THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

WRIT PETITION No.11598 OF 2023

JUDGMENT:-

1. Heard Sri C. Venkaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner

and learned Government Pleader for Municipal Administration

for the respondent No.1 and Sri G. Naresh Kumar, learned

counsel, representing Sri M. Manohar Reddy, learned Standing

Counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3, the Eluru Municipal

Corporation and its authority.

2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, issuance of

notice to respondent No.4 is considered not necessary and is

dispensed with.

3. The Writ Petition is being deciding finally with the consent

of the learned counsels for the parties.

4. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India has been filed for the following relief:-

“It is therefore prayed that the Hon‟ble Court may be

pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus
or any other writ under Article 226 of constitution of India
declaring the confirmation order issued under Sec. 452 (2)
and 461 (2) r/w 428, 429 of A. P. Municipal Corporation
Act, 1955 and under 89 (3) of A. P. M. R. and U. D. A. Act
2016 by 2nd respondent - Municipal Commissioner, vide
notice No. 16/1075/ELR/UC/ 2023, dated 24.04.2023
 2

threatening to take action in respect of constructions of

petitioners residential house in two floors situated in Door
No.23B-6-14/1, though mentioned in the house tax receipt
as 23B-6-14/2 of Eluru Municipal Corporation in the site
of 193 Sq. yards in TS. No. 101/84 without considering
petitioner‟s detailed written reply explanations submitted
to official respondents dated 18.01.2023 and 18.04.2023
as illegal, arbitrary, ultravires, contrary to the procedure
established by Law and contrary to the principles of
natural justice and against the spirit of judgment reported
in 2013 (6) ALT page 42 held by the Hon‟ble High Court of
Andhra Pradesh between Kadiyala Sudarsan and others
vs. Government of A. P., represented by its Principal
Secretary and others apart from being violative of Article
21 and 300-A of Constitution of India and consequently
direct the respondents not to interfere with petitioner‟s
possession and enjoyment of said residential house by
setting aside the impugned confirmation order dated
24.04.2023 in the interest of justice and pass such other
order or orders as the Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case”.

5. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the petitioner’s

father purchased an extent of 193 Sq. Yrds of site situated in

RS.No.101/84, bearing Door No.23B-6-14/1 of Eluru Municipal

Corporation under a registered sale deed dated 11.03.1985

from one, Indana Mallikarjuna Rao and constructed ground

floor with slab and first floor after obtaining sanctioned plan

from the respondent No.2, the Eluru Municipal Corporation

after the death of the petitioner’s father in 2006, the petitioner

 3

is residing with his family in the said house. Recently, the

western side of the house wall of the first floor building and

some other portion was damaged. The petitioner started

carrying out the repairs without damaging the nature of the

building and not in violation of the rules or structural stability

of the building.

6. It is the further case of the petitioner that the respondent

No.4, his neighbor filed W.P.No.42358 of 2022 for direction to

the Corporation to take action on his representation on the

allegation that the constructions were unauthorized. The writ

petition was disposed of on 02.02.2023, with direction to the

respondent No.2 to take steps to demolish the unauthorized

construction after giving notice to the present petitioner by

following due process of law. The petitioner filed W.A.No.297 of

2023 which was withdrawn and thereafter, he filed I.A.No.1 of

2023 in W.P.No.42358 of 2022 for setting aside the ex-parte

order dated 02.02.2023 which is pending.

7. The respondent No.2 issued provisional order/notice under

Sections 452(1) and 461(1) and other provisions of the statute

dated 12.01.2023 no sufficient cause as to why the construction

should not be removed/altered or pulled down within a specified

period. The petitioner filed written reply dated 18.01.2023,

inter alia submitting that the construction was raised under the
 4

plans dated 16.05.1990 and there was no new construction nor

any unauthorized construction. The reply was received by the

respondent No.3 on 19.01.2023.

8. Again on 10.04.2023, a similar show cause notice was

issued to which the petitioner filed reply on 18.04.2023 by

Registered Post with Acknowledge Due to the respondent Nos.

2 and 3 which was received by the authorities, evident from the

postal acknowledge dated 21.04.2023. The impugned

confirmation order was passed on 24.04.2023.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

impugned order of confirmation dated 24.04.2023 for demolition

of the petitioner's construction is not a reasoned order. It is

vague, without considering the petitioner's reply to the show

cause notice and in violation of the principles of natural justice.

10. He places reliance in Kadiyala Sudershan and others

vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal

Secretary, Revenue Department and others1.

11. On 03.05.2023, in view of the submission advanced as

also noticing the contradiction in the impugned order of

confirmation and finding prima facie, non-application of mind

by the Authority, in passing order on printed proforma, this

1
2013 (6) ALT 42
 5

Court directed the Commissioner of the Eluru Municipal

Corporation to appear before this Court today.

