis Toolkit Reference
Manual. London: Lynton
House
IDN009. Improper filling of Failure of the LNG cargo tank NA NA NA
LNG Cargo Tank causing adjacent tank
escalation.

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN010. Extreme weather Initiating event frequency for Joint probability from the BHPB will shutdown loading www.noaa.gov (weather
during loading operations extreme weather to occur conditional and marginal operations for wave heights data buoy # 46025).
during loading operations. probabilities. greater than 2.8m. NOAA Gertman, David I., and
0.014 * 4.7E-02 = 6.6E-4 data buoy (46025) shows that Harold S. Blackman. 1994.
wave heights at Cabrillo Port Human Reliability & Safety
will be less than 2.8m 98.6% Analysis Data Handbook.
of the time, hence 0.014 /yr New York: John Wiley and
exceedance. Sons, Inc.
Table 5-36. Source
Categories of Action
Consequence, …II.6
Value used: Violate
procedure and devise own
formula 4.7E-02
IDN011. Extreme weather Failure of emergency 2.3E-4 per transfer Data shows a ‘Snaptite’ Health Safety Commission,
during loading operations disconnect of loading arms. coupling failure rate (while © 1991, Major Hazard
the transfer is in progress) of Aspects of the Transport of
2.3E-5 due to collision while Dangerous Substances,
loading. Taking the collision London (page 259)
probability data out leaves us
with a failure rate of 2.3E-4.
IDN012. Extreme weather Ignition of released LNG from Assume no forced ventilation Based on Pmax of the Ignition DNV Technica Ltd. 1992.
during loading operations emergency disconnect or inside tank. Model on page 81. Offshore Hazard and Risk
loading arm failure. 0.25 Analysis Toolkit Reference
House
IDN013. Loading arm leak Initiating event frequency for 3.85E-03 Based on the referenced Gas Research Institute.
during normal loading loading arm leak during normal value for a medium leak 1990. Reduction of LNG
operation loading operation. (50mm) in the loading arms. Operator Error and
Equipment Failure Rates.
IDN014. Loading arm leak Failure of leak detection from 0.05 Expert Judgment, assume 5% NA
during normal loading loading arms. failure rate for detection of
operation loading arm leak.

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN015. Loading arm leak Failure of automatic 3.0E-2 Assume system designed to Recommended Guidelines
during normal loading isolation/shutdown of loading SIL-2 Safety Integrity Level, for the Application of IEC-
operation operation. as defined in IEC Guideline 61508 and IEC-61511 in the
Petroleum Activities on the
Norwegian Continental
Shelf © 2001. (Page 37 -
Table 8.1)
IDN016. Loading arm leak Failure of manual ESD of 2.4E-02 Table 5-3. System-oriented Gertman, David I., and
during normal loading loading operation. Human Error Probability Harold S. Blackman. 1994.
operation Data Sample. Value used: Human Reliability & Safety
Mean Human Error Analysis Data Handbook.
Probability (HEP), Error of New York: John Wiley and
omission, for ESALS Sons, Inc.
(emergency safety and
activator logic system)
Operates, location: control
room operator
IDN017. Loading arm leak Ignition of released LNG from Assume no forced ventilation Based on Pmax of the Ignition DNV Technica Ltd. 1992.
during normal loading loading arm leak. inside tank. Model on page 81. Offshore Hazard and Risk
operation 0.25 Analysis Toolkit Reference
House
IDN018. LNG tank leak into Initiating event frequency for 2.7E-08 There are no recorded failure Sooby, W., and J. M.
adjacent void space LNG tank leak into adjacent of Moss-type LNG spheres. Tolchard, 1994. Estimation
void space. Failure rates for equipment of Cold Failure Frequency
items where no failures have of LPG Tanks in Europe,
occurred can be calculated by LPG Engineering and
assuming that the failure can Safety Group, Shell
be described by a Binomial International Petroleum
distribution with the Company Limited.
appropriate number of
consecutive successes. LPG
service was used as surrogate.

