Duty To Render Assistance During Armed Conflict
Duty To Render Assistance During Armed Conflict
Duty To Render Assistance During Armed Conflict
Volume 94 2018
CONTENTS
Captain Pedrozo is a retired naval judge advocate and former professor of interna-
tional law at the U.S. Naval War College. While on active duty in the U.S. Navy, he served
in a number of positions, including Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Pacific Command, and Spe-
cial Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Captain Pedrozo was a member
of the peer-review group that provided comments on the Commentary on the Second Geneva
Convention during the drafting process.
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of the
U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or
the U.S. Naval War College.
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I. INTRODUCTION
B etween 1952 and 1960, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) embarked on a project to write a detailed commentary on each of
O
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, based primarily on the negotiating his-
tory of the Conventions and prior State practice. With the passage of time,
the ICRC decided to update the commentaries to reflect State practice “in
W
applying and interpreting the Conventions . . . during the decades since their
adoption.”1 By doing so, the ICRC would “ensure that the new editions re-
I
flect contemporary practice and legal interpretation.”2
The maritime landscape, both operationally and legally, has changed sig-
nificantly since the first edition of the Commentary on the Second Geneva
Convention (GCII) was published in 1960.3 ICRC experts believe that the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked can be better protected if the GCII rules
are clearly understood in light of current operational realities. Accordingly,
the intent of the updated Commentary is to reflect current State practice and
provide “up-to-date legal interpretations based on the latest practice, case
law, academic commentary and ICRC experience” to afford greater protec-
tion for combatants and civilians during armed conflicts at sea.4
One question left unanswered by the new Commentary is the relationship
between international humanitarian law (IHL) and other international trea-
ties applicable to the maritime domain, such as the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and treaties adopted under
the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Does the
outbreak of hostilities terminate or suspend the applicability of these mari-
time conventions or do they remain in effect, in part or in their entirety,
GCII establishes a legal framework for the humane treatment and protection
of victims of armed conflict at sea. In this regard, Article 12 requires parties
to the conflict to respect and protect, in all circumstances, members of the
armed forces and other individuals falling with the scope of the Convention
“who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked . . . without any
adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opin-
ions, or any other similar criteria.”5 Paramount to achieving this core objec-
tive of humane treatment, the parties to the conflict are required, after each
engagement and without delay, to “take all possible measures to search for
and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick,” without discriminating be-
tween their own and enemy personnel.6 This obligation has its origins in Ar-
ticle 16(1) of the Tenth 1907 Hague Convention, which provides that “after
every engagement, the two belligerents, so far as military interests permit,
shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick, and wounded, and to pro-
tect them . . . against pillage and ill-treatment.”7 The main difference between
the 1907 and 1949 conventions is that the phrase “so far as military interests
permit” was replaced with “take all possible measures,” thus applying the
stricter requirement adopted for war on land to war at sea.
5. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter GC II]. Individuals failing within the scope of the Convention are set forth
in Article 13.
6. Id. art. 18; see also COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION, supra
note 1, art. 18, ¶ 1618.
7. Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention art. 16, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No. 543, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 397 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
Hague Convention No. X].
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8. Neutral vessels that respond to such an appeal or that have on their own accord
provided assistance to wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons, “shall enjoy special protec-
tion and facilities to carry out such assistance.” GC II, supra note 5, art. 21.
9. The belligerents “shall grant both protection and the necessary facilities to those who
respond to this appeal.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 17, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
10. Hague Convention No. X, supra note 7, art. 9.
11. GC II, supra note 5, art. 21 (emphasis added).
12. COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 18, ¶
1637.
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sick, as well as in the general purpose and intent of GCII to maximize pro-
tection for victims of armed conflict at sea. Nonetheless, the plain language
of the Convention—“may appeal”—does not support this conclusion.