12. The order dated 03.05.2023 reads as under:-

“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

petitioner was issued show cause notice/provisional order
dated 12.01.2023, to which the petitioner filed reply on
18.01.2023. Again another show cause notice/provisional
order dated 10.04.2023, was issued to which the
petitioner filed reply on 18.04.2023. Thereafter, the
impugned order of confirmation has been passed on
24.04.2023.
2. He submits that in the first paragraph of the impugned
order, it is mentioned that the petitioner did not submit any
reply, and in the second paragraph, in one sentence, it is
stated that the reply submitted by the petitioner is not
satisfactory.
3. The contradiction is apparent in the impugned order,
prima facie, indicating the non-application of mind by the
Authority in passing the impugned order as stereotyped
and on printed format.
4. Post on 10.05.2023, on which date, the Commissioner
of the 2nd respondent-Eluru Municipal Corporation shall
appear before this Court to explain about the above
contradiction in the order.
5. Till the next date of listing, the operation of the
impugned order shall remain stayed.”

13. Sri S. Venkata Krishna, the Commissioner of Eluru

Municipal Corporation is present. He submits that the petitioner

filed the reply to the show cause notice/provisional order.

 6

14. Sri G. Naresh Kumar, submits that the same printed

proforma for passing confirmation order is, available, online for

the Municipal Corporations, in which only the alterations with

respect to the name, the property details etc. are made and the

same is digitally signed and dated.

15. The order of confirmation dated 24.04.2023 on the

printed format is reproduced as under:-

“Eluru Municipal Corporation

CONFIRMATION ORDER
ORDERS UNDER SECTION 452(2) AND 461(2) R/W 428, 429 OF APMC
ACT 1955
AND
UNDER 89(3) OF APMR & UDA ACT 2016

Notice No: 16/1075/ELR/UC/2023 Date: 24-04-2023

Sub:

Eluru Municipal Corporation – Town Planning Section –

unauthorized construction in the premises of D.No/Plot No. 23B-
6-14/1 Situtated at Chinta chettu Road Street/Colony, RRPET
area – Eluru Municipal Corporation – Conformation order Section
452(2) & 461(2) of APMC Act 1955 and under Section 89(3) of
APMR & UDA Act 2016 – Issued – Regarding.

Ref: 1. This Office Provisional Notice No.

16/1075/ELR/UC/2023, Date: 10-04-2023.
***

ORDER:

Whereas, in the reference cited, a show cause notice

under Section 452 (1) & 461 (1) of APMC Act 1955 and 89
(1 & 2) of APMR & UDA Act 2016 was served on you/your
representative to show cause as to why the portion of
construction made unauthorizedly in the site mentioned above
should not be removed, altered or pulled down. But, you have
neither pulled down the unauthorized construction nor
submitted any reply to the show cause notice till date.
 7

Therefore, you are liable for issue of confirmation order under

Section 452 (2) & 461 (2) of APMC Act 1955 under Section 89 (3)
of APMR & UDA Act 2016.
Sri/Smt Ille Ratna Prasad has submitted a reply to the
above-said show-cause notice. But the reply given is not
satisfactory and contrary to provisions of rules is in force.
Therefore, the show-cause notice issued is hereby confirmed and
confirmation notice under Section 452 (2) & 461 (2) of APMC Act
1955 and 86, 89 (3) of APMR & UDA Act – 2016 is issued once
again you are hereby instructed to bring down you construction
into the rule frame within (7) seven days from the receipt of the
notice. Otherwise, action will be initiated against your
construction as per the provisions of the act.

For Commissioner
Eluru Municipal Corporation

To Signature valid
Digitally signed by Srinivasu
Sri/Smt Ille Ratna Prasad, YANDAMURI
D.No/Plot No.23B-6-14/1, Date: 2023.04.24 15:59:51 +05:30
Chinta chettu Road Street/Colony, Assistant City Planner, UCIMS 2st
RRPET. Notice Authority”

16. A perusal of the aforesaid, shows that in the first para it

is mentioned "But, you have neither pulled down the

unauthorized construction nor submitted any reply to the show

cause notice till date....", and in the second para, it is

mentioned "But the reply given is not satisfactory and contrary

to the provisions of rules is in force…".

17. The contradiction is apparent. If as per first para, reply

is not filed, where is the occasion to consider it and say, in

second para that the reply given is not satisfactory.

 8

18. Section 452 of the Municipal Corporation Act provides as

under:-

“452. Proceedings to be taken in respect of building or

work commenced contrary to Act or bye-laws:- (1) If the
erection of any building or the execution of any such work
as is described in Section 433 is commenced or carried out
contrary to the provisions of this Act or bye-laws made
thereunder, the Commissioner, unless he deems it
necessary to take proceedings in respect of such building
or work under Section 426 shall:

(a) by written notice, require the person who is

erecting or re-erecting such building or executing such
work or has erected or re-erected such building or executed
such work, on or before such day as shall be specified in
such notice, by a statement in writing subscribed by him
or by agent duly authorized by him in that behalf and
addressed to the Commissioner, to show sufficient cause
why such building or work shall not be removed, altered or
pulled down; or

(b) shall require the said person on such day and at

such time and place as shall be specified in such notice to
attend personally or by an agent duly authorized by him in
that behalf, to show sufficient cause why such building or
work shall not be removed, altered or pulled down.