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN019. Powered collision Number of transits on traffic 10,010 transits per year. VTS LA/LB statistics for U.S. Coast Guard Vessel
of merchant vessels using separation scheme (TSS) per 2001, 2002 and 2003. Traffic Service Los
coastal traffic lanes year Angeles/Long Beach. 2002-
2004. Excel spreadsheet
with 2002-2004 vessel
traffic data for VTS
LA/LB. Forwarded by
OMC William Hooker,
USCG May 20, 2004.
IDN020. Powered collision Probability of hitting the FSRU 6.1 E-6 Rayleigh distribution function NA
of merchant vessels using while on course, P1. skewed to one side with a
coastal traffic lanes mode of 0.5 nautical miles
and a FSRU located at 2.5
nautical miles.
IDN021. Powered collision Failure of the merchant vessel 2.0E-4 NA DNV, Concept Safety
of merchant vessels using steering control, P2. Assessment of LNG
coastal traffic lanes Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
(FSRU), Final Report
March 14, 2003, Project
No. 230-11749
IDN022. Powered collision Failure of the collision vessel to 0.67 NA DNV, Concept Safety
of merchant vessels using recover from its errant state to Assessment of LNG
coastal traffic lanes an FSRU warning. Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
IDN023. Drifting collision of Total traffic in box vessels per 5,005 VTS LA/LB statistics for Vessel Traffic System Los
merchant vessels using year. 2001, 2002 and 2003. Angeles/Long Beach
coastal traffic lanes annual reports 2001, 2002
and 2003

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN024. Drifting collision Probability of break down in Value depends on the NA DNV, Concept Safety
of merchant vessels using the box, Pb. probability of break down per Assessment of LNG
coastal traffic lanes hour Pbh, the length of the box Floating, Storage &
L and the speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit
Pb = Pbh x L /S (FSRU), Final Report
If Pbh = 2.0E-5/hr, L = 2.7 March 14, 2003, Project
nautical miles, S = 3 knots, then No. 230-11749
Pb = 1.8E-5
IDN025. Drifting collision of Probability of wind, Pw. Value depends on the annual NA AMOG Report – Metocean
merchant vessels using wind rose data around the study for BHP application
coastal traffic lanes FSRU.
From North West, Pw equals
0.11
IDN026. Drifting collision of Collision diameter divided by Value depends on the collision NA DNV, Concept Safety
merchant vessels using perpendicular length to wind diameter and the perpendicular Assessment of LNG
coastal traffic lanes direction length to wind direction for Floating, Storage &
each box. Regasification Unit (FSRU),
If collision diameter is equal to Final Report March 14,
0.15 and the perpendicular 2003, Project No. 230-
length to wind direction for a 11749
specific box is 1.6 nautical
miles, then collision diameter to
perpendicular length to wind
direction will be 9.4E-2.
IDN027. Powered collision Number of transits with Value depends on the traffic on NA Telephone conversations of
of commercial vessels direction to Port Hueneme per each route followed by the Port Hueneme officials with
calling at Port Hueneme year vessel on its way to Port John Pierce, Ecology and
Hueneme. Environment, Inc., Houston,
Texas

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN028. Powered collision Probability of hitting the FSRU Value depends on the distance Assumed that vessels follow NA
of commercial vessels while on course, P1. to the FSRU a straight route between
calling at Port Hueneme islands or avoid areas in the
direction of Port Hueneme.
Applied normal distribution
function with a standard
deviation of 0.5 nautical
miles for each route.
of commercial vessels steering control, P2. Assessment of LNG
calling at Port Hueneme Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
of commercial vessels recover from its errant state to Assessment of LNG
calling at Port Hueneme an FSRU warning. Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
IDN031. Drifting collision of Total traffic in box vessels per Value depends on the traffic on NA Telephone conversations of
commercial vessels calling at year. each route followed by the Port Hueneme officials
Port Hueneme vessel on its way to Port with John Pierce, Ecology
Hueneme. and Environment, Inc.,
Houston, Texas
IDN032. Drifting collision of Probability of break down in Value depends on the NA DNV, Concept Safety
commercial vessels calling at the box, Pb. probability of break down per Assessment of LNG
Port Hueneme hour Pbh, the length of the box L Floating, Storage &
and the speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit (FSRU),
Pb = Pbh x L /S Final Report March 14,
If Pbh = 2.0E-5/hr, L = 2.7 2003, Project No. 230-
nautical miles, S = 3 knots, then 11749
Pb = 1.8E-5
Failure Rate Data