Similarly, it does not appear that GCII obliges a neutral to respond to
the request for assistance given the language of Article 21, under which ap-
peals are made to the “charity” of commanders of neutral vessels. However,
the Commentary correctly states that this does not mean “that the response to
an appeal . . . is necessarily left entirely to the commander’s discretion.”13 As
discussed in the following Part, there are a number of non-IHL treaties that
impose an obligation on States to come to the assistance of persons in danger
of being lost at sea. To the extent these treaties have not been annulled by
the concept of lex specialis and remain in effect during an armed conflict at
sea, neutrals would arguably have a duty to provide the requested assistance,
if feasible and consistent with their treaty obligations.
The duty to render assistance first appeared in the 1910 Salvage Conven-
tion,18 almost forty years before the IMO was formally established.19 The
obligation is codified in Article 11, which provides that “every master is
bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel, her crew
and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an enemy,
found at sea in danger of being lost.”20 The Convention explicitly does not
apply to warships or other “Government ships appropriated exclusively to a
public service.”21 However, given that the obligation extends to anyone in
distress, “even though an enemy,” the duty to render assistance under the
Salvage Convention applies both in times of peace and during an armed con-
flict.
An obligation to render assistance, as well as establish search and rescue
services, is also contained in the International Convention of the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS).22 Regulation V/7 requires States to “undertake to en-
sure that necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and
co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in
distress at sea around its coasts.”23 Regulation V/33 further requires that
masters of ships at sea—which are in a position to be able to provide assis-
tance—on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at
sea, “proceed with all speed to their assistance.”24 If the ship receiving the
request is unable or considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to provide as-
sistance, “the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to
18. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and
Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 576 [hereinafter 1910 Salvage Con-
vention].
19. The IMO was not established until 1948. Convention on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289
U.N.T.S. 3. The organization’s name was later simplified to the International Maritime Or-
ganization as it is now known.
20. 1910 Salvage Convention, supra note 18, art. 11.
21. Id. art. 14.
22. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 2.
23. “These arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and maintenance
of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary, having regard
to the density of the seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers and shall, so far as possi-
ble, provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such persons.” Id. annex, ch. V, reg.
7.
24. Id. annex, ch. V, reg. 33, ¶ 1.
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requisition . . . ships as the . . . search and rescue service considers best able
to render assistance, and it shall be the duty of the master or masters of the
ship or ships requisitioned to comply with the requisition by continuing to
proceed with all speed to the assistance of persons in distress.26
Like the 1910 Salvage Convention, SOLAS Regulation V/1 also exempts
warships, naval auxiliaries, and other ships owner or operated by a State and
used only on government non-commercial service from its application.
Nonetheless, warships and other government vessels “are encouraged to act
in a manner consistent, so far as reasonable and practicable, with . . . chapter
[V].”27 As discussed in Part VI below, U.S. State practice is to apply the duty
to render assistance to its warships and other non-commercial government-
owned or operated vessels.28
The 1979 Search and Rescue Convention29 contains similar provisions
regarding the establishment of search and rescue services and the duty to
render assistance to persons in distress at sea. Chapter 2 of the Convention’s
annex requires the parties to make the “necessary arrangements . . . for the
provision of adequate search and rescue services for persons in distress at
sea round their coasts.”30 If a party receives information that a person is in
distress at sea in its search and rescue region, “the responsible authorities . .
. shall take urgent steps to provide the most appropriate assistance availa-
ble.”31 Additionally, any unit that receives information of a distress incident
shall take “immediate action to assist as is within its capability or shall alert
other units which might be able to assist, and shall notify the rescue co-or-
dination centre or rescue sub-centre in whose area the incident has oc-
curred.”32
25. Id.
26. Id. ¶ 2.
27 Id. annex, ch. V, reg. 1, ¶ 1.
28. See supra Part VI.
29. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S
No. 11,093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97.
30. Id. annex, ch. 2, ¶ 2.1.1.
31. Id. ¶ 2.1.9.
32. Id. annex, ch. 5, ¶ 5.9.1.
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Apart from the aforementioned IMO instruments, the 1958 High Seas Con-
vention, UNCLOS, and the 1944 Chicago Convention also impose a duty to
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship sailing under its flag, insofar
as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passen-
gers:
(a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
(b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress
if informed of their need of assistance, insofar as such action may reason-
ably be expected of him.41
The duty is not, however, absolute. The master is only required to act when
doing so would not place the ship or its crew and passengers in “serious
danger.”42 Article 12 further requires coastal States to “promote the estab-
lishment and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue
service regarding safety on and over the sea and—where circumstances so
require—by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbour-
ing States for this purpose.”43
A nearly identical requirement, with the same limiting language, is found
in Article 98 of UNCLOS:
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as
he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress,
if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reason-
ably be expected of him . . . .
41. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 14, art. 12.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 98.
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Rules of treaty interpretation are set out in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT).52 Article 31 provides the general rule: “a treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”53 A treaty may only be terminated or suspended “as a result
of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the . . . [VCLT].”54 Of
note, none of the treaties imposing the duty to render assistance contains an
express provision providing for their suspension or termination during an
armed conflict.
If the provisions of the treaty are unclear or its interpretation “leads to a
result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” then “recourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to con-
firm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31. . . .”55 Given
the humanitarian nature of the duty to render assistance contained in the
various maritime conventions, which is akin to the obligation to search for
casualties imposed by Article 18 of GCII, an interpretation that these con-
ventions automatically terminate or are suspended at the outbreak of an
armed conflict would appear to be “manifestly absurd and unreasonable.”
The VCLT also cautions that
52. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [here-
inafter VCLT].
53. Id. art. 31(1).
54. Id. art. 42(2).
55. Id. art. 32.
56. Id. art. 43. Furthermore, Article 73 states the provisions of the VCLT do “not pre-
judge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from . . . the international responsi-
bility of a State or from the outbreak of hostilities between States.” Id. at art. 73.
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As stated in Article 73, one issue left unanswered by the VCLT is the effect
of armed conflict on State obligations under existing treaties. Consequently,
in 2000 the International Law Commission (ILC) identified this gap as a
topic for its long-term work program. Between 2005 and 2008, the ILC dis-
cussed the issue and in 2008 adopted on first reading a set of eighteen draft
articles and an annex, along with commentaries. These draft articles and an-
nex were submitted to governments for comment and observations through
the U.N. Secretary-General. In 2010, the special rapporteur submitted his
proposed amendments to the draft articles to the ILC, taking into account
the comments and observations of governments. The following year, after
discussing the special rapporteur’s report, the ILC adopted the draft articles
and annex, with commentaries, and transmitted them to the U.N. General
Assembly with a recommendation to take note of the draft and to consider
the possibility of concluding a treaty on the subject at a later date. The Gen-
eral Assembly accepted the ILC’s recommendation in Resolution 66/99 on
December 9, 2011,57 and subsequently decided to return to the issue in 2017
with a view to examining the form to be given to the draft articles and invit-
ing governments to comment on any future action regarding them.58
Consistent with paragraph 48 of the GCII Commentary, Article 3 of the
draft ILC articles reflects the contemporary international law principle that
“the existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend
the operation of treaties as between (a) States parties to the conflict [or] (b)
a State party to the conflict and a State that is not.”59 An armed conflict may,
therefore, affect the obligations of parties to a preexisting treaty in different
ways, depending on whether they are a belligerent or a neutral. Article 3 “es-
tablishes the general principle of legal stability and continuity,”60 reflected in
the 1985 resolution of the Institute of International Law (IIL) on the Effects
57. G.A. Res. 66/99, Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (Dec. 9, 2012).
58. G.A. Res. 69/125, Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (Dec. 10, 2014).
59. Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, in Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly, 66 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 173, art.3, U.N. Doc. A/66/10
(2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n (forthcoming) [hereinafter Draft ILC Arti-
cles].
60. Id. art. 3, cmt. ¶ 1.
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61. Institute of International Law, The Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties (1985),
http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1985_hel_03_en.pdf.