(2) If such person shall fail to show sufficient cause

as required under Clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1), to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner, why such building or
work shall not be removed, altered or pulled down, the
Commissioner may remove, alter or pull down the building
or work and the expenses thereof shall be paid by the said
person.”

19. Section 461 of Municipal Corporation Act provides as

under:-

“461. Powers of Commissioner to direct removal of

person directing unlawful work:-- (1) If the
Commissioner is satisfied that the erection or re-erection of
any building or the execution of any such work as is
 9

described in Section 433 has been unlawfully commenced

or is being unlawfully carried on upon any premises he
may, by written notice, require the person directing or
carrying on such erection or re-erection or execution of
work to stop the same forthwith.

(2) If such erection or re-erection or execution of work

is not stopped forthwith, the Commissioner may direct that
any person directing or carrying on such erection or re-
erection or execution of work shall be removed from such
premises by any police officer and may cause such steps
to be taken as he may consider necessary to prevent the
re-entry of such person on the premises without his
permission.

(3) The cost o any measures taken under sub-section

(2) shall be paid by the said person.

[(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act,

any person who, whether at his own instance or at the
instance of any other person or anybody including a
department of the Government undertakes or carries out
construction or development of any and in contravention of
the statutory master plan or without permission, approval
or sanction or in contravention of any condition subject to
which such permission, approval or sanction has been
granted shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall
be levied as provided in Schedules U and V of the Act read
with Section 596 of the Act.]]”

20. Section 452 of the Municipal Corporation Act provides for

opportunity of hearing to the person against whom the action of

removal/alteration/pulling down of the building or part thereof,

 10

as the case may be is proposed. If the person fails to show

sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, then

only the proposed action can be taken. Further, even if the

cause shown is not sufficient to the satisfaction of the

Commissioner, the ultimate order that may be passed may be

for removal, alteration or pulling down of the building or part

thereof. Here also, the Commissioner has to take a judicious

decision as to what order is to be passed, considering, inter alia,

the nature of violations, etc., as in all the case of violations,

same order of demolition or pulling down of the building is not

to be passed statutorily and necessarily.

21. Section 461 also uses the expression, ‘if the

Commissioner is satisfied’ that the erection or re-erection of any

building or the execution of any such work as is described in

Section 433 has been unlawfully commenced or is being

unlawfully carried on upon any premises he may, by written

notice, require the person directing or carrying on such erection

or re-erection or execution of work to stop the same forthwith.

22. Therefore, the consideration of the reply in cases where

reply is filed, should be made objectively and judiciously.

Merely saying that the reply given is not satisfactory, is not

sufficient. Its no consideration at all.

 11

23. In Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax

Department, works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla

and brothers2, the Hon’ble Court observed and held that

reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once

ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance

of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the

cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of

fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of

reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of

uncertainty, dis- satisfaction and give entirely different

dimensions to the questions of law raised before the

higher/appellate courts.

24. In ACCT (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court further

reiterated the principle that when reasons are announced and

can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of

correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law

that correction process of judgments should not only appear to

be implemented but also seem to have been properly

implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance

public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the

consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It

was emphasized that recording of reasons in the orders is of

2
(2010) 4 SCC 785
 12

essence of judicial proceedings. Every litigant who approaches

the Court with a prayer is entitled to know the reasons of

acceptance or rejection of such request. The reasons, atleast

sufficient to indicate the application of mind to the law before

the Court is indispensible part of a sound judicial system.

Another rationale pointed out by the Apex Court is that the

effected party can know why the decision has gone against him.

Therefore the spelling out the reasons for the order made is

considered to be one of the statutory requirements of natural

justice. The litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing

reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that

when a party would be in a position to challenge the order on

appropriate grounds. This is also for the benefit of the higher or

the appellate court to ascertain the foundation for the

conclusions and the exercise of the judicial discretion by the

courts/authority in the legal and factual matrix of the case. In

exercise of the power of judicial review the concept of reasoned

orders/actions has been enforced.

25. It is apt to refer Paragraph Nos.11 to 20 of ACCT (supra)

as under:-

11. The Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India

[(1990) 4 SCC 594], while referring to the practice adopted
and insistence placed by the Courts in United States,
 13

emphasized the importance of recording of reasons for

decisions by the administrative authorities and tribunals. It
said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity
in its exercise". To enable the Courts to exercise the power of
review in consonance with settled principles, the authorities
are advised of the considerations underlining the action
under review. This Court with approval stated:-
"11. ….the orderly functioning of the process of review
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative
agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."
12. In exercise of the power of judicial review, the concept of
reasoned orders/actions has been enforced equally by the
foreign courts as by the courts in India. The administrative
authority and tribunals are obliged to give reasons, absence
whereof could render the order liable to judicial chastise.
Thus, it will not be far from absolute principle of law that the
Courts should record reasons for its conclusions to enable the
appellate or higher Courts to exercise their jurisdiction
appropriately and in accordance with law. It is the reasoning
alone, that can enable a higher or an appellate court to
appreciate the controversy in issue in its correct perspective
and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by the Court
whose order is impugned, is sustainable in law and whether
it has adopted the correct legal approach. To sub-serve the
purpose of justice delivery system, therefore, it is essential
that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions,
whether disposing of the case at admission stage or after
regular hearing.
13. At the cost of repetition, we may notice, that this
Court has consistently taken the view that recording of
reasons is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A
litigant who approaches the Court with any grievance in
accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant
 14