STEP:
commercial vessels calling at wind rose data around the study for BHP application.
Port Hueneme FSRU.
For instance it the wind blows
from North West, Pw equals
0.11
commercial vessels calling at perpendicular length to wind diameter and the perpendicular Assessment of LNG
Port Hueneme direction length to wind direction for Floating, Storage &
IDN035. Powered collision Number of transits with Value depends on the traffic on NA Telephone conversation of
of crude oil carriers calling direction to El Segundo per each route followed by the Mooring Master at El
at El Segundo year vessel on its way to El Segundo Segundo Refinery with
John Pierce, Ecology and
Environment, Inc.,
Houston, Texas
of crude oil carriers calling while on course, P1. to the FSRU. a straight route between
at El Segundo islands or avoided areas with
direction to El Segundo.

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
of crude oil carriers calling steering control, P2. Assessment of LNG
at El Segundo Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
of crude oil carriers calling recover from its errant state to Assessment of LNG
at El Segundo an FSRU warning. Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
IDN039. Drifting collision of Total traffic in box vessels per Value depends on the traffic on NA Telephone conversation of
crude oil carriers calling at year. each route followed by the Mooring Master at El
El Segundo. vessel on its way to El Segundo Segundo Refinery with
Refinery. John Pierce, Ecology and
Environment, Inc.,
Houston, Texas
crude oil carriers calling at the box, Pb. probability of break down per Assessment of LNG
El Segundo. hour Pbh, the length of the box Floating, Storage &
L and the speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit
nautical miles, S = 3 knots, No. 230-11749
then Pb = 1.8E-5
crude oil carriers calling at wind rose data around the study for BHP application.
El Segundo. FSRU.
0.11

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
crude oil carriers calling at perpendicular length to wind diameter and the perpendicular Assessment of LNG
El Segundo. direction length to wind direction for Floating, Storage &
IDN043. Powered collision Number of transits with Value depends on the traffic on NA U.S. Department of
of navy vessels operating on direction to Point Mugu Sea each route followed by the Defense, March 2002. Final
the Point Mugu Sea Range Range per year vessel on its way to Point Mugu Environmental Impact
Sea Range Statement/Overseas
Environmental Impact
Statement, Pt. Mugu Sea
Range. Prepared by the
U.S. Department of the
Navy, Naval Systems
Command, Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons
Division, Pt. Mugu,
California.
of navy vessels operating on while on course, P1. to the FSRU. a straight route between
the Point Mugu Sea Range islands or avoid areas in the
direction to Point Mugu Sea
Range.

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
of navy vessels operating on steering control, P2. Assessment of LNG
the Point Mugu Sea Range Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
of navy vessels operating on recover from its errant state to Assessment of LNG
the Point Mugu Sea Range an FSRU warning. Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
IDN047. Drifting collision of Total traffic in box vessels per Value depends on the traffic on NA U.S. Department of
navy vessels operating on the year. each route followed by the Defense, March 2002. Final
Point Mugu Sea Range. vessel on its way to Point Mugu Environmental Impact
Sea Range. Statement/Overseas
Environmental Impact
Statement, Pt. Mugu Sea
Range. Prepared by the
U.S. Department of the
Navy, Naval Systems
Command, Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons
Division, Pt. Mugu,
California.
navy vessels operating on the the box, Pb. probability of break down per Assessment of LNG
Point Mugu Sea Range. hour Pbh, the length of the box L Floating, Storage &
and the speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit
Pb = 1.8E-5