62. See Part VI.
63. Institute of International Law, supra note 61, at art. 3
64. Id. art 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 3.
67. Id. art. 4.
68. Draft ILC Articles, supra note 59, art. 4.
69. Id. art. 5.
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(a) the nature of the treaty, its particular subject matter, its object and pur-
pose, its content and the number of parties to treaty; and
(b) the characteristics of the armed conflict, such as its territorial extent, its
scale and intensity, its duration and, in the case of non-international armed
conflict, also the degree of outside involvement.72
Convention has 111 States parties.77 The object and purpose of these treaties,
particularly the humanitarian duty to render assistance, is consistent with the
humanitarian object and purpose of GCII to limit the suffering of victims of
armed conflict at sea. These factors clearly weigh in favor of concluding that
the treaties remain in force, at least in part, during an armed conflict.
Finally, the annex to the draft ILC articles provides a list of treaties that,
based on their subject matter, exhibit a higher likelihood of continued ap-
plicability following the outbreak of an armed conflict.78 One category that
meets this criterion and therefore remains in effect during an armed conflict,
whether all or only some of the contracting parties are belligerents, is multi-
lateral law-making treaties.79 Such treaties are defined as treaties that “create
rules of international law for regulating the future conduct of the parties
without creating an international regime, status, or system.”80 A 1948 letter
from the Legal Advisor to the State Department sets out the U.S. position
regarding such treaties:
A similar position was expressed in the 1948 letter of an official of the British
Foreign Office:
82. Letter from J. Mervyn Jones, British Foreign Office, to Richard Rank (Jan. 7, 1948),
in Rank, supra note 81, at 346–47, reprinted in Draft ILC Articles, supra note 59, cmt. to annex,
¶ 18, at 203.
83. Draft ILC Articles, supra note 59, art. 10.
84. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Jurisdiction of the
Court and Admissibility of the Application (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392,
¶ 73 (Nov. 26).
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Since the earliest days of the republic, U.S. courts have taken the position
that not all treaties terminate ipso facto at the outbreak of an armed conflict.
For example, in 1823, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[W]e are not inclined to admit the doctrine urged at the bar that treaties
become extinguished ipso facto by war between the two governments unless
they should be revived by an express or implied renewal on the return of
peace. . . . There may be treaties of such a nature as to their object and
import as that war will put an end to them, but where treaties contemplate
a permanent arrangement of territorial and other national rights, or which
in their terms are meant to provide for the event of an intervening war, it
would be against every principle of just interpretation to hold them extin-
guished by the event of war. . . . We think therefore that treaties stipulating
for permanent rights and general arrangements and professing to aim at
perpetuity and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace do not cease
on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts,
and unless they are waived by the parties or new and repugnant stipulations
are made, they revive in their operation at the return of peace.85
While recognizing that there are divergent views on the effect of war upon
treaties, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Karnuth v. United
States (1929). In that case, the Court held:
The effect of war upon treaties is a subject in respect of which there are
widely divergent opinions. The doctrine sometimes asserted, especially by
the older writers, that war ipso facto annuls treaties of every kind between
the warring nations, is repudiated by the great weight of modern authority,
and the view now commonly accepted is that whether the stipulations of a
treaty are annulled by war depends upon their intrinsic character. But as to
precisely what treaties fall and what survive under this designation, there is
lack of accord.86
85. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 464, 494–95 (1823).
86. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1929); see also Techt v. Hughes, 229
N.Y. 222, 240–43 (1920) (noting that Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Justice of the Court of
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Further, in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles articu-
lated in the aforementioned cases in Clark v. Allen, stating:
We start from the premise that the outbreak of war does not necessarily
suspend or abrogate treaty provisions. There may, of course, be such an
incompatibility between a particular treaty provision and the maintenance
of a state of war as to make clear that it should not be enforced. Or the
Chief Executive or the Congress may have formulated a national policy
quite inconsistent with the enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part. This
was the view stated in Techt v. Hughes . . . .87
Appeals of New York, and later U.S. Supreme Court Justice, provided a lengthy expose on
this legal question).
The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems
of the law. The older writers sometimes said that treaties ended ipso facto when war came.
The writers of our own time reject these sweeping statements. International law today does
not preserve treaties or annul them . . . . It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserv-
ing or annulling as the necessities of war exact.
Interestingly, although the Court of Appeals of New York heard Techt nearly a decade before
the U.S. Supreme Court heard Karnuth, the two courts rendered similar opinions regarding
the effects of war on existing treaties.
87. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508–9 (1947) (citations omitted).
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assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the
master or individual in charge can do so without serious danger to . . . [their]
vessel or individuals on board.”88 Failure to comply with this obligation sub-
jects a master or individual violating the law to a fine not exceeding $1,000,
two years imprisonment, or both.89 Further, Australian law imposes a similar
obligation on non-sovereign immune vessels, even with regard to persons of
a foreign State at war with Australia.90
The 46 U.S.C. § 2304 obligation specifically does not apply to warships
or other government owned or operated vessels in public service.91 However,
the U.S. Navy imposes a similar duty on commanding officers of warships
or the senior officer present via Article 0925 of the U.S. Navy Regulations.92
Navy Regulations are lawful general orders under Article 92 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.93 Failure to comply with the obligation to render
assistance, unless doing so would seriously endanger the ship or its crew, is
therefore subject to criminal prosecution at a special or general courts-mar-
ital.94 The case of the USS Dubuque, discussed below, exemplifies the im-
portance the U.S. Navy places on this duty.
When it has been definitely established . . . that persons are dead, the Coast
Guard is not required to conduct searches for bodies. If, however, requests
are received from responsible agencies . . . Coast Guard units may partici-
pate in body searches provided that these searches do not interfere with
the primary duties of the units. Commanding officers and officers in charge
shall exercise tact and good judgment in the use of their forces for such
purposes.97
95. Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M5000.3B, United States Coast
Guard Regulations § 4-1-7B (1992) [hereinafter U.S. Coast Guard Regulations]; see also 1
Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services, United States Coast Guard & Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-50, National Search and Rescue Manual: Na-
tional Search and Rescue System (1991); 2 Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Ser-
vices, United States Coast Guard & Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-
50.1, National Search and Rescue Manual: Planning Handbook (1991).
96. U.S. Coast Guard Regulations, supra note 95, § 4-1-7.C.
97. Id. § 4-1-7D.
98. Id. § 4-2-5A.
99. Id. § 4-2-5B.
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lives of the personnel assigned to it.”100 Additionally, having due regard for
the health of his or her crew, “the commanding officer shall take on board
distressed seamen of the United States, shipwrecked persons, and persons
requiring medical care.”101 Once on board, “assisted persons shall be fur-
nished rations and may be transported to the nearest or most convenient
port of the United States.”102
The duty to render assistance, however, only applies to “vessels or air-
craft [and seamen or airmen] of a foreign State at peace with the United
States.”103 Accordingly, if the United States is a neutral during the conflict,
Coast Guard ships could provide assistance to any of the belligerents at
peace with the United States, as well as to other neutral nations. Assistance
to a vessel and its crew of a nation at war with the United States would not
be provided under the Coast Guard Regulations, but rather would be af-
forded under Article 18 of GCII. Coast Guard Regulations also allow the
commanding officer to provide assistance to private efforts, when neces-
sary.104 This would include efforts by relief societies or private entities en-
gaged in the collection of wounded, sick, or shipwrecked personnel.
The duty to assist persons, ships, and aircraft in distress at sea is also
reflected in U.S. military manuals. For example, The Commander’s Handbook
on the Law of Naval Operations reflects the view of the maritime services—
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—that “customary international law
has long recognized the affirmative obligation of mariners to go to the assis-
tance of those in danger of being lost at sea” as codified in both the 1958
High Seas Convention and UNCLOS.105 A similar view on the customary
nature of the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is ex-
pressed in the German Navy Commander’s Handbook—“It is not due to
the morale of mariners but in accordance with seafaring tradition and thus
with customary law that all mariners help each other in cases of distress at
sea.”106 Thus, as a customary rule, the duty to render assistance remains in
effect in times of peace, as well as war.
For its part, the United States takes the duty to render assistance seriously.