or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-

recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it
may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more
particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice.
These principles are not only applicable to administrative or
executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in
fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial
pronouncements. A judgment without reasons causes
prejudice to the person against whom it is pronounced, as
that litigant is unable to know the ground which weighed
with the Court in rejecting his claim and also causes
impediments in his taking adequate and appropriate grounds
before the higher Court in the event of challenge to that
judgment. Now, we may refer to certain judgments of this
Court as well as of the High Courts which have taken this
view.
14. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients;
firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by
the action of the authorities should be given notice to show
cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and
secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give
reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper
application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the
given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order
itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative
authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court
should meet with this requirement with higher degree of
satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not
provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be
supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction
between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-
judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are
required to pass reasoned orders.
 15

15. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India

Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. [AIR 1976 SC 1785], the
Supreme Court held as under:-
"6. ......If courts of law are to be replaced by
administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some
kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law,
they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that
administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair
and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by
their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in
support of the orders made by them. Then alone
administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial function will be able to justify their existence and
carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in
the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be
given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi
alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which
must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must
be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of
compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law."
16. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.
and Ors. (2006) SLT 345, the Supreme Court clarified the
rationality behind providing of reasons and stated the
principle as follows:-
"56. ... „ ... “Reason” is a ground or motive for a belief or a
course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of
belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state
reasons for the amount awarded.
The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons
assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons
reveal the grounds on which the Arbitrator reached the
conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party.
The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in
 16

Poyser and Mills' Arbitration, In re, “proper adequate

reasons”. Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall
be a reason connected with the case which the Court can see
is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of
reasons.‟.‟‟"
17. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2
SCC 368], while dealing with the matter of selection of
candidates who could be under review, if not found suitable
otherwise, the Court explained the reasons being a link
between the materials on which certain conclusions are
based and the actual conclusions and held, that where
providing reasons for proposed supersession were essential,
then it could not be held to be a valid reason that the
concerned officer's record was not such as to justify his
selection was not contemplated and thus was not legal. In
this context, the Court held -
"18. ... „Reasons‟ … „are the links between the materials on
which certain conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions‟. The Court accordingly held that the mandatory
provisions of Regulation 5(5) were not complied with by the
Selection Committee. That an officer was „not found suitable‟
is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision
to supersede him. True, that it is not expected that the
Selection Committee should give anything approaching the
judgment of a Court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it
may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned
was found to be not suitable for inclusion in the Select List."
This principle has been extended to administrative actions
on the premise that it applies with greater rigor to the
judgments of the Courts.
18. In State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan
[(1981) 4 SCC 129], while remanding the matter to the High
 17

Court for examination of certain issues raised, this Court

observed:
"2. … It would be for the benefit of this Court that a
speaking judgment is given".
19. In the cases where the Courts have not recorded reasons
in the judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the
orders by the Court of competent jurisdiction are challenged
in absence of proper discussion. The requirement of recording
reasons is applicable with greater rigor to the judicial
proceedings. The orders of the Court must reflect what
weighed with the Court in granting or declining the relief
claimed by the applicant. In this regard we may refer to
certain judgments of this Court.
20. A Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of M/s.
Pipe Arts India Pvt. Ltd. V. Gangadhar Nathuji Golamare
[2008 (6) Maharashtra Law Journal 280], wherein the Bench
was concerned with an appeal against an order, where
prayer for an interim relief was rejected without stating any
reasons in a writ petition challenging the order of the Labour
Court noticed, that legality, propriety and correctness of the
order was challenged on the ground that no reason was
recorded by the learned Single Judge while rejecting the
prayer and this has seriously prejudiced the interest of
justice. After a detailed discussion on the subject, the Court
held:
(Mah LJ pp. 283-87, paras 8, 10 & 12-22)
"8. The Supreme Court and different High Courts have
taken the view that it is always desirable to record reasons
in support of the Government actions whether administrative
or quasi judicial. Even if the statutory rules do not impose an
obligation upon the authorities still it is expected of the
authorities concerned to act fairly and in consonance with
basic rule of law. These concepts would require that any
 18

order, particularly, the order which can be subject matter of

judicial review, is reasoned one. Even in Chabungbambohal
Singh v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 83, the
Court held as under: (SCC pp. 85-86, para 8)
"8. … His assessment was, however, recorded as "very
good" whereas qua the appellant it had been stated “unfit”.
As the appellant was being superseded by one of his juniors,
we do not think if it was enough on the part of the Selection
Committee to have merely stated “unfit”, and then to
recommend the name of one of his juniors. No reason for
unfitness, is reflected in the proceedings, as against what
earlier Selection Committees had done to which reference has
already been made."
10. In Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987) 2
SCC 222, accepting the plea that absence of examination of
reasons by the High Court on the basis of which the trial
Court discarded prosecution evidence and recorded the
finding of an acquittal in favour of all the accused was not
appropriate, the Supreme Court held that the order should
record reasons. Recording of proper reasons would be
essential, so that the Appellate Court would have advantage
of considering the considered opinion of the High Court on the
reasons which had weighed with the trial Court.
12. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Surinder Kumar and Ors.
[(1992) 1 SCC 489], while noticing the jurisdictional
distinction between Article 142 and Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Supreme Court stated that powers
of the Supreme Court under Article 142 are much wider and
the Supreme Court would pass orders to do complete justice.
The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle with
approval that the High Court has the jurisdiction to dismiss
petitions or criminal revisions in limini or grant leave asked
for by the petitioner but for adequate reasons which should
 19

