Eaack - A Secure Intrusion - Detection System For Manets

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EAACK A SECURE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM FOR MANETs

INTRODUCTION
Collection of mobile nodes with transmitter and receiver. Wireless network problem less geographical area coverage. Problem overcome by MANETs by allowing intermediate

parties to relay transmission of data.


t has decentrali!ed network infrastr"ct"re. nspite of "ni#"e properties network sec"rity is an iss"e.

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BACKGROUND
NT,-& .N %ETECT .N &/&TEM N MANETs 0
Watchdog 0
Consist of two parts Watchdog and Pathrater. Watchdog serves as %& and Pathrater cooperates with ro"ting protocols. &"ffers from problem s"ch as receiver collision ' limited transmission

power ' false misbehavior report ' partial dropping etc.


TW.AC1 0
%etects misbehaving links by acknowledging every data packet over

every + node along transmission path.


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BACKGROUND(Cont.)

The acknowledgement process re#"ired led to "nwanted network overhead degrading life of entire network.

AAC1 0
Combination of TAC1 and AC1nowledge. ,ed"ces network overhead b"t fails to detect malicio"s nodes with

false misbehavio"r report.

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BACKGROUND(cont.)
%igital &ignat"re 0 Two scheme %&A and ,&A are "sed.

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Comm"nication with digital signat"re

PROBLEM DEFINITION
Recei e! Co""isions # Collision of packets sent by $ sender at
receiver.

&o"rce
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&e#"ence diagram for receiver collisions

%estination

PROBLEM DEFINITION(cont.)
Li$ite% t!&ns$ission 'o(e! # Node intentionally limits
its transmission power to send packet to ne5t node.

&o"rce
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%estination

PROBLEM DEFINITION(cont.)
F&"se $is)e*& io! !e'o!t # &ender node intentionally report
misbehavior of receiver node.

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&o"rce

&e#"ence diagram for false misbehavior report

%estination

SC+EME DESCRIPTION
EAAC1 consist of + ma8or parts 0
AC1. &*AC1 9&ec"re AC1:. M,A 9 Misbehavior report a"thentication:. %igital &ignat"re.

;or disting"ishing different packet type $ bits packet

header is incl"ded in EAAC1. e.g. for general data (( ' AC1 () ' &*AC1 )( ' M,A )).
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SC+EME DESCRIPTION(cont.)

ACK 0 An end to end acknowledgement scheme.

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&o"rce

&ystem control flow

%estinatiom

SC+EME DESCRIPTION(cont.)

S ACK # An improved version of

TW.AC1.

&o"rce
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&*AC1 scheme

%estination

SC+EME DESCRIPTION(cont.)
MRA
,esolve weakness of watchdog i.e. fails to detect misbehaving

nodes.
&o"rce node searches its local knowledge to find alternative

ro"te to destination.

%estination receives M,A packet and searches and compares if reported packet was received.

f it is already received ' then it is false misbehavior report.

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SC+EME DESCRIPTION(cont.)
Di,it&" Si,n&t-!e
To

ens"re integrity of

%& ' EAAC1 re#"ires all

acknowledgment sending o"t.

packets to be digitally signed before

&ince e5tra reso"rces are re#"ired for this p"rpose so ' both

%&A and ,&A digital signat"re is implemented.

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SYSTEM ARC+ITECTURE

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;low chart for system architect"re of EAAC1

PERFORMANCE E.ALUATION
&im"lation methodologies 0
&cenario )0
To test performance of %& against receiver collison and limited power

transmission.
&cenario $0
To test performance of %& against false misbehavior report.

&cenario +0
To test performance of

%& when attackers are able to forge

acknowledgement packets.
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PERFORMANCE E.ALUATION(cont.)
&im"lation Config"ration 0

&im"lation cond"cted within N& $.+2 on platform =CC 2.+. Two performance metrics adopted0
Packet delivery ratio 9P%,:. ,o"ting overhead 9,.:.

)($2 bits key for %&A and ,&A respectively. &ignat"re file si!e for %&A and ,&A are 7< and )+) bytes respectively. &ensor node "sed is Tmote &ky.

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PERFORMANCE E.ALUATION(cont.)
Si$-"&tion Res-"ts/ Scen&!io 0#

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PERFORMANCE E.ALUATION(cont.)
Scen&!io 1#

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PERFORMANCE E.ALUATION(cont.)
Scen&!io 2 #

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CONCLUSION
,es"lts demonstrate positive performance against e5isting

scheme s"ch as watchdog ' TW.AC1.


%igital signat"res were incorporated which ca"sed more

,.s b"t vastly improves P%, when attackers are smart eno"gh to forge acknowledgement packet.
;or seeking optimal scheme both %&A and ,&A were

implemented b"t %&A scheme is more s"itable.


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FUTURE 3ORK
Possibilities of adopting hybrid cryptography techni#"es. Possibilities of adopting key e5change mechanism inspite

of predistrib"ted keys.
Testing the performance of EAAC1 in real environment

instead of software sim"lation.

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REFERENCES
,. >. Akbani' &. Patel' and %. C. ?inwala' @%o& attacks in mobile ad hoc networks0

A s"rvey'A in Proc. $nd nt. Meeting ACCT' ,ohtak' >aryana.


N. 1ang' E. &haksh"ki' and T. &heltami' @%etecting forged acknowledgements in

MANETs'A in Proc. EEE $3th nt. Conf.


1. Bi"' ?. %eng' P. 1. Carshney' and 1. Dalakrishnan' @An acknowledgment*based

approach for the detection of ro"ting misbehavio"r in MANETs'A EEE Trans. Mobile Comp"t.
N. Nasser and /. Chen' @Enhanced intr"sion detection systems for discovering

malicio"s nodes in mobile ad hoc network'A in Proc. EEE nt. Conf. Comm"n.

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T+ANK YOU

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