As an example, on June 10, 1988, the USS Dubuque (LPD 8) came across a
boatload of eighty Vietnamese refugees adrift in a dilapidated junk in the
South China Sea.107 The U.S. warship, under the command of Captain Alex-
ander Balian, was en route to the Persian Gulf to assume minesweeping du-
ties after the USS Roberts (FFG 58) struck an Iranian M-08 mine in the central
Persian Gulf on April 14, 1988. The Dubuque was carrying a contingent of
nine hundred Marines to augment U.S. forces in the Gulf in the event of
further hostilities with Iran following Operation Praying Mantis. Standing
orders in effect at the time of the incident included: (1) U .S. Navy Regula-
tions, Article 0925, which required commanding officers to render assistance
to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; and (2) Commander, U.S.
Seventh Fleet Operations Order 201, which required commanding officers
to take on board persons in life endangering circumstances at sea if relief of
persons in such circumstances cannot be accomplished by repair to boats,
re-provisioning, or navigational assistance.
An inspection of the junk by the Dubuque’s executive officer revealed
that the vessel had a makeshift sail and appeared seaworthy, but did not have
an operable engine. In his report to Captain Balian, he also reported that
twenty people had already died on the voyage and that the remaining survi-
vors on board looked emaciated and distraught. Nonetheless, Captain Balian
elected not to embark the refugees on the ship because he believed it would
endanger his mission by delaying considerably the Dubuque’s arrival in the
Persian Gulf. He was also concerned about the health and safety of his crew.
Captain Balian decided to provide the refugees with provisions—fruit,
canned food, rice, and fresh water—and send them on their way with a nav-
igational chart containing plotted coordinates to the Philippines. However,
Captain Balian was unaware that the junk had been adrift for nineteen days,
not seven as he had been told, and that thirty of the original 110 passengers
on board had already died. Balian was also misinformed that there were only
sixty (rather than eighty) refugees on board the junk. As a result, he miscal-
culated the time it would take for the boat to reach the Philippines and the
amount of provisions needed; therefore, the food and water provided was
insufficient for the remainder of the journey. The refugees drifted for nine-
teen more days until rescued by a Filipino fishing vessel. Only fifty-two of
the original 110 refugees that left Vietnam survived the ordeal. When they
ran out of food, they resorted to cannibalism to survive.
As a result of his failure to take the refugees on board or provide other
means for their rescue, Captain Balian received a general court-martial at
which he was found guilty of dereliction of duty for failing to give adequate
assistance to the refugees. He received a career-ending letter of reprimand,
and was relieved of command.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the law regarding the effects of armed conflict on preexisting treaty
obligations is not completely settled, most contemporary scholars would
agree with the position taken by the ICRC in the GCII Commentary that the
initiation of hostilities does not ipso facto terminate or suspend application of
previous adopted international agreements.108 Most scholars would also
agree that the concept of lex specialis derogat legi generali (special law repeals
general laws) constitutes a general principle of international law.109 The con-
cept is frequently raised when debating the applicability of international hu-
man rights law during armed conflicts regulated by IHL, but it can also apply
to other bodies of law, such as the law of the sea.
The United States takes the position that in nearly all circumstances, IHL
is the lex specialis governing armed conflict and the protection of armed con-
flict victims.110 This position is based on the premise that “[t]he rule that is
more specifically directed towards the action receives priority because it
takes better account of the particular features of the context in which the law
is to be applied, thus creating a more equitable result and better reflecting
the intent of the authorities that have made the law.”111 In this regard, IHL
“has been developed with special consideration of the circumstances of war
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. U.S. Coast Guard Regulations, supra note 95, § 4-2-5D.
115. Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note
1, ¶ 58.
116. Id.
117. VCLT, supra note 52, art 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
118. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
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treaty.”119 Parties to the conflict and neutral powers are therefore bound dur-
ing an armed conflict at sea by the provisions of the maritime conventions
that reflect customary international law.
In sum, the peacetime duty to render assistance to mariners in distress at
sea remains in effect during an armed conflict as a treaty obligation and/or
as a matter of customary international law in the following circumstances:
(1) Neutrals parties must render assistance to other neutral parties; (2) Neu-
trals parties must render assistance to belligerents upon request or sua sponte;
and (3) Belligerent parties must render assistance to neutral parties. How-
ever, the obligation is suspended as between the belligerents during the
armed conflict.
119. Draft ILC Articles, supra note 59, art.10; see also VCLT, supra note 52, art. 43.
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