be recorded in the order. The High Court may not pass cryptic
order in relation to regularisation of service of the
respondents in view of certain directions passed by the
Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Absence of reasoning did not find favour with the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court also stated the principle that
powers of the High Court were circumscribed by limitations
discussed and declared by judicial decision and it cannot
transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective
opinion varying from Judge to Judge.
13. In Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
[(1998) 2 SCC 242], the Supreme Court while dealing with the
cases under the Labour Laws and Employees' Provident
Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 observed that
even when the petition under Article 226 is dismissed in
limini, it is expected of the High Court to pass a speaking
order, may be briefly.
14. Consistent with the view expressed by the Supreme
Court in the afore-referred cases, in State of U.P. v. Battan
and Ors. [(2001) 10 SCC 607], the Supreme Court held as
under: (SCC p.608, para 4)
"4. … The High Court has not given any reasons for refusing
to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal. The manner in
which appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the
High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce
clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the
High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever
brief, in its order. The absence of reasons has rendered the
High Court order not sustainable."
15. Similar view was also taken by the Supreme Court in
the case of Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, 2003 (Supp.2)
SC 354.
 20

16. In a very recent judgment, the Supreme Court in the

case of State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar (2004) 5 SCC 568
while dealing with the criminal appeal, insisted that the
reasons in support of the decision was a cardinal principle
and the High Court should record its reasons while disposing
of the matter. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 572, para 8)
„8. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning,
M.R. In Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed: (QB p.
191 C)
"The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good
administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v.
Crabtree it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to
denial of justice." "Reasons are live links between the mind of
the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the
decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute
subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording
reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of
the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually
impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function
or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the
validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable
part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to
indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court.
Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary
requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the
order made; in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable
face of the sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or
quasi-judicial performance."
17. Following this very view, the Supreme Court in another
very recent judgment delivered on 22-2-2008, in State of
Rajasthan v. Rajendra Prasad Jain Criminal Appeal No.
360/2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 904/2007) stated that
 21

„reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the

same it becomes lifeless‟.
18. Providing of reasons in orders is of essence in judicial
proceedings. Every litigant who approaches the Court with a
prayer is entitled to know the reasons for acceptance or
rejection of such request. Either of the parties to the lis has a
right of appeal and, therefore, it is essential for them to know
the considered opinion of the Court to make the remedy of
appeal meaningful. It is the reasoning which ultimately
culminates into final decision which may be subject to
examination of the appellate or other higher Courts. It is not
only desirable but, in view of the consistent position of law,
mandatory for the Court to pass orders while recording
reasons in support thereof, however, brief they may be.
Brevity in reasoning cannot be understood in legal parlance
as absence of reasons. While no reasoning in support of
judicial orders is impermissible, the brief reasoning would
suffice to meet the ends of justice at least at the interlocutory
stages and would render the remedy of appeal purposeful
and meaningful. It is a settled canon of legal jurisprudence
that the Courts are vested with discretionary powers but
such powers are to be exercised judiciously, equitably and in
consonance with the settled principles of law. Whether or not,
such judicial discretion has been exercised in accordance
with the accepted norms, can only be reflected by the reasons
recorded in the order impugned before the higher Court. Often
it is said that absence of reasoning may ipso facto indicate
whimsical exercise of judicial discretion. Patricia Wald, Chief
Justice of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Article,
Blackrobed Bureaucracy Or Collegiality Under Challenge, (42
MD.L. REV. 766, 782 (1983), observed as under:-
"My own guiding principle is that virtually every appellate
decision requires some statement of reasons. The discipline of
 22

writing even a few sentences or paragraphs explaining the

basis for the judgment insures a level of thought and scrutiny
by the Court that a bare signal of affirmance, dismissal, or
reversal does not."
19. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that a losing
litigant has a cause to plead and a right to challenge the
order if it is adverse to him. Opinion of the Court alone can
explain the cause which led to passing of the final order.
Whether an argument was rejected validly or otherwise,
reasoning of the order alone can show. To evaluate the
submissions is obligation of the Court and to know the
reasons for rejection of its contention is a legitimate
expectation on the part of the litigant. Another facet of
providing reasoning is to give it a value of precedent which
can help in reduction of frivolous litigation. Paul D.
Carrington, Daniel J Meador and Maurice Rosenburg, Justice
on Appeal 10 (West 1976), observed as under:
"When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the
public can have assurance that the correcting process is
working. Announcing reasons can also provide public
understanding of how the numerous decisions of the system
are integrated. In a busy Court, the reasons are an essential
demonstration that the Court did in fact fix its mind on the
case at hand. An unreasoned decision has very little claim to
acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or
impossible to accept as an act reflecting systematic
application of legal principles. Moreover, the necessity of
stating reasons not infrequently changes the results by
forcing the judges to come to grips with nettlesome facts or
issues which their normal instincts would otherwise cause
them to avoid."
20. The reasoning in the opinion of the Court, thus, can
effectively be analysed or scrutinized by the Appellate Court.
 23