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
navy vessels operating on the wind rose data around the study for BHP application.
Point Mugu Sea Range. FSRU.
0.11
navy vessels operating on the perpendicular length to wind diameter and the perpendicular Assessment of LNG
Point Mugu Sea Range. direction length to wind direction for Floating, Storage &
IDN051. Drifting collision of Number of transits approaching Value depends on the traffic on NA BHP application
LNG carriers calling at the FSRU per year each route followed by the
Cabrillo Port vessel on its way to the FSRU.
IDN052. Drifting collision of Probability of drifting towards 0.01 Assumed that P1 equals to John Spouge. 1999. A
LNG carriers calling at the FSRU, P1. angle subtended by FSRU Guide to Quantitative Risk
Cabrillo Port divided by 2 π Assessment For Offshore
Installations, DNV
IDN053. Drifting collision of Probability of wind blowing Value depends on the annual NA AMOG Report – Metocean
LNG carriers calling at towards the FSRU, P2. wind rose data around the study for BHP application.
Cabrillo Port FSRU.
from North West, P2 equals 0.11

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN054. Drifting collision of Probability of break down, P3. Value depends on the NA DNV, Concept Safety
LNG carriers calling at probability of break down per Assessment of LNG
Cabrillo Port hour Pbh, the length of the box L Floating, Storage &
and the speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit (FSRU),
P3 = Pbh x L /S Final Report March 14,
If Pbh = 2.0E-5/hr, L = 2.7 2003, Project No. 230-
nautical miles, S = 3 knots, then 11749
P3 = 1.8E-5
IDN055. Drifting collision of Number of transits approaching Value depends on the traffic on NA BHP Application
supply vessels operating near the FSRU per year each route followed by the
Cabrillo Port vessel on its way to the FSRU.
IDN056. Drifting collision of Probability of drifting towards 0.01 Assumed that P1 equals to John Spouge. 1999. A
supply vessels operating near the FSRU, P1. angle subtended by FSRU Guide to Quantitative Risk
Cabrillo Port divided by 2 π. Assessment For Offshore
Installations, DNV
IDN057. Drifting collision of Probability of wind blowing Value depends on the annual NA AMOG, Metocean Study
supply vessels operating near towards the FSRU, P2. wind rose data around the for Cabrillo Port, Report
Cabrillo Port FSRU. No. 065 475 818, BHPB
For instance it the wind blows Application.
from North West, P2 equals
0.11
IDN058. Drifting collision of Probability of break down, P3. It depends on the probability of NA DNV, Concept Safety
supply vessels operating near break down per hour Pbh, the Assessment of LNG
Cabrillo Port length of the box L and the Floating, Storage &
speed of drifting S. Regasification Unit
P3 = Pbh x L /S (FSRU), Final Report
P3 = 1.8E-5

Failure Rate Data

STEP:
IDN059. Collision of fishing Number of fishing vessels on 2,208 transits per year. NA Natural Resources
vessels operating near collision course per year Consultants, Inc. March 10,
Cabrillo Port 2003, jjune@nrccorp.com.
Commercial and
recreational fisheries in the
vicinity of a proposed
pipeline near Ventura,
California.
(http:/www.nrccorp.com).
IDN060. Collision of fishing Failure of the merchant vessel 2.0E-4 NA DNV, Concept Safety
vessels operating near steering control, P2. Assessment of LNG
Cabrillo Port Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749
IDN061. Collision of fishing Failure of the collision vessel to 0.67 NA DNV, Concept Safety
vessels operating near recover from its errant state to Assessment of LNG
Cabrillo Port an FSRU warning. Floating, Storage &
Regasification Unit
No. 230-11749


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APPENDIX B

FAILURE RATE DATA

INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 2 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 3 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 4 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 5 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 6 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 8 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 9 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 10 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 11 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 12 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 13 Risknology, Inc.

SUBJECT: SYSTEM / COMPONENT / ASSUMPTION / VALUE: BASIS: REFERENCE:

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port 14 Risknology, Inc.

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