The reasons indicated by the Court could be accepted by the

Appellate Court without presuming what weighed with the
Court while coming to the impugned decision. The cause of
expeditious and effective disposal would be furthered by
such an approach. A right of appeal could be created by a
special statute or under the provisions of the Code governing
the procedure. In either of them, absence of reasoning may
have the effect of negating the purpose or right of appeal and,
thus, may not achieve the ends of justice.
21. It will be useful to refer words of Justice Roslyn Atkinson,
Supreme Court of Queensland, at AIJA Conference at
Brisbane on September 13, 2002 in relation to Judgment
Writing. Describing that some judgment could be complex, in
distinction to routine judgments, where one requires deeper
thoughts, and the other could be disposed of easily but in
either cases, reasons they must have. While speaking about
purpose of the judgment, he said,
"The first matter to consider is the purpose of the judgment.
To my mind there are four purposes for any judgment that is
written: -
(1) to clarify your own thoughts;
(2) to explain your decision to the parties;
(3) to communicate the reasons for the decision to the public;
and
(4) to provide reasons for an appeal Court to consider."
22. Clarity of thought leads to proper reasoning and proper
reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120,
the Court went to the extent of observing that "Failure to give
reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are really
linchpin to administration of justice. They are link between
the mind of the decision taker and the controversy in
question. To justify our conclusion, reasons are essential.
 24

Absence of reasoning would render the judicial order liable to

interference by the higher Court. Reasons are the soul of the
decision and its absence would render the order open to
judicial chastism. The consistent judicial opinion is that every
order determining rights of the parties in a Court of law ought
not to be recorded without supportive reasons. Issuing
reasoned order is not only beneficial to the higher Courts but
is even of great utility for providing public understanding of
law and imposing self- discipline in the Judge as their
discretion is controlled by well established norms. The
contention raised before us that absence of reasoning in the
impugned order would render the order liable to be set aside,
particularly, in face of the fact that the learned Judge found
merit in the writ petition and issued rule, therefore, needs to
be accepted. We have already noticed that orders even at
interlocutory stages may not be as detailed as judgments but
should be supported by reason howsoever briefly stated.
Absence of reasoning is impermissible in judicial
pronouncement. It cannot be disputed that the order in
question substantially affect the rights of the parties. There is
an award in favour of the workmen and the management
had prayed for stay of the operation of the award. The Court
has to consider such a plea keeping in view the provisions of
Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, where such a
prayer is neither impermissible nor improper. The contentions
raised by the parties in support of their respective claims are
expected to be dealt with by reasoned orders. We are not
intentionally expressing any opinion on the merits of the
contentions alleged to have been raised by respective parties
before the learned single Judge. Suffice it to note that the
impugned order is silent in this regard. According to the
learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, various
contentions were raised in support of the reliefs claimed but
 25

all apparently, have found no favour with the learned Judge

and that too for no reasons, as is demonstrated from the
order impugned in the present appeals."

26. In S. N. Chandrashekar and another vs. State of

Karnataka and others3, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is

well known that the concept of error of law includes the giving of

reasons that are bad in law or (where there is a duty to give

reason) inconsistent, unintelligible or substantially inadequate.

27. In S. N. Chandrashekar (supra), it was further held that

the order passed by the statutory authority, must be judged on

the basis of the contents thereof and not as explained in

affidavit. Consequently the reasons for the order are necessarily

required to be mentioned in the order itself.

28. Para Nos.33 and 36 of S. N. Chandrashekar (supra)

read as under:-

“Judicial Review:
33. It is now well-known that the concept of error of law
includes the giving of reasons that are bad in law or (where
there is a duty to give reason) inconsistent, unintelligible or
substantially inadequate. (See De Smith's Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, 5th Edn., p. 286.)
36. The order passed by the statutory authority, it is
trite, must be judged on the basis of the contents thereof and
not as explained in affidavit. [See Bangalore Development
Authority v. R. Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508)]”

3
(2006) 3 SCC 208
 26

29. In Kranthi Associates Private Limited (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the principles on the point

of necessity of giving reasons by a body or authority in support

of its decision in Paragraph No.47 of the SCC report. It is held

therein that reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,

which is clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or rubber-

stamp reasons is not to be equated with a valid decision making

process. The reasons are indispensible as component of a

decision making process as observing principles of natural

justice by judicial, quasi judicial and even by administrative

authorities.

30. This Court finds that many writ petitions are filed

challenging the same kind of order of confirmation, with the

same grievance of the petitioner.

31. In many writ petitions this Court has passed the order

directing the concerned Commissioner to pass fresh orders on

due consideration of the reply.

32. To refer few, in Tadavarthy Kishore and othters vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh and others4 also, the same issue

was involved. This Court after considering the judgments in

Poonamchand vs. Greater Hyderabad Municipal

4
W.P.No.27315 of 2022
 27

Corporation5, K. Ashok Kumar vs. Greater Hyderabad

Municipal Corporation6 and ACES, Hyderabad vs. Municipal

Corporation Hyderabad (FB)7, while quashing the order

impugned therein issued direction to the Corporation to pass

fresh order after considering the reply of the petitioner therein.

33. It is apt to refer paras 4 and 7 of Tadavarthy (supra) as

under:-

“4. Sri K. Ravi, learned senior counsel for the

petitioner, submits that the impugned order dated
11.08.2022 has been passed without application of mind
and in cyclostyle manner. He submits that the 1st
paragraph of the impugned order mentions that the
petitioner did not file any reply to the show cause
notice/the provisional order, whereas in the second
paragraph it has been mentioned that the reply given by
the petitioner is not satisfactory and contrary to provisions
of rules in force. He submits that the reply was filed by
the petitioner on 01.08.2022 though admitting that there
were some minor deviations and that he will regularize the
same in future. He further submits that the order was
passed under Section 452 (2) & 461(2) of APMC Act 1955
and under Section 115(3) of APCRDA Act, 2014, which is
revisionable under Section 679 of the APMC Act 1955 and
also appealable under Section 115 (7) of APCRDA Act 2014
for which there is period of limitation of 15 days from the
date of service of the order which was served on
16.08.2022 which has not yet expired, but in spite thereof,

5
2012 (1) ALT 524
6
2013 (2) ALT 517
7
1994 (3) ALT 73
 28

the officials of the respondents 2 and 3 are approaching

the subject property of the petitioners for demolition.
7. A perusal of the impugned order dated
11.08.2022, clearly shows non-application of mind. In the
first paragraph it is stated that the reply was not
submitted and in the second paragraph it is mentioned
that the reply given is not satisfactory and that too without
disclosing any reason as to how and why the explanation
of the petitioners was not satisfactory. The order as
passed is a cyclostyle order. The explanation offered by
the petitioners ought to have been considered.”

34. In Tadavarthy Kishore (supra), this Court clearly laid

down that, whether the deviations, as per the provisional order,

are minor, minimal or trivial, or affect public at large or in

public interest or not, or cause public nuisance or hazardous or

dangerous to public safety including of the residents, require

consideration by the competent authority of the Municipal

Corporation before resorting to the demolition. In this respect

this Court referred to the Full Bench judgment in ACES,

Hyderabad (supra) in which Section 452 of the A.P. Municipal

Corporation Act itself was for consideration.

35. In another case, E. V. Rama Rao vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh and others8 also the same issue fell for consideration.

This Court after referring to the judgments as aforesaid, as also

emphasizing the necessity of giving reasons by a body or

8
2022 SCC Online AP 2019
 29

authority in support of its decision, referring to Kranti

Associates Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed

Khan and others9 allowed that writ petition, as the order

impugned therein did not assign any reason for not accepting

the explanation submitted, and directed the Municipal

Corporation therein to pass fresh order.

36. It is apt to refer Paragraph Nos.18 to 22 of E. V. Rama

Rao (supra) are reproduced as under:-

“18. The Court also finds from the perusal of the

impugned order that it contains contradiction on the point
of submission of the reply by the petitioner, in as much as
in the first paragraph it is stated that the petitioner did not
submit any reply, whereas in the second paragraph, it has
been stated that the reply given is not satisfactory, and
contrary to the provisions and rules, but without
discussing as to in what respect and as to how it was
contrary to what rules.
19. In Poonamchand (supra) this Court has held in
para-7 as under:
“7. A perusal of the impugned notice shows
that respondent No.1 has not dealt with the
explanation of the petitioner and has rejected
the same with a cryptic observation that the
same is not satisfactory and “it may not be
considered”. In the opinion of this Court, the
very purpose of issuing a notice under Section
452(1) of the Act is to give an opportunity to a
person, who has constructed the building in an

9
(2010) 9 SCC 496
 30

illegal or unauthorised manner, to submit his

explanation. It is, therefore, obligatory on the
part of respondent No.1 to consider the
explanation. If satisfactory explanation is offered
by the owner of the building, respondent No. 1 shall
drop further proceedings. It is only in cases where
such explanation is not offered, that respondent
No.1 is not entitled to proceed further. Unless the
Commissioner refers to the contents of the
explanation and gives reasons for coming to the
conclusion that the explanation is not satisfactory,
he cannot proceed with further action and issue
notice under Section 636 of the Act. Failure to deal
with the explanation renders the very purpose of
issuing notice nugatory.”
20. In K. Ashok Kumar (supra) this Court held in
paras-2 & 3 as under:
“2. Section 636 of the Act gives power to the
Commissioner to require any construction made
without obtaining necessary permission to be
removed and in case the person to whom such a
direction was issued by the Commissioner ignores or
fails to remove any structure within the time
specified, the said task will be carried out by the
corporation at the expense of the said individual. It is
not in dispute that the petitioners have been issued a
notice in terms of Section 452 of the Act on 31.7.2012
for which a detailed reply has been filed by the
petitioners on 16.8.2012. They raised several
objections. Whether those objections are tenable
or otherwise would be decided by the person
who is concluding the exercise in accordance
with Section 636 of the Act. Whereas the
 31

relevant portion of the impugned order reads as

under:
“the reply submitted by you vide reference 3 rd
cited in response to the show-cause notice has
been examined and the same is not found
satisfactory.”
“3. To say the least this is most unsatisfactory way
of deciding an issue. Every order must contain the
reasons for the conclusion arrived thereat. It is the
reasons which provide the links to the conclusions.
The relevance of those reasons must lend support to
the conclusion. The expressions “found not
satisfactory” are reflective of the conclusion
but, not the reason. As to why the explanation
offered by the petitioners is not satisfactory,
forms part of their process of reasoning.”
21. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed
Khan on the point of necessity of giving reasons by a body
or authority in support of its decision, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court summarized the legal position in paragraph-47,
which is reproduced as under:
“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court
holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to
record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if
such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons
in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to
serve the wider principle of justice that justice
must not only be done it must also appear to be
done as well.
 32

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a

valid restraint on any possible arbitrary
exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even
administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision-maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review
by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries
committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions
based on relevant facts. This is virtually the
lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these
days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors
have been objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice
delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not
candid enough about his/her decision-making
 33

process then it is impossible to know whether the

person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be
cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of
reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to
be equated with a valid decision-making
process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the
sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial
powers. Transparency in decision-making not only
makes the judges and decision-makers less prone
to errors but also makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37])
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons
emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in
decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was
considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR,
at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford
[2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be given
for judicial decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play
a vital role in setting up precedents for the future.
Therefore, for development of law, requirement of
giving reasons for the decision is of the essence
and is virtually a part of “due process”.
 34

22. The order impugned does not assign any cogent

reason for not accepting the explanation submitted by the
petitioner and the same is no consideration at all.”

37. Right to Property is recognized as a human right. It’s a

right guaranteed by the Constitution of India as well under

Article 300-A, not to be deprived of it save by authority of law.

Orders of demolition/removal of the one’s property, in the

manner, like the one, as in the present case, cannot be

sustained as it would deprive the person of his constitutional

right to property not in accordance with law.

38. Passing an order on the printed proforma, does not

comply with the requirements of statutory provisions nor with

the principles of natural justice. The order is not to be passed

mechanically, just signing the printed format. There should be

consideration of the reply to the show cause notice and

assigning the reasons.

39. The administrative authority and the tribunals are also

obliged to give reasons absence whereof would render the order

liable to be judicial chastise. There should be no pretence of

reason or rubber-stamp reasons.

40. This practice, by the respondent authorities of passing

printed format order must be stopped. The authorities have to

discharge their statutory duty as per mandate of law, with due

 35

consideration of the facts submitted in reply to the show cause

notice, and recording their satisfaction, either way, supported

with reasons which should be assigned in the order itself.

41. There may be many genuine cases, where the

constructions are in violation of the rule or the building plans or

there is encroachment. But, because of the Authorities not

discharging their statutory duty in a manner recognized by law,

in passing the order statutorily, and in consonance with

Principles of Natural Justice, such orders cannot be permitted

to be implemented, with the ultimate result that, the objects of

the Municipal Corporation Act are defeated. From the point of

view of the party adversely affected, he is compelled to undergo

many rounds of litigation, unnecessarily to the disadvantage of

time, money and like factors. All this can be curbed, if the

Authorities pass the orders as per the statutory and judicial

mandates.

42. In the result, this writ petition is partly allowed setting

aside the order dated 24.04.2023, with the direction to

respondent No.2 to pass fresh orders in the petitioner’s case, in

accordance with law within two (02) weeks from the date of

receipt of copy of this judgment.

43. The petitioner shall submit copy of this order before

respondent No.2 in one (01) week, from its receipt.

 36

44. A Writ of Mandamus is issued in General to the

respondent Nos.1 to 3 and all Municipal Corporations through

their authorities, that no order will be passed on the printed

format by the Municipal Authorities under Sections 452 & 461

of the Municipal Corporation Act. They shall pass orders on

consideration of the reply submitted and such consideration be

manifested in the order on assigning of the reasons for the

satisfaction eitherway, recorded in the order itself.

45. The respondent No.1/Principal Secretary is directed to

issue necessary orders at his end, to all the concerned of the

Municipal Corporations in the State of Andhra Pradesh for

compliance.

46. The Registry shall send copy of this judgment to

respondent No.1/Principal Secretary for compliance.

47. Writ Petition is allowed in part with directions aforesaid.

No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending,

shall also stand closed.

__________________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
Date: 10.05.2023
Note:-
Issue C. C by 24.05.2023
B/o:- SCS
 37

120

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

WRIT PETITION No.11598 OF 2023

Date:10.05.2023
Scs.